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Book review

Charles Forceville, *Pictorial metaphor in advertising*. London/New York: Routledge, 1996. x + 233 pp. £55 (hb.), ISBN: 0-415-12868-4; £17.99 (pb.) ISBN: 0-415-18676-5.

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“The fantasy of a pictorial turn, of a culture totally dominated by images, has now become a real technical possibility on a global scale.” (Mitchell, 1994: 15)

In a field yearly witnessing dozens of publications, Charles Forceville’s *Pictorial metaphor in advertising* must be considered a noteworthy and welcome – if not always engrossing – attempt to anchor the study of pictorial metaphor within the discipline of verbal metaphor. Its main theoretical claim is that metaphor theory, as summarized and defined by Black (1979) and his followers, need not be limited to verbal metaphor, but may be profitably used as a solid base for the understanding and definition of visual metaphor as well.

By centering the study around one thoroughly discussed and well defined theory, Forceville makes his ideas accessible even to scholars who are not metaphor scholars par excellence, an approach which should be fully appreciated in a field often suffering from theoretical eclecticism. Having set up a solid theoretical model, the author is able to enliven our understanding of pictorial advertisement in a systematic way, by bringing various specific examples, the discussion of which forms the liveliest part of the book. It is, perhaps, a pity that this section appears no sooner than Chapter 6, though the need for a firm theoretical introduction is understandable. In the main, the author’s approach enables him to present advertisement as a legitimate data, comparable with other subjects – literature, fine arts, cinema – for his own study of pictorial metaphor. This is important because of the vague, sometimes inferior status advertisement usually accepts as a subject of academic study – surely, an anachronistic state of affairs in the wake of post-modernism. Overall, the book’s main contribution lies in Chapters 2 and 6: Chapter 2 prepares the terminology for the case-studies in Chapter 6.

In the theoretical section, beginning in Chapter 2, the author describes a substantial part of Black’s (1979) theory of metaphor, with reference to some elaborations of later scholars. The detailed presentation of Black’s theory stands in its own right

as an introductory layout of Black's terminology and ideas. Being an 'interaction' theory of metaphor, this theory easily lends itself to pictorial translation; the pictorial has always been able to represent the outcome of the 'interaction' process in a way language could only suggest but never affirm.

Black believed in the significant difference between simile and metaphor: "In discursively comparing one subject *with* another, we sacrifice the distinctive power and effectiveness of a good metaphor" (p. 32). Forceville, however, advances that "there is no essential difference between metaphor and simile" (p. 32). Nonetheless, in Chapter 6, he points at 'surface difference' in pictorial as well as in linguistic metaphor between metaphor and simile. Some elucidation of this incongruity would have been welcome.

Given Forceville's generally balanced use of Black's theory, it is a little difficult to understand his erratic and curiously biased attitude towards Kittay's (1987) work on verbal metaphor. A substantial part of Chapter 2 is devoted to the author's tenacious refutation of Kittay's perspectival account of metaphor. According to Forceville, Kittay's main weakness is her commitment to semantic fields, which places too much weight on the linguistic character of verbal metaphor, while her pragmatic considerations are much limited in scope, disregarding those networks of beliefs, attitudes, and emotions Black believed to be co-transferred with the vehicle to the topic (p. 15).

However, a different aspect of Kittay's book should pose a challenge to a theorist of pictorial metaphor who chooses to be alert to it. In her discussion of what she describes as a "tension"¹ created within the metaphor between topic and vehicle (e.g., *a man is a wolf*), Kittay (1987: 184) observes that "if we want to preserve the tension, we cannot give an account of interaction which neutralizes all tension between vehicle and topic. Unfortunately, this is what appears to happen in Black's account. Unless this tension is preserved, the 'suppress[ion of] some details' and emphasis of others does not really *organize* our view of man, for unless the categories of man and wolf remain distinct we cannot use one distinct entity – with its systematic interconnections – to reconceive the other. Instead the metaphor would serve as a neologism naming a hybrid creature, part-man, part-wolf. Rather than one subject serving as a perspective on a second, the two subjects are merely conflated".

Whether or not one agrees with her reading of Black, Kittay's linguistic description contradicts metaphorical representation from Ancient Egypt to Surrealism, and modern advertising.² Such images raise the question whether *pictorial* representations serve as a tool for defining degrees of 'literalness' of topic and vehicle. Does pictorial metaphor manifest the creation merely of 'hybrid creatures', or does it create new perspectives, in the sense of the Aristotelian 'fresh thing'? (I will return briefly to this question in my discussion of Chapter 6.)

¹ Forceville mentions this 'tension' a little later in the chapter (p. 27) without referring to Kittay's discussion.

² Ancient Egypt is the earliest occasion in the history of civilization where a clear line can be drawn between linguistic and pictorial metaphors, see Goldwasser 1995: (114-125).

Black's claim that metaphor '*creates* similarity' (emphasis added), a function vital to its role in poetry and science, is of obvious importance to a study of advertisement (p. 22). An important addition mentioned here by Forceville is Indurkha's (1991) terminology. Indurkha distinguishes between three kinds of metaphor: syntactic, suggestive, and projective. It is the last type, the projective metaphor, which is responsible, in his view, for poetic and scientific inventions, since it entails a richly structured topic and vehicle, both of which are well known to the addressee. What is new, and what creates the poetic or scientific metaphor, is their unexpected *coupling*. Later, in Chapter 6, Forceville presents several good examples which illustrate the force of such surprises (e.g., Fig. 2).

It is surprising, however, that it is only at the very end of his extensive discussion of Black, that the author presents the most important assumption, posited by Richards (1930) and Black, then invigorated and developed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), that metaphor is "primarily a matter of thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language". Surprising, that is, as this seems to me to be the self-evident precondition for any book on pictorial metaphor.

Chapter 3 is a more or less critical stock-taking of earlier theories of pictorial metaphor the author regards as relevant to his work. The first theory discussed is Wollheim's (1987), whose definition of metaphor is far more open-ended and abstract than those that have emerged from the Richards–Black school of metaphor. However, his discussion of artistic paintings, at least as Forceville delivers it, seems to be irrelevant to the main line of Forceville's work. Hausman (1989), the second theorist treated (p. 41), contributes more to Forceville's discussion, since he, too, works within the framework of Black's theory. Hausman, however, harnesses metaphor to his own special interest – defining the 'miracle of art'. His work nonetheless brings up the question of reversibility of terms in metaphor. Hausman is in favor of reversibility or 'multidirectionality', whereas Forceville rightly (to my mind) rejects the idea.

The work of Kennedy (1982), a perception-psychologist, which follows, is certainly the most relevant to Forceville's discussion. Kennedy's aims and tools are the closest to the author's. Yet Kennedy takes the 'queen of tropes' to be an all inclusive term for all other tropes, such as synecdoche, metonymy, allusion, paronomasia, etc., disregarding Black's warning that one should not ignore "the important distinctions between metaphor and such figures of speech as simile, metonymy, and synecdoche" (p. 55). Two other studies mentioned are those of Johns (1984) and Durand (1987).

Forceville then considers his own earlier work on Surrealist works of art (Forceville, 1988). He now sees the inadequacy of Surrealism for a fundamental discussion on pictorial metaphor, as this genre deliberately creates abnormal relations between signifier and signified.

The last but not least work discussed is Whittock (1990). Although the book deals with moving and artistic images, it contains, according to Forceville, some observations that are related to his present work (p. 61). Like Kennedy, Whittock presents various tropes under what he regards as varieties of cinematic metaphors. He contributes to Forceville's attempts to find clues or rules for a definition of tenor versus

vehicle in the pictorial medium, be it static or non-static – a question that is to recur repeatedly in Chapter 6.

In Chapters 4 and 5, Forceville turns to what he describes as the ‘discourse situation of advertisement’ (p. 69). To this end, he considers the Jakobsonian communication model, which assumes, for any communication act, a communicator, an addressee, a message, a code, a channel, and a context (Jakobson, 1960: 353).

In the case of advertisement, a ‘channel’ may be defined as print (mostly billboards, some newspapers ads, leaflets, etc.). What needs to be examined, therefore, is the relationship existing between word and image in the message. The author returns to Barthes (1986 [1964]) for a definition of a ‘relaying’ function versus an ‘anchoring’ function, which a text may acquire in relation to the given image. In the ‘relaying’ function, language and image stand in complementary relation (as in comic strips, for example), the linguistic message containing information not being present in the image. In the ‘anchoring’ function, the linguistic message guides the identification and interpretation of the pictorial components. Forceville rightly states that today’s advertising texts are complex messages of a more relaying than anchoring character. Eco’s (1972: 248–250) important discussion of the Volkswagen 1200 ad would have been an excellent example at this point. The ad is comprised of the car’s picture with an accompanying text which aims at reframing ‘car ideology’.

As to the Jakobsonian ‘code’, the writer claims, rather simplistically, that there is no established ‘pictorial code’ or ‘pictorial grammar’. In thus reasoning, he overlooks the complex, extensive discussions of this subject, carried out by art students and semioticians, from Gombrich (1956, 1982), through Eco (1972), and lately Mitchell (1986), to name but a few.

‘Context’, which comes next (p. 75), is the pictorial context in which an ad’s text is placed, and the immediate pictorial surroundings of the ad. With the aid of Bosch (1985), Olson (1970), and Tversky (1977), the author identifies the option of creating anchoring effects through additional pictorial stimuli next to the main pictorial subject. He, then, widens the term’s applicability, to include not only what is within the text, but also what is beyond it. Included in the ‘beyond’ category are the physical surroundings of the ad: bus shelters, parks or streets, in the case of billboards, newspapers articles, pictures, and other ads, in the case of printed ads.

More importantly, the ‘beyond’ category refers to the cultural context which is essential to a meaningful reading of an advertisement. Here, the author rightly refers to the most important concept of ‘script’, baptized by Abelson (1976: 33) as a “coherent sequence of events expected by the individual, involving him either as a participant or as an observer”, famous examples of which are marrying, shopping, or going to a restaurant. Forceville sees in advertisement an attempt to “manipulate the scripts he or she brings towards the product” (p. 81). However, another typical manipulation may be an aggressive attempt to entrench a certain product in a desired or essential script of the audience’s cultural code.

Chapter 5, Communicator and addressee in the advertising message, treats the ‘communicator’ and ‘addressee’ of the Jakobsonian model, presented in the previous chapter. Forceville tackles this subject by transposing into the pictorial Sperber and

Wilson's (1986, 1987) theory of relevance. The chapter includes a long presentation of 'relevance theory', a confrontation of this theory with Black's interaction theory, and, finally, an evaluation of how Sperber and Wilson's theory could be applied to advertisements.

According to Forceville, every advertisement, is *ipso facto* a bid for attention, i.e., has a communicative intention; it comes with a presumption of relevance, whereupon the advertiser wants to bring about a change in the cognitive environment of the addressee. However, in his view, advertisements differ in four important respects from the type of verbal communication which relevance theory attempts to explain:

1. Given the absence of a simultaneous existence of communicator and addressee, pictorial communication lacks the opportunity for an immediate feedback.
2. Given the number of addressees involved, pictorial communication entails an effort of "relevance to a target group" (p. 100). The advertiser should be able to address the 'average' addressee.
3. Advertisements are of multi-media character.
4. The textual part of advertisement is usually ambiguous.

The author now attempts to show how Sperber and Wilson's theory can contribute to Black's theory of verbal metaphor. The author sees in relevance theory a possible clue to the tantalizing 'mapping' problem.³ It seems to me, however, that a different school of thought, which views metaphor as a creation of an alternative *ad hoc* category, "having a prototype structure, being based on a common relational structure, enabling inference from one member of the class to another"⁴ (Shen, 1995: 25) is on the right path to solving the 'mapping' problem, and in any case provides a better solution to it than relevance theory.⁴

The chapter ends with a discussion of some of Tanaka's (1994) ideas. Tanaka also uses Sperber and Wilson's model, yet she offers an interesting perspective on the nature of the advertising message. She believes advertising to be "'covert' as opposed to 'ostensive' communication" (p. 104). The 'covert' communicator does not publicize, that is, make mutually manifest his informative intention. This attitude enables the advertiser to avoid taking responsibility for implications to socially loaded topics such as sex or snobbery. Tanaka's theory seems indeed applicable, at least, to some advertisements, if not to all of them.

In Chapter 6, Pictorial metaphor in advertisements and billboards, readers who have struggled patiently with complex theoretical issues pertaining to verbal metaphors are rewarded with the enchanted sphere of 'imagologies'. Here, the pictorial finally takes center-stage. As this chapter and the next one are comprised of detailed discussions of different advertisements, I shall give only a summary of the central issues and questions raised, though this can, in no way, do justice to the

³ He presents a long discussion of the metaphor *museums are the graveyards of art* (p. 96).

⁴ E.g. "... instead of the common categorization of 'rage' together with other types of emotions... the comparison 'suggests' an alternative grouping of 'rage' – this time with 'volcano' – as members of an alternative ad hoc category (e.g., 'things that erupt violently and unexpectedly')" (Shen 1997: 1-17).

author's *recherché* discussion, which makes extensive use of the tools presented in detail in the previous chapters.

Forceville divides his corpus of data into four groups:

1. *Pictorial metaphors with one pictorially present term.* The second term, though remaining undescribed, is unambiguously suggested by the pictorial context. The product advertised is usually the first term.
2. *Pictorial metaphors with two pictorially present terms.* This category is the most intriguing, as it opens a wide range of pictorial options for the presentation of the interactive relations between the primary and secondary objects. Forceville believes that the visual representation results "in hybrid phenomenon perceived as a single gestalt" (pp. 138, 143, 163).
3. *Pictorial similes.* Both terms are represented separately in their entirety.
4. *Verbo-pictorial metaphors.* One of the terms is rendered textually while the other is rendered pictorially. In most cases the pictorial term is the product advertised.

Forceville addresses questions such as: 'When' is there metaphor (p. 113)? Which term of the metaphor is the primary subject and which is the secondary one? Can a rule be determined that the primary object is always presented? Does the 'basic level' of a taxonomic category have any bearing on the processing of the visual metaphor (p. 134)? What are the essential differences (if any) between metaphor and simile, in the verbal as well as in the pictorial (p. 136)? How could one appreciate the importance of the anchoring text to the pictorial metaphor, and vice versa (p. 146)? Are there any rules for the definition of the 'order of terms'?

To my mind, 'metaphor with two pictorial terms' is the most fascinating, and I would like to comment on two pictorial metaphors of this kind, provided in the book. Pictorially, metaphors of this type differ greatly from one another. THE WORLD IS A CANDLE (Fig. 1) is an excellent interaction example, where I believe a convincing 'new being' emerges. The visual predicate 'roundness', which is shared by the candle and the globe, makes the coupling visually attractive. The result, however, is that the world is no longer a world and the candle no longer a candle, but something else – a 'fresh thing'. This result, I think, remains unattained in most other examples in the book. Some of them are "hybrid creatures", which are, in fact, a sum of elements (as anticipated by Kittay, see above), in which little or no interaction process is achieved, and which, accordingly, are much less attractive (e.g., Figs. 6.13, 6.14).

The candle-world metaphor sits well with Turner's (1991: 58) first approximation of the general constraint on verbal metaphor: "It appears to be the case that when we map one image metaphorically onto another, we are constrained not to violate the schematic structure of the target image". The concretisation of metaphors through the pictorial seems to obey this constraint on verbal metaphor. Forceville is less convinced than I am on this issue: "... physical resemblance is by no means a condition *sine qua non* for pictorial metaphor" (p. 145). Yet it seems that the better pictorial metaphors obey this constraint.

Another outstanding example of a fascinating 'new creature', which stands on the edge of the artistic, is the London Underground advertisement of the 'starving meter'

We halen energie uit de aarde alsof het nooit op kan...

Er zijn weinig dingen die, als ze op zijn, ook echt voor altijd op zijn. Naam een appel. In een m. En volgend jaar zit er een nieuwe aan de boom.
 Maar... zo makkelijk gaat dat niet met olie en aardgas. Ook die 'bronnen' in de aarde. Maar daar hebben we wel miljoenen jaren voor nodig.
 En nu doen wij nu mee. Althans. We halen de opbrengst van de miljoenen jaren in enkele uren af en zetten die op onze bodem.
We halen nu energie uit de aarde alsof het nooit op kan.
 Ga maar nu. Hoewel... met energie wij gebruiken dan onze geschiedenis. Zij hebben vroeger geen auto, geen tv, geen huiskamer, geen vliegtuig.
 Gelukkig hebben wij die nu wel. En we zouden ze niet graag opgeven. Houk ook niet. Maar dan moeten we er wel verstandig mee omgaan.
 En is nu, dan, als we al die handfortale dingen alleen gebruiken als het echt leuk of nodig is, kunnen ze ons redden. En genieten we er bovendien van.

Bewust onze geschiedenis herhalen van menselijke.
 Gelukkig hebben we steeds meer stroom die, wie paving wij blijven leven, daar ook iets voor moet doen.
 Dat, wie van de natuur wij genieten, die natuur niet moet verstoren. Dat, wie goed die water wil, moet helpen het water schoon te houden. Kortom, dat we verstandig moeten omgaan met dingen die voor ons van levensbelang zijn.
 Maar, leeft dat best wel voldoende voor energie? Zien we bijvoorbeeld dat mensen anders onder goed veld uitgegraven, dan vinden we die stroom. Maar de verwarming wordt niet met de rinnen open, vinden we vrij normaal. Ze wil we op die manier toch erg veel huishoudelijke apparaten veldgevoelen.
Met ons is het nu belangrijk als het nu doen.
 Toch is het belangrijk. Dat we ons nu ook zo druk maken over energie. Daar om vroeger ook minder reden voor. Maar nu we weten hoe belangrijk energie vandaag de dag voor ons is, moeten we er mee leren

omgaan als met andere dingen die niet voor ons bestaan.
 Zijn we bang op onze zaken dan moeten we wel zinnig zijn op de manier die in last rijden. Zijn we bang op onze veldgevoelen, dan moeten we ook zinnig zijn op de elektriciteit waardoor die last draagt. Zijn we bang op ons formaat, dan moeten we ook zinnig zijn op het gas waardoor we erop kunnen lopen.
Energie besparen is energie herwinnen.
 De energie die we normaal uit de aarde halen, zit er de eerste miljoenen jaren dat niet meer in. En maar het energieverbruik. Bijvoorbeeld sinds de laatste 25 jaar, hebben we over 18 jaar twee keer zoveel nodig. Terwijl de wereldbevolking alleen stijgt.
 Gelukkig spreken de onderzoekers naar verandering van de brandstoffen die gebruiken. Maar laten we ze daar wel de tijd voor geven. Dat is die we nodig hebben. Laten we daarom verstandig omgaan met wat we hebben.
Verstandig met energie.



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Fig. 1. THE WORLD IS A CANDLE (Forceville, 1996: 128).
 Source: Advertising agency: McCann-Erickson.

(Fig. 2). Here, it seems to me, a macabre new being, with a pictorial tension, is born. Even if the advertiser did not intend it to evoke pity (in Forceville's opinion, p. 131), or to impose 'blood-curdling' or 'ghostly skeleton' images on the audience's cognitive environment, these meanings certainly get activated. In a somewhat "Frankensteinien" manner, this creature gains a life of its own.




Figure 2: The 'Starving Meter' (Forceville, 1996: 135).
Source: Advertising agency: Foot, Cone & Belding.

Chapter 7, *Individuals' response to three IBM billboards*, examines how the same advertisements are interpreted by different individuals, in an attempt to explore the understanding of the 'collective' addressee. It reports the results of an experiment, in which forty individuals were asked to respond to three IBM billboards containing verbo-pictorial metaphors.

On the whole, *Pictorial metaphor in advertising* succeeds in making the notions of verbal metaphor available for the analysis of pictorial metaphor. It is a clear, suggestive book, which should be welcomed by scholars of metaphor and the visual arts, by media-oriented researchers, and by all lovers of images.

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