PHILIPPINES:
POST-TYphoon RESETTLEMENT PLAN CARRIES RISKS

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In November 2013, the strongest typhoon on record tore a path of destruction across the central Philippines, displacing four million people. In the disaster’s wake, the government adopted an ambitious plan to relocate 200,000 households away from at-risk coastal areas and resettle them out of harm’s way. While well-intentioned as a strategy to mitigate displacement from future typhoons and climate change, observations to date suggest that without sufficient planning and safeguards, government-led resettlement is a highly risky undertaking that threatens to prolong displacement and leave affected populations more, not less, vulnerable.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Resettling populations as a strategy to mitigate displacement from disasters is a complex process that requires substantial advance planning and resources on both the national and local level. Without sufficient planning and safeguards, policies that restrict the right of displaced populations to return pending resettlement are likely to prolong displacement, infringe on displaced persons’ legal and human rights, and increase their vulnerability.

- Governments wishing to undertake post-disaster resettlement must have in place national legal frameworks that protect the rights of those affected. They must also establish institutional arrangements for implementing resettlement that include clearly articulated roles and responsibilities between central, provincial, and local authorities.

- Where governments decide to resettle displaced people in the aftermath of disasters, international humanitarian agencies engaged in disaster response must put in place transitional shelter and protection strategies to protect internally displaced people during the resettlement process, and work with government counter-parts and development agencies to implement them.

- In post-disaster contexts, both governments and international humanitarian and development agencies must collaborate to develop more inclusive, innovative, and flexible shelter/resettlement responses that go beyond physically relocating people to empty plots of land.

OVERVIEW

In November 2013, the strongest typhoon on record tore a path of destruction across the central Philippines, displacing four million people. In the disaster’s wake, the government adopted an ambitious plan to relocate 200,000 households away from at-risk coastal areas and resettle them out of harm’s way. While well-intentioned as a strategy to mitigate displacement from future typhoons and climate change, observations to date suggest that without sufficient planning and safeguards, government-led resettlement is a highly risky undertaking that threatens to prolong displacement and leave affected populations more, not less, vulnerable.
BACKGROUND

On November 8, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) struck the central Philippines. With sustained winds of 195 miles per hour, the storm was the strongest on record and affected 14 million people across nine regions. Most heavily affected were the Eastern Visayan Islands of Samar and Leyte, where the typhoon first made landfall, bringing with it a 15- to 19-foot storm surge that submerged thousands of miles of coastline.

The destruction caused by the storm was enormous. More than 6,000 people were killed and 1.1 million homes were damaged or destroyed, displacing some four million people. The storm also had devastating and long-term impacts on the livelihoods of close to six million workers, 2.6 million of whom were already living at or near the poverty line. The coconut industry, a leading economic sector in affected areas that supported a million farming households, was particularly hard hit with the loss of more than 33 million coconut trees. It will take nearly a decade for these trees to grow back. The storm also had major impacts on the fishing industry. Boats and fishing equipment were lost and vital fish habitats like mangroves and coral reefs were destroyed, thereby affecting more than 60 percent of fishing communities.

Facing the enormous destruction and mindful of the country’s high susceptibility to typhoons (20 per year on average), shortly after the storm hit, President Aquino instructed municipalities in affected coastal areas of Leyte and Samar to enforce “no build zones” (NBZs) in all areas within 40 meters (120 feet) of the high water mark. According to the policy, rebuilding would be allowed within NBZs for livelihood and commercial purposes but not for residential dwellings. The government further announced that it would implement a relocation and resettlement program for those previously living in these areas.

Prior to the typhoon, coastal areas such as Tacloban City in Leyte and Guiuan in Eastern Samar had become densely populated primarily by poor, informal settlers reliant on small business and fishing-related activities for their livelihoods. These were also the areas that were worst affected by the typhoon due not only to their high exposure to high winds and storm surge but also the informal nature of the housing in which their inhabitants lived. In fact, in some municipalities like Tacloban City, the mayor already had initiated plans to relocate and resettle families living next to the water in some of the more densely populated “barangays” (neighborhoods or villages) prior to the typhoon. The large-scale devastation and displacement caused by the typhoon – accompanied by the need to rebuild devastated areas and the significant inflow of financial aid – created both an incentive and an opportunity for the national and local governments to prohibit people from returning to these areas and take measures to relocate and resettle them.

While perhaps well-intended as a measure to protect people from future typhoons, the NBZ policy and resettlement plans have proven enormously challenging. This is not surprising in light of the scale of the proposed undertaking – an estimated one million people (200,000 households) previously lived in areas subject to the NBZ policy. Refugees International (RI), in its report from a mission undertaken in February 2014 (three months after the typhoon hit), warned that the enforcement of the NBZ policy, in the absence of a well-planned and fully consensual and inclusive resettlement program for those affected, was not only resulting in prolonged displacement of poor, landless families but also contravened national law and international human rights principles regarding the right of displaced people to voluntarily return to their place of habitual residence, as well as prohibitions on forced evictions.

In November 2014, one year since the typhoon struck, RI returned to typhoon-affected areas of Leyte and Samar to assess the status of the government’s resettlement plans. Although resettlement is ongoing, RI’s observations suggest that without sufficient planning and safeguards, post-disaster relocation and resettlement can prolong displacement and leave affected populations more, not less, vulnerable.

FLAWS IN THE NBZ POLICY RESULT IN DELAYS

From the onset, the NBZ policy proved problematic. Despite the fact that an estimated one million people previously lived in NBZs, no official document, public notice, or ordinance was issued by the national government spelling out the legal or regulatory basis for the imposition of NBZs or how they were to be implemented. On a practical level, the rationale for drawing a hard line at 40 meters seemed arbitrary in the absence of hazard risk mapping. In some low-lying areas like Tacloban City, Haiyan’s storm surge traveled as far as a kilometer or more inland, rendering the uniform 40-meter delineation meaningless.

In prior disasters such as Typhoon Bopha in 2012, the national government had likewise instructed municipalities to impose NBZs, raising similar concerns as to their legitimacy and the rights of those affected. However, in the case of Bopha, the delineation of NBZs was based not on a blanket 40-foot demarcation but rather on recommendations of the Mining and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) and the National Economy and Development Authority (NEDA) regarding which areas were safe for residential purposes. In the case of Haiyan, the national government initially asserted that the 40-meter de-
marcation was based on the Philippines Water Code. However, to the extent that the 40-meter easement required under the Water Code applies to forested areas only and is designed to protect water quality, not public safety, this assertion proved controversial.

Recognizing these shortcomings, in March 2014 the national government, through the Office of the Presidential Advisor for Reconstruction and Recovery (OPARR), recommended that the policy be revised to require municipalities to delineate “safe” and “unsafe” areas for residential and commercial or economic use based on hazard risk mapping. But with 171 municipalities affected by the typhoon, conducting comprehensive hazard risk mapping took time, especially since most municipalities – small and under-resourced to begin with – lacked the financial and technical capacity to do so. Moreover, determining which areas were “safe” required conducting mapping for multiple hazards including hydro-meteorological hazards, storm surge, floods, landslides, and earthquakes. Where comprehensive risk mapping was conducted, determining which areas were “safe” also proved problematic. For example, in the municipality of Guiuan, located on the tip of Samar Island and surrounded almost entirely by the sea, multi-hazard mapping undertaken with the assistance of international agencies revealed very few hazard-free areas.

Ultimately, it took close to a year for the government to develop a hazard risk mapping process. In November 2014, the government released a multi-agency “Joint Memorandum Circular on Adopting Hazard Zone Classification in Typhoon Affected Areas.” Pursuant to the circular, national government agencies including the Departments of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), MGB, Science and Technology (DOST), and Interior and Local Government (DILG), in cooperation with other government agencies, are responsible for making available to local governments geo-hazard and hydro-meteorological hazard maps to be used by municipal governments to adopt “low,” “moderate,” and “high” hazard zones and incorporated into land use plans.

CHALLENGES IN IDENTIFYING AND ACQUIRING SUITABLE LAND FOR RESETTLEMENT

“Currently, no one is talking about any plan other than shipping people to remote land even though it won’t cover the case load.”

-Representative of international aid agency engaged in the Haiyan response

From the onset, it was clear that very little planning had been undertaken at the national or local level regarding where to resettle those affected. Since most municipalities lacked the requisite funds or institutional capacity to implement resettlement, they were forced to await national government assistance, which was slow to arrive. Finalizing and approving the national government’s Comprehensive Recovery and Reconstruction Plan (CRRP or “Master Plan”) itself took close to year.
Moreover, given the enormous scale of the program, identifying sufficient sites for resettlement has proven extremely difficult. The Master Plan envisions the construction of 205,000 permanent homes to accommodate the resettlement of approximately one million people. Since the government’s vision for resettlement entails moving groups of people to vacant plots of land (as opposed to, inter alia, supporting them to integrate within existing residential areas), finding available land has been a slow and challenging process.

In the first instance, local governments were asked to identify government-owned land within their jurisdictions suitable for resettlement. In some municipalities, like Tacloban City, the local government had already set aside 87 hectares (215 acres) for resettlement. Ultimately, however, only 25 hectares (or 62 acres) of land was deemed suitable for residential purposes. Given the lack of available, government-owned land, local governments were asked to identify private land. However, because much of the land in affected areas is protected for specific uses (e.g., timber), identifying land that could be acquired for resettlement was difficult in many municipalities. Where local governments were able to find suitable private lots, they were forced to await national government funding as they lacked the requisite financial resources. With adoption of the CRRP in October 2014, the National Housing Authority (NHA) stepped in with a “full package” to identify and purchase sites and build houses.

AN AWKWARD INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT

“\[It’s an open secret that while the national government supports resettlement, it isn’t present on the ground.\]

- UN agency official

It is well recognized that resettlement is a process that entails not only relocating (i.e., physically moving) people to new homes but also supporting them to restore their livelihoods and standards of living, to access to services, and to maintain their communities and social support networks.” In the case of Haiyan, the institutional arrangement set up by the national government to handle recovery and rehabilitation has proven cumbersome and ill-equipped to undertake all that resettlement entails.

While OPARR is responsible for “unifying the efforts of government and other agencies involved in post-Haiyan rehabilitation and recovery,” the office’s mandate is limited both in its term (through 2015) and authority. Since the Philippines adheres to a decentralized form of government, OPARR’s primary role is to coordinate recovery efforts in cooperation with local governments. Even this task has proven challenging since the office is thinly staffed, has an extremely limited field presence and, according to many agencies involved in the humanitarian response, “came in very late.”

Further complicating matters, the national government’s “cluster” system arrangement adopted by OPARR to oversee the four main areas targeted for rehabilitation – infrastructure, livelihoods, resettlement, and social services – appears cumbersome in the case of resettlement. Whereas the cluster head of the other three clusters is a specific government department (e.g., the head of the infrastructure cluster is the Department of Public Works and Highways), the resettlement cluster is led by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), which is comprised of 15 government departments and authorities. The awkward institutional arrangement under, and limited mandate of, HUDCC also leaves open the question of who will be responsible for monitoring resettlement over the long-term.
At the time of RI’s visit in mid-November 2014, there was limited evidence that HUDCC or the resettlement cluster had progressed in fulfilling their mandates. For example, the first meeting of the resettlement cluster did not take place in Tacloban City until November 25, 2014, more than one year after the typhoon hit. With 114 municipalities in total requiring resettlement, and the myriad support required to successfully resettle people in a manner that, at the very least, restores their living standards, it appears likely that HUDCC will face significant challenges in successfully achieving its task.

There also do not appear to be sufficient mechanisms in place to safeguard the legal and human rights of those who will be resettled. Not surprisingly, the NBZ policy and relocation and resettlement plans have raised numerous legal and human rights concerns. In February 2014, the Philippines Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued an advisory cautioning that the government’s NBZ policy and relocation/resettlement plans were potentially at odds with provisions of Philippine law and international human rights standards regarding the rights of displaced populations to voluntarily return, to adequate and decent housing, and to property restitution, as well as the prohibitions on forced evictions and arbitrary displacement. The Commission further emphasized the obligation of the government under national law and international human rights standards to consult with communities on all aspects of their resettlement. NBZs may only be enforced where (a) their imposition does not render people homeless, (b) affected persons are adequately consulted, (c) compensation for loss of property is provided in addition or as an alternative to resettlement, and (d) administrative appeals and judicial review are made available. The CHR also found that any resettlement undertaken by the government must include access to food, water, sanitation, shelter, medical services, education, and sources of livelihoods. It is unclear which agency or department within HUDCC will ensure that these requirements are met.

IDPS WAIT IN LIMBO

By early November 2014 – a year after Haiyan hit – no more than several hundred families had been relocated to permanent houses. In Tacloban City, where the mayor hopes to relocate 14,400 families by the end of 2015, only 52 permanent shelters had been completed on a site that, as of the end of November 2014, had yet to be hooked up to utilities and services. In Guiuan, where the city plans to resettle 12,000 families from three coastal barangays devastated by the storm (Barangays 6, 7, and Hollywood), the NHA had not completed construction of any permanent shelters (although 130 families had been relocated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to a temporary site that will later be converted to a permanent resettlement site).

Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the storm – primarily poor and landless families – have been forced to wait in limbo with little information regarding when – or whether – they will be resettled. As of late 2014, over 1,000 households (5,000 people) were still living in tent cities, while close to 5,500 families (27,500 people) were residing in temporary transitional shelters (bunkhouses). Thousands more who returned to their home areas to await relocation and resettlement also remain extremely vulnerable. This is largely due to the fact that in many municipalities in which the NBZ policy was enforced, humanitarian agencies were prohibited from providing assistance to displaced families who returned to these areas. Since sufficient transitional sites are unavailable, and most evacuation centers were eventually “closed,” most internally displaced people (IDPs) had no other choice than to return to their former communities and reconstruct their homes using whatever storm debris they could salvage, despite the prohibition on rebuilding.

**“NGOs keep telling us that this is a no build zone. But I have no other choice. I’m just waiting to be relocated, but I don’t know when.”**

- Displaced woman, Barangay 88, Tacloban City

Typhoon survivors grow frustrated with the slow recovery and resettlement process. Salcedo, E. Samar, Nov. 2014
Unfortunately, the restrictions on more permanent forms of shelter assistance in NBZs have left many vulnerable to the next storm. As of mid-September, almost a year after the typhoon hit, 42,000 households (more than 200,000 people) were still living in emergency or makeshift shelters in “unsafe zones,” many of whom had received little or no support since Haiyan struck due to the restrictions on humanitarian assistance in these areas. The slow designation of resettlement sites also impinged on the delivery of much-needed livelihood assistance since most livelihood interventions are tied to geographic location, thus prolonging the need for humanitarian assistance.

Despite these challenges and delays, the national government asserts that substantial progress has been made in identifying sites allowing resettlement to move forward as planned. At a November 10, 2014 press conference, OPARR announced that resettlement sites had been identified for 160,000 housing units. But according to government employees engaged in the resettlement process with whom RI spoke, it was not yet clear whether the available sites would ultimately prove suitable for residential construction due to drainage, land grading, and the like. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the government will be able to find durable solutions for some 40,000 households for whom no resettlement site has yet been identified (at least, had not been as of November 2014).

Lastly, with President Aquino leaving office in 2016, there is a question of whether the next president will continue to support the resettlement plan and extend OPARR’s mandate beyond 2015. This leaves OPARR and the resettlement cluster under a great deal of pressure to complete resettlement within a one-year time frame.

EMERGENT PROBLEMS IN THE RESETTLEMENT PROCESS

With such a small portion of the resettlement caseload of one million people completed, it is difficult to draw too many firm conclusions as to the program’s overall success. Nonetheless, RI’s visits to municipalities in Leyte and Samar and interviews with those involved in the resettlement process, as well as with targeted populations, revealed a number of emergent issues which, if not addressed, are likely to undermine successful resettlement.

The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has created guidance on post-disaster settlement planning that provides:

Responsible settlements are about more than the construction of shelter, they are about creating a safe environment for the entire community where they not only have access to an adequate standard of housing but also to utilities, critical infrastructure and livelihood opportunities. Adopting a settlements perspective involves the consideration of other aspects of community life beyond shelter and how they all fit together physically and functionally.

In the case of the Philippines, rather than embracing a “settlements” approach, the primary tactic has been to construct shelters on vacant plots of land regardless of the lack of access to even the most basic services like electricity, water, and sanitation. For example, at the main relocation site in Tacloban City (in Barangay 108, also known as “Tagapuro”) the NHA has started construction of permanent shelters. Yet there is no electricity at the site, and the municipal water utility’s lines do not extend far enough north to service the area, which is totally undeveloped. The NHA is considering the possibility of partnering with a private company to build a desalinization plant to provide water to the site. However, it is not clear if and when that will take place, as the water company is not yet convinced that enough people will be successfully resettled to the area and that it will have enough customers to support its investment.

In Jagnaya Barangay in Salcedo municipality in Eastern Samar, 50 permanent houses have been built (in this instance, by a private foundation) immediately adjacent to former residential areas but slightly uphill. However, since there is no water, sanitation, or electricity hooked up to the homes, IDPs are still residing in bunkhouses waiting to move in. The barangay chief told RI that the municipality was responsible for utility hook ups, while a representative of the local mayor’s office told RI that the local government was awaiting funding from another donor.
Land is being chosen because it’s available; not because it’s suitable.

-Representative of international aid agency engaged in the Haiyan response

Where resettlement projects are moving forward, the sites are often remote from town centers and IDPs’ former livelihoods, schools, and social networks. Tagapuro site in Tacloban City is in the northern part of the municipality, approximately 15 kilometers from the center of town. It is intended to be the main resettlement site for some 14,000 households. As one OPARR official working in Tacloban City told RI, “the main complaint of people is the location of the resettlement site. They keep asking me, ‘What will we do in the mountains?’”

In addition, at most sites, there is little evidence that construction of permanent housing is being accompanied by support for livelihoods, thereby undermining the sustainability of resettlement. In Guiuan, approximately 130 families – most of whom are fisherfolk – have been relocated to a plot of land located a few kilometers inland. However, because no programs are yet in place to create new livelihoods, and transportation subsidies have not been provided that would allow them to access their prior livelihoods, some families continue to reside in wooden shacks next to the sea during the week in order to fish and send their children to school. On the weekends, they return to their “new” homes since they cannot afford the cost of commuting back and forth on a daily basis.

Even where there is evidence of livelihoods support, such programs do not appear well coordinated. In Tacloban City, for example, the UN Development Programme and others are implementing a promising comprehensive livelihoods program for resettled families that envisions setting up a new “economic center” in Tagapuro. However, it appears that physical relocation is taking place in the absence of sufficient livelihood assistance or before livelihood opportunities like new markets are in place.

On the positive side, there are a few good examples of more innovative approaches to resettlement that appear not only more sustainable but also more cost effective. For example, several organizations in Tacloban City are implementing small-scale shelter and settlement projects using the concept of “in-filling.” This involves looking at the urban landscape and helping households to identify their own shelter and settlement options close to their original homes, livelihoods, and communities including rent-to-own, land rental, apartment rental, and host family subsidies. As a result, beneficiaries will be provided with shelter that is safer, and either within or nearby their current neighborhoods, thus allowing them to maintain social cohesion and access to livelihoods.

In addition, several resettlement projects have promised security of land tenure. At the Cogon site in Guiuan, IOM has constructed transitional shelters on a permanent resettlement site with the expectation that these shelters will be upgraded over time. After five years, the people who have been relocated there will be required to pay a small amount (50 pesos or ap-
proximately $1.13 a month) over a period of 18 years, at which
time they will get certificates of ownership for the house and
the land. In other areas, however, municipal officials told RI
that they will allow people to stay as long as they want but not
to rent or sell their homes. According to a representative of
the resettlement cluster, as of late November 2014, the land
ownership arrangements at each of the sites had not been de-
termined yet.

“\textit{A better approach would have been to put in infrastructure first, then build houses. But frankly, we had to get people out of tents.}”

- Local government official

ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN GOVERNMENT-LED RESETTLEMENT

As discussed in RI’s February report, UN agencies and other
international and local humanitarian organizations engaged
in the typhoon response also ran into difficulties navigating
the government’s NBZ policy and relocation/resettlement
plans. Despite the fact that NBZs are not new to the Phil-
ippines and had been enforced following numerous recent
natural disasters, including Typhoon Bopha in 2012, the UN
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in Manila was slow to
develop a unified strategy on how to address the issue with
the government.

Ultimately, inter-agency guidance was developed advocating
that: humanitarian agencies be permitted by the government
to provide assistance to IDPs who returned to NBZs; resettlement be adopted as a measure of last resort; and, where justified based on hazard mapping, durable relocation/resettlement plans be developed in consultation with affected communities. Additional guidance was later developed to help aid agencies responding to typhoon survivors’ shelter needs to decide whether or not to become involved in the relocation and resettlement process given the inherent risks, and “to ensure that relocation is undertaken with a holistic perspective and in a manner that respects the rights of all affected persons.”\textsuperscript{xi}

A UN inter-agency humanitarian evaluation of the response
conducted in October 2014 concluded that “[w]hile the HCT
advocacy eventually had some positive effect, and the advice
produced by the HCT was appreciated by agencies working
in the field, the decision-making process was slow. ... [H]ous-
ing, land and property issues should have been given much
more HCT policy and advocacy attention early on, and that
this would have benefited from a stronger policy push by the
HCT.”\textsuperscript{xi}

The experience from the Philippines also points to a larger
protection gap. This stems from the fact that while the hu-
manitarian response to natural disasters usually lasts for no
more than a year (in the case of Haiyan, the government de-
clared the official “end” of the humanitarian response phase
in July, eight months after the typhoon struck) resettlement
is a long-term process. Where people are being prevented
from returning pending resettlement, displaced populations
will not only be displaced for longer periods, but also face
increased risks including eviction, involuntary resettlement,
loss of livelihoods, and loss of social networks, and also be
exposed to protection risks such as gender-based violence.
In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, the “residual humanitarian
caseload” identified by the HCT of close to one million people
either still displaced or living in makeshift shelters in “unsafe
areas” (where they have been prohibited from rebuilding or
receiving more permanent shelter structures) is testimony to
this.

This suggests that in order to adequately protect displaced
persons during the relocation and resettlement process, hu-
manitarian actors engaged in the emergency response will
need to ensure that housing, land, and property (HLP) issues
are addressed from the outset by deploying sufficient HLP ex-
erts and advocating with the government for respect of HLP
rights. As RI recommended in its February report, in future
large-scale natural disasters, the protection cluster and the
UN Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT), in coop-
eration with the shelter cluster, should immediately establish
a HLP sub-cluster, and deploy more HLP advisors to provide
guidance on the ground. In addition, international humani-
tarian agencies engaged in the disaster response must develop
transitional shelter and protection strategies that protect IDPs
during the resettlement process, and work closely with gov-
ernment counter-parts and development agencies engaged in
recovery and resettlement to implement them. International
rehabilitation and development agencies, for their part, must
be better prepared to integrate protection and human rights
safeguards such as those outlined by the CHR into any reset-
tlement support programs.

CONCLUSION

A year following the typhoon, and with resettlement finally
In post-disaster scenarios, governments may be incentivized to prohibit rebuilding in at-risk areas and to resettle affected communities out of harm’s way. However, experience from the Philippines suggests that they should bear in mind that resettlement is a complex, time-intensive, and risky undertaking. Identifying suitable and sustainable resettlement options that not only provide affected communities with permanent shelter and access to services but also allow them to maintain livelihoods, support networks, and social cohesion is likely to take many years and requires significant advance planning and funding to implement.

Governments undertaking resettlement should have in place national legal frameworks to protect the rights of those affected by resettlement, accompanied by well-designed institutional arrangements that set forth the respective roles and responsibilities of national, provincial, and local government agencies. Sufficient and sustained funding must be available at all levels to implement resettlement including for land, shelter, infrastructure, and livelihoods support as well as to ensure that government agencies involved in the resettlement process have the requisite technical and human capacity to oversee the resettlement process and to monitor its implementation over the long term. The Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement within States, which lay out a normative framework and best practices regarding planned relocations in the context of natural disasters and climate change, provide an excellent resource for governments.

Following disasters, government restrictions on the right of displaced people to return pending resettlement should be avoided as they threaten to prolong displacement, violate affected populations’ legal and human rights, increase protection risks, and heighten vulnerabilities. Where they are enforced to protect people from hazard exposure, they must be based on hazard mapping and proportionate to the danger, and imposed in compliance with human rights standards applicable to forced evictions.

Where resettlement is warranted, there is a need for more innovative, cost-effective, and community-driven resettlement options that go beyond physically relocating people to empty plots of land.

International humanitarian agencies involved in disaster response need to develop policies and strategies relating to post-disaster resettlement. To the extent that resettlement is a long-term process that will span well beyond the humanitarian response phase of disaster response, humanitarian agencies must be prepared to develop and put in place transitional shelter and protection strategies that protect IDPs pending resettlement, and work closely with government counter-parts and development agencies engaged in recovery to implement them. International development agencies, for their part, must be better prepared to integrate protection and human rights safeguards into any resettlement support programs.

Whether the post-Haiyan resettlement program ultimately proves successful remains to be seen, and will require long-term monitoring. But with millions of people around the globe currently residing in areas exposed to the effects of climate change, resettlement as an adaptation strategy is likely to entail significant challenges, costs, and risks unless more innovative, inclusive, and rights-based approaches are developed.
ENDNOTES

1. The findings and recommendations contained in this report are discussed in greater detail in a forthcoming report on government-led relocation in the context of disasters and climate change to be published by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement. See www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp.

2. According to the Philippines Office of Civil Defense, approximately 200,000 households (one million people) resided before the typhoon in coastal areas subject to the government’s NBZ policy.

3. Article VIII, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines states that “Urban and rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated.” Principle 28.1 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement state that: “Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall endeavor to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons.”


13. In August 2013, a group of representatives from 10 countries came together to adopt the Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement within States, the first formal statement of principles providing a comprehensive normative framework for addressing internal displacement and relocation in the context of climate change, available at http://displacementsolution.org/peninsula-principles/

Alice Thomas traveled to the Philippine islands of Leyte and Samar to assess the humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan in February and November 2014. She interviewed affected individuals, Philippine and donor government officials, UN officials, and representatives of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, international non-government organizations, and local civil society organizations.