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Is Love Colorblind? Political Orientation and Interracial Romantic Desire

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The present research examined the association of political orientation with ingroup favoritism in two live romantic contexts. In Study 1, White participants had sequential interactions with both a White and Black confederate and reported their romantic desire for each. In Study 2, both White and Black participants speed-dated multiple potential romantic partners and reported whether they would be interested in meeting each speed-dating partner again. In both studies, White participants’ political conservatism positively predicted the strength of the ingroup-favoring bias: White conservatives were less likely than White liberals to desire Black (interracial) relative to White potential romantic partners. In contrast, Black participants’ political conservatism negatively predicted the strength of the ingroup-favoring bias: Consistent with system-justification theory, Black conservatives were more likely than Black liberals to desire White (interracial) relative to Black potential romantic partners. Political orientation may be a key factor that influences the initiation of interracial romantic relationships.

Keywords: political orientation; relationships; attraction; intergroup relations; system justification; speed-dating

Although it has been more than 40 years since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Loving v. Virginia struck down antimiscegenation laws in the United States, interracial marriages still account for less than 3% of all U.S. marriages (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003). Research suggests, furthermore, that initiating interracial relationships remains to some extent a social and cultural taboo (Joyner & Kao, 2005; Miller, Olson, & Fazio, 2004). Perhaps because of the difficulty in studying such rare events, psychological factors that facilitate (or hinder) the development of actual interracial relationships have received little empirical attention (for exceptions, see Fujino, 1997; Gaines, Gurung, Lin, & Pouli, 2006). The present study explored one potential moderator of interracial dating preferences: individual differences in political orientation.1

Political Orientation and Interracial Attitudes

Most conservatives would strenuously object to the assertion that their political ideology may lead them to make racially biased judgments and decisions. Consistently since 1932, the Republican Party (the more conservative of the two major political parties in the United States) has voiced support for equal rights and equality of opportunity for Blacks and other minorities in its party platform (Woolley & Peters, 2009). Although conservatives frequently oppose policies that benefit racial minorities (e.g., welfare, affirmative action), the...
principled-conservatism perspective suggests that this opposition stems from conservative values, such as self-reliance and a belief in limited government, not from racial biases (Snyderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991). That is, conservatives may object to such policies not because they harbor negative feelings toward minorities but because they believe that some social and economic inequality is inevitable and that people are largely responsible for their own fate.

However, conservative (vs. liberal) self-identification and Republican (vs. Democratic) political party affiliation consistently predict implicit (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) and explicit (e.g., Tarman & Sears, 2005) racial bias. Sears and Henry (2003) argue that political conservatism is a central component of (but not synonymous with) “symbolic racism,” which refers to beliefs that Blacks are too demanding in their push for equal rights and that they would achieve greater success if they were more motivated (see also Sears & Henry, 2005). Research from a social dominance theory perspective suggests that White conservatives may endorse such measures because conservatives are more likely than liberals to support the status quo in which Whites are the dominant group and have higher status (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). Indeed, social dominance orientation, a construct that assesses the degree to which participants endorse hierarchically organized systems of group-based dominance, appears to account for the association between conservatism and measures of racial bias (e.g., “Blacks are inherently inferior”; Sidanius et al., 1996).

In addition to the positive correlation between political conservatism and measures of racial bias, political conservatism has proven to be a reliable predictor of negative attitudes toward interracial dating and marriage. For example, self-identified Democrats were 1.7 times more likely than self-identified Republicans to approve of interracial marriage in a recent national survey (Johnson & Jacobson, 2005). Social dominance orientation, a construct that overlaps considerably with political conservatism as mentioned previously, also correlates negatively with approval of interracial marriage (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; see also Lalonde, Giguere, Fontaine, & Smith, 2007). Just as it is associated with approval of interracial relationships, political orientation predicts participants’ willingness to become personally involved in an interracial romantic relationship: Across several measures of political orientation, McClelland and Auster (1990) found that liberals were more likely than conservatives to consider dating, becoming “seriously involved” with, or marrying someone of another race. A recent study of online personal ads, furthermore, found that White conservatives were less likely than White liberals to report a willingness to date Black individuals (Yancey, 2007).

Finally, at least one study has asked participants to provide retrospective accounts of their actual dating experiences and found that conservatism negatively predicted having dated interracially in the past (Yancey, 2002).

There are a number of reasons why political conservatism among Whites might predict a reduced willingness to consider an interracial romantic relationship. If some conservatives are motivated in part by a desire for social dominance over outgroups (Sidanius et al., 1996), they might be less interested than liberals in interracial relationships because they are disinclined to risk racial “mixing” that could blur status differences between groups. Another (related) possibility derives from data demonstrating that conservatives are more likely than liberals to justify and rationalize existing social institutions (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). To some extent, interracial relationships threaten the existing social structure because they erode traditional barriers between social groups; therefore, White conservatives might be less than enthusiastic about bucking the system to pursue a romantic relationship with a member of a racial minority group. In addition, Jost and colleagues have argued that conservative ideology is motivated by the need to manage uncertainty and threat (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Developing romantic relationships are contexts that frequently inspire anxiety and uncertainty (Eastwick & Finkel, 2008c; Tsenov, 1979), and this uncertainty would likely be exacerbated (and thus even more unappealing to conservatives) to the extent that one’s desired partner is a member of an unfamiliar outgroup.

In short, there is empirical and theoretical precedent for predicting that conservatives will be less likely than liberals to be interested in an interracial romantic relationship. The present research was designed to investigate how individuals across the political spectrum behave in live interracial interactions. The existing research on interracial dating and marriage has generally examined attitudes toward interracial relationships and hypothetical reports of whether one would date interracially (but see Yancey, 2002). However, surprisingly little research has considered the extent to which political orientation shapes behavior during or outcomes arising from actual interracial interactions (but see Carney, Jost, Gosling, Niederhoffer, & Potter, 2007; Gaertner, 1973; Nail, Harton, & Decker, 2003), and none to our knowledge has examined initial romantic encounters. In addition, this work was designed to examine an additional topic that has not been addressed in previous research: Does the strength of the ingroup-favoring bias—that is, the tendency for people to prefer members of their racial ingroup relative to racial outgroups—vary across the political spectrum within the romantic domain?
Do Both Conservatives and Liberals Prefer Same-Race Romantic Partners?

An association between political orientation and interest in interracial dating does not address whether liberals’ dating decisions are truly colorblind. According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and other group justification perspectives (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1993), people attempt to rationalize the interests of and maintain positive feelings about their social groups. These motives cause people to exhibit more positive reactions to members of their ingroup relative to members of outgroups. Such a pattern of behavior is frequently observed on both behavioral measures, such as the amount of resources allocated to an ingroup versus an outgroup (e.g., Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979), and affective measures, such as positive feelings for ingroups compared to outgroups (for a meta-analysis, see Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Some scholars have argued that Whites, as members of a majority group in the United States, are especially likely to show such ingroup-favoring patterns on both implicit and explicit measures, as their desire to feel positively about their ingroup is congruent with their desire to justify the legitimacy of the broader social system that affords them their high status (Jost et al., 2004). Therefore, it is possible that these processes would lead White liberals, much like their conservative counterparts, to prefer dating a member of their own race than a member of another race; the correlational evidence suggests only that this ingroup-favoring pattern is less pronounced for White liberals than for White conservatives.

Are there any existing data that compare the size of the ingroup-favoring bias across the political spectrum? Although not relevant to romantic relationships per se, Jost et al. (2004) reported data on ingroup favoritism for White liberals, moderates, and conservatives on a variety of measures. Compared to White liberals, White conservatives did indeed demonstrate a stronger preference for Whites relative to Blacks on both explicit and implicit measures. However, Jost et al. also found that even the liberal White participants demonstrated an ingroup-favoring pattern; that is, liberals held more positive explicit and implicit attitudes about Whites than they held about Blacks. The only White participants who exhibited essentially no ingroup favoritism in Jost et al.’s work scored at the extreme liberal end of the political spectrum, and even this colorblind effect emerged only for the explicit racial attitudes measure.

The present article examines ingroup favoritism across the political spectrum, much like the data presented by Jost et al. (2004), but it also builds on earlier work by assessing the ingroup-favoring bias in the romantic domain specifically, a domain that entails a greater degree of intimacy compared to many (but not all, e.g., Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2006) of the contexts examined by social psychologists. Indeed, on the classic Bogardus (1928) Social Distance Scale, approval of interracial romantic relationships is the most extreme response that a participant can provide. Some scholars have suggested that romantic relationships may be one of the few domains where discrimination by race remains socially acceptable to this day; consider, for example, how commonly individuals specifically profess to seek a single White male/female in personal ads (Kennedy, 2003). Indeed, it may be one of the few domains where people are expected, if not encouraged, to discriminate between partners on the basis of personal preference, whether by weight, age, socioeconomic status, or race. Given the level of physical and emotional closeness that a romantic relationship entails, it is unclear how comfortable the average White liberal would be with an interracial relative to a same-race relationship.

Overview of the Present Research

The present work sought to examine the relation between political orientation and interracial, compared to same-race, romantic interest in a live dating context. Specifically, we conducted two studies in which participants had live, face-to-face interactions with both White and Black opposite-sex individuals in a romantic context. The live context of the present study is potentially important given that research within the race-relations domain (e.g., Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009; Pager & Quillian, 2005) and the romantic domain (e.g., Eastwick & Finkel, 2008a) has found that people’s actual behavior may differ substantially from their survey responses. In addition, we focused exclusively on the interracial pairing of White and Black participants (rather than striving for a comprehensive analysis with participants of diverse races) as this pairing is most relevant to the previous literature and is in many ways the archetypal taboo interracial couple (Kalmijn, 1993). The first study took place in the laboratory and entailed White participants “dating” one White and one Black confederate. The second study investigated the romantic experiences of both White and Black participants in an adult, community sample and used speed-dating procedures, a dating context that is particularly ecologically valid and self-relevant.

STUDY 1

Study 1 examined the extent to which political orientation predicts interracial romantic desire in an experimental, laboratory context. Our central hypothesis was that Whites’ political orientation would interact with
the race of their interaction partner to predict romantic interest. Specifically, conservatism should be associated with more ingroup favoritism. As far as the underlying simple effects are concerned, we predicted that the simple effect for participants scoring higher on conservatism (+1 SD) would reveal a significant ingroup-favoring bias (i.e., greater liking for the White relative to the Black partner). However, we were unsure whether participants scoring lower on conservatism (–1 SD) would show (a) significant but reduced ingroup favoritism or (b) no preference for the White relative to the Black interaction partner.

Method

Participants. White, single, male undergraduates participated in this study for partial course credit. Four participants who indicated a preference for same-sex romantic partners at the end of the study were dropped from all analyses; 54 participants remained (M̄age = 19.2 years, SD = 1.03).

Materials. Political conservatism was assessed in two ways. The short-form measure included 2 items rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale: “I endorse many aspects of conservative political ideology” and “I endorse many aspects of liberal political ideology” (reversed; α = .70, M = 3.71, SD = 1.64). The long-form measure was Hennington’s (1996) 12-item version of the Wilson and Patterson (1968) C-scale (–1 = yes, 0 = don’t know, 1 = no), for example: “Are you in favor of legalized abortion?” (α = .83, M = –0.29, SD = 0.47). These two scales correlated highly (r = .77), so we averaged z-scored versions of each measure to create our political conservatism index.2 This index was subsequently standardized (M = 0, SD = 1).

Romantic desire, the primary dependent measure, was assessed with five items on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale: “I would be excited to get to know my interaction partner better,” “I really like my interaction partner,” “My interaction partner seemed sexually attractive,” “I would be interested in going on a date with my interaction partner,” and “I think my interaction partner is very much like my ideal romantic partner” (White condition α = .88, Black condition α = .84). Participants also completed a five-item measure of comparative romantic desire using the romantic desire items but on a 1 (more true of partner #1) to 9 (more true of partner #2) scale. This measure was coded such that a score of 0 indicates equal preference for both partners (i.e., the participant reported a 5) and higher scores indicate a preference for the Black confederate (α = .88). Finally, participants completed a measure of romantic choice; they picked whom they would rather have as a romantic partner (0 = White confederate, 1 = Black confederate).

In addition, all participants completed the short-form, continuously scored (see Stoebler, Dette, & Musch, 2002) version of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1994), which contains both a self-deception (α = .77) and impression management (α = .64) subscale.

Procedure. At a group-testing session early in the academic quarter, participants reported their race and romantic status (“Are you currently involved in a romantic relationship?”), and they completed the short-form political conservatism measure. Only single, White men were eligible to participate. At the lab, an experimenter greeted participants and explained that they (a) would be participating in a study of romantic dynamics, (b) would have brief interactions with two female participants (one at a time), and (c) should treat each interaction as a short date. The experimenter also explained that the topic of conversation during the interaction would be constrained: Participants would take turns describing Thematic Apperception Test cards (TAT; Murray, 1971) for one another. Each participant would describe a card for 30 s, then switch, until each person had described four cards. This procedure allowed participants to have a live interaction with the two women while allowing for tight experimental control over the content of the conversations (see the following).

After each interaction, the experimenter escorted the confederate out of the room and administered to the participant a Partner Impression Questionnaire, which included the romantic desire measure. After both interactions, participants completed the measures of comparative romantic desire and romantic choice, as well as the second measure of political conservatism (long-form) and the BIDR.

Date racial composition was manipulated such that participants interacted with one White and one Black female confederate. The confederates, who were blind to participants’ political orientation, dressed similarly to each other and similarly across sessions. In addition, their TAT descriptions were entirely scripted, and we trained the confederates rigorously to ensure that their nonverbal behavior was as similar to each other as possible. The order that participants interacted with the Black versus the White confederate and the set of four pictures each confederate described were determined randomly for each session; these two variables were entered as covariates for all analyses.

Results

Multilevel modeling was used to account for the nesting of interaction partner within participant, and the
Results also revealed that political conservatism was a reliable predictor of comparative romantic desire, $B = -.42, t(50) = -2.73, p = .009$. When participants were required to directly compare their desire for the two women, more conservative participants were less likely to desire the Black relative to the White partner. Simple effect tests revealed that relatively liberal participants ($-1$ SD) reported a mean score of 0.45 (indicating a preference for the Black confederate that was significantly different from zero), $t(50) = 2.10, p = .041$, whereas relatively conservative participants ($+1$ SD) reported a mean score of -0.38 (indicating a preference for the White confederate that was marginally significantly different from zero), $t(50) = -1.80, p = .078$.

Consistent with this finding, a logistic regression revealed that political conservatism significantly predicted romantic choice, $B = -.76, e^B = 0.47, p = .020$. The more conservative participants were, the less likely they were to choose the Black over the White confederate for a romantic partner. Simple effect tests revealed that relatively liberal participants ($-1$ SD) were 2.0 times more likely to select the Black over the White confederate, whereas relatively conservative participants ($+1$ SD) were 2.3 times more likely to select the White over the Black confederate.

In a set of auxiliary analyses, the association of the Political Orientation × Race interaction with romantic desire remained identical (as did all reported simple effects) controlling for both the Self-Deception × Race and the Impression Management × Race interactions (both of which were nonsignificant). For comparative romantic desire and romantic choice, results were identical controlling for both BIDR subscales (both of which failed to predict either dependent measure significantly).

**Discussion**

Results from Study 1 supported our central hypothesis that White participants’ political orientation would be reliably associated with their romantic desire for a White versus a Black partner. Especially intriguing was the specific pattern of the Political Orientation × Race interaction. Consistent with prior research on political orientation (e.g., Jost et al., 2004), relatively conservative participants were drawn more to the White confederate, a fellow member of their ingroup, compared to the Black confederate. Curiously, relatively liberal participants actually revealed an outgroup-favoring bias in the present study: They were significantly *more* desirous of the Black relative to the White partner.

Although it is conceivable that these results emerged because the relative liberals were more likely to self-present or try to appear nonprejudiced on paper, nuances of the present data do not lend much support to this
contention. For one, our effects remained robust after controlling for self-deception and impression-management tendencies; in fact, these two individual difference variables could not significantly explain any variance in participants’ likelihood of desiring the Black relative to the White confederate. In addition, when participants were asked to describe what they believed we were studying in the experiment, only 13% of participants mentioned race (see Note 3), and only 2 of these 7 participants were at least .5 SD toward the liberal end of political orientation. Therefore, it seems unlikely that relatively liberal participants were systematically more likely to notice the racial component of the study and to intentionally boost their ratings of the Black confederate so that they did not appear prejudiced. Rather, we assume that these ratings reflected participants’ genuine experience of romantic desire for the two confederates.

Although Study 1 is noteworthy in that it entailed live interactions and had strong experimental control, it has at least three limitations. First, we only examined White men’s romantic desire within a population of college students. There are reasons to suspect that Black participants would not evidence the same Political Orientation × Target Race interaction pattern (Jost et al., 2004), and it is important to test whether the association of political orientation with ingroup favoritism differs between men and women. It is also possible that the outgroup favoritism effect among relative liberals is due in part to the collegiate nature of the sample, and therefore it would be informative to investigate these effects within an older community sample. Second, because of the difficulties of recruiting Black and White confederates of approximately equal desirability, this study only examined participants’ interest in two romantic targets. Even though confederate behavior and appearance were well controlled, it is conceivable that some nonracial difference between these particular women was the source of the interaction with political orientation. Third, to enhance experimental control, we forced participants to have a somewhat artificial interaction in which they described TAT pictures (with the confederate’s responses scripted in advance). Although this procedure permits the inference that the emergent differences between relatively liberal and conservative participants are unrelated to the topic of conversation, it would be useful to test whether these findings generalize to a context in which participants were allowed to converse freely.

**STUDY 2**

To address these three limitations of Study 1, we again examined data from live interactions in a romantic context. Specifically, we studied speed-dating, an increasingly popular activity in which romantically available individuals meet one another for a series of brief dates and decide whether they would (“yes”) or would not (“no”) be interested in meeting each other again. Speed-dating offers many advantages for researchers interested in studying romantic attraction and relationship initiation (Eastwick & Finkel, 2008b; Finkel & Eastwick, 2008), and researchers have recently started to use speed-dating to explore a variety of topics. The present data set was provided to the research team by a professional speed-dating company.

Thankfully, these data contained a sufficient number of Black participants that we could also examine whether the association of political orientation with ingroup favoritism differed by participant race. System-justification theory generates specific predictions in this regard (Jost et al., 2004). Because conservatism is in part characterized by system-justifying beliefs, such as support for the status quo and the rationalization of inequality (Jost et al., 2003), conservatives are likely to feel positively about members of majority or otherwise socially dominant groups. Therefore, given that Whites (but not Blacks) preserve and are supported by the status quo (see also Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006), increased conservatism may be associated with reduced ingroup favoritism among Black participants. Also, as in Study 1, we expect that White participants will exhibit the same pattern whereby conservatism predicts greater ingroup favoritism. In combination, these hypotheses for Black and White participants predict the emergence of a significant Political Conservatism × Race of Partner (same race vs. interracial) × Race of Participant (White vs. Black) three-way interaction predicting romantic interest. In this study, romantic interest is indicated by the consequential decision to say “yes” to a speed-dating partner, a response that opens up the possibility of future contact.

**Method**

**Participants.** Between February 2005 and April 2006, 2,781 White individuals (1,282 men, 1,499 women) and 97 Black individuals (30 men, 67 women) signed up to participate in a speed-dating event with a national speed-dating company. These participants all completed the race component of their speed-dating profile and completed a voluntary online questionnaire (containing the measure of political conservatism) after signing up for the speed-dating event. White participants were 39.9 years old on average ($SD = 8.90$) and Black participants were 35.2 years old on average ($SD = 7.27$); given the large standard deviations, we control for age in all analyses reported.

**Materials.** Participants reported their date of birth and sex when creating an account on the speed-dating
company’s Web site. After creating this account, participants were encouraged to complete a profile that could be viewed by other Web site users. This profile asked participants to select their race from the following choices: Caucasian, African American, Asian, Multiracial, Hispanic, East Indian, American Indian, Other, and No preference/Prefer not to answer. The present analyses examined the yes versus no decisions made by participants who identified as either Caucasian or African American on their speed-dates with individuals who identified as either Caucasian or African American.

After signing up for a speed-dating event, all individuals were offered the opportunity to complete a voluntary online questionnaire designed by the research team. This questionnaire asked participants to indicate on a scale from −4 (highly uncharacteristic of me) to 4 (highly characteristic of me) to what extent the item “politically liberal” described them (White participants: M = 0.15, SD = 2.44; Black participants: M = 1.31, SD = 2.03). This item was reverse scored to create a measure of political conservatism. Although this item is, strictly speaking, a measure of liberalism, we reverse coded it so that the figures and statistics would be comparable across studies. Furthermore, in a separate sample of 46 undergraduate students, this item correlated (r = .86) with a unidimensional measure that ranged from 1 (very conservative) to 9 (very liberal) as used throughout the field of political psychology. Thus, it seemed reasonable to use the “politically liberal” item as a reverse-coded measure of conservatism.

**Procedure.** Participants attended at least one speed-dating event hosted by a national speed-dating company. At the speed-dating event, participants had 6-min speed-dates with the ∼12 opposite-sex individuals in attendance. Immediately after each date, they indicated on a voluntary online questionnaire whether they would (“yes”) or would not (“no”) be interested in meeting their speed-dating partner again. Participants who both replied “yes” to one another were given the ability to contact each another through the speed-dating company’s Web site.

In total, we possessed complete data for (a) Whites’ yes/no decisions on 23,537 speed-dates with White individuals and 587 speed-dates with Black individuals and (b) Blacks’ yes/no decisions on 543 speed-dates with White individuals and 75 speed-dates with Black individuals. Multilevel logistic regression analyses were used to account for the nesting of speed-dates within participant. The intercept was permitted to vary randomly across participants (Level 2).

**Results**

First, participants’ yes/no decisions (1 = yes, 0 = no) were regressed onto political conservatism (standardized across all participants), speed-dating partner race (−.5 = same race, .5 = interracial), participant race (−.5 = White, .5 = Black), all two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction. As predicted, the three-way Political Conservatism × Speed-Dating Partner Race × Participant Race interaction was significant, B = .91, eB = 2.48, t(2,787) = 2.21, p = .027. This indicates that the Political Conservatism × Speed-Dating Partner Race interaction (i.e., the association of political conservatism with the strength of the ingroup-favoring bias) differed between White and Black participants.

Second, we examined data from White participants alone. Unlike Study 1, both the main effect of political conservatism (standardized across White participants), B = −.14, eB = 0.87, t(2,780) = −2.36, p = .018, and the main effect of partner race, B = −.88, eB = 0.41, t(2,780) = −7.97, p < .001, were statistically significant: Relatively conservative Whites were less likely than relatively liberal Whites to say “yes” to their speed-dating partners on average, and White participants were less likely to say “yes” to interracial (Black) relative to same-race (White) speed-dates on average (an ingroup favoritism effect). As for our central hypothesis, the Political Conservatism × Partner Race interaction was indeed significant, as in Study 1, B = −.26, eB = 0.77, t(2,780) = −2.28, p = .023; this interaction was not moderated by participant sex (p > .688). The likelihood that White participants said “yes” to White (same-race) and Black (interracial) speed-dating partners is plotted in Figure 2 as a function of political conservatism. Tests of the simple effects revealed that relatively conservative participants (+1 SD) were significantly less likely to say “yes” to Black relative to White speed-dating partners, B = −1.15, eB = 0.32, t(2,780) = −6.86, p < .001. Relatively liberal participants (−1 SD) were also significantly less likely to say “yes” to Black relative to White speed-dating partners, B = −.62, eB = 0.54, t(2,780) = −4.03, p < .001; even participants at the far liberal end of the political spectrum (−1.5 SD) demonstrated a negative association between partner race and “yes” likelihood, B = −.49, eB = 0.62, t(2,780) = −2.45, p = .014. In short, although White participants in Study 2 did not evidence the same crossover interaction found in Study 1, the ingroup-favoring bias still increased as individuals reported greater conservatism: As shown in Figure 2, the probability that a White participant at 1 SD toward the liberal end of the spectrum would say “yes” to a Black speed-dater was approximately 26%, whereas the probability that a White participant at 1 SD toward the conservative end of the spectrum would say “yes” to a Black speed-dater was approximately 16%.

Finally, we examined data from Black participants alone. Neither the political conservatism (standardized
across Black participants) nor the partner race main effect was significant (ps > .36). However, their interaction was marginally significant, $B = .61$, $e^B = 1.83$, $t(96) = 1.66$, $p = .100$; this interaction was not moderated by participant sex ($p > .244$). This political Conservatism × Partner Race interaction for Blacks is in the opposite direction from the one exhibited by Whites, indicating that conservatism was associated with a weaker ingroup-favoring bias among Blacks. The likelihood that Black participants said “yes” to Black (same-race) and White (interracial) speed-dating partners is plotted in Figure 3 as a function of political conservatism. Tests of the simple effects revealed that neither relatively conservative participants (+1 SD) nor extremely conservative participants (+2 SD) were significantly more likely to say “yes” to White relative to Black speed-dating partners (ps > .30). In other words, these conservative participants tended to reveal no racial bias in their dating preferences. However, relatively liberal Black participants (−1 SD) revealed a marginally significant ingroup-favoring pattern; they were less likely to say “yes” to White (interracial) compared to Black (same-race) dating partners, $B = −.94$, $e^B = 0.39$, $t(96) = −1.93$, $p = .056$.

Discussion

Study 2 revealed that the association of political orientation with ingroup favoritism differed for White and Black participants, as predicted by system-justification theory (Jost et al., 2004). Among White participants, data replicated the interaction found in Study 1: The ingroup-favoring bias was stronger among participants reporting greater levels of conservatism. Unlike Study 1, however, these data did not reveal the same crossover interaction, as both relatively conservative and relatively liberal White participants evidenced significant ingroup favoritism. Black participants, on the other hand, revealed a different interaction pattern such that conservatism was associated with a weaker ingroup-favoring bias. Relatively liberal Blacks did evidence ingroup favoritism in their romantic preferences, whereas relatively conservative participants showed no bias. Thus, the two groups that seemed to be the most open to an interracial romantic relationship in the present study were relatively liberal Whites and relatively conservative Blacks.

Like Study 1, Study 2 involved a live romantic context; in fact, the speed-dating environment was probably particularly involving for participants, as the events are designed to encourage the development of actual relationships. This feature of Study 2 also argues against the alternative explanation of the Study 1 findings that relatively liberal White participants exhibit less ingroup favoritism than relatively conservative participants because they are merely boosting their ratings of Blacks so that they do not appear prejudiced; after all, these dates and yes/no decisions had very real consequences for participants. Furthermore, Study 2 generalized the results of Study 1 in several key ways: Study 2 (a) revealed no evidence of sex differences in the Political Orientation × Partner Race interaction, (b) required participants to report on not just two (possibly atypical) confederates but on multiple interaction partners, (c) allowed participants to converse freely on any topic of their choosing, and (d) examined a noncollegiate adult population.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Despite the wealth of social psychological research on stereotyping and prejudice (Fiske, 1998) and on romantic relationships (Berscheid & Reis, 1998), the cross talk between these literatures has historically been meager (but see Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 2008). We know little about how interracial romantic relationships initially coalesce, and we have yet to identify the unique challenges and benefits that may arise as such relationships develop. In an attempt to partially address this void, the present work examined the extent to which political conservatism predicts romantic interest across racial lines. In two studies we found that Whites’ political conservatism was associated with experiencing less romantic desire for Black relative to White dating partners. This finding is consistent with survey research on interracial dating and marriage preferences (Johnson & Jacobson, 2005; McClelland & Auster, 1990; Yancey, 2002, 2007) as well as research on the association between contemporary measures of racial bias and conservatism (Jost et al., 2004; Sidanius et al., 1996; Tarman & Sears, 2005). This ingroup favoritism was more or less evident for relatively conservative Whites in both studies. Relatively liberal Whites, on the other hand, revealed an ingroup-favoring bias in Study 2 but an outgroup-favoring bias in Study 1. Perhaps there is a unique element of liberalism within a college population (Study 1) not present in a broader adult population (Study 2) that would cause liberals to strongly resist the status quo and subsequently prefer racial minority individuals as dating partners. Alternatively, perhaps there is an overall shift toward ingroup favoritism among older participants or among participants who are more likely to be seeking a marital relationship (cf. Joyner & Kao, 2005); such a shift could account for the emergence of the ingroup favoritism main effect for Whites in Study 2 and the elimination of the significant outgroup favoritism for relatively liberal White participants.

Results provided by the Black participants in Study 2 yielded findings consistent with system-justification theory. According to system-justification theory, conservatism should predict reduced liking for Black relative to White potential romantic partners (i.e., reduced ingroup favoritism) among Black participants, and this is precisely what the data revealed. It is important to note, however, that the simple effects analyses did not reveal that relatively conservative Black participants significantly preferred White to Black dating partners (even at +2 SD). Indeed, these participants revealed no significant bias in their dating preferences; it was the relatively liberal Black participants who expressed an ingroup-favoring pattern of romantic desire. Surely, a variety of competing motives shape romantic preferences: System-justification beliefs among Black conservatives may have increased the perceived value of White dating partners, but independently operating group-enhancement motives may have bolstered their interest in Black dating partners. Given that relatively conservative Blacks did not reveal any significant bias in their dating preferences, it appears that any system-justification motives that they held were not sufficient to override their group-enhancement motives (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Nevertheless, the finding that conservatism is associated with a weaker ingroup-favoring bias in romantic preferences among Blacks is a novel and notable contribution made possible by our broad speed-dating sample.

A few methodological limitations of the present work also provide direction for future research. First, we only examined the romantic interest of White and Black participants in response to same-race, versus interracial, dating interactions. Because different interracial romantic arrangements are differentially taboo, other combinations of interracial dates (e.g., White–Asian, Black–Latino) may not be associated with political orientation in the same manner. Second, because our political orientation measures were somewhat simple, we were not in a position to determine which aspects of conservatism or liberalism specifically mediated these findings. Some aspects of conservatism seem to be unlikely candidates (e.g., a strong belief in the free market), but future research will have to determine which psychological factors that differ between liberals and conservatives (e.g., social dominance orientation, system-justification tendencies, intolerance of ambiguity) do in fact account for the present findings. Third, although the Conservatism × Race interaction and the simple effect for relatively conservative Whites was consistent across both studies, relatively liberal White participants evidenced an outgroup-favoring bias in Study 1 but an ingroup-favoring bias in Study 2. Future research could determine whether this discrepancy is due to differences in (a) the age of the individuals in the sample (younger vs. older), (b) the dependent variable (romantic desire vs. “yessing”), (c) the mating motives of participants in the two samples (casual college relationships vs. long-term adult relationships), or (d) some other factor.

This work also has several strengths. For one, both studies investigated face-to-face interactions between opposite-sex individuals in a live romantic context; thus, it is unlikely that these results only apply to liberals’ and conservatives’ theories about what might appeal to them in a hypothetical romantic partner (see Eastwick & Finkel, 2008a). Second, the laboratory (Study 1) and speed-dating (Study 2) contexts have some nice complementary features. For example, given that participants in Study 1 only conversed about a set of standardized
TAT pictures, we can conclude that the source of the Political Orientation × Race interaction among Whites was not the differences in conversational topics raised by liberals and conservatives. Yet given that participants were permitted to discuss any topic they desired in Study 2, we can conclude that the Political Orientation × Race interaction generalizes to a more externally valid arena in which people are conversing freely. Third, we replicated the central Political Orientation × Race interaction among Whites within two very different populations: one a sample of young college students, the other a broader (and very large) sample of adults. Fourth, the speed-dating data enabled us to explore the romantic experiences of Black individuals, a population that has historically been understudied (Shelton, 2000). Given that this research was intended to advance scholars’ understanding of interracial romantic relationship initiation, it was important to address the experience of both majority and racial minority individuals.

The present report contributes to two stimulating and rapidly growing psychological literatures: one that lies at the intersection of race and romantic attraction (e.g., Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, & Simonson, 2008; Gaines et al., 2006; Miller et al., 2004) and another that has argued for an increased appreciation of the psychological potency of political ideology (e.g., Jost, 2006). This study is the first to provide evidence in a live dating context that participants’ attitudes are associated with their interest in initiating interracial romantic relationships. Specifically, political orientation seems to be one factor among both Whites and Blacks that predicts who is willing to venture across racial lines to form romantic relationships despite the social and cultural barriers that have kept the romantic lives of members of these racial groups largely separate since the aptly named Loving decision.

NOTES

1. In the current article, we use the term political orientation to refer to participants’ self-identification on the conservative versus liberal spectrum. Social psychological researchers commonly use unidimensional (liberal–conservative) scales to measure political orientation (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Tarman & Sears, 2005; see Knight, 1999, for a discussion). At times, researchers also measure political orientation by assessing participants’ support for particular politicalized issues (e.g., universal health care; Sidanius et al., 1996); this approach is perhaps less common because such (longer) measures typically correlate extremely highly with unidimensional items and because unidimensional scales predict feelings and behavior extremely well (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). The present article uses both approaches in Study 1 and the unidimensional approach alone in Study 2.

2. All hypothesis tests reveal identical conclusions if we used either of the two scales alone.

3. This interaction remained significant if (a) participants who suspected that the experiment involved race (N = 7) or (b) participants reported at the experimental session that they had entered a romantic relationship since the group-testing session (N = 6) were removed from the analysis. Given that all participants followed instructions and none suspected that the study involved political orientation, we included these 13 participants in the remaining analyses.

4. In addition, we conducted a successful replication of Study 1 with 43 White participants who completed the identical TAT interaction with different White and Black confederates (Son, 2008). Because this experiment had several additional features and the participants were intentionally selected to exhibit a restricted range of political orientation (only liberals), we do not report the full results of this study in the present report. However, even with this liberal sample, the same Political Orientation × Race Of Target interaction emerged: “Conservatives” (i.e., centrists) were more likely than strong liberals to exhibit ingroup favoritism in their romantic desire reports.

5. Elsewhere, we have reported data from a speed-dating study that we hosted for undergraduate students (Eastwick & Finkel, 2008b). In this previous study, relatively conservative Whites significantly desired White relative to racial minority speed-dating partners, whereas relatively liberal Whites significantly preferred racial minority partners to White partners. However, we did not have a sufficient number of Black participants in that data set (N = 3) to allow us to confidently draw conclusions specifically about White–Black romantic relationships—the focus of the present report.

6. Although Black individuals make up a relatively small proportion of the participants in this study (3.4%), it is worth noting that the absolute number of black participants (97) is substantial for a social psychology study.

7. Among Whites, there was a significant Sex × Partner Race interaction, B = .45, e^B = 1.57, (2.847) = 2.06, p = .040, indicating that women were more likely than men to say “yes” to Black (relative to White) partners. This pattern is consistent with demographic data showing that marriages between Black men and White women are about 2-3 times more common than marriages between White men and Black women (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000). Among Blacks, the Sex × Partner Race interaction was in the expected (opposite) direction but was nonsignificant.

8. In addition, if conservatism among Black participants was associated with a preference for colorblindness, a tendency to inhabit a more racially integrated social environment, or a generally open-minded approach to dating, then these alternative motives could be responsible for relatively conservative Black participants’ reduced ingroup favoritism in lieu of system-justification tendencies.

REFERENCES


