

# On Corporate Surveillance Data Doubles, and Post-Panopticism

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## Introduction

This paper argues that Foucault's theory of Panopticism is no longer a sufficient description of the dominant web of mechanisms for producing social order in Western society. While social order is still produced largely through surveillance methods just as it is in Foucault's Panoptic system, I argue that technological advances in surveillance combined with increased influences of corporations and consumerism have resulted in a new layer of modern surveillance practices that differ in key ways from some of the main features of Foucault's Panopticism. As such, our current system is more accurately described as "Post-Panoptic."

I begin section two by defining Foucauldian Panopticism and giving a brief background of this concept that was popularized as a social theory by Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*. Section three defines Post-Panopticism, and evaluates two arguments that fall under this heading. Although I reject both of these because neither gives an adequate reason for labelling our current system Post-Panoptic, each provides me with tools to shape my own Post-Panoptic argument in Section four. In Section five I discuss why our current Post-Panoptic system is potentially an unstable one.

## 2. Panopticism

This section gives a brief background and overview of Foucault's Panopticism, which was first proposed by Foucault in 1975's *Discipline and Punish* and has since been taken up by social theorists as "the leading principle of social order" governing modern society.<sup>1</sup> Foucault's Panopticism developed from the image of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, an architectural design that Bentham proposed in 1786. Basically, this design was for a circular building with single-person cells around the outside wall and a central guard tower in the middle. This tower would be constructed so that it had sightlines into each cell, but so that no cells had sightlines into the tower. Bentham proposed that this structure could be used to house a prison, school, hospital, or any number of institutions that Foucault calls "disciplinary"—institutions whose purposes involve to some degree an effort to take in citizens who stray from a social norm (of behaviour, health, intelligence, etc.) and make them into obedient and productive members of society.<sup>2</sup>

Foucault argues that the Panopticon—while extremely difficult to recreate in reality—is a structure in which disciplinary power can be exercised extremely efficiently over subjects, whether these be inmates, students, patients, or workers. Among the Panopticon's many functions, there are two components to this exercise of power that I think are most key for Foucault's arguments. The first is that, since subjects of surveillance are in isolated cells, the authority controlling the Panopticon is able to extensively observe and collect information on each. This

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1 Roy Boyne, "Post-Panopticism," *Economy and Society* 29, no. 2 (2000): 285-307.

2 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977), 200-02.

hyper-individualization and documentation of subjects allows for methods of normalization—whether corrective, educational, or medical—to be tailored to each person for maximum efficiency.<sup>3</sup> The Panopticon’s second key component is that subjects feel a constant threat of surveillance, since—given that subjects cannot see into the central watchtower—they never know at any moment whether they are being watched. This constant pressure causes subjects to be rigidly obedient and to self-regulate their behaviour because of the threat of being caught deviating. There is thus no need for any sort of physical coercion; power relations in the Panopticon are of “mind over mind.”<sup>4</sup>

The Panopticon’s subjects become what Foucault refers to throughout the text as “docile bodies”—they are normalized, obedient, and unlikely to rebel. Importantly, subjects are also trained to be highly *productive* in a capitalistic sense—in work-based institutions output is very high, and in medical and corrective institutions, subjects are made ready to re-enter society as economically contributing members. The Panopticon essentially takes in members of society who are “deviant” in some way and thus not functioning at full capacity, and expels individuals ready to function as cogs in society’s machinery.

This describes how an institution would function when placed within the ideal Panopticon model, but Foucault is skeptical that a perfectly Panoptical institution could exist in reality.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, he argues that between the 18th and 19th centuries, Western society became what can be described as “Panoptic.” This is because the primary methods by which power is exercised

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3 Ibid., 203-04.

4 Ibid., 201-06.

5 Ibid., 205.

over citizens to produce social control resemble, to a less pure degree, the methods used in the Panopticon: normalization and obedience are produced through individualized observation and documentation, plus a constant threat of surveillance.<sup>6</sup> Society is “Panoptic” largely because disciplinary institutions have become so commonplace and influential. Thus, “Panopticism” is, broadly, the theory that Panoptic methods of social control dominate contemporary society.

Observing how our disciplinary institutions operate, it is easy to see why Foucault’s Panoptic description of them it became a popular social theory. A simple demonstrative example is the contemporary education system. Children’s progress and behavior are constantly documented through standardized testing and observation, and efforts are made to normalize each child towards a pre-determined standard. Teachers, schools, and the government collect information about students, and the teacher’s gaze constantly enforces behaviour and productivity. Of course, children are not literally put into individual cells in a Panopticon-like structure, but it is easy to see how principles employed by the literal Panopticon are employed in a more diluted fashion in schools. I take it as relatively self-evident how one could fit a similar model onto the other institutions Foucault describes, such as prisons, hospitals, and workplaces.

Roy Boyne proposes that, since Foucault wrote *Discipline and Punish*, social theorists have taken up Panopticism as “the default background of much social and cultural analysis.”<sup>7</sup> As evinced by the literature I discuss in subsequent sections, there is no shortage of theorists who have continued through the past couple of decades to ar-

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6 Ibid., 208-09

7 Boyne. “Post-Panopticism,” 293.

gue either that Panopticism is still the dominant model in contemporary society, or that it has ceased to be such. It is difficult, though, to find arguments that Panopticism *was never* the dominant principle of social order, which attests to the influence of Foucault's theory. I adopt the mainstream presupposition that Foucault's characterization of Western society as Panoptic was accurate at the time he was writing in the 1970s.

If this is the case, then to ask whether 21st century societies are Panoptic is to ask whether we have moved from Panopticism to a different "Post-Panoptic" model.

### **3. Post-Panopticism?**

In this section, I introduce the general concept of Post-Panopticism, and I then discuss two particular arguments to show we are no longer in a Panoptic society. While I argue that neither of these accounts offers a sufficient reason for viewing contemporary society as Post-Panoptic, each of them nevertheless offers important insight that I use to develop my own Post-Panoptic arguments in Section four.

To define Post-Panopticism, I use the broad interpretation Boyne gives in his paper titled "Post-Panopticism." Boyne surveys five prominent theories that he categorizes under this heading. He takes the term literally: each theory claims that we are in a system that has come *after* Foucauldian Panopticism, having replaced it. Within this broad category of "after Panopticism," though, it is worth noting that there are essentially two sub-categories. Some of these views describe a system that has evolved from Panopticism and is Panopticism's logical successor; others describe a system that has replaced Panopticism, because Panopticism has in some way ceased to function properly. Since, like Boyne, I am concerned with examin-

ing in general whether our society has shifted to something other than Panopticism, I too conflate these two types of views into one, broad framework.

The first Post-Panoptic theory I want to discuss is proposed by Zygmunt Bauman, who argues that the Panoptic model of producing social control through surveillance has been replaced in Western society with a model of “seduction.”<sup>8</sup> While Bauman concedes that social control was maintained via surveillance throughout the 20th century, he argues that Panopticism’s widespread success was mainly due to the far reaches of institutions that conditioned people to be soldiers and producers.<sup>9</sup> As Foucault describes, the goal of disciplinary institutions like prisons, schools, and hospitals has largely been to shape individuals into normal, productive members of society. However, Bauman argues that in contemporary society, a principle of “seduction” has replaced Panopticism because “most of us are socially and culturally trained and shaped as sensation-seekers.”<sup>10</sup> He draws this conclusion from observations of today’s hyper-consumerist culture: our desires and actions are greatly shaped by an obsession with and greed for constant new stimuli and experiences. Bauman believes that whereas the Panoptic model once trained us mainly to be productive, we are now trained mainly to consume.

Responding to Bauman’s suggestion that Panoptic surveillance has been replaced with consumerist conditioning, however, Boyne argues that while consumption undeniably plays a large role in shaping our day-to-day behaviour, our practices of consumption are actually *interlaced with* surveillance. Boyne painstakingly details

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8 Zygmunt Bauman, “On Postmodern Uses of Sex,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 15, no. 2 (1998): 23.

9 *Ibid.*

10 *Ibid.*

the “collection of information” and “the ordering and deployment” of that information by corporations that produce the products we consume.<sup>11</sup> His accounts describe widespread modern corporate surveillance practices, from the extensive records tied to credit and loyalty cards kept by supermarket chains to the cookies that online shopping outlets deposit in browsers to track internet history and feed people tailor-made ads.<sup>12</sup> Boyne wrote these observations back in 2000, and they should be even more familiar more than a decade later as I write this paper, especially when consumption practices have become further digitized to involve online social networking and search engines. The two paradigmatic examples are of course Facebook and Google, which each collect and store massive amounts of information that are sold to third parties for purposes of advertising and analysis of consumption trends.<sup>1314</sup>

Boyne seems to give a convincing response. While Bauman’s suggestion that our social conditioning has shifted largely into the hands of corporations is well-taken, I do not think that this shift from conditioning as producers to conditioning as consumers alone constitutes Post-Panopticism if the mechanisms of producing normalization are still Panoptic. In the disciplinary practices Foucault describes, individual behavior and habits are observed and documented so that those in power can use this knowledge to create more individualized normalization methods. Nowadays, corporations use the data they collect about individuals to create more effec-

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11 Boyne, “Post-Panopticism,” 296.

12 *Ibid.*, 297.

13 Facebook, “Data Use Policy,” last modified January 30, 2015, <https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy>.

14 Google, “Privacy Policy,” last modified June 30, 2015, <http://www.google.ca/policies/privacy/>.

tive advertising and to strategically create new products. We are fed online ads specifically tailored to us, and patterns and trends in consumption are analyzed to develop new products that appeal to the desires that Bauman identifies: our ever-growing appetites for new stimuli and experiences. While the social norm toward which we are being shaped has shifted significantly into one of consumerism, this normalization by corporations is still accomplished through surveillance methods, so it alone does not constitute Post-Panopticism.

Developing Bauman's picture, Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson argue that contemporary society is not Panoptic because recent surveillance technology has given rise to the "data double" as subject of surveillance in place of the physical body. In Foucault's descriptions of Panopticism, surveillance is exercised directly on subjects' physical bodies; Haggerty and Ericson describe how this has largely been replaced by corporate surveillance of a "new type of body... which transcends human corporeality."<sup>15</sup> This "body" is the conglomeration of trails of digital information that we send out as we undergo daily activities. It includes information about our physical activities through means like GPS locations and credit transactions, but is also largely reconstructed from our preferences, tastes, and habits, via, for example, our purchases and internet activity.<sup>16</sup> Building on Bauman's account, Haggerty and Ericson suggest that this type of surveillance allows for the more efficient "production of consumer profiles through the *ex post facto* reconstructions of a person's behaviour, habits and actions."<sup>17</sup>

Is the simple fact that data doubles have largely re-

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15 Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, "The Surveillant Assemblage," *British Journal of Sociology* 51, no. 4 (2000): 613.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 615.

placed physical bodies as the subjects of surveillance enough to constitute a shift away from Foucault's Panopticism? It is not clear to me that it is. While this might mark a change in the specifics of how people are surveyed, it does not necessarily amount to anything beyond creating a more "high tech" Panopticon. If it otherwise preserves the Panopticon's main features, then this increased role of technology wouldn't be enough to conclude that Foucault's Panoptic model has become defunct. Haggerty and Ericson thus do not give sufficient justification that this is the case.

Finally, another important point that problematizes the arguments given by Bauman as well as Haggerty and Ericson is the fact that, while the roles of consumerism and technology in surveillance and social normalization have clearly evolved lately, the disciplinary institutions which Foucault described are still very much in operation. Discipline and normalization are still largely carried out by prisons, schools, hospitals, etc., and in these institutions discipline is mainly still exercised over physical bodies with the goal of creating productive members of society. The accounts I discussed in this section focus on the consumer as having *replaced* the producer, but it seems more accurate to say that subjects are now shaped into a mix of both.

#### **4. Tying the Ends Together: Post-Panopticism**

Coming out of Section three, I have established the following main points about contemporary surveillance and mechanisms of social control. The umbrella of surveillance practices has extended to include a much larger role for corporate surveillance, which is concerned more with normalizing individuals into consumers than the producers Foucault describes; contemporary technology

plays a significant role in this, and modern surveillance is largely exercised over “data doubles” rather than physical bodies. Still, the shifts from production to consumption and from physical bodies to data doubles are not enough on their own to warrant a label of “Post-Panopticism.” This is especially true given that traditional Foucauldian Panoptic institutions still exist.

What is my argument, then, that contemporary society is nevertheless Post-Panoptic? There is an important element of Panopticism that I described above in Section two that is conspicuously absent from the contemporary surveillance practices discussed by Bauman and by Haggerty and Ericson, but to which neither attends: essential to a Panoptic system is that subjects experience a constant pressure of the threat of surveillance, which causes them to consciously self-discipline in obedience to an established social norm. In the case of corporate surveillance of data doubles, this aspect is not present in a salient, widespread way. I did point out that many of the Panoptic institutions with which Foucault was concerned still function under these principles, as in the example of the modern school I discussed in Section two. Since corporate surveillance as discussed in Section three is now so influential, though, we have to conclude that there are essentially two layers of mechanisms for social control: that of the Panoptic, disciplinary surveillance practices Foucault describes, and that of corporate surveillance. Since one of these layers is Panoptic but the other is not, Panopticism is no longer a sufficient description of contemporary society.

In the Panoptic school, students self-discipline because of the threat of the teacher’s gaze; in the Panoptic hospital, patients follow a prescribed regimen because of the threat of the doctor’s gaze. The case of corporate sur-

veillance exercised over data doubles is clearly not analogous to these. While aspects of observation, individualization, collecting information, and normalization are in many ways analogous, the subjects' psychological reaction to this surveillance is not. I think it is obvious without requiring justification that most people today simply do not feel much pressure from corporate surveillance: it is not on their minds very often, they are unaware of its exact details, and they do not consciously change their actions substantially in response to it. There are of course some people who *do* develop varying degrees of anxiety about the fact that someone could be surveying them anytime, and so alter their online behaviour; at least on the face of things; however, this type of person is the minority. Furthermore, those who do feel the pressure of this corporate surveillance in this way engage in a type of self-regulation that is not consumer-creating self-discipline, but which accomplishes the opposite. Unlike Panoptic surveillance, it seems that corporate surveillance operates more efficiently when its subjects *do not* feel its pressure.

To what feature(s) of this contemporary layer of surveillance practices can we attribute this disanalogous psychological reaction? I argue now that this is due to the incorporeality of the data double compared with the physical body, such that surveillance over data doubles in some way just does not feel as invasive or "real" to us. Even though we might have some notion that the trails of digital information we produce are tracked, collected, analyzed, sold, etc., the fact that this surveillance is not being exercised directly over our physical bodies has the result that we are not fully or constantly aware of it, despite that it could be occurring anytime. There seems to be some kind of psychological block that keeps us from feeling the pressure of this surveillance. Although I ad-

mit this sounds like a somewhat vague notion, I hope to make it intuitively easy to grasp.

Now, contrary to what I have just proposed, I think there are strong intuitions to the effect that the general population *is* largely aware of digital corporate surveillance, but that this awareness does not produce a constant pressure to self-regulate because most people view this surveillance as harmless; or, as Jerome Dobson and Peter Fisher suggest, perhaps it is that we are aware of this surveillance but we do not mind it because it is incredibly useful to us.<sup>18</sup> After all, we get a lot of utility from the internet, GPS services, and credit cards, and it seems plausible that most people feel these advantages outweigh any negative effects.

As response to these intuitions and as argument for my own proposal, I suggest the following thought experiment. Let us imagine a world “W” in which the streams of digital information representing citizens’ activities, habits, and tastes are tracked and used by corporations and governments for exactly the same purposes as in the actual world; in W, all of the information that has been and ever will be collected is identical to that of the actual world as well, and is stored using identical methods. Corporate surveillance practices also became widespread along the same timeline as in the actual world. The only difference in surveillance practices between W and the actual world is that in W, each person is followed throughout their daily activities by a small, hovering camera that snaps photos of them as they use computers, credit card machines, and other such devices. The camera deletes these photos after processing and converting them into the same type of data that in the actual world is

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18 Dobson fisher 319 Jerome E. Dobson and Peter F. Fisher, “The Panopticon’s Changing Geography,” *Geographical Review* 97, no. 3 (2007): 307-23.

sent off by our computers and phones to be collected and stored, so in *W* no person sees the actual photos. Citizens of *W* understand how this conversion process works, and that only digital records of activities, not photos, are being sent to their surveyors.

My intention is to establish this case so that the only difference between surveillance in *W* and in the actual world is that, in *W*, surveillance is exercised on subjects' physical bodies rather than data doubles. With this in mind, I ask: would we imagine that the citizens of *W* feel the pressure of surveillance to a significantly greater extent than we do in the actual world, and that these citizens would be more reticent to share information based on this? The answer is yes; the physical presence of the camera would, in general, make an individual behave differently. The effect of changing this one variable would seem a priori to be that corporate surveillance feels much more invasive and "real" to its subjects, even if the type of data collected and the purposes for which it is used are held constant between *W* and the actual world. So, I conclude that the reason we do not feel the pressure of this surveillance is that the incorporeal nature of the data double makes it feel much less tangible to subjects, and that this is what makes us so incautious about sharing information.

To the overall Post-Panoptic picture I have just given, one might further raise an objection that I have described contemporary surveillance practices as too one-directional. After all, contemporary technology does not just allow for those in power to survey the masses, but also gives the ordinary citizen a lot more power to conduct his or her own surveillance. It could be that this type of surveillance is involved in producing social order, which would mean I have not described the entire picture of contemporary society. I foresee two possible objections to

my arguments under this category, which I now respond to in turn.

The first of these two objections is that modern technology gives regular citizens power to *survey one another*. Of likely innumerable methods of performing surveillance on the trails of digital information emitted by others, there are two kinds: firstly, through technology like cheap, easily available GPS tracking apparatuses and similar such devices, which could easily be planted in someone's personal belongings;<sup>19</sup> secondly, through observations of others' habits and tastes that we perform online through social networking platforms. Perhaps these types of peer-to-peer surveillance need to be taken into account when describing the way surveillance produces social order?

Regarding the former category, I would argue simply that this type of surveillance, while there is potential for everyone to partake in it, has not become a norm or even very widespread; simply having the *potential* to become a bigger influence on social conditioning is not enough to factor it into our account of the dominant contemporary practices. The latter category is, of course, much more widespread. However, we can actually see instances of this type of surveillance as largely in service of our conditioning as consumers by corporate surveillance. Our desire to constantly consume the newest and best products as they are churned out—whether this be technology, fashion, even just the consumption of social media products themselves—goes along with a desire to see what others are consuming, and to have them see what we are consuming. We are naturally inclined to some extent to conform to societal norms, and also to compete with others for social status; in an age of consumerism, these in-

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19 For examples of such products, see: Amber Alert GPS, "Products," accessed April 22, 2014, <http://www.amberalertgps.com/products>.

clinations manifest themselves as desires to compete and to conform in our consumption habits, requiring that we observe the behaviour of others to do so effectively.

A second possible objection regarding modern technology and citizen surveillance is that surveillance is now not only mainly performed by those in power over the masses, but largely in the opposite direction as well. This is a model that Thomas Mathiesen refers to as the “Synopticon.” He argues that mass media has turned us into a viewer society, in which we have unprecedented access to details about the lives of those in power.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, new technologies make on the fly surveillance of authorities much easier, such as cell phone cameras that are available to film instances of police brutality.<sup>21</sup> If those who condition the population through surveillance are increasingly becoming subjects of surveillance themselves, is the system I described incomplete? This could be the case if surveillance of those in power by the masses serves to regulate the actions of those in power, making for a multilinear, rather than unilinear, form of control.

One response to this objection is to note that much of this reverse surveillance still takes place within the previously established hierarchy. Mass media outlets might provide us with a window into the lives of those who survey us—in particular, the corporate executives responsible for the surveillance I have been concerned with in this paper—but many of these media outlets themselves are owned by these very executives, and tuning into them is itself an act of consumption of a product. Even where this is not the case, surveillance of the powerful is “often a mile wide but only an inch deep” in comparison to how

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20 T. Mathiesen, “The Viewer Society: Michel Foucault’s ‘Panopticon’ Revisited.” *Theoretical Criminology* 1, no. 2 (1997): 219.

21 Haggerty and Ericson, “Surveillant Assemblage,” 618.

the masses are surveyed.<sup>22</sup> For example, the ordinary person is not equipped with the means to perform constant, highly-detailed collection of information about the tastes and habits of a Facebook executive, whereas surveillance in the opposite direction can and does happen. Further, surveillance of the powerful is often only really “activated, or intensified, when there is some perceived *ex post facto* or prospective need to profile their movements, consumption patterns,” etc.<sup>23</sup> If it were let out that Google founder Larry Page were the subject of some kind of scandal, *then* many eyes would be turned toward him; otherwise, the minor details of his life go mostly unobserved.

It seems, then, that neither of these objections based on the now-widespread availability of surveillance tools is satisfactory. I have thus come to the following conclusions in this section: that an additional layer of surveillance practices has developed on top of the practices Foucault’s Panopticism describes, a layer which does not carry the important Panoptic feature of instilling in its subjects a constant anxiety about surveillance triggering self-discipline; together, these two layers make up the dominant mechanisms of social normalization in contemporary society. The presence of this second layer has made the label “Panopticism” insufficient, and we are therefore in a Post-Panoptic society.

## 5. An Unstable System?

Foucault has famously outlined what he believes to be the political role of the intellectual and philosopher in

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

various published interviews.<sup>24</sup> Broadly, he claims that his aim in describing the way our social and political systems function is descriptive, not normative. Particularly, Foucault applies this to his discussions of how one could resist or revolt against the current dominant system; rather than arguing that resistance *should* be undertaken, he aims to point towards directions from which it *could* be undertaken if one were so inclined, but leaves it up to his readers to decide what action, if any, should be taken. In this section I provide a similar type of analysis of the Post-Panoptic system I developed in this paper, and I show how it is unstable and vulnerable to potential lines of resistance.

The rapid development of modern surveillance technologies employed by surveyors in our contemporary system is in fact what gives it its instability. I proposed above that Mathiesen exaggerates the extent to which the masses currently employ surveillance technologies against those in power; however, technologies that allow everyday citizens to do a kind of reverse surveillance to uncover how they are being surveyed are becoming increasingly more sophisticated and available, even if not widely used.<sup>25</sup> There are of course some who engage in reverse surveillance quite extensively,<sup>26</sup> but on the whole it is not done in any widespread, deep sense. If a more significant percentage of the population consciously set out to find exactly how and from where they were being surveyed, though, this would at the very least lessen

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24 Michel Foucault, "Clarifications on the Question of Power," in *Foucault Live (interviews, 1961-1984)*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), 262.

25 For a basic example: Ghostery, "How it Works," accessed April 22, 2014, <https://www.ghostery.com/en/how-it-works>.

26 A common example: Wikileaks, "About," accessed April 22, 2014, <https://wikileaks.org/About.html>.

their degree of docility by making them aware for what purposes they are being used by corporations and how exactly their actions and habits are influenced. It is also clearly the first step towards actively resisting this influence. While the details of how this resistance could play out are beyond my means to develop here, I do hope to suggest that initial pressure would develop as a result of people using surveillance technologies in reverse to discover how they are being surveyed and conditioned.

If resistance of this type *were* to be exercised, what would be the result? Since I am discussing primarily resistance to the layer of surveillance practices that exists in addition to Foucauldian Panoptic practices, it seems that if we deconstructed this layer we might end up back in a Panoptic system similar to what Foucault described. If the current system collapsed after widespread use of surveillance technology by the masses led to active resistance, perhaps Panopticism would re-emerge as the dominant model of social control. This would mean that any problems one has with Panopticism would remain. Active resistance to our current system *as a whole*, addressing both layers of surveillance practices, would need to incorporate elements that target traditional Panoptic practices as well, since these practices are still in existence. I leave the detailing of this up to Foucault's readers to consider.

## 6. Conclusion

I have argued in this paper that Foucault's Panopticism is no longer an adequate description of the practices that produce social conditioning in modern Western society; we are thus now in a "Post-Panoptic" society. My argument incorporates observations about the increased roles of corporations, consumerism, and technology in

modern surveillance made by several social theorists, although none of these theorists' arguments take into account the important aspect of Panopticism that is missing from our contemporary system: that subjects of surveillance feel the constant pressure of being surveyed, which produces in them a desire to self-discipline. I further argued that this difference in subjects' psychological reaction to surveillance is because modern corporate surveillance is exercised largely over incorporeal "data doubles" rather than physical bodies, keeping us from being fully psychologically aware of it. Finally, I proposed that this current system is a potentially unstable one due to the increasing availability of technologies by which citizens could survey those in power and discover the details of corporate surveillance practices, which would be the first step towards active resistance.

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