The New Strategist Journal

Published by the Changing Character of War Programme, University of Oxford and the Defence, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, UK Ministry of Defence
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Making Sense of Strategy’s Relational Nature

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Relating military means to political ends — that is to say, the crux of strategy — remains the most important question in strategic studies. It is also perhaps the least explicitly studied, due both to the inherent difficulty of accomplishing the task in practice and to the commensurate challenge of reflecting upon it in general theory. Any inquiry is beset by the need to consider myriad variables, each of which may be of decisive importance in one particular context yet insignificant in another. The result tends to be a theoretical morass, inhabited both by undeveloped Clausewitzian truisms and by sloppy thinking. Strategic studies should be able to build upon the solid foundations left by Clausewitz while eschewing undisciplined thought and theory.

General theory has difficulty incorporating strategy’s relational nature in detail because so much of that relational nature is context-dependent. This article aims to explore that relational nature without neglecting the importance of contextual details during the actual practice of strategy; instead it seeks balance general theory against the strategist’s need to create specific theories of victory in practice.

Reaffirming classical strategy

The meaning of strategy has been lost, and with it much of the actual art of both practical and theoretical strategic thinking. (Strachan 2005, pp. 33-54) This loss is due, in large part, to the unique connotations of the word ‘strategy’ which make it more desirable than any other related or more appropriate word, such as ‘policy’ or ‘plan.’ As Sir Lawrence Freedman aptly notes, ‘strategy remains the best word we have for expressing attempts to think about actions in advance, in light of our goals and our capacities. It captures a process for which there are no obvious alternative words, although the meaning has become diluted through promiscuous and often inappropriate use.’ (Freedman 2013, p. x) A frequently seen inappropriate usage is one which actually places the concept of strategy above policy — so that policy is meant to serve strategy, and not vice versa! One commentator even suggested, ‘[t]he natural inclination is to view strategy as supporting policy, rather than the reverse... But strategy is more than this: it is the grand design, the overall mosaic into which the pieces of specific policy fit. It provides the key ingredients of clarity, coherence and consistency over time.’ (Foster 1985, p. 14) The relationship between strategy and policy is thus nearly impossible to determine simply due to confusion as to which is the master and which the servant.
This reaffirms the classical conception of strategy as its purest and clearest interpretation. ‘Strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose; it is neither military power per se nor political purpose. By strategy I mean the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.’ (Gray 1999, p. 17) Unlike the promiscuous use of ‘strategy’ prevalent beyond (and occasionally within) strategic studies, classical strategy carries with it a particular focus which informs both its everlasting nature and the central aspects of its varying character. Classical strategy is concerned nearly entirely with war, as both the word and the concept were recovered from the ancient world for the purposes of describing the military conduct of war.

War is at the heart of strategy, whether we use strategy within war the better to direct it, or whether we use it in peace to threaten war in support of our political objectives... Part of our current confusion about what is or is not a war, and whether war itself does or does not have utility, derives precisely from our inadequate grasp of strategy. One of the most obvious uses of strategy is to provide us with the tools to understand better the nature of war. (Strachan 2011b, p. 23)

The relationship between strategy and policy is thus caught up in and subsumed by the larger relationship between war and policy. Amongst Clausewitz’s most famous pronouncements is his determination that war is a continuation of policy by other means — specifically, violent means. This appears to be a simple statement, but it must be heavily qualified. As J.C. Wylie has suggested, ‘[w]ar for a nonaggressor nation is actually a nearly complete collapse of policy. Once war comes, then nearly all prewar policy is utterly invalid because the setting in which it was designed to function no longer corresponds with the facts of reality.’ (Wylie 1989, pp. 67-68) Hew Strachan similarly suggests that today we ‘fail to recognize how often states go to war not to continue policy but to change it. The declaration of war, and more immediately the use of violence, alters everything. From that point on, the demands of war tend to shape policy, more than the direction of policy shapes war.’ (Strachan 2011a, p. 508) Clearly, the relationship between war and policy — and therefore between strategy and policy — is highly complex due to the respective natures of both war and policy.

War contains its own escalatory dynamic due to its adversarial nature, as opposing belligerents seek to defeat one another for their own purposes. Clausewitz thoroughly explained this particular facet of the nature of war. ‘So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear that he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him... If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance... But the enemy will do the same’. (Clausewitz 1984, p. 77 This is the main dynamic by which the demands of war may capture the direction of policy as Strachan warns. Strategy thereby, in the face of armed resistance, threatens to become the master of policy rather than its servant and executor.

On the other side of the relationship, policy is always composite. It is never a monolith, but a compound always comprised of at least two parts. This is not a reference to the divide between domestic and foreign policy, although this is one additional complicating factor, nor is it an observation that any polity may have differing foreign policies toward India, Russia, China, etc., which similarly complicates policy-making. Rather, any policy is always comprised of at least two aspects
which together ultimately determine whether the policy has or has not been successful. First, there is the aim of the policy itself: does the West desire to maintain the territorial integrity of Ukraine; does the United Kingdom desire to revitalize its naval power with the construction of two brand new aircraft carriers; etc. Second, at what cost the achievement? This is the condition attached to the policy goal. The West was prepared to support Ukraine’s sovereignty short of war. Thus the West was unprepared to employ military force to sustain Ukraine’s sovereignty, despite the overall ineffectiveness of its statecraft. Thus if Ukraine does not retain territorial integrity, Western policies will have failed, but also if the West had gone to war over Ukraine, its policies would have failed. The United Kingdom has similarly found the cost of two carriers to be perhaps too high and its policy position awkward. In some cases the condition is judged more important than the goal itself. In other cases the policy goal is determined to be worth more than the condition attached to it; thus Joseph Chamberlain’s peace at any price crumbled in the face of the clear need to stop Nazi Germany.

The relationship between strategy and policy is thus dynamic, complex, and often nonlinear. For this reason, strategic studies frequently eschews serious discussion of this relationship beyond endorsing or, sometimes, condemning Clausewitz’s well known assertion that war is the continuation of policy by other means. Colin Gray aptly observed that ‘[t]he trouble is that there is a radical difference in nature, in kind, between violence and political consequence… this dilemma of currency conversion is central to the difficulty of strategy.’ (Gray 2010, p. 136) One result of this difficulty is that Western militaries prefer to avoid consideration of this currency conversion (as being well above their professional pay grades) in favor of conceiving of and acting in a politics-free operational level of war where generals must consider only purely military factors. Policy thus de facto maintains its significance only in starting and ending the war. Although frequently such an interpretation is attributed to Clausewitz, it is actually a Moltkean perspective on the relationship between war and politics. Moltke wrote in 1871 that ‘[p]olicy uses war for the attainment of its goals; it works decisively at the beginning and the end of war, so that indeed policy reserves for itself the right to increase its demands or to be satisfied with a lesser success.’ (Hughes 1993, p. 44) It does not or should not, however, affect the course of operations. By contrast, Clausewitz wrote that ‘[w]e want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse. The main lines along which military events progress and to which they are restricted are political lines that continue throughout the war.’ (Clausewitz 1984, p. 605) Politics cannot help but inform the practice of strategy, because strategy is practiced for the sake of political gain. Tension between these two perspectives concerning the relationship between strategy and policy remains rife even today in strategic studies, in academic circles as in actual practice.

Clearly, the relationship between strategy and policy is difficult to master in practice and possibly more difficult to elucidate in the writing of theory. The general theory of strategy, to fulfill the promise implicit in its name, must be at a sufficiently high level to encompass and comprehend the practice of strategy in all of history, from that of the Egyptians and Hittites at Qadesh to the present day. Yet it should not falter in the face of Bernard Brodie’s basic questions about the practicality of strategic theory in any given context of practicing strategists.

Strategic thinking, or ‘theory’ if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a ‘how to do it’ study, a guide to accomplishing something and
doing it efficiently. As in many other branches of politics, the question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work? More importantly, will it be likely to work under the special circumstances under which it will next be tested? (Brodie 1973, p. 452)

This underlines the tension between strategy as general theory and strategy in practice as a context-specific theory of victory. How should a strategic theorist go about balancing the general comprehension of strategy in all of history with its necessary context-specific contribution to strategic practice?

Exploring strategy’s relational nature

Strategy guides the employment of armed force toward beneficial political utility. A general theory of strategy must, at the least, create and encourage common meaning between two mutually foreign considerations. As with mathematical fractions, undertaking such a unification requires identifying the fundamental common denominator upon which both rest. For strategy and policy, this denominator is power as expressed in politics. Unlike politics, policy is not fundamental. Its position is actually somewhat anomalous; it is both the result of one set of processes (politics) and the guiding light for another (strategy). Politics is continually evolving; policy constantly strives to catch up to politics, therefore strategy is also constantly catching up and changing. The making of strategy and its consequences also loop back to impact the course of politics and so also impact policy.

Policy is a previously agreed-upon course of action determined as a result of political processes, which may be domestic, international, or both. Politics is concerned with fundamental issues, which go by many names despite being approximately the same thing. Harold Lasswell has defined politics as who gets what, when, how. Examples of ‘what’ include deference, income, and safety. (Lasswell 1972, p. 13) Politics itself is, to repurpose Basil Liddell Hart’s definition of strategy, the distribution and employment of power. Power, properly employed, may provide or account for everything else. Any chosen policy therefore only represents the accepted and anticipated changes to that distribution and employment of power.

It is thus arguably more useful to consider not strategy with policy but strategy and politics. Politics is not merely the result of choices about power, but also the ebb and flow of power. Policy is just a particular configuration for the use of power to influence its future distribution. Strategy and politics embodies the more fundamental relationship, for, as noted above, the need to practice strategy in war may well represent a failure of policy rather than its continuation.

Power is difficult to measure because it is necessarily relational; it is a meaningless concept without another party against whom to act in competition. Moreover, because it is relational, one’s own power may be upset by the actions of others. Thus any policy must assume the requisite freedom of action to enact anticipated changes to the distribution of power by the relevant instruments of political power. This basic insight applies as much to the development and implementation of policy in domestic settings as in international ones. A politician working to improve his polity’s future would pursue the enactment of policies which are realistic — that is, are achievable because the freedom of action exists to implement those policies. Freedom of action becomes even more important in conflict. As the French general André Beaufre proposed, ‘[a]ny dialectical contest is a contest for freedom of action.’ (Beaufre 1965,
This is especially true in war, which is by definition a highly charged situation which differs greatly from that of relatively peaceful domestic politics.

War is adversarial by nature. Each strategic actor’s freedom of action is therefore limited because the mutual introduction of violence changes the efficacy of all non-violent instruments. Non-violent instruments, such as economic or diplomatic pressure, retain some utility and effectiveness in the longer-term or in contexts where the use of force is not an immediate concern. However, such instruments cannot directly resist military force, which has the potential to trump all other forms of power in an immediate situation. Freedom of action in war thus necessarily revolves around the relative capabilities of each belligerent to threaten and use violence. Violence attains such centrality because, in war, the involved parties have each already determined that violence will be the prime instrument of political achievement.

War is also meant to be instrumental. ‘On the one hand it is about a purposive activity, geared to the demands of personal, group, and national security. On the other it is about the grim consequences of conflict.’ (Freedman 2012, p. 17) This anticipation of instrumentality impinges upon a strategist’s freedom of action. The practicing strategist should not act counter to the political interests for which he is striving. Thus tactically plausible actions may be politically — and therefore strategically — undesirable. A strategist’s concern with freedom of action is thus not only a concern about his enemy and what that enemy is capable of doing. It is also about how his own choices and actions affect the feasibility of achieving his political goal — the desired redistribution of power between the belligerents in question. As Geoffrey Blainey asserted in a wonderfully minimalistic manner, ‘[w]ar itself is a dispute about measurement; peace on the other hand marks a rough agreement about measurement… Wars usually end when the fighting nations agree on their relative strength, and wars usually begin when fighting nations disagree on their relative strength.’ (Blainey n.d., p. 122) A strategist should not act in a manner which decreases the power of his polity below that of his enemy. Policy therefore may also restrict a strategist’s freedom of action from undertaking actions which, although tactically feasible, may not have desirable strategic or political consequences.

Clausewitz’s definition of war remains one of the most clear and concise yet offered: ‘War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.’ (Clausewitz 1984, p. 75) It is deceptively simple and remains useful, but for the purpose of exploring the bedrock of strategy it is not cast in the most advantageous vocabulary. Wylie more helpfully suggested that ‘the aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy.’ (Wylie 1989, p. 66) Indeed, Wylie subtitled his work on military strategy as a general theory of power control. Controlling power is at the heart of both war and, more generally, also politics, both in its purpose and in its conduct, i.e. in strategy. The notion of control stems from naval and maritime strategy, imported by naval historian Herbert Rosinski from that specialized discipline into wider strategic studies. His discussion of control remains among the most lucid.

It is this element of control which is the essence of strategy: Control being the element which differentiates true strategic action from a haphazard series of improvisations… Comprehensive control of a field of action means a concentration upon those minimum key lines of action or key positions from which the entire field can be positively controlled… This concept of strategy as a comprehensive control has the advantage that it applies equally to the offensive and to the defensive. On the offensive, the aim of strategy is to break down the enemy’s control while
simultaneously preventing him from interfering with our attack. On the
defensive, strategy similarly seeks to constrain the enemy attack to such a
form and degree that, while the defense may be forced back, it still main-
tains control of its actions and avoids collapse. (Cited in Eccles 1965,
pp. 46-47)

Power is necessary to implement one’s chosen policy, or to prevent an enemy from
fulfilling his own policy goals. In wartime, the prime form of power is military power,
which achieves effect primarily through battle or the threat of battle. The recourse to
war is an acknowledgement that other forms of power besides military power cannot
on their own deliver the object desired by policy or politics. Yet military power
may be stymied by adversarial military power, and when this happens the halted
belligerent is unable to work effectively toward achieving his desired goals, since his
main engine of policy fulfillment is being rendered less effective by superior enemy
action. Moreover, his opponent may consequently gain greater freedom to pursue
his own political ends without having to counter constantly the offensive actions of
the defeated. This interaction between opponents does not occur just once, but is
repeated throughout the entire war, until one belligerent lacks the power or will to
continue.

Strategy may be considered a series of interacting and interdependent choices
made by opposing adversaries. Each belligerent seeks continually to limit the freedom
of action of his opponents to prevent them from both interfering with his own freedom
of action and to lessen their ability to achieve their policy goals. Each belligerent
simultaneously also seeks continually to maintain or expand his own freedom of
action to restrict his opponent and to achieve his own policy goals. Therefore one
may consider strategy to be the distribution and employment of military power
to preserve or expand one’s own strategic and political options and to restrict and
constrain those of one’s foe to achieve the desired future distribution of power. Power,
control, and freedom of action, woven together, form the fundamental pattern which
dominates the currency conversion from military force to political consequence.

The basic consideration of consequence, and particularly of the consequences of
employing one’s own military power to impinge upon the enemy’s freedom and power
to act, is thus the bedrock of strategic thinking. Action and its consequences are the
foundation of strategy, both in theory and in practice. A focus on power, control, and
freedom of action represent an emphasis on the required core competency of strategy.
The quality of a strategist and of any chosen strategy is ultimately determined by
whether or not political success is achieved through force of arms. Although historical
retrospective may be allowed the benefit of doubt, as any practicing strategist may
have had the right ideas and the right instruments but have simply faced an even
better equipped opponent, this is no comfort to strategists practicing in the present.
A strategist either performs well enough to succeed, or he does not. Measures of
quality typically follow that which is most fundamental. Nonetheless, power, control,
and freedom of action are arguably insufficient to inform strategy in practice as a
context-specific theory of victory.

Strategy’s relational nature and specific theories of victory

Strategy’s relationship with policy is important, and its relationship with politics
is even more important, but it also has other relationships which must similarly be
tended, such as its relationship with tactics — the cutting edge of strategy. Moreover, many of the influences within and upon strategy, in theory as in practice, stem from sources which do not directly pertain to strategy’s relational nature at all. Fundamentally, a focus only on strategy’s relational nature and its connection to politics and policy is inadequate because strategy is necessarily multi-dimensional. To study and understand strategy’s relational nature, rather than simply remaining at the general level, one must also delve into the aspects of strategy which impinge upon the challenge of relating military power to political consequences in specific practice in context.

The first aspect of strategy in context is the enemy and the role he plays in strategic practice. Strategy is by definition adversarial in theory and practice, but in strategic studies the enemy is frequently sidelined. This is not limited to the academic sector of the discipline, but is also prevalent in the armed forces. Michael Howard has long noted how ‘the complex problem of running an army at all is liable to occupy [a general’s] mind and skill so completely that it is very easy to forget what it is being run for.’ (Howard 1984, p. 194) This negligence may evidence a degree of inevitability. Militaries are created, organized, and maintained so that they may be called upon to inflict violence against a chosen enemy, should the political situation degenerate to that point. Yet ‘[p]revious to its interaction with the enemy, all strategy is generated with only the introspective view able to be taken.’ (Randall 2015)

Detailed consideration of the enemy falls under the purview of control as its vehicle. Each belligerent seeks simultaneously to improve his own control of the pattern of action in the war and erode that of his opponent. Doing this effectively requires consideration of how the enemy’s actions influence one’s own; of how one’s own actions interfere with the enemy’s; of what it may or may not be possible to achieve; and of what the enemy may or may not appear capable. The enemy’s own choice of means and ways gives clues to inform the strategist. ‘If the enemy’s actions can reveal his assumptions about what strategic ways he fears or values, the strategist should seek to exploit these in order better to achieve his ends.’ (Randall 2015 To control a strategic situation effectively is not only to be reasonably free to act as one desires with the means at one’s disposal — a strategist generally cannot, after all, completely erase his enemy’s powers of resistance — but also to restrict the adversary’s potential options, to prevent him from deploying and employing his own instruments of military power with any great chance of effect.

Control must balance both internal and external considerations. This is important not just for deployment and employment of military power, but also for their political consequences. A strategist in action generally desires either to gain some prize for his polity from his opponent, or to deny his opponent some desired prize. Control may be applied not merely to the interaction of simultaneous and reciprocal military actions, but also to how those actions affect a polity’s freedom of action in other fields of power, such as economics. A classic example would be the Napoleonic Wars, when Napoleon’s victories on land allowed him largely to deny the continental markets to the economic power of Britain, while simultaneously British success at sea denied overseas markets to French and continental economic power. Territorial occupation similarly prevents a polity from exercising its sovereign power on its own territory. A strategist seeking control may, if successful, escalate his control over the situation to the point where the polity’s entire ability to wield power of any sort collapses.
Clausewitz highlighted the importance of judgment when he identified the role of theory as educating a strategist’s judgment. Theory was, for him, ‘an analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to experience — in our case, to military history — it leads to thorough familiarity with it... Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.’ (Clausewitz 1984, p. 141) The strategist’s powers of judgment are the link between strategic theory and strategic practice, as well as being the font of strategic competence or incompetence. Power, control, and freedom of action suffice to explain action and consequences in strategic practice, but a strategist’s judgment may require extending his understanding to factors which lay beyond those three fundamental concepts.

One danger of the clarity of power, control, and freedom of action is that it may imply that the practice of strategy is easy, mechanistic, and linear because those three concepts describe strategic consequence in such a straightforward manner. Strategy is not easy, mechanistic, or linear. One belligerent acts to prevent a particular line of operations from being effectively exploited, thereby reducing the enemy’s power. In consequence, the inferior belligerent capitulates. As one scholar has powerfully argued,

[t]he overall pattern is clear: war seen as a nonlinear phenomenon — as Clausewitz sees it — is inherently unpredictable by analytical means. Chance and complexity dominate simplicity in the real world. Thus no two wars are ever the same. No war is guaranteed to remain structurally stable. No theory can provide the analytical short-cuts necessary to allow us to skip ahead of the ‘running’ of an actual war. No realistic assumptions offer a way to bypass these uncomfortable truths. (Beyerchen 1992, p. 90)

Friction sends operations awry in subtle ways. The interaction of adversaries and of itself generates chance, as do forces extrinsic to the war in question, such as weather. The enemy may not believe himself to be beaten decisively despite battlefield setbacks, or may believe his cause to justify further fighting despite such setbacks. Information is never complete. Indeed, the paucity of information may be so fundamental that Williamson Murray has incorporated it directly into his definition of strategy itself and chided others for proffering definitions which imply clarity in strategy-making. ‘In fact, such straightforward definitions go fundamentally astray, for strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.’ (Murray and Grimsley 1994, p. 1) The clarity of strategy’s bedrock — power, control, and freedom of action — serves primarily as a beacon around which individual strategists make judgments about the war in which they are involved, as well as a pillar which supports the development of strategic theory in other directions.

Other directions in strategic theory are necessary because the three bedrock concepts exclude myriad dimensions of strategy and strategy-making for the sake of clarity. In 1979 Michael Howard identified four dimensions to strategy which he felt had been neglected by modern strategic studies: the social, logistical, operational, and technological dimensions. (Howard 1979, pp. 976-986) Twenty years later, Colin Gray identified seventeen dimensions which comprise strategy: people, society, culture, politics, ethics, economics and logistics, organization, military administration,
information and intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, technology, military operations, command, geography, friction, the adversary, and time. Gray 1999, p. 24) Regardless of how many dimensions any strategist personally identifies in the practice of context-specific strategy, general theory must have something to say about all of them so that a strategist may accurately judge when to extend his practical deliberations beyond the three bedrock concepts to consider the functional aspects of strategy’s further dimensions in the context surrounding actual practice. Power, control, and freedom of action cannot on their own account for the whole of strategy’s relational nature because no theory can account for the impact of individual judgment on strategy and policy-making. Therefore the problem of currency conversion from military force to political ends will continue to plague the achievement of one’s own political ends because of the significant role played by the adversary’s individual decision-making, particularly with regards to recognizing and acknowledging defeat in war. Strategy’s myriad dimensions will ever affect the practice of strategy, although they may not always have equal degrees of influence, and the strategist may not always have to account consciously for each and every one of them in practice.

A general theory of strategy is necessarily a composite of two different theories. The first, which primarily promotes understanding of the bedrock concepts of strategy, is a theory of strategic effect. It is a theory which aims to determine how the employment of power leads to control of the enemy’s freedom of action. A theory of strategy without a core theory of strategic effect is all but useless; the former requires the latter to have any practical application. Strategic effect must, of necessity, be the central axle of any theory of strategy. The second theory inherent within a general theory of strategy is a theory of strategy-making. It details what factors may impinge upon the actual practice and decision-making of strategy, including how the effects of any given strategy are interpreted by its opponents, which are crucial to strategy’s relational nature in any particular context. This would not only include many of the dimensions which Gray highlighted, such as culture, ethics, military administration, logistics, and so forth, but also, crucially, civil-military relations. Not only is strategy-making the conduct one’s own of civil-military relations, but also intruding upon the adversary’s own civil-military relations.

This becomes an issue which may disrupt the making of strategy in societies which attempt starkly to isolate the soldiers from the politics. The United States’ model of civil-military relations in particular attempts to render the soldier apolitical, which soldiers frequently find genial. Meanwhile, ‘[t]he professional soldier’s traditional justification for being left to run the war untrammeled by politicians does not reject the idea that war is a political instrument. It just says that the politics can be left to one side until the victory is delivered. When the soldier says that, he implies not only that the politician should stay clear of his business, but also that policy is not part of the soldier’s business.’ (Strachan 2013, p. 83) This mirrors the flawed Moltkean understanding of war and policy. The making of strategy, and the effort of relating military power to political ends, is an ongoing practice in which both military and civilian personnel must work together despite their different cultures, widely varying experiences and professional concerns, and so on. Different groups involved in the making of strategy will emphasize its different dimensions.
Conclusion

Relating strategy to policy in both theory and practice is difficult as their relationship is complex and may take any number of different forms. Once discussion of strategy reaches this relational aspect, arguments tend to become vague, somewhat unsubstantiated, and circle around the issue without coming to grips with it. This is for good reason — what may work in one instance of strategic history may fail in another, or lead to wholly different results in a third. In strategic history, details pertaining to the myriad dimensions of strategy matter because any or all of these may send the relationship between strategy and policy awry. The general theory of strategy therefore has difficulty wrestling with this relational nature simply because it is general theory, rather than the judgment-driven specific theory of victory a belligerent may believe at any one specific moment in the historical practice of strategy.

This does not mean that strategic studies cannot do better than they already have, at the level of general theory. Strategic theorists should still be able to approach full but generic understanding of strategy’s relational nature. With the purpose of making consistent sense of this nature and at the possible cost of eschewing, for clarity, direct concern with many of the other dimensions and considerations of strategy, this may be accomplished by reinterpreting the relationship between strategy and politics in terms of their major common denominators: power, control, and freedom of action.

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