In early 2006, tensions within the East Timorese armed forces resulted in nearly 600 soldiers—around one-third of the military—abandoning their barracks over accusations of discrimination. They claimed that the military was dominated by the Lorosae, a name used to describe those from the three eastern-most districts of Timor-Leste, who were said to be discriminating against Loromonu: namely those from the 10 western districts. The government responded by dismissing the soldiers who had left their barracks. A protest by the sacked soldiers at the end of April turned violent, and over the following month the security apparatus of the state fractured into complex sets of groupings and alliances. Violence occurred between the two factions of the military: soldiers massacred police, military police ambushed soldiers, civilian groups armed by Members of Parliament attacked both military headquarters and homes, and the houses of parliamentarians were burnt and members of their families killed.

In the vacuum created by the collapse of the security apparatus, the intra-state violence was accompanied by widespread gang violence across Dili. To a significant degree gang-related violence mirrored the ethnic-territorial dimensions of the Lorosae and Loromonu division in the military, but it was also shaped by the interests of political parties and the control of local urban territories by the gangs themselves. By mid-year the state was largely paralyzed, many tens of thousands of people were living in refugee camps, a large number of houses had been destroyed, and an international military and police force were required to stabilize the security environment.

The “success story” of post-conflict Timor-Leste had become suddenly and disastrously undone. With hooded youths and the use of darts, arrows, and other home-made weapons, and factions based on ethnic and familial lines, it would not be difficult to read the crisis into the kinds of tribalizing violence that many writers suggest have come to dominate conflicts around the world. At its broadest level, this chapter is underpinned by an argument that such violence is not adequately described as a “retreat into savagery from below,” and is better understood as a response to a kind of disjuncture created between the two modernizing processes of nation-formation and state-building. More particularly, I will take what might appear to be a
counter-intuitive path by using a discussion of the often-positive nation-building effects of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Reception (CAVR) as a way into discussing the implications of the inter-state violence of the 2006 crisis. By examining the uneven integrative effects that a body such as CAVR has on a new national community, it becomes possible to understand how violence can emerge as a nation is brought into being—and while the state remains relatively distanced from the various developments that are unevenly drawing together that nation. This kind of dual development could be described in terms of a relatively unembedded state presiding over a fragile nation-in-formation.

For all the literature on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions very little is framed by debates of either security or nationalism studies. The first might seem the most obvious gap in the existing literature given that such bodies are designed to break cycles of violence and ensure longer-term forms of security. Similarly, while nationalist rhetoric commonly frames the work of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, including CAVR, the vast array of literature rarely crosses explicitly into the domain of nationalism studies. The aim of this chapter is to draw arguments around Truth and Reconciliation Commissions into a broad discussion around security through an understanding of how such bodies work to integrate peoples into a national community. In order to do this it is important to tap into key discourses in nationalism studies, notably the work of Benedict Anderson. This is in part so as to argue that, well beyond the particular community reconciliation and truth-seeking programs, a body such as CAVR can have integrative effects through, for instance, the production and distribution of textual material. Using Anderson’s arguments concerning the link between the temporal and the textual, I go on to argue that in post-conflict and agriculturally dominant societies the abstract nation can be constituted through a process that significantly includes embodied interaction.

These arguments are not meant to suggest that the process of nation-formation does not give rise to other forms of violence, but it is to argue that the integration of people into a community through a subjective self-orienting identification is typically a necessity in preventing future violence over a given territorial form. However, as evidenced by the violence in 2006 and 2007, this is not enough to ensure a post-conflict peace, in that violence can emanate from other struggles and from other quarters. This, as is argued at the conclusion of the chapter, can occur for instance when the state has yet to be embedded sufficiently within a given territorial setting.

**Security and Nation-Formation in Timor-Leste**

Born in “flames and blood” like so many other nations before it, on 30 August 1999 the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly against autonomy within Indonesia. This in effect set the stage for future national independence, which came only after the last devastating throes of the 24-year
Indonesian occupation when pro-Indonesian forces looted and destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure. Approximately 1,500 people were killed and a third of the population forcibly deported into Indonesia.

The level of destruction across 1999 meant that although Timor-Leste existed on the world map there were none of the usual means to sustain the new nation from within. A plethora of institutions led by the United Nations began the slow and uneven process of nation-formation—namely establishing those mechanisms which could carry and propagate the idea of the new nation over the longer term. Massive resources went into forming a centralized state, a market codified in relation to the national territorial form, and the symbolic means to carry the idea of the nation. In effect, the processes were being put in place to convey the day-to-day reminders, from bank-notes to the time on the clock, that both territory and sovereignty had been brought into a sustainable unison.3

Security was a key part of this process, and not only in terms of preventing continued militia and Indonesian military incursions from across the West-Timor border. It was also necessary to secure Timor-Leste from within, especially as many East Timorese who had previously and violently supported the Indonesian occupiers remained within the new country. Without a local police force or a judiciary, there was a genuine concern that the new country may be plagued by cycles of violence triggered by revenge and paybacks. One response to this dilemma included the formation of the CAVR. Although its formation overlapped with concerns for transitional justice and the welfare of people who had suffered acute violence, even the earliest calls for such a body were, at least at an elite level, framed in terms of national security and stability (CNRT 2000: 15).

From 2003 until its formal closure in late 2005, CAVR concentrated its activities around two key mandates. The first of these was its Community Reconciliation Program (generally known as the CRP process), which aimed to reintegrate into the community former perpetrators of certain “less serious” human rights crimes committed in 1999. By drawing the perpetrator, victim, and community together, the CRP process attempted to find a way to bind those persons once violently opposed to one another into peaceful coexistence. Former perpetrators who admitted their “less serious crimes” received a guarantee never to be prosecuted by the state for their human rights crimes as long as the admission of guilt was not disproved by new evidence in the future. Similarly “truth-seeking” sought to construct a truthful account of human rights abuses from 1974 until 1999. It had a longer-term effect on securing peace and preventing violence by clarifying human rights abuses publicly and attributing responsibility to those at blame, again undermining the potential for false accusations and cycles of revenge.

In thinking about security within a post-conflict society, it is important to move the discussion beyond the immediate programs and to consider the broader though less obvious social effects of a body such as CAVR. What I want to demonstrate here is that such institutions have the potential to...
negate violence by integrating people in quite unique ways into a new national form. Although this argument has consequences for nationalism studies, the real point in terms of this chapter is that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission can in effect produce forms of security, especially in places such as Timor-Leste, by shifting the subjective-identity boundaries of people towards a particular national form which at the very least helps mitigate further violence at that national level. Before these arguments can be made there is a need to discuss how, on the one hand, nation-formation has been theorized—with a special emphasis on the work of Benedict Anderson—and how, on the other hand, nation-formation has occurred in practice in Timor-Leste.4

For Anderson (1991), ontological shifts across early modernity—new developments both social and scientific—stimulated social changes that made possible new forms of community, including the nation. He notes a shift from the way that time is understood in pre-modern societies, namely as a “simultaneity along time, where the past and future are bound to an instantaneous present, marked by prefiguring and fulfilment” (what he calls Messianic time). Changes across early modernity result in “homogenous, empty time,” marked by a temporal coincidence, and measured by the clock and calendar (Anderson 1991: 24). According to Anderson, this change in temporal perception towards homogeneity enabled people to imagine themselves as living alongside other people simultaneously.

Although nationalists subjectively call upon less abstract forms of social integration—for example, through the embodied connection of blood and belonging—the nation remains understood as a bounded community of strangers moving simultaneously across time. Although Timor-Leste is a world away from the nations that Benedict Anderson wrote of in the initial chapters of Imagined Communities, his comprehension of the importance of print and also temporality allow for some of his ideas to be carried forward into a very contemporary example of nation-formation.

To begin firstly with the question of print, a whole range of textual outputs produced by CAVR presented the nation as nothing other than a fait accompli. Unlike any other number of possible subjects that could still invoke a sense of simultaneity, the content of CAVR material carried maps, lists of commissioners, laws, mandates, programmatic structures and explanations are all presented graphically or literally within the legal-territorial logic of Timor-Leste. For example, a reader of the CAVR booklet Hear Our Voices may sense a relation to one person in the book as they come from the same district, yet that person is presented alongside a whole range of others, distinct and limited to Timor-Leste, and yet fused as equals as part of a national whole. Moreover, the words lift readers out of their immediate embodied world and present them as being linked together across the abstract national time and space.

In public hearings in villages and sub-district towns across the country, and at the national hearings, the CAVR placed victims of violations at
the centre of the national story of Timor-Leste. The voice of our sisters and brothers who suffered, and who were silenced for so many years, is a vital voice which must be heard in independent Timor-Leste. We believe that only through understanding and appreciating the impact of violence upon people’s lives we as individuals and as a nation remain vigilant to ensure that this behaviour is never repeated in our land.

(CAVR 2005: Preface)

Drawing people into the national form—“we as individuals and as a nation”—takes people’s localized and immediate histories and experiences and redraws them into a “national story of Timor-Leste.” However, the content of such documents is only one element in an integrative process that also requires a consideration of the mass-produced and identically printed texts that are being circulated.

For Anderson, the nation came into being due significantly to what he famously refers to as “print capitalism”—namely a process whereby the intersection between modes of communication (mass print) and production (capitalism in search of new markets) gave rise to print languages that were below the elite use of Latin and above the multiple day-to-day vernaculars. These new markets acted as a kind of disembodied field of exchange in which the reader was linked across a territory with countless unknown others. In the process, they “gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language-field, and at the same time that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belong” (Anderson 1991: 44).5

At first glance the applicability of Anderson’s ideas to contemporary Timor-Leste would appear limited. This is not least the case as access to mass-communication systems have remained severely limited because of the destruction across the territory in 1999. Moreover, literacy remains extremely low in Timor-Leste and the reality is that the majority of people still live in subsistence-agricultural conditions where printed materials, such as newspapers, remain few and far between. However, in the absence of a mass communications infrastructure, an institution such as CAVR was one of the few organizations that was able to distribute identical materials across the entire country and to have these materials carry explicitly national content.

While literacy remains low, organizations such as CAVR (along with the United Nations for instance) have helped consolidate the idea of language-fixity in relation to territory. Circulated textual material came in either one or all of the four constitutionally designated languages: Portuguese and Tetun as the two official national languages, and English and Indonesian as working languages. Although there was a narrow plurality in the languages used, a sense of language fixity has been created, not least as these are the officially designated languages of Timor-Leste (therefore limiting the many other languages and vernaculars spoken in Timor-Leste to their specific regions). Moreover, whichever language is used it still provides a sense of
differentiation from a colonial past—Tetun is not spoken in Portugal and Portuguese is not spoken in Indonesia. In effect then, this meant that the circulation of textual objects, from posters and pamphlets to various booklets, created an opportunity for a subjective recognition of living simultaneously with a distinct number of unknown strangers within a defined territory through the use of set languages.

The sense of simultaneity that Anderson argues is created through the consumption of replicable objects should not be confined to the consequence of reading in the context of a print culture. The importance of textual production—namely of books, leaflets, posters, and banners—is amplified by both the relative permanence of such objects and their transferability. However, other forms of mass communication were still used by CA VR as a way of both carrying information about its programs and also inculcating a sense of nation:

the whole purpose of our program was to foster this notion of, this is the whole country doing this. So Los Palos listening to Suai, Manufahi listening to Dili, Liquica listening to Viqueque and Oecussi listening to Ermera, and so people can say, particularly around the CRP process, we’re all part of this, this is bigger than the single community … At the local local level, and at the national level, and at how the two mix through the sharing of experiences through people being brought from all different villages and regions to the national level … And that was our design, that people would feel that in doing this local thing they were part of the national process.6

(CAVR, 2003: Interview with Participant 4)

This quote neatly reflects the arguments made thus far in this chapter. In the first instance, people are both learning about a national program and learning about the nation itself—“Liquica listening to Viqueque and Oecussi listening to Ermera”—identifying those different places within the territorial confines of the new nation. Here we also see an oral equivalent to the impact of print languages: namely a radio program held together by the one language of the broadcaster to which all the people are “listening,” simultaneously undertaking the same activity and comprehending the same material with a set of strangers within a distinct territory. However, for all its importance, mass-mediated information remains only one way in which the idea of a nation is invoked through the practices of CA VR, and in broader terms is only one pattern of social practice that allows for a cohesive national community to be built. As the next section will highlight, when addressing the question of how a national body coheres into a secure and peaceful territory, it is important to consider not just the disembodied, but also the embodied-corporeal—that is, the sense of the body as carrying the nation into being.
**Embodiment and National Security**

Thus far the argument has been made that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission can provide forms of security through the process of integrating people into a new national formation. Through the process of confirmation of a new territorial form, security is provided at the national level by mitigating tendencies for either further divisions internally, or for instance in the case of Timor-Leste, attempts to agitate for reintegration with Indonesia. Those arguments, however, work overwhelmingly within the framework that Anderson (1991) set up in *Imagined Communities*, and this, I suggest, is only a partial way of understanding how such a process of integration occurred in Timor-Leste.

In a short article written during the period of the Indonesian occupation, Benedict Anderson asked why Indonesia’s attempt to absorb Timor-Leste had failed. As part of his answer, he argued that from 1975 East Timorese nationalism grew massively for two reasons. First, a “profound sense of commonality emerged from the gaze of the colonial state. Indonesian power is infinitely more penetrating, infinitely more widespread, than Portuguese colonial power ever was” (Anderson 1993: 25). Working in tandem with this was, secondly, the ability to form a common opposition via the practice of a Catholic faith, at once permissible under the Indonesian regime of Pancasila while simultaneously in opposition to Islam as the dominant faith of the oppressor.

The Catholic commonality in some sense substitutes for the kind of nationalism I have talked about elsewhere, which comes from print capitalism. Moreover, the decision of the Catholic hierarchy in East Timor to use Tetun, not Indonesian, as the language of the Church has had profoundly nationalizing effects. It has raised Tetun from being a local language or *lingua franca* in parts of East Timor to becoming, for the first time, the language of “East Timorese” religion and identity.

(Anderson 1993: 26)

For Anderson, creating a field of common fixed language through the use of Tetun allowed for the establishment of a domain where a person will participate in a like activity with a distinct group made up of thousands of unknown others. However, if we take Anderson to be right that East Timorese nationalism also grew at least in part out of the coercive effect of the Indonesian state—of being subjected to its gaze—it is then possible for a sense of modern simultaneity to be freed from the focus that Anderson gives to language. The knowledge that “like activity” is occurring across a fixed territory—including the living under a repressive regime and all that that entails—can be replicated in other ways. The idea of a “Sunday Mass” is a perfect example of this. People may never have the need to enter other churches across the territory in order to receive communion, but if so they
would know when and how to do so, and feel bound into a Catholic community at least in part by the shared knowledge of this community. A secularized equivalent is the Independence Day ceremony, where people across a country stop at the same time and participate through ceremonial processes in almost identical activities involving songs, flags, and salutes, that give rise to a sense of co-presence, of people linked by the likeness and purpose of their activities with unknown others.

The emphasis given by Anderson and other modernist thinkers to the abstract character of the nation, necessary for the sense of co-presence and shared temporal and spatial relations with others, allows us to understand a key process in how nations are formed and sustained. Yet nations cannot simply be understood if they are left at the level of the imagined, as if taking place only in the “lair of the skull” (Anderson 1991: 35). For all the emphasis given to the disembodied, or a whole series of epitaphs such as “imagined,” “industrial,” “mass,” “modern,” and “abstract” social relations constituted at the face-to-face also remain crucial to understanding nation-formation and in turn how a national community is rendered secure in the aftermath of war. By face-to-face, or embodied extended relations, it is meant those forms of social relations that are integrated by regularized, meaning-generating contact either conducted in person or through the modalities of co-presence (James 1996: 23–25).

The relationship between the nation and a sense of corporeality, as being “in the body,” is important in two ways. First, there is the sense of the embodiment of simultaneous activity, for instance the choice of participating in a reconciliation hearing, not for the sake of spectacle alone but because the event is seen to be important to a broader society. This then extends the importance of the ceremonial beyond its own immediate logic by giving corporeal significance to an act that is felt across locales rather than within a particular place. In this way, we enter a kind of two-way process linking the corporeal and the nation, where activities such as community reconciliation hearings and truth-seeking activities help bring the nation into being at the same time as the nation bears back upon the physical body of its participants, and activities are redefined as being “national.”

Secondly, a sense of the corporeal is also important to consider in relation to how information was transmitted across territory. With a lack of mass-communication systems, CAVR operations were centered in the capital, which in turn co-ordinated regional offices and then sub-district teams. As one CAVR worker explained, it was these sub-district teams which would carry CAVR programs to the most localized levels.

They work sub-district by sub-district. Any sub-district of operations will work for three months. Normally in the first week or two the team will go around the villages and socialize the commission’s work, gives a series of speeches about the team’s mandate, about the reconciliation mandate, about the help that the victim support team may be able to
provide and they’ll then start implementing. For the truth-seeking side of things, it involves taking statements about violations of human rights which can be any degree of violations from minor violations to gross violations of human rights, and they’ll typically be working with victims of those atrocities.

(CAVR 2003: Interview with Participant 11)

Organizational activities that in other instances may have been significantly co-ordinated via mass communication systems were carried into the communities by people traveling and conveying information in an embodied way. In such instances people come to be informed about the nation in which they live not just through the limited circulation of printed materials for instance, but via the carrying and imparting of knowledge of the nation by embodied others who make “speeches.” In this sense the nation is formed through the innumerable tracks and pathways made across the land that connect otherwise isolated communities into a nation as a whole. As one CAVR worker explained, the embodied character of such relations was in fact crucial to the establishment of lines of communication that in turn allowed for the development of the national program.

Up until the end of the commission we did not have phone lines to these people. ... So people had to come once a week, people from the regional offices and the district team co-ordinators came to Dili, and the week after that the regional coordination unit from Dili went to the regional offices ... That is how we communicated and that is how we got statements in. We physically had to do our communication face-to-face, like the rest of Timor-Leste.

(CAVR 2006: Interview with Participant 16).

This narrating of the nation sees a disembodied—embodied transferal of information about the national form to a myriad number of persons within the territory, embedding, shaping, and further consolidating a conscious sense of integration. In the case of CAVR, members of the community hear the embodied voice of the conveyor of information, but the information itself is authored and authorized from afar. This is one way in which a kind of mutual dependence can be understood to occur between the corporeal ushers of the nation and the disembodied forms of mass organization and communication. The kind of mutual dependence is particularly prescient in the case of significantly agricultural societies where a mobile industrial workforce has yet to significantly dislodge people from traditional lands. And this kind of embodied—disembodied mutuality is incredibly important in terms of providing for security in a post-conflict society by producing a coherent and integrated sense of nation, and hence at that level mitigating the likelihood of domestic insurrection and further division based on counter-national identities. However, this does not mean
that an institution such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission is the
only entity that can bring such a process into being, but as argued above,
it is to say that this is one of the key effects of such a body. However, as the
next section will show, such integration cannot resolve all forms of violence.

A State of Crisis

Thus far I have argued that Truth and Reconciliation Commissions can help
achieve peace at a national level, particularly through the integrative
effects that such processes have on constituting a nation. In closing this
chapter, I now want to link the discussions above in a way that helps
understand one level of the violence of 2006. I am mostly interested in the
violence that occurred within the state, notably that which arose both from
within and across state institutions resulting in various acts of violence in
the capital, including the massacre of police, killings outside of the parlia-
ment, attacks on the homes of senior military figures and on the military
headquarters. Although the subsequent gang violence was intertwined
with the collapse of the state security apparatus, the point of interest in this
final section is to explain the violence that occurred directly through the
state.

Critical to this discussion is a differentiation between nation-formation
and state-building. As discussed in the opening of this chapter, nation-
formation is the process of putting in place the integrative processes that
hold a community together and enable sovereignty to be expressed. State-
building, although intersecting with the nation-formation process, is the
development of practices and processes of governance through institutional
forms with regard to a particular territory. Although organizations such as
CAVR have contributed to integrating people into the nation, the integration
of the state has not occurred nearly to the same extent in post-occupation
Timor-Leste.

CAVR was never going to be an institutional form that could carry the
state with anything of the force that it was able to carry the nation. While
mandated by law, a strong sense of neutrality was required between CAVR
and the state, as senior government and military elites from Timor-Leste
needed to give testimony, including about their role in human rights abuses.
From the perspective of the state, neutrality was also required so that no
matter how critical CAVR was of the Indonesian invasion, relations between
the two nations could be maintained by distancing CAVR. This separation
between nation and state in CAVR practices is evident for instance in the
publication of *Hear our Voices*. Although this booklet carries the words and
pictures of those from across the whole nation, this book is overwhelmingly
framed by demands made to the new state, “I ask the government to take
care of the disabled,” “I ask the State to take care of those of us who are still
unwell,” “I was raped by the militia ... I ask the government to take care of
those of us who have suffered in this way.”
Such appeals to the state are not unusual across a range of societies and could in fact represent an engrained faith that the state is worth appealing to. However, the argument here is that the sentiment framing *Hear Our Voices* is representative of a more general condition in Timor-Leste, where people see themselves as so beyond and outside the systems of state power that they feel the need to appeal to it rather than through it. Beyond CAVR, other organizational processes have not been able to embed the state in a way where people—through the education system and school curriculums, laws and policing, citizenship, the development of taxation, and perhaps most importantly elections—come to see it as something that reframes their lives in a day-to-day way. This has been significantly due to both the level of socio-material destruction of 1999 and a subsequent centralization of political power in Dili, and hence the new state has not been able to replicate anything like the “gaze” of its Indonesian predecessor, even in a benevolent form.

Rather than the state being seen as generalized and integrated across society, the basis for its relationship is often seen to exist through patrimonial and familial linkages that distribute security in the form of resources, wealth, and opportunity to people. Hence for those who want to gain access to the state—and in a society where there is immense poverty there is an obvious attraction in doing so—the options are either to mimic the patrimonial form in an attempt to locate an in-road, or otherwise to turn to options associated with the use of force. Hence, with the crisis in 2006 it should not be surprising that violence began *within* the state over access to resources—in this instance through claims over discrimination with regard to promotion and opportunities—with favoritism seen to be given to one ethnic-territorial grouping over another.

The final argument of this chapter, and bringing together its various parts, is the point that what was peculiar about the 2006 crisis is that the national form was not more seriously challenged by the violence or by key aspects of the state. Although a violent and politically driven competition over state resources spread beyond the state to the nation, the already existing identification *with* the nation in its contemporary form did not shift. Suggestions of an alternative national form—such as a further division of Timor-Leste for instance along *Lorosa’e* and *Loromonu* lines, or a reconnection with Indonesia—did not surface as a narrative during the crisis. Instead these ethnically framed identity formations were used to justify the rights of groups of people—for instance through the claim that it was *Lorosa’e* who won the war for independence for the whole nation or that it was *Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente* (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) that should determine the access and control of state resources through the military or the parliament. Hence, the crisis of the embryonic state came in part via demands framed by the nation, suggesting that many East Timorese have come to see the nation as a natural and assumed domain, even when large-scale conflict occurs within its boundaries.
In concluding, it is important to be clear about several arguments made in this chapter. One is that CAVR typified a form of nation-formation in a post-conflict and agricultural community, and importantly its presence helped to rethread communities across the land through both disembodied and embodied processes. Multiple processes and innumerable organizations and networks of people need to be taken together in order to understand the full process at hand, a task well beyond the confines of this chapter. The argument here is that CAVR has an unusually influential role to play in such a process, not just in the fact that its programs are geared towards securing the nation, but that both the form and content of CAVR’s institutional activity is nationally framed. This process of national integration has occurred to an extent that has helped embed the nation in its current form as the logical domain for life, including during the violence that erupted across 2006. As a second key argument, this violence, complex as it is, can be said to not have put the nation in jeopardy in that it has been aimed at either disrupting or consolidating access to state resources. A fracture may have opened up providing the basis for a division or collapse of the nation in the future, but for the present time Timor-Leste has been secured domestically even while the state has been torn apart.

Notes

1 I would like to thank my Globlism Institute colleagues in Timor-Leste, especially Anna Trembath, for their support with the arguments that I am trying to develop across this paper. I would also like to thank the various staff members at the (Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Reception) CAVR who gave me so much time when they had so many pressing things to attend to.

2 Lorosā’e and Loronomu are Tetun words, with Loro and shortening of Loron, meaning day or sun, and sa’e meaning to rise up and monu to fall, respectively indicating what elsewhere is called East and West.

3 The influence here is straight from Gellner (1983).

4 The intellectual influence of Benedict Anderson is immense, but then so it is in the case with Paul James whose work on the nation has significantly underpinned the thinking in this chapter. In particular see James (1996).

5 Italics added for emphasis.

6 Italics added. The speaker used the word local twice to emphasize the sense that this was at the most localized level possible.

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