Draft Addendum XXXIII and Council Amendment
For Board and Council Review

Commercial Black Sea Bass Management

Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission & Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council
December 2020
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9. Discussion
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Background

- State commercial allocations of coastwide quota originally implemented in 2003 (Amendment 13)
  - Loosely based on historical landings from 1980-2001
- Significant changes to stock abundance and distribution
  - Larger expansion N of Hudson Canyon relative to S
- Current allocations do not align with resource distribution/availability
Background

• Action Goals as Defined by Board and Council

  – Consider adjusting the current commercial black sea bass allocations using current distribution and abundance of black sea bass as one of several adjustment factors to achieve more balanced access to the resource

  – Consider whether the state allocations should continue to be managed only under the Commission's FMP or whether they should be managed under both the Commission and Council FMPs
Management Options for State Allocations

Proposed Management Options

A. Status Quo

Alternative Options

B. 5% Allocation for Connecticut

Yes

No

C. DARA

D. Trigger Approach

E. CT & NY Trigger Approach

F. Percentage Approach

No Further Changes

G. Regional Configuration

G1. 2 Regions (ME-NY & NJ-NC)

G2. 3 Regions (ME-NY, NJ, & DE-NC)
A. Status Quo

• State allocations of coastwide commercial quota originally implemented in 2003 (Amendment 13)
  – Loosely based on historical landings from 1980-2001
• Managed under Commission FMP only

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B. Increase CT Quota to 5%

- Addresses disparity between CT’s low quota and BSB availability
  1. DE and NY held constant
  2. Move 0.25% from ME and NH to CT
  3. Move quota from remaining states, proportional to current allocations, to total 5%
- Option can stand alone, or be combined with other options

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C. Dynamic Adjustments to Regional Allocations

• **DARA** approach balances fishery stability and response to changing stock distribution

• **Phase 1**: Gradual transition from initial quotas to quotas partially influenced by stock distribution

• **Phase 2**: Allocations updated routinely when new stock distribution information available

• Sub-options determine scale and pace of allocation changes

• Sub-options are designed to represent a range of choices
C. DARA – Formula Visualization

Coastwide Quota

% initial allocations

% stock distribution

% N Region

% S Region

Divided among states based on initial allocation %

Divided among N Region states

Divided among S Region states

N State Allocation

S State Allocation
1. Final relative importance of initial allocations versus resource distribution at the end of the transition phase

- **Sub-option C1-A**: allocations based 90% on stock distribution, 10% on initial allocations
- **Sub-option C1-B**: allocations based 50% on stock distribution, 50% on initial allocations
2. Change in relative weights of each factor (initial allocations and stock distribution) per adjustment

- **Sub-option C2-A**: relative weights change by 5% per adjustment
- **Sub-option C2-B**: relative weights change by 20% per adjustment
3. Frequency of weight adjustments during transition

- **Sub-option C3-A**: Adjustments every year
- **Sub-option C3-B**: Adjustments every other year
4. Regional allocation adjustment cap

- **Sub-option C4-A**: Max of 3% change per adjustment
- **Sub-option C4-B**: Max of 10% change per adjustment
- **Sub-option C4-C**: No cap

- Smaller cap = less change in regional allocations during a single adjustment
D. Trigger Approach

• Coastwide quota up to and including established trigger amount is distributed according to “base allocations”
  – Trigger determined by sub-option set D1

• Amount of quota above established trigger amount (surplus quota) is distributed using a different allocation scheme
  – Determined by sub-option sets D2 and D3
1. Trigger Value Sub-options

- **Sub-option D1-A:** Trigger value of 3 million pounds
- **Sub-option D1-B:** Trigger value of 4.5 million pounds
D. Trigger Approach- Sub-option set 2

2. Distribution of surplus quota

- **Sub-option D2-A:**
  Even distribution of surplus quota*

- **Sub-option D2-B:**
  Distribution of surplus quota based on regional biomass from stock assessment

*ME and NH each receive 1% of surplus quota
D. Trigger Approach- Sub-option set 3

3. Distribution of regional surplus quota (*only with D2-B*)

- **Sub-option D3-A**: Even distribution of regional surplus quota*
- **Sub-option D3-B**: Regional surplus quota distributed to the states within each region in proportion to their initial allocations*

*ME and NH would each receive 1% of N. surplus under both options
4. Allowing “base” allocations to change over time

• **Sub-option D4-A:** Static base allocations

• **Sub-option D4-B:** Dynamic base allocations

• Only applicable under Sub-option D2-B (regional surplus allocation)
E. Trigger w/ increase to CT & NY first

- 3 million pound trigger (no sub-options)
- Coastwide quota up to and including 3 million pounds distributed based on initial allocations
- Surplus quota distributed as follows:
  1. Increase CT’s allocation to 5% of the overall quota
  2. Increase NY’s allocation to 9% of the overall quota
  3. Remaining surplus quota split N/S according to proportion of biomass in each region, then allocated to states within each region in proportion to initial intra-regional allocations
F. Percentage Approach

• Allocate a fixed % of the annual coastwide quota using the initial allocations regardless of coastwide quota amount

• Allocate remaining quota to states differently (evenly or regionally, as determined by sub-options)

• Allows a portion of the quota to be allocated using a distribution other than the initial allocations even under lower coastwide quotas
1. Percentage of annual coastwide quota to be allocated using initial allocations

- **Sub-option F1-A:** 25%
- **Sub-option F1-B:** 75%
2. Distribution of remaining quota

- **Sub-option F2-A**: Even distribution of remaining quota to all states*

- **Sub-option F2-B**: Distribution of remaining quota based on regional biomass from stock assessment

*ME and NH each receive 1% of remaining quota
3. Distribution of regional quota to states within a region (*only with F2-B*)

- **Sub-option F3-A:** Even distribution of regional quota to states within each region*

- **Sub-option F3-B:** Remaining quota distributed to the states within each region in proportion to their initial allocations*

*ME and NH would each receive 1% of northern region quota*
Options C through F consider incorporating regional distribution information from the stock assessment and require a regional configuration.

- **Sub-option G1**: Two regions: 1) ME-NY, and 2) NJ-NC.
- **Sub-option G2**: Three regions: 1) ME-NY; 2) NJ; and 3) DE-NC.
Federal Management Options
A. Status Quo (No action)

– Commercial state allocations included only in the Commission’s FMP.

– Changes to these allocations would not require a joint action with the Council.

B. Commercial state allocations included in both Commission and Council FMPs

– Future allocation changes considered through joint action between Commission and Council

– Landings monitored by NOAA Fisheries

– Interstate transfers managed by NOAA Fisheries
If state allocations are added to Council FMP these sub-options determine when paybacks of state quota overages are required:

- **Sub-option B1**: Paybacks only if coastwide quota is exceeded (current process under Commission Addendum XX)

- **Sub-option B2**: States always pay back overages (exact amount of pounds by which a state exceeds its quota deducted from their allocation in a following year)
Options for federal in-season closures

A. Status Quo (No action)
   - Coastwide federal in-season closure when landings are projected to exceed the coastwide quota

B. Coastwide federal in-season closure when landings projected to exceed commercial quota plus a buffer of up to 5%
   - Council and Board agree to appropriate buffer for the upcoming year through the specifications process

C. Coastwide federal in-season closure when commercial ACL is projected to be exceeded
   - Discards in weight cannot be monitored in-season; requires GARFO to make assumptions about discards in the current year
PUBLIC COMMENT SUMMARY
• Seven Public Hearings held via Webinar for individual or multiple states
  – 62 attendees, 13 commented

• 17 Written Comments
  – 4 organization letters
  – 13 from individual stakeholders
### Section 3.1: Allocation Approaches

#### Addendum XXXIII Allocation Approaches

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<th>Option B</th>
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Option C: DARA Sub-options

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Option D: Trigger Sub-Options

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Option F, Percentage Sub-options, had no support from written or public hearing comments.
Option G: Regional Configuration

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Comments on Allocation Approaches

• **14** individuals endorsed status quo
• **8** individuals endorsed Option B, increase CT’s quota to 5%
• **1** individual each supported the DARA, Trigger, and CT/NY Trigger
Comments on Allocation Approaches: Status Quo

• Supporting comments:
  – fears of overfishing and undercounting fish
  – quota is still being caught in states that would lose quota
  – Biomass hasn’t shifted, only expanded
  – Concern about commercial quota being moved to recreational industry
  – New Jersey has already given up quota in the past
• More fish are being seen in Connecticut waters than many commercial industry leaders have ever seen
  – More habitat and prey from offshore windfarms
  – Fish are established and breeding
• An organization supports DARA because it is based on science and is fair and equitable
  – Two comments said that DARA was too complicated
• One comment supported the Trigger Approach (option D) because it could benefit states with lower quotas
Federal Management 3.2.1

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Federal Management 3.2.2

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Comments on Federal Options

• 4 comments in favor of more federal involvement
• 6 comments in favor of allocations in the ASMFC FMP only
• Federal comments: majority of fish are caught in federal waters.
• ASMFC comments: like the flexibility of management and dislike the increased complexity under federal management.
Comments on Federal Options

• 2 individuals support status quo for overage paybacks
• 2 individuals support always paying back overages
  – Comments in support stated that states should pay back anytime they exceed their quota
Additional Fishery Comments

• Frustration with the complexity of the document
  – Options too complicated to consider

• Timing of addendum is inappropriate

• Support for revising state based allocations to decrease discard for states with lower quota

• Black sea bass is a very important fishery, and that it is caught year round
• The impact of ITQs on the market are detrimental
• More consideration for the SAW/SARC process
• Return of permits from northern states to southern states
• A rollover quota bank
ADVISORY PANEL INPUT
Advisory Panel Comments

• Allocation Changes
  – 7 expressed support for status quo (2 from NJ, 1 from CT, 3 from VA, 1 from NC)
  – 2 supported a change using DARA (1 from RI, 1 from NY)
  – 1 supported trigger with increase to CT and NY first (1 from NY)

• Adding to Council’s FMP
  – 3 expressed support for keeping allocations only in ASMFC FMP (1 from RI, 1 from CT, 1 from NY)
  – 2 expressed support for adding to MAFMC FMP (1 member from NJ, 1 from PA)
Other comments, not consensus statements:

• No changes until we better understand impacts of COVID-19.
• BSB is primary fishery and livelihood for NJ pot fishermen.
• Should consider a quota bank rather than re-allocation.
• NJ allocation is lower than it should have been; $16 million in lost income.
• Should consider stock enhancement programs for states that want a higher allocation.
Other comments, not consensus statements:

- Northern states have low trip limits; fishermen don’t depend on BSB to same extent as in south; should not re-allocate to those fishermen.
- Should reduce discards (e.g., allocate more to pots/traps).
- Concerns about federal trawl survey’s ability to sample structured habitat.
- ITQs are problematic: not a fair way to provide access to fish; volumes landed are too high, negatively impacts price.
- Should consider federal waters possession limit.
DRAFT IMPACTS ANALYSIS
Preliminary Impacts Analysis

- Changes in allocations might impact:
  - Spatial distribution of landings (lesser impacts on spatial distribution of effort).
  - Revenues from those landings.
  - Discards, mostly in state waters.

- NOT expected to impact:
  - Total catch, landings, or fishing effort.
  - Stock status.

- Total catch and effort will continue to be driven primarily by the coastwide quota.
Socioeconomic Impacts

- Potential changes in revenues from black sea bass landings for fishermen, dealers, and other support businesses.
- Revenues impacted by many factors (allocations, coastwide quota, prices, other market factors).
- Impacts of allocations considered in isolation.
- True impacts may vary based on changes in these other factors.
No Change in Allocations

- Continued positive impacts for fishermen/dealers which have relied on landings of BSB.

- Continued negative impacts for fishermen whose efficiency is negatively impacted by high BSB discards due to mismatch between availability and allocations.
Revised Allocations

- Positive impacts for states with increased allocations (increased potential landings and revenues). Negative impacts for states with decreased allocations.

- Tradeoffs associated with:
  - Predictability/stability
  - Aligning allocations with distribution

- Large and fast changes could cause fishery disruptions. Optimal scale and pace of change may be a policy decision.

- Trawl fishermen may be better able to take advantage of large increases in allowable landings than pot/trap fishermen.
Other Impacts

- **2 vs 3 regions**
  - Defines regions but doesn’t pre-determine allocations to states.
  - Under current biomass distribution, NJ would get a higher allocation under 3 region vs 2 region approach.

- **Add allocations to Council FMP**
  - Transfers after Dec 16 would be limited to unforeseen emergency situations.
Other Impacts

- **Overage paybacks**
  - Loss of potential revenues when paybacks required, but higher revenues when overage occurred.
  - Only require paybacks when coastwide quota exceeded.
  - States always pay back overages.

- **In-season closures**
  - Negative socioeconomic impacts when closure triggered (loss of potential revenues).
  - Closure at 100% of quota: Highest potential for closure.
  - Closure at quota + buffer: Lesser potential for closure.
  - Closure at ACL: Unknown frequency of closures as discards are not monitored in-season. Closures may be harder to predict.
COUNCIL STAFF
RECOMMENDATION
Council Staff Recommendation

Allocation Percentages

- **B**: Increase CT from 1% to 5%
- **F**: Percentage of coastwide quota distributed based on initial allocations
  - **F1-B**: Allocate 75% of the coastwide quota based on the initial allocations (after first accounting for CT increase to 5%).
  - **F2-B**: Allocate the remaining 25% based on the most recent regional biomass distribution information from the stock assessment.
  - **F3-B**: Further divide the regional allocation among states within a region in proportion to the initial state allocations, except that ME and NH would each receive 1% of the northern region quota. The initial allocations would account for the CT increase to 5%.
- **G1**: Two regions: 1) ME-NY and 2) NJ-NC.
### Example based on staff recommendation and 2018 biomass distribution

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<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Current allocations</th>
<th>&quot;Initial allocations&quot; (CT to 5% first)</th>
<th>Revised allocations under 2018 biomass distribution</th>
<th>Difference between current and revised allocations</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>-0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>13.00%</td>
<td>12.47%</td>
<td>16.68%</td>
<td>+3.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>10.55%</td>
<td>14.11%</td>
<td>+3.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>6.69%</td>
<td>+5.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>9.36%</td>
<td>+2.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>19.19%</td>
<td>15.58%</td>
<td>-4.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>4.06%</td>
<td>-0.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>10.55%</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
<td>-2.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>19.19%</td>
<td>15.58%</td>
<td>-4.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>10.55%</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
<td>-2.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total moved from NJ-NC to ME-NY under 2018 biomass distribution. **14.64%**
Council Staff Recommendation Rationale

**Allocation Percentages**

- Seeks to better align allocations with recent biomass distribution while accounting for historical dependence of states on the fishery.
- Under current distribution, no state would lose more than 4.5% and no state except CT would gain more than 3.7%.
- Addresses unique position of CT.
- Allocations would change in response to future distribution changes, helping to provide continued fair access.
- Approach is the same regardless of coastwide quota – not dependent on outcome of com/rec allocation amendment.
Council Staff Recommendation

Federal Management of Quota

- **2B**: Add the commercial state allocations to the Council’s FMP.
- **2B1**: States only pay back overages if the coastwide quota is exceeded (current practice under Commission FMP).
- **3A**: Coastwide federal in-season closure when landings are projected to meet the coastwide quota (no change from current practice).
Add Allocations to Council FMP; No Changes to Overage Paybacks

- Ensures joint decision making on future changes.
  - State allocations are an important part of the mgmt. program.
  - State allocations jointly managed for summer flounder and bluefish.

- Notable amount of commercial harvest comes from federal waters (e.g., at least 64% on avg during 2010-2019).

- Additional restrictions on transfers after Dec 16
  - Minor impacts as states closely monitor their quotas to prevent overages.
  - Requiring overage paybacks only if coastwide quota exceeded reduces need for transfers to account for minor state-level overages.
Council Staff Recommendation Rationale

No Changes to In-Season Closure Regulations

- Federal in-season closure when quota fully landed.
- Has not occurred to date – States have successfully monitored landings and taken in-season action as needed to prevent coastwide-closure.
- Compared to other alternatives, no action/status quo is least likely to result in quota overages. Therefore, least likely to require state-level overage paybacks.
- Can be modified through a future FW if needed.
Decision Points

1. Should the commercial state allocations be included in both the Council and Commission FMPs or remain only in the Commission’s FMP?
2. Should the state allocation percentages be modified? If so, how?
3. If added allocations added to Council FMP, should the provisions related to payback of state-level quota overages be modified?
4. Should the federal in-season closure regulations be modified?
Extra Slides
## Council Staff Recommendation With 3 Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Current allocations</th>
<th>&quot;Initial allocations&quot; (CT to 5% first)</th>
<th>Revised allocations under 2018 biomass distribution</th>
<th>Difference between current and revised allocations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>-0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>-0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>13.00%</td>
<td>12.47%</td>
<td>15.10%</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>10.55%</td>
<td>12.78%</td>
<td>1.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
<td>5.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>8.48%</td>
<td>1.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>19.19%</td>
<td>19.52%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>10.55%</td>
<td>8.68%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>19.19%</td>
<td>15.79%</td>
<td>-4.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>10.55%</td>
<td>8.68%</td>
<td>-2.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total percentage moved from NJ-NC to ME-NY under 2018 biomass distribution: 10.21%
Council Staff Recommendation With 3 Regions and CT to 3%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Current allocations</th>
<th>&quot;Initial allocations&quot; (CT to 3% first)</th>
<th>Revised allocations under 2018 biomass distribution</th>
<th>Difference between current and revised allocations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>-0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>-0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>13.00%</td>
<td>12.77%</td>
<td>15.64%</td>
<td>2.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>10.81%</td>
<td>13.23%</td>
<td>2.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>3.67%</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>19.65%</td>
<td>20.10%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td>4.11%</td>
<td>-0.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>10.81%</td>
<td>8.88%</td>
<td>-2.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
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<td>19.65%</td>
<td>16.14%</td>
<td>-3.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>10.81%</td>
<td>8.88%</td>
<td>-2.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total percentage moved from NJ-NC to ME-NY under 2018 biomass distribution. 8.90%
### Federal Management Options

<table>
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<th>Issue</th>
<th>Options</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commission/Council FMP</strong></td>
<td>A. Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Add to Council FMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overage Paybacks</strong></td>
<td>B1. Only when coastwide quota exceeded (Status quo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B2. Always pay back overages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal In-season closures</strong></td>
<td>A. Status quo (Quota exceeded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Quota + 5% exceeded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. ACL exceeded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Allocation Options

#### A. Status Quo

#### B. CT to 5%

#### C. DARA Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Sub-options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Final Weights | C1-A (90%/10%)  
C1-B (50%/50%) |
| % Change per Adjustment | C2-A (5%)  
C2-B (20%) |
| Adjustment Frequency | C3-A (every yr)  
C3-B (every 2 yrs) |
| Cap | C4-A (3%)  
C4-B (10%)  
C4-C (None) |

#### D. Trigger Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Sub-options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Trigger | D1-A (3 million)  
D1-B (4.5 million) |
| Surplus Distribution | D2-A (even)  
D2-B (regions) |
| Distribution to States in Region | D3-A (even)  
D3-B (proportional) |
| Base Allocations | D4-A (static)  
D4-B (dynamic) |

#### E. Trigger w/ increase to CT & NY first

#### F. Percentage Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Sub-options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| % Initial | F1-A (25%)  
F1-B (75%) |
| Remaining % Distribution | D2-A (even)  
D2-B (regions) |
| Distribution to States in Region | D3-A (even)  
D3-B (proportional) |

#### G. Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sub-options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1: 2 regions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2: 3 regions</td>
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</table>
Management Options for State Allocations

Proposed Management Options

A. Status Quo

Alternative Options

B. 5% Allocation for Connecticut

C. DARA

D. Trigger Approach

E. CT & NY Trigger Approach

F. Percentage Approach

No Further Changes

G. Regional Configuration

G1. 2 Regions (ME-NY & NJ-NC)

G2. 3 Regions (ME-NY, NJ, & DE-NC)
3.1 Management Options for State Allocations

A. Status Quo
B. Increase CT Quota to 5%
C. Dynamic Adjustments to Regional Allocations
D. Trigger Approach
E. Trigger Approach (Increase CT and NY first)
F. Percentage Approach
G. Regional Configuration

3.2 Federal Management Options

3.2.1. Options for Adding State Allocations to Council FMP
   - Options for Paybacks of State Quota Overages
3.2.2. Options for Federal In-season Closures
DARA Example

- 30:70 final weights initial allocations/resource distribution
- 5% per year change in weights
- annual adjustments
- 3% adjustment cap
- transition time 12 years
Proportion of black sea bass commercial harvest landed in New Jersey from northern and southern region statistical areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Average 2010-2019</th>
<th>Average 2010-2014</th>
<th>Average 2015-2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average 2010-2019: 54%
Average 2010-2014: 43%
Average 2015-2019: 66%

NJ BSB landings by area

- % N
- % S
New Jersey Regional Allocation
- 10:90 final weights initial allocations/resource distribution
- 10% per year change
- annual adjustments
- 10% adjustment cap
- transition time 9 years
Table 7: Comparison of 2018-2019 black sea bass landings to example RHLs and commercial quotas for each allocation alternative under the 2020 ABC (15.07 million pounds) and the assumptions outlined in Appendix C. (Landings and limits in millions of pounds; 2018-2019 landings provided by the NMFS Greater Atlantic Regional Fisheries Office).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>1c-1</th>
<th>1c-2</th>
<th>1c-3</th>
<th>1c-4</th>
<th>1c-5</th>
<th>1c-6</th>
<th>1c-7</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Catch-based</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com. allocation</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec. allocation</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>.51%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example commercial quota</strong></td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018-2019 avg com. landings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Difference from 2018-2019 com. Landings</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-24%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example RHL</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>9.14</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>8.28</td>
<td>9.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018-2019 avg rec. landings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Difference from 2018-2019 rec. landings</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-35%</td>
<td>-30%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Framework Actions

- If allocations are added to Council FMP, could be modified through a future framework action.

- Current framework regulations:
  - “The MAFMC's recommendations on adjustments or additions to management measures must come from one or more of the following categories: ...commercial quota system including commercial quota allocation procedure...”
History of Allocations

- **Joint amendment 9 (implemented 1998)**
  - Established joint mgmt. of BSB.
  - State allocations based on 1988-1992 landings – disapproved by NMFS.
  - Coastwide quarterly allocation implemented.

- **Amendment 13 (implemented 2003)**
  - Many options jointly considered, analyzed.
  - Council voted for coastwide federal quota to facilitate state allocations in ASMFC FMP.
  - NMFS advised against state allocations in MAFMC FMP due to concerns about monitoring.
  - Board-only vote on state allocations. Intended to be in place for 2003 and 2004.

- **Addendum XIX (implemented 2007)**
  - Continued allocations without a sunset clause.

- **December 2015**
  - Council and Board initiated a comprehensive BSB amendment. Allocations one of many topics discussed. Discussed at 3 subsequent joint mtgs. No progress made due to other priorities.