The Power in Being Yourself: Feeling Authentic Enhances the Sense of Power

Muping Gan¹, Daniel Heller², and Serena Chen¹

Abstract
Across five experiments (total N = 715), we propose that people can gain a subjective sense of power by being authentic—in other words, state authenticity breeds power. Supporting this, participants reported feeling more powerful when they visualized themselves behaving authentically versus inauthentically (Study 1), or recalled a time when they felt authentic versus inauthentic (Studies 2-4). Studies 3 and 4 revealed that authenticity (vs. inauthenticity) likely drives the authenticity-to-power effect. Finally, Study 5 showed that perceivers infer others’ power and make important downstream judgments (i.e., likelihood of being an effective negotiator and leader), based on others’ authenticity. Importantly, our findings could not be explained by positive affect or by preexisting power differences, and held across diverse situations (e.g., those absent of social pressure). Implications for state authenticity as a strategic means to attain power and for understanding its dynamic nature and effects are discussed.

Keywords
authenticity, social power, power emergence, experimental research

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Subjective Power and State Authenticity
Social power entails having asymmetrical control over valued resources, creating the capacity to influence others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). It represents both a social-structural construct and a psychological, subjective state and is associated with numerous positive outcomes (Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015). Most research has focused on documenting these outcomes, with less attention given to the question of what breeds subjective power in the first place (Anderson & Brion, 2014). Extant research has considered how power may arise from fixed characteristics of the individual such as race, social and emotional skills, physical attributes, and personality traits (e.g., Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Anderson & Kilduff, 2009), from structural sources (e.g., one’s location in informal social networks; Burt, 1992), and from prolonged experiences of power (e.g., leadership emergence; Bass, 2008).

More recently, research has begun to uncover transient behaviors that can momentarily affect one’s subjective sense of power such as engaging in various paraverbal behaviors (e.g., lower voice pitch), violating norms, and using abstract language (e.g., Stel, van Dijk, Smith, van Dijk, & Djalal, 2012; van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, Gündemir, & Stamkou, 2011; Waksler, Smith, & Han, 2014). The current research investigates the role of a novel transient state—namely, state

¹University of California, Berkeley, USA
²Tel Aviv University, Israel

Corresponding Author:
Daniel Heller, Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel.
Email: dheller@post.tau.ac.il
Authenticity Enhances Subjective Power

The central hypothesis we develop is that state authenticity breeds a sense of power. The starting point of the rationale for this hypothesis is the notion that the relative self-sufficiency of the powerful frees them to pursue their own beliefs, goals, emotions, and values. In contrast, the lack of self-sufficiency of the powerless may engender the feeling that one’s behavior is strongly influenced by external social forces (Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012), an important component of inauthenticity (Wood et al., 2008). Indeed, research shows that power leads to greater expression of one’s felt emotions, attitudes, values, and personality traits (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Hecht & LaFrance, 1998). For example, the powerful are less influenced by others’ attitudes and thereby remain more true to their own attitudes (Galinsky et al., 2008). Still more directly, subjective power has been shown to enhance reports of state authenticity (Kifer et al., 2013; Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). For example, participants primed with high power reported greater state authenticity than their counterparts primed with low power (Kifer et al., 2013, Study 2a; Kraus et al., 2012, Study 3).

The documented effect of subjective power on state authenticity raises the possibility that authenticity itself may be a signal of power. In fact, people are able to readily detect power hierarchies and categorize others within these social frameworks (Srivastava & Anderson, 2011; Zitek & Tiedens, 2012), suggesting that people have rich and highly accessible beliefs about the powerful (Hall, Coats, & LeBeau, 2005). Because lay beliefs are likely to serve as the basis for self-perception processes (Bem, 1972), we propose that people may derive subjective power from observing that they feel the way powerful people typically do. Indeed, research indicates that because certain actions are uniquely and importantly associated with power (e.g., abstract thinking, rule breaking), over time the behaviors themselves come to signal power for the actor himself or herself, as well as for perceivers (Magee, 2009; van Kleef et al., 2011; Wakslak et al., 2014).

Extending such logic, we reasoned that because the powerful frequently experience being in line with their true selves, the concepts of power and authenticity are strongly and repeatedly jointly activated in people’s minds, leading them to become, over time, mentally associated (e.g., Barh, 1997). In addition, from the perspective of perceivers observing the powerful show no apparent hesitation in, for example, expressing their political beliefs or core values should also lead people to develop power-authenticity mental associations. Beyond this, feeling authentic entails believing the locus of control of one’s behavior is internal—in one’s control independent of external social influences (Deci & Ryans, 1995), which is an important component of subjective power (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). Together, the above theorizing and evidence suggest that state authenticity is likely to signal that one is powerful, willing to be his or her true self regardless of possible external constraints such as peer pressure. Indeed, such a portrait fits lay theories and expectations of the powerful (Kuehn, Chen, & Gordon, 2015).

In sum, the circumstances of the powerful allow them to be more authentic. Thus, lay notions of power have come to include authenticity, suggesting that state authenticity likely cues having power and thereby enhances subjective power, as well as others’ perceptions of one’s power.

Overview of Studies

Across five experiments, we tested whether state authenticity enhances the subjective experience and social perceptions of power. Our focus was on the effect of state authenticity regardless of the preceding context or cause that bred the authenticity (see also Johnson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 2004). Study 1 asked participants to report their subjective power in a situation after visualizing behaving (in)authentically. Participants in Studies 2 and 3 recalled an (in)authentic experience and then reported their subjective power. Study 3 included a control condition to shed light on whether authenticity enhances power, inauthenticity reduces power or both occur. Study 4 incorporated a specific positive affect condition as a comparison for the authenticity condition. Finally, Study 5 tested whether the link established in Studies 1-4 is mirrored in social perception—namely, people make inferences about a target’s power based on the target’s authenticity. This study also investigated the effect of authenticity on...
We tested two main alternative explanations for the hypothesized authenticity-to-power effect: positive affect and preexisting power differences. First, the fact that authenticity is linked to positive affect (e.g., Kifer et al., 2013; Lenton, Bruder, Slabu, & Sedikides, 2013), paired with theory and evidence indicating that positive affect and power are linked (e.g., Keltner et al., 2003), raises the possibility that our key finding is driven by authenticity eliciting positive affect rather than by authenticity per se. To address this, in Study 1, we measured mood; in Study 4, we pitted authenticity against a specific positive affect; and in Study 5, we manipulated target’s felt positive/negative mood orthogonally to the target’s authenticity. Second, because power differences may already be operating in situations in which people behave authentically (e.g., people are more apt to behave authentically when they have power), an authenticity-to-power effect in the recall studies may reflect preexisting power differences in the situations participants recalled. Thus, in Study 2, outside coders coded for, and in Study 3, the participants themselves reported on, preexisting power differences in their recalled situations.

Across studies, we set sample size in advance aiming for a minimum of 50 participants per condition (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013). For studies using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), we included attention-check questions. We decided a priori to exclude participants who failed these checks (details are reported in each study). Given that, on average, 15% of MTurk participants are excluded for poor attention (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014), we adjusted the number of participants we recruited accordingly.

**Study 1: Do People Feel More Powerful When They Imagine Behaving Authentically?**

In Study 1, we manipulated state authenticity by having participants visualize themselves behaving (in)authentically in a hypothetical scenario, and then reporting their subjective power in the situation. In developing the scenario, we were careful to keep the action tendency (i.e., speaking behavior) constant across conditions given evidence that action heightens judgments of a target’s power (Magee, 2009).

**Method**

**Participants.** We recruited and compensated 154 participants online via MTurk for a study on “people’s thoughts and feelings in particular situations.” In total, 19 were excluded from all analyses, eight for failing one or more of two attention-check questions (i.e., please leave the answer to this question blank, please select strongly disagree for quality assurance purposes), and 11 for incorrectly answering a question testing their comprehension of the visualization task (see below for more details). The remaining 135 participants (72 females) ranged from 18 to 77 years in age ($M = 37.19$ years). In total, 107 participants were European American, eight African American, seven Asian American, seven Latino/a, one Native American, and five reported they were mixed and/or “Other” ethnicities.

**Procedure.** Participants were randomly assigned to visualize behaving (in)authentically. Specifically, they were asked to imagine that at a social gathering

> . . . the conversation turns to politics. A particularly sensitive issue comes up and everyone seems to take the same stance. People are enthusiastically agreeing with one another and appear to be really into the conversation. The issue is pretty important to you, but you hold the opposite position as everyone else. One person in the group notices that you aren’t talking much and asks you directly what you think. You hesitate for a moment but then decide to go ahead and stay true to your views by saying to the group what you think about the issue [You hesitate for a moment and then decide to hold back and hide your views by simply saying that you’re not sure what you think about the issue].

Participants were asked to visualize the scenario for at least 1 min. Afterward, they reported their state mood on a pictorial measure ($1 = unhappy$ to $9 = happy$; Self-Assessment Manikin; Bradley & Lang, 1994), allowing us to test whether the proposed authenticity-to-power effect was due to mood (i.e., participants in the authentic condition endorsing more positive self-beliefs, including being powerful, due to positive mood).

For the remaining measures, participants reported their thoughts and feelings after the imagined situation. As a manipulation check, participants rated how much they felt authentic and genuine ($1 = Not at all to 7 = Very much so; \( \alpha = .95 \))

These items were embedded among three filler adjectives. Next, as a comprehension check, participants were asked to recall what they did in the visualization task. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed. One participant was aware of our hypothesis—namely, he or she explicitly stated our authenticity-to-power hypothesis (the awareness criterion we used in all studies)—but was retained because exclusion did not alter results.

**Results and Discussion**

**Authenticity manipulation check.** An independent samples $t$ test revealed that, as intended, participants in the authentic condition ($M = 5.64, SD = 1.42$) felt more authentic in the situation they were asked to imagine relative to those in the
inauthentic condition \((M = 2.40, SD = 1.73)\), \(t(133) = 11.74, p < .001, d = 2.04\).

**State mood.** An independent samples \(t\) test revealed no condition effect on state mood, \(t(133) < 1\), thus minimizing a positive mood account for our findings.

**State power.** As hypothesized, participants in the authentic condition \((M = 5.79, SD = 1.99)\) reported feeling more powerful compared with those in the inauthentic condition \((M = 2.82, SD = 2.04)\), \(t(133) = 8.53, p < .001, d = 1.48\).

In sum, Study 1 showed that participants who visualized acting authentically compared with inauthentically reported feeling more powerful, as hypothesized. Participants did not differ in self-reported mood across conditions, which is inconsistent with a mood interpretation of our key authenticity-to-power effect. However, Study 1 has potential limitations. First, the authenticity-to-power effect we found may reflect differences other than authenticity between the situations visualized in the two conditions—for example, whether people feel greater social pressure or whether one expresses a minority opinion, in the authentic relative to the inauthentic situation (regarding these possibilities, see below for coding analyses of participants’ responses in Studies 3 and 4). Also, because our key finding was obtained using hypothetical scenarios, it is subject to alternative causal interpretations such as a power-to-authenticity effect.

**Study 2: Do People Feel More Powerful After Recalling an Actual Time They Were Authentic?**

Study 2 aimed to conceptually replicate Study 1 with a non-hypothetical manipulation of state authenticity: Participants were asked to recall a situation in which they had actually felt authentic or inauthentic, and then reported their subjective power.

**Method**

**Participants.** We recruited and compensated 113 participants online via MTurk for a study on “experiences and feelings about the self.” Eight were excluded for failing one or more of three attention-check items and two for not responding to the writing prompt that served as our authenticity manipulation. The remaining 103 participants (57 females) ranged in age from 18 to 61 years \((M = 34.65\) years). In total, 75 were European American, 15 Asian American, six African American, three Latino/a, one Native American, and three were mixed and/or “Other” ethnicities.

**Procedure.** Participants were randomly assigned to recall and write about a past incident in which they felt authentic (or inauthentic), defined as being (or not being) true to oneself and behaving (or not behaving) in accordance with one’s true thoughts, beliefs, personality, or values (for full instructions, see Kifer et al., 2013). They were asked to write for at least 2 min. Afterward, participants rated their level of agreement \((1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree)\) that they were true to themselves, authentic in the way they acted, and were really being themselves in the incident they wrote about \((\alpha = .96)\). These items, adapted from Fleeson and Wilt (2010), served as our authenticity manipulation check. Participants then completed our key dependent measure of state power, consisting of eight items, each beginning with the stem, “Right now, I feel . . .” Using a 9-point scale, anchored on each end by a descriptor, participants indicated how submissive–dominant, passive–active, unassertive–assertive, timid–firm, uncertain–certain, insecure–confident, dependent–independent, and powerless–powerful they felt (adapted from Smith, Wigboldus, & Dijksterhuis, 2008; \(\alpha = .93\)). These items were embedded among pairs of non-power-related fillers. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed. One participant was aware of our hypothesis but was retained because exclusion did not change our results.

**Results and Discussion**

**Authenticity manipulation check.** An independent samples \(t\) test revealed that participants in the authentic condition \((M = 6.45, SD = 0.70)\) felt more authentic in the situation they wrote about than did those in the inauthentic condition \((M = 2.67, SD = 1.44)\), \(t(101) = 16.88, p < .001, d = 3.36\).

**State power.** As hypothesized, participants in the authentic condition \((M = 6.36, SD = 1.46)\) rated themselves higher in power than those in the inauthentic condition \((M = 5.44, SD = 1.60)\), \(t(101) = 3.04, p < .01, d = .60\).

**Alternative account: Preexisting power differences.** Arguably, the authenticity-to-power we found may reflect preexisting power differences in the situations participants recalled. To assess this, two research assistants, blind to hypotheses, classified each recall situation into one of four categories: (a) another person or people in the situation had power above the participant (low power), (b) another person or people had equal power to the participant (equal power), (c) the participant had power above others in the situation (high power), or (d) no other person was mentioned in the situation and, as such, power was not applicable. The coders showed sufficient inter-rater reliability \((\alpha = .72)\); disagreements were resolved through discussion.

Examining only those participants who recalled an instance involving equal power, or where power was irrelevant ( authentic condition, \(n = 43\); inauthentic condition, \(n = 38\)), yielded almost identical findings: Authentic participants \((M = 6.31, SD = 1.40)\) reported greater state power than inauthentic participants \((M = 5.36, SD = 1.66)\), \(t(79) = 2.75, p < .01, d = .63\). In sum, Study 2 showed that regardless of
the power- or non-power-related circumstances that led to the act of authenticity, recalling an actual time when one felt authentic (vs. not) enhanced subjective power.

**Study 3: Does Authenticity Enhance, or Inauthenticity Reduce, Subjective Power or Both?**

Study 3 aimed to extend Study 2 in two ways. First, we included a control condition to shed some initial light on the locus of our proposed authenticity-to-power effect—whether it is driven by authenticity, inauthenticity, or both. Given the strong Western emphasis on being the true self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), authenticity might be the “default,” a notion supported by a recent diary study showing that, on average, people feel they are living highly authentically across time (intercept = 6.83 on a 1-7 scale; Lenton et al., 2016; see also Fleeson & Wilt, 2010); this suggests that the authentic and control conditions in the present study may generate comparable feelings of power, whereas the inauthentic condition diverges and thereby drives our key authenticity-to-power effect. Research indicating that negative events tend to carry more weight than positive events (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001) would suggest that inauthenticity would be more salient than authentic or neutral states, thereby also implying that inauthenticity may be driving our key effect. Perhaps, the authentic episodes that participants recall represent times when they were particularly authentic, or people are especially adept at dismissing times when they were inauthentic—both possibilities that would suggest that authenticity would be driving our proposed effect. In short, we had no a priori hypothesis about the locus of this effect. Second, Study 3 participants themselves (vs. outside coders in Study 2) reported on any power differentials that existed in the situation they recalled, allowing us to control for these ratings in our main analyses.

**Method**

**Participants.** We recruited and compensated 181 participants online via MTurk for a study on “experiences and feelings about the self.” In total, 18 failed one or more of three attention-check questions, and seven did not follow the instructions for our authenticity manipulation and were thus excluded from all analyses. The remaining 165 participants (86 females) ranged in age from 18 to 67 years (M = 31.87 years). In total, 125 were European American, 11 Asian American, nine African American, six Latino/a, four reported mixed and/or “Other” ethnicities, and one did not report anything. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (authentic, inauthentic, or control).

**Procedure.** Participants in the authentic and inauthentic conditions completed the same recall tasks used in Study 2 while control participants wrote about their last trip to the grocery store (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Then, all participants responded to the three authenticity manipulation-check items used in Study 2. Next, we used the same power scale as in Study 1, with the wording tweaked to reflect current states (van Kleef et al., 2011). Then, we had participants recall the situation and indicate, if applicable, who had more power in that situation (1 = The other person/people had more power to 9 = I had more power). Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed. One participant was aware of our hypothesis, but was retained because exclusion did not alter results.

**Results and Discussion**

**Authenticity manipulation check.** An ANOVA revealed a significant condition effect for the manipulation check, F(2, 155) = 146.28, p < .001, η² = .66. Planned comparisons showed that participants in the inauthentic condition (M = 2.49, SD = 1.75) reported feeling less authentic in the situation they recalled relative to those in the authentic condition (M = 6.50, SD = .65), t(99) = 15.75, p < .001, d = 3.17, and the control condition (M = 5.83, SD = 1.13), t(108) = 11.90, p < .001, d = 2.29. Participants in the control condition also reported feeling less authentic than those in the authentic condition, t(99) = 3.71, p < .001, d = .75. Thus, the manipulation was effective as participants in the authentic condition felt the most authentic, followed by those in the control condition, and finally those in the inauthentic condition.

**State power.** An ANOVA revealed a condition effect for state power, F(2, 155) = 4.35, p < .05, η² = .05. Replicating Study 2’s key finding, a planned contrast showed that participants in the authentic condition (M = 6.51, SD = 1.65) felt more powerful than those in the inauthentic condition (M = 5.50, SD = 1.97), t(99) = 2.81, p < .01, d = .56. Because we did not have a priori hypotheses about the control condition, we performed Dunnett’s post hoc tests to control for Type I error. The control condition (M = 5.63, SD = 1.88) reported less power than the authentic condition, p = .03 but did not differ from the inauthentic condition, p = .92.

**Alternative account: Preexisting power differences in recalled scenarios.** Compared with participants in the inauthentic condition (M = 3.45, SD = 2.89), those in the authentic one (M = 5.09, SD = 3.28), t(90) = 2.53, p = .01, d = .53, reported having had more power in their recalled situations. Thus, we re-ran the analysis for state power controlling for these self-rated differences. Authentic participants (adjusted M = 6.46, SD = 1.86) continued to report greater state power than inauthentic participants (adjusted M = 5.67, SD = 1.86), t(90) = 2.04, p < .05, d = .43.

Overall, Study 3 replicated Study 2 by showing that authenticity leads to greater subjective power relative to inauthenticity and extended it by showing that this effect may be driven by authenticity insofar as inauthenticity did
not reduce power relative to the control condition. However, one could argue about the “neutrality” of the state the grocery store control condition elicited and the stability of its effects (e.g., whether the experimental and control conditions are equated on social aspects, see Schmid, Kleiman, & Amodio, 2015). Thus, conclusions about the comparisons with the control condition in this study should be interpreted with caution. The major finding in this study is the robust difference between authenticity and inauthenticity conditions. Finally, the power-enhancing effect of authenticity held over and above self-rated power differences in the recalled situations.

Study 4: Is the Authenticity-to-Power Link Merely Due to Affect?

Study 4 focused on addressing the alternative account that our key finding is driven by authenticity eliciting positive affect rather than authenticity per se. Unlike in Study 1 in which we simply measured mood, in Study 4, we included a positive affect condition. We expected authenticity to uniquely affect power, independent of any effect due to positive affect.

Method

Participants. We recruited and compensated 164 MTurk participants for a study on “experiences and feelings about the self.” In total, 20 were excluded due to failing one or more of the three attention-checks and one for not following the manipulation-task instructions. The remaining 143 participants (77 females) ranged from 18 to 70 years in age (M = 32.69 years). In total, 116 were European American, 14 African American, nine Asian American, two Latino/a, and two reported mixed and/or “Other” ethnicities.

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (authentic, inauthentic, or contentment). Authentic and inauthentic participants completed the same recall tasks used in the prior studies, while contentment participants were asked to recall and write about an instance in which they had just eaten a delicious meal and felt full and comfortable (adapted from Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010). We chose a discrete positive emotion, contentment, for the control condition rather than a broader positive state (e.g., happiness) because we judged that contentment more closely approximates the specificity of the state of (in) authenticity. Furthermore, we selected an emotion induction asking participants to imagine feeling contentment after eating food—a particular emotional situation that is not known to be confounded with either authenticity or power.

Afterward, all participants responded to the same authenticity manipulation-check items used in the prior studies, along with the pictorial mood measure used in Study 1. Finally, participants completed the same subjective power measure used in Study 3 before being probed for suspicion and debriefed. One participant was aware of our hypothesis but was retained in all analyses because exclusion did not alter results.

Results and Discussion

Authenticity and mood manipulation checks. An ANOVA revealed a condition effect on the authenticity manipulation-check index, F(2, 142) = 132.13, p < .001, η² = .65. Participants in the inauthentic condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.81) reported feeling less authentic in the situation they described compared with authentic (M = 6.41, SD = .66), t(95) = 13.78, p < .001, d = 2.83, and contentment participants (M = 5.91, SD = 1.00), t(92) = 11.08, p < .001, d = 2.31. Contentment participants also reported feeling less authentic than authentic ones, t(93) = 2.86, p < .01, d = .59.

An ANOVA revealed no condition effect on state mood, F(2, 142) = 1.64, p > .05, η² = .02. Most importantly, contentment participants (M = 6.35, SD = 1.22) felt as happy following the recall task as authentic participants (M = 6.53, SD = 1.54), t(93) < 1. Overall, then, our manipulation had its intended effects. Participants in the authentic condition reported feeling the most authentic, followed by contentment and then inauthentic participants. In addition, the authenticity and contentment manipulations produced comparable feelings of positivity. Thus, if our authenticity-to-power finding is driven by authenticity eliciting positive affect, then the authentic and contentment conditions ought to show similar levels of state power.

State power. An ANOVA revealed a condition effect for state power, F(2, 142) = 5.20, p < .01, η² = .07. Replicating our prior studies, planned contrasts showed that authentic participants (M = 6.49, SD = 1.75) reported higher state power than inauthentic participants (M = 5.38, SD = 2.05), t(95) = 2.86, p < .01, d = .59, and contentment participants (M = 5.56, SD = 1.61), t(93) = 2.68, p < .01, d = .56. Inauthentic and contentment conditions did not differ, t(92) < 1.

We also ran the omnibus analysis on state power controlling for mood. The condition effect remained significant, F(2, 142) = 4.37, p = .01, η² = .06. Compared with authentic participants (adjusted M = 6.30, SD = 1.42), inauthentic (adjusted M = 5.61, SD = 1.43), t(95) = 2.38, p < .05, d = .49, and contentment participants (adjusted M = 5.52, SD = 1.42), t(93) = 2.68, p < .01, d = .56, reported lower state power. Inauthentic and contentment conditions did not differ, t(92) < 1.

Study 4 helped rule out a positive-affect account of our authenticity-to-power effect. These results may also speak to the question of the locus of the authenticity-to-power effect—if we consider the contentment condition a type of control condition. As in Study 3 (which used the grocery store trip as the control condition), contentment participants in Study 4 reported less state power than their counterparts in the authentic condition but did not differ from the participants in
the inauthentic condition. This pattern of findings is arguably particularly informative in the current study as it was obtained despite the control condition being more similar (in positivity) to the authentic condition than to the inauthentic condition. However, as noted in Study 3, just how “neutral” a control condition is can be debatable, calling for caution in interpreting comparisons with the contentment condition. Regardless, Study 4 clearly indicates that, as hypothesized, authenticity enhances state power relative to inauthenticity, independent of any effect due to positive affect.

**Study 5: Does Authenticity Enhance Perceived Power, Leadership Ability, and Negotiation Skills in the Eyes of Others?**

In Study 5, we hypothesized that by being authentic, people communicate not only to themselves, but also to others, that they are relatively more powerful. Participants were asked to read a vignette about a target person who behaved authentically or (in)authentically and then to make inferences about the target’s power. To ensure that the authentic target was not viewed as more powerful than the inauthentic one simply because the former was seen as feeling more positive affect, we crossed our authenticity manipulation with an affect manipulation. Thus, the study used a 2 (behavior: authentic vs. inauthentic) × 2 (affect: felt good vs. bad) between-subjects design.

We predicted that targets who behaved authentically (vs. inauthentically) would be perceived as more powerful, regardless of target affect. Given the aforementioned link between positive affect and power, we also expected that targets who felt good would be deemed more powerful than targets who felt bad. Similarly, we expected main effects for authenticity and affect, but no interaction effect, on important downstream, power-related judgments (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007; van Kleef et al., 2011). That is, we expected that an authentic target would be deemed a more effective negotiator and leader than an inauthentic one. We also expected that a target who felt bad, relative to felt good, would be rated as a less effective negotiator and leader.

**Method**

**Participants.** We recruited and compensated 207 MTurk participants for a study on “beliefs and perceptions of others.” In total, 10 failed at least one of three attention-checks, and 19 gave the wrong answer to the comprehension questions of the vignette (see below) and were thus excluded. The remaining 178 (96 females) ranged from 18 to 72 years in age (M = 37.13 years). In total, 147 were European American, 11 Asian American, 10 African American, four Latino/a, one Native American, and five were mixed and/or “Other” ethnicities.

**Procedure.** Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four vignettes about a target who behaved (in)authentically and felt good (or bad) about having done so. As in Study 1, careful attention was given to keeping the action tendency (i.e., speaking behavior) constant across conditions. The manipulations were embedded in a story to increase participant involvement and to conceal the study’s purpose (see appendix). The behavior and affect manipulations were introduced by the target stating,

...The issue was pretty important to me, but I held the opposite position as everyone else. I hesitated for a moment but then decided to go ahead and stay true to my views by saying to the group what I thought about the issue. [I hesitated for a moment and then decided to hold back and hide my views by simply saying to the group that I wasn’t sure what I thought about the issue.] Ultimately though, I felt pretty good [bad] about having done so.

Next, participants rated the target on the same power (α = .90) items used in Study 3, with the items adapted to refer to the target, rather than the participant himself or herself. Also, embedded among the power adjectives, participants rated the target on warmth (i.e., likable, warm, and unfriendly, reverse-scored; α = .75) and on authenticity (i.e., authentic and genuine; α = .91) using 9-point Likert-type scales (1 = Not at all to 9 = Very much so). The warmth items allowed us to rule out a halo effect account for our findings, whereas the authenticity items served as a manipulation check.

Then, participants made judgments about the target in two power-relevant scenarios. In the first power-related scenario, participants judged the target’s likelihood of effectively negotiating for a good deal on an apartment (adapted from Magee et al., 2007, Study 1; 1 = Not at all likely to 7 = Very likely). In the second power-related scenario, the target was described as leading a team of employees at work and participants rated the legitimacy of the target’s power (“This person can make others feel . . . that they have commitments to meet,” “. . . that they should satisfy their job requirements,” “. . . that they have responsibilities to fulfill,” and “. . . that they have tasks to accomplish,” using a scale anchored at 1 = Definitely not and 7 = Definitely; α = .94; Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989). Similarly, participants made judgments for two power-irrelevant scenarios, using scales anchored at 1 = Not at all likely and 7 = Very likely, participants judged how the target would feel about spending the holidays at home (i.e., enjoy being home, feel nostalgic) and what type of host the target would be for an out-of-town friend (e.g., be able to plan a fun weekend, be a gracious host).

Next, participants answered two comprehension-check questions regarding the authenticity and affect levels of the target, and were probed for suspicion and debriefed. None expressed awareness of our hypotheses.
Results and Discussion

Target’s authenticity manipulation check. A 2 (behavior: authentic vs. inauthentic) × 2 (affect: good vs. bad) ANOVA for the authenticity manipulation-check index yielded two main effects. Participants rated the authentic target (M = 7.10, SD = 1.49) as more authentic than the inauthentic one (M = 4.88, SD = 1.72), F(1, 177) = 215.01, p < .001, η² = .32. The target who felt good (M = 6.22, SD = 1.88) was rated as more authentic than the target who felt bad (M = 5.68, SD = 2.00), F(1, 177) = 3.89, p = .05, η² = .02. There was no interaction, F(1, 177) < 1.

Inferences about the target’s power. For the power adjectives, both main effects were significant in the 2 × 2 ANOVA. As predicted, participants rated the authentic target (M = 5.87, SD = 1.44) as more powerful than the inauthentic target (M = 4.20, SD = 1.43), F(1, 177) = 60.97, p < .001, η² = .26. The target who felt good (M = 5.36, SD = 1.51) was also rated as more powerful than the target who felt bad (M = 4.65, SD = 1.74), F(1, 177) = 9.32, p < .01, η² = .05. As predicted, the interaction was not significant, F(1, 177) < 1.

For the two downstream judgments, only the predicted effect of authenticity emerged. The authentic target (M = 5.19, SD = 1.40) was perceived to be a more effective negotiator than the inauthentic target (M = 4.05, SD = 1.44), F(1, 177) = 27.64, p < .001, η² = .14. Similarly, the authentic target (M = 5.55, SD = 0.98) was considered to possess more legitimate power than the inauthentic target (M = 4.74, SD = 1.11), F(1, 177) = 25.99, p < .001, η² = .13. Neither the affect main effect, nor the interaction, was significant (Fs < 1.91).

Assessing halo effects. A 2 × 2 ANOVA for the warmth adjectives yielded no effects (Fs < 1.47). The same was true for a 2 × 2 ANOVA for judgments of the target in power-irrelevant scenarios (ps > .05). Together, these results minimize a halo effect account for our findings.

In sum, Study 5 showed that the authenticity-to-power effect established in Studies 1-4 extends to social perception. People infer about others’ power based on their authenticity. Although positive relative to negative affect also led to greater inferences of power—an expected effect given the previously documented positive affect–power link—there was no interaction between authenticity and affect. Thus, the authentic target was not viewed as more powerful than the inauthentic target simply because the former was seen as experiencing more positive affect. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that since the power judgments in the current study relate to hypothetical scenarios, definitively establishing the causal sequence from authenticity-to-perceived power is somewhat difficult.

Coding of Recalled Authenticity Episodes

A potential concern with the vignettes used in Studies 1 and 5, as well as with the recalled episodes of authentic behavior solicited in Studies 2-4, is that authenticity only influences power under certain circumstances. Specifically, perhaps authenticity only enhances feelings of power when one is expressing a minority opinion, being authentic in the face of social pressure or exhibiting a flattering trait when being authentic. Furthermore, it is possible that our key results are limited to situations when being authentic involved violating norms given the effect of norm-violating behavior on boosting power perceptions (van Kleef et al., 2011).

To address the first set of possibilities, we had three research assistants, blind to hypotheses, content code participants’ responses to our (in)authenticity prompts in Studies 3 and 4 (n = 198). Study 2’s responses to the (in)authenticity prompts were used for training purposes (for results and full coding details, see Supplementary Materials).

Minority Opinion

Is the authenticity-to-power effect specific to situations involving the expression of a minority opinion? To address this, we coded responses for the expression of minority opinion (Yes/No). We used the decision given by the majority of the three coders as the index of minority opinion (there was unanimous agreement for 97% of scenarios).

Overall, there were very few instances of minority opinion in the recalls (n = 7, 3.5%), and the frequency of these instances did not differ between the authentic condition (n = 5; 5%) and the inauthentic condition (n = 2, 2%), χ² = 1.60, p = .26. Furthermore, examining only participants who wrote about an instance that did not involve the expression of minority opinion (n = 191) yielded very similar findings; authentic participants (M = 6.45, SD = 1.73) continued to report greater power than inauthentic participants (M = 5.43, SD = 2.01), t(189) = 3.73, p < .001, d = .54.

Social Pressure

We also examined whether our effects are limited to situations in which there was considerable initial social pressure to go against one’s true self (i.e., to be inauthentic). That is, being authentic in these types of situations might be uniquely indicative of particularly high levels of agency among those in the authentic condition relative to the inauthentic participants. Thus, we coded responses for the magnitude of social pressure to go against one’s true self present in the recalled situation (1 = no pressure, 2 = some external pressure, 3 = a lot of pressure). The ratings of the three coders (α = .91) were averaged.

First, we examined whether the inauthentic and authentic conditions differed in social pressure in the recalled situations. Inconsistent with the proposed alternative account, participants in the inauthentic condition (M = 1.70, SD = .65) reported going against more social pressure than those in the authentic condition (M = 1.37, SD = .50), t(196) = 3.57, p < .001, d = .51. Moreover, rerunning the analyses for state power controlling for social pressure yielded the expected pattern:
Authentic participants (adjusted $M = 6.52$, $SD = 1.89$) again reported greater state power than inauthentic ones (adjusted $M = 5.42$, $SD = 1.89$), $F(1,197) = 16.26$, $p < .001$, $d = .58$. Furthermore, there was no interaction between social pressure and authenticity condition on state power, $F(1, 197) = 1.45$, $p = .20$. Thus, regardless of social pressure levels associated with the authenticity feelings, recalling an authentic experience when one was true to the self (vs. not) enhanced participants’ state power.

**Revealing of a Flattering Trait**

Arguably, the authentic and inauthentic conditions may differ in the extent to which the behavior described revealed a flattering versus unflattering trait (e.g., participants are more likely to describe a behavior reflecting a flattering trait in the authentic condition). To assess this possibility, we coded responses for the extent to which the behavior revealed a strength or a flattering trait about the participant ($1 = major weakness/very unflattering to 5 = major strength/very flattering$). The ratings of the three coders ($\alpha = .93$) were averaged.

First, we examined whether the inauthentic and authentic conditions differed in revealing a flattering trait in the recalled situations. Consistent with the proposed alternative account, participants in the authentic condition ($M = 3.51$, $SD = .65$) revealed more flattering traits than those in the inauthentic condition ($M = 2.77$, $SD = .50$), $t(176) = 8.94$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.28$.

However, rerunning the analyses for state power controlling for revealing of a flattering trait left the results intact. As expected, authentic participants (adjusted $M = 6.38$, $SD = 2.05$) again reported greater state power than inauthentic ones (adjusted $M = 5.56$, $SD = 2.03$), $F(1, 197) = 6.82$, $p = .01$, $d = .40$. Furthermore, there was no interaction between revealing of a flattering trait and authenticity condition, $F(1, 197) = .95$, $p = .39$, such that how flattering the authentic behavior recalled was did not moderate the effect of authenticity on state power.

In sum, these additional coding analyses demonstrate that across Studies 3 and 4 the difference between authentic and inauthentic conditions on state power is robust and is not limited to situations involving minority opinion or social pressure, or behaviors revealing a flattering behavior.

**Norm-Violating Behavior**

Finally, we explored if the effect of authenticity on power is independent of previously documented effects of norm violation on increasing subjective feelings of power (van Kleef et al., 2011). Here, we had two additional research assistants, blind to hypotheses, code participants’ responses to our (in) authenticity prompts in Studies 2-4 for the presence or absence of norm-violating behavior, defined as acts that infringe on principles of proper and acceptable behavior. The two coders showed sufficient inter-rater reliability ($\alpha = .72$), and disagreements were resolved through ratings by a third coder. Across these studies, 10% of the authentic experiences and 29% of the inauthentic experiences participants recalled were judged to be norm violating, $\chi^2(2, N = 301) = 18.52$, $p < .001$. Given that more inauthentic relative to authentic experiences were judged to be norm violating and yet authenticity resulted in reduced feelings of power, it assures us that our authenticity-to-power findings are not simply due to authenticity being more norm violating and thus more empowering.

For state power, which we standardized in each of the studies (since the studies used different measures), there was no main effect for norm violation, $F(1, 298) = 1.50$, $p = .22$, and no interaction between norm violation and authenticity, $F(1, 298) < 1$. This shows that norm-violating authenticity is no more empowering than non-norm-violating authenticity, suggesting that our results are not merely due to engaging in disinhibited, rule-breaking behavior, but rather uniquely reflect the effects of authenticity.

**General Discussion**

Five experiments supported consistently our hypothesis that state authenticity signals subjective power to the self (self-perception) and to observers (social-perception). On the self-perception side, we showed repeatedly that state authenticity increased subjective power relative to inauthenticity (Studies 1-4). Critically, the effect of authenticity on power could not be explained by preexisting power differences (Studies 2 and 3). We also dispelled the competing account that the effect of authenticity on power was simply due to authenticity eliciting positive affect, which then resulted in greater power (Studies 1 and 4). Finally, extensive content coding of participants’ recalled episodes revealed that the authenticity-to-power effect is not limited to situations involving minority opinion, social pressure, behaviors revealing a flattering behavior, or to norm-violating behaviors. Similarly, on the social-perception side, we found that an individual who behaved authentically was judged by observers to be more powerful, to be a more effective negotiator, and to possess more legitimate power (Study 5), an effect that was again unique from that of positive affect.

**Implications**

In conjunction with previous work (Kifer et al., 2013; Kraus et al., 2011), the current research demonstrates a bidirectional state authenticity-power link, revealing authenticity as one way in which subjective power may be self-reinforcing (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and thus contribute over time to the maintenance of power hierarchies. More importantly, our results contribute to the relatively limited literature on the antecedents of power, revealing a novel antecedent in the form of state authenticity. Our findings point to being authentic as...
a means by which to gain momentary power, one which is available even to those people who are structurally or dispositionally low in power. Whereas research on power’s antecedents has often focused on fixed characteristics of the individual (Anderson & Brion, 2014), the current research aligns with more recent work in looking at transient behaviors that alter state power (Smith et al., 2008; van Kleef et al., 2011; Waskleak et al., 2014). Our preliminary examinations of the locus of the effect of state authenticity on power suggested that authenticity enhances state power rather than inauthenticity reduces state power or both effects (Studies 3 and 4). Thus, it appears that authenticity is driving the effect on power; notably, this is despite diary study’s findings showing that authenticity is more typical than inauthenticity (Lenton et al., 2013), as well as our own findings of similarity on the authenticity manipulation check between the control and authenticity conditions. It may be that because the authentic episodes that participants recalled represented times when they were highly authentic, they were particularly informative for subjective power inferences. It may also be that people are especially adept at explaining away episodes of inauthenticity. For example, by dismissing state inauthenticity resulting from excessive politeness and social niceties, inauthenticity may not impact subjective power perceptions. Nevertheless, given the aforementioned difficulty in establishing a truly neutral authenticity condition (Schmid et al., 2015), we acknowledge these comparisons should be viewed with caution.

At face value, these findings may appear to conflict with research indicating that greater self-monitoring—adapting one’s behavior to fit the social context (Snyder, 1974), which can be construed as inauthentic—is associated with greater power (Day, Schleicher, Unckless, & Hiller, 2002; Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence that high self-monitors experience lower feelings of authenticity. In fact, high self-monitors may conceive of the self in more context-specific ways or have a broader self-concept and feel equally or even more authentic than their low self-monitoring peers.

Our work also advances the authenticity literature. Notably, although we know a fair amount about the well-being benefits of trait authenticity (Wood et al., 2008), the same cannot be said for state authenticity. Recent research is revealing state authenticity as a distinct and meaningful construct in need of more attention (Sedikides et al., 2017). Indeed, there is only a small inverse correlation between frequencies of authenticity and inauthenticity ($r = -0.21, p = .03$; Lenton et al., 2013), suggesting that people commonly experience both over a span of time. Nevertheless, only a few studies have produced experimental evidence of its effects (e.g., reduced feelings of immorality and greater well-being; Gino et al., 2015; Kifer et al., 2013). In demonstrating that state authenticity enhances power, our work expands the understanding of the nature of state authenticity, its dynamic effects, and positive impact on outcomes beyond greater well-being.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

Whereas our research reveals that state authenticity signals power to observers, it would be useful for future research to examine the cues that perceivers use to infer authenticity. Briefly, we speculate that perceivers’ perceptions of verbal and nonverbal cues, as well as perceptions of the congruence between current behaviors and both previous mental states (i.e., thoughts, feelings, and attitudes) and previous behaviors may influence their judgments of a target’s authenticity. Relatedly, to enhance ecological validity, future research should investigate the bidirectional authenticity-power effects longitudinally, as they unfold over time.

Although we argue that the authenticity-to-power link is largely a direct one, future research should also explore potential cognitive mediators, such as self-concept clarity (Campbell, 1990)—the extent to which self-beliefs are clearly defined, internally consistent, and stable. Authenticity may convey to the self and to others that one has a clear and consistent sense of self to abide by, which in turn may inform feelings and perceptions of power. In addition, it is possible that authenticity exerts its effect through a motivational route. That is, whereas authenticity may engender engagement and approach motivation, inauthenticity may lead to avoidance motivation due to markedly different perceptions of person-environment fit (Schmader & Sedikides, 2017). Approach and avoidance motivations, in turn, are paragons of the powerful and powerless, respectively (Keltner et al., 2003).

Finally, while our extensive coding testifies to the generalizability of our authenticity-to-power effect, future research should identify boundary conditions. Given that there are different norms for emotion expression across roles (Butler & Gross, 2004), the same behavior (e.g., expressing felt emotions) in different roles may affect one’s power differently. Take, for example, a person who feels compelled to suppress his or her emotions at work. This inauthentic behavior may not negatively influence his or her subjective power because it is deemed required by workplace norms and, as such, may not reduce state authenticity. However, if the person is unable to self-disclose emotions with a friend, such a behavior might result in greater subjective powerlessness due to a corresponding reduction in state authenticity.

Another potential boundary condition is the outcome of authenticity. That is, does authenticity enhance subjective power regardless of its outcomes? For example, if one’s authenticity is met with negative consequences, will it still have the same empowering effect? It may be that while authenticity produces momentary boosts in power, if there are negative consequences to one’s behavior, then over time such authenticity could reduce power. Further research is needed to explore this possibility.
Another potential boundary condition relates to our use of MTurk samples which oversample White Americans, thereby rendering the generalizability of our findings to diverse ethnic and cultural groups unknown. Nevertheless, the limited research on cross-cultural differences in authenticity suggests that people from both Western and Eastern cultures do experience authenticity, albeit conceptually and pursuing authenticity in different ways (e.g., English & Chen, 2011; Slabu, Lenton, Sedikides, & Bruder, 2014). Relatedly, future research might explore whether socially devalued groups that tend to experience social identity threat may experience reduced authenticity levels (Schmader & Sedikides, 2017) and, consequently, show reduced subjective power levels.

Given our theoretical focus on the authentic experience (regardless of “actually” being authentic), we did not manipulate directly (in)authentic behavior. Furthermore, because we did not manipulate (in)authenticity as it happened in the moment, our test of the authenticity-to-power effect may not have been as strong as the actual phenomenon. Thus, for example, it is possible that in-the-moment inauthenticity reduces power relative to a neutral state, but our manipulation was unable to capture it. Although future research should explore other manipulations of authenticity, we believe our recall method is meaningful and reliable. Priming through recall can activate experiences stored in memory and mirror the effects of actual experiences occurring in the moment (Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003; Woike, 1995). Thus, having participants recall a time when they felt (in)authentic (see also Kifer et al., 2013) paves the way for future research on the casual effects of state authenticity.

Conclusion

Ultimately, although more work is needed to identify the conditions under which authenticity might not benefit the self or even be socially detrimental, the current investigation points to the perks of being one’s true self: an elevated sense of power. Thus, our results suggest an important opportunity in being authentic while occupying various private and professional roles as spouses, friends, employees, and students. Not only is authenticity beneficial for well-being, but it may also be empowering.

Appendix

Vignette Used in Study 5

This past weekend, I was at a friend’s house for a potluck dinner. The food was delicious, and I made my signature chili for the occasion. At one point, a group of us were talking about politics. When one particularly sensitive issue came up, everyone seemed to take the same stance. People were enthusiastically agreeing with one another and seemed really into the conversation.

One person noticed that I wasn’t really talking much and so asked me what I thought. The issue was pretty important to me, but I held the opposite position as everyone else. I hesitated for a moment but then decided to go ahead and stay true to my views by saying to the group what I thought about the issue. [I hesitated for a moment and then decided to hold back and hide my views by simply saying to the group that I wasn’t sure what I thought about the issue.] Ultimately though, I felt pretty good [bad] about having done so.

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Supplemental Material

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