Diversity and the Discourses of Security and Interventions

Damian Grenfell

INTRODUCTION

Human security came to the fore in the wake of profound changes in international politics. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War ushered in a period that was seen to have great potential for peace and a new prosperity. In actuality, this new period seemed to bring with it the most frightening violence as once seemingly stable nation-states began to disintegrate into a range of deeply complex conflicts. Amongst others, there were wars across former Yugoslavia, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, genocide in Rwanda, and Indonesia appeared on the cusp of disintegration. Across the 1990s the world indeed seemed to be ‘on fire’, to borrow from the title of Amy Chua’s book. Against the tide of liberal euphoria, rather than coming together the world appeared to be splitting apart in a series of secessionist and sub-national conflicts.

One response to this violence was the emergence of a new security doctrine – a ‘human security’ – which challenged the hitherto dominance of state-centric forms of security. Introduced into the discourse of international security by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), human security draws attention to the individual, societal and economic sources of insecurity, variously conceived as the prioritization of people and human needs as opposed to the geostrategic security of states. With poverty being seen as a cause for conflict, development and security were presented as inherently linked and a means to achieve stability within states.

Criticized for its capaciousness, the human security framework has been a useful device with which to conceive social complexity and the dynamics of global security. Nevertheless, the evolution of the doctrine has been used towards justifying interventions that aim to transform societies towards a particular political and economic formation commonly referred to as a ‘liberal peace’. The problematic nature of the ‘human security’ doctrine, like the implementation of a liberal peace more generally, is that it is
constituted by the intervening powers rather than by a local population. It has become a technical exercise, often based around indices and measurements rather than creating the space to define what is important to the "end-user" ("people" in security-speak). Security is a deliverable.

To make these arguments, the first section of this chapter contextualises the emergence of human security in the early 1990s. The second section in turn argues that human security was a response to the prevalence of "new wars", and fulfilled the need for a new security approach given the increased possibility for interventions. Following this is another interlinked argument, that where violence was deeply imbedded in the fabric of societies, a new doctrine of security was required to transform all of society. This sets up a discussion in the fourth section where critiques of human security, both those relating to the creation of a liberal peace as well as those seeing the doctrine as a biopolitical technology, are drawn together to show that "national" and "human" security work to secure a Global North. The chapter concludes by arguing that there may be a way to retrieve human security, but this requires a significant shift on behalf of the interveners, well beyond the call to rethink the application of liberal ideology that frames the objectives of such interventions. Finding meaningful and sustainable forms of security requires adaptation across cultures, but there needs to be considerable caution when calling for "hybrid" forms of security. While drawing together different forms of sociality may allow for a more complex form of understanding and attaining security, such a "hybridity" needs to be driven by local communities.

One important point of clarification with regards to this chapter is the use of Global North and Global South. These are used as shorthand terms in preference to older classifiers, such as First and Third World, or East and West, and an opportunity for more detailed discussions than is possible here would allow recognition of the great variations between sites designated under either category. The term Global South is used here to describe sites of insecurity and social fragility, commonly encompassing societies that straddle distinctly different social formations—from customary communities through to modern states—often in deeply uneven ways. In contrast, the Global North is treated as a site of relative security, of "insured" populations that can offset their insecurities in a range of ways (Duffield, 2007), and live in societies that are constituted in dominance across a modern-to-postmodern spectrum (for these ontological categories see James, 2006). While there are many societies that have experienced human security programs, human security in this chapter is discussed in relation to sites in the Global South that have experienced forms of intra-state violence where conflict has had a deep social impact.

This chapter sets out to provide the reader with an orientation to human security and interventions in a post-Cold War world. The key argument throughout is that the doctrine of human security was a response to the changing nature of violence and conflict in a period of intensifying globalization. Rather than providing the means for producing a sustainable and meaningful peace, the doctrine has come to be a technical exercise that serves to reshape recalcitrant sites of violence. The chapter concludes by asking if there is a way to retrieve human security, and the reply offered is a cautious suggestion that this would require a move beyond ideology and to think on, and work with, acutely different forms of society.

A 'HUMAN SECURITY' FOR A NEW AGE

Up until the end of the Cold War, security was overwhelmingly understood in terms of military-related threats to the nation-state. The basis for understanding power and violence in the world was linked to national interest, the relative power between states, and the condition of national sovereignty. There were attempts to widen and deepen the
discourse of security (see Buzan 1983) but these remained more at the margins in comparison to a focus on national security and the 'high' politics of state security as opposed to the 'low' politics of domestic policy (Hough, 2008: 3). For the field of international relations, realism was the dominant ideology across the twentieth century, both in terms of foreign policy as well in academia (famously Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State for the United States, and Hans Morgenthau and his book Politics Amongst Nations). From explaining the ancient Peloponnesian conflicts through to the Cold War, security was understood in the context of a conservatively framed competition for power.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of Soviet Communism were pivotal moments in reshaping conceptions of security and associated threats. The world was no longer pressed into a framework of superpower competition nor hinged to two ideological blocs that risked nuclear annihilation. Rather than Cold War 'realpolitik', this was a period of 'liberal triumphalism'. Francis for one took the demise of the Soviet Union as a liberal revolution which constituted the culmination of a universal history of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1992: 48). The terms 'bipolarity', the 'balance of power' and 'mutually assured destruction', all part of the Cold War security lexicon, became increasingly residual concepts as various forms of liberalism permeated the ideological landscape.

It was across the early 1990s that the doctrine of 'human security' gained tremendous traction, notably as the framing device for the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report. It was time, this report argued, to reconceptualize security in order to deal with the multiple threats facing individuals in their daily life.

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. ... Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. With the dark shadows of the cold war receding, one can now see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations. (UNDP, 1994: 22)

Of critical difference, human security moved the point of reference away from the nation-state to the individual, broadening the previously narrow conceptions of threats to national sovereignty to prioritize 'safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression', as well as 'protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life — whether in homes, in jobs or in communities' (UNDP, 1994: 24).

Importantly, the definition of threat moved from the international domain of intra-state relations to be grounded in the day-to-day struggles and aspirations of people's lives, especially those living in acute poverty and sites of conflict. Human security appeared to be fundamentally different to what had gone before, both in terms of focusing on the person but also for expanding threats to include freedom from 'fear' and 'want', and to live in 'dignity' (UNTFHS, 2013). Given its breadth and different dimensions, human security is more of a doctrine than a single concept, and is focused on enabling a 'good life' much in the same way that Johan Galtung's 'positive peace' equates to the absence of structural violence, in which the condition of society is defined by the 'egalitarian distribution of power and resources' (1969: 183).

In an attempt to provide boundaries to what human security might mean in practice, the original UNDP report set up seven categories of threat: economic, health, food, environmental, political, community, and personal. These are universal threats, and their mitigation is seen as the way to ensure a prosperity and reduce the chance for conflict. There is little mention of the role of the intersection between culture and security (the closest being the section on 'community security' which is analytically very weak).
Moreover, there is little sense of security or threat being defined by the populations of the Global South, despite that being the location in which human security is to be applied.

In the years since this report, 'human security' has to a significant extent become part of the orthodoxy of threat management in a whole range of international organizations and discourses. The term has been given institutional legitimacy through its adoption by organizations such as the UNDP, as well as its uptake as a guiding principle in the foreign policies of a series of 'middle powers', including Norway, Japan and Canada (Behringer, 2005: 307, 309). There has additionally been the creation of the United Nations 'Human Security Unit' in 2004, a follow-up to the 'Commission of Human Security' that produced the 2003 Human Security Now report, as well as other research efforts such as the Human Security Report Project (formerly the 'Human Security Centre') in Canada. The term has also been adopted by a wide range of non-government organizations (NGOs) as well as aid agencies working in sites of conflict.

Echoing a common liberal faith that prosperity reduces the chances of conflict, the connection between levels of development and conflict is set as a cornerstone of human security. To this end, it should not be a surprise that the term 'human security' was given significant standing by the UNDP, the body that had historically been responsible not for security but for the material advancement of societies facing extreme poverty (Battersby and Siracusa, 2009: 3). The role of development in threat mitigation is an extremely common theme in human security policy documents, such as the 2003 Human Security Now report.

This intersection between development and security, where one is seen to assure the other, is frequently referred to as the 'security-development' nexus (Stern and Ojendal, 2010). In an attempt to develop conflict resolutions strategies, particularly in relation to the Global South, development and security programmes are treated as forming a 'nexus' which is deemed as essential in terms of negating conflict.

This intersection between the two once quite distinct domains of development and security can be seen in various human security programmes implemented around the world. For instance, while more than 80 countries have different programmes funded by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, in sites where there has been extensive violence programmes focus heavily on conflict mitigation initiatives, poverty alleviation programmes, or both. By way of example, in Timor-Leste the focus is on food security, education and water management; in Bosnia Herzegovina, it is 'community reconciliation through poverty reduction'; in Kosovo, human security programmes include 'weapons in exchange for development', 'multi-ethnic partnerships for improved education, health and sustainable livelihoods'; and in the Solomon Islands, there are programmes for 'tensions reduction, reconciliation and rehabilitation' (UNTFHS, 2013).

While each of these programmes is applied in different contexts, some of them clearly demonstrate a nexus even at the programmatic level (i.e. 'weapons for development'). The more significant point though is that the whole overarching framework securitizes development, making its purpose not only material...
improvement but in turn risk mitigation. What is also evident is the way in which security is achieved through intervening in societies and changing material and social conditions at the level of ‘day-to-day life’; a remaking of security from within, albeit delivered by exogenous organizations. The implications of this will be explored further into the chapter; however for the moment it is important to return to the question of global politics so as to further understand the contextual terrain in which human security came to the fore as an alternative to state security.

INTERVENTIONS AND GLOBALIZING WARS

The years following the end of the Cold War appeared to be caught in a deep fracturing of many states around the world. Far from ushering in an era of peace and tranquility, history was splintering in the face of a series of internecine conflicts that appeared to be both deeply brutal and impossible to resolve. As risks of violence between states appeared to regress, it appeared that there was an acceleration of violence within societies; a move from the inter-state to the intra-state as people tried to remake the order of things around them in a rapidly changing world. At times these wars have been for secession (Tamils in Sri Lanka unsuccessfully; South Sudan, Timor-Leste and the break-up of former Yugoslavia all resulting in new nations), while other conflicts have been between groups competing to control resources or attempting to redefine a polity (Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Haiti, Libya).

These conflicts have often been presented as ‘new wars’, and according to authors such as Mary Kaldor and Herrfried Münkler, they present a qualitatively new mode of warfare, made distinct by information and technology, as well as in their form and motives (Kaldor, 2001; and Münkler, 2005). Kaldor sees this contemporary warfare as differentiated by its decentralized organization and integration into a ‘global’ war economy, rather than being based on ‘vertically organized hierarchical units’ (Kaldor, 2001: 8–9). Central to her analysis is the link between new wars and what she refers to as ‘identity politics’. Kaldor sees the rise of identity politics as significantly emanating from ‘established political classes’ and the threats that are posed to them by globalization. Maintaining legitimacy rests largely on the manipulation of political culture and the ability to mobilize people based on prejudices through an identity politics. This politics, she says, ‘tends to be fragmentative, backward-looking and exclusive’, based on nostalgia, and ‘the construction of the heroic past, the memory of injustice, real or imagined, and of famous battles, won or lost’ (Kaldor, 2001: 78).

Such analysis helps us understand how the most localized expressions of violence, wrapped in the veil of particular identities and specific historical claims, are at points informed and shaped by the abstracted global connections that allow for the deterritorialized flow and coordination of ideas, people, goods and information. In this regard, the emergence of human security across the 1990s can be understood in part as a response to the perceived threats of intra-state wars, such as Kaldor discusses. In one respect, the sources of threats are so abstracted, globalized and imbricated in liberal cosmopolitanism that the only way to contain the negative externalities is through the reverse process of grounding security within the daily lives of local communities (this theme will be returned to later in the chapter). However, the traction human security achieved over the 1990s also makes sense given two interlinked changes to the international system, described here in turn.

In one respect, the end of the Cold War meant that at times there were greater opportunities for contestation from within nation-states, especially where there was less imperative for either superpower to maintain a system of patronage to allies. Financial, material and political support from the United States or the Soviet Union did not flow to the Global South as it had done previously. As a
result, some states could no longer mobilize resources to repress or contain political contestation from within. This was the case for regimes such as those in Liberia and Sierra Leone who no longer received direct superpower backing (Kabia, 2009: 41–2). Other countries such Indonesia, whose long-term repression of communism had won it a blind eye from the West with regard to the massive human rights abuses committed, found they were left far more exposed to the winds of international judgment (Aspinall and Berger, 2001: 1012). While not able to explain all of the new wars – as forms of intra-state violence had been occurring well before the end of the Cold War – the end of superpower rivalry did accelerate this tendency for internal contestation (Wolf, 2006: 10–13, 55).

Yet while there seemed more opportunities to contest politics, there was also a far greater political space for mobilizing humanitarian-military interventions to quell sites of acute violence. During the Cold War, attempts to intervene into conflicts were typically deemed by either the United States or the Soviet Union as a threat to their spheres of influence or an attempt to impose the ideological stamp of either side on a new locality (Paris, 2004: 13). Peace efforts would be regularly vetoed in the Security Council, the horrific ramifications of which have been well captured by Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes – 279 of them – cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period. (United Nations (1992) An Agenda For Peace: 3)

In the post-Cold War era, the sharp reduction in superpower rivalry meant that the Security Council has been far less constrained in terms of intervening in sites of conflict. As Roland Paris has argued, these changing dynamics resulted in a sharp upswing in peace efforts where, in the decade from 1989 to 1999, the UN deployed thirty-three peace operations, more than double the fifteen missions that the organization conducted in the four preceding decades' (Paris, 2004: 17). Large scale 'humanitarian-military' interventions were either mounted and/or authorized by the UN Security Council into a whole range of sites, including Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, as well as by organizations such as NATO into Kosovo.

Not only did peacekeeping missions become more frequent, but they were also becoming larger and more complex. During the Cold War the emphasis on peacekeeping missions had been on enforcing peace treaties and keeping opposing militaries apart. However, in the post-Cold War era there was an increasing tendency towards more complex interventions, to the point that the UN actually took on being the governing authority for a territory (Chopra, 2002; Lemay-Hebert, 2011). Reflecting this increased complexity was the growth in the resources involved, whereby between 1988 and 2008 the number of troop-contributing countries increased from 26 to 121, the numbers of military and police personnel grew nearly tenfold, and the annual UN peacekeeping budget rose from US$2.3 billion to US$7.4 billion (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 150). These interventions comprised networks of organizations including those of the ‘UN Family’ (UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM and so on), as well as a host of aid agencies and NGOs working around the main peacekeeping efforts.

In this context, the move away from state-security to human security can be understood as a response to both the increasing prevalence of new forms of warfare, and the trend for increasingly complex interventions into conflict-ridden societies. The security architecture put in place since the end of World War II could no longer respond to these new challenges. Rather than focusing on threats between nation-states, there was a need to create a new security doctrine that would both legitimize and organize interventions in a way that would assist with responding to the
sources of localized forms of conflict (how this occurs is discussed later in the chapter). In fact, human security in this sense can be seen as part of an emergence of a new discursive framework, which included ‘peace-building’, ‘early-warning’, ‘R2P’ (Responsibility to Protect), ‘state-failure’ and ‘state-building’, as ways of justifying and codifying different aspects of interventions, via legal and normative frameworks through to the actual on-the-ground practice of transforming societies. Before this is discussed in more detail, there is a second important dynamic to discuss in understanding why human security came to the fore, though this relates more to the practice of violence in intra-state wars rather than the international dynamics.

THE ‘DARK SPIRIT’ OF GLOBAL VIOLENCE

In an immediate sense, one of the most noteworthy aspects of the intra-state wars in the post-Cold war era has been the issue of civilian casualties, or what is also known as the ‘civilianization of armed conflict’ (Wenger and Mason, 2008: 835). The statistics for civilian casualties in contemporary conflicts are mounting. In Iraq, fatalities between 2008 and 2010 show that there were 2,237 military personnel deaths in comparison with 9,466 Iraqi civilian fatalities (Fischer, 2010: 4). A report on Syria estimates that between March 2011 and April 2013 there was a ‘minimum casualty figure’ of 92,901 deaths (OHCHR, 2013a: 1). While this figure does not differentiate between non-combatant and combatant deaths, it is believed that civilians are ‘bearing the brunt of widespread, violent and often indiscriminate attacks which are devastating whole swathes of major towns and cities, as well as outlying villages’ (OHCHR, 2013b: paras 2, 7).

One reason for civilian related deaths not being numerically separated out from combatants is the increasingly blurred boundaries between combatants and non-combatants. As such, there is a tendency to represent figures of death in terms of direct (battle related) and indirect causes (such as famine, poverty and disease). Again the figures are harrowing, with only ten per cent of estimated total war deaths in contemporary conflicts having been a direct result of battle. For instance, in Sudan (1983–2002), 55,000 deaths out of two million were ‘battle deaths’; and similarly in Angola (1975–2002) with an approximate 160,500 out of an estimated 1.5 million deaths the direct result of battle (Wenger and Mason, 2008: 842). As Carolyn Nordstrom has remarked, ‘the least dangerous place to be in most contemporary wars is in the military’ (1992: 271).

While there is some debate whether or not more civilians are killed now than in more traditional warfare, Beswick and Jackson argue that previously the targeting of civilians was secondary to the main military strategy, whereas now it is the strategy (2011: 27). The targeting and killing of civilians in contemporary warfare can occur for a range of reasons, including attempts to eradicate certain groups within society, as a strategy to create terror, or because the fighting is mounted from within rural or urban communities. Rather than being between two or more states with formalized militaries, in new wars violence is interspersed through societies and without clear frontiers. The significance of this form of violence, and how its effects permeate society, is identified by Derek Summerfield in the following quote:

A key element of modern political violence is the creation of states of terror to penetrate the entire fabric of grassroots social relations, as well as subjective mental life, as a means of social control. It is to these ends that most acts of torture and violence towards civilian populations are directed, rather than to the extracting of information. The mutilated bodies of those abducted by security agents, dumped in a public place, are props in a political theatre meant to stun a whole society. Not only is there little recognition of the distinction between combatant and civilian, or of any obligation to spare women, children and the elderly, but the valued institutions and way of life of a whole population can be targeted. It is depressingly clear that such strategies are highly effective. (Summerfield, 1996: 1)
The complexity of violence within societies goes further however, as Summerfield's analysis is still suggestive of a distinction between the perpetrator and the perpetrated. Over an extended period of internecine warfare, the lines between civilian and combatant are virtually impossible to distinguish — people can become both abusers and abused, victims as well as perpetrators. With armed groups (such as militias or insurgent groups) formed within communities, it can be next to impossible to differentiate those who partake in violence and those who have been subject to it. Violence becomes part of the social membrane, imbricated in people's daily lives as local communities and battle zones intersect.

If we think then on a military intervention into a society that has experienced violence in these terms, securing peace via a military victory in the traditional sense is no longer possible. It is not conceivable for instance to 'exterminate all the brutes', as might occur in more orthodox forms of war fighting, as this would require the killing of large swathes of population. The only way to secure a society in a general sense in the wake of imbricated violence is whole-scale social transformation, through a re-coding and structuring of society in both a normative and material way. In this respect, human security becomes one doctrine amongst a possible array of means and techniques to broadly try to transform societies, a security through a remaking from within.

The justification of the need to secure humans in post-colonial states or sites of new wars is heightened when that violence is seen as essentially tribal or customary, and thus somehow deemed outside the logic of modernity and 'beyond history'. Depictions of violence in the Global South and at the periphery of Empire are very often presented as some kind of resurgent tribalism — of clans, blood ties and ritual, of blood, revenge, and savagery, of somehow being beyond the comprehensible limits of modern civilized society. This sentiment is captured in the writing of Michael Ignatieff as he tries to account for the violence between Croatia and Serbia: 'Whatever the case, it is hard to continue believing in the healing power of the historical truth when you stand in the middle of a vandalised museum. Some dark spirit, stronger than truth, was at work here' (1993: 35). Here the museum acts as a motif for civilization, and the 'dark spirit' as a way of trying to capture the rage of deep societal hatred. Such a depiction is common in media representations, and by authors such as Richard Kaplan, Robert Harvey and Benjamin Barber who have written on global violence in the language of 'new barbarism' and 'Jihad' (see Barber, 2001; Harvey, 2003; Kaplan 1994). Of course, it is very possible to see such violence as shaped by and imbricated in modernity rather than being some expression of a deep primordialism, and the critique of such representations is well warranted (Duffield, 2001: 111; Grenfell and James, 2008: ch. 1; Mkandawire, 2002: 184).

While the need for its application becomes ever greater when violent conflict is seen to be part of a tribalized chaos, the main point is that human security is a way to transform societies where a clear military victory is no longer possible. Human security in this context becomes a kind of civilizing force while also providing a way to counter the effects of violence that is deeply interwoven in societies. In this respect, it can be understood as part of an interlocking set of mechanisms to secure post-conflict societies, a facet of peace-building programmes, able to complement Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in the way they therapeutically attempt to negate the effects of mass traumas (Pupavac, 2004: 159; Toome, 2012: 27) and legitimize new political orders (Wilson, 2003: 369). To get a fuller sense of the operations of power in play, it is now important to consider human security in the context of broader liberal interventionism.

LIBERAL INTERVENTIONISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF HUMAN SECURITY

Thus far it has been argued that human security gained traction in a post-Cold War world where localized conflicts were increasing and
there was a greater political space for the UN to lead interventions. In this context, human security both reflected a change in threat dynamics, as well as providing a doctrine that could legitimize interventions where violence was seen to be embedded into the social fabric. This section will discuss how human security has become part of a broader restructuring of societies by intervening forces, defining threats at a global level to be applied to localized cultures as a way of containing risk and the potential for conflict. Firstly though, it is important to briefly delineate what is meant by the term intervention, especially to broaden its definitional base away from simply being a matter of peacekeeping or a form of neutral engagement into a conflict.

In the context of this chapter, an ‘intervention’ into the Global South is understood as a process of attempted social transformation undertaken by organizations exogenous to a given site of mass conflict. Rather than focusing singularly on military-led efforts, such as a specific peacekeeping force, interventions are treated here as incorporating the fuller gamut of activities employed to transform societies; state-, peace- and nation-building, development and human security. Interventions are undertaken by a range of actors, often led by state-based militaries, and with non-government organizations, agencies of states, businesses, consultants, volunteers and so forth. For all the differences between these institutional forms, in many sites of intra-state violence a common basis to their operations tends to be the shared intent to change the social fabric so as to produce a sustainable modernity.

The ‘modern’ can be described as a system of social integration characterized by highly abstracted social relations constituted predominantly through disembodied relations (as opposed to ‘face-to-face’ relations). Social integration in this context tends to identify the scientific and the secular as sources of authority (rather than the cosmological), meaning that bureaucrats who rely on logic and officials elected on merit come to the fore in terms of social organization (Grenfell, 2008). It is across the modern that we see the notion of citizenship and social contract emerge, a way of trying to hold together individuals and localized groups of people within larger and abstracted systems of governance. Hence, the argument here is that the kinds of interventions discussed in this chapter effectively attempt to transform societies that are unevenly constituted across different ontological orders, such as the customary (where for instance social order is determined by genealogy and kinship, subsistence forms of production, and oral modes of communication). The motives for intervener might differ dramatically, however what is shared is an ambition to transform societies constituted across uneven ontological formations to one more closely integrated across the modern.

The military-humanitarian interventions that have been discussed through this chapter have given rise to some highly sophisticated critiques. Authors such as Oliver Richmond and Mark Duffield have demonstrated how interventions are embedded in power relations and represent a particular form of global order (Duffield, 2001, 2007; Richmond 2011). The critiques themselves differ substantially in terms of emphasis, approach, and theoretical framing, though it is perhaps not an undue generalization to say that they share a view that the ‘principal aim of peace operations thus becomes not so much about creating spaces for negotiated conflict resolution between states but about actively contributing to the construction of liberal politics, economies and societies’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2008: 4–5). It is argued here that this reconstruction of society can occur in two ways.

Firstly, interventions are used as an avenue to reconstruct the political and economic structures of societies towards a particular form. Far from separating warring factions, Richmond argues that post-Cold War interventions serve to create a ‘liberal peace’. Societies are reconstructed from the ground up so that they can more closely resemble an
idealized version of Western liberal-capitalist societies

Essentially, what arises from this ‘hegemonic discourse’ of peace is what Mandelbaum refers to as the ‘Wilsonian triad’ which, because of its liberal intentions, is based upon a universalist understanding of peace as an objective of intervention (Mandelbaum, 2002: 6). Consequently, this legitimates a broad swath of contested means deployed directly and indirectly in the process of intervention. This works on the logic that democratisation, free market reform, human rights protection, and development, will ultimately create peace in post-conflict societies. This is exactly what the ‘peacebuilding consensus’ implies. (Richmond, 2004: 140)

Human security is one of the ‘broad swath of contested means’, and is deployed as a ‘validating concept’ for interventions in societies riddled by conflict. While human security can come in various forms, from emancipatory through to conservative interpretations (Richmond, 2007; Tadjbakhsh, 2010), its underpinning liberalism is difficult to avoid. The universality of its application, the faith placed in the ways it can be institutionally mediated, as well as moving the security referent to the individual (and treating the individual as an autonomous agent) all point to how the doctrine is framed by a liberal faith, as does the way it is framed in terms of human rights discourse (UNFHS, 2013). Even the 1994 UNDP report speaks in terms of a social contract (1994: 5–6) and at a deeper level, Stern and Ójendal point to an underpinning teleological framing where the ‘past’ is presented as insecurity, ‘now’ as the promise of security and the ‘future’ the achievement of security (2010: 14). In all of these facets it is possible to see the liberalism of human security as ideologically akin to and fitting into a broader liberal set of socio-economic structures created via an act of intervention.

Secondly, while it is important to discuss interventions in terms of socio-political structures, the way power is deployed in such sites is also critical. Duffield, by way of example, sees the ‘security-development nexus’ as being part of a process of transforming sites of risk (Duffield, 2007). In such instances, the priority for undertaking development as a way of ensuring humanitarian values, especially entitlement to basic material well-being and human rights, is displaced by a new priority arising from seeing poverty as a threat. Weakly constituted states create space for criminal networks and terrorist organizations, able to manipulate and prey upon impoverished populations, and in turn potentially disrupt the globalized system of markets and states.

In response, via interventions, security and development become part of an attempt at transforming societies, a bio-political force in the way that it works as a ‘regulatory power that seeks to support life by intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population’ (Duffield, 2007: 16). For Duffield, human security becomes a technology of governance, intended to infuse the fabric of society via the willful internalization of its ambitions by recipient populations:

People in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected to do it willingly themselves. Compared to imperial peace, power in this form, while just as real and disruptive, is more nuanced, opaque and complex. Partnership and participation imply the mutual acceptance of shared normative standards and frameworks. (Duffield, 2001: 34)

Here it pays to return to the earlier discussion of the types, or more to the point, the pattern, of projects that are undertaken in the name of human security. Overwhelmingly, human security projects are framed either in terms of conflict resolution or around some kind of ‘enabling’ mechanism, such as health, the environment or particularly forms of economic development. In terms of the former, the emphasis is on forming social cohesion, for instance by building mutual trust between antagonistic groups, a process that forces the adaptation of those caught within a conflict rather than addressing broader structural changes that may have
given social difference meaning in the first instance. In terms of ‘enabling programmes’, in many respects we can see how human security programmes run parallel with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which focus on health, education and poverty reduction. While MDGs provide a framework for action across all kinds of society, in sites of conflict the human security doctrine provides an added justification to reach into communities in the most intimate way, to the point of trying to remake sexual relationships (gender programmes), reproduction (family planning), the relationship to self and society through the body (health) and knowledge (education). If the end point of these objectives were realized across a whole community, then the outcome would be a thorough transformation to a modern liberal state geared towards self-reliance and productivity.

The more broadly human security is applied, as in ‘freedom from fear’ as well as ‘freedom from want’, the wider the legitimation is to intervene into different aspects of society. Security is not grounded culturally, but becomes a technical exercise delivered by systems based on highly abstracted authority, the logic and rationality of all kinds of ratings and indices, rankings and measurements, that allow for societies to ‘achieve’ a quantifiable level of security within designated fields and sub-fields. The threats are delineated, interpreted, applied and evaluated by a global conglomerate of organisations tasked with re-ordering societies in a way that lifts them into a modern, and generally liberal, subjectivity of progress and secular agency (Stern and Ojendal, 2010: 17).

The lack of space for local articulation of threats, in tandem with the inverse penetration into communities without linking threats to broader social and political processes, means that much of human security can be seen as inextricably tied to the interests of a Global North. As will be discussed in the next section, this is not an argument against either development or interventions per se, but it is important to point out that if these are shaped towards the political and ethical objectives of a Global North, then the architecture that is put in place may in fact be both inappropriate and irrelevant to vastly different contexts, an argument that takes us in the direction of debates on both development failure as well as the fragility of state-building efforts (see Hameiri, 2010: 10–38).

For the moment however, we need to concentrate on understanding how human security becomes part of an architecture of power that suggests a far closer relationship between human security and the nation-state than is often claimed. As Duffield suggests ‘the idea of human security embodies a mobilizing relation of governance able to bridge the worlds of sustainable development and international security’ (Duffield, 2007: 111). In practice then, human security is directed at securing local populations in a way that ensures that risks are mitigated by making them self-reliant, at the same time as structuring them into a global liberal order (Kiesscher, 2011: 522). This was particularly important in the post-Cold War era as new wars were no longer interpreted within a larger set of superpower relations, and were seen as sources of threat both in terms of violence to the regional order (the break-up of Yugoslavia) as well as to the supply of resources (for instance Timor-Leste, Libya). While in response to the post-11 September attacks in the United States in 2001 there was a reversion by the US to a more conventional state-centric security position (Battersby and Siracusa, 2009: 23), human security has continued to be part of the mainstream, especially in that it has provided a way of addressing poverty in the Global South so as to ameliorate risks to the Global North (Goodman, 2008: 45–50). In this regard then, human and state security appear to be on a continuum rather than being thoroughly different, especially when the latter is seen to be employed to recalibrate societies in order to mitigate risk to northern orders and interests.
RECONSTITUTING A POST-COLONIAL HUMAN SECURITY?

The key question for the final part of this chapter is how human security might be reconfigured to ensure it resonates in post-colonial states that have experienced intensive conflict. How can it be taken away from the politics of liberal interventionism and made relevant to a local order? Of course, the doctrine could be abandoned but to do so would risk losing any potential benefits a re-imagining might mean to local communities and how they are impacted by threats in a globalizing world. The focus here then will firstly be on a call for human security to be reoriented towards the local in terms of the articulation of and responses to threat, and building on this, a second argument that human security needs to recognize and adapt to vastly different life-worlds. Across these two arguments, this chapter is calling for changes in how security is understood so that it is no longer ‘haunted by a “Western-centrism”’ that mistakes “Western” experiences for the universal, thus failing to take note of different insecurities and responses in other locales’ (Hönke and Müller, 2012: 384).

To the first argument then, while human security has typically been structured and practiced in localized sites around the world, and legitimated as being a response to the needs of ‘ordinary people’, its formulation and designation of threat, as well as the implementation of programmes, has overwhelmingly occurred via international organizations. In an attempt to properly understand how threats are understood and security constituted by the communities in conflict, the need to reorient this to a local level has been called for; a point well captured by the 2003 report Whose security counts: Participatory research on armed violence and human insecurity in South-East Asia:

The majority of empirical studies on arms control and the effects of firearms focus on ‘objective’ indicators of armed violence – drawing on a rich and growing vein of epidemiological surveillance data and prioritizing deaths, injuries and crime. But there is surprisingly little research on how small arms availability and misuse is ‘subjectively’ experienced – particularly in relation to people’s own personal security. What precisely makes people insecure, how is insecurity understood, and what are local responses to redressing their situation? As a result, many impacts go unrecorded or remain hidden. ... A people-centred analysis of small arms availability and misuse is a first step to democratizing the security agenda. Even where gun violence is a daily reality, many policymakers, bureaucrats and analysts fail to recognize precisely how people are affected, the multiplier effects of insecurity on the wider community or how individuals develop local solutions to their problems. (2003: 8).

Ten years on there seems to have been little change however, a point made by Charlotte Lemanski who argues that human security remains very much the practice of international based organizations and states as ‘macro-scale’ and ‘top-down’ interventions, and needs to be reoriented to the ‘micro-scale’ and the ‘bottom-up’ in communities in the Global South (2012: 62). Lemanski argues that there is a gap between the ways in which security is conceptualized at a global scale and that of everyday people in urban environments, defined more in terms of everyday subjectivities. At this level, threat is conceptualized across three broad categories: ‘physical (in)security’, ‘financial and tenure (in)security’, and ‘lifestyle and cultural (in)security’ (Lemanski, 2012: 65). That culture is identified as a category opens up a conversation about more basic changes to human security, though it is worth critically examining two more immediate ramifications of such a move.

Firstly, the drawing of culture into how security is constituted reshapes the debate. It provides an opportunity for localized understandings of the world as well as seeing localized cultures in terms of how they can contribute to security rather than being the wellspring of violence. It can demonstrate how interventions in the Global South often occur in societies that are
unevenly constituted across different ontological formations – of ‘ways of being in the world’ – that are fundamentally different to Western forms of modernity and postmodernity. Whether these are categorized as indigenous, customary, tribal or traditional, security needs to be constituted so as to actually reduce threat in a way that resonates with communities, rather than being shaped to a preconceived modernity in a liberal form.

This form of security production already occurs in practice where the provision of security has come about by drawing different ontological levels together. For instance the Arbakai in Afghanistan is a form of community policing based on tribal social relations, and has been used to supplement modern security forces (Tariq, 2008: 10). If we move to another site of global intervention, namely Timor-Leste, it has been argued that the new state has been so limited in terms of its penetration into society that its stability has actually, albeit rarely acknowledged, relied on the dominance of customary forms of conflict resolution (Grenfell, 2012: 16–17). Such examples show that when there is a need, security can be constituted across ontological formations, even though in these instances it has been done for instrumental reasons when modern forms on their own were either insufficient or non-functional.

Secondly, creating space for the localized designation of threat and possible responses would require a restructuring of how human security programmes actually occur in localized sites. This would no doubt require far greater participation in the initial formulations and levels of priorities given to threats, as well as a focus on how, at the very least, global processes impact on security in local sites. The latter is vital in terms of being able to identify and address the ways in which global flows of finance, commodities, people and information create forms of insecurity within communities.

We can then argue here that to begin rethinking human security, one needs to both engage across scales of the local to the global, as well as across ontologies from the tribal and customary through to the modern and postmodern. This may of course produce forms of security that contest the priorities designated in the universal spirit of the Global North, and perhaps even bring to an end the possibility of a liberal peace. However, how this is done requires great care, especially if it means that some kind of hybrid form of security is seen to be the solution.

In speaking of societies that are grounded in a different ontological order than the intervening states and organizations, Richmond for instance calls for a post-colonial version of human security, one based in its emancipatory heritage but that is ‘capable of organising hybrid understandings of security in relation to the human subjects they produce and are constituted by rather than falling back on the often empty securitisation of western forms liberalism and realism’ (Richmond, 2010: 44). For Richmond, this represents the potential for a post-colonial renegotiation of liberalism, and is part of a reformist approach which ultimately leads to ‘an empathetic, emancipatory process, focused on everyday care, human security, and a social contract between society and the polity, which acts as a provider of care rather than merely security’ (Richmond, 2009: 578).

As I will discuss here, the language of hybridity can be problematic in two ways. Firstly, the notion of a hybridized form of human security suggests initially a pluralized, open and contestable space between foreigners and local populations. For Volker Boege and colleagues, the hybrid ‘focuses on the combination of elements that stem from genuinely different societal sources that follow different logics; and it affirms that these spheres permeate each other and, consequently, give rise to a different and genuine political order’ (Boege et al., 2009: 606). However, what Richmond suggests is a post-colonial form of human security that is in fact still wedded to a liberal conclusion, with no right of refusal or even radical reorientation of that order. Permeation is one way. Adaptations to a human security, or even a fuller liberal peace, are still with
the aim of forming a social contract where the content, rather than the political form, is adjusted to suit the locality. The likelihood of such a narrow hybridity is confirmed when those doing the intervening have access to massive resources in comparison to local populations that struggle to acquire emergency assistance.

This first point only problematizes the approach to hybridity, suggesting that the process remains weighted to a particular end point. However, there is a second more fundamental challenge to approaching a hybrid human security. The problem is based in an erroneous conflation of different analytical categories that would likely compound problems in practice when calling for a hybridity formed between a liberal politics and, for example, customary practices. The problem here is that liberalism is an ideology – one possible way of understanding the world from within modernity – while the ‘customary’ is an ontology, a way of being in the world. The possibility of a hybridity of this kind, and in turn of a ‘post-liberal peace’, is then forged on a false axis where the power of the intervener is maintained in practice by not having to interrogate their own ontological foundations in the same way as a local population is.

In such circumstances, locals are being asked to transform foundational ways of being in and understanding the world in order to reach a ‘hybridized’ security. Little is being asked of the intervener, as the ontological basis for that particular expression of ideology is left preserved, including the very assumption of universalism, let alone democratization, the state and so on. And yet at the customary level, the very ontological foundations of society are being subjected to acute change. This dynamic is key to understanding the sense of inequity that can be perceived by locals with regards to foreign involvement in the intervention, even when those responsible for the intervention often present their actions in a benevolent light (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2012: 1).

In response to all of this, the conceptualization and articulation of security needs to be transformed at the level of ontological reflexivity of the intervener, an exercise that does two things. Firstly, the modernity of the foreign intervention, including the application of human security, comes to be contextualized rather than taken as the natural and appropriate position to which all of reality should ascribe. Secondly, and importantly, it allows for different social systems to be examined – for instance here the customary and the modern – and seeing them for their differences. The negotiation is at the point of ontological difference. If this change cannot come via the intervener, even at its more progressive and grounded end of the spectrum, the likelihood of a hybridized vision of human security is unlikely to allow any more than a degree of localized adaptation, while the major structures and practice of power build an alien architecture based on a northern order.

**CONCLUSION**

In sum then this chapter has argued that by contextualizing the origins of human security, it can be seen as both a response to new global dynamics as well as the forms of violence that have become prevalent in contemporary warfare. Human security is part of a broader attempt to transform societies, presented in an emancipatory way by both lifting people out of poverty and in doing so reducing threats from conflict. However, while human security aims to change basic elements of social life, it does so in a way that is implicated in a global network of power. According to human security as it is currently practised, sites in the Global South that are outside of liberalism, and more broadly modernity, need to be recalibrated to a form that reduces the risks posed to the Global North by the potential escalation of localized violence or restriction of access to resources. In this sense, human security has a ‘civilizing’ ambition to it. It has been argued here instead that human security should be
thoroughly localized and focus on enhancing a political space for working across societies that are composed of acutely different social formations and conceptions of threat.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Do justifications for liberal intervention perpetuate colonist attitudes toward countries and peoples in the Global South?
2. Are human beings the primary beneficiaries of human security?
3. Is it possible to synthesize notions of hybridity and diversity with the concept of human security?

NOTE

1. My sincere thanks to Bronwyn Winch, a colleague at the Globalism Research Centre at RMIT, for her collegiality and support towards my writing of this chapter.

REFERENCES


