

## POLITICAL SCIENCE 1003: INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

**Professor Caitlin Talmadge**  
**The George Washington University**  
**Spring 2016**

**Meeting Time:** Mondays and Wednesdays, 2:20-3:10 pm

**Location:** Room 113, 1957 E Street, NW

**Professor office hours:** Wednesdays, 1:00 – 2:00 pm, and by appointment

**Professor office location:** Monroe Hall 466, 2115 G Street, NW

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### **Teaching Assistants:**

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*Please be sure to read the course email policy prior to emailing the teaching staff.*

**Description of Course:** This course is an introduction to the character, causes, and consequences of international conflict and cooperation, in both military and economic affairs. It is not a history or current events course, but it does use past and present-day cases to examine theories of international politics and expand our understanding of the range of possible forms of international behavior. The course is organized chronologically, beginning with the Peloponnesian War, the European state system, imperialism, the spread of free trade, and the two world wars. It continues after 1945 with decolonization, the spread of democracy and human rights, trade liberalization, international law, financial integration, and environmental cooperation, as well as sources of conflict such as the Cold War, nuclear weapons, the control of oil, humanitarian intervention, and terrorism. The major goal of the class is to be able to identify and explain continuity and change across these different issues and time periods using theories and concepts from the field of international relations.

This is a very challenging course with an above-average workload. You will find it more manageable if you commit to keeping up with the readings and attending the lectures each week.

**Class Meetings:** Lectures are given on Mondays and Wednesdays. Discussion sections will meet every week for 50 minutes. Attendance in sections is mandatory, and failure to attend and participate will substantially hurt your performance in the class.

**Examinations:** There will be two mid-term examinations and a final exam. All of the examinations in the course will test your ability to analyze history and facts using the theories and arguments we have covered.

The first exam will be a take-home essay distributed online through Blackboard at 3:10 pm on Monday, February 22. It will be due in hard copy, in class, the following Monday, February 29, at exactly 2:20 pm. If you think your watch might be slow, come early. You must also submit a copy of your paper prior to this time to SafeAssign, through the course website, which uses an electronic program to detect cheating. If you use a

Mac, be aware that Safe Assign does not work with Safari, only Firefox. Your TA will provide further details on compliance with SafeAssign. Your exam is not turned in until it has been submitted both to SafeAssign and in hard copy. It will be counted late if either is missing.

The second exam will be given in class on Monday, April 4. It will consist of identifications and an essay question. More details will be provided closer to the test date.

The final exam will consist of identifications and two essays, one covering the material since the second midterm and one asking you to synthesize material from the entire course.

The final exam will be held according to the university schedule, which the teaching staff does not control. Due to the large size of this class, the teaching staff is unable to offer alternative exam times for the convenience of students. However, if you have three or more exams scheduled on the same day, you are allowed to petition for one of them to be rescheduled. Note that this must be done at least three weeks prior to the last day of classes: <http://registrar.gwu.edu/final-exam-schedule>.

**Response papers:** In order to help you prepare for section and exams, there will be three, 300-word (1 page) graded response papers due throughout the semester. The response papers will ask you to address your choice of questions sent out by the teaching staff. Always write the word count, your TA's name, your section time, and your name at the top of the first page of the paper. Your TAs will provide additional details about the writing, submission, and grading of these papers, which will be due in hard copy in your section meetings. The first response paper is due in section the week of February 1; the second one is due in section the week of March 21; and the third one is due in section the week of April 18. Because the purpose of response papers is to synthesize the material from lecture and readings on your own before attending section, absolutely no late response papers will be accepted. If the paper is not turned in on time, you will receive no credit and no opportunity to make up the assignment.

**Readings:** Most of the readings for this course are available on the course website or the Internet. Two books are required for purchase: Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (1994), and Jeffry Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century* (2007). They are available for sale online, as well as on two-hour reserve at Gelman Library.

**Studying:** It is a good idea to form study groups to generate summaries of the readings and definitions of key terms. The syllabus also provides weekly hints to help you read efficiently. These questions are not comprehensive and are meant only to help you prepare for lecture and section. However, if you can answer them and identify the key terms listed each week (based on the readings, not what you find on Wikipedia!), you will be well on your way to a good performance on the exams. Try to do the readings in order each week.

**Academic Integrity:** If you are found to have cheated on any part of an assignment, you will automatically receive a failing grade on that assignment. You may also face further consequences for academic dishonesty at the professor's discretion. Please note that failure to cite sources you use in any written assignment (including response papers) is academic dishonesty and will be punished accordingly. If you are unsure how to cite, please ask your TA. It is your responsibility to review the university's Code of Academic Integrity prior to turning in your work: <http://studentconduct.gwu.edu/code-academic-integrity>.

**Extensions and Late Assignments:** There will be no extensions or make-ups granted except in cases of 1) religious holiday observance, brought to the teaching staff's attention *within the first two weeks of the*

*semester*, or 2) medical emergency confirmed *promptly* by a doctor who has seen you and judges that you were *physically unable* to complete the work for the course on time. To be clear, neither you nor your doctor needs to provide the teaching staff with details of your condition; that is your private business. You do, however, need medical documentation, provided in a timely manner, to certify that you were unable to fulfill your responsibilities in the class. Otherwise, if you miss an exam, you will receive a failing grade. Furthermore, for each day that a take-home assignment is late, it will be marked down 1/3 of a grade (e.g., a B would become a B-). The teaching staff reserves the right not to accept extremely overdue assignments.

**Email Policy:** Email facilitates various pitfalls that students should avoid. First, students should communicate professionally with the teaching staff, avoiding informal salutations, casual language, and sloppy punctuation and spelling. Second, please check the course syllabus or ask a classmate prior to emailing the teaching staff with a question; do not expect a reply to questions that have already been answered. Third, when emailing the professor, always copy your teaching assistant unless you have a specific reason not to. Fourth, please keep your communications brief. If you have a complicated issue to discuss, it is best left to face-to-face interaction in office hours.

**Disability:** If you have a registered disability and require accommodations, please provide the professor with the necessary paperwork within the first two weeks of the term, and we will make arrangements accordingly. The teaching staff is committed to making the course a level playing field for all students. Additional information is available at <http://disabilitysupport.gwu.edu>.

**Counseling:** The University Counseling Center (UCC, 202-994-5300) offers 24/7 assistance and referral to address students' personal, social, career, and academic problems. Services for students include crisis and emergency mental health consultations, confidential assessment, counseling services, and referrals. For more information, see <http://counselingcenter.gwu.edu>.

**Security:** If we experience an emergency during class, we will try to stay at this location until we hear that we can move about safely. If we have to leave the classroom, we will meet in Rawlins Park (across E Street from the Elliott School) in order to account for everyone and to make certain that everyone is safe. Please refer to Campus Advisories for the latest information on the university's operating status: <http://campusadvisories.gwu.edu>.

**Electronic devices in class:** The use of laptops, cell phones, and other electronic devices in lecture and section is prohibited except in cases of documented medical need. While these devices can enhance some aspects of learning, they can also prove distracting to you and those seated around you. Please turn them off and put them away.

**Grading:** Your grade will stem from the take-home midterm (15%), the in-class midterm (25%), the final exam (40%), section attendance (5%), section participation (5%), and response papers (10%).

Grades in this course are not negotiable, but if you believe you have been subject to a grading error, you may appeal after a 24-hour waiting period. You must make your appeal in writing to your TA and submit your original exam or essay. Your TA will respond in writing. If you still believe your work has been mis-graded, you may submit another appeal to the professor, along with your original appeal, your work, and your TA's response. Please bear in mind that appeals often result in lower rather than higher grades, and that respectful appeals tend to have more success. That said, the teaching staff is always happy to help you understand how you can perform at your best; please come see us if you need feedback or help.

The grading scale in this class is as follows: A: 94+; A-: 90-93; B+: 87-89; B: 84-86; B-: 80-83; C+: 77-79; C: 74-76; C-: 70-73; D+: 67-69; D: 64-66; D-: 60-63; and F: 59 and below. The course is not graded on a curve; you will receive whatever grade you earn. In previous iterations of the course, the average has been a B, which is a very good grade in a large survey course. Here is a qualitative sense of what the different grades mean:

**A:** The student performed well above the teaching staff's expectations. He or she displayed a thorough command of both the theoretical and empirical material in the course, as well as original analytical insights into that material. The student will be among the best in the Political Science major.

**A-:** The teaching staff was very impressed by the student's performance. The student demonstrated a thorough grasp of both the theoretical and empirical components of the course. He or she will do very well in the Political Science major.

**B+:** The student met all of the teaching staff's expectations in the course; the student will perform well in the Political Science major.

**B:** The student met most of the requirements of the course but had trouble with some of the theoretical and/or empirical components. The student still has the potential to do well in the Political Science major if these deficits are remedied.

**B-:** The student demonstrated consistent weakness with respect to both the theoretical and empirical material in the course, but he or she clearly attempted to prepare for assignments. It is difficult to evaluate whether the student will succeed in the Political Science major.

**C:** There is little evidence the student learned anything in the course, and he or she demonstrated disregard for the course requirements. The Political Science major is not recommended.

**D:** There is no evidence the student has learned anything in the class. He or she demonstrated blatant negligence in completing the course requirements. The Political Science major is not recommended.

**F:** The student did not attend class and/or turn in assignments. It is unclear whether the student will succeed in college.

<b>COURSE SUMMARY</b>	
<b>Date</b>	<b>Lecture/Assignments</b>
January 11	1. Introduction to PSC 1003
January 13	2. Analyzing International Relations: Theory and Evidence, Part 1
January 18	<i>NO CLASS: MLK Day</i>
January 20	3. Analyzing International Relations: Theory and Evidence, Part 2
January 25	4. Statecraft in the Ancient World: the Peloponnesian War
January 27	5. The Concert of Europe and Bismarckian Realpolitik
February 1	6. The Expansion of World Trade in the 19 <sup>th</sup> Century <b>RESPONSE PAPER 1 DUE IN SECTION THIS WEEK</b>
February 3	7. Globalization and Imperialism before 1914
February 8	8. The Rise of Germany and the Path to World War I
February 10	9. International Relations Theory and the Causes of World War I
February 15	<i>NO CLASS: Presidents' Day</i>
February 17	10. Collective Security and the League of Nations
February 22	11. The Great Depression and the Interwar Political Economy <b>MIDTERM 1: TAKE-HOME ESSAY DISTRIBUTED THROUGH BLACKBOARD</b>
February 24	12. The Origins of World War II
February 29	13. The Origins of the Cold War <b>MIDTERM 1 DUE IN CLASS AND ON SAFEASSIGN AT 2:20 PM</b>
March 2	14. International Trade and Finance after 1945
March 7	15. The United Nations and Decolonization
March 9	16. Wars of the Cold War: Korean and Vietnam
March 14	<i>NO CLASS: Spring Break</i>
March 16	<i>NO CLASS: Spring Break</i>
March 21	17. The Nuclear Revolution <b>RESPONSE PAPER 2 DUE IN SECTION THIS WEEK</b>
March 23	18. The Middle East in World Politics
March 28	19. Oil and Other Commodity Cartels
March 30	20. The IMF, WTO, and World Bank
April 4	<b>MIDTERM 2: IN-CLASS EXAM</b>
April 6	21. Globalization, Growth and Poverty Alleviation
April 11	22. Environmental Agreements: The Global Commons
April 13	23. The End of the Cold War and Its Consequences
April 18	24. Is the World Still Dangerous? Terrorism, Failed States, and WMD <b>RESPONSE PAPER 3 DUE IN SECTION THIS WEEK</b>
April 20	25. Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention
April 25	26. International Relations in an Age of Financial Crisis
April 26	27. The End of Realpolitik? (Make-Up Class)
April 27	28. Mandatory Review Session (Designated Monday)
TBD	<b>FINAL EXAM</b>

## DETAILED COURSE SCHEDULE

### January 11

#### Lecture 1: Introduction to PSC 1003

##### Readings:

- John Mueller, "War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 124, no. 2 (summer 2009), pp. 300-319
- You should get started on the readings for the next lecture, which are unusually long and challenging.

Reading questions: What are the different types of wars? What are the major trends in conflict and cooperation over the last 200 years? How might we explain them?

##### Identification:

- War aversion
- Norm against conquest

### January 13

#### Lecture 2: Theories of International Relations I

##### Readings:

- Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy* (November/December 2005), pp. 55-62.
- Charles L. Glaser, "Realism," in Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies*, third edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 13-17.
- Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, pp. 9-15.
- John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace," *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 2 (fall 1994), pp. 87-104.
- Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" *Foreign Policy* no. 110 (spring 1998): 82-89.

Reading questions: What is a theory? Why do we need theories? What factors do realist, liberal, and constructivist theories of international relations emphasize? Why are liberal and constructivist theories generally more optimistic regarding the possibility of international cooperation and change? What are the different variants of realism? Does realism predict only conflict, or can it also explain cooperation? According to Gilpin, how does change happen in international politics? What is the democratic peace theory? What are the normative and institutional/structural explanations for peace that this theory provides? What are international institutions? Why would powerful states bother forming or cooperating with international institutions? How can such institutions help overcome uncertainty and solve credibility problems?

##### Identifications

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Realism</li> <li>• Liberalism</li> <li>• Constructivism</li> <li>• Anarchy</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Power</li> <li>• Unitary actor assumption</li> <li>• Security seekers vs. greedy states</li> <li>• Structural realism</li> </ul> |
|--|---|

- Offensive vs. defensive realism
- Security dilemma
- Hegemonic war
- System equilibrium/disequilibrium
- Democratic peace (normative and institutional/structural)
- Regime type
- Illiberal democracies
- Transaction costs
- Uncertainty
- Credibility
- Relative vs. absolute gains

### January 18: NO CLASS: MLK Day

### January 20

#### Lecture 3: Theories of International Relations II

- Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, pp. 1-15.
- Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," *Perspectives on Politics*, vol. 1, no. 1 (March 2003), pp. 27, 29-30 (under "The causes of war"), 33-34 (under "Other theoretical perspectives" and under "Deterrence, the spiral model, and cognitive psychological biases").
- You should also review the readings from the previous lecture.

Reading questions: Can war ever be the product of rational decision-making? Are the misperceptions that may lead to war always irrational? What do the spiral model and the deterrence model each identify as the major cause of war? What is a commitment problem? What are the "levels of analysis" or "images" in international relations?

#### Identifications:

- 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> images
- Bargaining model
- Incentives to misrepresent
- Commitment problems
- Issue indivisibility
- Spiral model
- Deterrence model

### January 25

#### Lecture 4: Statecraft in the Ancient World: the Peloponnesian War

#### Readings:

- Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, "Introduction," in Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Walter Blanco, pp. xiii-xviii.
- Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (Rex Warner, trans.), "The Dispute over Corcyra," "The Debate at Sparta and Declaration of War," and "Melian Dialogue," 24 pages total.

Reading questions: What were the basic similarities and differences between Athens and Sparta? According to Thucydides, what was the main cause of war between the two city-states? Which international relations theories seem most relevant to the explanation? Do you see anything relevant to modern international relations here?

Identifications:

- Athens
- Sparta
- Corinth
- Corcyra
- Melos
- Helots

**January 27****Lecture 5: The Concert of Europe and Bismarckian Realpolitik**Readings:

- Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, “The Concert of Europe,” “Two Revolutionaries,” and “Realpolitik Turns on Itself,” pp. 78-102, 103-136, 137-167, map pp. 324-5.
- Gordon Craig and Alexander George, “Balance of Power, 1815-1914: Three Experiments” in Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, pp. 25-42.

Reading questions: How should we define international stability? Consider the three main periods discussed in the reading: 1815-1854 (the Concert of Europe), 1870-1890 (Bismarckian Realpolitik), and 1890-1914 (the pre-World War I era, which we will also study in more detail next week). Which era would you say was the most stable? What factors do you think increased or decreased stability during each era? Are any of the theories we discussed last week helpful in making this assessment?

Identifications:

- Metternich
- Napoleon III
- Bismarck
- Congress of Vienna
- Holy Alliance
- Quadruple Alliance
- Sovereignty
- Realpolitik
- Crimean War

**February 1****Lecture 6: The Expansion of World Trade in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*****RESPONSE PAPER 1 DUE IN SECTION THIS WEEK***Readings:

- Jeffrey Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5, pp. 13-55, 80-123.
- Arthur Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,” *International Organization*, vol. 38, no. 2 (1984), pp. 355-372.

Reading questions: What is globalization? What factors were most important in the rise of globalization in the 19<sup>th</sup> century? What is Frieden’s argument about the relationship between nations’ integration into the global market and their economic development? What is a hegemon, and what does Stein mean when he speaks of a “hegemon’s dilemma”? Does globalization prevent international conflict?

Identifications:

- Globalization
- Repeal of the Corn Laws
- Cobden-Chevalier Treaty
- Gold Standard
- Specialization/division of labor
- Comparative advantage
- Mercantilism
- Hegemonic Stability Theory
- Most-Favored-Nation Status

### February 3

#### Lecture 7: Globalization and Imperialism before 1914

##### Readings:

- John Hobson, "Imperialism: A Study" in H. Wright, ed., *The 'New Imperialism'*, pp. 5-34, 36-39.
- Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, "The Partition of Africa," in *The 'New Imperialism'*, pp. 151-158.
- Nicolas Mansergh, "Diplomatic Reasons for Expansion," in *The 'New Imperialism'*, pp. 114-124.

Reading questions: What are the main arguments made in each article about the causes of imperialism? Are these causes mutually exclusive?

##### Identifications:

- Imperialism
- The Scramble for Africa
- Sectional/sectoral interests

### February 8

#### Lecture 8: The Rise of Germany and the Path to World War I

##### Readings:

- Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, "A Political Doomsday Machine" & "Into the Vortex," pp. 168-217, map p. 326.

Reading questions: Was World War I inevitable? Was it rational? (Consider the bargaining model and the spiral model from the first week.) What factors were most important in the outbreak: structural causes related to the balance of power or domestic causes such as misperceptions? If the war was destined to occur, what factors kept it from happening before 1914?

##### Identifications:

- Alsace-Lorraine
- Splendid isolation
- The Reinsurance Treaty
- Schlieffen Plan
- The low countries
- Crowe Memorandum
- Offense-defense balance
- Kaiser Wilhelm
- Triple Entente
- Triple Alliance
- Franz Ferdinand
- July crisis

### February 10

#### Lecture 9: International Relations Theory and the Causes of World War I

Reading:

- Charles L. Glaser, "Realism," in Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies*, third edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 17-26.
- Dale Copeland, "German Security and the Preparation for World War I," *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 56-78.

Reading questions: What is the security dilemma? What factors make it more or less intense? Is the security dilemma a useful way to explain the origins of World War I? In general, do you find this or other "rationalist" explanations of the causes of World War I persuasive? Why does Copeland argue that "only Germany can be considered responsible for wanting and bringing on major war"? Is he right?

Identifications:

- Balancing
- Internal balancing
- External balancing
- Bandwagoning
- Offensive realism
- Defensive realism
- Buckpassing
- Security dilemma
- Offense-defense balance
- Offense-defense distinguishability
- Preventive war
- Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg
- Helmuth von Moltke (the younger)
- Russian military build-up

**February 15: NO CLASS: Presidents' Day****February 17:****Lecture 10: Collective Security and the League of Nations**Readings:

- Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, "The New Face of Diplomacy," "The Dilemmas of the Victors," and "Stresemann and the Re-emergence of the Vanquished," pp. 218-245, 246-265, 266-287; map p. 321.
- Woodrow Wilson, Speeches: "Peace Without Victory" (22 January 1917); "Fourteen Points," (8 January 1918), 9 pages total.

Reading questions: What were the main features of the Treaty of Versailles? Did the treaty help contain the seeds of its own destruction, i.e., was it a peace treaty that actually paved the way for the next major war? What were the key features of the League of Nations? Why did it fail to prevent aggression and ultimately another world war?

Identifications:

- Treaty of Versailles
- Collective Security
- League of Nations
- Fourteen Points
- Self-determination
- Gustav Stresemann

**February 22****Lecture 11: The Great Depression and The Interwar Political Economy**

## **MIDTERM 1: TAKE-HOME ESSAY DISTRIBUTED THROUGH BLACKBOARD**

### Readings:

- Jeffrey Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, Chapters. 6 and 8, pp. 127-154, 173-194.
- Arthur Stein, "A Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, The United States, and International Economic Order," *International Organization*, vol. 38, no 2. (1984), pp. 373-376.
- OPTIONAL BUT RECOMMENDED: Charles Kindleberger, "An Explanation of the 1929 Depression," in *The World in Depression* (1983), pp. 288-305.

Reading questions: What caused the Great Depression? What were its main features? What role did the gold standard play in the Great Depression? According to Hegemonic Stability Theory, how could the Great Depression have been avoided or shortened?

### Identifications:

- The Gold Standard
- John Maynard Keynes
- Smoot-Hawley Tariff
- Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
- Lender of Last Resort
- The Great Depression

## **February 24**

### **Lecture 12: The Origins of World War II**

### Readings:

- Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, "The End of the Illusion" and "Stalin's Bazaar," pp. 288-318, 332-349.
- OPTIONAL BUT RECOMMENDED: Scott Sagan, "Origins of the Pacific War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* vol. 18, no. 4 (spring 1988): 893-922.

Reading questions: Was World War II just a continuation of World War I? Do you think the war would have occurred without Nazi ideology or Adolf Hitler? How and why did the Allies "appease" Hitler in the years leading up to World War II? Were their decisions rational given the information available to them at the time? Why did Stalin agree to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact? Do you see the spiral model or the deterrence model as relevant in explaining the outbreak of the war in Europe? What about in the Far East?

### Identifications:

- Maginot Line
- Anschluss
- Lebensraum
- Sudetenland
- Rhineland
- Axis Powers
- Allied Powers
- Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
- Munich Agreement

## **February 29**

### **Lecture 13: The Origins of the Cold War**

**MIDTERM 1 DUE IN CLASS AND ON SAFEASSIGN AT 2:20 PM**Readings:

- John Lewis Gaddis, "The Return of Fear," in *The Cold War: a New History*, pp. 6-47.
- George Kennan, "The Long Telegram," February 22, 1946, available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm>, 9 pages.
- "The Novikov Telegram," Sept. 27, 1946, available through the Cold War International History Project, 8 pages.

Reading questions: Was the Cold War inevitable given the geopolitical situation and balance of power between the US and USSR in 1945? Or were non-structural factors, such as ideology and personality, the key drivers of hostility? Do you think "commitment problems" of the type we discussed in the bargaining model from the first week were relevant (you may wish to refer to the Reiter reading, p. 30)?

Identifications:

- Yalta
- Potsdam
- George Kennan
- Novikov Telegram
- Containment
- Iron Curtain
- Spheres of Influence
- NSC-68
- Cominform
- NATO
- Truman Doctrine
- Korean War

**March 2****Lecture 14: International Trade and Finance After 1945**Readings:

- Jeffrey Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, Chapters 11 and 12, pp. 253-300.
- Robert Keohane, "A Functional Theory of International Regimes," in *After Hegemony*, pp. 85-97, 107-9, 135-139.
- Arthur Stein, "A Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, The United States, and International Economic Order," *International Organization*, Vol. 38:2 (1984), pp. 376-386.
- Address by General George C. Marshall, Secretary of State of the United States, June 5, 1947, pp. 1-3, available at <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/marshall.htm> ; audio recording available at <http://www.hpol.org/record.php?id=7>

Reading questions: Is international economic cooperation in the postwar era best explained by Western security concerns about Soviet bloc, United States hegemony, or domestic political conditions? What is an international regime? According to Keohane, why did such regimes emerge after World War II?

Identifications:

- Marshall Plan
- Bretton Woods System
- International Monetary Fund
- World Bank
- GATT
- European Coal and Steel Community

- European Economic Community
- OECD
- Transaction costs

### March 7

#### Lecture 15: The United Nations and Decolonization

##### Readings:

- Jeffrey Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, Chapter 13, pp. 301-320.
- The United Nations Charter, Preamble, Chapter I, and Chapter VII, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>

Reading questions: How does the United Nations' collective security system differ from the rules established in the earlier League of Nations? According to Frieden, why did many newly-independent governments in Asia and Africa choose import-substituting industrialization as a development strategy in the postwar era?

##### Identifications:

- UN Security Council
- UN General Assembly
- Uniting for Peace Resolution
- United Nations Emergency Force
- Suez Canal crisis
- Import-substituting industrialization
- Export-oriented industrialization

### March 9

#### Lecture 16: Wars of the Cold War: Korea and Vietnam

Note: You may wish to review Gaddis' discussion of the Korean War, pp. 40-7, from the reading for Lecture 13.

##### Readings:

- Fredrik Logevall, *The Origins of the Vietnam War* (Pearson: New York, 2001), pp. 58-82.
- Yuen Foong Khong, "The Lessons of Korea and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965," in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, *Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy*, pp. 302-334, 336-344.

Reading questions: Compare and contrast the accounts of U.S. intervention given by Logevall and Khong. Why did the United States intervene in Korea and Vietnam? Out of Waltz's three images, which seems most important in explaining U.S. decision-making in these wars? How well does the bargaining model account for the wars?

##### Identifications:

- Ngo Dinh Diem
- Ho Chi Minh
- Strategic Hamlet Program
- Gulf of Tonkin
- Pleiku
- Rolling Thunder
- Tet Offensive
- Robert McNamara
- Domino Theory

## March 14 and 16: NO CLASS: Spring Break

### March 21

#### Lecture 17: The Nuclear Revolution

#### **RESPONSE PAPER 2 DUE IN SECTION THIS WEEK**

##### Readings:

- Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, chapter 1, pp. 1-46.
- Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, The Concise Edition*. pp. 60-65, 106-108.

Reading questions: According to Jervis, how have nuclear weapons changed international politics? What is the stability-instability paradox? Did Soviet missiles in Cuba actually change the nuclear balance with the United States? If not, why was the United States so concerned about them?

##### Identifications

- The Nuclear Revolution
- Mutually Assured Destruction
- Second-strike capability
- Stability-Instability Paradox
- Deterrence
- Compellence
- The Long Peace
- Cuban Missile Crisis

### March 23

#### Lecture 18: The Middle East in World Politics

##### Readings:

- Paul Salem, "The Middle East: Evolution of a Broken Regional Order," Carnegie paper no. 9, June 2008, pp. 3-10.
- Gregory Gause, "The Persian Gulf as a Security Region," in *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1-2, 12-14.
- Daniel Yergin, "The Oil Weapon" and "Bidding for Our Life," in *The Prize: The Quest for Oil, Money and Power*, pp. 588-597, 602-609, 613-632.
- President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, "Memorandum of Conversation, subject: Middle East War," October 17, 1973, 2 pages.
- OPTIONAL BUT RECOMMENDED: Steve Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, "The End of Pax Americana: Why Washington's Middle East Pullback Makes Sense," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2015), 9 pages.

Reading questions: Why did war break out in the Middle East in 1973? Did Arab domestic politics play a role in the origins of the war, and if so, what was that role? What explains U.S. actions during the war? What were the most important international consequences of the war? More generally, what have been the most important factors driving U.S. behavior in the Middle East during the last several decades?

Identifications:

- Gamal Nasser
- Anwar Sadat
- King Faisal
- Golda Meir
- Iranian revolution
- Oil embargo
- 1967 Arab-Israeli War
- Yom Kippur War/October War

**March 28****Lecture 19: Oil and Other Commodity Cartels**Readings:

- Jeffrey Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, Chapter 16, pp. 363-391.
- Joan Spero and Jeffrey Hart, "Oil, Commodity Cartels, and Power," in *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, 5th ed., pp. 276-306.
- Jeff Colgan, "Why OPEC Is Not a Cartel," *Foreign Affairs* Snapshot, December 3, 2015, 3 pages.
- "Russia plans \$40 a barrel oil for next seven years as Saudi showdown intensifies," *The Telegraph*, December 11, 2015, 2 pages.

Reading questions: What were the causes and consequences of the oil embargo? What factors have affected OPEC's power in the ensuing decades? Why were southern countries unable to capitalize on their "commodity power" during the 1970s and 80s? In other words, why is it so difficult to make cartels work? What are the main challenges to OPEC functioning as a cartel today? Do you see any similarities between the difficulty of organizing cartels and the challenges of other forms of international cooperation that we have studied?

Identifications:

- The Seven Sisters
- Monopoly
- Oligopoly
- Cartel
- Nationalization
- OPEC
- Swing producer
- Stagflation
- Volcker plan
- Operation Ajax

**March 30****Lecture 20: The WTO, IMF, and World Bank**Readings:

- Jeffrey Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, Chapter 20, pp. 457-472.
- Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents*, (New York: Norton, 2002), Chapter 1, pp. 3-22.
- Kenneth Rogoff, "The IMF Strikes Back," *Foreign Policy*, no. 134 (Jan/Feb 2003), available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2003/021003.htm>, 6 pages.

Reading questions: What explains why people view globalization and its attendant institutions, such as the WTO, so differently? What is the Mundell dilemma, according to Frieden? How do global institutions address or fail to address the problems associated with this dilemma? What are Stiglitz's main criticisms of the IMF? What are Rogoff's responses? Whom do you think is right?

Identifications:

- Globalization
- Mundell dilemma
- International Monetary Fund
- World Bank
- GATT
- World Trade Organization
- Conditionality
- Sequencing
- Washington Consensus
- The Battle of Seattle

**April 4****MIDTERM 2: IN-CLASS EXAM****April 6****Lecture 21: Globalization, Growth, and Poverty Alleviation**Readings:

- Jeffrey Frieden, *Global Capitalism*, Chapter 19, pp. 435-456.
- Jeffrey A. Frankel, "Globalization of the Economy," NBER Working Paper no. 7858 (August 2000), pp. 1-37.
- David Dollar and Art Kraay, "Spreading the Wealth," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 1, January/February 2002, pp. 120-133.
- Ana Swanson, "Why Trying to Help Poor Countries Might Actually Hurt Them," *Washington Post*, October 13, 2015.
- Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Foreign Aid Skeptics Thrive on Pessimism," *Los Angeles Times*, May 7, 2006, 1 page.

Reading questions: Does globalization place downward pressure on states to equalize social and environmental practices at the "lowest common denominator"? Or instead are there instances when globalization actually increases these standards? Is globalization today as extensive as the period of globalization we studied earlier in the course? According to Frankel, which factors—other than tariffs or non-tariff barriers—prevent the world from being perfectly globalized in trade? Besides globalization, what other factors seem important in efforts to alleviate global poverty? Why does Angus Deaton argue that foreign aid can actually hurt the world's poor? Is he right?

Identifications:

- Anti-globalization movement
- Home-country bias in trade
- Angus Deaton
- The resource curse

**April 11****Lecture 22: Environmental Agreements: The Global Commons**Readings:

- Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science*, vol. 162, no. 3859, December 13, 1968), pp. 1244-5.
- Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, "The Development of Environmental Regimes: Nine Case Studies," "Conclusion," and "Trade and the Environment," in Porter and Brown eds., *Global*

*Environmental Politics*, (1996), pp. 67-96, 105-106, 129-141.

- Reading on climate change TBD

Reading questions: What is the tragedy of the commons, and how can it be overcome? The readings this week discuss the “tragedy” with respect to the environment, but can you think of how it might apply to other topics studied in the course? Porter and Brown point to the 1987 Montreal Protocol as a successful international regime designed to solve the problem of ozone depletion, but international cooperation to solve climate change has generally been much less successful. Why?

Identifications:

- Tragedy of the commons
- Free-rider problem
- Montreal Protocol
- Copenhagen conference

### April 13

#### Lecture 23: The End of the Cold War and Its Consequences

Reading:

- James Davis and William Wohlforth, “German Unification,” in *Ending the Cold War*, Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow, eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2004), pp. 131-153.
- Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-10.
- John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (summer 1990), pp. 5-8, 10-28.
- James Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When: the U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington: Brookings Press, 1999), pp. 1-5.
- John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: the Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014, pp. 77-89.

Reading questions: What caused the end of the Cold War? Evaluate the relative importance of shifting power, ideas, individual leaders, and domestic politics. What did Van Evera and Mearsheimer each predict would happen in Europe after the end of the Cold War? What were the assumptions behind the two sets of predictions? Why has NATO expanded rather than disappeared in the post-Cold War era? In what ways do you think the period since the end of the Cold War has been similar to or different from the other post-war periods we have studied? How do you explain renewed tension between Russia and the West as exemplified by the recent fighting in Ukraine?

Identifications:

- Mikhail Gorbachev
- German unification
- Soviet economic decline
- Constructivism
- NATO expansion
- Vladimir Putin
- Russia-Georgia War
- Crimea
- Orange Revolution

### April 18

## Lecture 24: Is the World Still Dangerous? Terrorism, Failed States, and WMD

### **RESPONSE PAPER 3 DUE IN SECTION THIS WEEK**

#### Readings:

- Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 2006, pp. 41-44.
- Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists*, 199, 5-11.
- *U.S. National Security Strategy*, September 2002, chapter V, 4 pages.
- Owen Cote, "Weapons of Mass Confusion," *Boston Review*, April/May 2003, 7 pages.
- "Terrorism: John Mueller Says Threat Is Overblown," *Rochester City Newspaper*, January 23, 2007, pp. 1-6.
- Robert Pape, "Blowing Up an Assumption," *New York Times*, May 18, 2005, 1 page.
- James Traub, "Think Again: Failed States," *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2011, pp. 1-7.
- Barak Mendelsohn, "The Jihadi Threat to International Order," *The Washington Post*, May 15, 2015, 7 pages.

Reading questions: How would you define terrorism? Do our theories of international relations adequately account for terrorist actors and/or states' responses to them? Why or why not? What do you see as today's greatest security threats, and how dangerous are they compared to past threats we have studied? Are terrorism, WMD, and failed states inextricably linked, or are they distinct? What is Pape's argument about the strategic logic of suicide terrorism, and do you think it is correct?

#### Identifications:

- |                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
| • Non-state entity/actor | • Failed states                        |
| • Terrorism              | • Strategic logic of suicide terrorism |
| • WMD                    | • Islamic State                        |
| • Bush Doctrine          | • Al Qaeda                             |

## **April 20**

### **Lecture 25: Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention**

#### Readings:

- Michael Walzer, "Interventions," in *Just and Unjust Wars*, ch. 6, pp. 86-91.
- Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," *Atlantic Monthly* (September 2001), pp. 84-108, available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200109/power-genocide>.
- Benjamin Valentino, "The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 6 (November/December 2011), pp. 60-73.
- Alan Kuperman, "False Pretense for War in Libya?" *Boston Globe*, April 14, 2011, 2 pages.
- Brian Haggerty, "The Delusion of Limited Intervention in Syria," *Bloomberg View*, October 4, 2012, 4 pages.
- Marc Lynch, "Would arming Syria's rebels have stopped the Islamic state?" post at the Monkey Cage blog at the *Washington Post*, August 11, 2014.
- Emile Simpson, "The Cold Realities of the Post-Paris War on Terror," *ForeignPolicy.com*, November 20, 2015, 6 pages.
- "Summary of Lee Kuan Yew speech on Asian Values and Democracy," *The Straits Times*, Nov. 21, 1992,

3 pages.

- SKIM: “African Human Rights Charter,” <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm>

Reading questions: Why is humanitarian intervention a more prominent issue today than it was during the Cold War? Under what conditions does Michael Walzer believe that one nation has the right to violate another’s sovereignty? What is the difference between his view and Samantha Powers’ view (hint: think about the difference between a right vs. a duty/obligation to intervene)? Why are Valentino and Kuperman skeptical about humanitarian intervention? Could the United States have prevented the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by intervening earlier or more extensively in the country’s civil war, or could it do so now? Is there a universal conception of human rights?

Identifications:

- Sovereignty
- Self-determination
- Rwanda
- Moral hazards of intervention
- Asian values debate
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Responsibility to protect (“R2P”)
- Bashar al-Asad
- No-fly zone
- Arming Syrian rebels

**April 25**

**Lecture 26: International Relations in an Age of Financial Crisis**

Reading:

- Menzie Chinn and Jeffrey Frieden, “Reflections on the Causes and Consequences of the Debt Crisis of 2008,” *La Follette Policy Report*, vol. 19, no. 1 (fall 2009), pp. 1-5.
- Jeffrey Frieden, “The Crisis and Beyond: Prospects for International Economic Cooperation,” *PEGGED Policy Paper No. 5* (December 2009), pp. 1-9.
- “A Second Wave,” *The Economist*, June 18, 2011, pp. 29-31.
- Martin Feldstein, “The Failure of the Euro: the Little Currency That Couldn’t,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2012, pp. 105-113.
- Ngaire Woods, “The European Disunion: How the Continent Lost Its Way,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2016, 6 pages.

Reading questions: What were the main causes and consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis? Compare this crisis and the response to it to the experience of the Great Depression—what is similar, and what is different? Why do nations find it politically difficult to respond to financial crises? How does the recent debt crisis in Europe reflect the Mundell dilemma we studied earlier in the course? Does it suggest that there are fundamental limits to economic openness? What are the arguments for pessimism and optimism about the future of the European Union?

Identifications:

- Capital flow cycle
- Monetary policy
- Fiscal policy
- Deficit countries
- Surplus countries
- Sectoral interests
- Maastricht summit
- Tradeable goods
- Devaluation-and-default
- European Stability Mechanism

**April 26**

**Lecture 27: The End of Realpolitik? (Mandatory Make-Up Class)**

Readings:

- Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest*, vol. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.
- Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.
- John Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia," Fourth Annual Michael Hintze Lecture in International Security, August 4, 2010, pp. 1-12.
- Andrew Moravcsik, "Europe, the Second Superpower," *Current History*, March 2010, pp. 91-98.

Reading questions: Which authors are more optimistic and which more pessimistic regarding the future of international relations? Which authors seem to embrace realism and which ones liberalism? What do Fukuyama and Huntington each predict about the sources and likelihood of future international conflict? Of the two, whom do you think has done a better job explaining the real-world course of global politics in the last twenty years? Are their views mutually exclusive? How does John Mearsheimer's view of China relate to the earlier readings in the course about the security dilemma and the bargaining model (especially commitment problems)? What does Andrew Moravcsik believe that today's Europe reveals about the future of international relations? How does Moravcsik's description of Europe in 2010 compare with the predictions about Europe's future that we read in Week 12?

Identifications:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The end of history</li> <li>• Clash of civilizations</li> <li>• Signaling of intentions</li> <li>• Rise of China</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional hegemony</li> <li>• European Union</li> <li>• Hard power</li> <li>• Convergence of state preferences</li> </ul> |
|--|---|

**April 28: Mandatory Review Session (Designated Monday)**

*There are no assigned readings or prepared lecture material for this class session. Come to class with any questions you have in preparation for the final exam.*