Developing Cultural Industries
Learning from the Palimpsest of Practice

Christiaan De Beukelaer

European Cultural Foundation
CULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH AWARD 2012
Christiaan De Beukelaer
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh & University of Leeds
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European Cultural Foundation
CULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH AWARD 2012
“This thought-provoking study gives a comprehensive contribution to move ahead the debate from theory to practice. In investigating the bottlenecks of the music industry in Burkina Faso and Ghana, Christiaan De Beukelaer provides constructive criticism and addresses the obsolete and antagonizing division of countries between: developed vs. developing, north vs. south and even worse first vs. third world. He rightly argues that recognition of the ‘potential’ of the cultural industries and the creative economy is not enough, effective policies and initiatives should be in place to realize it.”

Edna dos Santos Duisenberg
Former Chief, UNCTAD Creative Economy Programme

“A must for those interested in the West African music business and the new ‘cultural industries’ paradigm. Christiaan De Beukelaer delves into the history of this new developmental concept and examines how it is encouraging governmental assistance to the African music industry. He also presents its negative Eurocentric presumptions that ignore local views on the social and humanist role of music in society and its ownership.”

John Collins
Professor of Musicology, University of Ghana at Legon

“This book is a timely reminder why cultural policy studies needs not be some idle backwater but can be right at the heart of contemporary debates around culture, economy, development and modernity. Christiaan De Beukelaer places current policy debates in their broader academic context but, more importantly, he shows why these debates matter and to who.”

Justin O’Connor
Professor of Cultural Economy, Monash University, Melbourne
“This is an important and timely intervention about the relevance of the creative and cultural industries as drivers of development, particularly in varied African contexts. It raises pertinent questions about applying global north solutions in global south conditions; it advances the debate. Hopefully it will also help shift current strategies that foreground the creative economy’s contribution to development in a more nuanced direction.”

Mike van Graan
Director, African Arts Institute, Cape Town

“Christiaan De Beukelaer makes a significant contribution to the literature on cultural and creative industries by foregrounding his research in the African context of Burkina Faso and Ghana. The book raises important questions about culture, cultural industries and creative industries and their relationship to one another that will stimulate new ways of thinking about the current discourse of ‘culture and development’ and ‘creative economy.’ Thorough in its approach and content, I recommend this book for students, scholars and researchers interested in development, Africa, the cultural and creative economy, and public policy.”

Avril Joffe
Postgraduate Course Coordinator in Cultural Policy and Management,
Wits School of Arts, Johannesburg
# Table of Contents

Endorsements 5  
Table of Contents 7  
Foreword 9  
Acknowledgements 11  
Preface 13  

1. **The Global Creative Economy Debate** 18  
   1.1. A layered concept and a layered debate 19  
   1.2. A range of literature on a common theme 24  
   1.3. Research questions 28  
   1.4. Approach 30  
   1.5. Scope 33  
   1.6. Chapter outline 35  

2. **Culture and Development: a history of intertwined concepts** 37  
   2.1. The long histories of development and culture 38  
   2.2. Industrialization, enlightenment and romanticism 40  
   2.3. Modernity: makeability and popular culture 44  
   2.4. Development and culture (industries) in the plural 50  
   2.5. New paradigms for a new millennium 55  
   2.6. Culture or cultural industries for human development? 60  
   2.7. Copyright and piracy as illustration 62  

3. **Cultural Industries: potential, limitations and strategic adoption** 68  
   3.1. “There are no cultural industries here” 71  
   3.2. Cultural industries in context 73  
   3.3. Statistical illusions as a disguise of limitations 74
3.4. “When the river turns, so must the caiman” 76
3.5. Risky business 82
3.6. Precariousness along a broken value chain 85
3.7. Between discourse and practice 90
3.8. Traveling concepts 94
3.9. Survival despite the odds 95

4. The Moral Imperative for Cautious Optimism 99
4.1. Capabilities: a framework for engagement 100
4.2. Political participation 102
4.3. Transparency guarantees 107
4.4. Economic facilities 111
4.5. Social opportunity 115
4.6. Education 118
4.7. Capabilities for culture 126

5. The ‘Development’ of Cultural Industries 127
5.1. The ‘palimpsest’ of cultural production 129
5.2. Cultural and creative industries models 134
5.3. A theoretical basis for grounded plurality 136
5.4. Towards a circular politics of culture and development 140
5.5. Reclaiming the role of culture in the creative economy debate 147
5.6. Cultural policy reconsidered 149

6. Conclusion 153
6.1. Beyond a single story 153
6.2. History 156
6.3. Concepts 158
6.4. Capabilities 159
6.5. Mutual learning from global cultural industries research 160

References 163

List of CPRA 2012 Jury Members 183
For 60 years, the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) has been striving towards an open, democratic, creative and inclusive Europe in which culture is a valued and key contributor. Informed by reflection and research, we devise our programmes and initiatives to best serve contemporary needs and respond to impending cultural urgencies across Europe. However, our work goes beyond Europe and includes a strong external dimension, namely with regards to Europe’s cultural engagement with other regions and the EU’s external cultural relations strategy. Cultural and creative industries play an important part in the development of this strategy.

This publication is part of the ECF’s Cultural Policy Research Award (CPRA) programme that supports young (under 35) cultural policy scholars in carrying out a comparative, applied cultural policy research of European relevance. Launched in 2004, in partnership with the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), the initiative has since been awarded to ten young researchers. Each award winner has received a grant of € 10,000 to carry-out the research project, to connect to other scholars and to grow an international network of young cultural policy researchers. The CPRA has strengthened their professional trajectories, given them and their research interest visibility, and in most cases informed policy-making on local, regional or European level. Through the CPRA, young scholars play an active role in broadening and deepening the cultural policy research area within a global perspective, drawing inspiring new horizons for a next generation of researchers.

Christiaan de Beukelaer (Belgium), currently lecturer at the Queen Margaret University in Edinburgh, received the award in 2012 for his research proposal Developing Cultural Industries: learning from the palimpsest of practice. The research explores the connection between culture and human development and focuses on the policy implications of increased attention on cultural and creative industries concepts in the so-called ‘developing
countries’ - a term which De Beukelaer challenges vigorously.

Christiaan scrutinizes existing concepts of cultural and creative industries, as applied in public policies in African countries and largely influenced by programmes of intergovernmental development agencies. He then searches for empirical evidence of their true value for human development. He looks into the role of the music industries in Ghana and Burkina Faso in particular and in doing so is able to draw conclusions on the potential and deficits in the existing development approaches for these areas. He considers the cultural industries as a source for diversity that goes beyond the economic debate on growth, and looks into possibilities to build more organic relations between existing concepts, policies and practices.

This research will undoubtedly advance cultural policy thinking and debate in Europe on three levels: it gives an insight into the way a European debate resonates and has a meaning in a global perspective; it advances the empirical understanding of the cultural industries in West Africa and; it challenges the extent to which European action can and should inform progress of the cultural industries elsewhere.

The ECF would like to thank Christiaan De Beukelaer for his excellent contribution and we are grateful to the international jury that has selected his research among 21 proposals as the winning project.

We wish to sincerely thank the European Network of Cultural Administration Training Centres (ENCATC) for its important collaboration in the CPRA.

Isabelle Schwarz

Head of Advocacy, Research and Development
European Cultural Foundation, 20 December 2014
This study has benefited tremendously from the generosity of a great number of people. Hereby, I would like to thank all of them and extend my particular gratitude to the following people.

First of all, I would like to thank the European Cultural Foundation, the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, and ENCATC for the generous Cultural Policy Research Award I received in 2012. The exposure this has generated, and the network it helped me build is truly invaluable. The substantial support for my research greatly facilitated the lengthy fieldwork for this study. I wish to thank Katherine Watson, Isabelle Schwartz, Mats Rolén, GiannaLia Cogliandro, Elisabeth Darley, Lyudmila Petrova, and particularly Tsveta Andreeva for their support. I equally wish to thank the entire CPRA jury, Lluís Bonet, Eleonora Belfiore, Sanjin Dragojević, Jacques Bonniel, Mikhail Gnedovsky, Therese Kaufmann, and Timo Cantell, for the faith they had (and hopefully still have) in me regarding this project as well as for their comments on this work. Many thanks as well to Yudhishtir Raj Isar, for mentoring me in the process of turning my research into this report and to Diane Dodd for her editorial work.

Many thanks to my PhD supervisors, David Hesmondhalgh and David Lee, for their support, advice and most of all, patience. This study, after all, largely overlaps with my current doctoral research, which led to some shifting of priorities. Thanks are also due for many others at Leeds, in particular Kate Oakley, Anamik Saha, Toussaint Nothias, Caitlin Schindler, Patrick Enaholo, Andreas Rauh Ortega and Yangling Yang.

Throughout my fieldwork, there are numerous people who helped me tremendously. In Ouagadougou: Gaston Eugène Hounhouenou, Emile Raguidissida Zida and Marceline Kuela. In Accra: Selorm Yao Ani-Frimpong, John Owoo and Korkor Amarteifio. They made my work possible, and facilitated many contacts and meetings. I am equally indebted to John
Collins, Francisco d’Almeida, Salif Sanfo, Jordi Baltà Portolés, Oumarou Moussa and Souleymane Ibrahim. None of this would have been possible without the many people who agreed to share their thoughts and insights with me. Without them, and many others who keep cultural life running in Burkina Faso and Ghana, my work would not have been possible at all.

For many reasons I should mention Jan Baetens and Frederik Truyen. They have supported me ever since I started my MA in cultural studies at Leuven. And it is safe to say that without their encouragement, I would not have made it this far.

I would also like to thank the following people for their help, for friendly conversations, collaborations, and critical engagement with my work: Roger Dillemans, Filip De Boeck, Noel Salazar, Ann Cassiman, Marieke Krijnen, Ivan Vander biesen, Raquel Freitas, Miikka Pyykkönen, JP Singh, Nancy Duxbury, Anita Kangas, Wayne Modest, Jessica Rucell, Katriina Soini, Joost Dessein, Milena Dragićević Šešić, Julija Matejić, Cecilia De Ita, Constanza Parra, Jasmina Kuka, Nathalie Blanc, Bernard Miège, Felencia Hutabarat, Mike van Graan, Belisa Rodrigues, Peter Rorvik, Nadia Nkwaya, Avril Joffe, Wolfgang Schneider, Daniel Gad, Ofonime Inyang, Marija Jauković, Elise Aalund, Joost Smiers, Carolina Matos, Carla Figueira, Johanna Barnbeck, Diane Birungi, Aimee Fullman, Annamari Laaksonen, Heritiana Ranaivoson, Yvonne Donders, Alexandros Vrettos, Nadine Sieveking, Louise Friis Pedersen, Elsebeth Krogh, Frédéric Jacquemin, Visnja Kisić, David Stevenson, Véronique Guèvremont, Christine M. Merkel, Anna Steinkamp, Ammar Kessab, Mien De Graeve, and all those whom I have forgotten to mention.

Last, but not least, I wish to thank my parents, brothers and friends for being there, even though they are probably still wondering what I do exactly.
This project started from a simple but startling observation. At the 2008 World Music Expo (WOMEX) in Seville, I was struck by the fact that mostly European and American managers and agents represent many artists from around the world. I perceive the relative absence of non-European managers and agents to be a problem. Surely, there are quite a few of them, but not relative to the amount and importance of artists from around the world.

This initial observation encouraged me to put my degree in Musicology to use in an attempt to research this issue. Soon enough, I found out that the situation was far more complex than I could have imagined. But, the one element that has remained firmly in place is that there are few African managers who have the network and means to take their band(s) on tour around the world.

At the same time, UNCTAD published their first Creative Economy Report (2008), hailing the potential of the cultural and creative industries for development. This publication caused a shift in my thinking. Precisely because the focus of this report was more on the ‘potential’ (see chapter 3) than the existing projects in ‘developing countries’ I decided to look into and became intrigued by the ‘discursive optimism’ of UNCTAD.

The combination of my initial observation of what I perceived to be injustice at WOMEX and the exaggerated claims of the Creative Economy Reports (again, see chapter 3) drove me to engage with this topic in a more systematic way. Now, two Masters degrees and almost a PhD later, I am still not quite sure what to think of the utterly globalized Creative Economy Discourse. I cannot reject it, because there is too much proof that confirms it has been useful to attract greater policy and political attention to culture, but I cannot really embrace it, because of its economic reductionism that rightly prompts mistrust in the discourse.

This book is the result of my explorations over the past five years. It reflects my ambiguity towards the cultural industries (and their conceptual
variations). It also reflects my engagement towards the advancement of real opportunities and capabilities for people who have chosen to make culture their life. They continue to make that choice everyday, in spite of the many obstacles and the limited successes. I hope this study somehow helps all of these artists and managers, because that is what it is meant to do.
## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEIC</td>
<td>Agence de Promotion des Entreprises et Industries Culturelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRODEM</td>
<td>l’Association des Producteurs, Distributeurs et Éditeurs de Musique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARPEM</td>
<td>Appui au Réseau ouest-africain de Pépinières d’Entreprises de la filière de la Musique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARPIC</td>
<td>Programme d’Appui au Renforcement des Politiques et Industries Culturelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBDA</td>
<td>Bureau Burkinabè du Droit d'Auteur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBEAC</td>
<td>Bureau Burkinabè d'Etudes et D’Appui-Conseils</td>
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<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>British Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCI</td>
<td>Cultural and Creative Industries</td>
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<td>CDIS</td>
<td>Culture and Development Indicator Suite</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIGF</td>
<td>Guarantee Fund for Cultural Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSGA</td>
<td>Collective Management Societies of Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPRA</td>
<td>Cultural Policy Research Award</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCCD</td>
<td>Danish Center for Culture and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECF</td>
<td>European Cultural Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENCATC</td>
<td>European Network of Cultural Administration Training Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCFA</td>
<td>Franc de la Communauté Française d’Afrique</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGIC</td>
<td>Fonds de Garantie des Industries Culturelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHAMRO</td>
<td>Ghana Music Rights Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTRA</td>
<td>Ghana Tape Recordists Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDCA</td>
<td>Human Development and Capabilities Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Indicator</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFPI</td>
<td>International Federation of the Phonographic Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMD</td>
<td>Institute for Music and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INAFAC</td>
<td>Institut National de Formation Artistique et Culturelle</td>
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<tr>
<td>J2C</td>
<td>Journalistes et Communicateurs pour la Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCT</td>
<td>Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCTC</td>
<td>Ministère de la Culture, du Tourisme et de la Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUSIGA</td>
<td>Musicians’ Union Of Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Commission on Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPC</td>
<td>National Development Planning Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTB</td>
<td>Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>TED</td>
<td>Technology, Entertainment, Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCCD</td>
<td>World Commission on Culture and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCED</td>
<td>World Commission on Environment and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOMEX</td>
<td>World Music Expo</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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1. The Global Creative Economy Debate

The global creative industry, which encompasses films, TV, literature, and a host of other activities is enormous and growing larger. Even when the global economy contracted, the creative industry continued to grow, especially in China and other Asian countries. Africa’s contribution to this vast industry, unfortunately, is negligible. While the continent has a deep pool of talent, it lacks the infrastructure and capacity to commercialise its creative talent and reap the vast fortunes that are lying in wait. (African Business 2014, 15)

The discourse of the creative economy is global. Virtually every country around the world now uses the concept (or one of its variants) in politics, policy, advocacy and practice (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 53–85). This persuasive discourse does not only entice those countries who are historically strong in the cultural industries (USA, UK, Japan, France, Germany), and those countries who saw their share of this global market increase in the last decades (China, Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and so on). Countries with less established cultural industries also increasingly embrace the creative economy discourse. This goes for most countries in Africa as well. The fact that the African creative economy gets a cover story in a major Africa-focused business magazine is telling. But, their argument remains cautious: the share of Africa is currently negligible and there is a lack of both infrastructure and capacity to transform the potential of the continent’s creative talent into concrete results. The transition from potential to realization, or the process of developing cultural industries, is the key theme of this report.
1.1. A layered concept and a layered debate

The process that transforms cultural and creative potential into cultural industries is layered. At a policy level, the aims of previously disparate domains become increasingly intertwined. The two major elements of the debate in Burkina Faso and Ghana, which serve as guiding examples for this study, are national development plans and cultural policies. These two countries are exemplary of the recent uptake of this creative economy discourse and provide insight in the differences between the Anglophone and Francophone spheres of influence. Yet, there is nothing exotic about cultural policies and development plans. These documents simply form a normative basis for social, political and economic change, and a practical approach towards the execution of such change, like anywhere else in the world. For development plans, culture, albeit reduced to cultural and creative industries, now takes a more central position as a driver for the national economic development. Cultural ministries and their cultural policies increasingly focus on the economic potential of the cultural sector. This resembles a similar evolution across Europe, where ministries of culture increasingly focused on the economic return of culture in order to make a case for budgetary allocation. In the European case, this debate is driven by the need to defend such allocations, resulting in claims about social, economic and innovatory spill over from the cultural sector (Gray 2007). In Burkina Faso and Ghana this logic is similar, but the context differs. Culture is included in development plans precisely because broad claims about the role of culture in society travel through the creative economy discourse. In Burkina Faso and Ghana, there is no meaningful public spending on culture that can be defended. Rather, the aim of stakeholders in the cultural sector, from government officials, to entrepreneurs, and artists in adopting the creative economy discourse is both to convince the central government to allocate greater budget to the culture ministry and to create an environment conducive to private enterprise in the cultural sector.

The debate remains phrased in a contrast between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. The argument here is that it makes more sense to look at the similarities than the differences across this outdated division of
countries. The challenges are similar, and the particularity lies in the fact that every country has its own lengthy and contradictory path-dependent practices and policies that are often intertwined with neighbours far and near. That particularity cannot be captured in the simplistic division of the world in ‘developed and developing;’ ‘in north and south;’ in ‘center and periphery;’ or ‘first and third worlds’ (De Beukelaer 2014a). This division has always been political and discursive, rather than based on a real dichotomy between two groups of countries (Escobar 1995), and it is important to consider that all countries are, or should aspire to be, ‘developing’ (Neuwirth 2013). The next chapter addresses this point in greater detail.

There is also a conceptual layer that has many sides. Throughout this report, the ‘creative economy debate’ refers to a general discourse that travels globally through reports, the work of consultants and the writings of academics. Here, the term encompasses a broad range of terms, including ‘cultural and creative industries,’ the ‘cultural economy,’ and other related terms. The term thus provides a conceptual umbrella to capture the variety of ‘economies’ and ‘industries’ without claiming that there is any difference between them. There are indeed, several terms in use: cultural industries, creative industry, creative economy and so on. This multitude of significations means that there is little agreement on the terms and what they mean as they travel. In Ghana ‘creative (arts) industry’ is used, whereas in Burkina Faso ‘industries culturelles’ (or ‘cultural industries’), which signals the respective influence of the Anglophone and Francophone (policy) debates. Generally, the term ‘cultural industries’ is central, because it better incorporates the critical origins of the ‘culture industry’ and focuses more explicitly on the cultural basis of symbolic texts (Hesmondhalgh 2013). The issues regarding definition and use are central to this report, and they are discussed in greater detail later on. The empirical focus of this report is primarily on the music industries in both countries, which means that not all observations can be extrapolated to other cultural or creative industries.

The debate is also layered in terms of its goals. At this level, there are four main pillars. First, cultural industries serve to maintain cultural diversity. UNESCO links the cultural industries to development in its Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO
The rationale here is that the global circulation of cultural expressions occurs through the cultural industries. In order to protect a level of diversity in this global flow, all countries must have sufficiently strong cultural industries to make sure that their internal market can withstand the influx of imported films, music and books.

Second, the bottom line of the UNCTAD Creative Economy Reports is that the creative economy is a driver of economic growth (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP 2010). According to these reports, the creative economy is now growing faster than the economy as whole in most countries, but also provides an avenue of export diversification for countries with a focus on primary goods exports. This argument is in line with the mandate of UNCTAD, which aims to help countries diversify their exports to reduce dependence on raw material exports. The initial two reports published by UNCTAD (2008; 2010) focused primarily on international trade in the sector. The subsequent special edition by UNESCO (2013) shifted its focus to the local and often urban realities of the sector around the world, while focusing on the social and human aspects before economic aspects.

Third, the creative economy is linked to human development goals, signalling an engagement with ‘development’ beyond economic terms. This focus featured in the initial UNCTAD creative economy reports, but became more explicit in the UNESCO edition of the report that focuses on “widening development pathways” (2013). This means that not only economic, but also social, cultural and emotional aspects of development are part of the goals the creative economy should help attain. The 2013 report is strong as a conceptual introduction to the discourse, as a source of examples and as a basis to set policy agendas. However, it neither provides a systematic link between human development and cultural industries, nor does it provide a way to link the creative economy discourse to culture as a way of life, that proposes a holistic understanding of culture that does not collapse under its own weight. The current efforts to develop a Culture and Development Indicator Suite (CDIS) provide an ambitious (perhaps even too ambitious) way forward that may strengthen the weak link. Yet, there is little explicit policy attention for human development goals, as the debate remains largely framed in economic terms.
Fourth, the cultural industries are a means of giving voice in two distinct ways. On the one hand, voice is a way of cultural expression in order to tell stories, share dreams and cherish shared heritage. This articulation focuses primarily on the continuous (re-)creation of stories that make up and maintain diverse cultural communities, which Anderson calls “imagined” (1983). On the other hand, voice as a political project (Hirschman 1970), which aims for change within organizations or countries. Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright (2008a, 31) make the argument that the debate on the creative economy ideally connects these two understandings in order rethink the priorities of cultural policy by linking engagement with cultural diversity, social welfare and economic opportunity.

In sum, the ‘creative economy for development’ debate is largely presented as the logical continuation of earlier (and present) ‘culture and development’ debates. This is where the problem lies. The creative economy debate remains a predominantly Western affair, particularly given the limited engagement of non-Western countries with the underlying contradictions of the debate. The main drivers of the global creative economy debate are policies and reports from international organizations, which in turn draw on the work of creative consultancies that travel the world to “do a Florida thing” (McGuigan 2009), using the influential but flawed work of Richard Florida. At the same time, technical support from international organizations like UNESCO, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and the British Council (BC), also work primarily within their respective logic when advising ministries and NGOs on the adoption and implementation of the creative economy discourse.

The risk of the current debate is that the policies and frameworks proposed by the above reports and agencies are adopted with insufficient critical understanding. A Ghanaian stakeholder commented:\footnote{See section 1.4 for details on method and data analysis.}

\begin{quote}
The creative industry has been around not too long; I wonder how many people really understand the concept. It’s been a very short time. When we say culture industry, whose culture industry are we talking about? The whole world is talking about UNCTAD, but is that our cultural industry? We must think about what we call culture industry
\end{quote}
and where they are. In the north, there’s this village, Yindi, and in Europe, this could be called the creative city of weaving. But we’re in Africa, and it’s just a place where people are weaving, you see? So, we have to define, in our own terms, this is our creative industry. When we define [it] ourselves and we are willing to defend it, that’s when I think we’ll understand this whole concept. Again, now this is something that has been imposed, even in the government sectors, where they were going to rename the ministry of tourism; they call it creative arts. Creative arts, because it’s business as usual. Until we discover our own [understanding of the concept], what we call our own creative industry, and until we say we want to protect it, and have policies to protect it, and make sure we can compete with the rest of the world and not what somebody from the embassies says, you have to collaborate in exchange for a grant; the British Council, Alliance Française, Goethe Institut, and so on. This deforms the view of Ghanaian production, it’s perhaps not what we think is Ghanaian. We have to discover ourselves, what our creative industry is.²

This comment addresses an important reservation about the role of the creative industry. It signals discontent with the imposition of the terminology and its implications through international organizations. At the same time, the need to come up with a Ghanaian understanding of the global discourse is equally strong. This critical engagement with the concept is however exceptional. Commonly, the term is used for advocacy, rather than critically to understand existing processes, as a close reading of policy texts revealed. If advocacy is based on the uncritical adoption of terminology, ‘policies’ and ‘solutions’ are likely to be transferred without sufficient attention to the culturally contingent context where this policy is implemented. Since there is evidence that policy transfer is ineffective (Pratt 2009), such practices should be avoided. This does not mean that there can be no mutual leaning, but it means that exchange of ideas and practices should build on a critical reflexive understanding of what this globalized debate means in particular contexts.

² Personal interview with Ghanaian stakeholder in Accra, 7 July 2013.
The creative economy as a globalized discourse can be seen as a *Rorschach blot* \(^3\) (Cunningham 2009), since it is a concept that can be read in a variety of ways. But, the involvement of international agencies in sharing technical expertise largely remains framed in a Western understanding of the cultural industries. When someone is reading along over your shoulder, pointing out what to see in a Rorschach blot, it is difficult to develop your own culturally contingent understanding. In this context, the influence of France in Burkina Faso (through the *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*), and of Britain in Ghana (through the *British Council*) is clear. The focus here is on aspects of continuity and change in the process of developing cultural industries. This development is simultaneously a discursive, normative and practical project. The question is not: *should* there be cultural industries? The question is: *what kind* of cultural industries should be initiated or supported, for whom and by whom?

### 1.2. A range of literature on a common theme

The literature on the creative economy, much like the debate, exists at different levels and fields. The current academic debate on the role of cultural industries for development is not a mono-disciplinary matter. It is an issue that many disciplines engage with in critically supportive ways. Due to this fragmentation, the connection between critical academic research and policy-making is even weaker than in most fields, largely because a range of consultant-cum-academics align very closely with global policy debates. This does not mean that such a policy-oriented dialogue is necessarily problematic. But, while policy has gone global, critical research is lagging

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\(^3\) The inkblot test (also called the “Rorschach” test) is a method of psychological evaluation. Psychologists use this test in an attempt to examine the personality characteristics and emotional functioning of their patients. This test is often employed in diagnosing underlying thought disorders and differentiating psychotic from non-psychotic thinking in cases where the patient is reluctant to openly admit to psychotic thinking. Cunningham uses this as a metaphor for the versatility of the ‘creative economy’ as a concept that can be ‘read’ in a variety of ways.
behind, particularly beyond Europe, Australia, North America and increasingly also China. There is some literature that links cultural industries to development (Stuppes 2014; De Beukelaer 2012; Da Costa 2010; Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright 2008b; H. Anheier and Isar 2008; Radcliffe and Laurie 2006; Sen 2004a; Hermet 2000; Laaser 1997; Kovács 2008; Pratt 2014), but these remain dispersed across disciplines and are limited in their overall scope. The existing critical engagement with the link between culture, policy and development can advance the debate significantly. Particularly the link between cultural industries and human development merits attention. The following paragraphs address the ways different disciplines and fields explicitly and implicitly focus on the cultural industries.

Cultural policy studies built on a strong tradition of social criticism in cultural studies since the second half of the 20th century by Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, among others. While cultural studies focus more on providing critique cultural policy studies engages more explicitly with the policy implications of such critique (Bennett 1998). This shift gave way to a range of voices in the way this could be done (e.g. McGuigan 2003; Lewis and Miller 2003; Miller and Yúdice 2002). There are different approaches within cultural policy studies ranging from social (Belfiore and Bennett 2008), economic (Throsby 2010), and political (O’Brien 2014; Hesmondhalgh et al. 2014). All, however, are disciplines with a strong focus on Western European and Australian contexts.

Scholars writing about the link between culture and development respond to the need to take culture seriously in development thinking and practice. This ‘cultural turn’ in development thinking calls to take into account culturally contingent practices such as traditions, frames of thought and socio-cultural organization and to pay explicit attention to culture for development (Kovács 2008, 99). This is a challenge that seems to remain as big today as it was when the World Commission on Culture and Development launched their key report at the end of the UN decade for culture and development (WCCD 1996). Scholarly engagement with the topic has increased over the last decade (Nederveen Pieterse 2010; Radcliffe 2006a; Walton and Rao 2004; Schech and Haggis 2000; Hermet 2000). Yet, ‘culture and development’ which exists at the crossroads of development studies and
development anthropology remained largely focused on developing countries. In this context, culture is most often understood in the anthropological sense and not as creative artistic expression. This framework is thus useful to understand cultural industries initiatives even though it does not engage with them explicitly.

The creative economy debate has a long history. The term finds its origins in the critical Frankfurt School approach to the “Kulturindustrie” as mass deception in the 1940s (Adorno 2001). But the current use is very detached from the origins of ideological critique. The start of this shift lies in the adoption of a more optimistic, less elitist and altogether more pragmatic empirical engagement with the politics of cultural production from the 1970s onwards. Pioneering scholars considered the politics and economics of cultural production without dismissing critique, or embracing the concept as unproblematic (Miège 1987; Miège 1979; Girard 1982). This allowed for a greater focus on the problems and challenges within the realm of cultural production, rather than merely criticising the politics of commercial culture (Hesmondhalgh 2013). Since the 1990s a celebratory twist has changed the debate once more. The shift from cultural to creative industries opened up the range of activities counted as part of the sector (Garnham 2005; Tremblay 2011) that allowed for far grander claims concerning the role of culture and creativity in post-industrial societies (Landry 2000; Howkins 2002; Florida 2002). The recent optimism is of greater influences on the global debate than earlier critical scholarship, which did not dismiss potential, but addressed challenges in a constructive way. This means that critical approaches are now more external to the debate than at the core of it, as was the case until the rise of the ‘creative economy’ concept.

Human development and capabilities form an approach within development studies that rejects economic growth and average income as the sole indicator of development. The argument is that, while the economy is important, the more crucial quest in development is increasing the capability of people to expand their “real freedoms” (Sen 1999, 3) and respond to questions such as: “What are people actually able to do and be? What opportunities are available to them?” (Nussbaum 2011, x). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) builds on this rationale to develop
its Human Development Indicators, even if this approach reduces development to three proxies: economy, health and education. By including health and education in the debate, countries are gently forced to adapt their policies, because these sectors do not necessarily improve through economic growth (Nussbaum 2011, ix). Overall, the human development approach shows little explicit engagement with culture in general and barely any engagement with cultural expressions. Where UNDP explicitly engages with culture (UNDP 2004), it remains largely in an ethnocentric way (Nederveen Pieterse 2005; Telleria 2014). While the creative economy reports explicitly refer to human development (e.g. UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, 4; UNCTAD and UNDP 2010, 10; UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 11), there is hardly any engagement with cultural expressions in general, or cultural industries in particular, in human development debates. This study aims to change that.

That is why this text consistently uses the following terms to refer to the different elements of the ‘capabilities’ approach that forms the basis of human development. ‘Entitlements’ are those inalienable human rights we should all be able to claim. ‘Capabilities’ signal the extent to which we are able to claim these entitlements. The ‘realization’ of these capabilities is the result of our capabilities at work, it is what some would call results, or simply ‘development.’ They are called ‘realizations’ because they refer to the shift from normative theory to lived experience.

Lastly, ethnographical approaches to cultural practice in developing countries often engage explicitly with the tension between culture and economy in artistic and creative production (e.g. Shipley 2013; Plageman 2012; Charry 2012; Perullo 2011; Boateng 2011; Larkin 2008; Collins 1996; Wallis and Malm 1984). This field makes a connection between cultural industries and development. The disciplinary focus and terminology favours socio-cultural understanding of these processes over policy implications. Ethnomusicology, as such, resembles cultural studies as discussed above: it is rich in empirical detail, analysis and critique, but falls short in linking this to pragmatic policy debates. This limitation is however helpful, since it renders these texts useful to provide further understanding in the effect of previous policies (see Perullo, 2011) and contemporary processes of entrepreneurship and value creation (see Shipley 2013).
The problem with existing literature that engages with the cultural industries for development debate is dispersed across different academic disciplines that do not sufficiently interact. Each field provides valuable contributions to the debate, but the limited interaction between these approaches limits exchange and interaction.

1.3. Research questions

The notion of ‘creative economy’ now informs both cultural and development policies around the world, but there is little clarity on what this means exactly. How does the cultural and creative industries discourse influence the relation between culture and (human) development in Burkinabè and Ghanaian cultural policies and development plans? What does this discourse, including its variations mean precisely? And, most importantly, what should it mean to develop cultural industries?

First, at a conceptual level, the link between cultural industries and development implicitly counts as a pragmatic response to the culture and development debate. Precisely because the inclusion of culture in development thinking is not straightforward, such attempts have largely remained an abstract and theoretical contemplation, particularly in mainstream development thinking. The current creative economy debate allegedly merges these trends (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP 2010; UNESCO and UNDP 2013) and has the merit of providing an economic justification to engage culture in development. But, how do the cultural industries fit in the historical link between culture and development, which dates back at least to the 18th century? What does the general uptake of the creative economy debate mean for the continuity in thinking about culture and development?

Second, at the level of cultural practice, there is a disjuncture between the use and understanding of the creative economy discourse, as the quote of the Ghanaian stakeholder above illustrates. What does it mean that the discourse is used so widely, but that most people see existing practice as merely ‘embryonic’ or ‘emerging’? What particular difficulties does this pose for the use of the creative economy discourse in policy and practice?
Third, existing interventions to support developing cultural industries mostly build on a superficial understanding of existing practices on the one hand, and implicitly aim to change those practices according to an orthodox (i.e. Western) notion of what the cultural industries should be. How can supporting initiatives retain an openness to share ideas and learn, without dismissing the practices that do actually work? How can these initiatives actively aim for human development goals instead of seeing them as a by-product of economic growth? And, what is the role of existing, heterodox practices that exist beyond the economistic rationale of the creative economy?

Finally, while cultural industries exist in Burkina Faso and Ghana, they remain largely 'in the making' in terms of conceptual understanding (what are the cultural industries, and how does this term relate to existing practices?), in terms of normative basis (what should the cultural industries be?) and in terms of pragmatic intervention (how can the cultural industries be supported or developed?). When it comes to policy, the question remains: how can these different considerations be reconciled? And, what kind of a policy approach can take into account the complex history of cultural practice through existing (and future) academic approaches that explore how culture and development can be linked?

The competing historical, conceptual, normative and practical considerations need to be considered together: “development is too complex to allow partial approaches to have their way – although these lend themselves to technical finesse and managerial intervention, the managerial fiction of knowledge and mastery itself is part of the problem” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010, xvii). Developing cultural industries is a layered process, with human development as its ultimate goal, cultural policy as a framework, with culture and development as a guiding principle. Only when these different layers find each other, can the cultural industries be a basis for a socially inclusive project that help to articulate and provide a voice in an economically viable way.
1.4. Approach

The approach in this research aims to critically link the global creative economy debate to policies, initiatives and practices at a national level. The global side primarily builds on the recent creative economy reports (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP 2010; UNESCO and UNDP 2013) but also brings in earlier policy documents (UNESCO 1982a; OAU and UNESCO 1992; African Union 2005; UNESCO 2005a) and scholarly debate (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright 2008b; Hesmondhalgh 2013; Flew 2013). The current focus of policies and reports remains too much on what should be attained as opposed to what exists and how the existing context can be transformed.

In order to connect the global debate with its uptake in policy, this study engages explicitly with the Burkinabè and Ghanaian contexts. Their national policies include development plans (SCADD 2010; NDPC 2010) and cultural policies (MCTC 2008; NCC 2004). The particular initiatives under scrutiny are mechanisms that aim to support music industries. The conceptual focus is on the cultural and creative industries as a discourse, but the empirical engagement (chapters 3-4) builds on the music industries, spanning the formal and the informal, the commercial and the not-for-profit, the big and the small. The focus here is on music industries in the plural (Williamson and Cloonan 2007; Sterne 2014), because the scope is much broader than the recording industry.

In Burkina Faso, two linked projects serve as a departure. On the one hand ARPEM, a music industries support programme between the Burkinabè Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the French NGO Culture et Développement, and ACP Cultures (the EU-ACP support programme for cultural industries in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries). ARPEM ran from 2009 to 2012 and provided training for 60 entrepreneurs, created a documentation centre, and mapped musical activity in Ouagadougou.

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ARPIC\textsuperscript{5} is formally a different project, since the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) now funds it. The project continued the work started under ARPEM with the same team, on the same location and with largely the same aims. The major difference is that ARPIC also focuses on book publishing, performing arts and audio-visual production. This project runs from 2012 until 2015 and served as an embedded research basis for ethnographic work. In Ghana, the initiative under scrutiny is the collaboration between MUSIGA (the musicians union) and the British Council. They jointly organized training sessions for (aspiring) music professionals. The Ghanaian initiative is not as structured, long and formalized as those in Burkina Faso, but equally provides insight in the ways emerging music industries are supported through local initiatives with international partners.

In terms of practices, this study explores the work, challenges and aims of aspiring and more established music industries workers and entrepreneurs. The focus is on the space between the symbolic and the economic. The stress is on the processes of engagement to develop music industries over the symbolic messages and socio-economic impact of these industries.

The research method used combines a close reading of policy documents with an ethnographic approach. Textual analysis helps gain an understanding about the connection between global debates and national policies. By then connecting these policies to initiatives and practices using participant observation it is possible to provide a clear overview of existing practices and obstacles. Using semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the sector further reinforces this method. This study explicitly links a concern with cultural policy and culture as forms of life in order to explore ways to change “the social within the social” (Willis and Trondman 2002, 398).

The engagement with policy documents serves to detect the emergence of the creative economy discourse in cultural and development policy, to understand the aims and goals of policy texts by carrying out a textual critique on how they are phrased. The ethnographic engagement with the

\textsuperscript{5} Appui au Renforcement des Politiques et Industries Culturelles: \url{http://www.arpic-bf.org/} (accessed 12 February 2013).
translation of these practices is more important. Participant observation of music industries in Ouagadougou and Accra took place during eight months in 2013 (five months in Ouagadougou from January to May and then again, August to September and three months in Accra from May to August). These periods of observation were aimed to “describe what happens, how the people involved see and talk about their own actions and those of others, the contexts in which the action takes place, and what follows from it” (Hammersley and Atkinson 2010, 7). This resulted in over 75 semi-structured interviews that provide detailed insight in the strategic adoption and contestation of the creative economy discourse. At the same time, this allowed for participation in festivals, rehearsals, studio visits, debates, training sessions, formal meetings and most of all, informal encounters. All interviews and observations throughout the ethnographic work are anonymized, since they reflect critical evaluations of the initiatives in which interviewees participated. The anonymity allowed respondents to be more open and critical, without compromising their position in the sector or future participation in similar initiatives.

The locus of research is restricted to the capital cities: Ouagadougou and Accra. This reflects the shifts away from predominantly national interventions to an increasingly urban focus (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 33). Yet, in Burkina Faso and Ghana, policies remain largely national in focus, in spite of some existing local initiatives. The municipality of Ouagadougou has been a driver of Reemdoogo, the Garden of Music in the popular neighbourhood Gounghin. This initiative houses a 400-seat open-air stage, music rehearsal spaces and conference facility. The ARPEM programme grew out of the realization that this space, while popular and useful, did not respond to the economic needs of the music industries in the city. Similarly, the Accra Culture and Arts Network, an on-going civil society action, attempts to raise its profile as a cultural city.

Finally, this study engages with the working of the cultural industries within Burkina Faso and Ghana. While global debates on cultural imperialism

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6 This report can be complimented by quotes and descriptions based on these same interviews and observations, provided in the authors PhD dissertation that covers a similar topic of discussion. (De Beukelaer forthcoming).
(Tomlinson 1991) or homogenization of cultural expressions in the context of globalization (Robertson 1992; Singh 2011) remain important, they address mainly the impact of the international flow of cultural expressions, with less attention to the contexts of production in particular countries.

1.5. Scope

This study thinks broadly and narrowly. The narrow focus is on the situation in Ouagadougou and Accra. The particularities of these countries serve as examples to simultaneously build and illustrate the argument. The broader aim is to ask questions that can be asked anywhere. While these questions will obviously yield different answers around the world, they help to understand and critically reflect on the use of the hegemonic creative economy discourse.

At times, examples from other African countries help support the arguments outlined in this research. This is because there is insufficient literature to build the argument exclusively on the particular cases of Burkina Faso and Ghana, and similar tendencies can be identified across the continent. This does not mean that this study is about Africa. While the focus is on two African countries, which makes it by definition ‘African’, these findings do not necessarily count for the rest of the continent; at least not any more than a study of Portugal and Greece would count for all of Europe.

While Burkina Faso and Ghana are generally referred to as ‘developing’ countries, the focus here is not cultural industries in ‘developing’ countries. This is for three main reasons. First, the division has become out-dated, if not useless; since ‘developing’ countries that do well are now called ‘emerging’, and so-called ‘developed’ countries are in ‘crisis,’ and ‘Africa’ is ‘rising’ (Cornwall 2007; Nothias 2014; Neuwirth 2013; De Beukelaer 2014a). Second, a simple dichotomy undermines the empirical approach that sees both Burkina Faso and Ghana as just two countries with particular policies and initiatives embedded in culturally contingent histories. Third, such a division negates that all countries are in fact developing. Yet, the quest for fulfilling lives is nowhere near finished:
Development knowledge is increasingly relevant also in the north. The conventional distinction between developed and developing societies is less and less relevant – the “south” is in the “north” and vice versa. With the decline of welfare economies there is an increasing polarization within countries on account of shrinking public services. Social inclusion is nowadays a problem that is common to north and south, east and west. (Nederveen Pieterse 2010, 4)

As such, two competing approaches must be rejected. On the one hand, developing countries are not special cases that deserve a different treatment. On the other hand, there is also not a universal economic logic that will solve the issues at hand. The argument advanced here is that history matters, and so does culture. But the categorical divide of countries in two groups – even though there is no consensus where to draw the line between them – is not useful in any way. If ‘development’ is used, it should be as the deliberate and critical process of intervention into livelihoods, and not merely as a discursive division between allegedly ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries.

This report reflects and asks questions about the globalized creative economy discourse; it aims to be a guideline to unpack the contradictions and challenges of this term in the broader debate on culture and development. The message is reflexive and explorative and is not intended to prescribe certain choices or actions. It is a work that links a number of large questions in the debate and is necessarily driven by theories and conceptual debates. Yet it should not be a luxury to think and reflect on what is going on and what should be done. This does not mean that reflection and abstract engagement needs to be an esoteric activity (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, 48), but rather that research is a human right that should be widely practiced, because it is vital to have the “right to the tools through which any citizen can systematically increase the stock of knowledge that they consider vital to their survival as human beings and to their claims as citizens” (Appadurai 2013, 270). The aim here is to facilitate the process of making choices about what the cultural industries should be and what kind of development they are meant to foster.
1.6. Chapter outline

The remainder of this report is organized in four chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter 2 provides a historical outlook on the conceptual relation between ‘culture’ and ‘development’ in relationship to the cultural industries. This chapter makes three connected points. First, it shows how culture and development grew alongside each other, into conflicting and conflating notions. Second, it makes the case that thinking about ‘culture and development’ is not the same as thinking about ‘cultural industries for development.’ Third, it argues that the categorical division of developed and developing countries no longer holds. This opposition leaves insufficient leeway to discuss the real issues that prevail around the world and generates a discursive power relation that does little justice to the globally intertwined realities that can only be captured in many shades of gray, not just black and white. The tension between copyright and piracy illustrates how developing cultural industries can be at odds with cultural practices.

Chapter 3 addresses the limitations of the optimistic creative economy discourse on the ‘potential’ of the sector for development. It shows how stakeholders superficially understand the discourse in Burkina Faso and Ghana, while embracing it for strategic purposes. The chapter argues that a better understanding of the meaning of the creative economy discourse and its diverse iterations is needed to advance the debate and to include a broader group of stakeholders in the debate.

Chapter 4 focuses on existing efforts and initiatives to develop cultural industries through the lens of the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. The guiding principles here are: political participation, transparency guarantees, economic facilities, social opportunity and education, providing a selective reading of the capabilities approaches they have each developed (Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2011; Nussbaum 2012). The main argument is that the existing workshops and trainings for the cultural industries are simply not enough. They reduce the need for cultural citizenship to the need for practical entrepreneurship and legal training. The challenge for the cultural industries is not simply a problem of individuals. It
is a challenge that also exists at social and institutional levels. Working with capabilities, instead of skills or capacities, can help overcome this challenge.

Chapter 5 provides a theoretical framework to reconsider the links between culture and cultural industries in relation to human development. It stresses the diversity of cultural production as a basis for a variety of models of cultural industries. This provides a basis to reconsider human development as a circular process that can accommodate historical and cultural contingencies in the current development debate. This allows for two much-needed alterations in thinking and practice. First, change is mostly incremental, and not radical. Cultural (and other) policies will make small interventions in large processes. Second, the aim is not to attain normative perfection (that is, being completely ‘developed’), but to establish a framework for constant renegotiation of the aims and the means of societal change. The cultural context is thus both dynamic and stable. Changes, big or small, change can turn the circle into a vicious or a virtuous cycle.

The conclusion, chapter 6, provides a brief overview of the key findings and policy implications of this report.
Some concepts have long and troubled histories. Often, such histories are simplified to better make an argument. While doing so, much of the historical and spatial complexities and contradictions are lost in translation. This chapter makes the case that both ‘development’ and ‘culture’ are such concepts and argues that their history extends well beyond existing introductions to cultural industries in relation to development.

The path dependency of thinking about culture and development should be more explicit, because continuous historical shifts in the use of these terms transformed their meaning. Culture has been instrumentalized in development thinking in multiple ways throughout history (Nederveen Pieterse 2010, 76). The creative economy debate is not a break with this, but a clear continuation in the form of a strategic reconfiguration that builds on the existing discourse with a different meaning. This chapter stresses that a detailed historical understanding of culture and development forms the basis to understanding the current relationship between cultural industries and human development. The current meaning of development (i.e. socio-economic ‘progress’) has origins in its use after WWII. Prior to this, the term had a different meaning and it was used in different contexts. This

7 Path dependency refers to the complex influence of history on contemporary issues and debates without being deterministic about the way the past influences the future.
chapter shows that locating the link between culture and development in a broader historical perspective helps to understand how the creative economy discourse does and does not fit the present-day use of the term. Hence the questions: how do the cultural industries fit in the historical link between culture and development, which dates back at least to the 18th century, even if this was in a rather different paradigm? What does the general uptake of the creative economy debate mean for the continuity in thinking about culture and development?

It may seem contradictory that a call for a path-dependent understanding of culture and development in Burkina Faso and Ghana is located in the Western intellectual genealogy of these terms. Yet the aim of this chapter is to illustrate how the history of these concepts has influenced their contemporary understanding and illustrates the need for greater interaction between cultural studies and development studies.

2.1. The long histories of development and culture

The table below provides an overview of general tendencies discussed in this chapter. The aim is to illustrate historical changes and shifts rather than to highlight linkages. This chapter discusses in greater detail these linkages.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CULTURE</th>
<th>DEVELOPMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>18th Century</strong></td>
<td>Civilization (Eurocentric Teleology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entwicklung (Moser)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>19th Century</strong></td>
<td>Romanticism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evolutionism (Social Darwinism)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1850s</strong></td>
<td>Culture as Racial Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonial Economics (Trusteeship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1890s-1930s</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catching Up (Classical Political Economy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1940s</strong></td>
<td>Culture Industry (Adorno and Horkheimer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development Thinking (Truman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1950s</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1960s</strong></td>
<td>Post-Colonial Nation-Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependency (Neo-Marxism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1970s</strong></td>
<td>Industries Culturelles (Miège, Huet, Morin, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative Development (Basic Needs Approach)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early 1980s</strong></td>
<td>Cultural Industries and Policies (UNESCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structural Adjustment (Neoliberalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Late 1980s</strong></td>
<td>Culture and Development (WCCD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Development (Sen, UNDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainable Development (Brundlandt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990s</strong></td>
<td>Creative Industries (Australia, UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Development (Escobar, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000s</strong></td>
<td>Creative City, Economy, and Class (Landry, Howkins, Florida)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MDGs (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005</strong></td>
<td>Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO Convention)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008-10</strong></td>
<td>Creative Economy: International Trade (UNCTAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2013</strong></td>
<td>Creative Economy: Humanistic (UNESCO)</td>
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*Source:* The author, the section on ‘development’ partly builds on Nederveen Pieterse (2010).
2.2. Industrialization, enlightenment and romanticism

Gustavo Esteva (2010), alongside other critical development scholars, argues that development generally means the unfolding of the inherent potential of a thing or an organism towards its full form. This goes through three stages: an insufficient initial state, a state where the actual development takes place, and the final stage where development is attained, and the object has become developed. In the 18th century, this term was mostly used to refer to biological processes. Yet, throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries, this term transformed in meaning continuously. In the work of social historian Justus Moser, *Entwicklung* (German word meaning development) referred to processes of social change. Johann Gottlieb Herder advanced this thinking later that century by providing a link between historical changes and theories of nature: “Historical development was the continuation of natural development, according to him; and both were just variants of the homogeneous development of the cosmos, created by God” (Esteva 2010, 4).

Development gained a more reflexive use around 1800. Over the course of several centuries, the pre-eminence of religion faded in philosophical and practical thought. This, in turn, created the philosophical possibility for human self-determination. Development was the term that was used to stress that change is the result of human intervention, which replaced a religious understanding of the world. This approach culminated in the work of Karl Marx, who bridged the “Hegelian concept of history and the Darwinist concept of evolution” (Esteva 2010, 4). The term soon became commonplace in political thinking, and “the industrial mode of production […] became the definition of the terminal stage of a uni-linear way of social evolution” (Esteva 2010, 4). Industrialization and development have thus been intertwined from the early history of the concept development onwards, particularly since development served as a reaction, or solution, to the ills of industrialization. In the 19th century, the term can be equated with the idea of progress and catching up (Nederveen Pieterse 2010, 7). This resulted in a conceptualization of time as progress, of progress as linear change, and of linear change as the way towards modernity (see, Dussel 1993; Quijano 2007).
This meaning transformed further under the full colonial expansion at the turn of the 20th century. Yet, only “when the British government transformed its Law of Development of the Colonies into the Law of Development and Welfare of the Colonies in 1939” (Esteva 2010, 5) did the magnitude of the shift during the 1920-30s interbellum become apparent. From this time onwards, the development of the territories should not only serve exports and trade, but also the general well-being of the ‘natives.’ The term, however, remained forward-looking and continued to echo the optimistic spirit of modernity, without the explicit negation (under-development) that would become more common after WWII. It does, however, encompass a paternalistic tone that both claims cultural superiority and scientific domination over the colonized subjects. Not only colonial thinking, but also economic thinking had a lasting impact beyond independence: “industrialization was not a part of colonial economics, because the comparative advantage of the colonies was held to be the export of raw materials for the industries in metropolitan countries” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010, 6). Development provided a frame of thought and action in response to the social ills that resulted from industrialization and was thus rather uncritically transferred to colonial (and later post-colonial) contexts. The social ills under colonialism, however, lay not in rapid industrialization and the concomitant social transformation, but in exploitation, slavery, racism, and the naive arrogance enshrined in the “white man’s burden” (Easterly 2006).

The use of the term ‘culture’ dates back much further than the term ‘development;’ it has been described as “one of the two or three most difficult words in the English language” by Raymond Williams (1976, 87). This is both because of its historical transformation across European languages and its multiple meanings in a variety of ways and contexts today. In Williams’ account, culture primarily referred to cultivation or tending, as described in

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8 The ‘White Man’s Burden’ refers to a poem with that name by Rudyard Kipling from 1899, in which he discusses the burden of the White colonizer or imperialist to ‘help’ poor and colored colonized. While this aphorism was key to the late 19th century Zeitgeist, it is now seen as an illustration of the arrogance and ignorance enshrined in racial hierarchy.
the works of Cicero. Later, it referred to honour and worship in medieval times. By the early 15th century, the term had come to mean “husbandry, the tending of natural growth” (1976, 87). Throughout its early uses, culture referred to processes of looking after animals or crops. This gradually “extended to a process of human development” (1976, 87) alongside earlier uses. In the early 17th century, culture found its use as a metaphor for growth in thoughts and minds through the works of More, Hobbes and Bacon. The transformation of the term into an independent noun did not gain importance until the late 18th and early 19th century. The French use of the term remained in conjunction with the cultivation of something until the 18th century, when the term started to be used more or less interchangeably with civilization.

Around this period Kultur made its way into the German language (Williams 1976, 88–9), and “became the name of the Romantic, pre-Marxist critique of early industrial capitalism” (Eagleton 2000, 10). Herder, moreover, “attacked the assumption of the universal histories that ‘civilization’ or ‘culture’ – the historical self-development of humanity – was what we would now call a unilinear process, leading to the high and dominant point on 18th century European culture” (Williams 1976, 89). In contrast to this evolution, Herder called for the use of culture in the plural: national cultures, historical cultures, and cultures of different social groups. This Romantic pluralism also served as a basis for a cultural hierarchy (Eagleton 2000, 26), which European countries used to justify colonialism (Belfiore and Bennett 2008, 193). Culture counted as the social equivalent of biological evolution; a determinist approach to the hierarchy of human races within the social constellation of colonialism and slave trade (Schech and Haggis 2000, 18). The colonial enterprise thus built on the hierarchical view of different civilizations, which served as a means to justify rather than criticize their actions (see Herder). The use of demeaning terms like savages, barbarians, primitives and so on, also derive from the same notion of culture as a civilization. Yet culture and racial difference also fuelled intra-African animosity and conquest (Reid 2009, 140). At the same time, culture was also tied into the “Romantic anti-colonialist penchant for suppressed ‘exotic’ societies” (Eagleton 2000, 12).
As much as culture can refer to the rich diversity of peoples around the world, the very same term has long been abused to perpetuate artificial inequality. In that regard, culture has much in common with the way the term ‘development’ evolved in the middle of the 20th century. That term too, semantically divided the world in two unequal halves: the rich and the poor, the developed and the under-developed. It is striking that this on-going discursive division of people and their countries occurs along such creative uses of seemingly positively connoted concepts.

A crucial transformation of the term culture remains. Williams (1976, 90) distinguishes three meanings of culture throughout the late 19th century and into the 20th century: first, the human process of “intellectual, spiritual, and artistic development;” second, a certain way of life or constellation of “a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general;” and third, the result of intellectual and artistic pursuits, in the form of creative arts like music, literature, poetry, sculpture, and so on (Williams 1976, 90). This distinction will become increasingly important throughout the rest of this chapter. Particularly the contrast between the second and the third definitions are important: in development studies, culture usually means the former, while in cultural studies (and, by extension industries) it means the latter (De Beukelaer 2012, 21). By that time, culture had also become more a “capacity for new forms of thought, feeling, and behaviour” than a “governmental strategy [aimed] at exacting popular obedience to a sovereign authority” (Bennett 1992, 402).

Throughout Africa in the late 19th and early 20th century, the value of “the custom of the country” (not to say ‘tradition’) lost currency in favour of a future-oriented “modern cultural development” (Soyinka 1985, 554). At the same time, the creation of endogenous cultural expressions suffered from the influx of goods from early colonial trade onwards (Soyinka 1985, 540). The “variety and output of the arts had shrunk by 1935, due to competition from cheap manufactured imports and to a loss of buying power as well as a loss of status by the traditional elites” (Vansina 1999, 586). This influenced the (cultural) education in schools geared towards future civil servants. The early 20th century was also characterized by the imposition of metropolitan languages and Western cultural and societal standards, which strongly
influenced the cultural outlook of assimilated local elites: “the dilemma of the product of the colonial policy of cultural substitution [...] created a wrench in the creative personality of educated Africans” (Soyinka 1985, 563). This resulted in a movement of resistance, négritude, largely led by Césaire, Senghor and Damas, even though this was in fact more the result of interaction with Parisian ‘salons’ than with the discontentment of Africans who were not educated in the Western image (Soyinka 1985, 564).

Development seen as industrialization was in fact a cultural evolution. It signalled the emergence of a new way of life that soon pervaded an ever-increasing realm of human life and society. Yet, culture was also synonymous with romantic longing for another kind of society in response to the disruptive forces of rapid industrialization and later, as a reaction to colonialism in post-colonial (African) states. From the perspective of culture, development as industrialization, referred to merely one way of life, to which many (romanticized) alternatives were imaginable. The link between culture and development is thus neither straightforward nor uncontested. It is clear that seeing culture as the result of industrial processes is, up until the early 20th century, a contradiction in terms. Culture is not yet industrialized, but the Romantic contrast between culture and industry (or development) provides a fertile ground for pessimistic views such as Adorno and Horkheimer articulate later.

2.3. Modernity: makeability and popular culture

The wide embracing of development as a guiding principle in global relations after WWII was meant as a discursive break from colonialism. The change was successful to the extent that the discourse changed very rapidly indeed. The inaugural speech of Harry S. Truman in 1949, serving his second term as President of the USA, was optimistic about the potential to transfer skills and knowledge in order to improve livelihoods around the world. This modernist thinking phrased problem, process and solution in one magical word: development (Truman 1949). Yet this story does not account for the fact that this discourse created a problem in many ways. Colonies became ‘developing’ countries, and its colonized populations
‘underdeveloped’ citizens in need of linear progress towards modernity using the Western image. Countries were not ‘underdeveloped’ before they needed to be ‘developed’. This is not to say that there was no poverty, but it was not a condition that could simply be contrasted to the so-called rich countries. Moreover, in 1949, Europe and Japan were still recovering from WWII and malaria was still endemic in parts of the USA (Esteva, Babones, and Babcicky 2013, 5–6). More strikingly, in that period, the US was a segregated society, where the civil liberties and the social opportunities of African-Americans were actively neglected (Myrdal 1944, in Schech and Haggis 2000, 9–10). The discourse thus mainly served to consolidate the alleged superiority of the former colonial powers and, in particular, the United States (itself a settler colony that had become an imperial power). If anything is to blame for shortcomings in ‘the rest of the world,’ it is the disruptive effect of colonialism, slavery and racism that made some parts of the world developed. The idea that “all societies used to be poor” (Collier 2007, 5) became, and remains, commonly accepted. The common historical assertion builds on a very narrow understanding of poverty and provides a strong teleological outlook on progress: economic growth is the solution. The strongest subtext of development thus became economic, in spite of anthropological contestation from authors such as Sahlins (1968) who argues that the so-called ‘poor’ and ‘primitive’ people are the “original affluent society.” Economization of development thinking is not devoid of ideology. In light of the Cold War, there was a need to stress the possibility to attain the same wealth and comfort as the USA. In this context Hollywood served as a vehicle to spread the American dream as a global objective. The economic focus was also standardized by state accounting systems that allowed for a universal indicator: gross domestic product. Simon Kuznets developed the indicator in the 1930s for the US Department of Commerce. And by the early 1950s, the accounting method was used across the world to measure development. This economistic approach culminated in a teleological and technocratic approach to development, where several stages should be followed, if only to contain communism (Rostow 1960).

The break Truman instigated was however primarily discursive. The world did not change overnight. And the focus in education and
administration rapidly shifted from colonial civil servants to development practitioners, both from the newly independent nations around the world and for missionaries, mercenaries, and misfits from (formerly) colonial powers (Stirrat 2008). Moreover, people previously engaged in colonial administration often became teachers at ‘development’ programmes at universities established in the middle of the 20th century (Kothari 2005, 57). Initially these departments grew out of institutes for colonial administration. While development thinking constitutes a continuation of colonial processes through people, institutions and power relations, there was a shift towards a greater diversity of actors (Kothari 2005, 63), and this diversity has only increased in the past decades. The study of development, as a scholarly endeavour, remains a field to which theories of other fields like sociology, political science and particularly economics are applied, whereas the field rarely influences other social sciences in return. Development studies remains a field that does not have a very high status in the academic pecking order, given its engagement with the practical implications of the work done (Clammer 2012, 4; Nederveen Pieterse 2010, 2). Parallel to the rise of development as an academic discipline, scholarly interest in and beyond post-colonial states in local affairs and languages increased steadily (Sow and Abdulaziz 1999, 549).

Since the 1950s, “development implies intentional social change in accordance with societal objectives” (Hettne 2008, 6). This understanding is no less ambiguous than it is crucial. It presumes that ‘developed’ nations hold the solution to ‘develop’ the ‘under-developed’ countries through technical cooperation. The normative implications of this understanding were initially not questioned, and its contestation remains beyond the mainstream. Yet, three major characteristics of early development thinking are no longer common: first, the “essentialism of the ‘Third World’ and its inhabitants as homogenous entities;” second, the unconditional belief in the concept of progress and the makeability of society;” and third, “the importance of the (nation-)state as an analytical frame of reference” and as a central force to generate change (Schuurman 2000, 8).

Similar to the change in thinking about 'development' and the concomitant narrowing of the concept to an expedient and politicized notion,
culture also took on another meaning in the second half of the 20th century. Building on the existing opposition between development-as-industrialization and culture as a romantic and elitist counter-narrative, Adorno and Horkheimer (2008) advanced a strong critique of the rise of ‘mass’ culture in society, by introducing the term ‘culture industry’ in 1947. This term, in the singular, served as a radical critique on the colonizing logic of capitalism that had rapidly influenced the practice and understanding of cultural production. In this context, culture was no longer the antipode to industrialization and development, or simply a divisive factor between the colonizer and the colonized. Culture also became increasingly subsumed into the industrializing logic it formerly set out to counter in response to the industrial revolution. At the level of cultural critique, this argument held up for several decades. The next section addresses the fundamental oversight of this critique.

In mid-20th century, Europe saw the rise of social-democratic cultural policies with Britain and France leading the way towards the elevation of the general public through engagement with high culture. These policies did not engage with the cultural industries as such, as they were explicitly devised to allow access to “high culture” by the masses that had previously been excluded, in social and economic terms, from the aesthetic accomplishments of their societies (Girard 1982, 24–5).

Culture was also used as a guiding element in the post-colonial nation building across former colonies (Vansina 1999, 600–5; Plageman 2012, 147–82). Leopold Senghor in Senegal, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, and Sékou Touré in Guinea are clear examples of the way cultural expressions served as a way to bridge the multitude of ethnic groups through a postcolonial national identity (Collins 2009, 94). This often included an explicit appeal to a pan-African identity that linked cultural identity to political aims of African unity, thus serving as a “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai 2013, 179–95). There was significant state-sponsored patronage for the arts in some – but certainly not all – newly independent states. Orchestras played in nightclubs, bands toured locally and internationally with presidents and virtually all branches of public service had their own bands.
Towards the end of this era, the work of early cultural studies scholars like Raymond Williams (1957) and Richard Hoggart (1957) addressed the need to take the cultural expressions of the working classes seriously by making links between culture and power more explicit. Yet, in Burkina Faso or Ghana, mass culture did not have the strictly negative connotation it had among the European cultural elites. Even though ‘academic’ artists, creating a form of African modern art in dialogue with European art theory, remained closer to the elites, even though heads of state like Nkrumah primarily worked with artists from the newly urbanized ‘intermediary’ class (Collins 2009, 93–4). The early cultural industries were thus taken seriously in terms of their symbolic value.

In economic terms, the cultural industries were generating income thanks to the high propensity of live music, with musicians playing numerous concerts in different bands (Plageman 2012; Collins 1996). Notwithstanding the relative success of the cultural industries in this era the term ‘cultural industries’ was not explicitly used. The ideological critique advanced by Adorno and Horkheimer has little to say about (post-) colonial contexts, and has seen little adoption beyond the West. But artists moved easily between the realms of ‘high’ (or ‘academic’) and ‘low’ popular culture in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Commoditized culture was primarily geared to local elites (in the case of ‘academic’ culture) and tourists (in the case of ‘airport’ art, i.e. mass-produced objects that aim to pass as ‘traditional’ arts for tourists, see Vansina [1999, 587–92]), leaving little explicit attention to the socio-economic dynamics of cultural production for large local audiences.

Since cultural expressions were primarily conveyed through live performance (mainly music), state-owned media (radio and television), or other expensive supported activities (such as cinema) there was little incentive to engage with copyright legislation and regulation, all the more because recorded music was not easy to duplicate and pirating records was

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9 For example the success of Ghanaian highlife, Congolese rumba and Soukous, Nigerian Jùjú that travelled the continent (Vansina 1999, 610; Stapleton and May 1987, 3)

10 The recent book The Postcolonial Cultural Industry (Ponzanesi 2014) has a contribution to make in this regard, drawing links between postcolonial theory and the cultural industries.
not yet the cheap alternative it would become later on. Yet MUSIGA welcomed the adoption of the 1985 copyright law in Ghana, after their insistence that music be regarded as a business (Collins 1992, 260–1).

The link between culture and development in this era is complex and deeply intertwined with the changing geopolitical reality. Development serves as a versatile concept that both divides the world into developed and underdeveloped, and presents development itself as a way out of this opposition. This discourse is on the surface technocratic, as the solution to the underdevelopment of more than half of the world’s population is framed as the transfer of knowledge, skills and practices from the developed world. This discourse also implicitly argued that developing countries should build on ‘the dreams of others’ as a way forward. The solution thus became coterminous with the export of ideas and practices of capitalist modernity. At the same time, in the West, there was increasing opposition to the extension of economic and rational logics in the realm of cultural production. This critical pessimism did not travel to post-colonial states, where culture, in state-sponsored and market forms, became part of the imagination of national unity and an independent future:

_African societies, once again, are the masters of their own destinies, and they find the dreams and metaphors, the arts, which express their complex aspirations. The arts are new, because they mirror the new Africa. (Vansina 1999, 632)_

When culture was explicitly linked to the logic of thinking about development, the term was used as an abstract category and not artistic expression (Clammer 2012; Arizpe 2004).

In development thinking, the high-modernist notion of progress was prominent; the culture industry was used as a term to contest the application of that logic to the realm of culture. The next section shows that this opposition was – although pervasive – largely misguided: both the linear understanding of development as progress, and the pessimistic understanding of culture as industry were at odds with the complex realities these concepts tried to help understand.
Culture and development, as concepts, have continued to evolve. By the end of the 1970s, clear tendencies influenced both concepts in different ways. On the one hand, development became increasingly contested, leading to greater complexity in the understanding of the term and greater ideological struggles over the kind of development that should be aimed for. Culture, on the other hand, changed in meaning and importance at two disparate levels. In historical and social sciences, including development studies, a “cultural turn” emerged (Bonnell and Hunt 1999), signalling the need to engage more actively and critically with culture in academic pursuits. In cultural studies the pessimistic view of the culture industry that influenced scholarship for decades was debunked, yet its approach remains indebted to the Frankfurt School (Adorno 1975). This section addresses the details of these evolutions, while addressing the ways they overlap.

In the late 1970s, development shifted from a near-exclusive focus on economic growth as a lever of poverty eradication to the Basic Needs Approach, which aims to alleviate the most basic needs of those most in need. At the same time, UNESCO started promoting the notion of endogenous development. This was built on a thorough critique of the initial technocratic understanding of development, which presupposed that solutions to societal issues could be transferred from one locale to another. The increasing understanding that culture is not a problem that has to be overcome in the face of modernity, but that it is a building block in all societies and for all people, became more or less accepted.

In the 1980s, explicit pro-poor, culturally considerate approaches quickly lost ground as the spirit of structural adjustment changed the donor-driven development agenda. This ideological shift resulted in increasing conditions attached to aid packages. Countries with balance-of-trade shortages would only qualify for loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) if they would comply with their structural adjustment programs (SAPs). In practical terms, this meant the undoing of hard-fought accomplishments from previous decades (e.g. Federici, Caffentzis, and Alidou 2000). Public education, health, infrastructure and state industries
were dismantled or sold to private investors for a pittance. The logic behind this was that ‘developing’ countries were not considered as a special case; they just needed to get their markets in order and decrease the government’s share in the national economy. In Ghana, structural reform remained detached from the cultural vision of the country, thus failing to offer future narratives that resonated with the context in which they were applied (Hutchful 2002, 235). Interestingly, the structural reforms in Ghana also prompted a revision of the school curricula, cutting arts and culture from state-sponsored primary and secondary school programs (see section 4.6 on education).

At the same time, the considerations advanced by the Club of Rome in the 1970s prompted concerted engagement with the increasing threat of environmental change. This culminated in the report *Our Common Future*, also known as the Brundlandt report, published by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987). The key term to emerge from that report and that continues to resonate today, is ‘sustainability.’ This term initially connoted a normative engagement with the natural environment and intergenerational justice. However, it has now largely become an empty signifier that is used to denote economic sustainability or ‘business as usual.’

The 1980s are called the ‘lost development decade’ because of the negative impact of SAPs on the livelihoods of people. Yet, in spite of mainstream logic on structural reform that was concerned with the *method* of development, there were ample counter-currents that helped rethink the *aims* of development. The pragmatic focus on gross domestic product (GDP), an easily comprehensible number that went up when things go well and down when things go bad, is however increasingly contested. The ideological foundations lost universal appeal (Hicks and Streeten 1979; Fioramonti 2013), yet the linear idea of social and societal progress was hardly called into question. It is not until the 1990s that a major movement of resistance against the very notion of development surfaces. Post-development does exactly that: it questions the ways development has been engineered, it questions the aims of development and it questions the results of decades of development intervention on the lives of those who were to be ‘developed’ (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). In spite of good intentions, this approach was
too strong on critique and too weak on policy engagement to provide a viable alternative.

‘Human development’ is arguably the most successful attempt to break the hegemony of economic growth as a guiding principle of development. This principle formed a critique within the mainstream paradigm of development, primarily making comments in the margins, rather than dismissing the project as a whole. The precise meaning of this approach to development is however obfuscated by the difference in its philosophical foundations and its practical application. The basis of this approach derives from the seminal work of Amartya Sen on famines (Sen 1981). His argument is that during the Bengal food famine of 1943, the biggest issue was not food production, but entitlement. During this famine, food was exported, leaving the undernourished population with a food deficit. While this point does not easily apply to all conditions of famine (de Waal 1990), a new approach to development thinking emerged from the work of Sen.

The human development and capabilities approach proposes that the solution to limited entitlement among disadvantaged people is to increase their real capabilities (or possibilities) in society. Only when people have the social, economic and political means to make their choices can they claim the human development they want. Since 1990, this approach also has a practical application: the Human Development Index (HDI), produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The HDI is an indicator that can be used as an alternative to GDP rankings. It comprises three equally weighted categories: economy (in PPP per capita), education (in a combined measure of adult literacy and primary school enrolment) and health (in life expectancy). As such, there is still a simplified proxy in use to express development, but this UNDP HDI provides a greater incentive to focus on policies that benefit health, school enrolment and literacy alongside economic aims.

In 1993, UNESCO launched the World Commission on Culture and Development, reiterating their earlier commitment at Mondiacult to the role of culture in development processes (UNESCO 1982b). This resulted in *Our Creative Diversity* (WCCD 1996), the Stockholm conference (UNESCO 1998a), and the World Culture Reports (UNESCO 1998b; UNESCO 2000)
with the aim of gaining the same attention for culture as the Brundlandt report managed to generate for sustainability. The latter included were among the first documents to explicitly engage with the cultural industries in ‘developing’ countries.

The pluralism in thinking about development became both more ideological and less preoccupied with Cold War oppositions between capitalism and socialism. Yet, the paradigmatic debates between structural adjustment and basic needs, between human development and post-development, have not yet resolved the problem of development. The initial dualism between developed and developing countries made way for a more layered understanding, where some countries are ‘emerging’ and many developed countries are in ‘crisis’ while poverty rates and inequality are on the rise in the West (Therborn 2013; Standing 2011; Dorling 2010). In other words, while the duality of development thinking – which never made much sense – is almost abandoned, the plight of much of the world’s population remains a challenge for development.

From the late 1970s onwards, a cultural debate also unfolded. French cultural theorists were the first to challenge the Adornian critique on the perceived negative influence of the industrialization of culture (Miège 1979; Girard 1982; Miège 1987). The realization grew that the culture industry thesis was, in spite of its wide use in policy and academia (O’Connor 2011, 27), too radically pessimistic to deal with the empirical understanding of mass culture. The shift to cultural industries in the plural gave way to a more grounded engagement with the positive and negative effects of the spread of commercial culture (O’Connor 2010, 26). The focus shifted from outright critique to critical engagement with the empirical challenges of commercial culture. In this context, “using the term ‘cultural industries’ signals not only an awareness of the problems of the industrialization of culture, but also a refusal to simplify assessment and explanation” (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 25). UNESCO followed suit and joined the changed belief that cultural industries provided a framework to consider the inherent contradictions of commercial cultural production (UNESCO 1982a). In this context, the cultural industries became a realm of politicised, even utopian, political action (O’Connor 2011, 35).
Culture and Development, as a school of thought in development studies remained understood as a way of life at a (sub-national) local level (Nederveen Pieterse 2010, 67), and cultural expressions remained on a second plane, if they were mentioned at all (Schech and Haggis 2000). There was however, active and explicit engagement with cultural expressions. The 1972 World Heritage Convention was one of the first global cultural policies that explicitly engaged with the value of culture (UNESCO 2005b). The Organisation of African Unity subsequently wrote their Charter for Cultural Renaissance (OAU 1976). The debate shifted to a global level with the Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policy (UNESCO 1982b). Early engagement with cultural industries (in the plural) fuelled debate throughout Africa as well. This culminated in the Dakar Plan of Action (OAU and UNESCO 1992) that focuses on the role of cultural industries for development in Africa. It remained more a plan than action. Throughout the decade spanning the publication of the two documents, several regional meetings were held throughout the continent: Conakry (1985), Harare (1988), Antananarivo (1989), and Nairobi (1990). The main aim of the plan is to provide a new framework for policy and action for culture in Africa. This is framed as a response to trade liberalization around the world, through which the “threat of dumping of hazardous foreign cultural expressions” (OAU and UNESCO 1992, 9) had increased. The plan was part of a larger aim to create a single African economic community, through which intra-African trade would get preferential treatment. In addition, the need for a revision of high tax and relative absence of public subsidy is illustrated. Finally, this document built on the momentum of the World Decade for Culture and Development (1988-97). In spite of the assessment of needs and the explicit plan for action, this document made little difference in reality. As the subsequent Nairobi Plan of Action (African Union 2005) illustrates, the issues are still largely the same, fifteen years later.

In the period from the 1970s onwards, technocratic approaches were both advanced (under structural adjustments and neoliberalism) and questioned (in a post-development and basic needs approached). At the same time, culture became an important feature in the fringes of the development
debate, but failed to make a real impact. In the 70s and 80s, the cultural industries became subject to greater empirical engagement in the West. They also started to feature in development plans and initiatives, albeit to little effect.

2.5. New paradigms for a new millennium

The beginning of the 21st century signalled a shift in development thinking. For the first time, a global development agenda was agreed upon by the UN system, providing a practical framework for policy and action across the world. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)\(^\text{11}\) consisted of 8 clear and quantifiable goals:

1. Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Global partnership for development

The MDGs build on the human development paradigm, by focusing on increasing opportunities for people by combating the most abject limitations that have long strained education, health, gender relations and the environment. These aims are closely linked to the ten capabilities formulated by Martha Nussbaum (2011). Yet, the MDGs failed to take into account the role culture can play (as a way of life and otherwise) in attaining these goals. Only at a later stage was this omission rectified by the MDG achievement\(^\text{11}\).

\(^{11}\) At the time of writing, the UN is negotiating the ‘post-2015’ development agenda, which will likely result in new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Cultural organizations like IFACCA and Agenda21 have been lobbying to get culture into this framework, but it is as yet unclear what the result of this will be.
fund (MDG-F), which explicitly focused on culture (Baltà Portolés 2013). Sadly, the MDG-F hardly makes up for the general lack of attention to culture in mainstream development thinking and organizations (Arizpe 2004, 164).

In 2005, culture re-entered the development debate through the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO 2005a). But the insertion of culture for development was little more than a strategic choice in the negotiations leading to the acceptance of this legally-binding convention, that mainly served to provide a legal basis to keep the ‘cultural exception’ in international trade talks. Here, the interests of ‘developing’ countries comes second to the aim of France and Canada, who aim to uphold the exclusion of culture (that is, audio-visual production) from free trade negotiations at WTO level. In this way, these two countries aim to continue their protectionist measures for culture, against the contention of the USA that culture (i.e. entertainment) is just another group of products and services that should be part of free trade agreements at bi- or multi-lateral levels. While the convention is legally binding, it does not supersede trade agreements (Singh 2011, 85).

In order to gain sufficient support from UNESCO member states, the decision was made that the International Fund for Cultural Diversity would require only voluntary contributions from the parties to the convention. The fund was supposed to provide practical support for policy initiatives in ‘developing’ countries. The fund that should support cultural industries remains under-funded with merely US$6m disbursed by the end of 2013, and benefits for ‘developing’ countries limited overall (De Beukelaer and Freitas forthcoming).

In spite of the limited role the convention can play in practical terms, the influence on cultural policy discourse has been substantial. It is initially this document that has influenced the rise in policy interest in the cultural industries worldwide. The UNESCO convention provides the impetus to balance existing policy objectives with existing contexts of commercially viable cultural production. It is, however, vital to understand that the policy context is historically far more complex than this: public access to (high) culture has long been the aim of foreign donors and partners through cultural cooperation. Such activities remain present, even though their scope has
diminished, because of decreased cultural spending in Europe during the economic crisis (since 2008), and continues to exert influence on formal and informal cultural policies.

Parallel to UNESCO’s influence on the debate, the African Union agreed on the Nairobi Plan of Action for Cultural Industries in Africa (African Union 2005). This document built on the Dakar Plan of Action (OAU and UNESCO 1992) that failed to generate necessary action. This is explicitly mentioned (African Union 2005, 4), but also evident in the continued focus on a common market for the continent, piracy and the combination of high taxes and low subsidies. Moreover, the Nairobi Plan of Action makes no reference to any real advancement on these issues since the Dakar Plan of Action (1992).

The influence of the 2005 UNESCO convention is eclipsed by the Creative Economy Reports from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP 2010). These documents set out to provide an evidence basis for policy attention on cultural and creative industries (CCIs). The Reports have been successful at pointing out that the growth of the creative economy occurred at a rate higher than average economic growth, despite the recession that hit the global economy since 2008. They also provided an overview of economic exports worldwide in an attempt to promote trade diversification through the creative economy. While the share of ‘developing’ countries is exaggerated (see section 3.3), the global overview fuelled a renewed interest, which the UNESCO convention instigated even further. Yet, the impact of the creative economy was once again reduced to economic growth. While non-economic impacts are duly addressed, they remain solely measured through international trade, with economic growth serving as a proxy for human development, undermining the basis of that approach. This illustrates that the UNDP was only formally involved in the Creative Economy Reports. The UN Special Unit for South-South Cooperation – which is technically part of UNDP – commissioned the reports, but did not actually contribute to the content.

The publication of a special edition of the creative economy report by UNESCO in 2013 signalled a break with the strong economic focus. This report pays greater attention to the intrinsic contradictions of the creative
economy discourse, the human development elements and the diversity of practices within the creative economy. This underlined (the hitherto implicit idea) that it is impossible to speak of the cultural economy approach because understanding of and initiatives differ across and within countries. Moreover, the global focus of the UNCTAD Reports shifted to an explicit engagement with ‘developing’ countries. The UNESCO Report thus rephrased the argument that culture (and cultural policy) matters for development, which it had been promoting since the 1980s (UNESCO 1982b; UNESCO 1998a), in a way that incorporates and builds on the popularity of the creative economy brand. This leads to a creative and pragmatic conciliation of previously fragmented agendas: Cultural Diversity, following the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO 2005a) and the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UNESCO 2001); Culture and Development, building on the work of the World Commission on Culture and Development that published Our Creative Diversity under the presidency of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (WCCD 1996).

The shift in discourse is compelling, since the terms ‘cultural industries,’ ‘creative industries,’ ‘cultural economy,’ and ‘creative economy’ are not synonymous. The policy debate implicitly frames the shift from cultural to creative industries as a continuation of the same idea. The transformation builds on political grounds as it was part of a change in cultural policy focus in Australia and Britain in the 1990s (Smith 1998; DCMS 1998). This ties in with an overall tendency towards neoliberal public policy, even though the particular changes in Britain cannot be solely explained by this shift (Hesmondhalgh et al. 2014, 7). The discursive shift from cultural to creative industries built on the possibility to include less ‘cultural’ sectors such as software development and design in the mapping of the sector in order to inflate its economic size and potential (Garnham 2005). Only by doing so was it possible to hold up the claims about economic return (Tremblay 2011) and increase the appeal of the sector to policymakers and politicians, as they are not that easily convinced by mere cultural virtue (Throsby 2010, 196). The debate further developed through terms such as ‘creative cities’ (Landry 2000), ‘creative class’ (Florida 2002), and the ‘creative economy’ (Howkins 2002). While these evolutions built on convergence of policy
recommendations and predictions about the future, much of the activity, not least that of Florida, Howkins and Landry strongly draws on their personal flair and direct engagement with cities (Gibson and Kong 2005: 551-2). It is crucial that, while linking cultural industries to development provides a reductionist vision on culture, expanding the scope of the cultural industries to the creative industries or the creative economy provides no intrinsic basis to connect cultural expressions to culture as a way of life. This contradiction is in no way exclusive to the ‘development’ debate, as similar discursive confusions exist in cultural policy (Lysgård 2012).

Some countries engaged critically with the shift from cultural to creative industries. In China, the term of choice is ‘cultural creative industries’ (Wang 2004; O’Connor and Gu 2006), supposedly providing a basis to reconcile tradition and innovation within the same approach. In Latin America, the discourse was initially linked to the notion of hybridity (García Canclini 1995), but has become more central to policy debates (Fonseca Reis 2008; Solanas 2008; Piedras Feria 2008). In France, the shift has long been ignored but is now increasingly part of the academic debate (Bouquillion 2012; Bouquillion, Miège, and Moeglin 2013). Yet the connection of France to the UNESCO 2005 Convention provides an incentive to hold on to the industries culturelles, which impacts Francophonie debates. The next chapter addresses the lack of a contextualized understanding of the discourse in Burkina Faso and Ghana. This is necessary as most ‘developing’ countries have paid little attention to the way the terms (whether cultural or creative) relate to the past and present of cultural production. This is evident from the anecdotal engagement with non-Western cultural industries in literature (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright 2008b; Flew 2013; UNESCO and UNDP 2013). Where reflexive engagement with the sector exists (Lobato 2010; Larkin 2008), there is little focus on the conceptual shifts in the creative economy discourse.

To reiterate, this study uses ‘cultural industries’ as a guiding concept. Yet, when referring to the continuous spread and evolution of the globalized discourse, the term ‘creative economy debate’ used. This has three intertwined reasons. First, the cultural industries have a more explicit connection with the symbolic meaning of cultural production and maintain a closer link to the contradictions surrounding cultural production.
(Hesmondhalgh 2013; O’Connor 2011). Second, with the expansion of the sectorial scope of the cultural to the creative industries, the economic claims are inversely proportionate with the attention to artistic expression (Oakley 2009). Contrary to the idea that there is a cultural element in all industries (Mato 2009), the focus here remains on a more narrow understanding, i.e. the cultural industries as “symbolic texts” (Hesmondhalgh 2013). Third, the prime interest here is how the relation between culture and development tightens in the light of the changed language of cultural policy. The cultural industries form a better conceptual and historical grounding to this debate, linking culture as artistic expression and as a way of life.

2.6. Culture or cultural industries for human development?

In contrast to the explicit attention to human development in the creative economy debate, there is little attention to culture in the literature on human development and virtually no attention to cultural industries. Generally, the understanding of culture is much more in line with the so-called anthropological notion (Nussbaum and Glover 1995; Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2011). Yet it is necessary to develop an appreciation for cultural expressions that are linked to human development and capabilities in the broadest possible way, because the understandings of human development by Sen, Nussbaum and the UNDP focus on are rather different in nature. Sen sees capabilities as a way to live as a citizen in a well-functioning society (Sen 1999). Nussbaum focuses more strongly on capabilities as elements individuals require for living ‘a life worthy of human dignity’ (Nussbaum 2011, 32). The UNDP, on the other hand, uses life expectancy and education as quantifiable proxies of the range of capabilities (see chapter 4), in order to provide data for comparison and ranking (see UNDP 2013, or any other Human Development Report since the initial 1990 edition).

While frictions between cultural livelihoods and development aspirations are central in the transcultural basis of human development and capabilities approach (HDCA), and not the cultural expressions that may help mediate them. The only explicit engagement with cultural expression in the work of Sen builds the following understandings:
• Culture as a constitutive part of development
• Economically remunerative cultural activities and objects
• Cultural factors influence economic behavior
• Culture and political participation
• Social solidarity and association
• Cultural sites and recollection of past heritage
• Cultural influence on value formation and evolution (Sen 2004a, 39–43)

In this list, the cultural industries are by and large what Sen refers to as “economically remunerative cultural activities and objects.” Apart from heritage, which is often classified as one of the cultural industries, all further references to culture relate to ‘ways of life’ rather than cultural expressions, even if such a contrast can never be that clear-cut. As “the word culture, which is supposed to designate a kind of society, is in fact a normative way of imagining that society” (Eagleton 2000, 25), often through artistic and cultural expressions.

Sen acknowledges that “the sun does not set on the empire of Coca-Cola or MTV” (Sen 1999, 240), but he doesn’t explore the implications of these kingdoms on the ability of people to choose the kind of lives they “have reason to value” (Sen 1992, 5). The mere fact that the logic of Coca-Cola (MTV is no longer what it was in the 1990s) pervaded virtually every corner of the world has—at least to some extent—compromised the ability of people to decide what they value. The process of preference formation that flows from modern distribution of economic power is the very opposite of the public discussion, argument and open communication that Sen considers consistent with enhanced capability. Even a highly rational citizenry, fully capable of assessing what it has reason to value, still depends on access to information in order to evaluate the range of choices available. One need not be pessimistic to realize the power of the various “empire[s] of Coca-Cola or MTV” (ibid.) to promote preferences and priorities different from those that arise from individuals autonomously deciding what they “have reason to value” (Sen 1992, 5).
Sen’s engagement with the topic remains cursory and it receives little attention in the broader realm of human development studies. In spite of the ample reference to human development in the literature on cultural industries, there is little evidence of interest in the topic, let alone critical understanding in human development literature. Some even argue that UNDP does not sufficiently consider the careful cultural understanding in the work of Sen and Nussbaum, and becomes ethnocentric in the process (Nederveen Pieterse 2005; Telleria 2014). The point here is that while the creative economy debate should engage more actively (and critically) with the meaning of human development, also human development scholars should pay greater attention to cultural expressions and their role in contesting or embracing the politics of change.

The historical links between culture and development above are deliberately rather distant from the particular contexts of Burkina Faso and Ghana. Yet this long history has clear implications for the ways cultural industries are inscribed in development thinking. The closing section of this chapter turns to the particular case of copyright and piracy in the music industries to illustrate how the above theoretical contradictions impact practical issues.

2.7. Copyright and piracy as illustration12

Developing cultural industries is not solely about technical interventions, enabling environments and economic indicators; it is about understanding the role culture can play in development and deciding where to draw the line between culture as merchandise and culture as something sacred.

But, this process is also about understanding that in cultural industries, ‘culture’ is reduced to merely cultural expressions that can be bought and sold as commodities. Yet, culture is also something much bigger that

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12 While this section does not endorse the general dismissal of copyright as a useful tool (Smiers 2000; Lessig 2004), such critiques of the copyright system provides a welcome insight into the perils and or problems of the current system. There is an on-going debate about the overall usefulness of copyright in the digital era (Smiers 2000; Lessig 2004). While this normative debate is necessary, this section focuses empirically on the copyright context in Burkina Faso and Ghana.
influences in multiple ways the kind of choices we make and the kind of life we want. In this regard, culture should not and cannot just be taken into account in development approaches. Culture should be a basis to understand what exists and what is possible within that context, bearing in mind that culture is always a realm of struggle, debate and reconsideration: “Culture and development is not simply a matter of including culture but also of interrogating culture as a terrain of power, culture as ideology” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010, 77). Hence the example of piracy: what should be the relation between musicians and their audiences? And in what ways can existing practices, including piracy, serve to devise policies that aim for inclusive employment in the cultural industries, especially for those in the margins of society? The focus should be on working with what exists, in order to understand what should be and can be. In this regard, the creative economy debate looks much like conventional development thinking, where there is more attention for technical issues than fundamental questions (Clammer 2012, 47).

Developing cultural industries is not solely about technical interventions, enabling environments and economic indicators; it is about understanding the role culture can play in development and deciding where to draw the line between culture as merchandise and culture as something sacred.

The decreasing returns from live music and the increased presence of illicit sales of bootlegged cassette tapes, contraband CDs, and MP3 files created a new challenge for the music industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana: piracy. This has become an increasingly pressing issue as the means for reproduction became cheaper as technology evolved. It has undermined the very logic of the cultural industries, since they build on the exploitation of reproductions that are sold through distribution networks. The spread of affordable smartphones made sharing music via Bluetooth and USB-sticks fast and easy. Pirates and telecom operators however, control this market. As a result, the current focus of cultural entrepreneurs, in Burkina Faso and Ghana, is not on creating ‘best-sellers’ or ‘long-sellers,’ but on ‘fast-sellers.’ This is necessary to recuperate the
investment and generate profits before pirates start selling the copies. The race is thus not primarily against cultural and symbolic obsolescence but piracy. In this climate, the debate has turned more strident (GhanaWeb 2012), since artists and producers perceive that huge music business losses are due to digital piracy. There is little incentive to invest in music production, as breaking even has become a gamble that few are willing to take.

In the 1980s a Ghanaian alliance of ‘illegal’ street vendors initiated a scheme through which they paid a fair share in fees to the state copyright collection society (COSGA), only to be dismantled because of pressure from the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) (Collins 2006). A potentially successful regularization of ‘piracy’ into the legitimate music distribution circuit stalled, with a lasting impact on music sales to date. Piracy cannot be eliminated by legislation, but only by incorporating their modus operandi in the mainstream circuit. The trade of pirates provides new ways of music consumption that are often innovative and popular with audiences, not solely because of lower prices. As a result, the history of music piracy shows that this advantage of pirates does not fade with legislation, but by incorporation of their practices in the legitimate circuit. This is true for song sheets in the early 20th century, as much as it is for tape recording and digital file sharing (Kernfeld 2011). Piracy in this context, thus results both from the increased technological potential to generate illicit copies for resale and the reluctance, if not outright refusal, to experiment with licensing and enforcement models that deviate from the imposed (Western) norm. This is one of the levels where a critical disjuncture between culture as a way of life and culture as (commodified) cultural expression forms an obstacle to building fruitful links.

Many artists now have difficulties finding producers who are willing to invest in their talent. However, according to an artist in Burkina Faso (personal interview on 23 March 2013) it is thanks to digital production facilities that artists invest in the production themselves, thereby producing albums as ‘business cards.’ With this, they try to sell albums and succeed to some extent. Yet the main aim of records is now to provide an overview of the (new) work artists can perform on stage for promoters and to gain popularity in order to draw audiences to their live concerts, where most money is made.
The blame is not only on technology. The success of Nollywood in Nigeria shows that strict copyright regulation is not a precondition for the development of thriving cultural industries (Lobato 2010, 246). The flourishing of *tecno brega* (cheesy techno) in North-East Brazil builds mostly on live events, while recorded albums serve more as promotional material (Grasmuck 2011, 25). Similarly, the music industries in Kingston, Jamaica function more or less without an effective copyright regime. Yet there is little reason or ground to romanticise the “oppressive poverty, crime, and violence” that go along with the unregulated market (Power and Hallencreutz 2004, 237–8), even if it is questionable that poverty, crime, and violence would reduce with copyright enforcement alone. There is no reason to stop asking who benefits most from formal copyright regimes (Howard 2009). Yet the industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana have not really been able and willing to go along with the radical changes in consumption. This is however necessary, since audience habits have changed and music is now more linked to mobile phones than physical supports.

The culture of music consumption has changed but the approach to dealing with piracy has not. In Ghana, the copyright collection society, GHAMRO, send young adults and minors to jail for selling music from their laptop and by doing so infringing copyright legislation. Yet, these young street vendors make up the strongest music distribution network in the country. They have a large catalogue, operate in proximity to their customers and provide a valued service. Instead of providing a way to legalize this practice the authorities punish these entrepreneurs for their ignorance of the law. On a more positive note, the high occurrence of piracy signals an interest in endogenous cultural production:

*Pirating may be a breach of copyright but it is also an indication of the desire to belong by those who are denied first hand consumption of the cultural products in question. [...] the Nigerian video-movies industry [...] refused to wait until the time it is able to produce high-quality films with sophisticated modern technology [...] its popularity seems to suggest that a poorly produced culturally relevant film is better than none at all.* (Nyamnjoh 2008, 131)
Culture needs sharing and replication to accrue meaning. But it requires artificial scarcity to make cultural expressions accrue value in economic terms (Garnham 1987). There is a mismatch between supply and demand. But rather than trying to replicate the (largely defunct) copyright regime of the West, the solution is probably less glorious than hoped for: a levy on all blank discs (as is the case in Burkina Faso), USB-sticks, and smartphones and a sincere attempt to turn the ‘illegal’ street vendors into ‘legal’ entrepreneurs. This may not eradicate piracy at once but no single measure will.

The existing cultures of circulation in Burkina Faso and Ghana may be largely illicit, but they are effective. Trying to replicate such activities by exogenous business and regulatory models undermines the cultural fabric through which culture is shared. This is not a romantic argument but it is a pragmatic one: with the rise of digital piracy, history is merely repeating itself, since “constructing the unauthorized commercial copying of music as piracy destroyed the beginnings of a vibrant local music production industry [in the 1980s]” (Boateng 2011, 95; see also Collins 2006). Instead of trying to address the perceived problem as a potential solution, the copyright debate is framed in terms of potential (economic return from creativity) that is lost because of what is lacking (enforcement) (Schultz and van Gelder 2008, 122–134), while ignoring the potential transformation of what exists. The kind of enforcement that is needed is not addressed, thus remaining captured in the kind of technocracy that the culture and development approach aims to transgress.

When it comes to linking culture to development, the cultural industries seem like a useful framework; they are cultural after all and they have potential for development. Yet, promoting them through policy and action does not necessarily build on the context in which they exist. There are cultural differences in the way culture is produced, commoditized and traded. Often, such differences are not big and can even be invisible. Yet, while they are small, they are significant. Ignoring these differences would make the development of cultural industries like any mainstream action in development: a compelling initiative that does not take the local context into account.
At the same time, understanding the historical relevance of the European notion of ‘cultural industries,’ and its contradictory relations with both ‘culture’ and ‘development,’ is crucial. If anything, this chapter has shown that promoting cultural industries is not necessarily the same as working with culture for development. The next chapter illustrates this contrast and highlights the possibility to critically reconcile these approaches.
3. Cultural Industries: potential, limitations and strategic adoption

The global appeal of the creative economy discourse can be summarized in a single word: potential.

It is used to signal the importance of the creative economy in many policy documents and reports. To highlight but one example: “The creative economy has become a powerful transformative force in the world today. Its potential for development is vast and waiting to be unlocked” (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 15, emphasis added). Potential is embraced so widely because of its positive connotation, which manifests itself on an abstract and a practical level. It also builds on the idea that cultural and creative activity thrive abundantly in ‘developing’ countries (Throsby 2010, 191). What does it mean that the discourse is used so widely, but that most people see existing practice as merely ‘embryonic’ or ‘emerging’? What particular difficulties does this pose for the use of the creative economy discourse in policy and practice?

Potential is indeed ample. Yet such potential is in and of itself hardly compelling, even when it is illustrated by an ever-growing number of inspiring examples of success around the world. It simply shows that there are some people who managed to succeed, while many others failed. There are far too many initiatives that have stalled due to all kinds of constraints. The most obvious one is that the ministries of culture in Burkina Faso and Ghana have very limited budgets.
While some potential has been realized, far more remains unrealized. The rich overview of examples in the Creative Economy Reports (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP 2010; UNESCO and UNDP 2013) provide insight in many of the successes. Dozens of initiatives and practices from all corners of the world are highlighted in the UNESCO online web documentary. Yet, in debates and conversations on the global creative economy, there are only a few examples that are always mentioned. Typical examples include the film industries in India (Bollywood) and Nigeria (Nollywood); book publishing in Latin America (initially Buenos Aires, now increasingly Bogotá); and music industries in Jamaica and Korea (Reggae and K-Pop). Nollywood has become an increasingly popular example of cultural industry success beyond the West; the decentralized Nigerian video industry features among others in a special section in *African Business* (Dalby 2014, 22–27), in a report about the cultural context in Francophone West Africa (d’Almeida and Alleman 2010, 5) and literally serves as a textbook example (Flew 2013, 151–3). Nollywood is quoted so often with good reason. It produces many films, making it one of the biggest film industries in the world and, it employs a great number of people. It generates sizable revenues in spite of relatively low investment. It tells stories that audiences can relate to and it even turned conventional knowledge about copyright regimes upside down, since the sector transformed into a powerful industry despite, or thanks to, the absence of an effective copyright regime (Lobato 2010). Where detailed accounts of such local contexts exist (Larkin 2008) they remain detached from the policy-debate.

Stakeholders in the cultural industries draw inspiration from the growing number of great examples. Yet, little is known about these specific contexts and realities. What are the histories, policies, failures and who are the people behind these initiatives? These are not actively disregarded, as little information is often known, but the shift from potential to realisation is a long and messy process that simply does not get enough attention. The messiness and endemic failure of many initiatives is something that hardly needs illustration to anyone who has developed cultural initiatives anywhere in the world. But it does require more active engagement. Because currently, the unspoken rationale remains that if it works in Nigeria, why not elsewhere?
Yet that is precisely the question. It works somewhere, it works elsewhere, but it does not work everywhere.

Another example, to illustrate the complexity, is the global issue of urban mobility. Some cities have developed amazing systems over time including tramways, funiculars, metros, inner-city highways and so on… yet, increasing urbanization results in denser and bigger cities. A variety of solutions thus has to be found to similar issues in vastly different contexts. While many major cities like Jakarta, São Paulo and Accra are suffering from near-constant congestion, other cities have come up with solutions to improve mobility and liveability. Many cities are building bike-sharing schemes and invest in (parallel) bicycle infrastructure to encourage healthy and fast urban transport. Others, like Curitiba, invested in rapid bus transit using parallel lanes. Cities like Hamburg have developed a master plan to radically reduce the use of cars and the often-cited Vauban neighbourhood in Freiburg counts as an excellent example of low-carbon urban living, where transport works via tramways and bicycle highways on order to avoid car use. The list continues. But what does it prove? It proves that there is potential for more ecological transport facilities and that there are several instances where this potential is turned into reality. It does, on the other hand, not illustrate what debates and considerations preceded the execution of these initiatives. Neither do they show how these processes materialized. They are also not an illustration of the thousands of other mobility projects that have been developed throughout the world to incrementally improve small and bigger situations. Neither do they show what concessions had to be made to make these projects succeed. Perhaps most important of all, the highlighted 'best practices' remain superficial, as the social, political, geographical and economic considerations are not made explicit. These examples focus on a single point in time where results have been attained, rather than the long history preceding (or following) these interventions.

In the same vein, there is a huge human potential all around the world. People have ideas, dreams and hopes. But this is not enough. People often fail to realize what they could achieve, because of all kinds of constraints. These limitations can be physical, social, political, or perhaps cultural. The limits of cultural and creative potential are hardly any different. Many stories
remain untold. Many books remain unwritten. Many songs remain unsung. While the cultural industries are a compelling way to turn this potential into realization, there are many social, political and economic reasons why the potential of culture to support human development is not fully realized.

This chapter explores the contradictions between the potential, the limitations, and the strategic adoption of the creative economy discourse. The argument here is that the limited understanding of the discourse and known contradictions of the cultural industries pose a real obstacle to engagement in lobbying and policy-debates. This does not mean that cultural entrepreneurs or artists should become academics or politically active but that a better common understanding of these concepts in relation to existing practices, and potential solutions is needed. By engaging in better informed debate, stakeholders at all levels will be able to work towards joint solutions.

3.1. “There are no cultural industries here”

In spite of the discursive engagement with cultural and creative industries, there is a striking reluctance to fully embrace the term in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Stakeholders at all levels often mention the cultural industries because of the centrality of the discourse in national cultural policies and international texts. But many of them also contest the term when discussing its meaning in the context of cultural creation and circulation at local level. Overall, there is little belief that the cycle of production, dissemination and consumption can actually be called cultural or creative industries. The notion of ‘cultural industries’ is rejected on the grounds that the sector is not sufficiently organized and that it does not correspond to what an ideal image of such industries should look like.

There is however no agreement among stakeholders on the way this discourse does and does not apply to Burkinabè or Ghanaian contexts. There is a sizable, though smaller, group of people who would initially argue that there are indeed cultural or creative industries in the context they work in. While they argue that the concept can be used, they remark that the industries, in spite of their existence, are still in an emergent phase. This is acknowledged explicitly in the cultural policy text of Burkina Faso: “Les
industries culturelles sont, dans l’ensemble, embryonnaires”, provided by the Ministère de la Culture, du Tourisme et de la Communication (2008, 25) but others also make similar remarks (Zida 2010, 63; Zorom 2012, 79). There are cultural industries, but they are still in an embryonic phase. Similarly, studies of the sector highlight that it remains at times closer to craft than industry (d’Almeida and Alleman 2010, 7).

The concept is sometimes more fully embraced for example, in Burkina Faso, when there is talk about properly existing industries, Seydoni Productions is quoted as the only ‘industry’ (in the singular, presumably because it is just this one company) that hosts the biggest recording studio and the only large-scale cassette and CD duplication facility of the country. In Ghana, a general appreciation of the term is slightly more positive, for example, in Accra, where the claim is made that there are creative industries in the city and country, this is usually followed by the clarification that they are not functioning properly. The effort to critically translate policy into practice and practice into policy is insufficient.

The discrepancy between the discursive use and practical reluctance to fully embrace the term signals an issue that extends beyond terminology. The reluctance is not built on a rejection of the discourse on grounds of principle – as is often the case in Europe (Gielen 2010; Lovink and Rossiter 2007). The reluctance builds on the understanding that what exists cannot always be called a properly functioning industry. This raises the question to what extent the claim that these very industries are supporting human development in a variety of ways holds up.

The creative economy discourse helps cultural work be seen as a category of labour that needs serious attention and policies, just like any other business. Yet, unlike the claim of some entrepreneurs in Burkina Faso and Ghana, the cultural economy is different than the rest of the economy. It is a peculiar sector that needs serious and particular attention.

13 The cultural industries are, as a whole, embryonic.
3.2. Cultural industries in context

Generally speaking, national discourse on cultural or creative industries is rather recent. Yet debates have been active at the international level since the 1970s (UNESCO 1982a). Explicit engagement on this discourse in the African continent started with the first Dakar Plan of Action (OAU and UNESCO 1992), culminated into the second Dakar Plan of Action (ACP 2003) and the Nairobi Plan of Action for Cultural Industries in Africa (African Union 2005) before becoming an integral part of the Arterial Network publication Adapting the Wheel: Cultural Policies for Africa (Forbes 2011).

The cultural policy text of Burkina Faso consequently builds on the term industries culturelles (cultural industries) and locates its use in regional and international debates. The concept has entered the policy context in large part due to its use in the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO 2005a). General use of cultural industries as a concept in the cultural sector dates from the late 2000s, following the adoption of the current cultural policy. Analyses of Burkina Faso’s previous cultural policy (before 2004), shows that cultural industries is not mentioned at all (Andrieu 2007; André 2007).

Ghanaian cultural policy stresses in article 10 on the ‘culture industry’ that “the state shall recognise the economic viability of the arts and promote and sustain them through grants, loans and other forms of assistance” and that “employment opportunities shall be created for creative artists, musicians, dancers and other performing artistes” (NCC 2004, 42). In spite of the adoption of the ‘culture industry’ in policy texts, the general term currently in use is the ‘creative industry,’ as evident in the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (NDPC 2010). While the minister of the new Ministry of Creative Arts and Tourism uses ‘creative arts industry,’ most stakeholders use the term ‘creative industry’ in the singular.

UNESCO has largely driven the longstanding engagement with cultural industries in general terms, though the current conceptual uptake has evolved along former colonial ties. Ghana shifted towards the use of ‘creative industry’ (albeit in the singular) following the British shift towards the ‘creative industries’ (here in the plural) since the late 1990s (DCMS 1998;
Garnham 2005). Burkina Faso however, sticks to the initial use of ‘cultural industries’ and refers more explicitly to UNESCO and OIF as sources of influence.

3.3. Statistical illusions as a disguise of limitations

The UNCTAD Creative Economy Reports build strongly on a divide between developed and developing countries. They claim that, in 2010, the share of creative goods exports was almost equally divided between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries: 41 developed countries account for 51.18% and 158 developing countries for 48.03% of global creative goods exports, leaving 0.79% to the remaining 17 countries in transition (UNCTADstat 2012). Yet, when using OECD classifications, developed countries account for 62.71% and developing countries 37.29% of the creative goods export share and when building on UNDP classifications, the balance is respectively 60.81% to 37.25%. The remaining 1.48% of exports comes from countries for which no HDI data is available. More dramatically, 49 of the least developed countries (or LDCs), home to 880m people (12% of the world’s population) account for the very limited share of 0.11% (in 2012) of global creative goods exports (De Beukelaer 2014b).

The current world view on development, maintains a radical opposition between two kinds of countries (so-called rich and poor). There is little disagreement on the difference in human development between Norway and the Democratic Republic of Congo, respectively at the top and the bottom of the UNDP human development ranking in 2013. Yet, there is little or no agreement on the threshold that separates the ‘developed’ from the ‘underdeveloped.’ Moving beyond such a simplistic demarcation would not negate inequality and poverty; but by taking those issues seriously and placing them in their socio-political context, it is possible to see that common issues exist everywhere in different forms.

Practically, this means that there should be more attention to mutual learning: for example, Detroit could learn from Johannesburg, particularly with regard to developing cultural districts that the latter has been developing (De Beukelaer 2014a). Such an approach necessarily (and deliberately)
undermines the (implicit) premise that the transfer of ideas, technologies, knowhow and skills should always be from North to South, or from South to South. Unfortunately the naïve arrogance of the North impedes its ability to learn from the rest of the world:

Many representatives from developed countries assume that they know and do things better, and therefore play a role of lecturing their counterparts from developing countries, while they miss out on a great opportunity to detect important experiences in these countries which provide important lessons to be learned by themselves. (Neuwirth 2013, 131)

While increasing attempts are being made to support South-South collaboration, this maintains, rather than undermines, the idea that there is a categorical divide between two parts of the world. As a result, there is now an increasing tendency to exchange experiences and ideas between countries of the South, while northern countries still largely fail to acknowledge that they can learn from such debates as well. It is crucial to overcome the rigid division between the two imagined spheres in order to show humility and openness, and to engage in mutual learning on an equal footing. Because the existing divide presumes that there is a greater similarity between Indonesia and Bolivia than between Bulgaria and Turkey, while the former have little in common apart from their developmental status, the latter share centuries of history and have ample cultural traits in common. Yet, because Bulgaria is part of the ‘developed’ EU and Turkey is not, they are supposedly opposites.
3.4. “When the river turns, so must the caiman”

Global use of the creative economy discourse signals a paradigmatic shift in the understanding of culture in society. This shift is often accepted without much contestation. In one particular interview, a Burkinabè stakeholder described this as a *fait accompli*: “When the river turns, so must the caiman.”\(^\text{14}\) There has been a change, and it must be followed. Ideology is imposed on a context as a solid external force. As a result, the existing praxis has to be translated and transformed to suit the new *doxa*. This is not unique to West Africa, as this discourse has greatly influenced many cultural and economic policies around the world, often turning a blind eye to the known contradictions of the sector (Scott 2009). Contrary to this observation, there seems to be some room for negotiation, although limited debate on the terms constrains the space for dialogue and contestation of the exogenous understanding and conceptualization of culture and policy. The somewhat apathetic acceptance of a changed terminology needs to be located in a broader debate on ideology and political economy, responding to the lack of profound insight in the discursive shifts needed to better understand culture.

To take the metaphor of the river and the caiman further: What is perceived and presented as a river is in fact a man-made canal. Policy discourse is directive, but it is also the result of very intentional processes. Much like a canal, it is a quintessentially human and value-laden intervention. As such, the creative economy debate is not something that should simply be followed, it is something that can and should be conscientiously made.

In other words, the creative economy discourse does not exist in a void. Interest in the notion of the creative economy builds on a promise: “Developing Countries around the world can find ways to optimize the potential of the creative economy for generating socio-economic growth, job creation and export earnings” (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, 8). It is telling that this exact phrase is used in Ghanaian policy documents (National Development Planning Commission 2012, viii). Yet, UNCTAD clearly addresses that “[there are] obstacles such as lack of investment, lack of entrepreneurial skills and inadequate infrastructure to support the growth of

\(^{14}\) Personal interview with Burkinabè stakeholder in Ouagadougou, 5 March 2013.
the creative industries” (2008, 40). The way the issue is framed suggests that a technical intervention regarding investment, skills training, and infrastructure development are sufficient to realize the potential of the sector.

A similar argument is made in Article 14 of the Convention on the Promotion and Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO 2005a, 8–9):

*Parties shall endeavor to support cooperation for sustainable development and poverty reduction, especially in relation to the specific needs of developing countries, in order to foster the emergence of a dynamic cultural sector by, inter alia, the following means:*

- The strengthening of the cultural industries in developing countries
- Capacity-building through the exchange of information, experience and expertise, as well as the training of human resources in developing countries, in the public and private sector
- Technology transfer through the introduction of appropriate incentive measures for the transfer of technology and know-how, especially in the areas of cultural industries and enterprises
- Financial support

In this context, the emergence of a ‘dynamic cultural sector’ will be fostered by technical interventions. Capacity building, technology transfer and financial support are external measures that presume that the intrinsic potential of what is practiced is insufficient. The technical approach to the issue as illustrated below is crucial. It suggests that there is potential and that there are obstacles, but also that these obstacles can be clearly defined and ways to overcome these obstacles are readily known: “through the application of modern scientific knowledge, economics and scientific production” (Esteva, Babones, and Babcicky 2013, 1). The UNESCO Convention in particular makes the argument that the protection and promotion of cultural expressions is a technical matter that merely needs a technical approach. Such a technical approach conceals the ideological battle between free trade in culture and the ‘cultural exception,’ or protectionism, which the Convention aims to settle in legal terms. This
approach is part of a broader mandate of the convention to make “culture a
central task of governance for international and national cultural policies”
(Pyykkönen 2012, 550).

The appeal of the cultural industries also builds on necessity. There is
widespread understanding within the Burkinabè and Ghanaian cultural
sector that any public funding for culture is in direct competition with costs
for education, healthcare, defence and infrastructure (not to forget the
entitlements of the president and all government ministers). As such, many
see the need to find a way to cope without much (or any) governmental
subsidy. The political and economic independence it promises is appealing
in a context where support often comes with strings attached (see section
4.3). The cultural industries provide a way to conceive of a cultural ecology
that does not necessitate such funds. As such, it seemingly provides a
resolution to a longstanding issue in cultural policy debates, as has been
argued nearly 25 years ago:

*We live in an era of priorities, not ideals. Under any form of
government, there is not enough public money available to fund
everything worthy of support. Money spent on art and culture needs,
like everything else, to be justified against other areas of public subsidy.
[..] An expansion of the budget for art and culture means a reduction of
the budget for social services, education, housing, or some other area
of public provision. Without a substantial increase in all forms of public
spending, it is socially irresponsible to spend money on art and culture
if it cannot be rigorously justified. (Lewis 1990, 1)*

Lewis focuses on the general need to justify public expenditure on
culture. This is still the case, but the terms of the debate have changed. Now,
the argument is made that the sector should realize its own economic
potential because support from the government is unlikely to increase
significantly. In this context, a shift towards an economic rationality seems
inevitable. It should both relocate cultural activity into formal market logic
and it should turn to a language of economic rationality in order to justify
public spending. Such a justification is often a necessary strategy, because
arguments based on ‘the virtues of culture’ alone are unlikely to convince the ministries involved (Throsby 2010, 196). But such shifts cannot be reduced to a transition from culture as ‘market failure’ to culture as ‘economic driver’ as there are at least four models according to which the relation between culture and economy is understood (Cunningham, Banks, and Potts 2008; Potts and Cunningham 2008) (see section 5.2).

Changes in cultural policy discourse that move towards economic independence build on a paradox. In order to make a case for public subsidy for culture, the sector needs to prove its economic viability. So, in order to get support, it has to prove it does not need any support. While this reflects the cynicism of corporations that coerce states into providing tax breaks and subsidies with threats to outsource activity, the cultural sector would probably be better claiming a multiplier effect in economic returns on public subsidy, even though this argument is not very solid either (Madden 2001). The debate may be far more nuanced than this, as the sector yields social and economic benefits that are greater than the provided funds (Sacco, Ferilli, and Blessi 2013, 3). Yet, some Burkinabè and Ghanaian entrepreneurs believe that a cultural business is just like any other business and that it should be treated as such:

[Politicians] tell us that we have a business like the others; like those selling cement, cocoa, and so on. Cool! That’s good.¹⁵ (Entrepreneur, Burkina Faso)

One does not have to be a cynic to see that this argument can easily backfire. Why would any government provide structural support for a sector that does not need any support to be viable?

Do you think the sector can be self-sustainable?

You wouldn’t know; but all over the world, now, creative industries are fighting for itself. And they are proving it. It all depends on how we

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¹⁵ Personal interview with Burkinabè stakeholder in Ouagadougou, 7 July 2013.
can play it out, and if we can attract enough government funding to make the industry lucrative enough.\textsuperscript{16} (Musician, Ghana)

The contradiction between the lucrative nature of the cultural industries and the need for government funding to make it lucrative is telling. It symbolizes how the case for culture can almost only be made on economic grounds. The social elements and impacts are a nice surplus, but they hardly justify public expenditure.

The origins of the discourse are many, yet the result is one: There is no alternative. The rise of cultural industries is presented as the only possible solution to the problem of the unrealized potential of culture. At this point, the subliminal neoliberal ideology of the cultural industries becomes visible. Even though the links to agency remain clear within this approach, it is equally co-opted into a neoliberal ethic (Da Costa 2010, 511). David Harvey defines neoliberalism as follows:

\begin{quote}
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. [.]. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. (Harvey 2005, 2)
\end{quote}

The same argument, indeed, goes for culture. If markets do not exist, they must be created. In this regard, the global uptake of the creative economy discourse illustrates how ‘neoliberal globalization’ has permeated cultural policies around the world (McGuigan 2005). In spite of this free use of the term globalization, the provided analysis remains geographically constrained to the usual Anglo-Saxon suspects. Similarly the cultural policies under the

\textsuperscript{16} Personal interview with Ghanaian stakeholder in Accra, 24 May 2013.
British New Labour government were also termed neo-liberal, albeit with reservation (Hesmondhalgh et al. 2014). In Burkina Faso and Ghana, the mantra of neoliberal economics – that “there is no alternative” to the market (as Margaret Thatcher used to say) – is not often used in an explicit way, yet its spirit echoes through cultural industries initiatives. The message is that cultural entrepreneurs need to embrace the opportunities that exist. It is their role and responsibility to take risk and realise the dormant potential.

Culture is, in other words, subjected to a colonizing logic, as market thinking and economic value eclipse ‘cultural value.’ This is partly because the latter is more difficult to pin down (O’Brien 2014, 112), but mostly because the former pervades public policy at virtually every level. Neoliberalism can be seen as economic imperialism (Harvey 2005) as much as it can yield benefit to those who engage in an entrepreneurial way with the potential the market has to offer (Perullo 2011, 30). It is obvious that such an imperialist or colonizing force is not absolute, but the question how to negotiate the boundaries between traditional expressions and cultural industries in policy remains. One interviewee\(^1\) decidedly rejected the notion of cultural industries because it is such an alien term: “Why do you want to force us into concepts that are not necessarily our own?” Yet he equally rejected a possible understanding of the concept as neoliberal. In many ways, with good reason, because the history of political economy in most formerly colonized countries does not follow the diverse economic histories of their respective colonizers. And, while elements that make up the versatile term may be applicable to such contexts, the conceptual critique above is equally valid for the very notion of neoliberalism. There are two main reasons for this. First, these kinds of policies and interventions are not just neoliberal: “the neo-liberal agenda is not simply the prevalence of the ‘free-market’; of de-regulation, cuts in subsidy and the insistence on economic justifications for art” (O’Connor 2011, 41). Second, reducing the process in Burkina Faso or Ghana to a neoliberal tendency does not do justice to the socio-economic constellation: ‘Africa’ is not following ‘Euro-America’ but is at the vanguard of a more radical form of market capitalism (Comaroff and Comaroff

\(^1\) Personal interview with Burkinabè stakeholder in Ouagadougou, 17 April 2013.
2011:15-6) as there is far less to hold on to in terms of formal socio-economic arrangements.

So far, limitations on potential in Africa have been discussed in an abstract manner. Conceptual and theoretical arguments serve to question the widespread optimism around creative economy.

3.5. Risky business

Cultural industries are risky business (Prindle 1993). They are arguably riskier than many other activities because of volatile taste and hence, consumption. Predicting success is hardly ever possible, simply because nobody knows how to do this: over 80 per cent of music releases does not manage to recuperate investment in the US (Caves 2000, 61). At the same time, relatively low levels of interpersonal trust and high levels of personal risk are part of the relatively informal career trajectories in the sector (Banks et al. 2000, 460; Gibson and Kong 2005, 554). In response to this, strategies have been developed to mitigate risk. Economies of scale and integration (both horizontally and vertically) are part of this (Miège 1987, 274). Major conglomerates rely on a small number of major hits to mitigate risk within catalogues and establish control over circulation (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 27); this helps large companies (majors) maintain a dominant position in the market. Similarly, a constant play of merging companies and divesting loss-making activities is meant to limit risk over time, even though this is in itself a risky enterprise that does not always work (Fitzgerald 2011). The bulk of these strategies depend on scale. A large catalogue, a diverse range of media and a level of vertical integration can help bigger enterprises balance many investments with very few high-yield successes. This means that while cultural industries may generate high overall profits, in spite of the obvious risks, individual businesses may experience significant difficulties reaping proportional rewards from the sector (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 28). Therefore, working in culture means trying to “succeed in uncertainty” (Menger 2009). Risk and uncertainty are not exceptional stages at the outset of a career or the start of a new enterprise. They are at the very core of cultural industries.

High levels of risk are however not adequately taken into account in
cultural industries policies and initiatives in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Niger even though this is explicitly mentioned in reports (Kamara 2004; UNESCO 2010). Some entrepreneurs stress the need to make concessions at an early stage and hold back on high expectations. Yet the realization that culture is not an easy way to make a living is not universally shared:

DJ Black of Joy FM laments, “Some kid will have one hit and think he is famous. Meanwhile he has no money. To be a long-term success and really make money in Ghana music is not easy.” (Shipley 2013, 23)

This issue equally prevails at policy levels. In the Burkinabè cultural policy, the only mention of risk is in relation to a SWOT-like analysis regarding the implementation of policy (MCTC 2008). Ghanaian policies do not mention risk at all (NCC 2004). On a larger scale, the Compendium of Reference Documents of Cultural Policies in Africa (Kovács 2009) and the Arterial Network Guide on Cultural Policy Approaches (Forbes 2011) do not engage explicitly with the extent to which business in the cultural sector is risky.

The 2013 creative economy report warns against risk taking. Because dreaming too big and growing too fast is risky, it suggests it can be good to remain small and specialized. This can provide greater stability while retaining a scale that is easier to combine with domestic life. Scaling up is not always the best solution, as it may disrupt social and economic ties that rely on interdependence at a small scale (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 104–5).

Similarly, when it comes to loans and investments, specialized advice and schemes are needed to mitigate risk. Programmes and institutions with such expertise are starting to emerge, for example, the Cultural Industries Guarantee Fund (CIGF/FGIC) based in Lomé, the Programme d’Appui au Renforcement des Politiques et Industries Culturelles (ARPIC) based in

19 Support Programme to Reinforce Cultural Policies and Industries
Ouagadougou and the Agence de Promotion des Entreprises et Industries Culturelles\textsuperscript{20} (APEIC) based in Niamey (Niger).

The absence of a debate on risk in policy documents does not mean that there are no practical strategies in Burkina Faso and Ghana. In practice, there are two principal ways risk is mitigated. On one end of the spectrum, quasi-monopolistic companies have established secure positions in capital-intensive activities (awards, corporate events and operational marketing). These activities are perhaps not more capital-intensive than other cultural activities in relative terms, but the prohibitive entry-cost makes the investment too steep for most entrepreneurs, not least because they do not have access to external financing to start up such major initiatives. They directly and indirectly exert great power over the industries because they act as gatekeeper to well paid (artistic) work at major events they organize. The decline of record sales, low yield from royalties and limited licensing opportunities make corporate and promotional live events the most lucrative activity in the music industries in both Burkina Faso and Ghana. This means that concentration of power is less based on vertical integration of control over copyrighted material as is the case in global conglomerates, and more on the large-scale transformation of the audience reach of artists into a commodity (Shipley 2013, 283), because artists trade their popularity and exposure for sponsoring revenue. Similarly, their reputation and track record make them the most likely partners for promotional campaigns of multinational food and telecom corporations. While they claim to allow and encourage fair competition, they control technical equipment and political connections needed to succeed at major ventures. On the other hand, individual entrepreneurs try to retain control over as many activities as possible. This strategy to limit risk builds on excessive multi-tasking by aiming for some sort of vertical integration within individual or small enterprises: One single person or, a small team at best, will try to compose, arrange, produce, master, manufacture, distribute, manage and promote the work of a musician. The obvious limitations of specialization and time leave much potential unrealized. The result is that the produced work and events

\textsuperscript{20} Agency for the Support of Cultural Enterprises and Industries
are often sub-standard. Yet, the question can be raised whose standards should be applied here.

The inherent risk, in combination with very limited social protection creates a context where some succeed (hence the variety of ‘good examples’ and ‘best practices’ that circulate), but where the majority struggle to get by through subsistence entrepreneurship.

3.6. Precariousness along a broken value chain

Most people in the cultural industries struggle in precarious situations partly due to the lack of a clear occupational identity and poor job security. This signals a new kind of class, which exists across a range of blue and white collar professions, where job flexibility is more common than job security (Standing 2011, 7–13). Precariousness also signals a social critique of labour conditions, particularly in the downturn of social democracy in the West, where this new class has to cope with uncertainty that labour flexibility inadvertently brings about. While the term is thus used primarily in contexts where the protection of labour conditions deteriorated, it can arguably also be applied to many so-called developing countries as well, precisely because the ‘North’ is starting to look more like the ‘South’ in this regard: “Members of the precariat have lost the standard labour conditions they previously enjoyed: a safe, stable job with appropriate access to education, health services, pension plans, holiday time and so on. They are thus joining the ranks of the underdeveloped majority, even when they live in Birmingham or Chicago” (Esteva, Babones, and Babcicky 2013, 65). The previous section has shown that no one can predict what will have success, so there is a need to try as much as possible; sadly, this does not mean that all will succeed. Precariousness is a guiding concept in this section because it offers a way to show that insecurity and exploitation are in fact inherent to creative labour (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2010, 161); it is not a condition that ‘development’ will solve, unless the terms of labour are duly negotiated.

In the cultural industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana, precariousness builds on three mutually reinforcing issues. At the consumer end, there is limited overall spending power. Disposable income of most people does not
allow for (much) discretionary spending on culture. At the distribution end, limited spending power affects sales. This leads to – often illicit – strategies to lower retail prices of CDs, DVDs, or books. This in turn, erodes the readily fragile value chain and means that, also at the production end profits are limited, while room for investment is lacking. Moreover, the cultural industries build on an availability of surplus labour. There are far more university graduates than the civil service and established companies can employ. Some of these graduates rightly see opportunities in the cultural industries, but also in this sector, there is a systemic tendency towards strategic over-production, where the success of the few depends much on the attempts of the many.

What does this triple basis of precariousness mean in practice? Given the recent decline in record sales, many have turned primarily to the organization of live events. These are, reportedly, the most viable parts of the music industries in Burkina Faso and to some extent in Ghana. Also at this level, there is a mismatch between potential and realization. Due to inadequate infrastructures it is difficult to run events that are sufficiently profitable to cover the relatively high costs to organize the event. At an organizing cost between 1m and 15m FCFA (1,524.49EUR to 22,867.35EUR) for an average concert in Ouagadougou and a going rate for concert admissions between 500 and 2000 FCFA (0.76EUR and 3.05EUR) there are barely any venues that allow for a profitable combination. For a ‘cheap’ concert (at 500 FCFA) a starting artist (total cost of show 1m FCFA), a paying audience of 2000 people is needed to break even. Yet there is no venue that allows for such a capacity at such a low production cost. Similarly, an expensive concert (at 2000FCFA) for a bigger artist (total cost of show 8m FCFA) requires 4000 paying punters to break even. In Ghana the numbers differ, but the principle is by and large the same.

Given this precariousness it seems contradictory that the cultural industries are presented as drivers of development. Looking at the historical evolution of commoditized mass culture, the evolution occurred the other way around. This is summarized in the triple basis for the emergence of entertainment industries (Bakker 2008):
• Economic growth and increased leisure time increased demand
• Urbanization helped turn this demand into consumption
• Large share of young population increased demand further – as under-30s are a big (potential) market.

Many countries in Africa currently see the coincidence of these three factors. The cultural industries potential may be on the verge of realization, yet caution is needed. Much economic growth is resource-driven and does not necessarily result in labour-intensive activity. In any case, the cultural industries will not provide a quick fix (UNESCO and UNDP 2013). All the more because there is a real issue with purchasing power and national markets are often too small.\(^{21}\) Certainly, there is a demand for culture, especially from young people, yet their ability to spend (much) on culture is limited. Moreover, there has been a drop in real spending power in many countries, in part due to significant rises in food prices in 2008.

The explanation that economic growth, urbanization and a young population helps the growth of cultural industries derives from a particular time and place: the emergence of the film industries in the early 20\(^{th}\) century in Europe and the USA. The question is if this can be equally applied to cultural industries development in general and music industries in particular in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Given that histories develop differently, while the above model seems sensible, this does not mean that it should serve as a teleological model for contemporary evolutions. Second, the empirical data and observations on which this research builds are limited in geographical and temporal scope. They are meant as an explanation of a historical evolution, not as a prediction of future developments. Third, global dynamics between domestic and international markets make different dynamics hard to compare (for example, while the USA had a strong internal market, many present-day ‘developing’ countries cannot always rely on their internal market to render a film or a music production profitable). Fourth, the three elements cited above show that the wider socio-economic conditions are

\(^{21}\) Nigeria is a major exception, given the large internal market of over 160m people and the sizable middle class, which perhaps helps explain the success of Nollywood.
crucial in the emergence of viable cultural industries, therefore efforts to support them should thus be part of active engagement with society as a whole (De Beukelaer 2014b).

There are however, exceptions that show great creativity and resourcefulness to making things work. In Ghana, artist Becca released an album as a free addition to Graphic Showbiz, a newspaper focused on entertainment, with sponsorship from an electronics brand; the club +233 promotes live music in Accra, providing a steady income for a range of musicians; Scratch Studios focuses on licensing contracts for Ghanaian artists, alongside music production; and corporate events provide a basis of income for a growing group of musicians. In Burkina Faso, singer Patrick Kabré balances international touring with small concerts throughout the country; Alif Naaba won the Visa pour la Création (Visa for Creation) from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institut Français in 2012, this allowed him to record his fourth album, as well as to tour French institutes across the continent; and many artists have sponsorship contracts. These successful cases are largely the same as the examples discussed at the outset of this chapter. They are many, but they are not necessarily representative. Neither do they (re)present a blueprint for a way out of the impasse between potential and realization. It would be incorrect and misleading to point solely to structural factors as explanation for the precarious conditions along the broken value chain. While many lament the relative inability of the wider population to pay for culture, some offer a different reading. It is, they argue, not only about the ability to pay, but also about the willingness to do so. There is, after all, always money for beer and the church. This links the ‘willingness to pay’ debate in cultural economics (Throsby 2001, 80–82) to the (limited) ability to pay, given the relative lack of spending power.

Throughout different African countries, there is a tendency to argue that “an absence of demand in the cultural sector is often no more than an absence of supply” (Kamara 2004, 11). It is however clear that there is, and has been, ample demand. There has also been ample production, as well as circulation. The social and economic yield has however, been far less than the current optimism seems to suggest.
Moreover, the rise of digital technologies provides possibilities that were unimaginable in the era that informed the theory above:

*Given the dynamics of these industries, first mover advantages have been particularly pronounced making it all the more difficult for newcomers to gain a foothold. However, new technologies provide a window of opportunity to competition in global markets, even for small players, provided an enabling policy framework is designed to offer the much-needed support.* (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright 2008a, 32)

An example of such potential is crowdfunding. Initiatives like Africa Unsigned even explicitly target the African market.\(^{22}\) While there is potential in new technologies, there are also limitations in the current context. There is ample reservation regarding the potential of these new technologies and platforms in general (Hesmondhalgh 2010a; Mollick 2014). But there are particular issues in Burkina Faso and Ghana: Internet is unreliable and slow at best, while near-daily power cuts make yielding the potential benefits of the digital revolution no sinecure. In spite of these difficulties, Sana Bob, a Burkinabè singer, successfully raised €2,510 to record his new album in Ouagadougou, and Kibaré Music sells Burkinabè music online.\(^{23}\) These initiatives, often in partnership with foreigners, but rarely with foreign governments or formal organisations, nonetheless focus more on international markets rather than on local markets.

Due to high risk and strained markets, the general tendency for artists to have uncertain, below-average income (Caves 2000, 81) also holds in Burkina Faso and Ghana. At the same time, the cheap digital production facilities created more potential for strategic overproduction: the cost to record an album is low, and technology is widespread. This means that, while the technology to earn a return from music recordings (CDs and cassettes) is at a low, the technologies to *make* and share music are becoming cheaper and more common. The way out to formalise the market is probably in the better


regulation of existing (piratic) practices in music sales, rather than a return to a business model, based on selling records, which will probably never work again. In Nigeria, for example, pirate-controlled distribution networks actually helped advancing Nollywood (Lobato 2010) and in Jamaica, the music industries grew in spite of a weak copyright regime (Power and Hallencreutz 2002). Yet, neither in Burkina Faso nor in Ghana, is there a tendency to embrace the vernacular innovations that help including the precarious workers in cultural industries that work for everyone involved, not just those at the top.

3.7. Between discourse and practice

The rejection of the creative economy discourse builds on the predicate that “there are no cultural industries here.” Yet the main reason the notion of a fully functioning industry is rejected derives from the discrepancy between an ideal of such industries and the cultural industries that in fact exist. This does not mean that the cultural industries in Burkina Faso or Ghana are functioning as well as they could. On the one hand the cycle of production and circulation is partially broken. Yet this does not negate the existence of a high degree of cultural industriousness, because cultural actors work very hard to create, circulate and reach audiences. On the other hand, there is consumption, because audiences show great interest in music and film, even though such consumption is not always direct. But the discourse and logic of the creative economy is often at odds with the (perceived) reality:

“You know, showbiz, it’s not new to Ghanaians. It has always been a part of us. It is nothing new. [Although] it’s a huge challenge to put two and two together: to put together the new information and use that to modify what we do. I think there’s confusion” (Entrepreneur, Accra, 24 May 2013)

If there were merely a relative mismatch in understanding between the notion of the cultural and creative industries and the practice of cultural industriousness, why would this be an issue? The argument here is that the
discrepancy between discourse and practice limits a more meaningful debate for three reasons.

First, the limits of the discourse show a mismatch between theory and practice. This mismatch extends beyond what is described above in that it signals a far deeper schism between what is written and what is practised. It means that cultural policies and concerns from those working in the sector do not use the same kind of language. There is thus a need for a vernacular that allows for greater dialogue and advocacy between policy and practice. Only a shared language can address the intrinsic contradictions in the creative economy discourse beyond its superficial celebratory ethic. Because, as long as there is no real debate on what is part and what is not part of such a vernacular understanding about the cultural industries, there can be no clarity about the meaning of its claims. What sectors are included? For example, what place do marriages and funerals have in the cultural industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana? After all, if the focus is primarily on the economization of symbolic content, such activities are in fact part of the cultural industries (Gibson and Kong 2005, 543).

This raises questions: how do cultural industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana relate to the relation between the formal and the informal, the legal and the illegal, the professional and the amateur? A real debate is indeed needed on the terminology in order to make contestation of the concept possible and to take existing practices seriously. This, in turn, allows for an engagement with the societal meaning of such discourse. The point is not that agreement should be found on the exact concept in use. Rather, there should be greater debate towards a joint understanding of the terms in use – allowing for some (critical) differences between them. Does the Minister of Culture mean the same thing as the cultural activist, does the consultant mean the same thing as the artisan, and what are their relations to global and regional debates? Surely, no real agreement will be found on the use of this, or any, concept. But the actual role and meaning of the cultural industries can only be understood if there is a shared framework that accommodates different views to understand the perks and the perils of the creative economy discourse.
Second, limited engagement with the meaning of the term illustrates that its understanding remains rather superficial. There are fruitful efforts to explore the practical implications of cultural industries (Zida 2010; Zorom 2012). Yet, there is a relative lack of engagement with the normative implications of the adoption of such a loaded term. Culture has been created and enjoyed in a variety of ways and contexts before it was ever conceived of as an industry. Though there is little debate on what the cultural industries should be like. And, by extension, there is little debate on the general kind of economy or the kind of development that is envisioned. The cultural industries may be a vehicle to articulate normative imagination (see section 5.5) as much as it is a way of organizing social life in itself (De Beukelaer 2012). This is a general issue that extends well beyond the cases of a few individual countries. The approach towards a discourse at the 2013 African Creative Economy Conference illustrates this tension. The term is used to tap into global interest in ‘creative economy’ and help connect stakeholders in art and culture to the changing discourse of policies and funders. The opening of the conference remained rightly critical, as Mike van Graan asked pertinent questions about the role of the creative economy in the development discourse of African countries:

*Do we really need the creative industries primarily as drivers of economic growth? The continent appears to be doing rather well in terms of economic growth and increasing the size of Gross Domestic Product, the traditional, if limited means of measuring the wealth of a country. ... What difference can the creative industries make to economic development and/or to social and human development in Africa that more important and more highly invested economic sectors have been unable to do? (van Graan 2013, 3)*

Other speakers addressed questions about the composition (what sectors are included?), strategies (how to make the sector work?), and the lobbying potential (how does this term serve our respective agendas?) There was however, limited engagement with the utterly complex and contradictory
nature of the overall discourse. This may be because the conference participants were mostly practitioners, policy-makers, activists, civil servants and (foreign) donors and therefore it is hardly surprising that the event focused primarily on practical challenges, networking and collaboration, rather than abstract theoretical reflection on the meaning and use of the creative economy discourse. This is a common challenge at most practice-oriented conferences. Yet many practitioners indicated that the connection between cultural practice and creative economy discourse remains discordant. The testimonies of artists, activists and entrepreneurs, such as Siphiwe Ngwenya, Suzanna Owíyo, and Didier Awadi, provided detailed insight in their personal journeys, aims and practices. The remaining challenge for the *African Creative Economy Conference* and Arterial Network remains to conceptualise and share such experiences and practices to become part of continental variations on the global creative economy discourse, much like the blueprint for cultural policies that the Arterial Network published (Forbes 2011).

Third, the conceptual shift largely foregoes the question: what does the term cultural industries actually mean in a broader spatial and historical context? How does such a concept relate to non-commercial forms of cultural exchange? What does it mean that hardly any reference is made to the role of culture in religion, politics and chieftaincy? Also, what does it mean that its use is void of a clear understanding of the intellectual legacy of the Frankfurt School? To be clear, this longstanding debate is sometimes mentioned, and the term is credited to Adorno and Horkheimer (2008). Yet this is merely done in passing and it does not fully grasp the complexity of the debate. A key indication of this is that the term ‘*industries culturelles*’ is cited in the plural (MCT 2013, 10), whereas this is a change that only developed in the 1970s and indicated a significant shift in meaning, as mentioned above. Moreover, even though the shift towards creativity is correctly located in Australia and the UK, the underlying contradictions do not surface in the discussion (MCT 2013, 10) even though this has been addressed widely in the literature (Hesmondhalgh 2013; Garnham 2005). The way the conceptual history is

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24 This comment builds on observations at the 3rd *African Creative Economy Conference* in Cape Town, on 6-9 October 2013.
addressed in this governmental study is however a more complete engagement with the concept than is the case in some academic texts, where some have the tendency to detach the current celebratory use of the concept from its critical and pessimistic roots (e.g. Flew 2013). Without a clear understanding of the meaning of the malleable concept and its uses, a general debate on the cultural industries between artists, politicians and all those in between does not provide the necessary basis to discuss the potential and its limitations with the necessary detail and critical reflection.

3.8. Traveling concepts

It is hardly surprising that concepts differ in use and meaning around the world. This is documented (Kong et al. 2006; Cunningham 2009), though the particularities within African countries remain neglected. The cultural and creative industries travel, both between disciplines of academic inquiry and, between geographical and cultural realms, and so do policies that are meant to support the sector (Pratt 2009). As theories travel and concepts circulate (Larner 2011, 91) they acquire or lose meaning with the new context in which they are adopted (Wang 2004). This could mean that the historical weight of the creative economy discourse is a burden not worth carrying. The relative optimism about the realized potential of the cultural industries in the near future reflects more cheerful affiliation with unfettered capitalism than is common in Europe. There is a significant degree of cultural optimism in many contexts beyond the old world. Even though there is disagreement on the ideological foundations of ‘cultural optimism’ (Cowen 1998), it seems to resonate with many cultural entrepreneurs in West-African show business, more so than European pessimism rooted in critical theory does. In part, this is because Burkinabè and Ghanaian entrepreneurs are as enthusiastic and optimistic as they are anywhere in the world. But the lack of a clear framework for clear and precise criticism (as discussed in the previous section) is crucial as well.

The cultural industries are developing and, so is the discourse. The development of these industries is unequivocally local but it is also profoundly global. Whether or not there is a local legacy, the ways in which
concept and practice are embedded in debate is global. So far, the global conceptual exchange is biased towards a theory of the north that is permeating thinking in the south (see section 5.3). As long as there is reluctance to tear down this hegemonic conceptual influence, the creative economy discourse is actually rather a limit than a potential for its practical use to relocate culture in development.

3.9. Survival despite the odds

There is ample ‘local’ cultural production in Burkina Faso and Ghana, in spite of a sizable influx of foreign music. Greater concerns exist about the historical choices within these countries that hampered the music industries (see sections 2.7 and 3.9). Where foreign influences are lamented, this is more due to the influx of Nigerian and Ivorian, rather than American music, while the latter is the stereotypical culprit. This illustrates the observation that small communities always undergo the cultural influence of larger communities or polities, particularly when they are nearby (Appadurai 1996, 32).

When it comes to culture, the perceived reality always builds on a concoction of nostalgia, hope and despair. A compelling indication of this is nostalgia about the golden days. In Burkina Faso, the heyday of the Musiques Modernes Voltaïques, the modern musics of Upper Volta, as the country was known, is referred to as a distant past (Mazzoleni 2011). Similarly, the time of Highlife, Ghana’s success story in popular music throughout much of the 20th century, is primarily located in the past (Collins 1996; Plageman 2012). These works recall times when people were going out much more, when music life was more active and when musicians made a decent living from playing live. Yet, they equally evoke a more general romanticized nostalgia towards the decades ensuing independence (Plageman 2012, 227–8).

While there is a degree of nostalgia in the ample references to the ‘good old days,’ there is a certain truth in them that cannot be ignored. The thriving informal cultural economy is not something new. It has always existed in some way or another. In 1996, for example, Ghanaian popular music had a 71% share in the national market for popular music (Throsby 1998, 199).
clear illustration of this is that the ‘potential’ is still there, and that many traces of vibrant culture still prevail, be it in largely nationally defined markets. In spite of all the limitations and obstacles, popular music from Ghana and Burkina Faso have known considerable success, at home and abroad. Though, while Ghanaian *Highlife* is relatively known, the music of Burkina Faso is a secret that is too well kept.

But the realized potential goes well beyond artistic and social success of bands from a bygone era. Today, there is plenty to love and cherish. The lively hip hop scenes across the African continent are but one example that illustrates that cultural life is more than surviving (Shipley 2013; Charry 2012; Perullo 2011; Mbaye 2011; Eisenberg 2012). Culture is thriving in many ways despite the working conditions of many cultural workers remaining precarious.

Building on active knowledge that the market can help create, distribute and valorise a range of cultural expressions, the market approach needs to be balanced by a debate concerning its limitations. The market, while perfectly adequate for popular music, is unlikely to produce a full range of credible cultural goods that society needs (Keat 2000, 159–60). This argument, Keat insists, does not place culture out of the market sphere but provides a rationale to let the market work for those expressions it can accommodate and think about ways to provide alternatives for those expressions that do not.

The present-day potential of the cultural industries is limited also because of a lack of thorough understanding of the histories and changes in the cultural field. This is not to say that no reasons are known, but rather that not enough reasons are known. In Ghana, the military government of Jerry Rawlings enforced a curfew that kept nightclubs empty and musicians unemployed. This, in turn, led to a significant self-imposed exile of musicians and entrepreneurs. As a result, the military of the early 1980s is often quoted as a reason for the downfall of live music in Accra and beyond. Yet, some are fully aware that this particular period is used merely as shorthand for a more complex set of issues that plagued the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This understanding of history has become a trope that simplifies a complex set of issues into one clear cause that can be ascribed to one person.
In Burkina Faso the debate is very similar. There, the low entry prices for concerts are still blamed on the attempt of Thomas Sankara to democratize culture by lowering the prices to 300 FCFA. Yet, there was no, or insufficient, compensation for the significant cuts in revenues of artists and organizers. This caused many orchestras and live bars to run on a constant operational loss, gradually causing their decline. Currently, prices range between 500-2000 FCFA, but the complexity of the issue is simplified to one intervention largely blamed on a former president’s policy from 30 years ago. The point here is that cultural industries are not new to these countries but the terminology that was used at international level was not translated to national policies.

Whatever the reasons may be, many people working in culture are currently in dire straits and there is little reason to romanticize this (Laaser 1997, 54). In part this is because the cultural industries are developing. But the more important reason is that this is an intrinsic feature of the cultural industries. This chapter has addressed the inherent risk and precarious working condition in the cultural industries, to illustrate that they are not intrinsically and socially inclusive (Oakley 2006; Belfiore 2002; Peck 2005; Ross 2007). The next chapter engages with this question further and proposes potential ways to mitigate the social inequality in cultural production.

The development of cultural industries, as a process, as discourse and a range of practices, builds on a driving force: potential. But that potential is limited by the socio-cultural realities in which these industries are developed. The challenge is to find a balance between embracing the potential for optimism and change, while being aware (but not paralysed) by the limits to that optimism. Many strategies do work quite well. The question is: how to better link strategies that work well and improve those that don’t? Because changes emerge from messy histories and practices, vernacular innovations pragmatically embrace the past towards a normative understanding of the future: both critique and optimism can be unrealistically ignorant of the cultural reality that simultaneously enables and limits change.

The river has turned and so has the caiman. Or rather, a new canal has been dug for the caiman, which it now has to follow. And for all its limitations
and failures, this new paradigm is reigning cultural policies. Whether it is rejected or embraced, it must be first of all understood. Because there is indeed potential, though its realization requires approaches that most often do not yet exist. The next chapter highlights initiatives that try to develop cultural industries and outlines the strengths and weaknesses of these actions in light of human development and using the capabilities approach.
A general understanding of the creative economy discourse has inspired practical efforts in Burkina Faso and Ghana. This chapter engages with such attempts in light of human development goals and capabilities advancement. The initiatives studied give reason for optimism because they signal an engagement with cultural industries that confronts urgent challenges. Optimism should not however prevent critical observations.

Optimism linked to cultural industries advancement is linked to a more general optimistic ‘vibe’ about the African continent as a whole. Until recently, much thinking and writing on the situation in, and the possibilities of Africa have been tainted by Afro-pessimism. This tendency to frame events on the continent as politically and historically inevitable has long plagued the understanding and coverage of past, present and future (Nothias 2014). In the past decade, this pessimistic imagination of the continent has been gradually superseded by a far more optimistic discourse, even though this remains based on the same kind of tropes that “essentialise, racialise, rank, describe selectively and predict” the fate of Africa, even though these tropes are now used in a positive manner (Nothias 2014, 335). This celebratory vision is largely based on significant GDP growth in certain African countries, but also changed the framing of ‘African’ culture to an optimistic and hopeful language (Versi 2014; van Graan 2014; The Economist 2011). Nonetheless, optimism about the perceived “virtuous circle of economic growth and improved governance is already starting to wear thin” (The Economist 2014, 49).

This chapter aligns itself neither with the Afro-pessimist, nor the
business-oriented Afro-optimism. The focus is on the different ways a range of actors are transforming cultural potential into practical realizations. Yet, while the results of many initiatives are hailed as great examples (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 53–86), this chapter addresses the processes that help transform ideas into practice. Many examples may not be really successful, yet they are not outright failures either. There are far too many promising and sincere attempts to make changes at this delicate level to dismiss any of them as futile. The underlying conditions that shape these ‘relatively successful’ failures are crucial towards developing cultural industries.

In short, this chapter is about the messy processes that aim to transform potential into realization. It simultaneously stresses the need for a normative impetus and necessity to balance this with empirical judgement not least because, optimism must remain cautious for it could be countered too easily (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 51). History and global politics make it easy to resort to pessimism and even cynicism about the plight of ‘Africa,’ yet there is in fact much reason to be optimistic and hopeful (Nyamnjoh 2008, 129).

4.1. Capabilities: a framework for engagement

There is ample reason to agree with the contention that “we need to think less in terms of ‘needs’ (with its implied connotation of passivity and dependence) and more in terms of positive capabilities” (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 111). But there are different levels and ways to engage with this. The UNESCO Creative Economy Report focuses on institutions and pathways as critical factors in the development of cultural industries (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 87–122). What is currently missing is an engagement with the capabilities that underlie the formation and consolidation of such institutions. As such, a distinction is made between what is to be attained and where the bottlenecks are located (in terms of networks and skills) that continue hampering the full potential of these institutions.

In order to conceptualize the diverse levels at which efforts towards supporting individuals and/or institutions to act are made, the analysis builds on the ‘capabilities’ approaches of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya
Sen. The term ‘approaches’ is used in the plural because the respective ideas of Nussbaum and Sen on the building blocks of human development differ. Despite their differences, both Nussbaum and Sen provide a way to look beyond obstacles and realizations. In their understanding of processes, rights are referred to as ‘entitlements’ and realizations as ‘achieved functionings.’ It is, however, at the level of capabilities that there is room for change. But it is also at this point many things, often invisibly, go wrong. Also when discussing cultural industries, the focus is most often on what preconditions should exist or what results should be attained and less on how this should be done.

The approaches as conceived by Sen and Nussbaum do however build on an understanding of capabilities that is narrowly defined in terms of individual possibilities. As such, they do not take into account the structural context or circumstances required in which capabilities (fail to) exist (Jackson 2005, 104). This echoes the liberalist school of political philosophy in which their work originates. The social and institutional aspects that can both reinforce and weaken the individual ability to achieve are not sufficiently discussed. Yet, capabilities can also be understood in terms of institutions, social relations and entitlements. These levels respectively translate into structural, social and individual capabilities (Jackson 2005, 118). This helps to translate the tension between structure and agency into the ‘capabilities approach’: institutions operate at the structural level and individuals at the level of agency, whereas the social context hovers in between, as the realm where institutional structure and individual agency are translated and contested (Jackson 2005, 117).

The focus within this chapter is deliberately narrow. Little attention is paid to the ‘hard’ physical infrastructure needed to make the cultural ecology work. As such, electricity, Internet, event venues and so on are not explicitly part of this exploration. This is because the ‘soft’ infrastructure is important in the process to make the hard infrastructure work.  

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25 The difference between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure is defined as follows: ‘Hard infrastructure is the nexus of buildings and institutions such as research institutes, educational establishments, cultural facilities and other meeting places as well as support services such as
interviews and encounters with the Burkinabè and the Ghanaian is infrastructure: there are issues with venues, electricity, Internet, logging of content use in the media (i.e. recording what music is played, so royalties can be paid to the right people), and so on. But as straightforward as these issues seem, they cannot be overcome simply: it takes active engagement with the capabilities of stakeholders to gradually overcome such challenges.

The discussion here builds on a selection of key capabilities that is grounded in the particular context under scrutiny. There is no definitive list of required capabilities. Nussbaum provides one, but invites alternative compositions (2011, 36), but Sen refrains from providing one, since he argues that democratic processes, as opposed to theoretical reflections, should form the basis of such a list (Sen 2004b, 77; Robeyns 2005, 106). The overview here is thus by definition tentative and incomplete. The selection made for the purpose of this study builds on extensive fieldwork and policy analysis that provided a grounded basis for identifying crucial capabilities or ‘instrumental freedoms,’ as Amartya Sen calls them. Therefore the following sections will look more deeply at drivers of capabilities such as: political participation, transparency guarantees, economic facilities, social opportunity and education.

4.2. Political participation

Amartya Sen provides a three-tiered approach to participation in political processes that can advance capabilities. He distinguishes between the direct, the instrumental, and the constructive roles of the exercise of political rights. The direct importance relates to active political participation in elections and the social process surrounding them. The instrumental role helps in enhancing people’s ability to be heard about their needs and wants in the political arena. The constructive role relates to the underlying debates that help articulate and conceptualise the ‘needs’ that are claimed and

transport, health, and amenities. Soft infrastructure is the system of associative structures and social networks, connections and human interactions, that underpins and encourages the flow of ideas between individuals and institutions.” (Landry 2000, 133)
negotiated (Sen 1999, 148). This links to the framework in which cultural policies shape the context of cultural industries. The following subsections look more closely at these three themes.

A key trope in the relation between politics and culture is ‘political will.’ This refers to the translation of new and existing policies into practice: while the texts are there, and politicians pay lip service to the virtues of culture, this does not readily translate into action. In spite of their different political cultures, Burkinabè and Ghanaian cultural actors perceive the lack of political will as a major issue. Yet the countries do not easily compare: Ghana is a reasonably functioning democracy with free press, where public administration is influenced through prior British colonial rule and currently operates as a functional democracy with regular and fair elections. Burkina Faso is only formally a democracy; it’s electoral system is a superficial guise that masks the rule of President Blaise Compaoré since 1987. Free press is limited due to politically influenced (self-) censorship. Moreover, public administration bears a significant influence from the French system through colonial legacy.

The perceived lack of political will is cited as one of the major reasons why there is no real change towards a more established and remunerative set of cultural industries. Yet, there are policies in place and there is openness to

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26 Blaise Compaoré was forced to resign on 31 October 2014 by popular protest throughout the country. The analysis here thus builds on the situation before that date, as the implications of this political change are as of yet (10 December 2014) unclear.

27 This is just a brief introduction to the political constellation of these countries. In Ghana, a detailed reading of the supreme court ruling on the petition of the 2012 elections that upheld the presidential term of John Dramani Mahama (National Democratic Congress) after he took over office from John Atta Mills upon his passing earlier that year sheds light on the internal contestations of the fairness of Ghana’s political constellation. Similarly, in 2014, the CDP (Comité pour la Démocratie et le Progrès), the party of Compaoré, has seen a significant exodus of its members to the opposition following popular protest against his attempt to change the constitution in a way that would allow him to run for president again in 2015. As this is not a treatise on the political situation in West Africa, engagement with these national political struggles remains tangential to the overall argument.
involvement and engagement of civil society. Often, there is a sense that it involves speaking up for the importance of the arts and culture. The importance can be situated in cultural terms, for greater recognition of certain practices or expressions. More often, it means articulating greater recognition of the social status of people working in the cultural sector, in law and in discourse. But most often, it means making a case that the arts and culture are serious about their business. Recognition about the economic viability is important for investors and banks to take cultural entrepreneurs seriously. Sometimes, it does however mean that there is an expectation that political talk is translated into political action. The desire to receive some form of subsidy or support often influences the perception and reception of government policies for the sector. This raises the question; what is hampering the effective engagement of the cultural sector with the government in order to negotiate the further role politicians can play? The direct or intrinsic virtue of actual public engagement is not fully translated into action in Burkina Faso. This is, in part, due to the unorganized civil society, but also, and perhaps more importantly, due to the lack of actual democratic deliberation of policy.

The question remains why the mutual expectations of governments and cultural entrepreneurs are not always on a par? The driving idea of governments for adopting the creative economy discourse is to a large extent that people working in culture should be able to make a good and stable income from their activities. This is, after all the predicate of the exogenous cultural and creative industries discourse that actively influenced the policy language in recent years. Yet, the cultural sector seems to embrace this discourse in the assumption that it will lead to greater governmental recognition – and potentially, financial contributions to the sector. The ongoing negotiation of the terms and limits of public and private activities is generally instrumental in the political negotiation of claims that can be laid on public spending. Sen calls this level of political engagement the instrumental use of political participation. It helps lay claims on certain needs and helps find a common ground to negotiate the terms of interaction between government and civil society.
Both in Burkina Faso and Ghana, civil society attempts to bring together the fragmented cultural field in order to negotiate and formulate a joint vision towards legislation, policy and support. There is, as of 2010, little or no collective bargaining and lobbying in the Burkinabè cultural ecology (d’Almeida and Alleman 2010, 9). While governments, as well as networks and organizations (such as MUSIGA in Ghana, and APRODEM\textsuperscript{28} in Burkina Faso), have been trying to change this. It is, however a process that requires time and great effort. The greatest effort is perhaps for many individuals to see the benefit of concerted action. In part this can be linked to issues of trust, as described above. Yet, particularly in Burkina Faso, the difficulty to build sustainable alliances limits the opportunity for collective bargaining. In this context, it is the Ministry of Culture who is (indirectly) funding the establishment and consolidation of sector organizations in order to facilitate their lobbying power.

There is no formal censorship in Burkina Faso, but there is a clear sense of what can be said and what cannot. These limitations are a combination of hierarchical relations, aversion to open conflict and a subliminally repressive climate in political terms. Yet, politically active musicians, like Smockey (from \textit{se moquer}, to mock) and Sams’k Le Jah, are explicitly defying the powers that be. As a result, their music does not get airplay on the national radio or television. And they have encountered menaces due to their political engagement. But, after years of active engagement in music, these activists are still at the vanguard of political protest.

These artists and their work actively foster a basis for political engagement. In spite of the social and structural limitations in artistic and political expression, a compelling movement has grown increasingly visible in 2013 to contest the attempt of President Blaise Compaoré to change article 37 of the constitution. This would allow him to run for President again and remain in power until 2020. The protest movement, \textit{le balai citoyen} refers to citizens making the effort to clean-up politics in the country. In spite of limitations in political participation, the involvement of artists constructively informs and engages citizens in their struggle to be heard. Yet, their

\textsuperscript{28} L’Association des Producteurs, Distributeurs et Éditeurs de Musique (Benguelet 2012).
“expressiveness and emotion also imply that [such] dissonant voices will be heard, but these are aspects of culture that policy-makers are not always prepared to accommodate” (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 40).

On a level more directly related to the cultural industries, there is a growing group of young cultural entrepreneurs who want to make a living from their activities and who are demanding fiscal reform (d’Almeida and Alleman 2010, 5). Similarly, 7 September 2013, saw a coalition of cultural journalists (J2C, Les Journalistes et les Communicateurs pour la Culture) organize a march to demand the enforcement of the existing music quota legislation. The aim was clear and simple: the law that stipulates that a 60% of public media and 40% of private media content should be local has to be enforced. Pending concrete results of this action, it is interesting to consider that the initiative was taken by a few journalists and not by the rights holders or managers in the music business (Somé 2013). There is however, little debate on the contradiction between the call for protectionist measures (in the form of media quota) and the struggle at African Union and ECOWAS levels to create common markets for culture (OAU and UNESCO 1992; African Union 2005). Yet, in the case of Zimbabwe, where 75% local content quota exist for all broadcasters the results are mixed: while there is more airplay for (young) local musicians, audiences lament the quality of (at least some of) their work and the media exposure and “popularity has not translated into commercial success” (Chari 2013, 39). The call to enforce Burkinabè media quota may thus not be the most effective strategy for the music business.

The challenge to improve political participation far exceeds the challenge to consolidate the cultural industries. Success in negotiating apt policies, partnerships and regulatory frameworks in the cultural sector is an indicator to what extent the politicians and civil society manage to negotiate the terms under which the needs of the sector are translated into political will and action. The current debate is not only instrumental towards negotiating policies and strategies to implement them, but also constructive in defining what kind of needs should take priority (Sen 1999, 153–4). A prominent Burkinabè musician argues that the status quo currently aims to make everybody happy by trying to support all of them, while in fact providing no
one with the necessary means to produce quality recordings or accompanying video clips. His argument is that, rather than not making any choices by giving tiny shares to virtually all, the choice should be made to support fewer initiatives in a more substantial way. This, he argues, is the only way that emergent production can be helped to attain the quality needed to convince audiences of its worth. Making such choices, is however a key problem in cultural policy approaches, where a balance has to be struck between access and excellence, as the role of the government as a facilitator or as an architect of cultural practice (Craik, McAllister, and Davis 2003, 29). These are not simply practical but political choices, which stress the need for greater collaboration and negotiation between the cultural sector and its ministry.

4.3. Transparency guarantees

The previous section illustrates the expressed need of Burkinabè cultural sector to receive direct or indirect support from their government. This is however not a universally perceived necessity, as a fair amount of stakeholders indicate the opposite. They claim that cultural subsidies are not a good idea, for different reasons. A small minority would express explicitly that such subsidies are merely market distortion, as the free market would balance the exchange of supply and demand without the unfair competition that is fostered through public subsidies to private enterprises, thus following dogmatic defenders of free enterprise in all fields, including culture (e.g. Cowen 1998). More commonly, the point is made that subsidies are not an effective way of support, because of the way they are administered. It is however all too easy to blame individuals alone for perpetuating ‘corruption.’

The following four examples show the ways (a lack of) transparency influences the cultural industries. First, the tension between state and private sector in Burkina Faso is considered. Second, *payola* \(^{29}\) in Ghana serves as an example to discuss the relation between artists and managers on the one

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\(^{29}\) Payola is a bribe paid to radio and television stations, often directly to DJs and programmers, to get airplay. This practice and its implications are described in more detail further in this chapter.
hand and gatekeepers in the media on the other hand. Third, the administration of royalties by copyright collection societies is discussed, building on examples from Ghana and Burkina Faso. In closing, the high level of informal trade and interaction makes the challenge to operate in greater transparency difficult, not least because many cultural workers are actually not keen on disclosing their books.

The balance between public subsidies and private investment is a contentious issue around the world. Not only in Burkina Faso. Yet, in Burkina Faso, there is little debate on the amount of public support that is needed. There is a general understanding that the overall budget of the government is limited, and that even the slightest increase in funds for culture undercuts further investment in education, health, or infrastructure. This is no reason not to provide any public support as such, but the high priority of virtually all forms of public expenditure make the need for cultural support challenging. In short, there is too little funding and there is a fairly broad consensus that this should increase. Even though there is widespread understanding, increased public expenditure is not necessarily a realistic scenario.

There is a tendency among those who do not generally receive subsidies to dismiss the need altogether. This is because of the way they are administered. The perception is strong that there are no transparent processes in place when allotting and distributing funds, amounts are rather symbolic than sufficiently substantial to make a difference in a production or promotional budget.

When it comes to promoting music in the media, transparency also forms an issue. This is largely due to the intertwined practices of payola and royalties. Payola is a bribe paid to radio and television stations, often directly to DJs and programmers in return for airplay. This practice could be said to undermine their role as gatekeepers. The costs associated with payola are usually offset through royalty payments and music sales that flow back to the rights holders (thus the investment is paid back), but this return is limited in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Payola has been around from the early days of popular music throughout the world, and while regulation has made the process more transparent, it has not disappeared (Caves 2000, 290–4). Further, there is a combined issue in Ghana; on the one hand, there is no
clear regulation, let alone enforcement on the ways DJs and television programmers are to work together to promote music. Afia Sarpong (2014) discusses this in the article *Payola abr3*, which literally means “tired of *payola*” on Ghanamusic.com. On the other hand, there is no logging system in place to record what music is played and how often. This limits the possibilities to charge media organizations for content use and limits the ability of the Ghana Music Rights Organization (GHAMRO), currently the only copyright collection society in the country, to justly divide up the proceeds among artists according to their popularity. While GHAMRO is looking for solutions to this issue, they fail to practice what they preach: obtaining data from them regarding income and payments has not proven successful. A team of KPMG researchers conducting a large study for the Ghanaian Musicians’ Union (MUSIGA), encountered the same issue. The detailed report on the music sector in Ghana only reveals the overall royalties receipts (GH¢700,000 or EUR182,800), on a total revenue of GH¢140 million, or EUR36,559,638 (KPMG 2014, 129–30). This means that royalties make up only 0.5% of income from the sector. A recommendation would be to take the first step and publish all data publicly. That way both artists and media know what is paid in and out in terms of royalties and it could be seen to be done in a fair way.

In Burkina Faso, on the other hand, there has been a steady increase in royalty payments. This is in large part thanks to a levy on blank discs to compensate for royalty losses from piracy and home copying, which provides far greater transparency. The *Bureau Burkinabè du droit d'Auteur* (BBDA), the copyright collection society, has published all records in statistical year books of the ministry dealing with culture (*Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme 2010*; *Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme 2011*; *Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme 2012*). The revenues from copyright are also significantly higher: in 2009 the BBDA raised FCFA893.9m (EUR1.4m) in royalties on a total estimated music turnover of FCFA5432m (EUR8.3m) (BBEAC 2012, 74). Royalties thus amount to 16.5% of total income from

30 The lack of administrative transparency in collecting societies has also been problematic in Senegal (Penna, Thormann, and Finger 2004, 105).
music, whereas piracy is equally rife. Yet, also in Burkina Faso, the need for payola and the limited royalties payments poses a challenge for artists, who often have to invest in these costs personally (ARPEM 2010, 7).

The increasing availability of data and the greater openness of debates provide a basis for more active public deliberation about ends and means. Yet, the availability of such information does not solely depend on governments and public bodies. Transparency goes both ways, and while governments and copyright collection societies may have difficulties communicating their processes and data, so do the cultural industries provide a challenge when it comes to being measured. The high degree of informality in the cultural sector poses particular challenges. If they would be declared business, the economic turnover would be far more detailed and reliable, forgoing the need to make imprecise estimates of mapping exercises with incomplete coverage.

Yet, in Burkina Faso and Ghana, many cultural workers and businesses are not formally registered with the chamber of commerce. This is a reality that is unlikely to undergo radical change in the near future. Not because there will not be many cultural enterprises registering as formal companies, but rather because the informal sphere does not have the same meaning as it often has in the global North, where it is associated with tax evasion. In Accra and Ouagadougou, the informal economies have been discussed in detail (Hart 1973; Dijk 1986), and those in Lagos provide insight into recent evolutions in light of digital technologies (Lobato 2010). The existence of informal economies is not an issue as such, since such activities reduce unemployment (even if this remains unregistered by labour statistics), they also provide on-the-job training and a way into the economy (often through sub-contracting) (Dijk 1986, 178). The ways they are included in (cultural) policies makes all the difference. Informal economies are a field of action that should be understood as a vital constituent of fragile and emerging cultural industries, and not as a problem that needs to be overcome at all cost. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. What matters here is that informal activity renders the sector relatively opaque. Trade, employment and turnover are estimated but provide relatively little reliable data for governments and sector lobbyists to work with.
The lack of transparency of private and international investment, sponsorship and subsidies makes a detailed overview of the arts and culture funding almost impossible. In Burkina Faso, for example, 71.71% of support for cultural organizations comes from abroad (Mandé 2011). It is contradictory that most of this funding is project-based, but that applications require a proven track record. As such, it benefits those with established social and cultural capital to reinforce their dominant position.

4.4. Economic facilities

In Burkina Faso and Ghana, there is limited government support for arts and culture (d’Almeida and Alleman 2010; KPMG 2014). The Burkinabé Ministry of Culture and Tourism holds some 0.30% of the total government budget (BBEAC 2012). In Ghana, the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts supported the music sector, through the musicians union, with a GH¢2m (some €800K) in 2012. The overall lack of access to money is a major constraint to long-term thinking (ARPEM 2010, 9). Managers have the tendency to sign artists quickly, even though they lack capital to invest in production and promotion (Shipley 2013, 23).

At the same time, banks are reluctant to invest. Even though the Guarantee Fund for Cultural Industries has existed since 2003 at the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development in Lomé to facilitate and secure bank loans for the cultural industries (in collaboration with the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie). In Burkina Faso however, few loans have been granted thanks to this mechanism, and in the rare cases it has been used, significant issues with repayment have decreased the confidence of local banks, who are the institutions granting the loans. In Ghana this initiative is little known and no interviewee, from the sector, mentioned trying to obtain investment from this source, even though it is open to all ECOWAS member states. There is however other smaller initiatives within the country: the Institute for Music and Development (IMD) and the Danish

31 ‘The Institute for Music and Development (IMD) contributes to the evolution of a professional and vibrant music industry in Ghana and continues to play a pivotal role in the
Center for Culture and Development (DCCD)\textsuperscript{32} have established a micro-finance mechanism for the cultural sector. This also has known issues, as the cultural differences between bankers and artists have proven difficult to bridge. A stakeholder in this project highlights this:

\begin{quote}
Making them understand that this is what you need. So, it meant for a very difficult situation. Because the bank that could help them to do it, didn’t understand how to help. And they, who need to help the bank to help understand them, didn’t understand how they could help the bank make them understand. \textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

The fund is, however, cited as a good practice in the \textit{2013 Creative Economy Report} (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 117), even though it is in fact dormant and the complex context has not yet been fully addressed. This is, one of the instances where greater critical engagement with the nature and context of the sector is needed. In spite of ample goodwill from artist-entrepreneurs and bankers, in order to make such initiatives attain greater success, mediation is needed. Moreover, in this context, there is probably greater cultural similarity between professionals (bankers or artists) around the world, than cultural similarity in a certain place. Here, global networks of willing bankers could provide a framework to build greater understanding of the cultural industries in order to allow for better assessment of financial needs. Though there is also need for less voluntary measures that can form an integral part of cultural policies.

\begin{itemize}
\item development of a self-sustaining music industry network in Africa through advocacy, documentation of traditional and contemporary music styles and their dissemination through the electronic media as well as production of Audio visual material, human resource and institutional capacity building and creation of network opportunities.’ (http://www.imdghanaonline.org/aboutus.html) (accessed 23 March 2014)
\item The DCCD (or CKU in Danish) “is a self-governing institution under the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In close cooperation with Danish embassies and representations, CKU manages culture and development programmes in The Middle East, Asia, West Africa and East Africa.” (http://www.cku.dk/en/aboutcku/) (accessed 15 October 2014)
\item Personal interview with Ghanaian stakeholder in Accra, 7 July 2013.
\end{itemize}
In Burkina Faso, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, in collaboration with the Direction de la Promotion des Industries Culturelles et Créatives (DPICC) and Appui au Renforcement des Politiques et Industries Culturelles (ARPIC), is working towards the implementation of an Agence de Développement des Industries Culturelles et Créatives (ADICC) to provide technical support, funding and investment for the cultural sector. A feasibility study was concluded in 2013, and the agency is, as of 2014, yet to become active. There are thus some signs that the limited government funding for the cultural sector may be reinforced by a number of local initiatives, both in terms of subsidies and loans.

However, not only banks, but also entrepreneurs in the cultural industries distrust the sector. Banks generally distrust the sector, in spite of obvious successes, because of its volatility. Yet, there are few people in the sector who are willing to invest in certain parts of the industries, particularly production. There are many examples of successful artists that have scored hit songs that provided significant income. While some reinvest their proceeds in the cultural industries, bigger companies tend to diversify their investment portfolio, beyond the cultural industries, rather than expanding production within and beyond their organization. A manager at a large cultural enterprise in Ghana was asked if they would invest in music production and at this point, responded: “I could. We’ve done this in the past. We discovered [artist]. We invested in CDs, pushing and promoting them for two years.” But, pushed if they would do it again they said no. 34

This manager made it clear that their reluctance to invest in production had more reasons than just a lack of profitability, but the example is telling. In a similar way, a once-successful artist in Burkina Faso now runs a security firm, which was founded on the profits of artistic ventures. The instability of financial returns in the cultural sector encourages a shifting of the proceeds from music into other parts of the economy. In short, even those who work in the sector often share the reluctance of banks to invest in cultural industries. This shows that there is ample understanding concerning the risk that characterizes the sector, even though there is little explicit

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34 Interview with a Ghanaian entrepreneur, Accra 14 June 2013.
engagement with this risk as a general characteristic of the cultural industries, as discussed in the previous chapter. In part, this is due to the lack of “sound professionalism” in the sector (ARPEM 2010, 8) but also the incommensurability of the cultures of banking and cultural industries. While there are strategies that help mitigate this risk in the formal sector, these do not necessarily translate well to formal enterprises and the logic of banks and investors.

In spite of the on-going efforts to improve access to investment, the creative economy discourse remains mostly seen as a way to make a case for more subsidies or support for adequate infrastructure. This leads to a contradiction: while governments attempt to develop cultural industries in order to encourage entrepreneurship and profitability, the majority of participants in training schemes see these initiatives mainly as a way to obtain subsidies for their enterprise or support for the cultural sector as a whole. Even throughout the process of business plan development in Ouagadougou, subsidies were invariably mentioned in the budget, ranging from symbolic to decisive amounts. The point here is that still too many entrepreneurs build a budget on the presumption that the investment will be subsidized, and that only the working costs will need to be covered. There is however, a growing group who see the potential of working with economically viable initiatives in the market economy. Most cultural activities in popular culture can successfully subscribe to that logic. Though, “traditional” artists like Zougnazagmda in Burkina Faso and King Ayisoba in Ghana are very successful, both culturally and economically. Other initiatives remain dependent on local or international support to sustain their activities. Music schools or the publication of books in national languages cannot survive without support. There are unfortunately far more ideas than can be supported. So there is a need to make difficult choices. The limited studies that are conducted in the context of Burkina Faso propose a range of initiatives without any attention to budgetary restraints (BBEAC 2012; De Beukelaer 2013).

Limited access to subsidies, investment, and loans poses a problem for many entrepreneurs in the cultural industries. The active focus on increasing possibilities to access economic resources to turn ideas into practice is
welcome. Yet, in trying to create a climate friendly to business and investment, greater attention should be paid to social opportunities within existing and planned initiatives:

“the risk of making culture and creative industries policy-making ‘safe’ for investors or the authorities is of watering down goals to the point where it loses cultural meaning and merely becomes old wine in new bottles. A business-as-usual co-opting of cultural expression for existing interests, all the while missing opportunities to enhance dialogue, debate and, ultimately, new forms of development for marginalized people” (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 99).

While there is a need to consider the aggregation of wealth in the cultural industries and society as a whole, the more vital consideration is the spread of the opportunities that arise from economic development (Sen 1999, 39), as “the impact of economic growth depends on how the fruits of economic development are used” (Sen 1999, 44, emphasis in original). Also in music, the ‘winners’ need due attention, but those that are working at more ‘informal’ levels may need even more attention in order to have sufficient “space to grow and innovate” (Bloustien 2009, 464–5). This is amply demonstrated in the case of Reemdoogo in Ouagadougou outlined in section 1.4.

4.5. Social opportunity

Social opportunity (or social capital) is an important determinant of success in the cultural industries. This section addresses five ways through which decisive action can mitigate social inequality in the cultural sector.

First, artists and cultural professionals in Burkina Faso and Ghana have long been marginalized. The profession is often still seen as an option of failure, a last resort for those who have failed in life. It is not seen as “a viable career choice unless they already have financial resources” (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 121). As a result, the tendency remains to migrate to the North
in order to pursue a career in a more favourable environment (African Union 2005, 6). Yet, many successful artists and entrepreneurs have helped make transformations. Culture is increasingly seen as a respectable profession through which a decent living can be made. The stardom of the few reflects on the aspirations of many. The legal framework to see artistic and cultural activity as a particular kind of work is, however, lagging behind. Both countries have a legal statute for artists in the making. The Burkinabè legal text was voted on in 2012 but as of 2013, this framework exists only on paper. Moreover, it is unclear how these regulations engage with the more normative question about what precisely constitutes ‘good work’ in the Burkinabè and Ghanaian cultural industries, even though such an understanding is needed to frame the debate (Hesmondhalgh 2010b).

Second, there is an emerging commitment from ECOWAS ministers of culture and youth to build on the cultural industries to provide employment for the West African youth. The *Praia Declaration* (UNESCO 2013) engages explicitly with the need to work towards inclusive and sustainable youth employment. The concerted debate at a regional level provides a hopeful start for future action. Yet, the follow-up and evaluation of these intentions are crucial (Mensah 2013). The next section, on education, provides insight into the difficulties concerning education and inclusion of youth.

Third, Burkina Faso and Ghana know low levels of interpersonal trust, as indicated in the UNESCO Culture and Development Indicator Suite (UNESCO forthcoming) that is reflected in the organization of the cultural sector. The limited trust in collaborators generates hierarchies that concentrate power. Given limited transparency and accountability, this creates a *de facto* class divide between the big and the small operators in the sector. Where collaborations emerge, they often take the form of cartels, which further erodes trust in those who have ‘made it’ by those who have not (yet) made it. In Ghana, the tensions surrounding this divide are discussed openly, partly through online fora like Ghanamusic.com. In Burkina Faso the debate is more covert, even though (and perhaps precisely because) the hierarchies are more explicit than in Ghana, both in the music industries and in general.

Fourth, there is a socio-cultural habit of engaging in kinship jokes
(parenté à la plaisanterie) to defuse strained social relations between ethnic groups. In practice, this means that there are relations between ethnic groups that allow people to engage in making jokes in order to get across difficult messages. This helps to avoid confrontation, as these jokes are not seen as offensive, even though they may carry important and difficult messages. The Study on the Social and Economic impact of Culture in Burkina Faso (BBEAC 2012) discusses the potential benefits of this tradition for social development in detail. In Burkina Faso, the report that discusses this link also addresses the economic role the cultural industries can play. Unfortunately, the author makes no connection between the social impact of the kinship jokes to the economic potential of the cultural industries (De Beukelaer 2013). Developing this connection explicitly would be helpful precisely because it addresses power relations and conflict resolution.

Fifth, there is high involvement of ‘returnees’ or former diaspora in the cultural industries. They bring many good ideas, expertise, money and a whole different mind-set. Ghana has strong connections with Nigeria, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA), while Burkina Faso gravitates towards Ivory Coast, France, Belgium and Canada. The focus here is on returnees from Ivory Coast to Burkina Faso, since they constitute a large group of returnees and because they occupy key positions in the Burkinabè cultural industries and there is a greater tendency of returnees or diaspora to take key positions elsewhere. Most of them have come back to Burkina Faso in the past decades to study after growing up in Abidjan or elsewhere in the neighbouring country. There are two principal reasons for their return. First, the higher university fees for non-Nationals, forcing many Burkinabè back to Ouagadougou to pursue studies, rather than staying in Ivory Coast. Second, many were forced to return due to the civil war that erupted in the process of democratization after the 33-year reign of the first Ivorian President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny. This led to xenophobic hostilities against diasporic Burkinabè, often holding Ivorian citizenship. Upon their return they witnessed a cultural life that did not resemble the dynamism of Côte d’Ivoire, where artists like Alpha Blondy, Tiken Jah Fakoly, Magic

The stardom of the few reflects on the aspirations of many.
System and DJ Arafat had established lucrative careers. Hence they started organizing events, occupying radio presenter posts and so on. In short, they brought innovation. Yet, in doing so, they also took control of the commercial cultural sector in the country, by virtue of (re-)establishing it. Their first-mover advantage of the diaspora has translated into a rather firm grip on the sector, while they transformed the way the cultural sector is seen.

Literature on the cultural industries clearly indicates, contrary to celebratory claims in policy documents, that social inclusion or active engagement with inequality, takes explicit (policy) effort (Oakley 2006; Belfiore 2002; Peck 2005). Or, to use a metaphor, “big fish eat little fish” in the music industries (Penna, Thormann, and Finger 2004, 103). While perfect social equality is utopian, it is equally naïve to think that people in poverty can benefit from the same opportunities as those with greater resources. This is precisely the basis of the human development approach, which stresses the need to focus on the capabilities of people, and not merely outcomes. This is obvious from the limited success most artists have, as compared to the few who serve as 'good' example and sources of aspiration: “While a few artists transform musical value into other forms of wealth through the conversion of fame, most remain both hopeful and anxious about the potential connections the music will bring” (Shipley 2013, 283). In this context, social inequality is one of the negative tendencies (Girard 1982) that should be taken into account when devising policies in the countries. This argument is crucial to human development as well, since creating opportunities for as many people as possible makes more prosperous and inclusive societies possible. Opportunities are capabilities that build on deliberate choice, not on economic performance alone, and it is not simply “a luxury that only richer countries can afford” (Sen 1999, 143).

4.6. Education

Education is a key part of Human Development Indicators, as it enhances capabilities on an individual level. Education however, occupies a peculiar position in the capabilities approach, because it is actually an entitlement and not a capability as such. This is a crucial difference, since education is
something that can help attaining capabilities, but does not form an individual ability in itself. It is, rather, a means towards developing capabilities. Yet it is through education that other aspects of capabilities can be further developed.

The relation between culture and education is a highly complex one. Formal and informal learning coexist and much learning is autodidactic (ARPEM 2010, 9). Advancing education requires a holistic model that builds on extended formal and informal education (van Beilen 2012, 62–3), even though education alone cannot help stimulate the cultural industries (van Beilen and Hearn 2013, 219). Cultural education establishes traditions while raising interest and teaching artistic skills to children and adolescents. This lays the foundation for cultural creation. Much of such creation remains in the sphere of amateurism, in the best possible sense of the word: a work of love. Yet, it also allows for new generations of artists to emerge, which in turn allows for the cultural industries to draw from the realized cultural potential.

This section addresses the current place of culture in education at three levels: first, training courses for adult professionals; second, arts administration and arts programs at universities; and third, education at primary and secondary school levels. Each level struggles with specific problems but the initiatives in place are addressing real needs in a very constructive way.

Training programmes that focus explicitly on skills development in the cultural industries form the most explicit and visible link between education and the cultural industries. Only such short training programmes focus explicitly on cultural and creative industries. Burkina Faso has ARPIC35 and in Ghana, one of the initiatives consists of workshops jointly organized by MUSIGA36 and the British Council. These initiatives are built on relatively short-term project funding, primarily through foreign donors. One of their principal aims is to train artists and cultural entrepreneurs to run their

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36 Musician’s Union of Ghana
activities as economically viable businesses. Much attention is paid to the legislative, regulative and fiscal framework in which they are meant to work. As such, these training programs are part of an effort to regulate informal activity into a formal economic setting. The content of cultural industries training does not necessarily build on existing practices in the sector. At least in the context of *Esprit d’Entreprise*[^37] (the spirit of enterprise) in Burkina Faso, January 2013, the focus was in line with the ideological critique outlined in the previous chapter. The approach was technical and prescriptive. Any traditional way of working and trading was dismissed as inadequate, and no attention was paid to the reality that the entrepreneurs and administrators have as a starting point. There was no room to discuss divergent models, even through they are known and documented (Spaas 2012; Daffé 2013).

Yet, even more can be said about the scope and duration of trainings. One training week is too short. Particularly since the levels of previous knowledge is not equal between participants, limiting a swift start and steady tempo. The general level of education limits full engagement of participants. Moreover, the method of teaching is very instructive. While the course book is built around examples, these are solved as a group, leaving little chance to develop an active understanding of the material.

Nonetheless, skills-oriented training for practicing professionals is a need. And the existing initiatives provide a sensible response to that need, even though the demand still outweighs the offer. Since these initiatives are the only local education initiatives that focus explicitly on cultural industries, alongside continental initiatives by Arterial Network, far greater engagement is needed. Particularly since the networks these initiatives should have formed are yet to materialize, in part due to failure of the ARPEM project in Abidjan and Dakar. For the next generation of cultural workers, a shift in higher education is needed to accommodate the growing demand for professionalization in the cultural economy.

Internally, training programs also pose problems. International partners

[^37]: The author took part in this training 28-31 January 2013. This section is therefore based on personal observations and informal interviews with participants.
currently primarily carry the cost of training, although APEIC\textsuperscript{38} in Niger is an exception, where the government is contributing the largest share of the budget. The institutional framework is also taxing for such initiatives (Ouédraogo 2012, 27). More structurally, there is a significant discrepancy between the formal evaluation of training sessions in Burkina Faso (Ouédraogo 2012) and the feedback given by participants during interviews. While appreciation of these programs is high, informal conversations with participants reveals that the training does not fully respond to their needs.

Higher education poses a particularly serious challenge. In Burkina Faso, there are courses in arts administration (e.g. University of Ouagadougou) and artistic practice (e.g. INAFAC,\textsuperscript{39} Ouagadougou) and they operate on a very small scale that is not sufficiently relative to the size of the population. Arts programs have also not adapted to the cultural industries logic. More importantly, they provide relatively little critical insight into that logic. As a result, the tendency in Burkina Faso is to attend the Université Senghor in Alexandria, where the cultural department offers graduate programs in cultural heritage and cultural industries (leading to some active engagement with the cultural industries, such as Zida [2010] and Zorom [2012]). This institution is an initiative of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie meant to support the development of Francophone Africa. Since 2013, Burkina Faso also hosts the African Cultural Industries Institute (Institut Africain des Industries Culturelles), a school for higher vocational training in the sector.

In Ghana, greater attention is paid to university-level training of (traditional) performing artists (e.g. University of Ghana, Legon, University of Winneba, Methodist University, and University of Cape Coast). The

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\textsuperscript{38} Agence de Promotion des Entreprises et Industries Culturelles, Agency for the Promotion of Cultural Enterprises and Industries.

\textsuperscript{39} Institut National de Formation Artistique et Culturelle, National Institute for Artistic and Cultural Training.
engagement with cultural policies and creative industries is still nascent, yet there is a realization that these elements should be taken up in the curriculum and a clear intention to do so.

Higher education in general has to cope with a troubled legacy that may in part be blamed on the neglect of higher education in colonial times and the relative incapacity at a later stage to adapt the curricula to national contexts (Boahen 2011, 106; Kovács 2008, 99). The habit of elites to attend university in Europe and the USA has largely perpetuated this tendency, even though the University of Ghana has trained a number of influential global scholars. However, limited focus on basic research, the near-absence of teaching in local languages (Teferra and Altbachl 2004, 45) and low number of programs that extend beyond practical courses hampers the quality of education (Connell 2007, 109). Both for training and higher education, most textbooks and teaching examples build on foreign contexts, often following former colonial ties. While this practice is inevitable at almost all universities, the relative absence of literature on cultural policies or cultural industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana is an issue that must be addressed. It is worth noting some efforts to correct this imbalance, for example, an entrepreneurial alumnus of the cultural administration programme in Ouagadougou published a guide for the sector (Bara 2014). There is a need for more initiatives like this one, that can transform teaching about the cultural industries in the region, not at least because engagement with culture at universities (particularly in advanced courses and research) gives greater public legitimacy to pursue arts and culture as a profession (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 120).

Primary and secondary schools in Ghana and Burkina Faso do not generally offer cultural or artistic education as part of the curriculum (Flolu 2000; UNESCO forthcoming; UNESCO forthcoming). The reasons for this are diverse. In Ghana, cultural education was cut from the school curriculum during the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s. In Burkina Faso, it is less clear what the reasons are but the outcome is rather visible; musicians lament their limited knowledge of music theory and composition, while signalling the need for opportunities to improve their instrumental skills.
The success of live music in Ghana is often linked to lively musical life in Ghanaian schools between independence (when the first President, Kwame Nkrumah, paid great attention to the arts as a means of forming the nation) and the SAPs in the 1980s. The cut in cultural (and other parts) of education is often blamed on Jerry Rawlings, who served as Head of the military regime at the time. This action, was however part of an army-enforced imposition of radical macro-economic reforms (Reid 2009, 306), which were a reaction to the slumping economy of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In a similar way, theatre featured prominently in Burkinabè secondary education between the 1960s and 1980s, after which only some of the activities were taken up by private initiatives (Guingané 2001). This is, in fact, a far more general problem, as similar shifts away from formal engagement with education have occurred across the continent.

At the level of education in general, many choices have to be made. Given the low rates of literacy in Burkina Faso (29% [adults 15+] and 39% [youth 15-24], and respectively 7 and 6 percentage points less for women), priorities may seem to lay elsewhere. Even in Ghana, where literacy rates are significantly higher (67% [adults 15+] and 81% [youth 15-24] and, respectively 6 and 1 percentage points less for women), basic education for all remains a challenge. In spite of such challenges, there is little reason not to include broad attention to artistic and creative education throughout all levels of education, particularly since there is an increasing contradiction between policy aims (that focus on CCIs) and the existing curricula (that increasingly focus on subjects with immediate economic benefits) around the world. Artistic and creative focus in education fosters the formation of imaginative minds that benefit from play, creative expression and artistic imagination, which is crucial to the well-being and democratic citizenship of all (Nussbaum 2012) and professional development towards the cultural industries of an important minority.

The present situation in Burkina Faso and Ghana resembles the Tanzanian case, where musical practice, from learning through to performing has become dependent on the ability to learn as an autodidact (Perullo 2011,

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In terms of general education, there are however major efforts to get arts and culture (back) into the school curricula in Ghana and Burkina Faso. UNESCO is currently supporting an inter-ministerial effort to include arts and culture in the curriculum (UNESCO 2014). Similar efforts are made in Ghana, under the initiative of the Ghana Culture Forum. The question remains why this part of the school curriculum was ever eliminated in the first place.

In the face of cultural, democratic and spiritual survival, education should remain more than merely practical skills for economic growth.

This resonates with the ideas shared at the World Conferences on Arts Education in Port Elizabeth (2001), Lisbon (2006) and Seoul (2010) that called for the permanent and central inclusion of culture in the education curriculum and “study ways and means to draw up localized Arts Education programmes based on local values and traditions” (UNESCO 2006, 18). During a roundtable on difficulties in the music sector in the Northern region of Ghana, a proposal was made to overcome the current challenges in terms of education. How can the knowledge and skill of older artists be used to reintroduce artistic education in schools and beyond? This builds on the double challenge that currently exists: a lack of education and a lack of social protection for aging musicians. This could provide a way to bridge gaps between traditional and contemporary ways of expressing culture. Including the arts and culture in primary and secondary schools curricula would provide sizable and stable income opportunities for artists. Though, finding the balance between traditional apprenticeships and present-day social and educational structures in policies remains a particular issue (Perullo 2011, 353).

In the context of education, two Adinkra symbols epitomize a crucial argument: the Sankofa and the Ofamfa symbols respectively mean “return for it” and “critical examination” and when combined, they gain a new meaning:

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Adinkra are symbols created by the Akan people of Ghana.
“a return to the past must be guided by critical examination” (Gyekye 1996, iv). These concepts need not refer to a romantic yearning for the past: “A mere restoration of the ancient past – whatever glory attached to it in collective memories – was out of the question. But a run forward in the present path of development was equally absurd” (Gilbert Rist, in Esteva, Babones, and Babcicky 2013, 53).

There are two reasons these ancient symbols matter in this debate. On the one hand, they exemplify the argument made in chapter two. A critical examination of history can serve to help understanding where critical junctures in cultural industries and traditions may overlap or collide. This could, in turn, help bringing the current discourse closer to the current practice. This is a challenge in cultural practice and arts education, as “Ghanaians still have to face the increasingly difficult but inescapable task of developing an educational system that will synthesize indigenous Ghanaian culture and traditional orality with the literary and scientific resources of modern education” (Flolu 2000, 27). On the other hand, Sankofa and Ofamfa are not at all forgotten. A crucial illustration of this is the use of these symbols as decoration on the outer wall of the TV Africa studios in Accra. The presence of this culturally laden message signals a connection to its meaning, also in the television business. Yet, there is far less attention to the meaning of such symbols in policy debates than there is to the aesthetics of their presence. Even though similar concepts have been discussed widely, for example by Akinsola Akiwowo, through the concept of ‘ifogbontaayese,’ or “the wisdom to remake the world” (Connell 2007, 92).

The more general point is that the risk that skills training and (cultural) management will take the upper hand in (higher) education and (vocational) training is real. In many countries around the world, this is a crisis silently unfolding (Nussbaum 2012). In the face of cultural, democratic and spiritual survival, education should remain more than merely practical skills for
economic growth. A major account of such debate falls well beyond the scope of this report. Suffice to say, cultural industries are not operating in a policy and social vacuum, but neither do they operate in an intellectual vacuum. The arts and humanities should, in other words, be central when developing cultural industries (Nussbaum 2012; Belfiore and Upchurch 2013).

4.7. Capabilities for culture

The possibility to learn skills is needed to participate in political life, so having access to transparent records, having (equal) social possibilities and opportunities, and having access to an education is crucially important. This is significantly different from the skills-oriented training that is often organized for cultural workers, mainly because ‘capabilities’ are not the same as ‘capacities.’ Whereas this chapter focuses on the socio-political context in which certain choices can (or cannot) be made, it far transgresses the kind of options provided through training. This does not mean that training is not needed or would be inadequate. Training is needed and often they respond to real demands. The point is, that human development is about the capability of people to live “the life they have reason to value” (Sen 1992, 5). This means that there is a need to move beyond providing tools that are perceived to be vital to the kind of activity that is thought to be instrumental in the development of cultural industries, or by extension, society as a whole. If cultural industries are really about human development, training is not enough. While it would be a rather gratuitous to point out there is a need for more accessible, better and more creative education; it is a point that cannot be made often enough. The following chapter moves beyond this argument and links the need for engagement with a framework for action towards a more theoretical framework for cultural policy.
There is, and has long been, an incredible amount of cultural creation in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Yet, such activity has only recently become framed as ‘cultural (or creative) industries.’ This poses challenges for the understanding of the long history and the inherent contradictions of these industries as an instrument of critique and reflexive understanding. Yet, in spite of misunderstandings about what the cultural industries exactly are and how they work, there has been much active interest in adopting and encouraging the creative economy discourse and logic in the cultural sector.

In many ways, acknowledging the economic potential of culture and creativity is a welcome change. First, it helps promote the cultural workers as part of a dynamic economic sector that needs to be taken seriously in policies and regulations. This should help realize the potential of the sector. Second, it may help overcome unequal access to global cultural markets. This is, at least, what Article 14 of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO 2005a) argues: in order to take part in global cultural markets, the local cultural industries need to be strengthened. Yet this is to quite an extent, merely wishful thinking. Third, the focus on local cultural industries provides a way to tell stories and give voice to share those stories locally and more widely (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright 2008a). Culture, thus provides a socio-economic vehicle to articulate views on life, society, the past and the future (Appadurai 2004; Clammer 2012). However, the popularity of the creative economy discourse should not eclipse the range of cultural and creative activities that will never be economically viable. These activities need a place in policy and practice,
as much as they need a place in society. Even if the cultural industries are a helpful concept, they are not a panacea for the challenges of cultural production, distribution and enjoyment.

These important objectives deserve much attention. Yet, a central issue of any project in the name of ‘development’ has been finding the ways to turn potential into realization. This is where culture becomes crucial to development. Here, culture is not the stories that are told (be it through music, painting, films or literature), but the ways they are created, circulated and appreciated (not to say consumed). The point is that the ‘culture’ of cultural production is the basis for existing cultural industries, which means that culture should be understood in order to deal with both the diversity of cultural production and the diversity of cultural products. This is primarily a pragmatic concern, since the possibility to engage in policy-transfer in the field of cultural industries is limited at best (Pratt 2009). This means that context matters more than ‘best practice’ examples from elsewhere. The paradox is that the cultural industries can, on the one hand, help form and articulate such a change, whereas, on the other hand, they equally form a practice that can itself form a driving force of teleological modernization (Laaser 1997, 52–3).

At the same time, cultural expressions are transformative in their relation to so-called traditions, such that “Senegalese rap artists have seized upon and exploited Africanisms (particularly griotism) through various symbolic, linguistic, textual, and musical means” (Tang 2012, 79). This chapter addresses the above paradox towards a policy-oriented solution.

There is, and has long been, an incredible amount of cultural creation in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Yet, such activity has only recently become framed as ‘cultural (or creative) industries.’

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42 Griotism means building on the legacy of the West Africa griots, who served as court musicians and (informal) advisors to political leaders in the past. Many contemporary musicians come from a long lineage of griots and while they remain recognized as the heirs of this tradition, griots have evolved into contemporary professions around music and word.
5.1. The ‘palimpsest’ of cultural production

Cultural industries exist pretty much everywhere in some form or another, in the sense that some relation between cultural expressions and commerce exists. Yet, the very relation between cultural expressions and trade is culturally contingent (Bharucha 2010). Such a relation existed well before the notion of the creative economy and it will probably outlive it. So, developing cultural industries is not about teaching how to be an entrepreneur, or how to become economically viable, even though this may be part of a strategy. Developing cultural industries is about understanding what exists and seeing it as a form of practice in its own right. Improvements can be made in such practice and there is room for imagining how things could be radically different. But instead of imagining the radical difference based on models derived from France, Britain, or the USA, there is a need to build a firmer understanding of what exists. The current engagement with the creative economy discourse, however, insufficiently takes into account the ways in which cultural expressions are created and are much older than the present-day notion of the creative economy.

The practices and roles of the cultural industries are diverse: “Across the global South, cultural creativity is located in diverse cultural landscapes, epistemologies and worldviews, and layered within multiple histories and continua – pre-colonial, colonial, modern, and now emerging post-modern urbanism. They span oral, literate and neo-digital cultures as well as both informal and formal economies, all situated within rural, peri-urban, and urban settings” (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 87). Yet, this kind of holistic view of the sector remains largely excluded from the debate. The discourse of the creative economy is contrarily colonizing the cultural imagery, primarily through the perceived orthodoxy of the conditions for creation and circulation, rather than through the influx of cultural expressions, which is crucial in the cultural imperialism thesis (Tomlinson 1991). Critical development scholars argue that such a foreign imaginary is not wanted or needed as valid local knowledge (systems) exist (Shizha and Abdi 2014, 3). Yet currently, the creative economy discourse is used even though it remains relatively new to Burkinabè and Ghanaian cultural (policy) debates.
The current debate acknowledges and celebrates the practices that exist (UNESCO and UNDP 2013). The vernacular translation of this debate among practitioners focuses primarily on transformations from current practice (or, the existing potential) to what should be practiced (the realization of that potential). The paradox is that there is little understanding of these existing processes (at least in a way that can be systematically translated to policy debates) and that there is little debate on what should be aimed for; the normative dimension regarding the kind of cultural industries that could be developed should be central. When linking this potential for transformation, two opposed scenarios can be discerned.

On the one hand, cultural practice is framed as embryonic, emergent and thus implicitly as inferior in Burkina Faso and Ghana. To a great extent, the way forward is framed in technical terms, building on the idea that solutions are known and that skills transfers, capitalization, entrepreneurship training and the creation of infrastructure and institutions will transform existing practices into ‘developed’ cultural industries (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, 40). UNESCO (2005a, 8) makes a similar argument in the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. A concrete example here is a music distributor in Burkina Faso, who aims to establish a megastore, much like the ones found in Asia, Europe or the US. This approach echoes the kind of modernization thinking that was common in early development studies (De Beukelaer 2012, 20), and the ‘creative destruction’ of cultural praxis towards fully modernized cultural industries using the Western model, thereby changing its ethos (Cowen 2002, 51). Stakeholders in the cultural industries compare the existing practices to a textbook ideal that is rarely questioned and hardly exists. This does not mean that all stakeholders in Burkina Faso and Ghana think this way. There are critical voices, but they remain largely subsumed under the hegemonic entrepreneurial optimism and only given little critical consideration concerning change processes. A general teleological vision of change (whereby Western ways of producing, sharing and enjoying cultural expressions), is the aim. Yet, given the great diversity in the way culture is created and circulated, the focus within this paradigm remains on the modernization of cultural industries within the realm of orthodox development planning.
On the other hand, cultural practice is embedded in a notion of tradition and indigeneity. These notions form the basis for a critical, albeit minor, stance in development thinking. The aim here is not to come up with an alternative understanding of development, but to articulate “alternatives to development” (Escobar 1995, 215). Such alternatives are framed in notions of indigenous knowledge (e.g. Shizha and Abdi 2014) or post-development (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). Ironically, this stance is high on doctrine and low on scholarly basis, much like development strategies as a whole (Apthorpe 2005, 133–134). It provides an ideological critique of development, questioning its notion, intentions, world-view and mindset (Nederveen Pieterse 2000, 175), but when the theology of development is rejected, it is replaced by development ‘agnosticism’ (Nederveen Pieterse 2000, 187) that fails to provide a firm basis for constructive engagement with practical challenges. Poverty and underdevelopment may be discursive constructions of difference, deconstructing these terms does not solve the issues the (admittedly politically suspicious) discourse addresses. Moreover, post-development builds on the false premise that modernization is a singular project moving toward one modernity and fails to recognize the simultaneous existence of multiple modernities (Gaonkar 1999).

How to deal with the tension between these approaches to transforming informal (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 26–8) and embryonic (Burkina Faso) or emerging (Ghana) cultural industries? Such an opposition only makes sense within a logic of modernizing progress that thrives on a dichotomy between modernity and tradition (Pigg 1996, 163 in Schech and Haggis 2000, 37). The cultural industries can be “seen as a diverse and locally defined construct, where the cosmopolitan cultural entrepreneur acts as a hybrid agent, negotiating terms of modernity; both spatially and temporally” (De Beukelaer 2012, 21). The very products of the cultural industries are, moreover, instrumental in negotiating such terms: “Creativity in African cinema does more than re-imagine Africa and the challenges of being African. It also tells the story of how Africans are actively modernizing their indigeneities and indigenizing their ‘modernities,’ often in ways not always obvious to those obsessed with cultural hierarchies” (Nyamnjoh 2008, 131). But what does this mean for policies and initiatives for the cultural industries?
Seeing policies as part of a normative palimpsest can help overcome the apparent opposition between continuity and change. The term palimpsest refers to manuscript writing in Medieval Europe, when parchment was used to write on. Given the high price and scarcity of parchment, which was used before paper became common in Europe, there was a tendency to wipe out redundant contents from unused parchment and re-use it. It was however not possible to wipe out the previous contents entirely, so they remained somewhat visible underneath the new contents, while providing a new basis to create new texts, the traces of previous scriptures remain visible. This practice has become a metaphor in urban studies (e.g. Khirfan 2010) and cultural studies (e.g. Dillon 2005), since cities and cultural texts are also layers of change built on the foundations of earlier buildings and meanings, literally and metaphorically. There has, however, been relatively little attention to (cultural) policies as a form of a palimpsest, in spite of some exceptions (Carter 2012).

In the process of decolonizing both theory and policy, recognizing the existing palimpsest is needed to look forward and backward at the same time, explicitly recognizing the multiple developing spheres provides a framework to build on them. Boahen (2011, 112) explicitly makes the case that “African [should] take the colonial impact very much into account in the formulation of their future development programs and strategies.” Similarly, the perpetually overlapping urban-village divide, and the strong pre- and post-colonial histories play a vital role in understanding both the limitations and the possibilities within a given context; the same goes for rituals and religious considerations (Bharucha 2010). The conceptual discussion of the terms ‘culture’ and ‘development’ addressed above (chapter 2) is also part of such a palimpsest. In sum, a palimpsest of policies links global and local histories through ideas and concepts, leading to culturally contingent understanding of, in this case, cultural industries.

Developing cultural industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana is an activity that resembles attempts to make the territory look like the map. Progress is linked to the map; linking territory to the messy context that forms both the starting point and the problem that needs to be overcome. The focus is, to a great extent, on making the informal, though existing, activities look more
like what the cultural industries should be. This links in with the ‘river-canal’ metaphor articulated in chapter 3: the proposed changes are not a natural change, but the result of (often ideologically infused) choices. To take this metaphor further, in trying to create the right conditions to make the cultural industries flourish, there is a presumption that there is a map that can be followed, whereas the actual challenge is to create a map from the existing cultural territory.

This does not mean that a solution lies in simply mapping the existing enterprises and activities. It is more crucial to build a critical understanding of the creative economy as a malleable discourse in correspondence to needs and priorities of a certain country, city or region. There is increasing attention to such contradictions, as a debate on the Burkinabè national television unveiled (RTB 2014a; RTB 2014b), while different voices are heard, they do not seem to converge to a joint solution.

Framing the context of cultural production and circulation is thus not a theoretical gimmick. It is a way to show that current policies are in fact normative responses to failures and contradictions of earlier policies and equally normative aspirations for the future. For example, if culture had not been cut from Ghanaian school curricula, the current policy debate would take a very different approach to culture. Or, if there had been greater participation in the design, planning and exploitation of cultural venues in Burkina Faso and Ghana, the existing infrastructure would probably be more suitable to the needs of the sector. This, in turn, would have resulted in different focal points in the current debates. The current policy aim is thus not only to rectify past mistakes and avoid future issues, but also to understand why certain bad choices were made in the first place. Similarly, there is a need to re-contextualize the path dependency of ‘Southern’ creative economy debates. Path dependency refers to the principle that “the order in which things happen affects how they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point constrains the trajectory after that point” (Kay 2005, 553). This principle helps understanding socio-historical factors that both enable and constrain particular kind of change. The point here is that path dependency, while not a way to predict the future, may help to contextualize and theorize the histories of cultural production in order to understand what,
but mostly *why* certain things happened and how this influences strategies for future change.

To reiterate, this is not because ‘Africa’ or ‘developing countries’ are particular cases that do not fit the global debate. It is because each locale has a distinct history that forms the basis of the present. Most of all, these stories and histories are intertwined with local politics, revolutions, struggles, cultures and untold stories. Yet, the previous chapter has shown that much of these histories and particularities are often reduced to single narratives that have become common knowledge. Both in Ghana and Burkina Faso, the 1980s are seen as periods that incited radical changes in the music industries. Little attention is paid to the historical continuum in which these events occurred and in which the current initiatives are equally embedded.

Even though existing practices are embedded in local realities, the relation between culture and society, through history, politics and economy is a debate that is tied in with evolutions at a global level. Focusing on current challenges and approaches as a palimpsest of previous failures and successes, in which future visions are explicitly inscribed provides a way to rethink that relation. The palimpsest of circular relations thus forms a basis for a more explicit critical engagement with the past, present and future.

5.2. Cultural and creative industries models

Framing culture in Burkinabè and Ghanaian policy has gradually shifted from a project of national coherence (in need of public support) to a driver of the economy. That shift, this section argues, is necessary but it has been taken too far; building too much on the idea that different models of the creative economy are part of a teleological development, rather than a range of diverse logics that necessarily exist in parallel. Potts and Cunningham provide an overview of four ways to understand the link between creative industries and economy as a whole: First, in the ‘welfare model’ the economy drives creative industries through transfers of resources. Second, in the ‘competition model,’ the creative industries are just another industry. Third, in the ‘growth model’ the creative industries drive the economy through high rates of growth. Fourth, in the ‘innovation model’ the creative industries
evolve the economy through transfers of knowledge. (Potts and Cunningham 2008, 239).

Particularly in the case of popular music in Burkina Faso and Ghana, these models fail to provide an adequate depiction of general tendencies. The high performers of the music industries do not primarily rely on the limited spending power of the majority of the population to sustain them, but draw on corporate sponsorship: “instead of corporations mediating the relationship between consumers and producers, musicians are facilitating the relationship between corporations and publics” (Shipley 2013, 283).

Performances of Floby, one of the most popular artists in Burkina Faso, often look more like telecom-publicity than a concert. Whether these activities constitute a drain on the economy in the form of net transfers from the sponsoring companies, or if they are effective advertisement vehicles, leading to increased growth, is difficult to discern. But the overall typology of models, from subsidies to innovation is hardly adaptable to the context in these countries.

Moreover, the models above derive from the creative and not the cultural industries. The crucial importance here is that the former is more encompassing than the latter, by including sectors like software and design, that account for the majority of the ‘growth’ element (Tremblay 2011) and ICT-driven enterprises that are key to the ‘knowledge economy’ (Garnham 2005). The scope of these sectors remains limited in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Yet this means that they are probably the sectors with the highest potential growth. As highlighted in the introduction, Burkina Faso and Ghana build on the conceptual and typological basis of the cultural industries.

In the context of Burkina Faso and Ghana, the ‘innovation’ model is arguably the most promising. The ‘informal’ cultural industries build on models that somehow work in spite of the often-cited obstacles, like inadequate infrastructure, limited access to funds, insufficient training possibilities and limited enforcement of (otherwise good) policies and regulations. The cultural industries in this context build less on the gradual hollowing of the welfare state (discussed in relation to precariousness in section 3.6) than on a response to a general need for entrepreneurial coping
with rampant poverty. The ongoing shift from very limited government support to a stratified market between high-earning sponsorship contracts and few opportunities for well-paid live performances can hardly be captured in this Eurocentric model. On the one hand, there are those who have sponsorship contracts. Artists rely primarily on their audiences to ‘like’ them, not so much to spend on them but to demonstrate their popularity. Exposure is thus sold to companies (in the form of sponsorship). This reflects in extremely heavy publicity at concerts, where the differentiation between cultural expression and product placement is almost entirely blurred. In this context, music primarily becomes the means to attain external commercial aims: publicity for major telecom and food conglomerates. On the other hand, the majority of musicians do not have such contracts. Some of them operate between local and international networks to make a living but the greater part sees little monetary return for their sacrificial labour.

There is thus a model, or rather an intertwined set of models between sponsorship contracts and subsistence entrepreneurship, which somehow works. Similarly, Lobato (2010, 346) discusses “cultural production under weak copyright” in Nigerian “Nollywood” film industries as a “concrete example which we can use to road-test some of [the] theoretical propositions” regarding Western reflections on the reduced role of copyright (Lessig 2004). Rather than seeing the debates and practices in Nigeria as empirical illustrations of Western theories, they serve as a basis for greater theoretical engagement in their own right (Larkin 2008). Such divergent models are crucial to understand the global creative economy if that debate really is global.

5.3. A theoretical basis for grounded plurality

A mismatch remains between the global nature of the creative economy debate and the engagement with the term in particular places. Most framing of the ‘global creative industries’ remains confined within Western social theory (Flew 2013), in spite of existing efforts to ‘de-Westernize’ media theory (Nyamnjoh 2011). If the cultural industries of every Western country deserve to be treated in their own right, this should be the case for every country.
Such an argument does not solely apply to cultural production, but to social theory as a whole, as it is reorienting its focus and locus in a multipolar world. Achille Mbembe, for example, argues that “the world is catching up with Africa, not the other way around,” but also that “Africa needs to pursue becoming its own centre” (Blaser 2013).

Mbembe is far from being the only one to make such an argument. The recent work on ‘southern theory’ (Connell 2007) or ‘theory from the south’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012) articulates clearly how such normative and theoretical diversity works in practice. Similarly, economics is increasingly framed in pluralist (Fullbrook 2008a) and postcolonial terms (Pollard, McEwan, and Hughes 2011a; Zein-Elabdin and Charusheela 2004). These particular approaches deserve greater attention prior to discussing their implications for the creative economy debate.

Comaroff and Comaroff, much like Mbembe, argue that African modernity is not “running behind Euro-America, but ahead of it” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, 12). Moreover, such modernity is a vernacular, in the same way that ‘Euromodernity’ is a vernacular that takes many forms (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, 9). This is illustrated by their openness to “rapacious enterprise: to asset stripping, to the alienation of the commons, to privateers, to the plunder of personal property, to foreign bribe-giving. In sum, to optimal profit at minimal cost, with little infrastructure investment” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, 15). They conclude that the palimpsest that forms the overlap of colonial inheritance and the “postcolonial availability to neoliberal development” make Ghana and other ‘Southern’ countries “a vanguard in the epoch of the market” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, 16). If the South is running ahead of the North, the theories of the latter are unlikely to provide the solutions to the challenges of the former. This underlines that:

*The need to interrogate the workings of the contemporary world order – to lay bare its certainties and uncertainties, its continuities and contingencies, its possibilities and impossibilities, its inclusions and exclusions – has become increasingly urgent.* (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, 48)
Connell, on the other hand, challenges the hegemony of Western social theory in social sciences that builds on the false premise that “modernity created itself within the North Atlantic world, independent of the rest of humanity” (Connell 2007, x; see also: Quijano 2007; Dussel 1993). Yet, such a theory of “modern societies” presumes universal validity (Connell 2007, 212), but “mainstream sociology turns out to be an ethno-sociology of metropolitan society. This is concealed by language, especially in the framing of its theories as universal propositions of universal tools” (Connell 2007, 226). Nonetheless, she argues that “colonized and peripheral societies produce social thought about the modern world which has as much intellectual power as metropolitan social thought, and more political relevance” (Connell 2007, xii, emphasis in original). Such efforts, have however been crippled, since “governments turned to foreign advisors, while NGOs wanted only consultants, not basic research programs, assuming that ‘poor research was good enough for the poor’” (Connell 2007, 109). As a result, on the topic of cultural policies and cultural industries, there is hardly any academic research by local researchers that focuses empirically on African countries and there is too little critical engagement with the concepts and theories at all. The metropolitan advocacy and ‘technical assistance’ to implement cultural industries agenda plays an important role, both through governmental and non-governmental organizations. As long as cultural funding comes from international partners, they will likely maintain (implicit) influence on the conceptual language of policies.

This does not mean that no ‘basic’ research has been conducted in the South. Yet, limited research funding and frameworks has held back more substantial engagement at local universities. As a result, there remains a highly unequal exchange of ideas between the global North and the global South, in which “theory’ is generated in the west and data are supplied by the south” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010, 9). Such ‘academic dependency’ builds on three pillars in the south: first, greater focus on the empirical than the theoretical; second, the tendency to study primarily their own country (whereas the north is more outward-looking); and third, the relative lack of comparative studies due to a focus on single case studies (Alatas 2003, 608–9). The academic dependency is slowly waning, but there remains a comparative disadvantage, to say the least.
The critical reconfiguration of social theory occurs in parallel to the call to reconceptualise economic thinking as a pluralist endeavour (Fullbrook 2008a). This reflects protests by economics students that call for a reconsideration of economics disciplines as a practice that thinks beyond the reduction of human behaviour to a ‘*homo economicus*.’ Pluralist economics equally asks to consider cultural and historical contingencies and greater empirical grounding of economic theory, allowing greater openness to insights of other disciplinary approaches to “economic reality” (Fullbrook 2008b, 1–2).

Postcolonial economics approaches such plurality of thought and practice through postcolonial theory, which has had little influence on economic thinking so far (Pollard, McEwan, and Hughes 2011b, 9). Here, much like in the reflections on southern theory, the main aim is to generate a possibility for meaningful dialogue that takes heterodox practices seriously, because:

> Assumptions about the production and circulation of economic knowledge create blindness to the possibilities of knowledge sharing about contemporaneous experiences of successful economic strategies in the Global South, which is often tantamount to a [“Northern”] refusal to learn from experiences elsewhere (Pollard, McEwan, and Hughes 2011b, 12)

Postcolonial economics thus aims to create a space in which unorthodox practices can be articulated and understood in their own right and framework, rather than seeing them as mere deviations from orthodox economics (Zein-Elabdin and Charusheela 2004; Pollard, McEwan, and Hughes 2011b). Such a reading of the economy emerged first in practice, before it has been theorized (Larner 2011, 91), in the same way that “theory from the south” is grounded in everyday practice rather than in abstract normative theory (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, 48). Postcolonial critique provides a framework to think through the cultural industries as a palimpsest, both economically and theoretically. It is used as shorthand for the historical complexity that needs framing and understanding.
Practically, informal cultural industries need greater understanding within the above theoretical frameworks in order to grasp the role they play within society. Informality is not simply an anomaly in economic practice that needs direct policy action to eliminate it. While efforts are needed to engage with informal activity, this should be directed towards the improvement of livelihoods of those involved in informal economies. Policy intervention in this area has different work for self-employed and wage workers (Chen 2007, 11). Moreover, whether they are formal or informal, the “hierarchies that govern contemporary Ghana’s urban contexts are not products of persistent continuities or inevitable transformations; they are the result of generations of Ghanaians’ efforts to actively reshape their lived realities, often in a climate defined by music, dance and a great deal of fun” (Plageman 2012, 230). This means that contemporary sociology of cultural production, too, is always a culturally contingent *sui generis* model of activity that exists both thanks to many previous successes and due to as many mistakes – in policy, intervention, advocacy and entrepreneurship. The following section engages more closely with the circularity that links past and present choices in a constructive way.

5.4. Towards a circular politics of culture and development

Development, like happiness, is not an end point that can be reached (Stewart 2014). This undermines the division between developing and developed countries, as no country can, or should, claim to be fully ‘developed’ (Neuwirth 2013). This implies that they do not need to evolve any further, which is ideologically suspicious and empirically incorrect. More importantly, there is no finality to measure. The focus of measurement and action should thus be on the process, because rather than making radical changes, the aim is for gradual change within the existing context. In this context, the reductionist measuring of such change as economic growth, through the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), becomes even more challenging (Fioramonti 2013). As a result, understanding change as linear progress does not do justice to the messiness and contradictions that societal change embodies. Instead, could a conceptual understanding be used to frame and
phrase on-going processes of change? What kind of metaphor could help a greater understanding and envisaging of transformation?

Envisaging ‘development’ as circular, instead of linear, politics allows political context and history to be built upon, layer upon layer, as with a palimpsest. Development is thus not a departure from the past towards the future, but a constant reconfiguration of history in the present. This permits culture (or tradition) to be seen as a realm of struggle, both in the past and the present. Most importantly, the circular understanding of development implies a far greater focus on the process of change than on the goals it aims to attain. The previous chapter outlined five key levels at which such process-oriented actions are taken, while this chapter outlines a theorization of such processes. This section also closes with a clear policy-oriented example of a circular, process-focused understanding of development.

Linear progress implicitly bears a promise of change for the better. Circular change, on the other hand, does not share that intrinsic optimism. ‘Going around in circles’ is a negative cliché that illustrates this. More pessimistically, a vicious circle of change provides an even more bleak view on such change, since it implies that things are progressively getting worse. More optimistically, a virtuous circle allows the observer to see circularity in a more constructive way. Circularity avoids transgressing into the false choice between modernization and post-development: it stresses the link with the past while underlining continuous evolution. Even though every generation and technological evolution brings change, “we do not reinvent culture every generation” (Clammer 2012, 56). Using the example of copyright (introduced in chapter 2) one can see both vicious and virtuous circles discussed.

The market for recorded music has changed radically since the advent of digital technologies that allow the transfer of music across players and between people through the Internet, Bluetooth, and direct file transfer (copying each others music libraries). This is a global issue that affects the music industries in general and the recording industry in particular. The disc, which served as a major vehicle for music circulation and revenue generation throughout the 20th century is in decline, and it is unclear what kind of technologies or business models may provide the music industries
with an equally widespread and lucrative medium (Gebesmair 2009, 483). Given the shift in commercial activity, away from discs to live music, merchandizing and experiences, the plurality of the music industries should be stressed to overcome the limited and limiting focus on the music industry as a singular concept that often simply means the recording industry (Williamson and Cloonan 2007; Sterne 2014).

In both Burkina Faso and Ghana, the cycle of production, dissemination, and consumption is more or less in place and works to a certain extent. There is production and cultural products are circulated. There is ample consumption, even though a considerable amount is illicit. But, around the world, there is no clear understanding how to cope with the changes of the past decade that caused such a radical increase in piracy. Rather than trying to supplant the current, admittedly imperfect, cycle of the cultural industries with a broken copyright regime (Edwards et al. 2013), the solution lies in adopting current practices as a basis for change. The point here is that the wheel already exists. Much like the work of Arterial Network to help countries to “adapt the wheel” of cultural policy (Forbes 2011), existing practices form a useful basis for adaptation.

The vicious circle of mutually reinforcing issues (Figure 2) undermines the constructive evolution of practices within the music industries for example: limited spending power of audiences increases the demand for music at the lowest possible price. Through street vendors, Bluetooth file-sharing, and official downloads via telecom-providers, this demand in increasingly met. These largely illicit transactions limit the economic return to the rights holders. This limits the economic viability and profitability of the music industries, straining working conditions, particularly for those in informal wage labour. Given low economic return and the opacity of financial transactions, access to finance from banks is difficult to obtain. This makes large-scale (collaborative) investment in cost-efficient production difficult, leading to relatively high manufacturing costs for CDs and cassettes. This increases the price of legitimate releases and drives consumers to cheaper, pirated alternatives.
This overview is necessarily incomplete, as each part of the circle is intertwined with other circular issues. Limited spending power in the society as a whole, for example, depends on far more than the music industries. The same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for the other parts. The implicit promise that merely enforcing the existing copyright legislation will solve the intricate and connected issues throughout the music industries is misguided. It is an important step that needs attention but it is not disconnected from other interventions. Similarly, the idea that replacing the current cyclical cultural ecology with a new one, by modernizing practice, negates that the inherent capacity of the existing and indeed imperfect model to transform to a more adaptive model that embraces vernacular innovation.
The virtue of this vicious circle lies in its explanatory capacity: piracy is not uniquely to blame for the issues prevailing in the music industries. The vicious circle, or downward spiral, of mutually reinforcing issues can only be tackled by addressing each of these elements in their broader societal context. That is precisely what the virtuous circle model aims to clarify.

The virtuous circle of music industries (Figure 3) places attention on small changes and adaptations within the elements that make up the circle. For example, while technology lies at the basis of the surge in (digital) piracy since the late 1990s, it has also created new possibilities for distribution. Distribution practices, however, need regulation and the terms of practice need to be negotiated by and with the rights holders and those selling content. But prohibiting them is unlikely to have a positive effect on the cultural industries, because it undermines the most extensive existing music distribution network (Collins 2006, 163). Piracy actually grows from the inability of the vested industries to quickly embrace and adopt new technologies, as history has shown repeatedly. Piracy cannot simply be eliminated, therefore ‘legitimate music industries’ should embrace the practices of the pirates in a legal and accessible way (Kernfeld 2011, 221). By including the people working as pirates in such a regulation, it could strengthen the working conditions of music vendors and returns for rights holders. Street vendors can become pillars of a vast and fast and legitimate distribution network, embracing digital media. Once such practice is established, the enforcement of copyright legislation becomes gradually effective: it no longer undermines the link between musicians and their audiences, but weeds out those who continue to provide contents without holding the rights to do so.

This also means that street vendors can become legitimate distributors, instead of being marginalized. The returns from such legal sales will give greater proof of viability to music producers and artists in order to obtain external investment. Such investments can help harness the potential of innovation for cost reduction and the improvement of quality standards which in turn, leads to greater markets for products.
This circular approach means that very fine and detailed attention should be paid to issues at many levels, like education, infrastructure and policy, just to name a few. There is thus no need to re-invent a new kind of cycle that does away with what exists.

Whether the circle is vicious or virtuous, much remains to be said about the approach to change. What kinds of policies are devised to render the cultural industries more viable? What kinds of initiatives are deployed to make such ideas reality? Because the understanding of the term ‘cultural industries’ in Burkina Faso and Ghana is limited and its adoption in policy and practice generally remains superficial, policy texts focus more on replacing the existing ‘heterodox’ cultural industries with an orthodox
understanding of the cultural industries (insofar this exists). At the same time, initiatives like ARPEM and ARPIC in Burkina Faso, in fact, aim to transform the existing practices. Yet, also in such cultural industries support programmes, the focus is more on realizing a presumed orthodox commercial cultural practice than transforming the existing practices, particularly of the more vulnerable and precarious workers, into more inclusive cultural industries that build on what people are doing, rather than what they should presumably be doing.

Transforming unorthodox (and perhaps illicit) practices into legal and regulated heterodox practices has historically proven to be a challenge. The Western record industry lobby (IFPI) does not look favourably towards distortions of their allegedly orthodox practices. For example, in the late 1980s, when Ghanaian “cottage-industry cassette production” became legalized under the initiative of the Ghana Tape Recordists Association (GTRA), allowing street vendors (considered by some to be music pirates), to pay a blanket fee to rights owners. The IFPI reacted against this by funding the lobbying activities of antagonist groups in the country. The GTRA’s attempt to regularise their activities was dismissed. The recentralized solution to cassette piracy was the use of banderoles\(^{43}\) that managed to reduce piracy from 90% to around 15% until the late 1990s. As a result, many young entrepreneurs with good intentions (they wanted to regularize their business) were pushed out of the music business, leaving a vacuum in the distribution sector (Collins 2006, 162).\(^{43}\)

Banderoles are stickers used to indicate the authenticity of a product and are a source of income for collective management organisations (CMOs), who collect royalties on behalf of rights holders.

\(^{43}\) Banderoles use did not survive the transition to the digital era: the same kind of illicit street vendors now sell MP3s from laptops on the street. The current issue is almost identical to that of the 1980s: the ‘illegal’ street vendors are prosecuted for their activities (GhanaWeb 2012) and while there is no viable alternative, street vendors cannot operate legally due to the lack of a legal framework and the absence of any initiative that would allow them to pay royalties. At the same time consumers have little possibility to
purchase music legally. Earlier suggestions to harness the digital potential of
digital technologies (Collins 2006, 164) did not lead to much change. One
exception is an initiative by MUSIGA, the musicians union, to launch an
online music sales platform (MUSIGA 2013).

Setting up an effective distribution mechanism for digital music files
among people who often do not have a credit card to purchase music through
a legal platform was and is still a challenge. Evidence suggests it is counter-
productive to prohibit street vendors and their activities, since this
undermines an effective distribution system. The main problem with this is
that rights holders are not paid. Regularizing the work of these pirates
through an initiative like that of the GTRA may initially yield little to rights
holders but, it provides a potential way forward to build on a vast and effective
distribution network in order to gradually increase the revenue from sales,
much like Nollywood became a booming industry by working with pirates
(Lobato 2010, 346). It is difficult to make a business case for fighting piracy
when there is no alternative; the issue lies less in the social deviance than in
the highly effective distributive capacity that has grown thanks to piracy
(Lobato 2010, 347).

There is room for innovation and change from abroad. Existing cultural
businesses can learn from engaging with the framework of cultural
industries. As a result, those cultures of creation, distribution and
consumption form a fertile base to pick ideas from the creative economy
discourse, rather than being taken over by it. Hence the question: how can
culture be brought back into the creative economy debate?

5.5. Reclaiming the role of culture in the creative economy
debate

Relocating culture, as a “pattern of living” (Apthorpe 2005, 137), inside
the creative economy debate builds on incorporating southern theory and
postcolonial thinking into a circular conceptualization of policies for the
cultural industries. This includes both the cultural turn (Gibson 2003) and
path dependency (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 26; 89) (see chapter 2). Yet,
merely “adding and stirring” culture to development is a rather vague and
often ineffective undertaking (Nederveen Pieterse 1995). Similarly, the numerous attempts to ‘take culture into account’ in thinking about development have seen relatively little success (van Graan 2010, 3). These approaches have one crucial element in common: they favour small and messy processes or histories over grand ideas and theories. The difficulty with them lies in the relationship between development research and practice, since the latter favours personal experience to grand (or small) theories (Apthorpe 2005, 140).

But what does it mean to take culture into account for development? There are numerous ways to think of such a link (Radcliffe 2006b, 3), but the focus here is on three ways that the link is used. First, culture serves as a way to ease the implementation of development projects. In such a context, the projects remain as mainstream as before, but build on the cultural context, through applied anthropology, to facilitate the adoption and acceptance of such initiatives. Second, culture is a more subversive force, if you consider the livelihoods of those who are ‘to be developed’ as an alternative to development, rather than merely a means to attain it. This (as mentioned in section 5.1) is the post-development approach. Third, culture constitutes an area of struggle, through which normative future visions are negotiated. Culture, in this context, is used on both the anthropological and artistic notion. This “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai 2004) forms the basis to reclaim the importance of culture for the cultural industries.

The ‘capacity to aspire’ is part of a broader range of capabilities that form the basis for an informed citizenry to negotiate the terms of development:

“**If a traditional way of life has to be sacrificed to escape grinding poverty or miniscule longevity (as many traditional societies have had for thousands of years), then it is the people directly involved who must have the opportunity to participate in deciding what should be chosen**” (Sen 1999, 31).

Yet, this should not translate to a dichotomy between local ‘good’ culture and western ‘bad’ culture, since both are areas of struggle. And, currently the major area of struggle may be within every country, where small middle
classes may have been ‘misguided’ or even ‘bankrupt’ (Wainaina 2014).

The creative economy debate across the globe is generally a
preoccupation of experts, which undermines broad democratic debate.
Middle classes thus strongly influence this debate because they are part of it,
even when there are public deliberations because only those with resources,
“intellectual capital, money, and time” can really engage in such debates
(Schlesinger 2013, 31).

The history of music in Burkina Faso and Ghana shows that the interest
in and love for music has transformed styles, expressions and practices due
to political and technological change. Adaptation also occurred thanks to
religious incorporation and social adaptation. During the period of
 technological change and curfew, musicians went to church or started
working as spinners. They respectively kept live music active, and embraced
the democratizing potential of music technology (Collins 2012, 229). Cultural
expressions are resilient and transformative, yet, instead of mainly looking
forward, it may be a good idea to actually look back, and try to understand
what worked well and what did not, in order to gain critical understanding of
the palimpsest of cultural policy and practice.

The Ghanaian state failed to enforce a Western cultural property model,
because its legal foundation “is part of a modernization framework that
leaves very little space for alternative modes of social, economic, political,
and legal organization, [and] because the Ghanaian state has not fully
explored those spaces that do exist for considering those alternatives and
infusing them into policymaking” (Boateng 2011, 166). Understanding the
apparent failure of for example, intellectual property rights, is vital to rethink
the possible role of cultural industries in relation to human development.

5.6. Cultural policy reconsidered

The current role for cultural policy, regarding cultural industries, in
Burkina Faso and Ghana is to turn makeshift production and illicit
distribution into an effective, viable and fair framework for culture (MCTC
2008; NCC 2004). This entails a transformation of the existing, thus building
on culture as a way of life in order to support and encourage culture as
creative expression. Both Burkinabè and Ghanaian cultural policies stress the need to reconcile tradition, nation-building and cultural industries but do not spell out clearly how exactly to do this. These policies thus speak of good intentions, but lack the vocabulary and the practical approach to act on them.

In tandem with these policies, both countries produced (mostly) quantitative data on the cultural sector (KPMG 2014; Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme 2010; Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme 2011; Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme 2012; BBEAC 2012). There is indeed a need to build policies on data, even though policy making needs more insight on how things work, rather than how the sector performs economically (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 2005, 10). Qualitative insights are thus more useful to rethink policies and their aims than (often economic) quantitative measures.

UNESCO has long been attempting to come up with a set of indicators for culture and development. Their Culture and Development Indicator Suite proposes a range of indicators without aggregating them into a single number. This results in a so-called DNA, which visualizes the strong and weaker accounts of culture within particular countries. The CDIS thus provides a useful measure to engage with policy: it shows where the strengths and weaknesses are within countries, stressing where additional efforts are most likely to benefit the reinforcement of culture. While the project is promising, it is laborious and under-funded. It is unclear how it will survive and how it could provide a comprehensive coverage of countries.

The 2013 creative economy report provides a range of questions that can help set the policy agenda. In other words, it does not simply present trade statistics, arguing that economic growth will help increase trade and development. Surely, it focuses on economic aspects of the cultural industries, but embeds this aspect in a broader understanding of human and humanistic development. The report proposes four categories of questions and breaks them down in an array of very specific questions to help further cultural policy agendas in a deliberative and contextual manner (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 124):
1. What is the current situation? What are our cultural resources? What are our capacities to support the arts and culture in their contribution to sustainable development?

2. What is our potential? Do we have any particular strengths in the cultural area that can be used to fix existing problems or to create new development opportunities? Do we have cultural assets, such as heritage sites that give us a unique cultural identity or brand?

3. What are the areas in which serious problems might be addressed through cultural industry development? What are the gaps in our capacity to deal with such issues?

4. What will be the indicators of success? Are there benchmarks against which we can calibrate our performance? How will we know whether we have achieved what we hope to achieve?

These questions illustrate the possible versatility of the cultural industries in development approaches, without reducing it into a panacea. One question should however be asked more explicitly:

5. What kind of cultural industries should be developed? How should formal and informal, for-profit and not-for-profit, public and private, exclusive and inclusive initiatives be balanced?

Much like the questions in the creative economy report, this layered question considers the role, place and meaning of the creative economy discourse in cultural policies, which should by definition extend beyond the normative framework to balance the social, symbolic and economic roles of culture in society. The main implication of this question is that choices have to be made. Which parts of the cultural industries should be self-sufficient and which ones should receive public support? What kind of measures should be taken to include marginalized workers from (illicit) informal sectors into cultural industries that work for all creators and intermediaries? And, in
what ways can the stratified audiences (low and high income, urban and rural, and so on) benefit from creations of the local cultural industries?

In order to reconsider the role of cultural policy for human development, the focus on existing gaps between existing practices and aims should be more explicit. First, this requires qualitative insight into cultural practice (*how* do things work, *what* does not work and *why*?). Second, this presumes a clear idea of the aims of cultural policies (*what* should be attained?). Only when these questions are duly addressed, can a more practical approach be developed. Otherwise, *developing cultural industries* remains mostly a discursive project to rethink the cycles of cultural production and circulation through this hegemonic concept.

The process of *developing cultural industries* builds on an in-depth understanding of the circular logic that make these businesses work within the existing (and changing) socio-economic framework. This is needed to identify the small, albeit significant changes that can be made. In Burkina Faso and Ghana, this is implicitly done but this focus needs the greatest attention *within* the sector, in order to allow the existing cultures of the cultural industries to inform continuity and change. It is precisely at this level that the ‘path dependency’ of cultural production, circulation and consumption plays a pivotal role. Practices should inform changes in the creative economy discourse, more so than the other way around.
6. Conclusion

The development of culture has mostly remained absent from development projects in the past (Clammer 2012, 75). The current explicit place of the cultural industries in development plans and initiatives is seemingly changing this. Yet, most policies and actions remain focused on cultural industries to advance trade and economic growth. However, ‘culture’ and ‘cultural industries’ are two different things, particularly in relation to development. The culture that underlines this kind of thinking is not questioned and many stakeholders insufficiently understand the ideological implications of the development of cultural industries. Chapter 3 illustrates that the current paradigmatic shift towards the creative economy is not a river that somehow turned. It is a man-made canal, dug to accommodate the expanding influence of economic thinking on society. There are many kinds of cultural industries and even more ways to ‘develop’ them.

This concluding chapter proposes a policy-oriented approach by highlighting the different levels of engagement at which this challenge can be overcome. These levels are historical, conceptual, normative and pragmatic. Before engaging with these issues, it is worth reconsidering how the diversity of cultural industries practices relates to the diversity of cultural expressions.

6.1. Beyond a single story

When it comes to artistic and creative expressions, the need for a variety of voices is clear. Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie argues that such a multiplicity is needed to allow for a variety of stories to emerge. If the possibility of people and cultural groups to tell their stories is undermined by dominant ‘single stories’ or repressive regimes, a constructive basis for cultural expression and intercultural dialogue is undermined. In her TED talk, Adichie argues that:
The single story creates stereotypes, and the problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one story become the only story. (2009)

She highlights the risk that stories build on a single stereotype, because they are framed within a grand narrative that is necessarily incomplete, which is the root of fear in the cultural imperialism debate. This ‘single story’ is now increasingly diversified and global attention to cultural industries helps broaden the narrative even further. This is the element of voice within the cultural industries that is rightly embraced (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright 2008a) because the cultural industries can help fight stereotypes. This does not mean that they would eliminate stereotypes but cultural industries can help create a multitude of narratives that help communicate complexities in identity politics and build aspirations on the future:

Africans are not so much against stereotypical representations as such, but that if stereotypes are the game of the cultural industries, they would rather settle for stereotypes informed by their cultures and real life experiences, and not the figment of the imagination of some pontificating cultural other. (Nyamnjoh 2008, 132)

Such stereotypes will inevitably remain inherently problematic, but they can provide a way to reimagine the lives and futures people “have reason to value” (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 16). Two examples aptly illustrate this point. On the one hand, the satirical “web-television” series Samaritans, about a non-existent NGO “Aid for Aid” challenges the international development aid business from a Kenyan perspective. The make-believe NGO, based in a posh suburban area of Nairobi does nothing. They only exist to maintain the livelihood of their staff (a cosmopolitan blend of Kenyans and expats) and show hardly any real engagement towards poverty reduction, allegedly their raison d’être. The series challenges taboo topics about white supremacy (or at least privilege), class relations and social

44 http://www.aidforaid.org (accessed 4 May 2014)
privilege in a painfully accurate way. Yet it does so by building on stereotypes about the Kenyan middle class and international “aid workers.” On the other hand, *An African City*,\(^45\) set in Accra, follows the lives of five female *returnees* (diaspora resettling to their motherland) in a style akin to the American series *Sex and the City*.\(^46\) While blatantly ignoring the plight of the average Ghanaian, the series follows the lives of five women in Accra. This series tackles a range of taboo topics in the lives of highly educated women in Ghana, again by reducing their personae to stereotypes. While neither of these examples provides a complete picture of the countries in which they are set, they do provide an engaged and critical outlook on the challenges of social relations and life aspirations of a particular class. Both ‘web-tv’ series challenge the single story about Africa as an ‘underdeveloped’ continent, and increase ‘voice’ and ‘agency’ to a range of characters. In this way, the cultural industries can provide a way to challenge the single story about people and countries.

The point here is that, much like the stories that are told around the world, also policy debates are culturally contingent narratives. When the cultural industries are reduced to a single, stereotypical, story concerning the possibilities to create, circulate and share cultural creations, the existing variety of practices is not taken seriously. What is true for cultural expressions is indeed also true for policy debates: Only when the histories, cultural contexts and dreams enshrined in shared stories are taken seriously, can they serve to inform action and change within this context. This illustrates the theoretical argument made in the previous chapter.

The global creative economy discourse has recently begun to take seriously the ‘panoply’ of practice within the cultural industries around the world (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 53–86). In spite of increasing recognition in the policy debate that “the creative economy is not a single superhighway, but a multitude of different local trajectories” (UNESCO and UNDP 2013, 15)


\(^46\) *Sex and the City* is an American television romantic sitcom created by Darren Star and produced by HBO. Set and filmed in New York City and based on the book of the same name by Candace Bushnell.
there is still a risk that this approach becomes a single narrative that is uncritically adopted without sufficient attention to the local particularities. The current debate, still fails to translate diversity of practice into a variety of policies and normative frameworks. This is particularly important since it insufficiently accounts for subverting, reifying and reworking tendencies, of subaltern actors (Da Costa 2010, 519). In response, the policy debate should be more inward looking. Lived realities, histories, and contestations remain largely left out of the debate, and receive less attention than “best practices” elsewhere. As the closing section of this chapter highlights, there is also ample potential for mutual learning, provided it is based on a grounded understanding of existing practices and equitable mutual exchange between countries, whether they are ‘developed’ or not.

6.2. History

The global creative economy discourse rarely engages with history. There is some attention to the conceptual history of the term from Adorno onwards, but there is little focus on the local histories of cultural creation. The 2013 creative economy report mentions a few histories in passing, but overall the debate remains framed as a future-oriented solution to a problem of today. The local uptake of the creative economy debate should, however, locate the applicable aspects of this global script from earlier efforts. Yet the modernizing ethos of the cultural industries logic is semantically detached from “traditions” in cultural production. The respective socio-cultural bases of festivals, musical practice and storytelling hardly feature in present-day considerations about cultural production. Where stakeholders in the Ghanaian or Burkinabè music sectors refer to history, a broad range of events are reduced to a single image of a certain president or political era causing hardship (see chapter 3).

The ‘best practices’ in the creative economy reports and elsewhere are not only presented without their history, they are also invariably positive.

47 The term ‘subaltern’ derives from postcolonial and critical theory. It refers to those who have no voice within the established hegemony rule and oppression.
Some examples did in fact fail, as the Ghanaian microfinance for culture project shows (see chapter 4). This illustrates two things: there is more need for deeper engagement with the background of examples, and the failure of initiatives needs more attention. Most initiatives are not failures, but neither could they be considered successes. They continue to exist in perpetual struggle, despite the odds. Building an understanding of multiple small and bigger failing of many good intentions can provide lessons for future action. Cultural infrastructure is an example that illustrates this point.

Nearly all stakeholders in the music industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana mention that infrastructure is one of their major challenges. The venues in the capital cities are too small, too big, too expensive, or too rundown. In short, they exist, but they do not respond to changing needs. The proposed solution of many stakeholders is that the government should invest in more and better infrastructure. While this may partially help overcome the problem, as rapidly growing cities can indeed use additional capacity, such a solution does not account for the social and institutional capacities (or capabilities) to better design and exploit existing spaces. The point here is that stakeholders in Burkina Faso and Ghana focus more on the perceived lack in the present and the expected change in the future than on past events that has led to the current challenges.

Looking at history to learn, as captured in the link between the Adinkra symbols Sankofa and Ofamfa (see section 4.6), is enriching in itself. The argument here is more pragmatic. Many people have tried, and keep trying, to make a living from music – or culture in general – in the recent and more distant past. Tracing back these attempts and finding out why they worked and did not work will provide greater insight in present-day options than trying to transfer policies and best practices from around the world. Failure is not a bad thing. It only becomes an issue when it does not provide a basis for critique and improvement. The suggestion to help resolve historically and culturally contingent challenges is to focus more on the things that went wrong than on the perceived success elsewhere.
6.3. Concepts

The global creative economy discourse consists of a patchwork of different cultural industries that relate both to each other and to an abstract ideal. In order to develop such cultural industries, there should be more focus on what that concept means, and more importantly, what it should mean, without being blinded by the alleged orthodoxy of the concept. This includes challenging the uncritical adoption of an amalgam of definitions in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Two challenges are key:

First, is the debate about cultural or creative industries? The former stresses the symbolic meaning, while critically engaging with the empirical reality of creation and circulation. The latter includes sectors like software and design in order to make claims about economic return hold. Yet arts and culture fit uncomfortably in this evolution (Oakley 2009).

Second, is the debate about cultural industries or about culture? Throughout the debate, at all levels, there remains an uncomfortable tension between culture as a way of life or artistic expression and culture as an industry. These understandings are mutually influential, but have very particular meanings and histories that cannot be ignored (see chapter 2). What kind of “ways of life” and what kinds of “cultural industries” should be central to policy and action?

What does it mean that the growth and economic viability of the creative economy mainly builds on software and design (Garnham 2005; Tremblay 2011), sectors in which the share of Burkina Faso and Ghana are low, whereas the economic contribution of the arts and crafts, areas that are stronger in these countries, count relatively little in the overall creative economy? Does this mean that there should be greater efforts towards ICT and design driven segments of the creative economy Burkina Faso and Ghana, or that the comparative advantage of their arts and crafts sectors should be further exploited?
6.4. Capabilities

The key to linking cultural industries to a broad and inclusive human development agenda is through focusing actively and explicitly on capabilities (see chapter 4). Existing initiatives, in Burkina Faso and Ghana, aim to advance such capabilities in the cultural industries, but focus more strongly on short-term training programs for those already professionally involved in the industries than on providing a far more holistic focus on cultural citizenship. Both countries, nonetheless, see significant efforts to include arts and culture in primary and secondary education for all pupils (see section 4.6). Overall, both culture as a driver of economic growth and culture as a basis for socio-cultural affiliation receive explicit attention in policies and reports (e.g. BBEAC 2012), but the link between these two elements is not explicit (De Beukelaer 2013).

There is a need for a more explicit focus on capabilities as both means and ends of development. Capabilities are different from artistic or business skills, because they focus on the possibilities people have within the social, political, and economic realms of society, rather than merely looking at the individual skills. While the approach builds on a liberal (and individualist) philosophy (Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2011), it can also accommodate the social and institutional capabilities that allow greater achieved functionings in society (Jackson 2005).

The capabilities approach helps avoid two common pitfalls in developing cultural industries. On the one hand, focuses on a democratizing way to allow greater participation of the population in society as whole. This is meant as a way to help negotiate better infrastructure, more efficient institutions, and more (public) investment. On the other hand, the capabilities approach provides a way to constructively engage with ‘directly useful’ skills such as marketing, entrepreneurship, and technical expertise. This, without overlooking the structural inequalities that prevent solutions working for those who need it most, by exploring the underlying social, economic, and political tendencies that obstruct access to such skills by the majority of people. Capabilities, moreover, focus on the need to engage in deliberative action, that does not provide solutions for people, but engages people in the
process of defining what lives or, *mutatis mutandis*, cultural industries they “have reason to value” (Sen 1992, 5).

Capabilities are, thus, both the ends and the means of human development, and this is insufficiently reflected in existing approaches. Current training programs for people in the sector are a necessity, but do not engage enough with the much broader need for capabilities advancement within and beyond the cultural industries.

6.5. Mutual learning from global cultural industries research

There is no single approach that can work to develop cultural industries. There is, rather, a variety of insights that can help rethink creation, support and policy in a manner that reconciles histories, contexts, needs and aims of a certain locale. This closing section proposes four areas where mutual learning can help advance efforts to develop cultural industries in a reflexive and critical manner.

First, the categorical divide between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries is not useful. Why would the difference between ‘developed’ countries that are in ‘crisis,’ and ‘developing’ countries that are ‘emerging,’ or Africa that is ‘rising’ (De Beukelaer 2014a, 96) matter anyway? If the global creative economy debate is indeed global, it would help to find commonalities as a basis for comparison and exchange, rather than maintaining a divide according to politically expedient and empirically outdated divide between developed and developing. This does not mean that the plight of the poorest and most marginalized should be overlooked. It stresses the need to engage in greater mutual learning to tackle issues like youth unemployment, social exclusion, ethnic and religious stratification beyond the developed-developing divide. The poor in London and Accra do not look very different and neither do the rich. As an alternative to dividing countries in wealthy and poor, it is more fruitful to look at social stratification *within* societies.

Second, the aims and methods of cultural and development policies increasingly aim for the same results: economic growth, employment and trade. Cultural policies now focus on generating development for society and
development policies now largely reduce culture to whatever activities that fit the creative economy discourse. This provides a basis to reconsider the aims and focus of both. Again, such comparisons and explorations are not limited by geographical boundaries. Yet there are obvious limitations concerning the possibility to transfer good ideas from one place to another.

Third, diverse academic disciplinary engagements with culture and development provide potential for mutual learning. Particularly the connection between ethnographic and historical work on the one hand, and policy-oriented disciplines on the other hand would benefit from greater interaction. This does not mean that cultural policy studies should be more like ethnomusicology in order to say something about music industries, or vice versa. It simply means that there is much to learn from looking well over the boundaries of (inter-)disciplinary foci.

Fourth, to reiterate, the greatest resource towards developing cultural industries is history and contemporary practice. While the creative economy discourse is rather new, the practice is decidedly not. Understanding why certain projects, initiatives and policies did (not) succeed provides greater potential than looking across the border to another country where things supposedly work better. In Ghana, many interviewees made the comment that the cultural industries work better in Francophone Africa, while looking up to their distant neighbour Nigeria. In Burkina Faso, the perception lives among music industries stakeholders that the Anglophone African countries are better off, while they also envy the success of Côte d’Ivoire. From a distance, the situation always looks better than from within.

The aim of Burkina Faso and Ghana is to develop their cultural industries. This study provides insight in what policies, initiatives and practices exist to do this. It does not challenge the overall aim on grounds of principle, but shows what principles are at the basis of this discourse. In order to develop cultural industries, that can help share stories and imagination, help people earn a living, many things can be done. This study argues that interventions have to build on a thorough understanding of what exists, as a basis for innovative solutions to prevailing problems. The cultural industries have long existed, albeit not by this name. So there is no need to ‘develop’ cultural industries in the way that development discourse has long dictated the need
to ‘Westernize.’ In contrast, many minor changes within existing practices can inscribe the efforts to develop cultural industries in the palimpsest of cultural history that we call life.
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on Political Economy, Cultural Economics, Cultural Industries, Cultural Management and Policy. He is a Research Fellow and Assistant Professor on Cultural Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1991-1992) as well as a Guest Professor in different graduate programmes on arts and heritage management, and lecturer in more than 20 countries in Europe, Latin America and the USA.

Eleonora Belfiore, Jury member (United Kingdom)

Eleonora Belfiore is Associate Professor in Cultural Policy at the Centre for Cultural Policy Studies at the University of Warwick, UK. Her research interests revolve around the notion of the ‘social impacts’ of the arts, and the effect that the transformational rhetoric of impact has had on British cultural policy. In particular, Dr Belfiore has been researching the challenges posed by impact evaluation and assessment in the context of a growing trend towards evidence-based policy making in the cultural sector. Part of this work was published by Palgrave in 2008 as a monograph entitled *The Social Impact of the Arts: An intellectual history*, co-authored with Oliver Bennett. Most recently, Dr Belfiore’s research interests have focussed more specifically around the often unacknowledged role of deeply held beliefs and cultural values in the process of policy-making, despite the professed reliance on empirically acquired ‘evidence’ as a basis for decision making in the policy sphere.

Jacques Bonniel, Jury member (France)

Jacques Bonniel is Maître de Conférences in Sociology at the University Lumière Lyon 2 France. He is also Director of a post-graduate (Master) in cultural project management at the same university and co-organizer of a post-graduate course on *Cultural management and policies in the Balkans* together with the University of Arts in Belgrade and the University of Grenoble II. He conducts research for different regional and national
departments on cultural policies and has published a number of books, articles and research reports in the field of sociology, cultural policy and management. He participates in various national and regional working groups. Jacques Bonniel has been leading lecturer in sociology at the University of Lyon Lumière 2 since 1990. He was also Dean of Faculty of Anthropology and Sociology (University Lumière Lyon 2, 1995 - 2005) and he is a member of the Scientific Council of the university.

Sanjin Dragojević, Jury member (Croatia)

Sanjin Dragojević is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia. Dr Dragojević is also permanent guest-lecturer in cultural management organized by the Institute for Cultural Management, Vienna, Austria, and at the postgraduate programme of the Institute for Cultural Research, Krems, Austria. His interest areas include philosophy and sociology of culture, cultural development and international cultural cooperation, cultural policy, cultural management and information systems in culture. He has been involved and still participates in domestic and international projects carried out by the Institute of International Relations (IMO) and by the Culturelink Network. Dr Dragojević was one of the experts for the Council of Europe on the evaluation of cultural policy of the Republic of Croatia (1997), he participated in a number of UNESCO supported research projects. He has worked as a cultural consultant for county of Istria (Croatia), The Moving Academy for Performing Arts (Amsterdam), Croatian Humanitarian Network (Zagreb), Stella Film (Zagreb) and many others.

Mikhail Gnedovsky, Jury member (Russian Federation)

Mikhail Gnedovsky has been Director at the Cultural Policy Institute, a Moscow based NGO, since 2003. During these years, he has led or supervised, various projects aimed at the promotion of innovative agendas in
the cultural field in Russia. He has been involved in research and capacity-building projects, as well as in the development of strategies focused around issues related to the creative industries, arts and business collaboration, social implications of the arts, the role of cultural heritage in the regional economy. He has worked internationally as an expert on various cultural projects, including the programmes of the Council of Europe. In 1998–2002, he worked as Director for the Arts and Culture Programme at the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation) in Russia. In 2000-2003, he was also Member of the Arts and Culture Sub-board at the Open Society Institute in Budapest. In 2009, he was elected Chair of the Board of Trustees at the European Museum Forum. In 2005, he was awarded the Golden Cross of Merit of Poland.

Timo Cantell, Jury member (Finland)

Timo Cantell is Director of the Urban Research Unit at the City of Helsinki Urban Facts where over 20 researchers are engaged in studying various urban phenomena, including population, housing, economic issues, urban policies, cultural participation, etc. He is responsible for urban research strategy and activities within Urban Facts, and develops urban research activities in liaison with universities and other research institutions located in the Helsinki metropolitan region. Prior to Urban Facts Dr Cantell was professor in arts management at Sibelius Academy. He has published and lectured extensively on arts audiences, arts and urban growth strategies, urban regeneration and arts management.

Therese Kaufman, Jury member (Austria)

Therese Kaufman is Co-Director of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies (eipcp) in Vienna and one of the editors of the multilingual web journal transversal. She coordinated the multi-annual research project Creating Worlds (2009-2012) on the relationship between art and
knowledge production and she has worked on projects connecting visual arts, debate and theory production. She coordinated the transnational arts and research project translate - Beyond Culture: The Politics of Translation (2005-2008) and took part in the project team of republicart (2002-2005), the latter two co-financed by the EU Culture Programme. Therese is a member of the editorial board of the journal Kulturrisse. She lectures regularly on cultural policy and cultural theory. From 2003 until 2006 she was a board member of EFAH (now Culture Action Europe). In her writing and research she currently takes a specific interest in postcolonial studies and critical migration studies.
Christiaan De Beukelaer is Lecturer in Cultural Management at Queen Margaret University in Edinburgh and PhD candidate at the University of Leeds. His research primarily focuses on the role of culture and cultural industries in relation to development. He is a member of the U40 Network, serves on the Management Committee of COST Action Investigating Cultural Sustainability. He holds an MSc in Cultures and Development Studies (Magna Cum Laude, Leuven – with an excellence scholarship awarded by the Roger Dillemans Fund) and an MA in Cultural Studies (Magna Cum Laude, Leuven). His first degree is a BA in Musicology (Amsterdam). He has been invited to give talks at the Arterial Network African Creative Economy Conference (Cape Town, 2013) and the UNESCO World Forum on Culture and Cultural Industries (Florence, 2014), among others. He has published articles in Cultural Trends, the Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society, and The World of Music (new series). He is co-editor (with Miikka Pyykkönen and JP Singh) of the forthcoming book Globalization, Culture, and development: The UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

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Editor: Diane Dodd

Design and layout: Martin Takken and Tom Zandwijken
Printed by: ORGON Ltd., Sofia

Published by the European Cultural Foundation
Jan van Goyenkade 5
1075 HN Amsterdam
The Netherlands
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www.culturalfoundation.eu
“Christiaan De Beukelaer makes a significant contribution to the literature on cultural and creative industries by foregrounding his research in the African context of Burkina Faso and Ghana. The book raises important questions about culture, cultural industries and creative industries and their relationship to one another that will stimulate new ways of thinking about the current discourse of ‘culture and development’ and ‘creative economy’. Thorough in its approach and content, I recommend this book for students, scholars and researchers interested in development, Africa, the cultural and creative economy, and public policy.”

Avril Joffe
Postgraduate Course Coordinator in Cultural Policy and Management, Wits School of Arts, Johannesburg

“This book is a timely reminder why cultural policy studies needs not be some idle backwater but can be right at the heart of contemporary debates around culture, economy, development and modernity. Christiaan De Beukelaer places current policy debates in their broader academic context but, more importantly, he shows why these debates matter and to who.”

Justin O’Connor
Professor of Cultural Economy, Monash University, Melbourne