



TRANSFRICA NEWS

Vol. 4, No. 1

The Black American Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean

LINKS OF FREEDOM

Guest Commentary by William Lucy

The Free South Africa Movement is making "Voodoo II"—the second term sequel of Ronald Reagan's presidency—anything but a re-run. That's bad news for the government in Pretoria, which has found refuge in the administration's southern Africa policy of "constructive engagement." It's bad news too for companies and banks that exploit cheap black labor in South Africa but say they abhor the social system of legalized discrimination that makes their fat profit margins possible. But it's good news in the townships, in the squatter camps, in the mines and in the schools of South Africa, where the institutions of apartheid are most oppressive and most despised.

Reverberations of the Free South Africa Movement have also reached the black trade unions in that country. Very appropriate, because it was the arrest and detention of twenty-one black South African trade union leaders last November that ignited the mass public demonstrations in the U.S. against both apartheid and the administration's policy in the region.

In an era of single issue campaigns, the Free South Africa Movement is not just another "cause." It is a direct and creative political tactic, one rooted in the long tradition of conscientious dissent. The Free South Africa Movement has been an antidote for the state of political comatose that has threatened to seize the opponents of a teflon President. It has recruited new

cadres of activists and inspired veterans in all other movements for social change in the U.S.

Perhaps the Free South Africa Movement's most valuable contribution has been to focus national and local attention on the shameless bankruptcy of American foreign policy toward people of color who are fighting for peace and their right to self-determination. But once again, the administration has tried to walk away from its own policy failure, this time by closing the American liaison office in the Namibian capital of Windhoek, which was set up to monitor the South African troop withdrawal from Angola.

But U.S. policy in Southern Africa is being regularly exposed to an American audience that is repulsed by what it sees as ugly flashbacks to the days of Bull Conner, to the days when black American citizens were routinely beaten, tortured, murdered, jailed and denied their civil rights. One opinion poll has found that nearly 41 million adults who know about the daily demonstrations in front of the South African embassy supported them. Divestment campaigns have mushroomed throughout the country, buoyed by this groundswell of opposition to apartheid and our own government's cozy relationship with such a racist and undemocratic regime.

This upsurge clashes with those who believe that apartheid can and is, indeed, withering away. Some pater-



William Lucy, International Secretary-Treasurer American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees

nalistically point to the alleged harm that disinvestment by U.S. companies operating in South Africa would have on black workers there. Better to rely on economic growth or the Sullivan Principles, or more unions for black workers. Better for black South African unionists and workers to stick solely to economic reform, leaving the racist social order of apartheid intact. This kind of strategy is both reactionary and untenable, and merely serves to camouflage support for an unjust and oppressive *status quo*. It is also being articulated at a time when black South African workers and their unions have emerged as a strategic and unified political force, one increasingly empowered to cripple or shut down the economy. The Two Day Stay Away, which was organized last November in less than a week by a coalition of trade unions, student groups and community and political groups, paralyzed South Africa's industrial heartland. This explicitly political strike drew the support of one million workers, even though union members number only about 300,000.

(continued on page 2)

TRANSFRICA NEWS

The working class movement in South Africa now has reached the point where black unions have grown five times more rapidly than white unions since the government was forced to offer limited recognition to black unions in 1979. The fact is that the entire South African economy would collapse if all black workers were to go on strike for about three days. The leadership role of black trade unions, therefore, is critical. It is also the reason why more than 400 black trade unionists were detained by South African authorities between 1981 and 1983.

But it is too late. Our union brothers and sisters are already clutching the jugular vein of the South African economy: the mineral-rich sector. Only seven weeks before the 5-6 November 1984 general strike, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) shook the industry and the government to their roots, with the first legal strike by black mineworkers in South African history. Although the strike was settled within three days—after seven miners were killed, 500 injured and mine property worth millions of dollars destroyed—the tremor remains alive.

Nearly 40 percent of South Africa's GNP is derived from foreign trade, gold accounts for about 50 percent of the nation's export earnings, and the mining sector is by far the largest single source of government tax revenues. The fact that black mineworkers' wages average only one-sixth (\$160 per month) of white workers' wages may—just may—have something to do with this profit bonanza.

But then there is the other side of the ledger. The NUM, which was formed only three years ago, represented four percent of the mining workforce in 1983. Last year that percentage shot up five-fold to 20 percent of South Africa's half million black miners.

Under the banner of the Free South Africa Movement, organized labor in the U.S. will continue to step-up its anti-apartheid campaign. Since day

one when this movement began, organized labor has grown with it, marched in it and celebrated each blow struck for freedom and self-determination in South Africa.

Apartheid is seen as an enemy of American workers. Strategic minerals imported from South Africa help satiate the Pentagon's nuclear weapons orgy, while social programs are strangled to death. South African steel imports have been increasing 5,000 percent in the last ten years, while hundreds of thousands of American steel-workers have been especially hard hit by apartheid exports. A major study by Steelworkers Local 65 in Chicago found that 30 percent of the white former steelworkers laid off from U.S. Steel Corporation's South Works plant in 1979 are still unemployed; among black workers the rate of joblessness is at 61 percent after five years. This tragedy is even more bitter because the South Works plant produces steel beams identical to those imported from South Africa to construct a new state building in Chicago—in their city and paid for with their state tax dollars.

Thus, as the spotlight of anti-apartheid resistance sprays out from the success of the Free South Africa Movement, the American labor community will continue to bring to light to its members the deep connections between the fight against Reagan's "constructive engagement" foreign policy and his anti-worker policies at home, and the fight for freedom and self-determination in South Africa.

Yet our responsibility is much, much greater than our economic self-interests. We must be equal to the challenge of upholding our own integrity. The ripened wisdom of the late Amilcar Cabral must serve as our mandate. It was he who said: "...In the modern world, to support those who are suffering and fighting for their liberation, it is not necessary to be courageous; it is enough to be honest."

LERT...ACTION ALERT...ACTION

U.S. AID TO UNITA AND THE MNR

The repeal of the Clark Amendment by Congress last June may well have opened the floodgates for financial assistance to the two major resistance movement attempting to overthrow the governments in Mozambique and Angola. (The Clark Amendment, passed in 1976, prohibited the U.S. government from providing covert and overt aid to rebel groups in Angola.) Senator Malcolm Wallup (R-WY) has introduced bill S-1665 to provide 10 million dollars in assistance to the Mozambican National Liberation Front (MNR) while Congressman Claude Pepper (D-FL) has put forth HR-3472, to provide 27 million dollars in "humanitarian support" to the Nation's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Both UNITA and the MNR are sponsored by the South African government. South Africa aims to overthrow the current regimes in Angola and Mozambique so as to assure regional hegemony, thus providing an additional buttress to the racist system of apartheid.

Passage of the two bills will send a dangerous signal throughout the international community. First, aid to the contra groups will further serve to identify the United States with the aggressive policies of the Republic of South Africa. Secondly, the intensification of hostilities in Angola, which would result from U.S. aid, will undermine efforts to bring about a Cuban troop withdrawal which is key to resolving the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa.

Please contact your Congressional Representatives immediately and express your opposition to S-1665 and HR-3472.

□

□

MANDELA'S CONTINUING HEROISM

As one aspect of a South African government public relations campaign which has developed in response to the increased international pressure prompted by the recent protest activity, Botha has offered imprisoned ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, conditional release once again. This most recent offer stipulates Mandela's release on "renouncing violence" and by implication the liberation organization for which he has, to date, spent twenty two years as a political prisoner.

Violating the South African law which prohibits the quotation of banned people and political prisoners, Mandela's reply to Botha was read to an audience of 9,000 in Soweto by his daughter, Zinzi. The following are excerpts from Nelson Mandela's reply:

"I am a member of the African National Congress. I have always been a member of the African National Congress and I will remain a member of the African National Congress until the day I die.

I am surprised at the conditions that the government wants to impose on me. I am not a violent man. My colleagues and I wrote in 1952 to [Prime Minister] Malan asking for a roundtable conference to find a solution to the problems of our country but that was ignored. When Strydom was in power we made the same offer. Again it was ignored. When Verwoerd was in power we asked for a national convention for all the people of South Africa to decide on their future. This, too, was in vain. It was only when all other forms of resistance were no longer open to us that we turned to armed struggle.

Let Botha show that he is different from Malan, Strydom, and Verwoerd. Let him renounce violence. Let him say that he will dismantle apartheid. Let him unban the people's organization, the African National Congress. Let him free all who have been imprisoned, banished, or exiled for their opposition to apartheid. Let him guarantee free political activity so that the people may decide who will govern them.

I cherish my own freedom dearly but I care even more for your freedom. Too many have died since I went to prison. Too many have suffered for the

love of freedom. I owe it to their widows, to their orphans, to their mothers and to their fathers who have grieved and wept for them. Not only I have suffered during these long, lonely, wasted years. I am not less life-loving than you are. But I cannot sell my birthright, nor am I prepared to sell the birthright of the people to be free.

What freedom am I being offered whilst the organization of the people remains banned? What freedom am I being offered when I may be arrested on a pass offense? What freedom am I being offered to live my life as a family with my dear wife who remains in banishment in Brandfort? What freedom am I being offered when I must ask for permission to live in an urban area? What freedom am I being offered when my South African citizenship is not respected?

Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners cannot enter into contracts. [SWAPO] founder Herman Toivo ja Toivo, when freed, never gave undertaking, nor was he called upon to do so. I cannot and will not give any undertaking at a time when you, the people, are not free. Your freedom and mine cannot be separated. I will return."

□

U.S., SOUTH AFRICA CONTRAVENE U.N. DECREE 1

United Nations Decree 1 prohibits foreign exploitation of Namibia's mineral wealth until South Africa ends its illegal occupation of Namibia—a country at South Africa's northwestern border.

Half of the imported uranium used by U.S. utilities is bought from South Africa, much of which South Africa obtains by illegally mining at Rossing, Namibia, despite the Namibian people's political and armed attempts to expel South Africa from their country.

U.S. complicity in this situation results in the ongoing mineral depletion of Namibia with no compensation to Namibia, while strengthening considerably South Africa's foreign ex-

change earnings. Between 1981 and 1983, for example, the United States Energy Department's use of "South African uranium" for enrichment jumped 350 percent.

As TransAfrica and the anti-apartheid movement have continued the efforts to sustain national attention on the crisis in South Africa, Congresswoman Pat Schroeder has introduced a bill, HR-2567, which will prohibit the exploitation of Namibian natural resources by U.S. corporations in violation of UN Decree 1.

We must urge our Congressional Representatives to vote in affirmation of this key piece of legislation.

□



Southern Africa

TRANSFRICA NEWS

REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE ORDER SANCTIONS

On 9 September 1985, President Ronald Reagan issued an Executive Order which will impose a series of mild sanctions upon the Republic of South Africa. The President's action has dampened the hopes of Americans desirous of a strong and alacritous U.S. response to the racist regime in Pretoria. The Executive Order thwarted a Congressional initiative to implement sanctions which were far more stringent than those put forth by the President.

Nearly one month prior to the issuance of the Executive Order, representatives of both Houses of Congress met in conference to reach a compromise on the provisions of two South Africa sanction bills passed separately in the House and Senate (HR-1460 and S-995). The single piece of legislation emerging from the Conference Committee passed overwhelmingly in the House on 1 August 1985 (380-48). A similar outcome was expected in the Senate before the summer recess, however, a filibuster by Senator Jesse Helms of South Carolina postponed Senate action on the Conference Report until 9 September 1985.

The interregnum between certain Senate approval of the Conference Report, gave the administration the opportunity to draft a "toothless" set of sanctions and implement them just a few hours prior to the reconvening of the Senate. The announcement of the Executive Order and the subsequent pressure applied by the administration upon key Republican Senators previously committed to the Conference Report, resulted in the defection of the crucial votes needed to end the filibuster by Senator Helms and put the Conference Report on the floor of the Senate for a vote.

Prior to the 9 September announcement, the President had vehemently stated that he would veto congressional legislation imposing sanctions on South Africa, contending that sanctions would undermine the administration's policy of "constructive engagement." Much to the chagrin of the

President, when Congress recessed for the summer, there was sufficient support in both houses to override the threatened veto of the Conference Report. The Executive Order is significant in that it spared the President the humiliation of a Congressional override, while concurrently placing sanctions on South Africa which are far less burdensome to the administration's allies in Pretoria.

Yet the administration can only claim a partial victory from its Executive Order coup. Supporters of the Free South Africa Movement can be proud that their tireless efforts, which led to overwhelming congressional support for South Africa sanctions for the very first time, forced the President to partially abandon the failed policy of constructive engagement with the imposition of the Executive Order sanctions. It is now critical that we express to our legislators that the Executive Order sanctions are inadequate and that stronger sanctions should be imposed on South Africa. □

BAN ON KRUGGERRAND IMPORTS

As of 11 October 1985, importation or sale of the South African Kruggerrand to the United States has been prohibited. The ban of new Kruggerrand imports is the first Executive Order sanction to be put into effect to date. The prohibition of Kruggerrand sales in the U.S. does not apply to the gold coins brought into the country prior to 11 October.

We must continue to maintain pressure upon the administration and our legislators to insure that the remaining Executive Order sanctions are implemented posthaste. Concurrently, we must express that sanctions far more stringent than the Executive Order measures must be imposed on the South African government if change is to occur. □

U.S./SOUTH AFRICA CORPORATE AND FINANCIAL LINKS

Former South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, frequently explained that "foreign investment is the bricks and the mortar with which South Africa is built." U.S. direct private investment in South Africa is approximately \$2 billion. Total direct and indirect U.S. investment (including portfolio investments) amount to \$15 billion.

Apartheid's apologists and beneficiaries explain that a U.S. corporate presence in South Africa is a catalyst for social and political change within that country. They also warn that divestment and disinvestment would actually do greatest damage to the black South Africans whose interests disinvestment proponents attempt to protect.

The reality is that the major attraction of South Africa to foreign investors is the large, inexpensive, captive labor pool made possible through apartheid. U.S. corporations require less than one percent of the total black labor force to run their businesses efficiently, the lion's share of any salaries or benefits accruing (by law) to the trained white employees.

The primary responsibility of U.S. corporations is to their shareholders, not to the 22 million black people of South Africa. It is therefore counterproductive for us to delude ourselves by thinking that our continued corporate presence will hasten apartheid's dismantlement. For several years the Sullivan Principles have been a failed attempt to bridge the gap between the American corporate community in South Africa and socially responsible investment practices. This set of so called "fair workplace principles" has become an excuse for continued investment, its advocates claiming that compliance with the code can effectively reform labor standards in that country. Such a claim is made completely without base since less than one percent of the black South African work force (between 70,000 and

(continued on page 5)

100,000 in a work force of over 10 million) are employed by U.S. firms, so that any changes made inside U.S. operations reach a minute segment of black labor. The anti-apartheid community has been skeptical also of those aiming to reform apartheid, to make it more palatable to the international community. Dismantlement of apartheid is the goal of black South Africans and those who believe in democracy. The ultimate mandate of corporations operating within that country is to maximize profits, not to carve a just and humane society from a police state. And those goals are, at this time mutually exclusive.

A strengthened U.S. corporate presence over the past three years has not resulted in either political liberalization or social and economic advancement for black South Africans. Carnegie Foundation's 1984 Johannesburg Conference, which yielded some 300 papers, documented that the impoverishment of blacks has instead become more widespread. The infant mortality rate for blacks in South Africa, for example, at 282 per 1,000 remains by far, the highest on the continent. By contrast, the infant mortality rate for whites is 13 per 1,000.

Concurrent with this steady deterioration of the quality of black life in South Africa and South Africa's refusal to yield on its legally-enforced tenets of white supremacy, U.S. bank loans have grown from \$2.7 billion a year in 1981, the dawn of constructive engagement, to \$4.6 billion in 1983.

South Africa's largest black trade union, the 250,000-member Council of Unions of South Africa, has declared that the most effective way to pressure South Africa to end apartheid is to force key strategic American and international firms to pull out of South Africa. Desmond Tutu, Nobel laureate and Bishop of Johannesburg, advocates a pull out of American corporations in the next 18 to 24 months if South Africa does not implement fundamental social and political changes.

Advocating divestment and/or disinvestment is a criminal offense in South Africa, bearing a possible charge of subversion for which one may be sentenced to prison or death.

Advocates of divestment and/or disinvestment therefore do so at great personal risk. Their pleas should not be taken lightly.

RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE ACTION

- Impose an immediate ban on all new investment in South Africa;
- Withdraw foreign tax credits from U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa; and
- Begin the disinvestment of U.S. firms from South Africa if the government of South Africa does not begin a genuine process of negotiation with legitimate black South African leadership toward a political settlement (one person-one vote), and dismantle the system of legalized racism.

TransAfrica also recommends legislation which would implement the disinvestment process after a brief grace period of 180 days. The requirements for unitary democracy must remain the same in this legislation. The basis of the short interim between passage and implementation is that abundant patience has already been extended to the South Africans with respect to apartheid's dismantlement, and this grace has been met with increasing hostility and efforts to entrench apartheid more deeply into southern African society.

CONCLUSION

The difference between the reception which awaited Senator Robert Kennedy at the time of his trip to South Africa 18 years ago and that accorded Senator Edward Kennedy in 1985 reflects the changed black South African perception of U.S. concern (or lack thereof) regarding their plight. It says simply that there is a widespread belief that the United States is indeed a key supporter and ally of their enemies—the apartheid regime.

Black South Africans will unquestionably achieve political power in South Africa. Just as assuredly, they will remember quite clearly those who helped, and those who hindered, their

struggle along the way. It is therefore in our own strategic interests, separate and apart from any moral or political considerations, to rethink and redefine our foreign policy regarding the Republic of South Africa. "Capitalist" must no longer be allowed to automatically mean "pro-apartheid." Moral and other forms of support for black South Africa's human aspirations must no longer come only from sources unrelated to the United States. In summary, we must be mindful that by continuing to turn our backs on the black majority of South Africa, we not only violate every one of the principles of the American society, but we contribute to poor future relations with an imminent and probably powerful black South African government. □

U.S. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES

The United States first committed itself to the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa in 1963. This embargo has been upheld by every subsequent administration with varying degrees of commitment. In 1974 and 1975, the United States used its veto in the Security Council to ban more stringent, compulsory measures. In 1977, the Carter administration supported a new United Nations edict, Security Council Resolution 418, which extended the embargo's coverage to equipment and technology which, though having possible civilian uses, could also be used by the South African military and police. This extended embargo was rejected by the Reagan administration.

In the years since the United Nations arms embargo, South Africa has nonetheless built up an impressive military capacity which includes a wide selection of U.S. arms and equipment. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, 40 percent of the aircraft flown by the South African Air Force in 1978 were fully or partly of Ameri-

(continued on page 6)

can origin. Over the years, there has been an impressive traffic in major weapons systems to South Africa's government-owned munitions company—Armscor. The result is that today South Africa ranks near the forefront of world military power.

U.S. corporate transfers of equipment and technology include transport planes, helicopters, advanced communications systems, computers and other high-tech items. In addition, the Commerce Department has, over the years, permitted the sale of giant computers to the South African Energy Board for use at its Pelindaba nuclear enrichment plant, reportedly the site of Pretoria's nuclear weapons program.

Lockhead L-100 cargo planes, Swearingen Merlin-IV medium-m transports, Cessna Skywagon utility planes, Piaggio-P-166S maritime patrol planes, Aer Macchi AM-3C light transports, Atlas C-4M Kudo Scout planes are just some of the aircraft either produced in the United States and sold, directly with official U.S. sanction, to South Africa, or sold circuitously by being produced under license in third countries by U.S. companies.

Of particular importance to South Africa's high-tech police and military operations has been our provision of computers, communications devices, and other electronic systems. South Africa does not at this time have the capability to produce these systems economically, but these are items which its oppressive state security apparatus uses so effectively to repress its black citizens.

In the first quarter of 1984, the value of licenses granted for exports to South Africa by the State Department's Office of Munitions Control jumped to \$88 million, after having been only a fraction of that for all of 1983.

During the Reagan administration, the United States has even rationalized the export of crowd-control, electric shock batons to the South African police.

HAITI'S PUBLIC RELATIONS REFERENDUM

In late July, 1985, a "national referendum" was held in Haiti, supposedly to ratify legislation (already enacted early this June) to allow political parties to come into legal existence. However, Jean-Claude Duvalier, in his 14th year as Haiti's head of state, made it clear that the new law would not affect his status as President-For-Life and that any potential opposition party must acknowledge his permanency. In addition, new parties must have at least 18,000 members (though in Haiti no more than 20 people may gather without government consent), must not be "communist" in ideology or have such leanings, and must acknowledge Duvalier's authority to select his successor. The substance of the legislation, therefore, renders this gesture toward democracy virtually fraudulent.

The actual referendum confirms the fallacy of what the government has been calling a "profound transformation of Haiti's social and political relations." People were carried to the polls by bus and truck under armed uniformed guard. They requested ballots printed in French (10 percent of the Haitian population reads French), were asked to state their voting posture while three to five government officials watched over their Yes-No voting. Many Haitians admitted to voting several times. No international organizations were permitted inside the polling areas, nor to monitor the counting. When it was over, 2.3 million votes approved the president's plan. Only 494 opposed it.

The U.S. State Department has been mildly critical of the referendum although they expect no problem in administration recertification for continued aid to Haiti which approaches \$56 million yearly. A State Department official recently noted the "long way Haiti has come," despite this most recent calamity. No punitive measures against Duvalier are under consideration by the administration at this time.

Haiti appears in our view, as far from initiating a genuine process of democracy as it has been under the young Duvalier, the referendum—clearly orchestrated for international consumption—notwithstanding. Such presentations of democratic reforms have become quite common in efforts to supply continued assistance rations to the Reagan administration. These displays amount to little more than illusions.

SOMALIA REPORTED TO BE IN SOUTH AFRICA DEAL

According to the AFP and other news sources, it is believed that through secret negotiations the South African government is supplying Somalia with military assistance in exchange for landing and other strategic rights.

It has been reported that the Somali head of state, Siad Barre and South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha have negotiated an arms deal where South Africa would deliver a quantity of arms and military equipment to the Somali government in exchange for landing rights to South Africa airways at Mogadishu. Part of the deal also includes training of the Somali military and intelligence personnel by South African military advisors and technicians.

Mr. Ahmed Gare, First Secretary for information at the Somali embassy in Washington denies the allegations. Mr. Gare says that no Somali official has visited South Africa and that Somalia has participated in the struggle against apartheid since its independence. Still, reports of night flights that deposit suspicious cargo at the airport, handled by military staff, flow steadily. This ferrying has been linked to the recently detected diversification of the Somali arsenal, acquiring several second hand British Hunter Hawker ground attack aircraft and other new arms. South Africa's efforts to expand its military influence may extend well beyond the subcontinent.

DIRECT PROTESTS IN THE EIGHTIES AND BLACK POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

*by Dr. Mary Frances Berry,
U.S. Civil Rights Commission*

The Free South Africa Movement, beyond its obvious significance to the struggle for justice and peace in South Africa, and even beyond its meaning as a call for a more enlightened and supportive U.S. foreign policy toward black nations around the world, has important implications to black American political history and development. Let me first say that even before I was approached with the suggestion of a sit-in at the South African Embassy which was carried out as the launching event of the Free South Africa protests, black leadership was considering taking this kind of action on a number of domestic issues. Certainly, there is a less public agenda of the Free South Africa Movement which includes many of the concerns which have risen in response to a second term presidency and administration hostile to the development and needs of black America.

The Movement—its focus and all its concerns—is firmly based in TransAfrica's professional long-term efforts to change our government's policy which has been met with persistent resistance. It proceeds from a continuous concern with Africa by black Americans, and out of a traditional American concern with freedom and equality of individuals. And it proceeds from the relentless efforts of black Americans to be heard on issues which affect this country and our community. To win the attention of the American government, the American public and the American press in that regard, is a victory for the strained black voice which calls out on so many issues so very often. We all felt strongly at the Movement's inception, that an effective campaign would increase the force with which black American concerns generally are articulated to American policy-makers and the public.

We also were certain at the Movement's beginnings that through actions nationally led and coordinated by black Americans in direct protest of U.S. policy and apartheid, we were fully capable of reminding this country—and ourselves—how powerful our community can be when we are organized, consistent and willing to make the sacrifices necessary to win change in this society. The importance of that largely residual knowledge to our community at this point in time is great. If we can deliver this message to black America, while once again leading a Movement for all of America with a greater quality of life as our goal, we may open doors for possible political action which seem, two decades after the civil rights era, to be as tightly sealed as they were before the 1960's.

The Free South Africa Movement had engendered the best hope yet that the kind of sanction legislation which would put the United States on the side of freedom in South Africa would be imposed. But there are other lessons to be learned from the experience. When the issue is characterized in moral terms and a militant dramatization is sustained, progress can be made even when a conservative tide seems overwhelming. Our brothers and sisters taught that lesson first during the Civil Rights Movement. Those who seek social change have fresh evidence of the saliency of an important tool in the arsenal of justice.

FSAM CONTACTS

We encourage everyone to become actively involved in domestic efforts to end American support of apartheid. Below is a list of Free South Africa Movement contacts around the country:

Albuquerque:

Mr. George Anderson, (505)344-8422

Boston:

Dr. James Woodard, (w) (617)223-5715
(h) 734-5948
(tape message) 437-0228

Chicago:

Mr. John Dunham, (312)734-5824
(tape)

Cleveland:

Ms. Julia Chrin, (216)321-9349

Columbus:

Ms. Deborah Archie, (614)224-4111

Detroit:

Ms. Margaret Baylor, (313)548-1430

Houston:

Ms. Ada Edwards, (713)521-2964

Indianapolis:

Representative William A. Crawford,
(317)636-0310

Jacksonville:

Ms. Mary C. Miller, (904)358-2300 ext. 283

Los Angeles:

Mr. Ed Waters, (213)747-1367

Miami:

Mr. Todd Bernstein, (305)358-0102
Mr. Ray Fauntroy, (305)696-7252

Minneapolis:

Mr. Mel Reeves, (612)871-8033

Newark:

Mr. Larry Hamm

New York:

Ms. Harriet Michel, (212)730-5200

Pittsburg:

Ms. Gayle Austin, (412)624-6588

Portland:

Ms. Avel Gordley, (503)230-9427

Richmond:

Ms. Mary E. Cox, (804)358-7403

St. Louis:

Mr. Khatib Waheeb, (314)381-0266

San Diego:

Mr. Jim Stone, (619)263-8161

San Francisco/Oakland:

Ms. Willa Gray

San Jose:

Mr. Bob Marshall, (408)289-8107

Santa Cruz:

Ms. Nancy Netherland, (SDAAC)
(408)469-2166

Seattle:

Mr. Randy Carter, (206)632-0500

WATCH FOR "DIGGERS"

In early 1986, a new documentary film on the 100,000 black West Indian men whose labor produced that Panama Canal is expected to air on PBS stations around the country. This film, *Diggers*, produced by young filmmaker Roman Foster, is ultimately responsible for the realization of the "Eighth Wonder of the World," in the face of racist labor practices and constant belittlement of their contribution. The production incorporates actual footage, historic photographs and recent interviews with surviving Diggers who recall with insight and pride the circumstances and the sociology of their work toward the production of the Canal.

A DAY OF RECOMMITMENT A MARCH TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1985 12PM
(THE DAY BEFORE THANKSGIVING)

ASSEMBLE AT 23rd & P ST NW 12pm

COMMEMORATING THE FIRST YEAR OF
THE FREE SOUTH AFRICA MOVEMENT



Vol. 4, No. 1 Fall 1985
TRANSAFRICA NEWS®
 545 Eighth Street S.E., Suite 200
 Washington, D.C. 20003
 (202)547-2550
 Editor David Scott
 Editor Glenn McKeown
 Production . Maryse-Noelle Mills