

## Online Appendix

Burge, Ryan P., and Paul A. Djupe. 2016. "Emergent Fault Lines: Clergy Attitudes Toward the Emergent Church Movement." *Journal of Religious Leadership*.


### Further Notes about the Survey Sample of Clergy

Clergy were contacted to participate via their listed office email address. For the smaller denominations in our study –the Greek Orthodox and RCA – addresses were culled from publicly-available parish and denominational websites that listed this individual-level contact information. PC(USA) clergy contact information were provided to the authors from the denomination's in-house research office. For the largest denominations in our study – the UMC and SBC – we relied on a commercially-generated email list from the vendor Exact Data, which maintains current congregational lists for a variety of US denominations. Each of the culling methods has drawbacks from the standpoint of representativeness, although it is not possible to determine exact sampling biases a priori. In each denominational case, we endeavored to use the total population of clergy with listed email addresses, which is a subset of the total clergy population in each denomination. Given missing data, we received somewhere between 375-411 valid responses depending on the question.

This is clearly not a random sample of clergy, nor are the denominations/traditions present fully representative of the American religious population. These groups were included from what started as a longer list because they agreed to participate in several cases and then because we could gain access to others through commercial vendor lists that helped extend coverage. Though it is de facto a convenience sample, we did attempt to cover a wide spectrum of American Christianity and the distribution of responses bears that out. What is useful about the sample, despite its limitations, is that appropriate questions were asked to gauge approval of the ECM and the sample includes considerable diversity of religious and political conservatism. With appropriate controls, we can test with some confidence our hypotheses about the religious, political, and demographic correlates of ECM diffusion. On the other hand, we have little confidence that the descriptive statistics regarding the levels of knowledge of the movement and approval rates can be generalized to a relevant population. We will still display them (especially by denomination, which look representative), but they should not be taken as representative of the larger population of all clergy without circumspection.

We can compare our data to recent, larger survey efforts of clergy, like the Cooperative Clergy Study (Smidt 2009), which was a cooperative venture between a number of scholars to survey clergy in 10 Protestant denominations: Assemblies of God, Christian Reformed Church, Disciples of Christ, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, Presbyterian Church (USA), Reformed Church in America, Southern Baptist Convention, United Methodist Church, and Mennonite Church. A religious conservatism measure from the CCS with 7 likert (5 point) items has a mean of 4.1 (sd=1.0), while a comparable measure from these data has a mean of 3.6 (sd=1.1). That is, the distribution of religious conservatism in our data is more flat, including more moderates and liberals than the CCS. Our data are also symmetrically distributed in terms of partisanship (45 percent each Democrats and Republicans), whereas the CCS is somewhat more heavily Republican (55 percent). This is not to say that either is better, but is simply to say that there is considerable diversity in our sample and moreover that the two samples are not radically different from each other.

**Figure A.1** – Predicted Change in Probability of Choosing the “Don’t Know Enough To Rate” Option (Logistic regression estimates)



Note: The plot displays the change in probability of choosing the don't know option across the full range of the independent variable. The lines represent the 90% confidence interval around the estimated effect – if the line overlaps with zero then the variable has no statistically significant effect.


**Table A.1** – Logistic Regression Estimates of Choosing the Don't Know Option Regarding Approval of the ECM

	B	(se)	<i>p</i>
Religious conservatism	-2.39	(2.11)	.26
Religious authority	-.64	(2.01)	.75
Evangelical identity	2.03	(.72)	.01
Ecumenical identity	.15	(.59)	.79
SBC (reference)			
Greek Orthodox	5.25	(1.60)	.00
UMC	-1.97	(1.43)	.17
RCA	-1.32	(1.06)	.21
PC(USA)	-.88	(.91)	.33
Partisanship	-.73	(.42)	.08
Political activity	-6.75	(3.73)	.07
Partisanship * Activity	.89	(.77)	.25
Feelings toward religious right	2.62	(1.45)	.07
Tea party identifier	.28	(.70)	.69
Female	-.10	(.78)	.90
Years in the ministry	3.92	(1.25)	.00
Education	.59	(.85)	.48
Church class status	-.97	(1.35)	.79
Congregational diversity	-2.80	(1.76)	.14
Adult ed. democratic practice	-2.78	(1.62)	.58
Democratic norms	-.16	(1.48)	.26
West (reference)			
East	1.17	(1.13)	.34
Midwest	1.25	(1.14)	.21
South	.76	(1.18)	.23
Rural (reference)			
Small town	.66	(.71)	.35
Medium city	-2.76	(1.55)	.07
Large city	.25	(1.04)	.81
Suburb of large city	-2.09	(1.12)	.06
Constant	1.51	(3.48)	.66


Source: 2014 Clergy Study.

Model Statistics: N=289, % correctly classified=91.3%,  
% reduction in error=28.6, pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=.37

**Figure A.2** – Interactive Effects of Partisanship and Political Activity on the Probability of Choosing the “Don’t Know to Rate” Option (90% CIs)



**Figure A.3** – Predicted Effects on Support for the Emergent Church Movement (ordered logit)



Note: The plot displays the ordered logit coefficients with lines representing the 90% confidence interval around the estimates (overlap with zero indicates that the variable has no significant effect).


**Table A.2** – Ordered Logit Estimation of ECM Approval

	$\beta$	(se)	$p$
Religious conservatism	-1.52	(1.01)	.13
Religious Authority	-5.46	(1.17)	.00
Evangelical identity	.70	(.32)	.03
Ecumenical identity	.17	(.32)	.59
Emergent identity	1.74	(.51)	.00
SBC (reference)			
Greek Orthodox	1.41	(1.13)	.21
UMC	-.03	(.66)	.96
RCA	.24	(.56)	.66
PC(USA)	.13	(.56)	.81
Partisanship	.41	(.20)	.05
Political activity	2.97	(1.48)	.04
Partisanship * Activity	-1.03	(.34)	.00
Feelings toward religious right	-.69	(.75)	.36
Tea party identifier	-.69	(.42)	.10
Female	-.04	(.36)	.91
Years in the ministry	1.56	(.70)	.03
Education	-.92	(.48)	.06
Church class status	-.17	(.81)	.84
Congregational diversity	-1.14	(.81)	.16
Adult ed. democratic practice	-.09	(.74)	.90
Democratic norms	1.52	(.75)	.04
West (reference)			
East	.85	(.51)	.09
Midwest	.73	(.46)	.11
South	.66	(.50)	.19
Rural (reference)			
Small town	.15	(.43)	.72
Medium city	.16	(.52)	.75
Large city	.77	(.59)	.19
Suburb of large city	.54	(.47)	.25
Very large city	1.49	(.60)	.01
Suburb of very large city	.83	(.72)	.25
Cut point 1	-5.67	(1.59)	
Cut point 2	-3.52	(1.56)	
Cut point 3	-.42	(1.55)	
Cut point 4	2.59	(1.56)	

Source: 2014 Clergy Study.

Model Statistics: N=254, Pseudo R<sup>2</sup>=.27,  $\chi^2=183.2$  ( $p<.01$ )

**Figure A.4** – Interaction of Partisanship and Political Activity on Approval of the ECM



Source: 2014 Clergy Study. 90% confidence intervals. Inactive and active represent the end points of the political activity index.