

**HALLUCINATION DEFANGED:
PERCEPTION AND THE DUAL NATURE OF ITS OBJECTS**

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When asked to report on what a visual experience is like, it is natural to describe what it is that we see: ordinary medium-sized objects with their myriad colors, shapes and sizes. To experience a hummingbird, for instance, is to see a flash of bright red as it whizzes past; to have an experience of an elephant is to see its winding trunk and lumbering girth. From this intuitive thought—that experience just presents the world to us—emerges *naïve realism*, the view that ordinary perception fundamentally consists in an unmediated relation of awareness between a perceiver and constituents of the mind-independent world.

The possibility of hallucination, however, threatens to quickly falsify the naïve view: we all know that experiences are possible in which it seems *as if* we are perceiving an ordinary mind-independent object when there is no such object present. If such delusive experiences share their experiential character with ordinary perceptions, then it looks as if naïve realism cannot be true. For the naïve view treats perception as a relation between us and worldly constituents. But if we can have the very same kind of experience in the absence of any such constituents, it seems to follow that such experience does not, *in any instance*, include mind-independent objects as essential ingredients.

It has thus been universally assumed that the only way for us to hold on to naïve realism is to deny that delusive experiences and ordinary perceptions are experientially identical. Embracing this denial, however, has turned out to be the Achilles heel of the view. If the naïve realist can provide a compelling account of the phenomenology of ordinary perception only by relinquishing a satisfying account of the phenomenology of delusive experiences, then she has found a way to win one battle only by losing another. A truly successful account of perceptual experience, one might think, cannot pick and choose; it must provide a satisfying account of *all* perceptual phenomenology.

In this paper, I will argue that the naïve realist can indeed account for the phenomenology of *both* veridical and hallucinatory experiences. My argument will consist of two central moves. First, I will argue that the naïve realist can grant that both hallucinations and veridical perceptions make a perceiver aware of qualitatively identical items of awareness. This is because qualitative identity is compatible with ontological distinctness: the items of awareness—though qualitatively identical—are mind-*dependent* in a hallucination, but mind-*independent* in veridical perception. In order to be able to maintain this claim, however, a second move becomes necessary. The item of awareness in a hallucination is mind-dependent because the hallucinatory experience is *constitutively sufficient* for its item. But as will become clear, having granted that a hallucinatory experience is sufficient for its item requires that we grant that veridical perception similarly constitutes its item. I will argue that this still does not threaten the naïve realist idea that the items of ordinary awareness are mind-independent. Accepting that a perceptual experience—veridical or hallucinatory—is always constitutively sufficient for its object does *not* imply that the object of awareness is, in each instance, constitutively dependent on experience. This entailment only holds in the case of hallucination, due to the unique particularities of the case. The entailment, importantly, does not stand up to scrutiny in the case of veridical perception. Thus, we can maintain that the items of ordinary perception just are mind-independent objects and their properties, even having granted that such perceptions are constitutively sufficient for their items.

In order to explain why the fact that veridical experience is constitutively sufficient for its item does not entail the fact that the item is constitutively dependent on the experience, I must first introduce the novel metaphysical idea of *constitutive over-determination*. This will be the focus of section I. Once I have developed this metaphysical resource, the remainder of

the paper will be devoted to developing a version of naïve realism that is compatible with the qualitative identity of veridical perceptions and delusions. In sections II and III, I will present the strongest formulation of the threat that hallucinations pose to the naïve picture. Here, I will introduce the idea that the items of awareness in ordinary perception and hallucination can be qualitatively identical but ontologically distinct. Finally, in section IV, I will show that the naïve realist can resist the threat from hallucination if she treats the items of veridical perception as constitutively over-determined: both the experience and the mind-independent world are constitutively sufficient for one and the same item of awareness. Given that there are *two* fully constituting factors in place, the item is not constitutively dependent on either of those factors individually. This allows us to deny that the items of ordinary perceptual awareness are mind-dependent. The unique advantage of this proposal, in contrast to the traditional options in the debate, is that it makes room for the rich phenomenology of hallucinations without compromising the naïve view of perception.

Before I can get to the case of perception, however, we must first take a brief detour through some metaphysics.

I. CONSTITUTIVE OVER-DETERMINATION

Consider the following two examples:

Death: A brawl is underway in a bar. Athos, Porthos and Aramis are all involved. Porthos is stabbed and succumbs to his wounds on the spot. Extensive post-mortem exploration reveals that the swords of Athos and Aramis simultaneously pierced Porthos' heart with enough momentum for each sword to have caused a rapid death. In this case, Athos and Aramis are equally guilty of perpetrating Porthos' murder.

Cricket: India and Australia are playing the final of the Cricket World Cup. India bats first. There are two distinct ways in which India can win the match: 1) India wins if she scores more runs than Australia in the 50 overs allotted to each team. 2) India wins if she gets all the members of the Australian team out before they can score more runs than the Indian team. But this third scenario is possible as well: India makes 300 runs. Australia is batting second and has made 299 runs. There is one ball left in the game and the last two batsmen are playing. If either batsman gets out, India wins. If Australia does not make any runs on the last ball, India wins. The last ball is bowled. The batsman hits the ball in the air and is caught by a fielder before any runs can be completed. India enjoys a historic victory!

Death is a prototypical philosophical example of the phenomenon of causal over-determination. Either of Athos' or Aramis' jabs would have been individually sufficient for Porthos' death, but the way things played out, it just so happened that poor Porthos was simultaneously killed by both Athos and Aramis. There is only one death that occurs and neither Athos nor Aramis can be ascribed *sole* responsibility for the demise. In this instance, then, the two causes – each of which would have been individually sufficient for the death of Porthos – causally over-determine his demise. Of course, the death is not *constituted* by its causes – we normally think of death as constituted by the end of a person's life, regardless of how it comes about – but it is a clear case of *causal* over-determination.

In the second example, *Cricket*, India would have won if the tenth batsmen had been caught while Australia was still at 299. India would also have won if Australia did not score the requisite 300 runs in the allotted overs, even if the tenth batsman had not been caught. Australia's tenth batsman getting out and their exhausting the allotted overs before reaching 300 were each individually sufficient for an Indian victory. The particular victory that the

Indians enjoyed on this occasion, however, was brought about by the simultaneous occurrence of both conditions (the outing and the last ball having been bowled, each with the smaller run total). Here, we have a case, not of causal over-determination, but rather of *constitutive* over-determination. India getting Australia out and Australia using up its allotted balls (both while at a lower run total) are not mere causes of the victory; rather, they constitute the victory that India enjoys. It seems plausible to say that it wouldn't have been the very same victory (although it would have been a victory by India in cricket) if only one of the two conditions had obtained. One might conclude, then, that even though the tenth batsman's outing and the exhaustion of the allotted balls are each individually sufficient for this *kind* of event (namely, a victory) to occur, the *particular* victory that does occur is constituted by both the final outing and the lower run total at the end of the fifty overs. The particular victory is, therefore, constitutively over-determined.

We can define constitutive over-determination as follows: For any three event (or property) kinds X , Y , Z , a particular instance of kind Z (call it z) is constitutively over-determined *iff* instances of X and instances of Y are, in isolation, constitutively sufficient for Z to be instantiated but *both* an instance of X (x) and an instance of Y (y) constitute the specific instance z .¹ To see how this notion applies to our case, let Z be the event of India's victory, X , the event of Australia's tenth batsman getting out (before reaching 300 runs) and Y , the event of Australia using up its last ball (before reaching 300 runs). *Cricket* is a case of constitutive over-determination because the particular event in question z (i.e. India's actual victory) is constituted by two conditions x and y (Australia losing its last batsmen and using up its last ball, each before they reach the target score), either of which occurring in isolation would have been sufficient for the very same kind of event Z to occur.

We can also explicate the notion of constitutive over-determination in terms of metaphysical grounding. The fact that Aleeya is touching the Blue Mosque is grounded in the fact that she is touching one of its many central pillars; San Francisco's being in the temperate zone is grounded in it being located 37 degrees north of the equator; the fact that an object exists, according to Berkeley, is grounded in the fact that it is perceived. These are just some examples of one fact or property-instance being grounded in another fact or property-instance. The grounding relation is defined as an ontological relation that holds between properties or facts. It is typically distinguished both from causal or modal relations (insofar as it implies an explanatory connection between the relata), and from the identity relation (insofar as the relata themselves are ontologically distinct). Some have argued that we should think of the grounding facts as *truth-makers* for the grounded fact, but to put it more neutrally, we can claim that the grounded fact holds *in virtue of* or *because of* the grounding facts, such that the obtaining of the grounding facts is taken to be constitutively sufficient for the obtaining of the grounded fact. Because the grounding relation is explanatory, it only holds uni-directionally and is therefore asymmetric.²

¹ I want to distinguish the notion that I develop here from a notion that L.A. Paul refers to as constitutive over-determination in her 2007 paper. Constitutive over-determination, in the way that Paul defines it, is a subset of causal over-determination. An instance of constitutive over-determination in this sense is a case in which (a) $c1$ and $c2$ causally over-determine some effect e ; and (b) $c1$ constitutes $c2$ (for example, in the way that a sum of cells constitutes Laurie Paul). In contrast, constitutive over-determination, the way I intend the term, is an entirely distinct metaphysical species from causal over-determination (with the latter only serving as a helpful analogy for the former). It is the *constitution relation itself* between x , y and z that is over-determined on my usage of the term. In the cases that Paul discusses, there is a standard constitution relation between x and y , which gives rise to the (alleged) causal over-determination of some effect e that has both x and y as candidate (sufficient) causes.

² See Fine, 2012; Rosen, 2010; Schaffer, 2009 for their seminal discussions of grounding. For an older discussion of the in-virtue-of relation, see Jackson, 1977 and Foster, 1982. For recent skepticism about grounding, see Daly, 2012 and Wilson, 2014.

The grounding relation is, in most instances, a one-many relation where one fact is grounded in several facts. Each of the grounding facts serves as partial ground for the grounded fact, while all the grounding facts together serve as full grounds for the grounded fact.³ As can be seen below, constitutive over-determination can be understood as a special case of full grounding, where one fact F can be fully grounded in two distinct sets of facts G and H , where G and H can also serve *individually* as *full* grounds for F :⁴

1. The fact that India won the cricket match is plurally grounded in the fact that Australia's tenth batsman got out before reaching the target score *and* the fact that Australia used up its last allotted ball before reaching the target score.
2. The fact that India won the cricket match could have been fully grounded in the fact that Australia's tenth batsman got out before reaching the target score.
3. The fact that India won the cricket match could have been fully grounded in the fact that Australia used up its allotted balls before reaching the target score.

The fact that India won the cricket match can be *fully* grounded in either of two distinct facts. Furthermore, as our case reveals, the two ways in which this fact can be grounded are not exclusive – that is, they can co-obtain. When they do co-obtain, the resultant fact is over-determined. Once we recognize the structure of this case, we see that constitutive over-determination is quite a prevalent phenomenon.⁵ All event- or property-kinds that have disjunctive constitution conditions that are not mutually exclusive will have possible cases of constitutive over-determination.⁶

So far, we have seen that constitutive over-determination is not an esoteric philosopher's invention, but a phenomenon that we can find evidence for in our everyday lives. Now, in the remainder of the paper, I will make use of the notion of constitutive over-determination to offer a novel solution to an extremely old problem concerning the nature of perceptual experience. The problem emerges from a consideration of delusive experience: how can ordinary perception put us in direct contact with the world if we can have qualitatively identical delusive experiences that are logically independent of the world? As I will show in section II, the argument from the possibility of such delusions seems to threaten not only our commonsensical picture of perception, but the very possibility of metaphysical realism itself. To resist the threat, I will argue that we must maintain that veridical perceptions and sensory delusions both make us aware of sensible features that can have ontologically distinct instances. This allows us to hold on to the claim that veridical perception makes us aware of the features of mind-independent objects, while conceding that hallucinations only

³ On Fine's system, a partial ground is a sometimes-*improper* part of the full ground for a fact. Here, I use partial ground only to signify a *proper* part of the full ground.

⁴ I make explicit reference only to the two facts within the sets G and H that are not shared across both sets. There will be other relevant facts that are common to the two sets of grounding facts – for example, that India and Australia played a cricket match, that the match was played in accordance with the official rules etc. These facts will be constant across (1) – (3), so I have left them out for clarity of exposition.

⁵ One can treat the victory fact as itself disjunctive, or as a non-disjunctive fact that has disjunctive grounding conditions. I am inclined to pick the latter option but will not argue for this here. (One will prefer the latter option if, like Audi, 2012, one is skeptical about disjunctive facts)

⁶ For the non-cricket fans, here's another possible case of constitutive over-determination that has the same structure: in some legal codes, an individual may count as the official owner of a house either in virtue of the fact that they have a sale deed in their name *or* in virtue of the fact that they have resided in the home for a period that is greater than, say, ten years, without any challenge to their occupation of the premises. So the fact that X is a homeowner will be constitutively over-determined in every case in which it is *both* the case that X has a sale deed for the house in her name *and* the case that X has resided in the house without challenge for a period of ten years.

make us aware of mind-dependent sensible instances. As I will argue in sections III and IV, this suggestion will require us to treat the items of ordinary veridical awareness as constitutively over-determined (fully constituted both by the mind-independent world *and* by the act of perceptual awareness). Once we grant this kind of over-determination, we can salvage the commonsensical view of perception and return metaphysical realism to its secure foundations.

Before we can develop our defense, however, we must first understand the nature of the threat. In the following section, I will turn to what has been called *the* problem of perception:⁷ can veridical perception be how it intuitively seems to be if delusive perceptions are possible?

II. THE ARGUMENT FROM HALLUCINATION

In *A Treatise Concerning The Principles of Human Knowledge*, Berkeley presents us with a dilemma: Our very conception of mind-independent reality is a conception of a world that is visible, audible and tangible; a world that shows up to our senses. But this stands in direct conflict with the seemingly unavoidable philosophical realization that the only things we ever perceive are mind-*dependent* entities, or ideas. Either we must deny a central truth about the nature of perception, or we must relinquish our conception of a mind-independent world altogether. Berkeley chooses the latter option, arguing that the only world we are familiar with—the world that possesses mountains, rivers and houses—is in fact a world of ideas:

It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from being perceived by the understanding...yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what, I pray you, do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations, and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?⁸

The natural first reaction to this passage is one of bafflement: we have been given no reason whatsoever to think that the items of awareness are mind-dependent. Instead, the passage just seems to assume the truth of this claim. Most have argued that in this passage and others like it, Berkeley is guilty of an elementary conflation of “the object of perception and the perceiving of it, or of sensible qualities and ‘sensations’?”⁹ As a result, philosophers have by and large concluded that we can easily dismiss Berkeley’s dilemma so long as we keep this distinction clearly in view.

It is true that, in the quoted passage of the *Principles*, Berkeley does assume that the items of perceptual awareness—the manifest colors, shapes and sizes—are all ideas.¹⁰ The claim he is interested in arguing for there is not *that* the items of our awareness are ideas, but rather that *if* they are, *then* we have no coherent conception of material reality at our disposal. We can understand why this is the focus of Berkeley’s attention if we read the passage as a

⁷ See, for example Crane, 2005.

⁸ Berkeley, 1949, §4

⁹ See Smith, 1985. Smith himself does not accuse Berkeley of this conflation, but nicely describes the common reaction that commentators have had to the argument.

¹⁰ Evidence of this assumption is pervasive. See, for example, §5: “Light and colors, heat and cold, extension and figures, in a word the things we see and feel *what are they but so many sensations*, notions, ideas or impressions on the sense...” §7: “let it be considered, the sensible qualities are color, figure, motion, smell, taste and such like, that is *the ideas perceived by sense*.” (my emphasis)

reaction to Malebranche's skepticism about sensory access to the world. In the *Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion*, Malebranche explicitly provides an argument for the claim that color, figure and motion are ideas. He goes on to conclude, on the basis of this argument, that our senses can inform us about the external world only if God benevolently aligns the constituents of our minds with those of the world. Now Berkeley takes on board Malebranche's argument for the mind-dependence of the sensible qualities (this is why he does not provide an argument of his own in the *Principles*). He disagrees, however, with Malebranche's conclusion that this would, in God's absence, leave us in a skeptical position. Berkeley is keen to demonstrate that once we have denied that the sensible qualities we are presented with in perception inhere in material objects, as Malebranche does, we are left with no *conception* of a mind-independent world, knowledge of which would forever be beyond our grasp without divine intervention. Rather, we now clearly see, contrary to our prior confused notions, that the only world we ever had any grip on is in fact a world of ideas.¹¹ This is why Berkeley's own view, that the world is solely constituted by minds and ideas, is presented as a fundamentally anti-skeptical option. For on his idealism, there are no longer any barriers to knowing anything that we could coherently desire to know.

The seriousness of Berkeley's challenge to realism depends on the effectiveness of Malebranche's argument for the mind-dependence of the sensible qualities. Consider, then, the following passage in which Malebranche presents his central idea:

Now, on the supposition that the world is destroyed and that God nonetheless produces the same traces in our brain, or rather that He presents to our mind the same ideas that are produced in the presence of objects, we would see the same beauties. Hence, the beauties we see are not material beauties, but intelligible beauties rendered sensible as a consequence of the laws of the union of the soul and body, since the assumed annihilation of matter does not carry with it the annihilation of those beauties we see in looking at the objects around us.¹²

While most contemporary philosophers largely ignore Berkeley's threat to realism, the basic outline of Malebranche's argument is widely employed to argue for certain "indirect" views of perception. In the remainder of this section, I will present what I take to be the strongest version of Malebranche's argument; but in order to do so, I must first discuss the essential premises on which it relies.¹³

¹¹ This assumes some form of empiricism about the concept of a mind-independent reality, but a form that I take to be compelling to many defenders of metaphysical realism. It would be unfortunate if it turned out that metaphysical realism required giving up empiricism of this form. See Campbell and Cassam, 2014. Many contemporary sense-datum theorists do end up endorsing idealism, in line with Berkeley's recommendations (see Foster, 1982; Robinson, 1985, 1994), but for an example of someone unworried by the metaphysical implications of the sense-datum view, see Jackson, 1977.

¹² Malebranche, 1997, 11.

¹³ In the paper, I focus primarily on the case of perception, but it is helpful to keep Berkeley's dilemma in mind. Berkeley's argument, once properly understood, is an effective challenge to the thought that one can maintain an indirect theory of perception alongside a commonsense realism. In his 1985 chapter defending Berkeleyan idealism, Howard Robinson writes: "the seemingly overwhelming intuitive priority of realism entirely draws its force from our feeling that the immediate objects of our awareness are mind-independent physical objects. This is the sole origin of the psychological power of realism. Once one is persuaded that these immediate objects are not mind-independent, then the intuitive priority we give to realism has entirely lost its rationale. It is bad faith to pretend that representative realism answers to the intuitions which make realism psychologically compelling, because to get to the representative level we have already discounted as false the substance of that intuition, which was that the immediate objects of awareness are mind-independent." (169)

The first premise can be stated as follows:

Item Awareness (IA): What it is like for a perceiver to have a veridical experience V is at least partially constituted by what *items* the perceiver is in fact aware of.¹⁴

This thesis has strong pre-theoretical support. When asked to describe what it is like to see my cat jump in through my kitchen window, for instance, I immediately mention the *things that I see*: my cat's purple collar, the way his front paws land softly before the back ones touch the floor, his large yellow eyes, the dirty paw marks left behind on the window sill, and so on. Describing my experience seems to require describing the things I am perceptually aware of. Philosophers of many stripes have emphasized that perception seems to comprise a relation of awareness between a perceiver and some kind of item:

When I see a tomato...I cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly present to my consciousness.¹⁵

To [a non-philosophical observer] we address the request, 'Give us a description of your current visual experience', or 'How is it with you, visually, at the moment?' Uncautioned as to exactly what we want, he might reply in some such terms as these: 'I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer on the vivid grass...' and so on.¹⁶

In these passages, Price and Strawson both agree that from the perspective of perceivers, ordinary visual experience always *seems* to make us aware of something. For Price, it is a red, round and bulgy object; for Strawson, the light of the setting sun and the dappled patterns of the deer. What we are aware of seems to constitute what our experience is like – changing what is seen just amounts to changing the experience.¹⁷

Now, *IA* is the thesis that emerges if we take the perceiver's impression of the structure of visual experience at face value. If it seems to us that experience consists in a relation of awareness between us and some item, then, a proponent of *IA* concludes, *that* is how experience must in fact be.¹⁸ Furthermore, if *IA* takes our introspective verdicts about experience seriously, we have good reason to hold on to it unless further philosophizing shows that we *must* give it up.

¹⁴ Variations of this thesis include Robinson's Phenomenal Principle (1994), Crane's Object-Dependence (2005) and Pautz's homonymous Item-Awareness (2007).

¹⁵ Price, 1932, 18-19.

¹⁶ Strawson, 1979, 43

¹⁷ According to *Item Awareness*, the items of which the subject is aware are *constituents* of the experience. If these items are absent, the same veridical experience cannot occur. *Item Awareness*, therefore, is incompatible with all views on which experience only contingently consists in the awareness of any items.

¹⁸ Price is explicitly committed to *IA*. It is less clear whether Strawson ultimately accepts the thesis or not, but note this interesting passage in *The Bounds of Sense* in which Strawson discusses Kantian intuition: "The straight lines which are the objects of pure intuition... are not physical objects, or physical edges, which, when we see them, look straight. They are rather just the looks themselves which physical things have when, and insofar as, they look straight." (282) Here, Strawson seems to sympathize with *IA* given his suggestion that there is in fact a look that the object has that is presented to us in experience. I will return to the idea of *looks* as the real sensible features that are presented to us in experience at the end of the paper.

Note that *LA* is neutral with respect to what the items of awareness are. Price is committed to *LA* as a sense-datum theorist – it turns out that on his view, the item of awareness is a non-material sense-datum that has the properties of being red, round and bulgy. Strawson, on the other hand, clearly conceives of the items of perceptual awareness as constituents of the mind-independent world. If both can be described as finding *LA* pre-theoretically compelling, the thesis must be neutral on the ontological status of the items presented. Further, one can be committed to *LA* even if one treats the true items of awareness as properties, rather than substances.¹⁹ Lastly, *LA* does not require that the item presented be as it seems to the perceiver. It may seem to a subject as if she is aware of a hummingbird when in fact she is presented with a wooden replica. Similarly, it may seem as if a hummingbird is presented when all that is in fact presented is an array of colors produced by specially arranged lights. A proponent of *LA* insists that it cannot perceptually seem to me as if something is presented when in fact *nothing*—neither an object, not any sensible features—is presented. And this is where its truly intuitive appeal lies – how can experience have the presentational phenomenology that it does if not in virtue of the fact that something is genuinely presented?²⁰

What it means for perception to have presentational phenomenology is for it to seem as if the qualitative features of perception just are the qualitative features of the items presented.²¹ For example, the rich phenomenology of the experience I have when I look at my cat’s eyes is best described as an awareness of yellow, where it is the color yellow—and only derivatively the experience—that is qualitatively rich. Once we see this clearly, we recognize that *LA* requires that the items of awareness must themselves be qualitative. The most straightforward way to accommodate this—and this is how I will proceed in the paper—is to treat the items as qualitative properties themselves. The most natural candidates for qualitative properties are of course the sensible properties—the colors, shapes and sizes of things. But on some contemporary views on which color and shape turn out to be microphysical or structural properties, it is less natural to think of these as truly qualitative features that are directly presented to us in perception. In order to remain neutral on these issues, I will refer to the particular features that fix the character of our experience as *sensible appearances*. I use the term “appearance” merely to highlight that the features, *whichever* they may be, are features that are themselves qualitatively imbued.²²

¹⁹ As will become apparent, I will treat the items of awareness as sensible properties.

²⁰ Recently, many philosophers of perception have argued that we *can* make sense of how experience seems relational without committing to it actually being that way. Most commonly, philosophers of perception have argued that representational features of experience can make it seem to the perceiver *as if* she stands in a relation of awareness to the mind-independent world, even though the kind of experience she has does not require that any such relation obtain. I will return to this view in section IV. Some adverbialist accounts deny that experiences even *seem* relational. But this is what makes such views phenomenologically implausible – we do not seem to experience *redly*; redness shows up as the object of the experience, not as a modification of the experience itself. In this paper, I will not consider accounts that deny the phenomenological plausibility of *LA*.

²¹ Some representationalists like Pautz (see, for example, his 2010 paper) describe their view as relational. But, in the way that I use the term, perception is relational only if the relation is a relation of *awareness*. Pautz talks of the perceptual relation as a primitive relation of sensorily entertaining a proposition. But this kind of view is incompatible with *LA* – for *LA* to be vindicated, the qualitative character of an experience must derive, at least in part, from the items perceived. On Pautz’s view, the qualitative character of an experience derives entirely from the special kind of relation (of sensorily entertaining), rather than what one bears the relation to (abstract propositions are clearly not entities that have qualitative character).

²² In the last section of the paper, I will briefly suggest a less neutral reading of the term “appearances,” on which the term refers to a class of appearance properties that are distinct from the colors, shapes and sizes of objects.

Now, consider the following thesis:

Mind-Independence (MI): The items that a perceiver is aware of in veridical perception are mind-independent objects and their sensible appearances.

In the recent literature on perception, this assumption has received near-universal support. Almost everyone agrees that there is no introspective evidence of any mind-dependent items in ordinary perception – all that ever shows up to us are features of the ordinary mind-independent world. Even those theorists of perception who believe that the character of experience is fixed by mind-dependent properties will agree that the only items we are normally *aware of* are mind-independent objects and their properties.²³

IA in conjunction with *MI* results in a view that is no longer non-committal about the ontological status of the items of awareness. The conjunction of these two theses comprises what has come to be known as *naïve realism*: the thesis that ordinary perception consists in a perceiver standing in a relation of awareness to mind-independent objects and their sensible appearances. As John Campbell describes naïve realism (what he calls the “Relational View”):

On a Relational View, the phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself...On this Relational View, two ordinary observers standing in roughly the same place, looking at the same scene, are bound to have experiences with the same phenomenal character. For the phenomenal character of the experience is constituted by the layout and characteristics of the very same external objects.²⁴

Naïve realism—as evidenced by its name—is a view that is meant to capture our pre-theoretical picture of the nature of perception. What our perceptions are like is determined by what is seen, and what is seen is always the ordinary mind-independent world around us.

There is one last thesis we must introduce before we can state the argument from hallucination:

Sameness of Phenomenal Kind (SPK): a veridical perception V and a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination V^* are of the same fundamental phenomenal kind.²⁵

When we dream or we hallucinate, we have experiences that we cannot tell apart from our ordinary perceptions; this is why we are often severely misled in such circumstances. The most natural explanation for why the two experiences are indistinguishable is that they have the same experiential character. If there were a difference in the character of the two experiences, we should, at least in ideal circumstances, be able to tell. This line of reasoning is backed up by the fact that phenomenal character is commonly defined as what it is like *for*

²³ One can hold that phenomenal character is fixed by mind-*dependent* properties and also be committed to *MI* if one rejects *IA* – qualia theorists and many narrow representationalists, for example, treat the items of perceptual *awareness* as mind-independent objects and their properties even though they deny that these items fix the character of perceptual experience. See Searle, 1983; Block, 1997. Unwilling to give up *IA*, sense-datum theorists, in contrast, reject *MI* but they still insist that mind-independent objects are *indirect* items of awareness. Furthermore, they have much to say about why we *must* reject *MI* despite its strong pre-theoretical support. See for example, Jackson, 1977.

²⁴ Campbell, 2002, 116.

²⁵ It would not be sufficient to satisfy *SPK* if we merely conceded that in both hallucination and veridical perception, it seems to the subject as if she is perceiving a red rose. No one would deny that this description holds of both cases. *SPK* is a slightly more demanding thesis: it requires the *fundamental* kind that *explains* why it seems this way to the subject be the same across the two cases.

the subject. If what it is like for the subject differs across these cases, how could it be in-principle impossible for the subject herself to be aware of the difference? *SPK* concludes that a veridical perception and a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination must be of the same fundamental, *phenomenal* kind for this is the kind that tracks first-personally accessible, phenomenological features of the state. *SPK* does *not* require sameness of *all* kinds, it merely requires sameness of the kind in virtue of which the experiences have the first-personal features that they do.²⁶

Most philosophers grant that all three theses—*Item Awareness*, *Mind-Independence*, and *Sameness of Phenomenal Kind*—are deeply intuitive, and yet they conclude that we must relinquish at least one. This is because the argument stated below seems to demonstrate that the three theses are jointly inconsistent.²⁷

Consider a subject *S* who enjoys a veridical perception of a red tomato (call it *V*):

1. What it is like for *S* to have *V* is at least partially constituted by *S* being aware of a red (round, bulgy) appearance. (*LA*)²⁸
2. When *S* enjoys *V*, *S* is in neural state *N*.
3. A subjectively indistinguishable hallucination *V** can be induced in *S* by stimulating *S*'s brain to be in *N*.²⁹ (2)
4. *V** is of the same fundamental phenomenal kind as *V*. (*SPK*, 3)
5. What it is like to have *V** at least partially consists in *S* being aware of a red (round, bulgy) appearance. (1,4)
6. *V** is constitutively sufficient for the red appearance that *S* is aware of in *V**.³⁰
7. The red appearance that *S* is aware of in *V** is constitutively dependent on *V**.
8. If some feature *X* is constitutively dependent on an experience, then *X* is mind-dependent.
9. The red appearance that *S* is aware of in *V** is mind-dependent. (7,8)
10. The red appearance that *S* is aware of in *V* must also be mind-dependent. (*SPK*, 9)
11. The items that a perceiver is aware of in veridical perception are mind-dependent. (10)

If the argument is good, the conjunction of *LA* and *SPK* forces the denial of *MI*. To get clearer on the reasoning that the argument employs, consider an ordinary perception of a red, ripe tomato. If the experiential nature of a veridical perception is constituted by the sensible

²⁶ This is compatible with there being, say, an equally “fundamental” epistemic kind that only the veridical experience falls under. Here, I assume that there is no single fundamental kind that an experience falls under, but rather that fundamentality is context-dependent. (See Lewis, 1968/1983, for a defense of such contextualism) Even if one disagrees with Lewis on fundamentality, one can accept a modified version of *SPK* as long as one accepts a hierarchy of kinds, only some of which are relevant for the phenomenal features of the experience.

²⁷ For related discussions of hallucination, see Snowdon 1992; Robinson 1994; Martin, 2004; Crane, 2005.

²⁸ Remember that my use of the phrase “red appearance” is neutral on whether having a red appearance is identical to or distinct from being red.

²⁹ This claim has received universal support. As can be evidenced in the passage by Malebranche, many early moderns assumed the truth of such a claim, but it has also received strong justification from the scientific principle of the locality of causal influence. The claim is rather weak – it does not state that replication of the proximate cause brings about a phenomenally identical experience, but only that it brings about a state that is indistinguishable with respect to its effects on the subject. The implication that the induced state has the same phenomenology as the veridical perception only comes with the introduction of *SPK*.

³⁰ I will discuss the move from (5) to (6) (and the move from (6) to (7)) in much more detail below.

features of the object of awareness (*LA*), and if a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination and its veridical perception are of the same fundamental phenomenal kind (*SPK*), then the hallucination must also make the subject aware of the very same sensible features. But we know that there is no ordinary red tomato there for the subject to be aware of in the case of a hallucination. So the easy explanation we had in the veridical case for why there was a red appearance for the perceiver to be aware of (namely, that the mind-independent object was a constituent of the experience) is unavailable in the hallucination. And this is where the trouble arises.

Let's proceed more slowly. We suggested that stimulating the subject's brain is causally sufficient to bring about a hallucinatory experience. Given *LA* and *SPK*, this implies that proximate neural stimulation is sufficient to bring about a relation that has as one of its relata, a sensible appearance. One might conclude that the only way to explain this is if the experience is itself constitutively sufficient for the appearance to be instantiated. Bringing about the experience would then just amount to bringing about the instantiated appearance. However, this move requires a bit more elaboration. An opponent might insist that merely stimulating the brain may not be constitutively sufficient by itself to bring about the experiential relation. Instead, she might suggest, the neural stimulation causally enables the subject to perceive a sensible appearance whose instantiation is entirely independent of the stimulation. Now, of course, she must concede that this appearance is not instantiated by an ordinary material object, but this does not—without further assumptions—entail that it must be mind-dependent. In some sense, this was the view of the early sense-datum theorists who were committed to the claim that all experiences have mind-independent, non-material objects.³¹

Unfortunately, this proposal seems entirely unjustifiable in the case of hallucination – we have strong reason to believe that stimulating the subject's brain is *all* that is required to bring about the hallucination. In other words, we have no reason to presume that the universe must play a distinct, non-causal role in ensuring the presence of an appropriate item of awareness every time the appropriate neural stimulation occurs. In Malebranche's words, "God could annihilate *all* the beings He created"³² except for the brains of human beings and still reproduce all the same experiences we currently enjoy. Moreover, expanding our ontology to include a radically new kind of item—one that is mind-independent yet non-material—just does not seem warranted given that we are able to fully explain the hallucination by means of a less profligate ontology, as an awareness of a *mind-dependent* item. For these reasons, we can conclude that neural stimulation is all that is required—causally and constitutively—to bring about the experiential relation. If this is the case, then the sensible appearance that comes about is fully constituted by the act of awareness itself, making it a mind-dependent appearance.³³

³¹ See, for example, Moore, 1905; Broad, 1925. Early sense-datum theorists like Moore were keen to insist that the items of perceptual awareness were mind-independent because we could only count as *knowing* about sense-data if they were independent of the mind. This is an interesting line of thought (echoed also in Wittgenstein's work in the *Philosophical Investigations*), but for the purposes of this paper, I will just assume, along with most contemporary philosophers, that the realm of the knowable can extend to that which is mind-dependent.

³² Malebranche, Dialogue I, p. 10,

³³ Given that the item of awareness is the sensible appearance itself, there is no metaphysically weighty, mind-dependent *object* perceived in the hallucination. One can talk of the "object of awareness" of a hallucination as long as one uses this term merely in the ontologically deflationary, logical sense of "object". Importantly, such deflationary talk does not commit us to the existence of any concrete particular in which the appearance inheres. The claim that there is an instantiation of a sensible appearance, even though there is no concrete entity in which the appearance inheres, can be most easily understood in light of a trope theory of properties. On such a view, property instances are themselves particulars that can be located in space and time, and are not to be identified with

Once we have granted that the item of awareness (the sensible appearance) in the hallucination is mind-dependent, the argument from hallucination proceeds to the conclusion that the item of awareness in the veridical perception must be mind-dependent as well. The reasoning that is most often employed here is as follows: *LA* requires that ordinary experience fundamentally consist in a relation between a perceiver and an item. But *SPK* states that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are of the same fundamental phenomenal kind. Given that a hallucination consists in a relation between the perceiver and a *mind-dependent* sensible appearance, the only way for the two experiences to be of the same phenomenal kind is if we reject *MI* and conclude that the item of awareness in the veridical case is also mind-dependent.³⁴

In the next section, I will argue that this reasoning is straightforwardly invalid. I will suggest that a commitment to *SPK*—the claim that the hallucination and veridical perception are of the same *phenomenal* kind—does *not* require that the sensible appearances that the perceiver is aware of in the two cases must be of the same *ontological* kind. Having rejected this line of reasoning, however, I will offer a better (though still ultimately inadequate) defense of the move from (8) to (9) on behalf of the proponent of the argument.

III. THE DUAL NATURE OF SENSIBLE APPEARANCES

The argument presented above moves from the observation that the items of awareness in a hallucination are mind-dependent to the conclusion that the items of awareness in a veridical perception must be mind-dependent as well. This is the move that we must resist. All that *SPK* insists upon is that the two experiences are of the same fundamental *phenomenal* kind. We need not conclude that the two experiences are identical in all respects – after all, the veridical perception is the kind of experience that is caused by ordinary mind-independent objects in the world, hallucinations are caused by direct neural stimulation; a hallucination is the kind of experience that tends to produce false beliefs, a veridical perception is not; the list goes on. All that we need to ensure that a veridical perception and a hallucination have the same phenomenal nature is that they both make the subject aware of the same *qualitative* features. Sensible appearances, as we have defined them, are qualitative features. Therefore, all that is required to ensure that the two experiences are of the same phenomenal kind is that they make the subject aware of the same sensible appearances. As long as one and the same appearance property can have ontologically distinct instances, whether the instantiation of a sensible appearance is mind-dependent or mind-independent can make no difference to the nature of the property that is instantiated.³⁵

substances in which the property inheres. A commitment to tropes allows us to make sense of there being mind-dependent red appearances in the absence of any mental objects (sense-data) that are the bearers of these appearances. Unlike the usual canon of particulars—Socrates, the magnolia tree outside my house, Fido the dog—tropes can share their spatio-temporal location with other particulars of the same ontological category – therefore, a red appearance can be co-located with a round appearance, and so on. Note that being committed to the existence of tropes in this sense need not result in a commitment to a reductive theory of tropes – I am not arguing that all talk of concrete particulars (or universals, for that matter) should be replaced with talk of tropes.

³⁴ Crane, in his 2005, seems to rely on something like this reasoning: “*E* and *E** have different essential natures: for the nature of *E* is partly determined by the nature of [a mind-independent] *O*, and the nature of *E** cannot be. But this is inconsistent with assumption (4) [Identity of Subjective Indistinguishables], which implies that *E* and *E** are experiences of the very same specific psychological kind, since they are subjectively indistinguishable.” (240)

³⁵ Notice how (in fn.34) Crane moves, without any further justification, from the claim that *E* and *E** cannot have the same *essential* natures to the claim that they cannot have the same *psychological* nature. This is precisely the move that I have called into question.

Therefore, the ontological diversity of the items of perceptual awareness is compatible with *SPK*. But at this stage, someone might object that it is not in fact *possible* for sensible appearances to have such ontological plurality. Berkeley himself is famous for having denied that an idea could resemble anything other than an idea. If I am suggesting here that “ideas,” or mind-dependent items, can indeed resemble mind-independent objects insofar as they can both have the same sensible features, aren’t I ignoring Berkeley’s repeated warning? Consider, for example, the following passage of the *Principles*:

But say you, tho’ the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer an idea can be like nothing but an idea, a colour or figure, can be like nothing but another colour or figure...I appeal to any one whether it be sense, to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something with is intangible, and so of the rest.³⁶

Notice how in this passage, and in all others like it, Berkeley does not actually argue that a mind-independent object and a mind-dependent idea cannot both be colored, or shaped, or more generally, share one and the same sensible features. Rather, he has already *assumed* the truth of Malebranche’s claim that such sensible properties can *only* be properties of mind-dependent ideas. Having made this assumption, he rightly points out that no mind-independent object that is itself uncolored, or lacking in shape or texture, could ever resemble an item that has such rich sensible features. Given the assumption, a denial of the possibility of resemblance now seems quite plausible – if one item is essentially sensible and the other is essentially non-sensible, how could the two ever be said to be copies of each other?

The proposal that I have offered here, however, is strikingly different – my suggestion is that mind-dependent “ideas” and mind-independent objects can, in Berkeley’s terms, resemble each other, precisely *because* they can instantiate the very same sensible features. Unless we can find independent reason to rule out the possibility that sensible features can have both mind-dependent and mind-independent instantiations, Berkeley’s arguments have no force. His skepticism about resemblance just assumes the falsity of the only proposal that would make genuine resemblance possible.³⁷

Perhaps we can offer reasons on Berkeley’s behalf. One might develop an objection that is directed at properties in general: if a property is instantiated by a material body, say, on one occasion, it must be instantiated by material bodies on all occasions.³⁸ But a claim at this level of generality is clearly indefensible. Material bodies and abstract objects share all sorts of properties – the carton of milk in your refrigerator is rectangular in shape but so are the

³⁶ Berkeley, §8

³⁷ Of course, we might think that something that is uncolored *can* resemble something colored in *some ways*. But here, I’m just granting Berkeley the point in order to show that it still doesn’t rule out the view I am interested in developing.

³⁸ Some early modern theorists who followed in the footsteps of Descartes distinguished substances by their attributes (or essential properties, in modern parlance). On this picture, distinct kinds of substances could not have overlapping attributes. Furthermore, all other properties that a substance possessed were just *modes* or ways of having the attribute that was particular to the kind of substance in question. If the attribute of material substance was extension, all other properties that a material object had could only be ways in which that material body was extended. These properties, therefore, could not have been shared by a substance that did not have the attribute of extension. On such a view, it may in fact follow that different kinds of substances cannot share their properties, but given that we no longer think of properties as modes, we have no reason to accept such an ontologically restrictive view.

figures you reason about in geometry. The peaches in the fruit bowl and the positive integers smaller than 5 on the number line can both be four in number, and so on.

But what about minds? Perhaps the concern is unique to minds – one and the same kind of property cannot have both mental and material instances. But once again, there cannot be a universal principle in play here. There are many properties that are common to minds and bodies –existing in the twentieth century, being ten years old, being the bearer of many other properties, etc. are all properties, instantiations of which can be both mental and physical.³⁹

It is true that *some* properties are ontologically restricted due to the nature of the properties themselves. One might think that pain—given that it is essentially a feeling—must, in all instances, be mind-dependent. In the opposing direction, supposing that quarks and bosons are the fundamental constituents of material reality, one can rightfully conclude that being composed of quarks or bosons is a property that only mind-independent objects can have. And so the strongest form of the objection would be to make a restricted claim about the nature of sensible appearances in particular. Perhaps one could argue that there is something about the nature of these properties that makes them ineligible for ontological plurality. But such a metaphysical assertion would require a careful defense. At first glance, sensible features just don't seem to come with the ontological restrictions that essentially subjective or essentially material properties have – we ascribe shape and size to material objects, regions of space and abstract entities. We find it incredibly natural to ascribe color to entities as diverse as tomatoes, rainbows, phosphenes holograms and after-images. Indeed, the very fact that there has been such a protracted history of disagreement over the nature of the sensible features—whether they are mind-dependent, microphysical, structural or primitive—suggests that there is no *prima facie* reason to deny that sensible features can have ontologically diverse instances. A proponent of the argument from hallucination, then, would need to present persuasive metaphysical argument to prove otherwise.⁴⁰ Furthermore, notice how our neutrality on which features are the real sensible features makes it even harder for our opponent to succeed at her task – not only would she have to prove that, say, colors can only be instantiated by mind-independent objects, she would have to argue that *any* sensible feature whatsoever could only have ontologically singular instances. It is unclear what such an argument would look like.⁴¹

If we can treat both veridical and delusive experiences as made up of an awareness of the same sensible appearances—even though the instances are mind-independent on one occasion and mind-dependent on the other—this provides us an initial escape route from the argument from hallucination. The fact that the items of awareness in a hallucination are mind-dependent does not taint the mind-independent status of the items we ordinarily perceive.⁴² We have not yet seen any reason to accept the move from (9) to (10) as valid.

³⁹ Barry Stroud mentions the first example in *The Quest for Reality*. (2000, p.107).

⁴⁰ Most philosophers of mind have just assumed that qualitative features can only reside *either* in the mind *or* in the world. Much of the disagreement between the internalists about character (the qualia theorists, sense-datum theorists and narrow representationalists) and the externalists about character (the wide representationalists and naïve realists) presupposes, without argument, that there could not be something right about both views.

⁴¹ I will return to this subject in the last section and suggest that we think of the qualitative features that show up in experience, not as colors, shapes and sizes, but rather as color, shape and size *appearances*, where these properties are a distinct class of properties. In developing such a proposal, I will no longer use the notion of “appearances” in the neutral manner in which I have been using it so far.

⁴² Johnston, in his 2004 paper, develops a proposal that is strikingly similar to the view I have developed so far. On his view, a hallucination consists in a relation of awareness between the perceiver and an uninstantiated sensible profile. In a veridical perception, the subject is aware of the same kind of sensible profile, only in this case, instantiated by an object. One can see the similarities between the accounts if we think of the sensible appearances I have suggested the subject is aware of

There is, however, a better line of reasoning available to the proponent of the argument than the one we have considered so far. It has already been suggested that the only plausible explanation of how neural stimulation can be sufficient to bring about a hallucination is if the act of awareness brought about is itself constitutively sufficient for the item of awareness (a sensible appearance). But importantly, the very same neural state that is present in the hallucination is *also* present in the veridical perception. And so it must have the very same effect in the veridical case as well. In other words, if, in the hallucination, the neural state gives rise to an experience that is constitutively sufficient for its object, then, in the veridical case too, that same neural state must give rise to an experience that is constitutively sufficient for *its* object.

This is the real threat that the possibility of hallucination poses. Because the hallucination and the veridical experience both have the same neural stimulation as a common proximate cause, the effects of that cause must be the same in both cases.⁴³ And so we seem forced to concede that veridical experience is constitutively sufficient for its object. And now, the strengthened objection goes, we seem to have lost our ability to insist that the item of awareness in veridical perception is a *mind-independent* sensible appearance.

But notice a disanalogy between the hallucination and the veridical perception. In the former case, there was no plausible mind-independent item that could serve as a potential object of perceptual awareness. But in a veridical perception, there is an obvious candidate: When we perceive a tomato, there is (at least on the commonsense picture) a mind-independent tomato that has all the sensible features that we are aware of in the hallucination. Is there any way we can make use of this disanalogy to insist that a mind-independent item can play *some* role in determining the character of the veridical perception that it could not play in the hallucination? Having granted that the veridical perception must be constitutively sufficient for an item of awareness, can we nonetheless make a mind-independent item also do work?

We could insist that the perceiver is aware of *two* distinct items or that she enjoys *two* experiences. Given that she is in the same neural state as in the hallucination, she must enjoy one experience whose object is fully constituted by the experience itself. Going back to our example with the tomato, this would be an experience of a red appearance that is constituted by the experience. But, one could argue that she is aware of a distinct appearance as well, and in this case, the experience does *not* constitute its object. To the contrary, this latter awareness is of a red appearance that is entirely mind-independent: the red appearance of the tomato. On such a proposal, every time a perceiver has a veridical perception, there are two sensible appearances that she is aware of: one that is constituted by the subject's awareness and one that is constituted by the mind-independent object.

Unfortunately, there are several infelicitous consequences that come with adopting this strategy. First, if we insist that there are two sensible instances in the veridical perception, we have a doubling of the items of awareness that does not stand up to phenomenological

as constituting a sensible profile. For both views, the awareness of such a profile is meant to explain why it seems to the subject as if she is aware of a mind-independent object. For Johnston, the profile that the subject is aware of is the very same across veridical perceptions and hallucinations; the only difference consists in whether the profile is instantiated or not. My disagreement with Johnston rests on his treating the item of awareness in the case of hallucination as uninstantiated altogether. On the account I defend, the sensible appearances that the perceiver is aware of in hallucination are in fact instantiated, even if they do not inhere in an object. (See footnote 33, for how one can maintain such a claim). This allows us to treat the item of awareness in the hallucination as located in space and time. Spelling out the epistemic and phenomenological advantages of my approach, as compared to Johnston's lies outside the scope of this paper.

⁴³ Note that this does not imply that there cannot be any features that are unique to the veridical perception. It merely implies that whatever features are present in the hallucination must also be present in the veridical perception.

scrutiny. I do not seem to be aware of two instances of every sensible appearance that shows up in perception – there is no *second* red, round or bulgy appearance when I see a single red tomato. If we try to insist that there are in fact two such appearances even though we only have introspective access to one, we immediately face the question of which instance we are aware of—the one constituted by the experience or the one constituted by the object—and why that instance screens off the other from introspective accessibility.

Even if we put aside the phenomenological oddity of the view, there is a second, more serious concern with the proposal. All the rational and behavioral effects of a *hallucination* – the beliefs it gives rise to, the introspective verdicts that the subject makes, the actions that it results in – must derive from an awareness of the appearance that is constituted by the experience. But given that the hallucination and the veridical perception are subjectively indistinguishable, the very same effects are also typically associated with the veridical experience. If a veridical perception always consists in an awareness of an appearance that is fully constituted by the experience, then in both kinds of experience, we have all the same effects *and* a common explanation—namely, the awareness of an appearance that is constituted by the experience. This means that a mind-independent sensible instance that is unique to the veridical case, even if present, is always screened off by the appearance that is constituted by our experience; it is rendered entirely explanatorily redundant.⁴⁴

To resist the threat, we need the metaphysical resources to deny that there are *two* sensible property instances that the subject is aware of in the case of a veridical experience, while still giving the mind-independent object work to do in constituting the item of awareness. This is where the notion of constitutive over-determination becomes essential. In the following section, I will argue that there is only one, *over-determined*, sensible appearance that the subject is aware of in the case of a veridical experience. Both the mind-independent object and the subject's awareness constitute the particular sensible appearance that the subject is aware of even though both the act of awareness and the mind-independent object are individually sufficient for an appearance of the very same kind to be instantiated.

IV. CONSTITUTIVE OVER-DETERMINATION AND VERIDICAL PERCEPTION

Remember that constitutive over-determination is a relation that holds between three event (or property) kinds X , Y , Z : a particular instance of kind Z (call it z) is constitutively over-determined *iff* instances of X and instances of Y are severally sufficient for Z to be instantiated but both an instance of X (x) and an instance of Y (y) constitute the specific instance z . Now consider the following triad:

A red appearance being instantiated: Z

Having an experience of a red appearance: X

The tomato having a red appearance: Y

We know from our preceding observations that appropriate stimulation of the brain can, all by itself, bring about an experience that has a red appearance as the item of awareness. This means that such an experience is constitutively sufficient for the instantiation of a red appearance. Therefore, X is constitutively sufficient for Z .

Yet, naïve reflection on how objects themselves can have sensible features independently of being perceived reveals to us that Y , in isolation, is also constitutively sufficient for Z . The tomato has all the same sensible features we perceive it as having even when it is

⁴⁴ See Martin 2004 for a discussion of how positive disjunctivism—a view that rejects *SPK* but grants hallucinations psychologically relevant character—is subject to these sorts of worries. Positive disjunctivists have argued that hallucinatory and veridical experience can in fact share a psychologically relevant kind that does not screen off the unique veridical kind. In my opinion, these efforts are ultimately unsuccessful, but defending this charge lies outside the scope of this paper. For recent versions of positive disjunctivism, see Logue, 2012 and Hellie, 2013.

unperceived. Therefore, the tomato having a red appearance is constitutively sufficient for a red appearance to be instantiated in virtue of the fact that the red appearance inheres in the tomato.

So far, then, we have granted that a mind-independent object and an act of awareness can each be individually sufficient for redness to be instantiated. But what happens when the mind-independent object and the act of awareness are simultaneously present? In the previous section, we entertained the possibility that a veridical perception consisted in an awareness of two appearances: one that was constituted by the experience, and one that was constituted by the mind-independent object. We rejected this proposal on phenomenological and theoretical grounds – the proposal neither stood up to phenomenological scrutiny, nor did the explanatory work that we wanted it to do.

We are finally at the stage at which the notion of constitutive over-determination becomes invaluable. I want to suggest that we think of the red appearance that is instantiated in a veridical perception of a tomato as constitutively over-determined: there is a *single* appearance that is constituted both by the mind-independent tomato *and* by the subject's act of awareness. If the tomato were absent but the perceiver were still having an experience of a tomato, the particular appearance that she veridically perceived would not be instantiated. She would, on such an occasion, be enjoying a hallucination and would thereby be aware of a red appearance that was solely constituted by her awareness. Since such a hallucinatory appearance would be solely constituted by the experience, it would be constitutively *dependent* on the experience—or in other words, mind-dependent. Similarly, if the tomato still had a red appearance but the perceiver were not having an experience at all (perhaps she closed her eyes for a moment), then too, the red appearance that she veridically perceives could not be instantiated. In such a scenario, the tomato would have a red appearance that was solely constituted by the ordinary mind-independent tomato. In both non-actual scenarios, there would still be qualitatively identical appearances present, but neither would be numerically identical to the particular appearance that the subject is in fact aware of in the veridical perception.⁴⁵ The suggestion, then, is that the two conditions, which are individually sufficient for instantiations of the sensible appearance, *both* constitute the particular appearance that is instantiated in a veridical perception. It is a case of over-determination because either constituting factor would have been sufficient, in isolation, for an instance of the same kind of sensible appearance.

Once again, we can present the case in terms of metaphysical grounding – in instances of constitutive over-determination, grounding facts which, in isolation, could have been full grounds for the grounded fact, serve as plurally full grounds for that fact:

1. In veridical perception, the fact that a red appearance is instantiated is plurally grounded in the fact that the tomato has a red appearance and the fact that the subject is having an experience of a red appearance.
2. The fact that a red appearance is instantiated can be solely grounded in the fact that the tomato has a red appearance.
3. The fact that a red appearance is instantiated can be solely grounded in the fact that the subject is having an experience of a red appearance.

The fact that a red appearance is instantiated is grounded in two facts, each of which can in isolation, serve as full grounds for the grounded fact. (This is what makes it a case, not of joint determination, but of *over*-determination.)

The disanalogy between the veridical perception and the hallucination now becomes clear. In the hallucination, the experience was constitutively sufficient for its item, but

⁴⁵ Again, talking about the numerical identity of property-instances is best made sense of with the help of a trope theory.

crucially, it was the only sufficient condition that obtained. In the veridical case, however, even though the experience is still constitutively sufficient for its item, it is no longer the *only* sufficient condition present. The mind-independent object, which is also constitutively sufficient for the item, is present as well. Given that there are two conditions in place, each of which is sufficient for the instantiation of the appearance, we must deny that the appearance is constitutively *dependent* on either. Crucially, that very sensible appearance is constituted by the object just as much as it is constituted by the experience, and therefore, it is *not* dependent on the experience for its instantiation. Compare this to the hallucination: in that case, the appearance would not have been instantiated if it were not constituted by the experience. This is why it is only the latter appearance, and not the former, that is mind-dependent. In the hallucination, the fact that the experience is constitutively sufficient for its item implies that its item is mind-dependent *only* because there are no other constituting factors present. When there are additional conditions present—as there are in the case of veridical perception—constitutive sufficiency does not imply constitutive dependence.

More can be said about the distinct ways in which the mind-independent object and the act of awareness constitute the very same appearance. What makes it the case that the presence of the tomato is sufficient for the instantiation of a red appearance is that the red appearance *inheres* in the tomato. Given that the red appearance inheres in the tomato, it can legitimately be said that, in veridical perception, we are aware of a property *of the mind-independent object*. In contrast, the fact that the *experience* is constitutively sufficient for the instantiation of the appearance does not hold in virtue of the appearance inhering in the experience. The experience is sufficient for a red appearance to be instantiated at a location in space, but unlike the mind-independent object, the experience does not itself *have* a red appearance.⁴⁶ We must acknowledge that even though there are two conditions that simultaneously obtain, each of which is sufficient for the instantiation of the sensible appearance, the sensible property *only* inheres in the mind-independent object. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no mental object that the perceiver is aware of in a veridical perception. Rather, the only object the perceiver can be said to be aware of is an ordinary mind-independent object – she is aware of the tomato in virtue of being aware of a sensible appearance that inheres in the tomato.

Constitutive over-determination allows us to resist the worries concerning screening-off and doubling mentioned in the previous section. There, we were concerned that the only way the mind-independent object could play a role in veridical perception was if it constituted a *second* item of awareness. We now have the ability to allay this concern. We do not need to accept that there must be two sensible items that the subject is aware of in the case of veridical experience (one that is constituted by the experience and one by the mind-independent object). Remember the original case of over-determination mentioned at the start of the paper. In the example *Cricket*, India only wins *once* even if her victory is constituted by Australia losing its last wicket *and* using up its allotted balls. The explanation of over-determination in that case is straightforward. As I have already suggested, a victory in cricket is an event that has distinct constitution conditions that can simultaneously obtain. When they do simultaneously obtain, we have an event that is constitutively over-determined. Understanding the structure of that case prepares us for the analogous but less familiar claim in the case of property instantiation. In the case of veridical perception, there is only *one* sensible appearance that is constituted both by the experience and by the object in the world. Having already argued that one and the same sensible appearance can have both mind-independent and mind-dependent instantiations, I have shown that the conditions on sensible appearances being instantiated are multiple. The case of veridical perception shows

⁴⁶ See Peacocke, 2008 for a discussion of how mind-dependent properties can be instantiated in an external space.

that these distinct conditions can simultaneously obtain. That is why, just as in the case of *Crickets*, we end up with a case of property instantiation that is over-determined.⁴⁷

How about the screening off worry? We were concerned that any mind-independent sensible appearance that we posited in the veridical case would be explanatorily superfluous if we also had to admit to an instantiation of an appearance that was constituted by the experience – the latter would be poised to do all the phenomenological and epistemic work, leaving the former explanatorily inert. But appeal to constitutive over-determination allows us to resist this implication as well. Given that the sensible instance that the subject is aware of in a veridical perception is over-determined, there is *no* instance in the veridical perception that is only constituted by the experience. In the veridical perception of the tomato, there is only one red appearance that is constituted *both* by the mind-independent tomato and by the perceiver's awareness. Therefore, we cannot eliminate mention of the mind-independent world when explaining how it is that an awareness of a red appearance has the epistemological and behavioral effects that it does in the veridical perception. In accounting for the appearance that the perceiver is aware of, we must make reference to the mind-independent world.

We can call the view I have proposed *particularist naïve realism*. It is naïve realist because it insists that perception necessarily acquaints us with features of the mind-independent world. It is particularist because this acquaintance is secured by the fact that the particular property-instances that we are aware of in veridical perception inhere in mind-independent objects, even though these instances belong to a broader kind that can have ontologically diverse, sometimes mind-dependent, instantiations.

The unique character of particularist naïve realism can be further drawn out by focusing on the contrast between veridical perception and a so-called veridical hallucination. In a veridical hallucination, a perceiver suffers an ordinary hallucination—she does not perceive the world—but it just so happens that her hallucination lines up with the way that the world actually is. In Grice's well-known example, it may be the case that Jane hallucinates John even though John is in fact standing in front of Jane.⁴⁸ The possibility of veridical hallucinations is meant to bring out the inherently causal nature of perceptual experience. Now, on a particularist naïve realist view, an ordinary hallucination consists in the subject being aware of sensible features that are fully constituted by the act of awareness. It is an awareness of these features that makes it seem to Jane as if she is seeing John, when in fact she is merely hallucinating. In the veridical hallucination, given that the world coincidentally lines up with the hallucination, there will be *two* instances of the very same features: there will still be the mind-dependent color, shape and size appearances that are fully constituted by the episode of hallucination, but now there will also be the separate color, shape and size appearances that are actually instantiated by John. Importantly, only *one* of these two sets of instances is perceived – namely, the set of hallucinatory appearances; the other is present but unperceived. If Jane were veridically *perceiving* John, there would only be *one* set of sensible appearances, but that set would be over-determined – it would be constituted both by the experiential episode and by the perceived individual, John. The difference between a veridical hallucination and a veridical perception, then, is clear: in the former case, the mind-independent object does not constitute the item of perceptual awareness, even though it does constitute a qualitatively identical, unperceived item. In the veridical perception, on the other hand, the tomato and the experience constitute one and the same appearance, thereby ensuring that there is only one item there to be perceived.

⁴⁷ One might worry that there is a disanalogy insofar as *Crickets* involves the over-determination of an event, while our case of perception involves an over-determination of property instantiation. But we can assuage this concern by showing how both cases can be described only in terms of facts – this is why the translation that employs grounding terminology is helpful.

⁴⁸ See Grice, 1988.

Let's take a step back and recap. The argument from hallucination threatens to proceed from the observation that the items of awareness in a hallucination are mind-dependent to the conclusion that the items of awareness in a veridical perception must be similarly mind-dependent (this was the move from (8) to (9)). I suggested that the strongest way to defend this move was to insist that the neural state that causes the hallucinatory experience is also present in the veridical case and must thereby give rise to an experience of the very same kind. In particular, if the experience brought about in the hallucinatory case is constitutively sufficient for its object, the experience that comes about in the veridical case must also be sufficient for its object. The strategy that employs constitutive over-determination makes room for us to admit that the veridical experience is indeed sufficient for its item, while still denying that the item is mind-dependent. Given that the experience is not the only sufficient condition as it is in the hallucination, the item is not constitutively dependent on the experience. Furthermore, because the appearance *inheres* in the mind-independent object alone, we can maintain that veridical perception makes us aware of the mind-independent world and its features.

Finding a way to resist the conclusion of the argument allows us to hold on to all three pre-theoretical theses that we started out with. First, particularist naïve realism allows for the phenomenal character of ordinary perception to be determined by the objects of awareness and their sensible features (thereby respecting *LA*). Second, given that hallucinations and veridical perceptions make perceivers aware of the same sensible features, the view allows for veridical perceptions and hallucinations to share a fundamental phenomenal kind (thereby respecting *SPK*). What about *MI*? On particularist naïve realism, one *cannot* maintain that the items of perceptual awareness are solely constituted by the world, and nothing else. Over-determined appearances are constituted by both the world and the experience. However, the best definition of mind-independence is a negative one: a feature is mind-independent just so long as it is *not* mind-dependent. If this is the definition we accept, given that over-determined appearances are not constitutively dependent on an experience, they must be mind-independent features. My view also allows that these appearances *inhere* in ordinary mind-independent objects; they do not inhere in any mental objects whatsoever. And therefore, the only objects we are ever aware of in veridical perception are constituents of the ordinary mind-independent world. This constitutes a robust defense of *MI*.

Particularist naïve realism offers a unified account of perceptual phenomenology while nonetheless respecting the distinctive nature of veridical perception. In order to bring out why the view is the most compelling account of perception available, I want to very briefly mention the other possible strategies one may employ in response to the argument from hallucination. As will become obvious, the advantage of my proposal is that it allows us to robustly maintain the naïve picture of ordinary perception while accepting the equally intuitive thesis of phenomenological similarity across hallucination and veridical perception. In comparison, the traditional strategies require us to give up one or another compelling aspect of the pre-theoretical view, thereby rendering the resulting views unnecessarily revisionary.

Unlike my approach, all standard responses to the argument from hallucination grant its validity. If one also considers the argument sound, this leads to a sense-datum theory of perception and a rejection of *MI*. This approach, however, returns us to Berkeley and provides him the ammunition that he needs to mount his attack on metaphysical realism. If we are only ever acquainted with mind-dependent sense-data, the external world starts to fade from view. A straightforward denial of *MI*, therefore, is not only phenomenologically unconvincing but leads to disastrous metaphysical and epistemic consequences.

Of course, we can hold on to *MI* if we deny the soundness of the argument and reject one of the other premises. Remember that the argument for the rejection of *MI* relies on the joint acceptance of *LA* and *SPK*. A recent strategy, adopted by disjunctivists who want to

hold on to naïve realism in the face of the argument from hallucination, is to reject *SPK*. If we reject *SPK*, we are not required to treat a hallucination as having the same relational structure that our veridical experiences have. Therefore, the fact that a hallucination can be neurally induced need not have any straightforward implications for the status of the items of awareness in veridical experiences.⁴⁹ But in order for the disjunctivist to deny that hallucinations are qualitatively identical to veridical perceptions, she must insist that we are systematically misled about the phenomenal character of our delusive experiences. Divorcing the phenomenal character of our experiences from what is distinguishable from the subject's point of view is a radical revision of our very conception of phenomenology.⁵⁰ If we are able to respect naïve realism—as I have shown we indeed are—without any such revision, the motivation for the disjunctivist alternative rapidly dissipates.

Perhaps the most pervasive response to the argument from hallucination has been to reject *LA*, the thesis that what it is like to perceive is at least partially constituted by the items that the perceiver is aware of. According to proponents of this strategy, it is because we insist that perception is relational that we end up having to choose between sense-datum theory and disjunctivism. Rejecting *LA* drives a wedge between the particular items of awareness associated with a perceptual experience and the phenomenal nature of the experience. Representationalism is the primary view that emerges out of the rejection of *LA*.⁵¹ A representationalist grants that in a veridical perception, it seems to the subject *as if* she is aware of a tomato, but suggests that this experience is logically independent of there being any tomato—and indeed, any item at all—that she is in fact aware of.

The representationalist, however, faces a new and difficult question: How can it seem *as if* a red, round object is present if there are no sensible qualities instantiated at all? It can seem as if an object is present in the absence of the object, but that is most easily understood in terms of the subject being aware of sensible features that mislead her into thinking that she is presented with an ordinary object. A proponent of *LA* explains *seeming* awareness of an object in terms of *actual* awareness of sensible appearances. But someone who rejects *LA* rejects it regardless of whether the items are objects or the sensible features of those objects. Therefore, the representationalist no longer has this straightforward answer at her disposal. The success of the view then, depends on the dim hope that one can explain how mere *seeming presence* can account for the rich, *actual* phenomenology of our experiences. This is where the project has floundered. There has been a long tradition of reductive and non-reductive accounts of intentional presence. Reductive accounts have long been subject to accusations of inadequacy when applied to the case of perception, while non-reductive

⁴⁹ See Hinton, 1967; Snowdon, 1981; Campbell, 2002; Martin, 2004. In his 2004 paper, Martin discusses how rejecting *SPK* does not by itself free the disjunctivist of all constraints, because, as we have already discussed, the disjunctivist must grant that the hallucinatory kind is also instantiated in the case of veridical perception.

⁵⁰ Martin explicitly endorses this implication. He argues that the disjunctivists must accept such “limits of self-awareness” precisely because disjunctivism entails that we cannot tell apart the unique phenomenal character of a veridical perception from a state that does not share that phenomenal character. He is explicit in acknowledging the serious nature of this admission, but suggests that we must decide whether this is worse than losing the world in the best instance of perception. In this paper, I hope to have delineated a strategy that allows us to hold on to both. Also, see Siegel, 2008; Pautz, 2011 for a discussion of some of the problems with disjunctivism.

⁵¹ See, for example, Anscombe, 1965; Dretske, 1995; Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995. Qualia theorists also reject *Item Awareness*. (See Block, 1997; Shoemaker, 1990) Qualia theorists are even more revisionary of the naïve view – while representationalists can easily grant that at least it *seems* as if we are presented with mind-independent objects and properties in ordinary perception, qualia theorists have a hard time vindicating even the phenomenological claim. As a consequence, I will not focus on their view here.

accounts offer little more than stubborn insistence that the notion of intentional presence is up to the task.⁵²

The representationalist was motivated to reject *IA* only in order to avoid the dangers of sense-data and disjunctivism. But now that we have seen that neither of those options is forced upon us—that *IA* is in fact compatible with *MI and SPK*—we no longer need to content ourselves with the weak notion of intentional presence. We can insist that the items of awareness in ordinary perception are robustly present – they are actually there for us to see.

Appealing to constitutive over-determination may have seemed like a lot of fancy footwork, but it should now be clear that the consequences are well worth it. Employing the notion makes room for the possibility that we are genuinely acquainted with the external world in veridical perception, all the while accepting the possibility that direct neural stimulation can lead to qualitatively identical non-veridical experiences. Once we have ensured that naïve realism is in fact on secure ground and need not deny the possibility of qualitatively rich hallucination, we have stripped the representationalist and the disjunctivist of the primary motivations for their respective views. Employing the notion of constitutive over-determination, therefore, has allowed us to offer a unified, non-revisionary account of perceptual phenomenology.⁵³

V. CODA: THE REAL SENSIBLE QUALITIES

There are two potential concerns that I want to address briefly here. First, someone might point out that there is a strong disanalogy between the two cases of constitutive over-determination that I have discussed in the paper. In the case of the cricket match, we do not intuitively think of the two sufficient conditions (the tenth outing and the completion of the overs with a smaller run total) as competing with each other for the constitution of a victory. It is natural to think that either of these conditions is the kind of thing that can make a victory, and, furthermore, that one does not exclude the other from also playing the constitutive role on any particular occasion. We are in no way surprised when we notice that the two conditions can sometimes simultaneously obtain – nothing about our ordinary understanding of sports victories suggests that such an over-determined scenario is impossible. In the case of perception, however, one might think that our ordinary conception of experience *does* seem to rule out the possibility of over-determination. It is quite natural to think that if the world constitutes how things look to a subject on a particular occasion, the mind cannot *also* play a constitutive role on that very occasion; and *vice versa*. On the proposal I have developed, however, the world and the mind do *not* always compete in this way. Rather, in the *ordinary* case—in veridical perception—they are both equal, non-exclusionary players. And so one might protest that the plausibility of the phenomenon in *Cricket* does not carry

⁵² In Chapter 1 of my dissertation, I argue that representationalists are unable to offer an account of intentional presence that does justice to the phenomenology of perceptual experience. In brief, I argue that all substantive accounts of representation make it the case that representational properties are non-occurrent and non-categorical in nature. I argue that this makes representation fundamentally unsuited to explain phenomenal character given the strikingly occurrent and categorical nature of our perceptual phenomenology.

⁵³ One might worry that the resulting view is not really “naïve” at all: constitutive over-determination is by no means, an intuitive notion. In response to this, I concede that the metaphysical tools I have developed here are unlikely to be classified as intuitive. However, the way in which we must stay “naïve” is not to ensure that our philosophical toolbox remains that way, but rather by insisting that we do not, through theoretical investigation, distort the naïve understanding of the phenomenon we are interested in. To that extent, I hope to have employed some admittedly non-naïve resources to preserve the naïve view of perceptual experience.

over to the perceptual case. We have pre-theoretical commitments in the latter case that we never had in the former.

The first thing to note is that the analogy to the case of cricket is meant to reveal that the *general* phenomenon of constitutive over-determination is not in principle puzzling. The example reveals that there are perfectly straightforward cases of constitutive over-determination that don't surprise us at all. Contrast this, for example, with *causal* over-determination. There, some have suggested that a metaphysical view that allows for causal over-determination violates our pre-theoretical conception of causes as exclusionary. But we just don't have a similar pre-theoretical conception of constitution that is at odds with the possibility of constitutive over-determination. That being said, there is still the worry that it is our conception of *experience*—and not constitution—that rules out over-determination in the perceptual case in particular. I will return to this after I spell out the second concern about the view, because I think both concerns can be allayed in the same way.

Particularist naïve realism implies that the particular sensible feature that the subject is aware of when she perceives the tomato is not numerically identical to the sensible feature that inheres in the tomato when the perceiver is not present. But doesn't this mean that the tomato *changes* in virtue of being perceived; and how could this possibly be the case? How could the mere fact that someone walks into the room with their eyes open make a difference to the tomato itself?

Fortunately, it would be a mistake to think of the tomato as undergoing any *change* in virtue of being perceived. Tomatoes change when they go from green to red, from ripe to raw, from intact to sliced, and so on. An object undergoes a change from *t1* to *t2* if there is a difference in which properties are instantiated by the object at the two times.⁵⁴ In our case, there is no change in *which* properties are instantiated. The tomato has all the same sensible features before and after a perceiver enters the room.⁵⁵ It is, however, true that the *way* in which the sensible feature of the tomato is instantiated varies based on whether it is perceived or not. When perceived, the sensible feature is instantiated in virtue of the nature of the tomato *and* the act of perceptual awareness. When unperceived, the sensible feature is instantiated solely in virtue of the nature of the tomato. Furthermore, an instance of the very same kind can be instantiated in the absence of a mind-independent object altogether. One might worry that our conception of properties like color and shape does not ultimately admit such flexibility in manner of instantiation. The fact that one and the same color or shape can be instantiated in a variety of ways may strike many as suspicious. Furthermore, one might worry that a commitment to a materialist account of color, shape, size, etc. is incompatible with such diversity in the manner of instantiation. If color or shape can never have mind-independent instantiations, then it cannot be the case that hallucinations make us aware of genuine instances of such properties.⁵⁶

So far, I have remained neutral about which properties are the real sensible features that we are aware of in perception. I have been using the notion of sensible appearances as a placeholder for whichever the real sensible properties are. The most natural view is that the real sensible properties are ordinary colors, shapes and sizes. One must remember though

⁵⁴ A further qualification of the relevant properties would be needed if we wanted to distinguish between intrinsic change and mere Cambridge change.

⁵⁵ A trope theory of properties allows us to insist that one and the same property *F* can have numerically distinct property instances (*f1*, *f2*,...) that inhere in one and the same concrete particular at different points in time. Without such a view, it makes no sense to speak of a concrete particular having *f1* at *t1* and *f2* at *t2*, where *f1* and *f2* are numerically distinct instances of the same property *F*.

⁵⁶ Primitivist accounts of colors are compatible with colors being properties that can have ontologically diverse instantiations. The restriction to mind-independent objects comes from treating colors as microphysical or structural properties that only material objects can possess. See, for example, Campbell 1993, for an account of what such a primitivist account might look like.

that particularist naïve realism only requires that there be *some* sensible properties, instances of which can serve as the immediate items of awareness in both veridical and hallucinatory perceptions. Colors and shapes might seem like a natural first choice, but they need not be what we settle on at the end of theoretical reflection.

We can address both the worries expressed above if we give up our neutrality. I want to suggest that we think of the term “sensible appearances” in non-neutral terms as picking out an actual class of *appearance properties* that are distinct from the colors and shapes and sizes of objects. If we think of appearances as qualitative properties themselves, they are perfectly poised to have both mind-independent and mind-dependent instances. When we ascribe an appearance to an object, we describe a categorical feature that the object has independent of being perceived by us. In Austin’s words, “I am not disclosing a fact about myself, but about petrol, when I say that petrol looks like water.”⁵⁷ However, when we hallucinate, we are yet again undeniably confronted with the *appearance* of a mind-independent world, even though such an appearance is constituted by our awareness of it. Lastly, appearances are well poised to have the property of over-determination that we need to employ in the case of veridical perception. A tomato can look red when no one is in the room, but it can also look red *to a perceiver*. In the latter instance, when the tomato is in fact being perceived, it is quite natural to speak of the appearance as constituted both by the way the tomato is and by our awareness of it.

Understanding ordinary perception as affording awareness of sensible appearances also makes sense of how the mind and the world partake in a non-exclusive relation with respect to fixing the character of perceptual experience. As just mentioned, when we describe an ordinary perception of a red tomato, we must make essential reference both to the tomato and to the perceiver. It is the tomato in which the look inheres; and, yet, in it looking that way *to a subject*, features of the subject are necessarily implicated.

Once these clarifications have been made, particularist naïve realism emerges as an extremely compelling account of perception. By resolving the tension between the naïve view of perception and the possibility of hallucination, we have also introduced the possibility of a satisfying response to skepticism. Traditional views of perception, having excluded the world from the constituents of ordinary perception, struggle to explain how we are not alienated from the world. Disjunctivists, who deny that hallucinations share their character with ordinary perceptions, rescue our knowledge of the world only by opening themselves up to a more pernicious form of alienation from our own phenomenology. Being able to grant that hallucinations and veridical perceptions belong to the same phenomenal kind, while insisting that the world is a necessary *constituent* of our ordinary perceptions, gives the view developed here the resources we need in order to secure unproblematic knowledge both of the world and of our own minds.

⁵⁷ Austin, 1962, p.43

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