COMMONWEALTH EXCHANGE

The Commonwealth's Call to Duty

Advancing modern Commonwealth defence connections

by Tim Hewish

Foreword by Rt Hon. Dr. Liam Fox MP

/About Commonwealth Exchange/

Commonwealth Exchange (CX) is a newly established think tank that promotes the trading, educational, and strategic potential of the Commonwealth in the UK. It does so through the publication of research papers, the production of seminars, and the creation of introductory trade guides.

Its chairman is Lord Howell, Commonwealth Minister 2010-12. It is also assisted by a cross-party advisory board and supported by a wide range of benefactors.

Its latest report on Commonwealth immigration and visa in the UK received world wide media coverage and was supported by the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, who kindly wrote the foreword.

/About the Author/

Tim Hewish is Executive Director and co-founder of CX. He was previously a researcher for a Conservative Member of Parliament.

He has a master's degree in Imperial and Commonwealth History from King's College London.

He is the author of: *How to Solve a Problem like a Visa – the unhappy state of Commonwealth immigration in the UK.*

Tim is the also author of: *Common-Trade, Common-Growth, Common-Wealth: An inquiry into the establishment of freer trade, growth, and prosperity across Britain and the Commonwealth.*

He was awarded third place in the Institute of Economic Affairs' *Brexit* essay competition 2014.

/Acknowledgements/

We would like to thank the Commonwealth Argosy Group for their considerable support towards our report and its launch without which it would not have been possible to produce. You can find more about their work on www.commonwealthargosy.com

We are also grateful to the authors of the opinion pieces from defence think tanks from around the Commonwealth. We value their contribution as it has provided a wider perspective.

Thank you to Lord Howell, our chairman, as well as to our advisory board and of course our benefactors, who make CX possible.

Thanks also to those behind the scenes, but never far from our thoughts, who spend their days supporting us and have spent many late nights proof-reading the report.

The final version of the report was copy-edited by Hazel Harris at Wordstitch Editorial Services (www.wordstitch.co.uk).

Design and production by Marian Hutchinson (marianhutchinson@hotmail.co.uk)

Centre page defence infographic and two-pager report summary by Chris Smith (www.studiocs.co.uk)

TJH

/Contents/

/Foreword – Rt Hon. Dr. Liam Fox MP/

The international security environment has been revolutionised by the advent of globalisation. We now live in a world of hitherto unknown interdependence where threats and problems in one part of the world ricochet quickly around the rest. Whether we are talking about the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the disease impact of SARS or the banking crisis of 2008, contagion can quickly affect us all. This new dynamic will require us all to develop new means of dealing with our collective threats and will require a range of flexible responses.

The old institutions will not be sufficient to provide us with the variety of levers we will need to guide us through the complexities and challenges of this new era. That is not to say that they will necessarily be redundant but they will need to be augmented to give us the agility we will require. If the 20th century was the century of blocs defined by geography, the interdependence of the 21st century will need cooperation based on mutual interests, functionality and shared outlook, even when those involved are in very different parts of the globe.

Where will the Commonwealth fit in this new picture? On the plus side, it is an organisation with huge geographical reach and which represents a wide range of states. It includes some of the most affluent and developed nations as well as some of the poorest and most underdeveloped. All share, to one degree or another the vulnerabilities of our times – the risk of failing states, the rise of transnational terrorism, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, global financial imbalances and the competition for commodities. On the negative side, it was never conceived as a security or defence organisation and, given the tensions between some member states, is unlikely to become one. Yet, many Commonwealth members have played a role in one type of international coalition or another as part of their global responsibilities and alliances.

There is no reason why the Commonwealth should not be a forum that considers questions of geopolitical importance. After all, groups such as the EU do so, notwithstanding that it was never conceived as a defence or security alliance. While there may be little room for unanimity on any course of action in response to perceived threat, there are likely to be many overlapping interests. In the world we are entering, we will require greater flexibility and will need many more levers to pull in the face of abundant new risks and challenges.

A Commonwealth security forum could provide an interesting and potentially useful adjunct to the current global security architecture. At the very least, it would be a useful tool in assessing trends and could give valuable early warning signals of future problems. We cannot have too much dialogue or an excess of information in the era of globalisation. It may just be that the Commonwealth could be coming of age in the right way at the right time. It is a time to be bold.

Rt Hon. Dr. Liam Fox MP
Secretary of State for Defence (2010-11)

/Glossary/

ABCA	American, British, Canadian, Australian, & New Zealand Armies' Program
ACSC	Advanced Command and Staff Course
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ANZAM	Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia defence agreement
ANZUK	Australian, New Zealand, and UK force
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUKMIN	Australia–UK Ministerial Meetings
BATUK	British Army Training Unit Kenya
BATUS	British Army Training Unit Suffield
BCFK	British Commonwealth Force Korea
BCOF	British Commonwealth Occupying Force
CDR	Closer Defence Relations agreement
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CMF	Commonwealth Monitoring Force
CMS	Commonwealth Military Scholarship
ComSec	Commonwealth Secretariat
CSC	Commonwealth Scholarship Commission
CSF	Commonwealth Security Forum
DfID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign & Commonwealth Office
FESR	Far East Strategic Reserve
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangement
FVEY	Five Eyes intelligence program
HADR	humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
IED	improvised explosive device
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
JSCSC	Joint Services Command and Staff College
MAJDP	Malaysia–Australia Joint Defence Program
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RCDS	Royal College of Defence Studies
RMAF	Royal Malaysian Air Force
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIMBEX	Singapore Indian Maritime Bilateral Exercises
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)

Our Recommendations

I

Establish a Commonwealth Security Forum (CSF)

Enhance Commonwealth understanding and advance ties in this currently under-developed field through regular dialogue

II

Create a Commonwealth Military Scholarship (CMS)

Enable a strengthening of strategic knowledge between Commonwealth Armed Forces

III

Upscale Commonwealth Officer Exchange Programmes

Better develop human interoperability of Commonwealth Armed Forces personnel

/Executive Summary/

Today the Commonwealth and global security concerns are scarcely mentioned together and yet they have a strong joint heritage. The Commonwealth works on a myriad of issues, but defence is one area left untapped by policy makers. This report acts as a discussion piece to assess whether there are ways to enhance cooperation in this field to the benefit of all members.

Throughout the report we construct a picture that shows the under-utilised opportunities for greater Commonwealth interaction in security and defence. We do so using illustrations from historic and current actions and we also provide three policy recommendations. This is interlaced with commentary and opinion from leading defence think tanks from around the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth's footfall in every habitable continent would enable it to build the influence and geographical reach to help grow a security network. This can be seen readily in the terrorist atrocities that continue apace in Nigeria and Kenya and now Cameroon; piracy more widely in both East and West Africa; drug smuggling in the Caribbean; natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific and the Caribbean; Singapore's new Arctic shipping route; the growing interest in the Antarctic from many countries; and assistance with the Ebola outbreak.

Importantly, this report is not arguing for the creation of a defence force or security council like NATO. Any such plans are premature. The base from which the Commonwealth starts is modest. Rather, the report is about finding opportunities to collaborate across the Commonwealth's 53 nations through a number of hard and soft military factors. The scope is certainly there.

Numerous defence professionals told us that any discussion of upgraded Commonwealth connections will need to be "low rent", given the tightening of defence spending in many countries. It will also have to compete against international and regional organisations that sit above and below. Another cautionary note was to avoid any suspicion that the expansion would solely advance British interests. Any future plans must be multilateral, allowing for equal voices.

Commonwealth Forces in History

There have been a number of joint operations under the auspices of the Commonwealth in a historical context. We have charted this genesis of Commonwealth defensive action through various formulations of joint forces in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe. These events, although little known to the majority of people, provide a useful understanding of what went before. However, they should be seen as part of the post-World War II and Cold War context.

An extended history section can be found on pages 13-18.

Current Commonwealth Mutilateral Military Linkages

We explore current Commonwealth military ties both bilaterally and multilaterally. The UK has a significant number and we investigate its Commonwealth footfall, while the policies of other countries such as Australia, Canada, and India underscore the need to enhance these bilateral ties with other Commonwealth countries. The current Commonwealth military linkages are primarily not under any Commonwealth aegis, but they do highlight the dynamics and the relationships at play. The rationale is that such links can be strengthened or kept updated and may even allow for new opportunities and proposals to emerge.

An extended linkages section can be found on pages 19-28.

Areas of Development

For the Commonwealth to be relevant in the defence and security realm, it must provide opportunities to discuss, understand, and develop solutions to a number of fundamental concerns. We have pinpointed seven such areas. The list is not meant to be exhaustive and others may appear after further study. A Commonwealth Security Forum (CSF) would need to consider these topics.

An extended glossary can be found on pages 29-31.

Recommendations

I Establish a Commonwealth Security Forum (CSF)

Why have a CSF?

Importantly, it is not the case that because there is currently not a forum one should not exist. A case needs to be made. This must be compelling. We have set out 12 reasons why a CSF would develop Commonwealth strategic relations:

- It would be cross-regional, as the only security forum that has nations representing all habitable continents.
- It would increase the diplomatic reach of emerging and developing nations.
- It would enable soft-power projection for developed nations.
- Every Commonwealth nation would be consulted from inception.
- It would provide effective defence-capacity-building opportunities.
- It would provide strategic educational benefits.
- It would enhance conflict-prevention measures.
- It would allow for wider operational discussions such as joint training and exercises, and interoperability.
- It would provide a regular and fixed meeting and act as the backbone for regular contact between Commonwealth nations.
- It would provide opportunities as a venue for bilateral private diplomatic and military meetings.
- It would provide business-to-government trade opportunities.
- It would widen the policy and research benefits of think-tanks.

What would a CSF look like?

The best method is to look towards tried-and-tested forums that have a track record of success. This option leads us to consider the International Institute of Strategic Studies' (IISS) Dialogue series. The IISS's Shangri-La Dialogue in Commonwealth Singapore was established in 2002. The IISS extended the series to the Middle East in 2004 and will expand to Latin America through the 2015 Cartagena Dialogue in Columbia.

Details relating to frequency, duration, cost, and delivery are fundamental. To keep costs down we propose that a CSF take place during the biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and last for two days. Having the existing Commonwealth architecture already in the host city over the same period would allow for a smoother introduction. It would mean extra aeroplane seats and hotel rooms on what is already a fixed space in the Commonwealth calendar.

Both the IISS and the Commonwealth Business Forum organisers have informed us that their events require a low seven-figure dollar expenditure. However, the latter admits that this varies depending on the Commonwealth host nation.

Private sponsorship from business could cover some of the costs, while the Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec) could provide funding out of its current budget, which is funded by Commonwealth nations. However, this would mean the CSF would no doubt have to come under the official control of ComSec. If the host nation contributed then it would also have a stake in the CSF's delivery, but of course this nation would change every two years. Additionally, if a third party such as a think tank were to deliver the CSF, it might start as an unofficial meeting like the 2002 Shangri-La Dialogue.

Attendees are also of critical importance. Shangri-La started as Track 1 diplomacy, which is reserved for official government delegations and leading Armed Forces personnel. Track 2 diplomacy casts the net more broadly to include non-state actors such as think tanks, NGOs, and the media. In recent times Track 1.5 has been developed as a blend. The concern is that the more open a forum is, the less official voices can speak freely, especially on topics of great sensitivity such as defence and security.

These questions also concern scale and personnel. These will affect cost too. Cartagena provides some answers. The IISS states that it expects the number of total delegates to be between 250 and 300. Whichever body or bodies create a CSF will have to acknowledge the difficulties of organising 53 separate delegations. Of course, CHOGM itself has a track record on delivery. And in an inaugural event participation might initially be low – say around 20 nations.

Personnel invitations should most definitely be sent to all three branches of the Armed Forces to include chiefs of staff and their deputies along with permanent Defence Ministry teams and defence attachés. Defence secretaries or ministers provide a strong pull for sponsorship and media coverage as well as the important keynote speech that serves the IISS's Dialogues well.

The itinerary is also pivotal. There is no value in having a fully costed and high-ranking event that is let down by a poor schedule. We would prefer to see the forum revolve around numerous themes and not regions to maximise the interest.

Of equal merit is what happens at the fringes. There should be significant room left for bilateral or multilateral deals or discussions to take place in private, which would allow progress to be made on a number of policy issues. This would provide strength to the claim that any new forum was not just a talking-shop. For example, advancements on interoperability, intelligence sharing, and military exercises would prove highly valuable. Other private meetings would be the business delegations having the opportunity to meet with other leading delegates.

A more detailed analysis can be found on pages 33-42.

II Create a Commonwealth Military Scholarship (CMS)

We recommend the creation of a Commonwealth Military Scholarship (CMS), which officers of certain ranks could apply for once accepted onto a specific course in a selected Commonwealth nation's university or academy.

The major benefit of this scheme would be to deepen ties and interactions between Commonwealth military personnel early in

their careers, and these ties would be carried forward as officers progressed to higher ranks in their respective Armed Forces. This approach has numerous soft-power advantages.

The delivery and funding of the scholarship are of major importance. One possibility is the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission (CSC). We have been informed that it would be quite possible to integrate a CMS into the CSC scheme if funding were made available. This could take the form of the existing Department for International Development (DfID) grant being allowed for defence-oriented courses, or new funds could be released by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The CSC told us that for around £200,000 seven scholarships could be provided.

In the UK, we have identified the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) and the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) as possible adopters of the CMS. The RCDS has an annual intake of between 90 and 100 officers. In 2015, 65 are foreign nationals with 20 of those coming from Commonwealth nations.

The RCDS and the JSCSC each have an optional Defence Studies MA course run by King's College London. The RCDS offers an International Security Studies MA. There are 24 places available and is always full. We suggest that a CMS could be offered to allow more Commonwealth officers to take up this MA if they pass the entrance exam.

The JSCSC works slightly differently. Its students represent the top 10% of the officer cadre and undertake the Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC). It has representation from a number of Commonwealth nations. In 2015 this stands at 20 out of a 296 total. The course is available to officers of rank 3/4. We take the view that the JSCSC is a possible candidate organisation to use a CMS, which would assist its officers undertaking the ACSC or its King's master's degree. Of the 296 on the ACSC course, 75% take the Defence Studies MA. The number of Commonwealth students is currently not available.

We have also identified a number of Commonwealth defence academies that could provide similar options for the application of the CMS. How a wider CMS could work could be a possible discussion topic at our proposed CSF. If heads of the defence academies and leading academics were invited, space and time could be set aside to develop such a policy. This would also give the forum increased educational value.

A more detailed analysis can be found on pages 38-40.

III Upscale Commonwealth Officer Exchange Programmes

The rationale for upscaling such programmes is most readily demonstrated in the potential increase in forces' interoperability where soldiers from both sides work together learning each other's systems and organisations, returning to their home forces with this knowledge. This will translate into positives at the operational level when interacting in exercises or even on tour during times of war or disaster relief.

The same goes for understanding other countries' doctrines and procedures; such understanding may aid the building of a common set of standards that Commonwealth officers can master. Even at the most basic level, the fact that the majority of Commonwealth nations use English as a shared language assists with communication at an operational level.

The very nature of these swaps allows for the Armed Forces of both countries to learn and evolve. Interaction with new forces breaks down perceived barriers and fosters trust and goodwill. This can only be a positive development for inter-force relations. And the cost is low because officers of the same or similar standard are exchanged.

The major issue relates to the quality of the officers. It is widely accepted that the UK forces train their officers to an exceptionally high standard. However, whether the same quality would be offered by the full range of Commonwealth forces remains a concern. Therefore, numerical upscaling must keep reciprocal quality at the forefront of any decision making.

A UK example highlights why Commonwealth officer swaps have merit. In 2013, the MoD announced that it would reintroduce five-year residency rules for new Armed Forces recruits. This requirement had been waived in 1998 for Commonwealth nationals.

In 2007 the number of Commonwealth and Irish servicemen in the British Armed Forces was 6,700. By 2012 the number had increased to 7,980 (4.8% of the total). The clear majority (7,120) were in the British Army.

We discovered British Army figures for Commonwealth soldiers as of January 2014 via a freedom-of-information request. These latest statistics show 5,980 trained Commonwealth soldiers, making up 7% of the British Army total.

This has a knock-on effect for Commonwealth soldiers, which brings officer exchanges further into play as opportunities to work and operate with Commonwealth personnel are reduced.

India and Commonwealth Cooperation

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) / New Delhi, India
Commander Abhijit Singh / *Research Fellow*

In the past few years, there has been an attempt to revive the idea of Commonwealth cooperation, with an emphasis on security and intelligence sharing. In particular, this report's suggestion to create a Commonwealth Security Forum around the biennial CHOGM – similar in design to the Shangri-La Dialogue held every year at Singapore and aimed at greater strategic interaction between Commonwealth nations – comes across as rather striking.

While an international alliance of English speaking democracies is an interesting proposition, not many practical proposals regarding its implementation have so far been forthcoming. The Commonwealth's 53 member countries, it has been rightly pointed out, have much more in common than the English language. The many converging interests and cultural complementarities among the organization's constituent members do present a compelling case for economic, security and intelligence cooperation. However, the notion that the Commonwealth can somehow play a significant part in shaping the contemporary world order, dominated increasingly by China, is yet to be fully tested.

In the Indian minds, the Commonwealth is still a largely ceremonial, British-dominated organization with an antiquated aura. India's policy elite tend to regard the commonwealth alliance as an outmoded entity, increasingly irrelevant in a contemporary geopolitical and economic context. Still, a handful (but growing number) of policy experts agree there is much India can do along with fellow Commonwealth countries to enhance security and development in the Indo-Pacific region.

Maritime security is one area where New Delhi could have a working relationship with other Commonwealth capitals. In recent months India has improved its maritime relationship with Australia even signing a framework agreement for defence cooperation. The Indian navy and the Royal Australian Navy will now hold regular joint maritime exercise, the first of which will be conducted later this year. New Delhi is also in the process of expanding its defence exchanges with other Indo-Pacific nations, many of which (Malaysia, Mauritius and Maldives) happen to be a part of the Commonwealth.

One way India could improve its security cooperation with other Commonwealth nations is to focus on intelligence, counter-terrorism and low-level defence initiatives like military scholarships for officers to study at different national military academies; officer exchange programs for training assignments, and cross-posting of officers for operational coordination. But as a rising power, India can also influence the Commonwealth's economic prospects, by offering technical, economic and capacity building assistance to the smaller states.

It is pertinent that an active leadership role in the organization could give New Delhi the diplomatic leverage to resist China's growing maritime advances in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In recent months, China's growing economic and geopolitical influence among Indian Ocean states – particularly the proposal to create a Maritime Silk Road – has caused much anxiety among Indian policymakers. The idea of a Commonwealth security forum – as stretched as it may presently appear - could be crucial in the context of preserving India's power equities in the IOR.

A few years ago, C Raja Mohan, one of India's leading strategic thinkers pointed out that in its pursuit of great power status India could end up following the foreign policy of the British Raj in the early 1900s: regional primacy by providing security to weaker states and preserving regional order. While New Delhi may not be presently convinced it must play a leading role in the Commonwealth, it may soon realize that working with the organization's constituent members in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific is an effective way of giving its security and geopolitical agenda greater traction.

One example of Commonwealth officer-swap programmes is Exercise Long Look, an arrangement between Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. It lasts for around four months. As this preamble makes clear:

"The aim of Long Look is to broaden the experience and professional knowledge of selected personnel and to promote continued cooperation between the participating defence forces through exposure to other procedures, equipment, personnel and cultures."

Any discussions on swaps could be explored during a CSF in bilateral or multilateral meetings.

A more detailed analysis can be found on pages 40-42.

Conclusion

Throughout the report we have endeavoured to construct a picture that shows the under-utilised opportunities for greater Commonwealth interaction in security and defence. We acknowledge that the notion of closer Commonwealth defence ties is starting from a low level. However, the power and potential of Commonwealth Armed Forces working collectively to assist others for the general good in a multitude of areas could help with current and future security concerns across many regions.

The report should be judged overall on its feasibility. Our recommendations provide a means to forward the Commonwealth in a way that is fundamentally attainable and viable.

Crucial to the understanding of Commonwealth strategic concerns is that we are looking ahead, not to the past. History provides the backdrop, but ultimately solutions to the Commonwealth's pressing defensive problems need progressive and modern architecture. The Commonwealth must be better prepared.

Further interaction breeds understanding and fosters camaraderie, which has a positive impact on interoperability. As a collection of developed, developing, and emerging economies, the Commonwealth can utilise this unique club in the strategic realm for mutual aid, protection, and security. We see no better way than to commence discussions with a forum of Commonwealth partners. Many lives would certainly benefit and indeed prosper.

/Introduction: Why Research Commonwealth Security?/

Today the Commonwealth and global security concerns are scarcely mentioned together and yet they have a strong joint heritage. The Commonwealth works on a myriad of issues, but defence is one area left untapped by policy makers.

This report acts as a discussion piece to assess whether there are ways to enhance cooperation in this field to the benefit of all members. Before embarking on our research we knew that there would be detractors who would reject the notion on the basis of a number of dated misconceptions. We aim to dispel those lingering doubts.

One such error is viewing any step taken as a signal towards militarism. This is not what the report is advocating. We do not promote slippage back to grand standing armies or vast naval exercises. The Commonwealth as a conception is about ensuring peace, prosperity, and stability for its members. However, numerous conflict zones continue to span a number of Commonwealth countries and are in fact increasing in number. Therefore, it makes sense to find geo-political space for a pan-Commonwealth solution. Our key recommendation is for the establishment of a Commonwealth Security Forum (CSF) to accompany future biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs).

Canadian Views on Commonwealth Security

Atlantic Council of Canada / Toronto, Canada
Brian Merry / *Kabir Bhatia* / *and Zaid Al-Nassir* / *Program Editors*

Canada has been an active Commonwealth member and has consistently upheld the Commonwealth's goals and values, acting as both advocate and mentor for smaller member states in a number of areas. In a defence capacity, Canadian operational support hubs, such as those currently operating in Jamaica and Kuwait, have helped to enable the inter-regional mobility of "people, material, equipment and supplies". This has allowed for flexible and cost-efficient co-operative military operations as well as coherent and timely responses to natural and man-made crises. Canada's actions thus far reveal its commitment to the maintenance of international political and economic stability.

Canada has consistently demonstrated its support for global cooperation in combating threats to transnational security. The Halifax International Security Forum (HISF), formed in 2009, is funded by the Canadian Department of Defense and the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency. It serves as an apt example of Canada's leading role in fostering economic and military collaboration, and is representative of Canada's belief that intensified collaboration within the Commonwealth acts in the interest of national security. Operating out of Washington, D.C., the HISF, which has been called "the Davos of international security", seeks to develop joint solutions to international security issues at the executive level, by fostering both transnational political, and military, discourses. In past years, the forum, which has participants from of over 40 countries, has focused on regional security issues including post-war security in Afghanistan as well as the repercussions emanating out of the 2012 Israeli-Hamas war for the international community as a whole and Middle Eastern security in particular.

To account for the disproportionate military capacity of member states, a Commonwealth forum could allow smaller, less economically developed member states the opportunity to acquire the economic and technical support necessary for the adequate development of their economic and intelligence gathering capabilities.

A Commonwealth forum could also foster soft-power diplomacy through officer exchange and scholarship programmes. The Canadian Forces College currently offers training programs to officers from other countries, thereby enabling good strategy dissemination. The Commonwealth could offer annual military scholarships to select armed forces personnel across the Commonwealth in order to facilitate more such exchanges. We recommend that the Commonwealth Forum encourage the establishment of more of these programs in member states.

To conclude, Canada is always looking to expand its security ties, and the expansion of soft-power cooperation would allow Canada this opportunity. In a globalized world facing growing transnational threats from both state and non-state actors, a Commonwealth forum would also offer the appropriate platform for the deliberation of issues relating to common security, as well as the negotiation of multilateral policy responses to such issues.

At present, most nations remain wedded to 20th-century ways of viewing the world either as East versus West or in regional blocs, and this is no different in the defence sphere, for example with NATO or the EU, which had their genesis in the 20th century and have struggled to move on. Getting past this mental block is challenging.

The leading actor in the defense sphere is the United States. A large proportion of nations look to it for protection and assistance with their security concerns. To manage this the US has the Unified Combatant Command system. For some a US relationship has positive connotations; for others they are firmly negative. This is beyond the scope of this report other than to say that a Commonwealth dimension could nullify such an unhelpful dualism.

Linked to the US are ideas surrounding the Anglosphere. After the US, the main Anglosphere powers are all Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK). These five represent a significant nexus in the defence realm, in schemes ranging from the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence-sharing alliance to Armed Forces' interoperability within the American, British, Canadian, Australian, & New Zealand Armies' (ABCA) programmes.

We take the view that the concept of the Anglosphere should be opened up to include additional Commonwealth nations. They should not necessarily join the existing security architecture as this would appear impractical; rather, ways should be found to increase intelligence sharing and interoperability between Commonwealth countries for mutual safety and security.

As a number of Commonwealth nations become emerging or developed economies, it is sound judgement to forge shared alliances that go beyond the traditional Anglosphere powers. The Commonwealth, with footfall in every habitable continent, has the geographical reach to help grow the security network.

We also reference other areas of collaboration in the field of defence diplomacy: interoperability; military training; intelligence sharing; anti-piracy; combating terrorism; humanitarian support; and environmental disaster relief. We argue that the Commonwealth needs to build an influential role to help collectively as a Commonwealth and with others. This can be seen readily in the terrorist atrocities that continue apace in Nigeria and Kenya and recently Camaroon; piracy more widely in both East and West Africa; drug smuggling in the Caribbean; natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific; Singapore's new Arctic shipping route; the growing interest in the Antarctic from many countries; and assistance with the Ebola outbreak.

During the research stage we met numerous defence professionals who said that any discussion of upgraded Commonwealth connections will need to be "low rent" given the tightening of defence spending in many countries. It will also have to compete against international and regional organisations that sit above and below, such as the UN, NATO, and the EU. Another cautionary note was to avoid any suspicion that the expansion would solely advance British interests. Any future plans must be multilateral, allowing for equal voices.

With all this in mind the structure of the report will start with a focus on historical Commonwealth military operations post-World War II, including in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe. The report then details existing Commonwealth multilateral military linkages, notably the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK. Key bilateral relationships will also be explored with a particular, but not exclusive, focus on the UK and its footprint across the globe.

A number of recommendations are also put forward, with our prime suggestion being the creation of a CSF that would follow the successful blueprint of the International Institute of Strategic Studies' (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue for Asia. Other ideas revolve around Commonwealth military scholarships and an upscaled Commonwealth officer exchange programme, which allow for further interaction in the strategic and operational domains.

A discussion piece would not be complete without additional voices. Throughout the report the reader will hear from defence think tanks from around the Commonwealth, which comment on renewed strategic partnerships and how to practically realise such designs. Included in the report is an infographic breakdown of key Commonwealth military strengths by equipment and personnel.

To conclude, we take the view that the Commonwealth can provide a shared security bulwark against those who wish to destabilise and spread fear. However, we should also see the Commonwealth as an opportunity to improve existing standards and procedures and in fact forge new ties. Taken together, these possibilities for a more engaged Commonwealth could help us to find the safest path to stability in an uncertain world.

/Commonwealth Forces in History/

There have been a number of joint operations under the auspices of the Commonwealth in a historical context. It is prudent to briefly identify such events and to assess their value as lessons for any future growth of Commonwealth security apparatus.

World Wars I and II

Both world wars saw what was then the British Empire fight in many theatres of war across the globe. Most people are aware of the American, British, and French sacrifice and have a strong knowledge of Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and South African battles. Yet it has taken the centenary of World War I for certain groups in Commonwealth diasporas in the UK to highlight the sacrifices of the Indian Army as well as those from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. This is fundamentally welcome and should be strongly encouraged.

Given the size of this report, we will not detail the world wars, chiefly because what could loosely be called Commonwealth forces were under total British command and were not of the independent nature of modern Commonwealth strategic alliances. However, those who are interested in such detailed reports should read *The Commonwealth Armies: Manpower and Organisation in Two World Wars* by F.W. Perry.

Occupation of Japan: The British Commonwealth Occupying Force (BCOF)

At the close of World War II, the unconditional surrender of Japan led to its occupation by the US under General MacArthur. However, there was a little-known Commonwealth dimension. The British Commonwealth Occupying Force (BCOF) was created to assist the US. The prime role of the BCOF was demilitarisation:

> "Maintain military control and to supervise the demilitarisation and disposal of the remnants of Japan's war-making capacity.[1]

The BCOF represented three services from four separate nations (Australia, British India, New Zealand, and the UK) under the same command. Australia was particularly keen to have a presence during the occupation and after much wrangling secured the BCOF Commander-in-Chief role in the person of General Northcott, followed later by General Robertson. This marked the first time that British troops were under full Dominion command. The table below shows a breakdown of troop numbers.

Chart 1: Commonwealth Troop numbers in BCOF

Nation	June 1946	April 1948	Sept. 1948
Australia	11,400	8,200	6,200
India	10,800	0	0
UK	9,000	1,300	462
New Zealand	4,400	2,500	348

Source: Bates, 1993, *Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force*

As we can see, India played a significant role: by June 1946 it was providing just over 30% of the entire force. However, with the Partition of India and independence fast approaching, Indian troops operating under British control were naturally withdrawn. This created concerns for Australia as Indian units were viewed as vital parts of the infrastructure and could not be easily replaced.

Financing of the operations in Japan also changed, which presented challenges:[2]

Chart 2: Expenditure by Commonwealth nations in Japan

Nation	Expenditure Feb. 1947 (%)	Expenditure March 1948 (%)
Australia	31	75
India	24	0
UK	32	6
New Zealand	13	19

Source: Bates, 1993, *Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force*

Out of the £21 million total over the years of occupation, Australia paid £14.4 million, India £3 million, the UK £2.8 million, and New Zealand £0.9 million.

Despite these economic and personnel reductions over time, historians have written favourably about the BCOF, stating that:

> **"For its first two years the BCOF has been a truly cosmopolitan and powerful formulation. But as Commonwealth partners had differing priorities and the task of occupation diminished it went into a slow decline.[3]**

Another went on to propose that:

> **"The success of the BCOF through its transformation from an occupation force to an effective base organisation is little short of remarkable. It is highly unlikely that any other groups of forces outside the British Commonwealth could have done it.[4]**

Further analysis from a purely military perspective argued that there were "real achievements" for the professional soldiers stationed in Japan. The maintenance of a supply line spanning 6,000km was a considerable feat. The same historian concluded that:

> **"At ground level…one should look for real significance in the Commonwealth. The emotional factor was an overriding influence on the self-justification of the BCOF. Over 80,000 served…they felt it was right to be in Japan and it was absolutely necessary for the Commonwealth to be present.[5]**

The decline of the BCOF was triggered by the discussions that led to the San Francisco Treaty, which would stipulate occupying forces were to be withdrawn. However, the Japanese were not too concerned about the need for immediate withdrawal of the BCOF as Japan recognised the political and economic advantages of the continued presence of a Commonwealth force.

These *advantages* resulted from the outbreak of the Korean War, which went on to involve a Commonwealth force. This gave the BCOF a new lease of life as it became the main support base for the Commonwealth effort in Korea.

Korean War 1951-54: 1st Commonwealth Division (BCFK)

Despite the existence of the BCOF, albeit dwindling, the creation of a Commonwealth component in the Korean War was by no means a foregone conclusion. There were many imperial hang-ups as a fighting force is very different from an occupying force.

As historians make clear, the concept of imperial defence was left hollowed when the UK was forced to surrender in Singapore, and this then influenced Dominion attitudes to any attempt to revive Commonwealth defence cooperation after World War II. Whatever the undertones, it is accepted that the sudden requirement to field forces in Korea caught all nations unprepared. Australia and New Zealand shared the UK's strategic assumption that there would be a major deployment to the Middle East in the event of a general or third world war.

There was huge concern about what constituted a Commonwealth force. Canada did not contribute to the BCOF in Japan but it did in Korea, which was in keeping with its historic lack of interest in Asia and the Pacific. Moves were also made towards India, Pakistan, and South Africa concerning the contribution of force numbers. The violent fall-out of Partition and the stand-off between India and Pakistan over Kashmir meant assistance was never going to be forthcoming. South Africa stated clearly that it would not deploy its forces outside the African continent, plus the onset of apartheid policies meant no African support was anticipated.

The US was keen to have an ally. As the situation in Korea rapidly deteriorated, it tried to lure Commonwealth nations by playing them off one another. The UK wanted to restore its military prestige East of Suez, Australia wanted to play a larger role in the Pacific, while New Zealand didn't want to be left out. This combined pressure forced Canada to re-examine its own position. The US made clever use of time-zone differences in its approaches to the Commonwealth nations, allowing New Zealand to announce deployment of its ground troops before Australia, which in turn managed to beat the British by an hour.[6]

Now that the troops were committed, it became a question of delivery. The ability to use the BCOF in Japan as a base was strategically important as Japan was more able to meet the economic and military demands of a fighting force than Korea, which

was ravaged by fighting. Again, interestingly, questions over command were fundamental. In Japan, Australia successfully demonstrated that an officer from the Dominions had the ability to command British troops, and this in turn helped the much wider argument that Australia could lead the Commonwealth in the Pacific. Therefore, given Robertson's command of the BCOF, he was offered the role of commanding Commonwealth forces, this time in Korea.

The Canadians were less compliant than the Australians and the New Zealanders. For a start they disliked the name and preferred calling it a UN force. They went as far as to say that even if the term "Commonwealth" achieved popular usage every effort should be made to stop it being used in an official capacity. In sum, Canada was in favour of a Commonwealth force but rejected any identification of the fact that the force was derived from Commonwealth nations.[7]

The British dismissed the Canadian view on two grounds: firstly, it was simply illogical to call the division a UN force when it was never conceived as such and, secondly, there would be practical difficulties (with regard to language, procedure, training, etc.) if foreign troops were included.

As an aside, the British were reluctant to provide a force. They were concerned about Chinese intervention in the Korean War and how this would affect Hong Kong. They took the view that, if Britain were to reduce its focus in Hong Kong to fight in Korea, it would make the former vulnerable to Chinese aggression. However, General MacArthur's request for Commonwealth assistance was based on an actual threat in Korea as opposed to a potential threat to Hong Kong that had not manifested itself in reality. Britain found it hard to substantiate its view.

We can therefore see that, even before the Commonwealth Division was established, the internal wranglings of these Commonwealth nations were under away.

Eventually, the British saw that there was considerable gain to forming a division that:

> **"Had a particular psychological and political effect of demonstrating Commonwealth solidarity and unity of aim.[8]**

Now the question turned to what percentage each nation would supply. The UK made up 58%, the Canadians 22%, Australia 14%, New Zealand 5%, and India 1% in the form of the field ambulance. As the British had the largest force, the new division maintained the guiding principle that Britain should select the general officer. It was significant that the British chose Major-General Cassels. He had knowledge of the Indian Army and spoke Urdu. He had also served alongside the Canadians in World War II and had just finished his placement as head of British Services Liaison in Australia. Clearly he had Commonwealth credentials. This selection of Cassels plus officers who could sustain relationships with Britain's Dominion counterparts signalled a shift in British thinking after World War II.

Thus, on 28 July 1951, the 1st Commonwealth Division became operational. The BCOF had administrative control, with its commander-in-chief also in command of the Division, which had by then been branded the British Commonwealth Force Korea (BCFK). It is not in the scope of this report to evaluate the success of the BCFK in detail; however, historians conclude that its results were mixed. The major difficulty arose from operational frictions between the US and the Commonwealth forces as opposed to internal disagreement within the Commonwealth. Numerous external events altered functions on the ground. The US dismissed General MacArthur while Churchill returned to government in 1952. In addition, the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951 signalled a withdrawal of Allied Troops, which, as stated previously, meant the BCOF could not remain in Japan. This confused BCFK operations as administrative command resided in Japan.

In terms of expenditure, the funds were as follows:[9]

Chart 3: Expenditure by Commonwealth nations in Korea

Nation	Expenditure Dec. 1952 (%)	Final Settlement (£m; total £45.2m)
Australia	12.5	£7.3m
Canada	27.9	£10.3m
New Zealand	5.3	£2.3m
UK	54.3	£25.3m

Source: Grey, 1988, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War*

Putting the "Wealth" into a Commonwealth Security Forum

African Defence Review / Johannesburg, South Africa
John Stupart / *Managing Editor*

2015 has already been beset with several major conflict events in Africa. Ranging from Boko Haram's attacks on Maidiguru to the late-January announcement by FARDC of Operation Sukola 2, geared towards destroying a recalcitrant FDLR rebel group. In the case of the latter, the South African National Defence Force is contributing a battalion plus of troops and heavy weaponry in a joint military campaign with foreign militaries. Add to this an impending operationalization of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), and the SANDF has its hand full. Put simply, the South African military is being placed in new and ever-shifting counter-insurgency (COIN) environments on all three theatres of modern conflict, and never before has the SANDF needed experienced advice.

Although South Africa and the SANDF have the benefit of a rich history in COIN warfare, this is not enough. Other members of the Commonwealth also hold valuable historical expertise spanning centuries, particularly in the recent ISAF operations in Afghanistan. However, much as the British did not benefit from foreknowledge of the battle of Maiwand before it deployed to Maiwand in force, so too can the SANDF not rest on its laurels. New and constructive methods of engagement with allies old and new must be formed in order to maximise the South African soldier's ability to fight insurgencies throughout the African continent.

But South Africa need not go the course alone. Already the sterling work done by the British Military Stabilisation and Support Group (MSSG) has greatly-benefitted SANDF forces preparing for peacekeeping and peace enforcement deployments. But given the rich knowledge available within the broader commonwealth, this manner of bond can be strengthened. Member states would be well-suited towards the creation of a Commonwealth Security Forum (CSF) geared towards mutual benefit. Much as the South African warfighter requires better understanding of the types of battles he or she will face, so too can the Canadian or British soldier, for example, bring lessons learned from East Asia.

The SANDF's partnerships with foreign military academies has languished in recent years, with some meaningful engagements conducted largely through the SANDF Reserve Force structures. The CSF could galvanise the spirit of information exchange and pave the way to larger inter-commonwealth partnerships between officers and NCOs alike. The MSSG has proven a remarkable success story for both South African and British military leaders, and provides a useful reminder of the need to constantly evolve these linkages into broader, more-knowledgeable forums. The growth into a Commonwealth-wide project is just such an evolution, and one that may well save lives as African soldiers embark on their deployments into some of the worst crises the continent has seen.

It is said that Commonwealth forces possessed a high degree of interchangeability, which allowed for a number of successes, although the reasons for these successes varied. However, these linkages were not to last forever:

> **"The breakdown in the ideal of Commonwealth defence mirrored the erosions of a Commonwealth emphasis in other areas such as trade preference and placing capital investment.[10]**

As the Korean War wound down into a stalemate in 1953 along the 38th parallel, Commonwealth troops withdrew against a growing concern in the Malay Peninsula regarding a Communist uprising. This territory still remained under British control so these developments required British forces to remain (unlike the Japanese and Korean forces, whose presence was optional). Despite this, the UK did not act unilaterally because it looked to a Commonwealth solution to help.

The Malayan Emergency 1954: The British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR)

The Malaysian Emergency had been taking place since 1948, but it was not until the stalemate of the Korean War that a Commonwealth plan for the defence of Southeast Asia surfaced. During a Defence Ministers' meeting in October 1953, the idea of a trilateral defence force was floated between Australia, New Zealand, and the UK that was meant to give teeth to the 1948

ANZAM agreement between the three powers over Southeast Asia. After a number of meetings the result was the creation of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) to act as a "deterrent to Communist aggression in Southeast Asia". This scope was later widened to include a specific reference to what was then the Federation of Malay and Singapore. In 1955 the FESR was formally established and operational.

This had an impact on the then current policy as Australia and New Zealand switched their main commitment of forces from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Collectively, the three Commonwealth forces' deployment was curtailed once Malaysia gained independence in 1957 as these Commonwealth nations had to agree terms to allow their forces to remain in Malaysia.[12] The FESR did receive additional Commonwealth help from Fiji and Southern Rhodesia. The former sent around 1,600 Fijian troops between 1952 and 1956 while the latter first took part in 1951 and then returned to operations between 1956 and 1958.[13]

To conclude these sections on Korea, Japan, and Malaysia, it is clear that a definitive pattern was visible. The term "Commonwealth" in a military sense was a concept that had a specific meaning. It had resonance only in Southeast Asia, with Australia, New Zealand, and the UK being the main players. As has been shown, Canada had to be dragged into a named Commonwealth force in Korea yet it sat out of operations in Japan and Malaya. Britain could command the Indian Army up until the latter country's independence, which had a knock-on effect during operations in Japan. In Korea, India provided medical, not military or administrative, support. Smaller forces – Fiji and Southern Rhodesia – did play a role in Malaysia, but Fiji was at the time a British colony while Southern Rhodesia's foreign policy was governed by the UK.

Therefore, a wider sense of a Commonwealth defence force did not extend beyond this one region, and significant Commonwealth actors in Africa and the Indian sub-continent sat out of such multilateral Commonwealth operations. It should also be noted that major developments were taking place in other parts of globe between 1945 and 1960. The Cold War became a permanent state of affairs in Europe, while decolonisation became more rapid. It is against this backdrop that these three operations should be judged.

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia War 1979-80: Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF)

Further Commonwealth-inspired operations in Southeast Asia declined once the UK made a strategic withdrawal East of Suez in 1971. No further Commonwealth military action took place although joint forces remained in Malaysia and Singapore under the new ANZUK (Australian, New Zealand, and UK) force between 1971 and 1976. The next time any military dimension appeared in a Commonwealth context was during the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia War under the auspices of a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF).

At the time the UK was trying to broker a deal between the warring factions in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. There was also considerable antagonism between the UK and the rest of the Commonwealth over the former's position. It was agreed that there would be a general election in Zimbabwe, but the difficulty came in how this would be observed to avoid intimidation from rival factions. A 10,000-strong UN force was proposed, but it was rejected by the British. Those who proposed the UN force then switched to arguing for a Commonwealth force to offer protection to the electoral parties. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, dismissed this suggestion but was caught flippantly saying that '300 British bobbies could do the job'.[14]

Despite this throwaway comment, the 300 figure was nevertheless the foundation on which the future CMF was created. Once the Ministry of Defence (MoD) became involved, key questions were asked, such as where would the troops come from, what would they do, and under whose authority would they operate? The independent-minded Major-General Acland was appointed to lead Operation Agila, with just over 1,500 Commonwealth peacekeepers under his command. This number included 150 Australians, 22 Fijians, 50 Kenyans, and 75 New Zealanders. Britain provided 800 soldiers including some 300 Royal Air Force personnel.[15]

It has been argued that, despite the small number of troops, the CMF was a "soundly-established body of troops" that successfully carried out its objective. However, the CMF had a secondary unforeseen task, which was to feed the hungry and care for the sick in the region of 22,000 people.[16]

Again, this iteration of a Commonwealth force had the majority of its contingent from Australia, New Zealand, and the UK, but interestingly not Canada, although it did include Fijian and Kenyan support. To date, the CMF is the last time a named Commonwealth force has been deployed. The near majority of recent conflicts have involved NATO, UN forces, or US-led coalitions. Major individual

Commonwealth actors have participated in these operations, but never under the aegis of a combined Commonwealth force.

There may be no formal Commonwealth designated force today, but this does not mean that Commonwealth linkages in the defence sphere do not endure. There are a number, and these will be explored in greater detail in the next section.

Finding a Niche for Commonwealth Security Cooperation

Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) / Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Shahriman Lockman / *Senior Analyst*

Does security cooperation need to be tied to geography? Can it be fruitfully sustained between countries that aren't necessarily in the same region and with potentially vastly different security concerns and priorities? These are some of the questions that we need to keep in mind while considering how to encourage greater security cooperation between the 53 nations of the Commonwealth.

As regional organisations continue to develop and mature, countries around the world are placing more and more emphasis towards deepening their security ties with those within their immediate and extended neighbourhoods. For Malaysia, this involves putting growing attention and resources towards security cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the various ASEAN-led fora –principally the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM Plus.

Yet, Malaysia has far from abandoned in long-standing security ties with its Commonwealth partners. Indeed, one of Malaysia's most valued defence relationships is the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). While the FPDA doesn't come under the Commonwealth's ambit, it involves the fellow Commonwealth nations of Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

Often and rightfully described as "the longest-standing multilateral arrangement in Southeast Asia," the FPDA was initially solely aimed at the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore. Since its inception in 1971, the FPDA has proved to be remarkably versatile, expanding its cooperative activities to include non-conventional issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and anti-piracy. Last year in October, for instance, the FPDA conducted Bersama Lima 2014, an exercise that engaged about 4,000 personnel, 15 surface vessels, a submarine and 58 aircraft in various manoeuvres in Singapore, the Malaysian Peninsula, and the South China Sea.

Indirectly and to a certain extent, Malaysia's involvement in the FPDA has also served to sustain its identity as a Commonwealth nation. Malaysia is therefore likely to be positively disposed towards proposals for greater security-related interactions in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Security Forum, a Track 1.5 conference envisaged to be held at the sidelines of the biennial CHOGM, seems like the right initial step.

The Malaysian Armed Forces also sees great value in professional military education programmes. The obvious aim here is to enhance the knowledge and skills of its officers. But just as important, such programmes are seen as providing opportunities to build relationships with important partner countries. The idea of establishing a Commonwealth military scholarship for officers is therefore likely to be well received by the Malaysian defence establishment.

Nonetheless, it is important to calibrate these and other proposals with current realities in mind. All over the world, defence and security establishments are faced with a proliferation of cooperative initiatives, particularly those within their respective regions. As a result, attention and resources are increasingly being spread thinly across the growing number of meetings and exercises being held. Thus, the main challenge for proponents of security cooperation in the Commonwealth is to find ways of addressing niche areas, ones that aren't necessarily at the top of the agenda of regional organisations but sufficiently important to attract the commitment of the Commonwealth's diverse membership.

/Current Commonwealth Multilateral Military Linkages/

Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA)

In the military sphere, the Commonwealth has retained its Southeast Asian focus with its three main partners along with Malaysia and Singapore. The FPDA celebrated its 40-year anniversary in 2011 and does not look in imminent danger of dissolution.

The FPDA's genesis derived from the UK's withdrawal East of Suez in 1971. Australia and New Zealand wanted to retain a presence in the region, while Malaysia and Singapore required protection due to their limited naval and aerial defence capacity. The Arrangement allowed the three external nations to keep a presence in Malaysia through the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Butterworth airbase. The headquarters (RMAF Butterworth) would be governed by a two-star Australian commander.

The FPDA held regular defence exercises in the sea and air that over time became annual. Land exercises were first incorporated in 1981, although it was not until 1992 that Singapore and Malaysia participated fully on land. There are those who say the FPDA is an outdated Cold War construct, but the level of advancement has been increased significantly since 1991. For example, in 1997 the FPDA focused on the promotion of "greater interoperability" involving advanced weaponry and command-control-communications (C3) systems.[17] In 2000, the five countries' respective defence ministers agreed to joint air, sea, and land exercises with the army fully integrated into the FPDA so to improve operational capability and interoperability. In the same year new programmes were added away from conventional exercises; these looked at asymmetrical warfare such as counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. These exercises were updated again in 2003 to include anti-piracy, disaster relief, and drug smuggling.[18]

Additionally, the current annual tri-force (land, sea, and air) operation Ex Bersama Lima has been running since 2004; the latest iteration took place in October 2014 and included

> **"4000 personnel, one submarine, 15 ships, 58 aircraft, three dive teams, four Ground-Based Air Defence units and various support elements from the FPDA member nations.[19]**

Recent contemporary analysis from an Australian defence think tank has stated that, despite its numerous paradoxes, the FPDA has strength. It argues that the FPDA is effective by maintaining channels of open communication between Malaysia and Singapore on defence and military matters when their historically fraught relationship can complicate many issues. Meanwhile, the think tank praised the FPDA's "considerable flexibility" in interpreting the "security ambit du jour" of anti-terrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).[20] It rebutted the "outdated" charge by stating:

> **"The FPDA – with its mix of regional and extra-regional member states, lack of formal alliance commitments, and proven adaptability – hardly seems anachronistic. Rather it is particularly well-suited to the likely future strategic circumstances… The FPDA is a non-provocative form of hedging and confidence-building.[21]**

This line is supported by others, given the uncertainty about Chinese military growth in the Asia-Pacific region, and the FPDA is the main contributor to the air defence of Malaysia and Singapore. It continues to act as a psychological deterrent to any prospective aggressor, as that aggressor would have to factor in retaliatory action firstly by Australia and then by the UK, which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and nuclear power. Such action would also likely bring the US to the aid of its key strategic allies.[22]

More broadly, the FPDA's shift towards more combined annual exercises plus its upgrades to its command-and-control structure mean that the five nations can "effectively operate under a single command".[23] For Malaysia and Singapore this 40-year arrangement has led to greater professionalisation of their Armed Forces as a result of the joint operational exercise. For Australia, it provides an active presence in Southeast Asia through RMAF Base Butterworth as well as significant training benefits for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). This is why Australia has been the most active extra-regional FPDA member out of the three. New Zealand has similar but smaller interests in the region.

As for the UK, it is interesting to note that the FPDA is the only formal security agreement that links the country to Australia, yet the UK was absent for the FPDA's military exercises for well over a decade in the 1980s. Whether the UK's membership will continue

is a concern for the future. Its Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2010 undermined the FPDA by only mentioning it in the glossary despite there being a whole section dedicated to alliances and partnerships.[24]

An area to explore in the FPDA's future is whether to include additional members or establish some form of observer status. The FPDA does not cover Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia so such a gap might create an opportunity for the Commonwealth nation of Brunei and its substantial air force to be invited. Meanwhile, another key Commonwealth partner, Canada, has been floated by a joint Australian-Canadian think-tank report.[25] This prospective Canadian pivot to the Pacific with Australian assistance will be discussed in a later section. The question could also be opened up further to include other Commonwealth powers such as India, but this is yet to be seen.

To conclude, the FPDA has not remained a product of its time. It has grown into a modern, flexible, multi-regional alliance from which other Commonwealth nations should learn. Its networked approach is welcomed by those Commonwealth supporters who see the Commonwealth in this mould rather than as a bloc. The FPDA's more inclusive element does somewhat alter the traditional Australian-New Zealand-UK axis although it still represents the historical Commonwealth Southeast Asia focus. Despite this, it does serve as a model, which has been described as "defensive and non-threatening", for any prospective cross-regional Commonwealth linkages in the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.

ABCA Armies Programme

ABCA is the first of the UK's alliances that also included the US. It is rooted in the aftermath of World War II and numerous joint Anglo-American operations across Europe. The need for further standardisation between these two nations and Canada became a priority as their relations with their Allied partner the USSR worsened. Thus in 1947 ABC Armies was established. Such plans were vindicated when the Korean War broke out and the US needed to work closely with Commonwealth allies. Australia joined in 1963 and New Zealand secured observer status two years later, only joining as a full member in 2006. ABCA remains headquartered in the US.

ABCA is another example of the bedrock of the Anglosphere with its main focus on interoperability. As ABCA states:

> **"The focus of the Program is on interoperability, defined as: the ability of Alliance Forces, and when appropriate, forces of Partner and other Nations, to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks[26]**

Exercises take place biennially and the host nation rotates. There are naval and air versions: the AUSCANNZUKUS and the Air and Space Interoperability Council respectively.

Importantly, the genesis of ABCA precedes NATO and the former continues to operate outside the larger Western organisation, although not as a rival force. In addition, ABCA does not constitute a formal political alliance; rather, it is seen as an exclusive club. As such there are minimal political ramifications.

The difficulty of expanding ABCA and the other naval and air iterations to a wider Commonwealth context is how this would be viewed by the US. For example, if the UK or others were to look to emerging Commonwealth nations for enhanced interoperability, the trajectory would need to mirror the standard set by the US, to avoid operational complications in co-operative ventures. This is not to say Commonwealth members of ABCA cannot develop external alliances (the FPDA serves as proof), but each nation should remain vigilant that any new partnerships do not stray too far away from American military standards. This is a fundamental concern should Commonwealth nations look closer at future interoperability methods.

Five Eyes (FVEY)

Probably for the wrong reasons, the FVEY intelligence community has had more news stories than it would have liked in recent years. FVEY encompasses the same five Anglosphere powers and takes part in communication sharing otherwise known as signals intelligence (SIGINT). Again, it derived from World War II US–UK relations and these countries' need to work together to intercept and crack Axis codes and top-secret intelligence.[27]

We have included FVEY in this report because it serves as a note of optimism just as much as it does of caution. In combating

modern-day terrorism by an increasingly technological foe, the use of electronic intelligence capture is military and political gold dust. Few can argue when such "spying" prevents grand-scale terror attacks, but many do object to wholesale spying on other nations or even internal surveillance. The merits of such approaches are beyond the scope of this report, but in a Commonwealth context increased intelligence sharing remains one sphere that could be vastly improved. FVEY provides a benchmark, but this may only work well as a small elite club or on a bilateral basis because, as those in the industry make clear:

> **One general rule about intelligence is that the more a secret is shared, the less secret it becomes.**

Therefore, opening up intelligence sharing on a Commonwealth wide scale may prove difficult, while trust underscores the sharing of a secret no matter the scale of the information. In future sections we will look at areas where the Commonwealth can improve and in what context. Intelligence sharing is one such field.[28]

Key Bilaterals

Having a command of current Commonwealth bilateral relationships will give a greater understanding of how to build on these ties should other Commonwealth nations be welcome to such an approach. It is appropriate to first look at the UK, the major traditional power in the Commonwealth.

UK-Commonwealth bilaterals

We have already scoped out the historical links the UK has with specific Commonwealth partners and there has been endless talk of Britain embarking on a 50-year managed decline. This section concerns itself with current UK-Commonwealth strategic relations.

Surprisingly, the Commonwealth is mentioned twice in the UK's 2013 International Defence Engagement Strategy. One of these mentions is as follows:

> **We also recognise the value of engaging with multilateral organisations. The UN, EU, NATO, Commonwealth, Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), African Union, Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), and other international and regional players may provide us with opportunities to use Defence Engagement to achieve our ends more efficiently than through bilateral channels, especially where we can combine efforts with like-minded countries.**[29]

Chart 4: UK military bases overseas



How this multilateral statement manifests itself as bilaterals can be seen most readily through the UK's use of military bases.[30] The largest is the British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) in Alberta, Canada. It is home to 1,000 armoured vehicles and tanks and it trains 7,000 military personnel.[31] In Africa, the UK has a presence in both Kenya and Sierra Leone. The former houses the British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK), which trains small cohorts of British military troops on tour.[32] The latter, based south of Freetown, was established at the end of Sierra Leone's civil war and acts as a small advisory and training base for the country's Armed Forces. The UK also has two British Peace Support Teams, one in Kenya and the other in South Africa. In addition, the UK uses its overseas territories to provide strategic placing of troops around the world. These locations include the Falklands, Gibraltar, and areas in Cyprus.

Moreover, the British Military Garrison Brunei provides a small base for the UK for jungle exercise training and acts as its only presence East of Suez.[33] However, this is about to change. The British Foreign Secretary recently signalled his nation's intention of building a permanent UK naval base in Bahrain:

> **"[This] arrangement will put the longstanding presence of the Royal Navy in Bahrain on a permanent footing…a clear statement of our commitment to our sustained presence East of Suez.[34]**

Interestingly, his announcement came during one of the IISS's strategic forums – something that this report proposes the Commonwealth could adopt and adapt. The crucial phrase from the Foreign Secretary is that concerning the reversal of the UK's commitments East of Suez. Such a move was actually forwarded back in 2013 by the Royal United Services Institute, although the Institute argues that the UK never really left.[35] Although Bahrain is not a Commonwealth member, such a step by the British does raise the possibility of greater interaction between partners East of Suez, which may include Commonwealth ones. A strengthened or more inclusive FPDA may be part of this policy. Deeper ties with India or Pakistan could also be fashioned into such a policy shift. Of course, this does not have to mean physical demonstrations such as military bases; such talk is premature and at this stage unhelpful. Simply getting Commonwealth nations to collectively discuss mutual concerns in an acknowledged Commonwealth forum would be the first major goal – something that this paper advocates.

As for wider UK engagement with other Commonwealth nations, the Royal Navy does provide assistance to the Caribbean through its regular Atlantic patrols for drug trafficking and anti-terrorism measures as part of its Atlantic Patrol Task (North). However, in 2011 it was claimed that the UK would need to pull back on its Atlantic commitments.[36] Despite the scaremongering, the UK did not reduce its presence in the Caribbean and in fact has had four major successes with the *HMS Argyll* (Type 23 Frigate), which resulted in seizures of £77m worth of drugs during a six-month deployment.[37] The *Argyll* also took part in disaster-relief measures during Hurricane Gonzalo, helping Bermuda to restore its airport.[38] The *Argyll* was replaced at the end of 2014 by the smaller *HMS Severn* patrol vessel.[39]

In keeping with its disaster-relief efforts, the UK also worked in Asia during Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. Setting off from Singapore, *HMS Daring* (Type 45 Destroyer) worked to provide aid, resources, and expertise in the region.[40] She was relieved of her duties by *HMS Illustrious* for what would be one of her final large-scale operations before the aircraft carrier was decommissioned.[41] Although the Philippines is not a Commonwealth nation, UK naval operations East of Suez assisted by close regional Commonwealth partners Singapore and Malaysia will be important as and when such disasters become more regular as a result of a changing climate and could signal a multilateral response with a wider Commonwealth dimension.

Moving from environment to health matters, the UK has been instrumental in tackling the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone. 700 British Army personnel were deployed to build a hospital and were later joined by 100 more as well as Canadian doctors who flew from the UK.[42] Again, this highlights the strong humanitarian ties between major Commonwealth nations and the ease with which they will work together; however, forwarding this thought process to the emerging and developing Commonwealth nations has not been explored. Recently, we discussed this topic with leaders in the Royal Commonwealth Society who expressed concern that the Commonwealth did not have an active policy position on Ebola (despite the fact that the disease had affected a number of its members) and was struggling to secure other members' participation in a co-ordinated effort under a Commonwealth banner. Such humanitarian assistance could well be a good use of future Commonwealth military architecture. We urge this avenue to be pursued in any prospective CSF.

Another chief bilateral is AUKMIN (Australia-UK Ministerial Meetings). Established in 2006, this alternating biennial meeting demonstrates close inter-Commonwealth ties and is a possible blueprint for extrapolation; however, there are those who are more sceptical. As one Australian think tank states plainly:

> The litmus test for substance in a bilateral defence relationship is what the two defence forces actually do together…[upon reading the last communiqué] the reader searches in vain for just one practical measure of planned and funded defence engagement.[43]

The author goes further to say:

> Wallowing in heritage and history is no substitute for an active and modern strategic relationship…The region [Asia-Pacific] is looking for strategic not just trading partners. It's in Australia's interests to do more with the UK to show that our strategic engagement isn't just limited to a handful of Asia's emerging powers.[44]

This tension between talk and a real affirmation of Commonwealth interaction is an important take-away. If any prospective security forum were to be created, a talking shop would not be welcome. To alter the dictum slightly, from hard talk must come good deeds.

Similarly the same could be said of talks between the UK and Pakistan. A defence consultative forum was established back in 1995 yet the latter country remains plagued by instability and terrorism.[45] The recent atrocity resulting in the deaths of 132 children at the hands of the Taliban shows that talk alone and with just one nation will not reverse this trend. The need for anti-terror policies across the Commonwealth will be discussed in a later section.

Taken together, these circumstances show that the UK has a multifaceted but scattered approach to the Commonwealth, although rarely by design. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review provides an opportunity to re-engage with Commonwealth powers in a way that is substantial and constructive to all parties.

Additional Commonwealth bilateral cooperation: An overview

Australia-Canada

There are strong links between these two nations through the US-led multilateral associations explained above; however, the bilateral relations are not as advanced. This is changing slowly, as is demonstrated by a recent report co-authored by two leading think tanks.[46] The report states that both nations are seen as middling powers with similarly sized and structured Armed Forces. Australia has made moves to become a regional and extra-regional power in the Indo-Pacific, while Canada has not been tempted, unlike the US, to pivot to Asia more explicitly given its historical aversion to Asia-Pacific affairs. The report recommends that Canada should try to overcome this with the help of strategic Australian assistance.

To this end it makes a number of recommendations. These include installing reciprocal defence attachés at the colonel level; securing Canada's participation in the FPDA (as mentioned above); creating a bilateral officer cadet study programme between the ADF Academy and the Royal Military College of Canada; closer collaboration in and learning from Canada's Arctic territorial responsibility by Australia to aid its growing responsibility in Antarctic waters; and the creation of a Defence Minister bilateral meeting to mirror AUKMIN.[47]

We support such aims and take the view that these proposals could be advanced further on the sidelines at a prospective CSF as there is currently little space for such a bilateral dialogue.

Australia-New Zealand

It almost goes without saying that these two nations have deep bonds forged in both world wars. The term "ANZAC troops" is widely known. Our history section showed how both countries have played a significant role in Commonwealth forces since World War II. However, moving to more modern times, these nations share a Closer Defence Relations agreement (CDR), although it is not a formal treaty. The CDR has had a focus on force interoperability and intelligence sharing. There is also an annual Defence Minister (ANZMM) meeting to accompany the CDR.[48]

Despite these enduring ties, a 2011 joint defence report found that Australia and New Zealand:

> Do not always take full advantage of our complementarities. Our very closeness can at times mean we do not push the limits of effective cooperation.[49]

Commonwealth Military Stats

This data is from the IISS' Military Balance 2014. The Balance is the annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics. It is a world leader in this practise and represents the most accurate information. For this report we have reproduced the top ten Commonwealth nations in a number of fields where available. We did this so readers could better visualise the Commonwealth's personnel and equipment capabilities in a military context.

Army

- 1,129,900
- 160,000
- 126,150
- 99,800
- 80,000
- 62,000
- 55,000
- 50,000
- 45,000
- 37,150

Navy

- 58,350
- 33,350
- 23,800
- 16,900
- 15,000
- 14,000
- 13,500
- 11,300
- 1,050 (Coast guard)
- 9,000

Airforce

- 127,200
- 70,000
- 36,000
- 28,000
- 19,000
- 16,650
- 15,000
- 14,050
- 14,000
- 13,500

Reserves

- 1,155,000
- 312,500
- 79,100
- 51,600
- 30,950
- 28,550
- 15,050
- 10,000
- 6,000
- 5,500

Main Battle Tanks

- 2,874
- 2,501
- 276
- 245
- 239
- 227
- 120
- 96
- 78
- 62

Aircraft (attack)

- 866
- 422
- 283
- 142
- 132
- 95
- 86
- 67
- 54
- 50

Australia Bangladesh Botswana Brunei Canada Fiji Ind

Singapore South Africa Sri Lanka Trinidad

Helicopters (total)

406
328
237
125
91
76
54
41
35
27

COMMONWEALTH EXCHANGE

Submarines

14
11
8
6
6
4
3
2

Destroyers

11
6
3

Frigates

13
13
12
12
11
10
6
4
4
2

Nuclear Arsenal

280
90-110
80-100

Military Spend ($)

57,035,000,000
36,297,000,000
25,976,000,000
16,389,000,000
9,864,000,000
5,890,000,000
5,000,000,000
2,715,000,000
2,143,000,000
1,793,000,000

% GDP on Defence

3.56%
3.44%
2.75%
2.74%
2.53%
2.40%
2.35%
2.10%
1.84%
1.69%

dia Kenya Malaysia Namibia New Zealand Nigeria Pakistan

l and Tobago Uganda United Kingdom Zambia

It felt that reform was required. Interestingly, its analysis provides helpful information on any prospective Commonwealth forum. For example it found that:

> **"The yearly cycle of bilateral talks has become overly driven by process, with a great deal of effort invested in negotiating agendas, preparing briefing packs and drafting and clearing detailed records of conversation. The discussions themselves have become somewhat formulaic and predictable.[50]**

Moreover, there were also suggestions of a bilateral strategic dialogue on Track 1.5, which in effect would mean opening up the official government-to-government forum to invite academics, think tanks, commentators, and retired officials. As well as requests for enhanced staff exchanges, there were calls for a defence policy element in HADR exercises as well as cooperative working on counter-improvised-explosive-device (IED) training. Such suggestions could be incorporated in a multi-regional Commonwealth context.

Australia-India

There are attempts in Australia to align the country as an Indo-Pacific power rather than just a Pacific one. This feeds into its new approach to India. There have been positive developments in particular areas such as civilian nuclear technology, university education, and trade. This has led one leading Indo-Australian analyst to state that:

> **"As Indian Ocean powers, maritime security and naval cooperation is a natural avenue for Australia and India to expand their security partnership.[51]**

Bilateral naval exercises are expected to commerce later in 2015, which led the analyst to conclude that these two countries should push to conduct sophisticated naval exercises involving high-end technology. China is, of course, a factor in such clamours for closer ties within the region. This strong defence bilateral would prove to be a powerful counter-weight.

The countries' new bilateral security framework ties them to annual summits with Prime Minister meetings, regular Defence Minister meetings, regular bilateral maritime exercises, and close cooperation in counter-terrorism.[52]

Such developments and comments have substance, as the new Indian Prime Minister's address to the Australian Parliament made clear:

> **"Australia is a major partner in every area of our national priority…it will no longer be at the periphery, but at the centre of India's vision.[53]**

Given the cordial ties between both Prime Ministers, this could be enhanced in a CSF and India could be drawn closer to other potential Commonwealth security partners.

Another perspective has been provided by a leading Indian think tank; it has shown that the nations' security interests are "increasingly aligned". However, it admits that deeper security cooperation is likely to take a long time to develop. Its remarkably in-depth report on Indo-Australian security engagement provides an exhaustive list of recommendations such as Australia offering additional officer places for Indian soldiers as well as increased exchanges; a push for more naval passing exercises; both countries taking a lead on a HADR cooperative system in the Indian Ocean; co-ordination of the countries' navies in anti-piracy efforts; improvements to maritime domain awareness; building on the increasing employment of common platforms used by both air forces leading to long-term bilateral air exercises; and collaboration in scientific research via India's Bharati Antarctic Station, which is close to Australia's own.[54]

With this in mind, a CSF could provide a backdrop from which to realise these strategic goals among others.

Australia-Malaysia

This bilateral has its genesis in World War II and the FPDA, as explained above. In 1992, these countries signed up to the Malaysia-Australia Joint Defence Program (MAJDP). It is described as the "cornerstone" of the defence relationship by the

Australian High Commission in Malaysia.[55]

As of 2012, under the MAJDP Australia has six officers in units in Malaysia while Malaysia has 11 officers in units in Australia. The Program includes a number of army field exercises, such as Exercise Haringaroo, which is held three times a year, and the annual bilateral Navy exercise – Mastex. There is also long-term training in the form of a Master's programme in Australia and Malaysian and Australian students at respective staff colleges. Additionally, there are numerous short-term courses across the services of both countries.[56] Significantly, Australia is currently the only country with forces permanently based in Malaysia: it has approximately 50 ADF personnel located at RMAF base Butterworth. [57]

In 2007 Australia conducted an inquiry into Australian–Malaysian relations and concluded that the defence partnership was:

> **"Overwhelmingly positive and provides substantial benefits for Australia. There is a strong foundation for this relationship to develop further…The continued stationing of ADF personnel at RMAF Butterworth is of significant value to the Australia–Malaysia relationship.[58]**

The MAJDP was born from the close relations provided by the FPDA, which presents a strong example that larger multilateral Commonwealth ties can also branch off into future closer bilateral links. This bilateral offers a key point to underscore when discussing potential Commonwealth forums.

India–Singapore

India and Singapore have a been upgrading their defence relations in recent years, which can be considered to be part of India's wider Look East policy. Singapore has a deal that allows it to train its infantry, armoured troops, and fighter pilots in India, while it is known that both countries share intelligence.[59] As land and airspace are scarce in Singapore, it is strategically sensible for the city-state to seek these agreements with India.

Since 2003 they have shared an annual India-Singapore Defence Policy Dialogue and in 2005 they signed a memorandum of understanding on joint army exercises. Additionally, there are the Singapore Indian Maritime Bilateral Exercises (SIMBEX), which have grown from anti-submarine warfare to more complex maritime exercises. This has led to greater interoperability, allowing SIMBEX to function with standard operating procedures.[60] In late 2014 this was expanded, signalling a step up in bilateral military ties from these exercises to cooperation in defence technology.[61]

Certain commentators have described the growth of this defence partnership as "phenomenal" and as key to the countries' wider bilateral relationship. They go further to state that:

> **"New Delhi must draw on the strength of its existing bilateral relationship with Singapore to pursue other strategic interests in the region…and should now explore trilateral engagements in the region with Singapore and other friendly countries.[62]**

Of course the authors don't mention which nations but, given its close ties with Australia, this could be an avenue for India, while Singapore's traditional links to Australia through the FPDA would suggest a sensible option for any prospective trilateral commitment. Malaysia and New Zealand would also provide possibilities. Again any such discussions could be forwarded through a wider Commonwealth dialogue.

Canada-Caribbean

Often an overlooked element of Atlantic security against the backdrop of an Anglo-American presence, Canada plays a resourceful role in the Caribbean region. Canada has been active in the Caribbean – particularly in Commonwealth Jamaica, providing training and equipment to the Jamaican Defence Force and helping to fund the Caribbean Junior Command and Staff College. It also has a record of assisting with HADR operations in serious hurricane seasons through helicopter supply.[63]

Building on this, Canada recently signed an agreement with Jamaica to establish a permanent presence on the island with what it

describes as an "operations hub" in Kingston. This is planned to include access to facilities at a port, airport, and military base as a staging post for Canadian troops in the event of a "substantial treat in the region" such as drug smuggling, terror-related concerns, or further HADRs.[64]

This is certainly a considerable exercise despite the modest numbers as it is part of a wider policy objective for Canada to have a larger global presence as a middle power through seven proposed operational hubs. It has been reported that talks were taking place in 2012 with Commonwealth Kenya, Singapore, and Tanzania as well as Germany, Kuwait, Senegal, and South Korea.[65] With such commitments in the Caribbean and a push for a role globally, Canada may well value a CSF to assist with its strategic and diplomatic efforts. As the joint Australian–Canadian report highlighted, the latter is encouraged to strengthen its position in Asia and the Pacific.[66]

/Areas of Development/

Thus far we have explored historical Commonwealth defence ties and current multilateral and bilateral relationships; however, for the Commonwealth to be relevant in the defence and security realm, it must provide opportunities to discuss, understand, and develop a number of fundamental concerns. We have pinpointed seven such areas. This list is not meant to be exhaustive and other areas may appear after further study. A CSF would need to consider these topics. In this section we provide definitions of key terms and highlight nations where these areas of development can be seen.

Defence Diplomacy

Defence diplomacy is a means of using a nation's military apparatus, often through non-violent methods, to achieve strategic goals. With the development and use of soft power to which this report subscribes, defence diplomacy has been opened up to include the following activities:[67]

- bilateral and multilateral contact between senior military and civilian defence officials;
- appointment of defence attachés to foreign nations;
- bilateral defence cooperation agreements;
- training of foreign military and civilian defence personnel;
- provision of expertise and advice on the democratic control of Armed Forces, defence management, and military technical areas;
- contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits;
- placement of military or civilian personnel in particular countries' defence ministries and Armed Forces through exchanges;
- deployment of training teams;
- provision of military equipment and other material aid; and
- bilateral or multilateral exercises for training purposes.

Almost every nation uses some form of defence diplomacy as a tool of statecraft. The Commonwealth has a wide spectrum of countries so its deployment of defence diplomacy is varied; however, as may be anticipated, nations such as the UK and Australia are leaders in the field. The Commonwealth as a network, though, does provide a platform for all nations to meet as equals to voice their concerns. Defence diplomacy used in a Commonwealth context could give an advantage to emerging economies such as India and South Africa as they grow from being only regional powers. This would breed better understanding and working relations. It would also allow smaller nations with marginal military capacity to communicate their security concerns.

Interoperability

If defence diplomacy is meant to typify soft power, interoperability is the demonstration of hard factors. NATO is the prime example. It defines interoperability as:

> **"The ability for forces, units and/or systems to operate together… [It] allows them to share common doctrine and procedures, each others' [sic.] infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate. Interoperability reduces duplication [and] enables the pooling of resources.[68]**

The developed Commonwealth nations already share this sort of relationship with the UK and Canada in NATO, and these nations join Australia and New Zealand in the three ABCA programmes with the US. Similarly, the FPDA provides an avenue for certain levels of interoperability. The bilateral relations explained above also act as fertile ground: India–Singapore and Australia–Malaysia are notable examples.

Importantly, NATO's guidelines also explain that interoperability does not necessarily require common military equipment. This is a common misconception. Rather it is about the ability for each other's equipment to share a common facility and be compatible for the purpose of refuelling and repairs.[69] To imagine this more easily think of fuel and ammunition. Nations might not use the same tanks, helicopters, or weapons but with closer interoperability a foreign Armed Force could fill up or gather supplies much like a civilian would when driving a car abroad.

To take this idea further, NATO states that communicating in a common language is a "prerequisite" for interoperability.[70] Taken at face value this could mean use of the same working language, such as English. This would certainly be helpful in the Commonwealth as English is the main language that unites its countries. This was certainly seen during the BCFK missions by the British, in which Canada's suggestion of a multi-lingual UN force was not adopted. However, there can also be benefits to the development of a common doctrine and training if the commands are understood by multiple forces.

Therefore, the closer the Armed Forces of Commonwealth nations interact, the more a focus should be placed on interoperability should they wish to participate in shared operations across a wide spectrum such as HADR or anti-piracy.

Intelligence Sharing

Intelligence takes a number of forms. For our purposes we will be focusing on SIGINT, although Commonwealth nations may wish to look at the broader ambit. During the Julian Assange coverage, the FVEY programme, which includes four main Commonwealth nations, received a public backlash with accusations of illegal spying against foreign citizens as well as countries' respective domestic citizens.

Despite this, SIGINT remains one of the strongest assets nations have against a multitude of threats – terrorism being primary. More co-ordinated efforts between Commonwealth nations in this field may prove fruitful if intelligence is shared more freely. Need can be found in Commonwealth Africa, where attacks in Kenya and Nigeria remain acute and occur in stubbornly high numbers, and are even spreading into Cameroon.[71]

As mentioned above, the question of expanding intelligence sharing boils down to trust, as once a secret is more widely shared the chances are it will become less secret. Therefore, a pan-Commonwealth mechanism appears highly unlikely to develop. Rather, nations with developed intelligence services could work more with the emerging powers on a bilateral or small multilateral basis under a Commonwealth umbrella. Such discussions would naturally have to be worked out in private but a CSF could provide the impetus to do so.

Anti-terrorism

Anti-terrorism is an area of significant concern for numerous Commonwealth nations. It goes beyond the sharing of intelligence and links into other areas such as training and technical expertise. The UK's base in Kenya already provides such a Commonwealth mechanism and could be replicated in other nations should they be willing. Even without the operational costs of maintaining a base, military personnel swaps and visits to areas worst effected by terrorism should be stepped up at a Commonwealth level. Canada's anti-IED training in the Caribbean is one such example. Terrorism is not uniform and each group works in different ways; therefore, learning about and adapting to these variations would help many Commonwealth Armed Forces. Any conference must have this topic high on the agenda.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR)

Environmental disasters loom large in many Commonwealth nations across the world, whether in the form of hurricane season in the Caribbean, typhoons in Asia, extreme flooding in India and Pakistan, or the effects of a changing climate in smaller Commonwealth states. In peace time the use of military structures in areas such as HADR can provide a supreme help to those who have their livelihoods damaged or at worst destroyed. Australia, Canada, and the UK lead in this regard. This also brings us back to interoperability. When Commonwealth Armed Forces are operating in nations far from home to provide assistance, factors such as fuel and supplies become paramount. The same can be said for health disasters such as the Ebola outbreak. It is well known that the UK is playing a leading role in helping Commonwealth Sierra Leone. However, a more co-ordinated response could have been implemented across the Commonwealth had an operational structure been in place.

A strong commitment to HADR efforts also reflects well on developed nations. Working for a collective Commonwealth good provides higher soft-power status, but this should be tempered by better practical understanding of the areas in need. For example, if the British Armed Forces were able to "plug and play" their equipment, kit, and personnel more easily and other Commonwealth nations understood British procedures and communications, there would be better outcomes for those people affected by

humanitarian disasters. Therefore, any Commonwealth security summit should undertake discussions on HADR and welcome leading NGOs in an advisory capacity.

Anti-piracy

Again, the Royal Navies of the UK and Canada are leaders in this field. In particular the UK has worked with Kenya and Mauritius in the prosecution of pirates, although this has been halted in recent years.[72] However, piracy does not only occur along the east coast of Africa; its west coast is witnessing a rise in attacks. This brings a number of other Commonwealth nations into play, such a Nigeria and Ghana. The motives and acts carried out on one coast often differ from those on the other coast, as a recent in-depth Economist report makes clear.[73]

Interestingly, the voluntary Combined Maritime Forces, which are made up of over 30 nations, has a piracy force commanded by a New Zealander. Despite actors such as the Combined Maritime Forces, the Economist explains:

> **"If there is to be a halt to piracy Nigeria will have to take the lead in patrolling its own waters and curbing illegal activity. Given the country's inability to deal with an insurgency by Boko Haram militants in the north…there is little reason to think that it will have much success in protecting its waters…The worry is that piracy, itself, is becoming enmeshed with drugs and arms-smuggling networks linked to violent jihadist groups in the Sahel.**

Much like terrorism, this is a serious and prevailing concern. A wider Commonwealth understanding and response should be welcomed and could provide value to the nations affected by piracy.

Military training

Military training is a topic that spans several of the topics already mentioned, yet it remains salient in its own right. Many of the developed nations have expertise that can be shared and passed on to emerging or developing Commonwealth nations to help them to combat terrorism, halt natural disasters, or provide greater interoperability on missions. This would of course have to be targeted and scaled up where possible. It is more likely to occur on a bi- or trilateral level. It is important because it allows Armed Forces that have little outside interaction to better understand how others operate and where improvements can be made.

Training can mean a multitude of things. Military exercises are of course the most visible but take years to prepare and cost the most money. Educational military training and officer swaps provide a more low-rent but equally effective way to build Commonwealth camaraderie. Our call for a CMS falls into this category.

To conclude this section it is important to make clear that any Commonwealth advancement of closer strategic ties should avoid repetition or duplication; no government or armed force wants another layer of bureaucracy to navigate. However, where there is a genuine need for a multi-regional response, this report believes firmly that the Commonwealth does have an opportunity to play a role – though not on a grand scale, as such an objective would be merely a delusion. We are not talking about the creation of a Commonwealth military rapid-response unit or an infrastructure and headquarters to mirror NATO. The necessary money and recourses are simply not there, nor is the political capital.

Rather, allowing the Commonwealth to have a voice on strategic concerns that travels across lands and oceans can only be a positive outcome for those nations concerned. The form the voice takes and how it may be given an edge are the main subjects of our next section, which lays out the possibility and practical issues of such a challenge.

Our fundamental shared interest: supporting the United States

Australian Strategic Policy Institute / Canberra, Australia
Harry White / *Analyst*

The goal of Commonwealth must be to effectively pursue the shared interests of its member states. In the strategic realm, there are two ways we might go about that. On one hand is the work of deepening our ties and our channels of communication. On the other, is supporting our shared security, which means supporting the strongest position in the international system that the United States can sustain over the long term.

The recommendations which have come out of this initiative such as a Commonwealth Military Scholarship to strengthen the ties that bind Commonwealth militaries, the formation of a Commonwealth Security Forum, and other activities in this vein, can provide benefits of the first kind.

But, precisely what the resulting deeper ties and better communication allows, is for us to more effectively pursue our shared interests – and with a group as rich and broad as The Commonwealth, its no surprise that those interests are structural.
Our key shared strategic objective is the support a peaceful and orderly international system. In practice today, that means supporting the most robust American role in the world which can be sustained over the long term. It's not a new observation that China's rise (along with the growth of others in Asia, and Russia's resurgence) has put tremendous pressure on Washington's capacity to be all things to all people. Those challenges will increase as America's relative – but not absolute – strength declines, making it harder for Washington to keep us safe without help. So how can we help?

First, as the Commonwealth contains so many trusted American partners (all four of the other "five eyes"), there is a limited but important role to play in helping to shape American strategic thinking. That means a focus on a sustainable US position in Asia and globally, not simply an assumption that unchallenged global primacy has to be Washington's goal. A unified Commonwealth view of the best balance between order-maintenance on one hand, and avoiding great-power competition on the other (tactfully communicated) would be of real value. Mechanisms like a Commonwealth Security Forum could be a part of forming and communicating that view.

The Commonwealth can help with action as well as ideas, but likely not in Asia, despite the fact that's where American leadership is under the most pressure. The Five Power Defence Arrangement is often flagged as a hope for Commonwealth influence in the region, but as a grouping it's more vestigial than functional. That's because shaping behaviour in Asia today requires the potential to bring enormous military force to bear. That's not a role within the grasp of The Commonwealth's members.

But if the Commonwealth were able to take responsibility for other tasks traditionally performed by America, like constabulary duties, humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, etc. in other parts of the world, that would free up Washington's capacity to focus on Asia. In particular, Commonwealth membership and capacity are particularly strong in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, so they are natural areas of focus.

From an Australian perspective the main goal of deepening Commonwealth security activity, beyond supporting a sustainable US position, would be developing ties with India. From Canberra, the relationship with New Delhi is less than the sum of its parts. Any assistance in nurturing that relationship – in the context of an increased Commonwealth role in the Indian Ocean for example – would be smiled upon from Australia.

Of course Australia would like deeper relations with partners like India and Canada. But there is a limit on the impact of most bilateral relationships, because our strategic environment in Asia is now dominated by giants. A collective effort by the Commonwealth to strengthen the international system in places like the Pacific and Africa are the most significant step the organisation can take towards advancing the strategic goals of Asian member-states. Where deeper ties and better communication help us to make that effort, the mechanisms proposed here will be invaluable.

/Recommendations/

1 Establish a Commonwealth Security Forum (CSF)

As has been expressed, in defence and security matters the Commonwealth scarcely gets a mention. There are many valuable policies focusing on education, health, human rights, and increasingly trade. However, security is not covered. Historically, the *imperial* then *Commonwealth* Prime Minister's Meetings (now CHOGM) used to include a large dose of military affairs, but this was at a time when the UK and (what were then) the Dominions maintained a hegemony. Since decolonisation there has been little cross-regional Commonwealth assistance in this field. Many nations prefer to work in cohort within regions. A bloc mentality remains.

Despite this, the forthcoming 2015 CHOGM's official programme after the Prime Minister's Meeting will include a People's, Women's, Youth, and Business forum. With this in mind there is certainly scope for a security forum to accompany the biennial meetings.

Why Have a CSF?

Importantly, it is not the case that because there is currently not a forum one should not exist. The case for must be compelling. Below we have set out 12 reasons why a CSF would develop Commonwealth strategic relations.

Cross-regionality

As the only security forum with nations representing all habitable continents, a CSF would offer a wider scope of study and understanding.

Increased diplomatic reach of emerging and developing nations

A CSF would provide a stronger voice in world affairs – importantly, in a forum of equals. For example, India's diplomatic reach and placement of defence attachés could be extended.

Soft-power projection for developed nations

A CSF would allow developed Commonwealth nations the opportunity to renew or maintain strategic bilateral relations with major parts of the world. For example Canada's recent operational hub set up in Jamaica.

Every Commonwealth nation would be there from inception

As a new forum for discussion, a CSF would give each nation the chance to shape the forum from the beginning with an equal say. It could evolve to meet strategic/operational demands.

Effective Defence Capacity Building opportunities

A CSF could help to build up effective defence structures and strong borders and also support national/local policing measures and multi-regional stability.

Strategic educational benefits

Learning about security issues or conflict areas in differing regions, not just one or two, would be made more feasible. In-depth Commonwealth discussions could be had on selected topics of study such as Ebola, anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, HADR, and military exchanges and scholarships.

Enhancement of conflict-prevention measures

A CSF could work in step with current Commonwealth democratic measures and provide greater dialogue.

Wider operational discussions

These could take the form of joint training and exercises, and interoperability (e.g. refuelling, standardisation, use of bases).

Provision of a regular and fixed meeting

A CSF could act as the backbone for regular contact between Commonwealth nations in this field, allowing for better preparation and success.

Bilateral private diplomatic and military meetings

It would allow for bilateral meetings to reaffirm or build new strategic ties at the fourm's sidelines.

Business-to-government trade opportunities

Governments could assemble national defence-sector delegations to help open markets, increase trade, and provide expertise and services.

Think-tank benefits

Inviting think tanks would provide a chance to discuss policy and understand best practice.

Now that the reader has a firmer grasp of the reasons *why* a security forum could take place, the following set of questions revolves around *how* the forum could be designed. This sub-section is discursive in nature and provides a number of options as opposed to a fixed template within which to work.

What Would a CSF Look Like?

The best method is to look towards tried-and-tested forums that have a track record of success and of increasing demand for further forums. This leads us to consider the IISS's Dialogue series. The IISS's Shangri-La Dialogue in Commonwealth Singapore was established in 2002. Its rationale was as follows:

> **"In response to the clear need for a forum where the Asia-Pacific's defence ministers could engage in dialogue aimed at building confidence and fostering practical security cooperation…Shangri-La has established itself as a key element of the emerging regional security architecture.[74]**

As an annual conference, it has evolved over time in terms of format and personnel to include chiefs and deputy chiefs of defence staff, heads of defence ministries, and defence secretaries, while the agenda has shifted from solely plenary sessions to break-out sessions. Over time nations from outside the Asia-Pacific have been invited, including the UK and the US. Such has been the Dialogue's success that China has participated since 2007. A number of Commonwealth nations have also taken part, including Australia and India.

The programme was expanded to the Middle East as the Manama Dialogue in 2004. The event in Bahrain had its most successful year in 2014 when the UK Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, gave a keynote to announce that the UK would be opening a permanent naval base in Bahrain. This was a striking piece of foreign policy conducted in such a forum. The Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, also gave 2014's keynote at Shangri-La. Therefore, it would appear that many nations value the

IISS's Dialogue platform as a means to headline foreign and defence diplomacy.

This view is reinforced as the IISS looks to extend the Dialogues further. In March 2015 it will have established the Cartagena Dialogue in Columbia. It will focus on Latin America and its increased interaction with Asia-Pacific nations. This is a helpful development as instead of trying to recreate a Shangri-La forum, which has 14 years development, it would be better in a Commonwealth context to follow the scope and parameters of the inaugural Cartagena Dialogue.

Now that the CSF has a blueprint, details relating to frequency, duration, cost, and delivery are fundamental. The IISS runs its Dialogues over a three-day period annually, in the same venue each year. To keep costs lower we propose that a CSF take place during the biennial CHOGM and last for two days. Having the existing Commonwealth architecture already in the host city over the same period would allow for a smoother introduction. It would mean extra aeroplane seats and hotel rooms on what is already a fixed space in the Commonwealth calendar. An annual stand-alone conference independent from CHOGM at different venues would increase costs. Making the CSF a day shorter than Shangri-La reflects the fact that the latter is more developed.

Both the IISS and the Commonwealth Business Forum organisers have informed us that their events require a low seven-figure dollar expenditure. However, the latter admits that this varies depending on the Commonwealth host nation. The headline figure may seem considerable, but how this is to be financed should be the deeper question.

Shangri-La 2014 had leading sponsors such as Airbus, BAE Systems, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Mitsubishi, and Northrop Grumman.[75] Any CSF would probably not secure such headline sponsors in the first instance (especially the American companies), but key defence industry players from Australia, Canada, India, and the UK could be approached. This sort of funding approach is also reflected in the new Cartagena Dialogue. Another mechanism could be for the host government of CHOGM to make a contribution. This already occurs for other Commonwealth forums. It would also appear that the Singapore and Australian governments have financially supported Shangri-La, and it has been intimated that Cartagena appears to have financial backing from Columbia. The same could be implied for Manama too.

The next question is who would deliver the forum itself. The Commonwealth Secretariat could provide funding out of its current budget, which is funded by Commonwealth nations. However, this would mean the CSF would no doubt have to come under the official control of ComSec. If the host nation contributed then it would also have a stake in the CSF's delivery, but of course this nation would change every two years.

Additionally, if a third party such as a think tank were to deliver the CSF, it might start as an unofficial meeting like the 2002 Shangri-La Dialogue. A think tank might have greater flexibility and freedoms in delivery in terms of agenda, but its unofficial status compared to CHOGM through ComSec may compromise participation. This will be a trade-off for those with a strategic interest in a potential CSF.

Attendees are also of critical importance. Shangri-La started as what is termed Track 1 diplomacy, which is reserved for official government delegations and leading armed forces personnel. Track 2 diplomacy casts the net more broadly to include non-state actors such as think tanks, NGOs, and the media. In recent times Track 1.5 has been developed as a blend. An example of this structure can be seen in Cartagena:

> **"The IISS will aim for some 40% of the total attendance to be composed of government ministers and senior government officials; 40% to be CEOs, business entrepreneurs and private-sector leaders; and around 20% to be drawn from top experts, strategists and economists.[76]**

The concern is that, the more open a forum is, the less official voices can speak freely, especially on topics of great sensitivity such as defence and security. This criticism has been levelled at Shangri-La, which has recently been described as "not a real dialogue, but rather a quarrel between generals and ministers"; it has also been said that "often it is harder to seek dialogue and understanding in front of the press and video cameras".[77] With this in mind an inaugural CSF maybe well be best served by limiting itself to Track 1 diplomacy with approved business delegations. However, if a think tank were to deliver the forum, there would be scope for more actors to participate.

These questions also concern scale and personnel. These will affect cost too. Again, Cartagena provides some answers. The IISS states that it expects the total number of delegates to be between 250 and 300, to allow for "inclusive representation".[78] What makes a CSF difficult is the potential to have 53 delegations. The Dialogues often invite around 15 nations a year between them, and

they take place in three different regions. Whoever creates a CSF will have to acknowledge the difficulties of organising 53 separate delegations. Of course, CHOGM itself has a track record on delivery. And in an inaugural event participation might be low – say around 20 nations – until the notoriety of the forum grew over time.

Personnel invitations should most definitely be sent to all three branches of the armed forces – land, sea, and air – to include chiefs of staff and their deputies along with permanent Defence Ministry teams (e.g. the MoD) and defence attachés. It has been conveyed to this report by a leading UK security company that including defence ministers at an early stage can have an inverse effect of strengthening the forum, as each must project the current status quo. Better that representation from defence ministries debate and move discussions along so that their ministers can make announcements or sign arrangements at a later stage. That said, defence secretaries and ministers provide a strong pull for sponsorship and media coverage and may also deliver the important keynote speech, which serves the IISS's Dialogues well. Therefore, a keynote and top-level debates with, say, the Indian or Australian Foreign Minister would add diplomatic weight to any CSF.

Now that cost and composition have been analysed, the itinerary is pivotal. There is no value in having a fully costed and high-ranking event that is let down by a poor schedule. As we have learnt, the IISS organically built its Shangri-La format over time; therefore, it is sensible to follow such plans. A keynote from one of the leading defence secretaries or defence chiefs of staff would also be favourable. However, the major pull factor for a CSF would be the plenary sessions. These could cover but would not be limited to the topics mentioned above, such as anti-piracy, HADR, anti-terrorism, and interoperability. An example of this flexibility is shown in the latest discussions on the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue with Singapore's Defence Minister, suggesting that the Dialogue focus on four new themes:

> **"Threat of religious extremism; dynamics between major powers; political instability in Asian countries; and trans-national challenges arising from disasters and cyber security threats.[79]**

To obtain a better visual understanding of this we have reproduced part of the 2014 Shangri-La agenda on page 37.[80]

As you can see, each session lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and had three or four main speakers. The level of speaker ranged between defence ministers, military commanders, think-tank directors, and heads of missions. As per this agenda, break-out sessions could be incorporated concurrently so delegates could choose which sessions to attend. These could be introduced once the CSF had grown in stature.

Another option given to us by defence industry sources suggests that, rather than be organised around a set of topics, the forum could centre around a single topic – for example, anti-terrorism. We take the view that this might narrow the scope too much as not all Commonwealth nations have terrorism issues. Another take is to have the discussions organised by region. However, this could undermine the need to include all regions simultaneously; in this mode of organisation, it may be that only those nations concerned with a region would take an interest. Therefore, we would prefer to see the event revolve around themes (plural) and not regions to maximise the interest.

Of equal merit is what happens at the fringes. There should be significant room left for bilateral or multilateral deals or discussions to take place in private, which would allow progress to be made on a number of policy issues. This would provide strength to the claim that any new forum was not just a talking-shop. For example, advancements on interoperability, intelligence sharing, and new military exercises would prove highly valuable. Business delegations would have the opportunity to meet with other leading delegates in other private meetings. This would ensure that Commonwealth nations have some of the best market options available to them when making procurement or other strategic decisions. These meetings could also take place at the Commonwealth Business Forum should space and opportunity be at a premium.

To conclude, we have provided justification for having a prospective CSF and have given detail on how such an event could take place following an industry standard model. Flexibility should remain the paramount drive. If too proscriptive, manoeuvrability and the ability to be pragmatic would be lost. Our sketch of a possible model should not be fixed; rather it should act as a benchmark from which to work. Everything depends on the buy-in from key Commonwealth actors, whether ComSec, the host nation of CHOGM, or interested think tanks. Funding will of course vary depending on the deliverer. The topics should be those that most concern Commonwealth nations and the time dedicated should reflect the importance of each topic. We believe that the most cost effective way to build a CSF would be to build it onto CHOGM, as stand-alone ventures may prove too costly. Finally, as with

THE SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE 2014 SPEAKER AGENDA

FIRST PLENARY SESSION 9am-10am

THE UNITED STATES' CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL STABILITY

Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense, US

SECOND PLENARY SESSION 10am-11.30am

ADVANCING MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COOPERATION

Itsunori Onodera, Minister of Defense, Japan
Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Defence, UK
Dato' Seri Hishammuddin bin Tun Hussein, Minister of Defence and Acting Minister of Transport, Malaysia

THIRD PLENARY SESSION 12pm-1.30pm

MANAGING STRATEGIC TENSIONS

Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Minister of Defense, Indonesia
Senator David Johnston, Minister for Defence, Australia
General Phung Quang Thanh, Minister of National Defense, Vietnam

SIMULTANEOUS SPECIAL SESSIONS 3pm-4.30pm

1. THE CHALLENGES OF MAINTAINING AND MANAGING OPEN SEAS

Chair: Dr Wenguang Shao, Consulting Senior Fellow for China and International Affairs, IISS; Managing Director, Phoenix Chinese News and Entertainment Company

Fu Ying, Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee, National People's Congress, China
Shinsuke Sugiyama, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan
Richard Fadden, Deputy Minister of National Defence, Canada Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander, US Pacific Command

2. THE IMPACT OF NEW MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Chair: General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, Senior Adviser for the Middle East and Asia-Pacific, IISS; former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK

Air Marshal Mark Binskin, Chief of Defence Force (Designate), Australia
Major General Yao Yunzhu, Director, Center for China- America Defense Relations and Research Fellow, Academy of Military Science, People's Liberation Army, China
Dr Ralf Brauksiepe, Parliamentary State Secretary of Defence, Germany
Lieutenant General Ng Chee Meng, Chief of Defence Force, Singapore

3. CLIMATE CHANGE, HADR, AND SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Chair: Christian Le Mière, Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security, IISS

Lord Tu'ivakanō, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Tonga
Dr Jonathan Coleman, Minister of Defence, New Zealand Dr Gowher Rizvi, International Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister, Bangladesh
Professor Raymund Quilop, Assistant Secretary for Strategic Assessment, Department of National Defense, Philippines

all policy proposals, it comes down to political will in making sure the package and what is being offered are sold correctly and that there is a high enough level of political demand.

II Create a Commonwealth Military Scholarship (CMS)

There are other practical ways to create closer Commonwealth interaction in the security sphere that could occur immediately, building on existing structures. One such element is in the educational realm, concerning military officers studying in different Commonwealth nations at national defence academies or universities. We recommend the creation of a Commonwealth Military Scholarship (CMS), which officers of certain ranks could apply for once accepted onto a specific course in a selected Commonwealth nation's university or academy.

The major benefit of this scheme would be to deepen ties and interactions between Commonwealth military personnel early in their careers, and these ties would be carried forward as officers progressed to higher ranks in their respective Armed Forces. This approach has numerous soft-power advantages. It helps to develop stronger bonds and levels of trust and loyalty between Commonwealth officers, which feeds into human interoperability. We spoke to a former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff who told us that a CMS should be welcomed by the MoD as a positive way of promoting its Commonwealth ties through military education.

The delivery and funding of the scholarship are of major importance. One possibility is the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission (CSC). We were able to speak with its high ranking staff for further information. The CSC's annual budget in 2012/13 was £21m and its main benefactor was a Department for International Development (DfID) grant. Interestingly, the Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS) gave £400,000 and the Scottish Government gave £90,000, but the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) gave nothing as it looked towards its own Chevening scholarship programme. Note that the FCO gave £175,000 the previous year.[81]

A leading voice in the CSC informed us that it would be quite possible to integrate a CMS into the CSC scheme if funding were made available. He said that this could take the form of the existing DfID grant being allowed for defence-oriented courses, or new funds could be provided by the MoD. Given that other government departments give or have given grants, he saw no reason why the MoD could not do likewise. In fact there are a number of defence- and security-related courses already offered through the DfID grant-in-aid. These take place in Bristol, Cranfield, Durham, Kent, and Sussex universities. However, it would appear that these courses are for the civilian population and not for current serving military personnel from Commonwealth nations.

King's College London's Department of War Studies runs two MA courses that are respectively linked to the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) and the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC). However, though King's uses Commonwealth scholarships in other departments, this is not the case for War Studies. Our CSC source said that the War Studies department would be welcome to submit a request for a scholarship through the former's programme.

Another key point to understand is the divide between development and diplomacy. The DfID's grants tend to focus on the former, while the FCO's Chevening scheme looks towards the latter. With this in mind, any CMS through the CSC would have to justify its development impact. A way to circumvent this potential stumbling block would be through a new MoD grant whose parameters would be linked to a defence diplomacy angle. The CSC told us that for around £200,000 seven scholarships could be provided, which gives the reader a feel for what sort of outlay the MoD or the DfID would have to grant.

As for which organisations could apply for funding, our CSC source said that he had no qualms about a CMS provided that it retained academic merit. Other than universities, of which the overwhelming majority do not have a military component, the two UK institutions that we have identified are the RCDS and the JSCSC. The former invites officers of high rank through diplomatic channels whereas in the latter there is an application process.

Taking each in turn, we have discovered that the RCDS has an annual intake of between 90 and 100 officers. In 2015, 65 are foreign nationals with 20 of those coming from Commonwealth nations. Our high-level source made clear that each year there is always representation from a number of leading Commonwealth African nations, a few officers from India and Pakistan, and some from Malaysia and Singapore, while Australia and New Zealand have a strong annual presence too. He stated that over the years the Commonwealth numbers have been fairly constant.

Regarding who pays for the RCDS course and how much it costs, we have been informed that this is decided on a case-by-case basis.

For example, the MoD each year selects developing or emerging nations of high diplomatic value. Officers from those nations will have a significant proportion of their course costs covered by the MoD. For others the course is usually covered by the officer's own country. We also learnt that the elective King's MA in International Security Studies (which is only available to RCDS students) has 24 places available and is always full. We were informed that as the course is by invitation and often paid for by overseas Governments the CMS would not have direct application. However, as stated previously, the British Government has supported some overseas officers and could therefore look to a CMS for possible funding.

The JSCSC works slightly differently. Its students represent the top 10% of the officer class and undertake the Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC). An overview of the course explains:[82]

> **"The course provides professional education covering a wide spectrum of military defence and security issues for a select cadre of UK and international military and civilian officers.[83]**

It has representation from a number of Commonwealth nations.[84] In 2015 this stands at 20 out of a 296 total.[85] The course is available for officers of rank 3/4. We take the view that the ACSC is therefore a possible candidate to explore a CMS, which would assist its officers undertaking the ACSC or its King's master's degree. Of the 296 on the ACSC course, 75% take the Defence Studies MA. The number of Commonwealth students is currently not available. We were informed that this could be applied to emerging or developed countries. Again, we argue that a CMS could allow more Commonwealth soldiers to study for the MA. Whether this funding came from the DfID's current grant to the CSC or a new prospective MoD grant would have to be discussed inter-departmentally.

We have singled out the JSCSC because we believe it represents a strong opportunity to advance the Commonwealth's educational defence ties. As this *Telegraph* article makes clear:

> **"It must be one of the most profitable arms of defence, not least for the links that are fostered with the 100 or so international students…A key part of the course structure is the syndicate…Close bonds are formed by men who will later go on to advise senior officers or ministers.[86]**

This UK example serves to explain how a CMS could work; however, we have also identified a number of Commonwealth defence academies that could provide similar options for the application of the CMS. These include the Canadian Defence Academy, Australian Defence Force Academy, New Zealand Defence Academy, South African Military Academy, National Defence University of Malaysia, National Defence Academy (India), and Nigerian Defence Academy. Many of these have an academic element that they offer to international officers. How this is funded in these nations is a harder question to answer. A number of these nations have their own CSC mechanism; however, to us the easiest method of funding a CMS would be for the countries' respective defence ministries to put in place an initial sum to take in as many officers from the Commonwealth as were willing. The colleges themselves could administer the CMS and offer it to the number of Commonwealth officers on their books. The decision, of course, would rest with them.

How the MoD, with stringent budget cuts in 2010 and more pending in 2015, would justify a £200,000 outlay for educational scholarships could prove problematic. However, we have been made aware of the MoD's International Policy and Planning directorate. Sources have explained that funding is made available to receive foreign delegations or for British delegations to go abroad. These trips can cost £50–80k a visit and can last only a matter days. The source questioned the overall strategic value in some of these meetings and intimated that some of this expense could be put to better use, with the CMS being one such idea. The source said that, seeing as a scholarship usually lasts for 12 months and the soldier and both nations in question get something out of it, there is a strong case that a scholarship represents better value in terms of UK soft power than short and expensive trips. Again, how the MoD would fund the prospective CMS is entirely its remit, but this is one suggestion offered to us.

A leading Commonwealth educationalist told us that the UK retains its leading soft-power status, and education as a soft-power tool could be advanced by the UK adopting the CMS. This source noted the UK's educational leverage, particularly in West Africa and to a lesser extent in India.

How a wider CMS could work might well be a possible discussion topic at our proposed security forum. If heads of the defence academies and leading academics were invited, space and time could be set aside to develop such a policy. This would also give the forum increased educational value.

In conclusion, we have explained how a CMS could work and suggested which organisations could discharge the scholarship itself. The CSC is such a body and its existing DfID grant could be used provided a developmental case was made for these military courses. Alternatively, the MoD could add a small grant to the CSC as the FCO has done in the past and BIS does currently. Other options would need to be explored for different Commonwealth nations and their academies. We urge leaders at the RCDS and JSCSC to make an approach to the CSC in order to advance this recommendation. King's College London's Department of War Studies could also make a similar pitch for its two linked military MA courses. Overall, this policy suggestion has the ability to increase soft-power projection for developed Commonwealth economies, but it also offers emerging economies such as India and South Africa the chance to train and educate officers in countries such as Australia, Canada, and the UK, which will lead to better understanding and foster greater trust.

III Upscale Commonwealth Officer Exchange Programmes

Our final recommendation in this report focuses on officer exchanges across the Commonwealth. This was brought to our attention by a UK news story. In 2013, the MoD announced that it was to reintroduce residency rules for new Armed Forces recruits. Recruits would have to demonstrate that they had lived in the UK for the past five years or more. This requirement had been waived in 1998 for Commonwealth nations.[87] Its reintroduction will no doubt have an impact on personnel. This development followed on from revelations in 2012 that one in ten members of the UK Armed Forces had been born abroad. This lead Colonel Richard Kemp, ex-commander of the British forces in Afghanistan, to state:

> **"I've been proud to serve with Commonwealth troops. They are among our finest soldiers. But the responsibility for defending this country lies with the citizens of this country. We must not ask the Commonwealth to take on a disproportionate amount of the burden.[88]**

The most recent numbers available go back to 2012. Interestingly and also of some concern, the documents that updated those statistics for 2013 and 2014 strangely omitted the table "Strength of the Trained UK Regular Forces by Service and Nationality".

Chart 6: UK Defense Statistics – Personnel Table

	2007	%	2008	%	2009	%	2010	%	2011	%	2012	%
All Services	**172,480**		**168,180**		**168,510**		**173,300**		**172,600**		**166,110**	
UK	160,420	(96.1)	160,700	(95.9)	159,610	(95.4)	164,220	(95.0)	163,980	(95.1)	157,540	(94.9)
Irish and Commonwealth	6,700	(3.9)	6,810	(4.1)	7,370	(4.4)	8,160	(4.7)	8,050	(4.7)	7,980	(4.8)
Nepalese	20	(–)	50	(–)	310	(0.2)	440	(0.3)	430	(0.2)	520	(0.3)

Source: gov.uk

As the table above shows, in 2012 there were 7,980 (4.8%) Irish and Commonwealth servicemen – up from 6,700 in 2007. The clear majority (7,120) were are in the British Army.[89] We were able to uncover a nationality breakdown of the British Army figures for Commonwealth soldiers as of January 2014 via a freedom-of-information request. This found 5,980 trained Commonwealth individuals, making up 7% of the total British Army forces. The table is reproduced opposite:[90]

The text accompanying the table also admits plainly that:

> **"Prior to 1998 there were relatively few Commonwealth personnel in the Army, about 590 in 1998…It should be noted that following the changes in July 2013, the five year residency requirement for Commonwealth personnel has been re-introduced and inevitably the number of Commonwealth personnel in the Army will fall.[91]**

We highlight this story because the decision to remove the Commonwealth waiver for five-year residency requirements will make officer exchanges more important – if there will be fewer Commonwealth soldiers fighting for the UK then at least they can fight *alongside* the UK. Another recent news story shows the UK's needs for Commonwealth service personnel:

Chart 5: Number of soldiers form the Commonwealth serving in the British Army – Jan 14

Nationality	#	Nationality	#	Nationality	#	Nationality	#
Australian	55	Cameroonian	105	Dominican	25	Jamaican	325
Bangladeshi	15	Canadian	35	Ghanaian	735	Kenyan	215
Barbadian	5	Fijian	1,705	Grenadian	130	Malawian	195
Belizean	50	Seychellois	15	Guyanese	20	Maltese	5
Bogtswanan	25	Sri Lankan	10	Indian	145	Mauritian	50
New Zealander	50	Nigerian	210	Pakistani	15	Sierra Leonian	35
South African	630	St lucian	225	Swazi	10	Tanzanian	10
Tongan	10	Trinidadian	40	Ugandan	60	Vincentian	295
Zambian	35	Zimbabwean	225				

Source: MoD

> **"The Royal Navy is facing a shortage of some 250 personnel in key specialist areas, such as engineering and other technical skills. It has developed 150 schemes to try to fill the void, including a plan to hire as many as 100 sailors from Canada and 50 from New Zealand.[92]**

One exchange example is Exercise Long Look, which takes place between Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. It lasts for around four months. As this preamble makes clear,

> **"The aim of Long Look is to broaden the experience and professional knowledge of selected personnel and to promote continued cooperation between the participating defence forces through exposure to other procedures, equipment, personnel and cultures.[93]**

Additionally, here is an example from a serviceman who took part:

> **"Long Look has been a great learning experience – I've brought a number of lessons back to the UK. I would recommend people to give it a go.[94]**

New programmes could be created away from developed Commonwealth nations, looking at ways to learn from and better understand emerging and developing Commonwealth nations. This could help to utilise soft power for developed nations and allow emerging economies to punch above their current weight in diplomatic and military affairs.

The rationale for upscaling such programmes and for these to spread to other parts of the Commonwealth independently of the UK is most readily demonstrated in the potential increase in forces' interoperability where soldiers from both sides work together learning each other's systems and organisations, returning to their home forces with this knowledge. This will translate into positives at the operational level when interacting in exercises or even on tour during times of war or disaster relief. The same goes for understanding other countries' doctrines and procedures; such understanding may aid the building of a common set of standards that Commonwealth officers can master. Even at the most basic level, the fact that the majority of Commonwealth nations use English as a shared language assists with communication at an operational level. The reader will recall the discussion above of this exact point being made by the British during the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division in Korea over multi-lingual forces.

The very nature of these swaps allows for the Armed Forces of both countries to learn and evolve. Interaction with new forces breaks down perceived barriers and fosters trust and goodwill. This can only be a positive development for inter-force relations. The cost is also low because officers of the same or similar rank are exchanged – for example, a UK submariner with a Canadian one of equal rank.

The former UK Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff we spoke to said that officer exchanges were an "attractive idea", but he stated that they would be quite difficult to implement practically. His reasoning was that the reach and scale of the British Armed Forces is being progressively reduced, which therefore limits any exchange potential. His other major concern related to the quality of the officers. It is

widely accepted that the UK forces train their officers to an exceptionally high standard. However, whether the same quality would be offered by the full range of Commonwealth forces remains a concern. He admitted that many emerging or developing Commonwealth nations would jump at the chance to receive British officers in exchange programmes but that the UK would be reluctant to lose some of its best personnel even in the short term through a swap. This is the reality in which our recommendation must sit.

Notwithstanding this UK-centric explanation, officer exchanges omitting the UK could take place between other Commonwealth nations, such as Australia and India, New Zealand and Malaysia, or Nigeria and Canada. The same benefits outlined above relating to interoperability and camaraderie would be apparent. This is an especially attractive means to develop closer ties between the future strategic partners highlighted in the section on bilaterals, as the cost of doing so is minimal when compared to other options. Again, any increase in quantity has to take quality into account.

In summary, the upscaling of Commonwealth officer exchanges could provide new working opportunities between Commonwealth nations. Linking these to emerging and developing economies as well as the more traditional developed nations would enhance forces' interoperability and help to achieve coalition building at a strategic and human level. Despite the fact that the swaps providing these benefits would be relatively cheap, issues around quality should be taken into strong consideration. Given the UK's recent change in residency policy regarding Commonwealth soldiers, we have argued that exchanges have added saliency. We also encourage other nations to explore exchange options, as closer Commonwealth ties across these countries could have a positive impact not only at an operational level but also on countries' growing defence diplomacy. Any discussions on swaps could be explored during a CSF in bilateral or multilateral meetings.

/Conclusion/

Throughout this report we have endeavoured to construct a picture that shows the under-utilised opportunities for greater Commonwealth interaction in security and defence. We have done so through examining historic and current actions as well as providing policy recommendations to Commonwealth nations. This is interlaced with commentary and opinion from leading defence think tanks from around the Commonwealth.

We wanted to convey through an extensive report the overarching possibilities of doing more with the Commonwealth's latent strategic abilities. The aim of each section was to demonstrate why enhanced Commonwealth ties in this field are a positive development. We want these linkages maximised.

With this in mind the report should be judged overall on its feasibility. The history section showed what was achievable in a past context, while current bilateral or multilateral links highlight the enduring practicality of such ties. Our recommendations provide a means to forward the Commonwealth in a way that is fundamentally attainable and viable.

That is why any combined Commonwealth force existing in the near future is a distant prospect. Any such force must have a presence that expands its focus beyond its namesake's historical operations in Southeast Asia and between the traditional partners of Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. It must draw on support from a number of Commonwealth nations, must possess modern authority, and must work in a range of parameters that are not solely troop deployment. Environmental and disaster relief along with anti-terror and anti-piracy measures should be priorities, as should a renewed focus on interoperability.

Crucial to the understanding of Commonwealth strategic concerns is that we are looking ahead, not to the past. History provides the backdrop, but ultimately solutions to the Commonwealth's pressing defensive problems need progressive and modern architecture to deal with them. The Commonwealth must be better prepared.

Our report showed that one of the main mechanisms to achieve this could be the creation of a Commonwealth Security Forum (CSF). We mapped out in significant detail why such a forum should take place, providing 12 robust reasons. Equally important, we explained how this forum would work on a practical level. Our view was that a CSF would be best served to take place during the biennial CHOGM meetings, while a format and design similar to the IISS's regional Dialogues would be a sensible direction to pursue. We also provided a backdrop of strategic concerns that could be discussed and ameliorated in such a forum.

Other smaller scale recommendations were the establishment of a Commonwealth Military Scholarship (CMS) and an officer exchange programme. We explained that the scholarship would deepen ties and interactions with officers across the Commonwealth, strengthening human interoperability while offering many soft-power advantages. These selected young officers would no doubt become the next generation of Commonwealth military leaders.

Our suggestion of upscaling officer exchange programmes derived from the UK's reintroduction of its five-year residency rules in the British Armed Forces. This has had a knock-on effect for Commonwealth soldiers. Therefore, this brings officer exchanges further into play as opportunities to work and operate with Commonwealth personnel are reduced. Such swaps increase forces' interoperability and complement standardisation and communications at an operational level. We learnt that numerical upscaling must keep reciprocal quality at the forefront of any decision making. We stated that both the scholarship and exchange programmes could be explored in any future CSF.

Given our three recommendations, we have shown that a pan-Commonwealth response is a sensible course to help with defensive issues across many regions through friendly but differing Commonwealth nations in a modern association. Throughout the report we have strived to provide an honest assessment of the Commonwealth's capacity – strengths as well as weaknesses – in a wider defence and security context. We want the Commonwealth to have a bright and prosperous future but this will be difficult to attain without an understanding of security.

In summary, we acknowledge that the notion of closer Commonwealth defence ties is starting from a low base; however, the power and potential of Commonwealth Armed Forces working collectively to assist others for the general good in a multitude of areas could help with current and future global security concerns. Further interaction breeds understanding and fosters camaraderie, which

has a positive impact on interoperability. As a collection of developed, developing, and emerging economies, the Commonwealth can utilise this unique club in the strategic realm for mutual aid, protection, and security. We see no better way than to commence discussions with a forum of Commonwealth partners. Many lives would certainly benefit and indeed prosper.

/Endnotes/

[1] Australian War Memorial, n.d., British Commonwealth Occupation Force 1945–52, http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/bcof, accessed 12 Dec 2014

[2] J Grey, 1988, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War*, Manchester University Press, p170

[3] P Bates, 1993, *Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force 1946–52*, Brassey's, p217

[4] Grey, op. cit., p132

[5] Bates, op. cit., p223

[6] Grey, op. cit., p35

[7] Ibid., p92

[8] Ibid., p102

[9] Ibid., p170

[10] Ibid., p188

[11] I Pfennigwerth, 2008, *Tiger Territory*, Rosenberg, p55

[12] A Smith, 2005, *Southeast Asia and New Zealand: A History of Regional and Bilateral Relations*, Victoria University Press and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p21

[13] Fijian Government, 29 Jan 2014, Documentary to Explore Relationship between Malaysia & Fiji during the Malayan Emergency, http://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Center/Press-Releases/DOCUMENTARY-TO-EXPLORE-RELATIONSHIP-BETWEEN-MALAYS.aspx, accessed 16 Dec 2014

[14] A Verrier, 1994, Peacekeeping or peacemaking? The Commonwealth Monitoring Force, Southern Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, 1979–80, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 1, No. 4, p449

[15] UK Mobile Air Movements Squadron, Old Bods Association, n.d., Operation Agila, http://ukmamsoba.org/agila.htm, accessed 16 Dec 2014

[16] Verrier, op. cit., p458

[17] CA Thayer, 2007, The Five Power defence arrangements: The quiet achiever, *Security Challenges*, Vol. 3, No. 1, p87

[18] Ibid., p88

[19] Ministry of Defence Singapore, 15 Oct 2014, Permanent Secretary for Defence visits FPDA exercise, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2014/oct/15oct14_nr.print.img.html, accessed 17 Dec 2014

[20] T Huxley, 8 Nov 2012, The future of the FPDA, *The Strategist*, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-future-of-the-five-power-defence-arrangements/, accessed 17 Dec 2014

[21] Ibid.

[22] Thayer, op. cit., p92

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ministry of Defence, 2010, *The Strategic Defence & Security Review 2010*, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf, accessed 17 Dec 2014

[25] J Blaxland, 2013, *Closer Australia–Canada Defence Co-operation in the Asia Pacific,* ASPI & CIGI paper, p8

[26] ABCA Armies' Program, n.d., History, http://www.abca-armies.org/History.aspx, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[27] NSA.gov, 1955, UKUSA Agreement 1955, https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/new_ukusa_agree_10may55.pdf, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[28] G Corera, 29 Oct 2013, Spying scandal: Will the ou mean here. Can this be sBBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24715168, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[29] UK Government, 2013, *International Defence Engagement Strategy*, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/73171/defence_engagement_strategy.pdf, p3, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[30] H Alexander, 11 July 2013, Where are the world's major military bases?, *Daily Telegraph*, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10173740/Where-are-the-worlds-major-military-bases.html, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[31] British Army, n.d., The British Army in Canada, http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22727.aspx, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[32] British Army, n.d., The British Army in Africa, http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[33] British Army, n.d., The British Army In Brunei, http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22792.aspx, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[34] P Hammond, 6 Dec 2014, Intervention at the IISS Summit in Manama, Foreign Secretary speaking on the tenth anniversary of the Manama dialogue [speech], https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/intervention-at-the-iiss-summit-in-manama, accessed 23 Dec 2014; see also BBC News, 6 Dec 2014, UK to establish £15m permanent Middle East military base, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30355953, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[35] G Stansfield and S Kelly, 2013, *A Return to East of Suez?* UK Military Deployment to the Gulf, Royal United Services Institute, https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/East_of_Suez_Return_042013.pdf, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[36] BBC News, 11 Feb 2011, Hand-wringing over defence cuts, http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2011/02/110211_warship.shtml, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[37] B Farmer, 5 Dec 2014, Marine snipers shoot boat engines to seize 215kg of cocaine, Daily Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11276881/Marine-snipers-shoot-boat-engines-to-seize-215kg-of-cocaine.html, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[38] Royal Navy, 20 Oct 2014, *HMS Argyll* helps Bermuda recover after Hurricane Gonzalo, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2014/october/20/141020-argyll-bermuda, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[39] Royal Navy, 15 Dec 2014, *HMS Severn* formally takes over North Atlantic duties, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2014/december/15/141215-severn-atlantic-duties, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[40] UK Government, 11 Nov 2013, *HMS Daring* deployment to boost UK response to Philippines typhoon, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hms-daring-deployment-to-boost-uk-response-to-philippines-typhoon, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[41] UK Government, 25 Nov 2013, *HMS Illustrious* takes over from HMS Daring in the Philippines, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hms-illustrious-takes-over-from-hms-daring-in-the-philippines, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[42] Associated Press, 20 Dec 2014, Ebola mission to Sierra Leone begins for Canadian, U.K. military medical teams, CBC News, http://www.cbc.ca/m/news/politics/ebola-mission-to-sierra-leone-begins-for-canadian-u-k-military-medical-teams-1.2880228, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[43] P Jennings, 10 Jan 2013, AUKMIN: Awkward Anglos, *The Strategist*, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukmin-awkward-anglos, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[44] Ibid.

[45] *Economic Times of India*, 12 Nov 2013, Pakistan, UK to enhance anti-terror cooperation, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-11-12/news/43981203_1_defence-cooperation-defence-industry-defence-forces, accessed 23 Dec 2014

[46] Blaxland, op. cit.

[47] Ibid.

[48] New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, n.d., Australia: Defence links, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Australia/3-Defence-links/index.php, accessed 5 Jan 2015

[49] IJ Watt, JW McKinnon, DJ Hurley, and RR Jones, 2011, *Review of the Australia–New Zealand Defence Relationship*: Joint Report to Defence Ministers 2011, p2, http://www.defence.govt.nz/pdfs/reports-publications/review-australia-nz-joint-report.pdf, accessed 5 Jan 2015

[50] Ibid., p8

[51] D Rajendram, 14 Sept 2014, Collaborating across the Indian Ocean, Lowy Institute, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/collaborating-across-india-ocean, accessed 5 Jan 2015

[52] PV Iyer, 20 Nov 2014, China chill behind warmth of India–Australia security pact, *Indian Express*, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/china-chill-behind-warmth-of-india-australia-security-pact/#sthash.O6lOVQ8Z.dpuf, accessed 5 Jan 2015

[53] SIFY News, 18 Nov 2014, Full text of Modi's address to the joint session of Australian Parliament, http://www.sify.com/news/full-text-of-modi-s-address-to-the-joint-session-of-australian-parliament-news-international-olsl9Uciccafi.html, accessed 5 Jan 2015

[54] D Brewster, 2013, *The India-Australia Security Engagement, Opportunities and Challenges*, Gateway House Research Paper No. 9, Indian Council on Global Relations, p7–11

[55] Australian High Commission Malaysia, n.d, Defence Section, Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, http://www.malaysia.highcommission.gov.au/klpr/Defence.html, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[56] Malaysia–Australia Defence Alumni Association, 21 May 2012, Malaysia–Australia Joint Defence Program, http://www.m-adaa.org/malaysia-australia-joint-defence-program, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[57] Department of Defence, Australia, 2007, *Submission to the Inquiry into Australia's relationship with Malaysia*, p7

[58] Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2007, *Inquiry into Australia's relationship with Malaysia*, Section 3, p27, http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jfadt/malaysia/report.htm, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[59] C Kremmer, 6 June 2013, "Historic" visit to Australia by India's Defence Minister, http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/news/historic'-visit-australia-india's-defence-minister, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[60] Defence eXpress, 22 May 2014, India, Singapore naval wargames SIMBEX kicks off in Andman Sea, http://www.defenceexpress.com/index.php/navy/item/417-india-sigapore-naval-wargames-simbex-kicks-off-in-andman-sea, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[61] Times of India, 5 Sep 2014, India, Singapore to exchange defence technology, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Singapore-to-exchange-defence-technology/articleshow/41744636.cms, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[62] Governance Now, 26 Sep 2014, India–Singapore defence relations: Changing geopolitics, http://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/india-singapore-defence-relations-changing-geopolitics, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[63] Jamaican Information Service, 4 Oct 2011, Senator Nelson leads high level team to Canada for security-related talks, http://jis.gov.jm/senator-nelson-leads-high-level-team-to-canada-for-security-related-talks, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[64] C Clark, 26 Jun 2012, Canadian Forces to set up shop in Jamaican capital, Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-forces-to-set-up-shop-in-jamaican-capital/article4372986, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[65] *The Gleaner,* 5 June 2011, Canada to set up military base in Jamaica, http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110605/lead/lead8.html, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[66] Blaxland, op. cit.

[67] G Winger, The velvet gauntlet: A theory of defence diplomacy, Institute for Human Sciences, http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/the-velvet-gauntlet, accessed 6 Jan 2015, taken from A Cottey and AW Forster, 2004, *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance*, Oxford University Press

[68] NATO, 11 May 2012, Interoperability: Connecting NATO forces, http://www.nato.int/cps/nl/natohq/topics_84112.htm, accessed 6 Jan 2015

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] T Musa and D Lewis, 3 Jan 2015, At least 15 killed in "Boko Haram" attack on Cameroon bus, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/03/us-cameroon-boko-haram-attack-idUSKBN0KC0GQ20150103, accessed 7 Jan 2015

[72] BBC News, 1 April 2010, Kenya ends trials of Somali pirates in its courts, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8599347.stm, accessed 7 Jan 2015

[73] The Economist, 29 Nov 2014, The ungoverned seas: The waters around Somalia are calmer, but piracy in west Africa is rising, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21635049-waters-around-somalia-are-calmer-piracy-west-africa-rising, accessed 7 Jan 2015

[74] IISS, n.d., Shangri-La Dialogue: About Shangri-La, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-s-la-s-dialogue/about-shangri-la, accessed 23 Jan 2015

[75] IISS, n.d., Shangri-La Dialogue: Sponsors, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-s-la-s-dialogue, accessed 23 Jan 2015

[76] J Chapman, 6 Nov 2014, IISS Cartagena Dialogue: The trans-Pacific summit, http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/november-4b85/the-trans-pacific-summit-50bd, accessed 23 Jan 2015

[77] Z Wang, 18 June 2014, The Shangri-La Dialogue: Troublemaker or peacemaker?, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/the-shangri-la-dialogue-troublemaker-or-peacemaker, accessed 23 Jan 2015

[78] Chapman, op. cit.

[79] *Shanghai Daily*, 26 Jan 2015, Religious extremism should be on agenda at upcoming Shangri-La Dialogue: Singapore DM, http://shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=265215, accessed 26 Jan 2015

[80] The 13th IISS Asia Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue 2014 – Speaker agenda, 2014, https://www.iiss.org/-/media/Documents/Events/Shangri-La%20Dialogue/SLD%2014/SLD%202014%20Speaker%20Agenda.pdf, accessed 26 Jan 2015

[81] Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK, 2013, 54th Annual Report to the Secretary of State for International Development, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/376592/annual-report-2012-2013.pdf, accessed 29 Jan 2015, p38

[82] Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, n.d., Advanced Command and Staff Course – ACSC, http://www.da.mod.uk/Courses/Course-Details/Course/137, accessed 29 Jan 2015

[83] Ibid.

[84] Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, n.d., JSCSC multinational participants, http://www.da.mod.uk/Colleges-Business-Units/Joint-Services-Command-and-Staff-College/JSCSC-Multinational-Participants, accessed 29 Jan 2015

[85] UK Government, 29 July 2011, Latest students graduate from Defence Academy, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/latest-students-graduate-from-defence-academy, accessed 2 Feb 2015

[86] T Harding, 16 Sep 2010, Defence review: Inside the college that trains the top brass, *Daily Telegraph*, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8006065/Defence-Review-inside-the-college-that-trains-the-top-brass.html, accessed 2 Feb 2015

[87] UK Government, 12 July 2013, UK residency rules for Armed Forces recruits, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-residency-rules-for-armed-forces-recruits, accessed 31 Jan 2015

[88] M Beckford, 1 Oct 2012, One in ten members of Armed Forces was born abroad, Daily Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9577167/One-in-ten-members-of-Armed-Forces-was-born-abroad.html, accessed 31 Jan 2015

[89] Ministry of Defence, 2012, *United Kingdom Defence Statistics 2012*, Chapter 2: Personnel, Table 2.13, p27

[90] UK Government, 25 Mar 2014, Number of soldiers from former British colonies serving in the army, FoI request, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/number-of-soldiers-from-former-british-colonies-serving-in-the-army, accessed 31 Jan 2015

[91] Ibid.

[92] D Haynes, 16 Jan 2015, Navy lines up Canadian and Kiwi sailors to keep its warships at sea, The Times, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/defence/article4324553.ece, accessed 31 Jan 2015

[93] R Irving, n.d., A long look at UK over next four months, http://www.defence.gov.au/news/raafnews/editions/4708/topstories/story05.htm, accessed 31 Jan 2015

[94] Navy News, 25 Aug 2011, Sailors should take a Long Look at a spell Down Under, https://navynews.co.uk/archive/news/item/941, accessed 31 Jan 2015°

> A Commonwealth security forum could provide an interesting and potentially useful adjunct to the current global security architecture. At the very least, it would be a useful tool in assessing trends and could give valuable early warning signals of future problems. We cannot have too much dialogue or an excess of information in the era of globalisation. It may just be that the Commonwealth could be coming of age in the right way at the right time. It is a time to be bold.
> Rt Hon. Dr. Liam fox MP / Secretary of State for Defence (2010-2011)

A collective effort by the Commonwealth to strengthen the international system in places like the Pacific and Africa are the most significant step the organisation can take towards advancing the strategic goals of Asian member-states. Where deeper ties and better communication help us to make that effort, the mechanisms proposed here will be invaluable.
Harry White / Analyst
Australian Strategic Policy Institute / Canberra

The idea of a Commonwealth security forum – as stretched as it may presently appear – could be crucial in the context of preserving India's power equities in the Indian Ocean Rim. While New Delhi may not be presently convinced it must play a leading role in the Commonwealth, it may soon realize that working with the organization's constituent members in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific is an effective way of giving its security and geopolitical agenda greater traction.
Commander Abhijit Singh / Research Fellow
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) / New Delhi

Does security cooperation need to be tied to geography? Can it be fruitfully sustained between countries that aren't necessarily in the same region and with potentially vastly different security concerns and priorities? These are some of the questions that we need to keep in mind while considering how to encourage greater security cooperation between the 53 nations of the Commonwealth.
Shahriman Lockman / Senior Analyst
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) / Malaysia

Canada is always looking to expand its security ties, and the expansion of soft-power cooperation would allow Canada this opportunity. In a globalized world facing growing transnational threats from both state and non-state actors, a Commonwealth forum would also offer the appropriate platform for the deliberation of issues relating to common security, as well as the negotiation of multilateral policy responses to such issues.
Brian Merry / Kabir Bhatia / Zaid Al-Nassir / Program Editors
Atlantic Council of Canada / Toronto

The South African National Defence Force's partnerships with foreign military academies has languished in recent years, with some meaningful engagements conducted largely through the South African National Defence Force Reserve Force structures. The Commonwealth Security Forum' could galvanise the spirit of information exchange and pave the way to larger inter-commonwealth partnerships between officers and NCOs alike.
John Stupart / Managing Editor
African Defence Review / Johannesburg

Kindly supported by

commonwealth Argosy