

# Damming Peace and Developing Dissent

## *The Southeastern Anatolia Project and the Kurdish Resistance in Turkey*

Dean Chahim  
SIS 490D  
December 6, 2010

### I. Introduction

*The Turkish republic is facing its gravest threat yet. A social earthquake could cut one part of Turkey from the rest, and we could all be buried beneath it.*<sup>1</sup>

-Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey, in a letter to Prime Minister Suleyman Demire, 1993

President Ozal's letter from the grave – written shortly before his death and leaked only after his passing – indicates the sheer magnitude of the Kurdish question for the stability of Turkey. After years of using military suppression, in the 1980s, Turkey turned towards ostensibly peaceful means to quell the conflict: dams. In the name of regional “economic development,” the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) will build 22 dams while implementing a slew of secondary projects to improve social services and attract investment to the region.<sup>2</sup> Yet while the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) dams, particularly the Ilisu, may bring (marginal) national economic growth,<sup>3</sup> they are unlikely to fulfill the GAP's underlying goal of bringing peace to the Kurdish conflict.

The GAP, while recognizing the primarily economic origins of the Kurdish discontent, will fail to deliver economic benefits for the majority of impoverished Kurds. By focusing on large dams and irrigation, the project (1) necessitates the involuntary displacement – and subsequent destitution – of hundreds of thousands, (2) exacerbates existing structural inequalities, and (3) causes environmental damage to water and soils that threaten smallholders and overall long-term production. These effects

<sup>1</sup> Pope, Hugh. 1993. “Voice from grave airs a Kurdish solution: Ozal letter published advocating forced migration to defeat PKK.” November 13. *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/voice-from-grave-airs-a-kurdish-solution-ozal-letter-published-advocating-forced-migration-to-defeat-pkk-1503951.html> (Accessed December 5, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> “History of GAP.” *Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration*. <http://www.gap.gov.tr/about-gap/history-of-gap> (Accessed December 6, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> For a scathing critique of even the proposed economic benefits of large dams versus their eventual costs, see McCully, Patrick. 1996. *Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams*. London; Atlantic Highlands N.J. USA: Zed Books.

will only worsen the economic condition of the majority and thus do little to douse – and much more to fan – the flames of the Kurdish resistance. Worse still, the impoundment of water in Turkey encourages downstream Syria to redouble its support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Only by ceasing future destructive dam-building and promoting structural land reforms can Turkey make a lasting peace with its Kurdish minority and fulfill the original goals of GAP – and avoid instability domestically and a tarnished human rights image globally.

In this paper, I draw on both the literature specific to Turkey and the GAP but also the burgeoning critical literature on dams, involuntary displacement, the environment, and inequality in other contexts. I first review the Kurdish conflict in Turkey<sup>4</sup> and the origins of the GAP before delving into each of the three aforementioned effects of the GAP individually. I then conclude with the broader regional and global political effects of the GAP and policy recommendations to prevent future conflict.

## II. Genesis of the Kurdish Resistance and the Emergence of GAP

Current and future resistance to the GAP project cannot be seen as an isolated conflict; instead, it is a product of a decades-long struggle rooted in economic marginalization. The historic political and economic marginalization of the Kurds provided fertile ground for the development of a resistance movement, spearheaded most visibly by the Marxist-Leninist PKK. The PKK “imbued Kurdish nationalism with the idea of class war” and thereby provided an outlet for discontent with both social and political repression of the state and economic repression of the local *agha* land-owning class.<sup>5</sup> The demands of the PKK on the Turkish state have oscillated between full autonomy, federalism, and at the minimum, ethnic and cultural rights.<sup>6</sup> Simultaneously, they have fought against the *agha* landowners who controlled the bulk of the land in southeastern Anatolia.<sup>7</sup> To achieve these goals, the PKK engaged in

---

<sup>4</sup> While I limit discussion to Turkey and the recent era out of respect for length, the conflict’s roots are geographically wide and much older. See, e.g., McDowall, David. 1996. *A Modern History of the Kurds*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris.

<sup>5</sup> McDowall, David. 1996. p.419. The *agha* landowner system can be considered practically feudalistic – and indeed traces its origins to land given to political supporters during the Ottoman empire.

<sup>6</sup> McDowall, David. 1996.

<sup>7</sup> McDowall, David. 1996.

direct, armed confrontation with both the *agha* class and the government, along with terror tactics against civilians supporting either.<sup>8</sup>

In the late 1980s, the government put increasing military and authoritarian pressure on the Kurdish population and the PKK in a strategy aimed at “matching terror for terror.”<sup>9</sup> The resulting atrocities and loss of freedom meant that the conflict “progressively radicalized the Kurdish population,” which became more open in its support for the PKK.<sup>10</sup> Yet despite the mix of motivations for popular support, as historian David McDowell notes, “It was well understood among more thoughtful Turks that the key to the conflict was partly political but possibly *primarily economic*.”<sup>11</sup> The economic motivations were borne out of the extreme poverty and poor social (health, education, etc.) indicators of the region relative to the rest of the country. This reality was not lost on the Turkish state.

Through the GAP, proposed by President Ozal in the late 1980s, the government ostensibly aimed to replace (or, as it turned out, complement) the military “stick” with an economic “carrot.” Yet as will be demonstrated, the project only superficially addresses the root economic causes of the conflict while actively worsening the objective economic and social reality for the majority of disaffected Kurds.

### III. Displacement, Destitution, and Discontent

There are no shortages of insurgencies in other contexts which have been empowered by the popular discontent generated by forced migrations. As Binayak Ray notes, referring to India and the Naxalite insurgency and comparisons with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Phillipines, “the failure to judiciously address the resettlement of ‘internally displaced persons’ could be disastrous and even threaten the integrity of the nation.”<sup>12</sup> Turkey, like most countries, has a poor record with “judiciously” addressing the resettlement of Kurds, which bodes poorly for prospects of peace and internal stability.

---

<sup>8</sup> McDowell, David. 1996.

<sup>9</sup> McDowell, David. 1996. p.424.

<sup>10</sup> McDowell, David. 1996. p.426.

<sup>11</sup> McDowell, David. 1996. p.434. Emphasis added.

<sup>12</sup> Ray, Binayak. 2008. *Water: The Looming Crisis in India*. Lanham: Lexington Books, p.45.

At least 350,000 people, the vast majority Kurds, had already been involuntarily displaced by GAP dam inundations as of 2004.<sup>13</sup> The completion of the Ilisu dam promises to displace another 55,000 to 80,000, in addition to highly important archeological sites.<sup>14</sup> Involuntary migrations cause enormous social and political cleavage and only increase Kurdish discontent.

The extensive public relations campaigns undertaken by the GAP authority to portray the project as primarily about economic development downplay (or simply ignore) the fundamental use of the project as a hydraulic *weapon* to displace the Kurds. In his leaked 1993 letter to Prime Minister Suleyman Demire, President Ozal advocated for “the mass deportation of up to 200,000 Kurds to deny the PKK a sympathetic population in their areas of operation.”<sup>15</sup> He noted that building dams – the centerpiece of the GAP – would ensure that they could never return.<sup>16</sup>

The irony is that the involuntary displacement of Kurds by the Turkish state is not new, and is unlikely to be effective as a means of quelling the Kurdish resistance. The GAP simply gave a new, technical justification to involuntary displacement through the rhetoric of “development.” Indeed, by the time of Ozal’s letter, roughly the same number he suggests (200,000) Kurds had *already* been deported,<sup>17</sup> most through the *Kararname 413* verdict, which gave the governor-general of the region broad powers to “resettle” (by force) any people who he thought necessary.<sup>18</sup> Rather than weakening the PKK, these past deportations had “merely spread the networks of PKK supporters.”<sup>19</sup> Beyond this relatively neutral effect, the involuntary displacement has serious, negative psychosocial and economic effects for the “resettled.”

Resettlement plans for the Ilisu dam have been made without consultation with the affected Kurds,<sup>20</sup> and compensation is likely to be limited in both scope and amount, leading to further

---

<sup>13</sup> Morvaridi, Behrooz. 2004. “Resettlement, rights to development and the Ilisu Dam, Turkey.” *Development and Change* 35(4): 729.

<sup>14</sup> Kurdish Human Rights Project. 2007. *The Ilisu Dam Project: A Flawed Plan is Revived Unchanged*. KHRP. [http://www.khrp.org/component/docman/doc\\_download/112-the-ilisu-dam-project-a-flawed-plan-is-revived-unchanged.html](http://www.khrp.org/component/docman/doc_download/112-the-ilisu-dam-project-a-flawed-plan-is-revived-unchanged.html), p.5.

<sup>15</sup> McDowall, David. 1996. p.437.

<sup>16</sup> Pope, Hugh. 1993. (Accessed December 5, 2010). On balance, he also argued that resettlement provisions, such as jobs, should be made for the resettled.

<sup>17</sup> McDowall, David. 1996. p.437.

<sup>18</sup> McDowall, David. 1996. p.427.

<sup>19</sup> McDowall, David. 1996. p.437.

<sup>20</sup> Morvaridi, Behrooz. 2004.; Kurdish Human Rights Project. 2007.

discontent. As many as 50% of the Kurds in the region to be inundated by the Ilisu dam stand to receive nothing from the current Resettlement Plan due to its requirement of land deeds, which few small farmers have.<sup>21</sup> Even those who receive compensation are likely to receive insufficient amounts;<sup>22</sup> incomes from common resources – such as pasture – are also excluded, undervaluing the economic losses to the displaced.<sup>23</sup>

The involuntarily displaced, even when they receive compensation, are thus likely to be both worse off economically and socially than they were before. This has been shown both globally<sup>24</sup> and in Turkey, where 63% of those resettled by the state and 74% of those who accepted compensation are unhappy, primarily due to a lack of income after resettlement.<sup>25</sup> Kurds displaced in past GAP projects to cities have been often socially excluded or ill adapted to urban life, and have difficulty finding employment.<sup>26</sup> They overwhelmingly – and unsurprisingly – wish to return to their original villages.<sup>27</sup> Resettlement thus merely perpetuates the economic marginalization of the Kurds – and ironically the very motivation for their resistance.

Using involuntary displacement as a weapon, the GAP fails miserably. By dismantling social bonds and diminishing economic conditions for the resettled, the GAP does not neutrally “spread” Kurds already sympathetic to the resistance and the PKK as McDowell posits.<sup>28</sup> Instead, it actively *induces* sympathy for the resistance among the disgruntled displaced and their families, as well as human rights observers globally. Thus, far from diminishing the resistance, the politics of displacement via inundation provide ideological fuel for the resistance. Furthermore, the Kurds who are not already internal dam refugees will soon become economic refugees as the GAP attracts agro-industry to the region and strengthens inequality.

---

<sup>21</sup> Morvaridi, Behrooz. 2004. p. 729.

<sup>22</sup> Sahan, Emel et al. 2001. “Case-Study: Southeastern Anatolia Project in Turkey – GAP.” Seminar Report. Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. [http://www.eawag.ch/research\\_e/apec/Scripts/GAP07feb01.pdf](http://www.eawag.ch/research_e/apec/Scripts/GAP07feb01.pdf). p.11.

<sup>23</sup> Morvaridi, Behrooz. 2004. p. 729-30.

<sup>24</sup> World Bank. 1994. *Resettlement and Development: The Bankwide Review of Projects Involving Involuntary Resettlement 1986-1993*. World Bank. pp.4/1, 4/2, cited in McCully, Patrick. 1996. p. 82.

<sup>25</sup> Sahan, Emel et al. 2001. p.11.

<sup>26</sup> Sahan, Emel et al. 2001. p.11.

<sup>27</sup> Sahan, Emel et al. 2001. p.12.

<sup>28</sup> McDowall, David. 1996. p.437.

## IV. Widening the Gap

While focusing (appropriately) on inter-region inequality, the GAP fails to recognize the pervasive *internal* inequality within Southeastern Anatolia, which stands to be deepened, not improved, by GAP. This means that the claimed economic benefits of the GAP will not be reaped by the masses of impoverished Kurds, but rather by a new class of elite industrialists. While the elite may change from the *agha* land-owners to agro-industry tycoons, the relative inequality between them and the masses of Kurds the GAP claims to help will worsen.<sup>29</sup> Given that it was never simply poverty, but rather *inequality* and the idea of “class war” that the PKK first used to generate support among the Kurds, the GAP appears primed to only strengthen the PKK’s support base and the Kurdish resistance as a whole.

The existing inequality in the GAP region is stark, and thus the likelihood that impoverished Kurds could benefit from the GAP project is low. Even at the outset of the plan’s creation, “8 per cent of farming families owned over 50 per cent of the land, while 41% held between 10 and 50 dunums and another 38 per cent held no land at all.”<sup>30</sup> More recent estimates do not provide direct comparison of distribution, but indicate that 3.3% of families own over 500 hectares and confirm that 40% of the population is still landless.<sup>31</sup> This inequality is a main source of unrest among the Kurds, who by the early 1980s had grown “increasingly disaffected” with the *agha* landowning class, a sentiment capitalized on by the PKK.<sup>32</sup>

The GAP project aims to promote the development of industry and cash crops for export in the fertile valley region, but global experience shows that it is likely that these developments will only exacerbate the inequality between the Kurds and the *agha* class. As Patrick McCully notes in his geographically broad critique, “irrigation schemes are promoted with the promise of land to the tiller, but end up delivering it to the absentee landlord.”<sup>33</sup> He notes that these wealthy absentee landlords, in cases from Iran, to India, to California, are those best able to capitalize on irrigation and cash crop

---

<sup>29</sup> I intentionally do not consider the GAP’s secondary social programs here. While possibly helpful in making poverty and inequality more bearable, in comparison to the radical socioeconomic restructuring induced by the dam and irrigation schemes, they appear limited in scope and impact. They were, quite literally, an afterthought to the program.

<sup>30</sup> McDowall, David. 1996. p.434.

<sup>31</sup> Sahan, Emel et al. 2001. p.6.

<sup>32</sup> McDowall, David. 1996. p.421.

<sup>33</sup> McCully, Patrick. 1996. p. 173.

production, both of which require extensive capital inputs beyond the means of most poor farmers. Worse still, he notes, “small farmers...are vulnerable to having their share of water diverted to the better off” who are “better able to bribe and lobby officials to ensure that they get plentiful water at the right time.”<sup>34</sup>

In Turkey, to add to their advantages over smallholders, the GAP even intends to give free land to companies that employ over 10 people and eliminate taxes on companies that keep these employees for three or more years.<sup>35</sup> These measures, aimed at encouraging investment, are also likely to drive out of business any small farmers that remain – and can access the promised irrigation water. The Kurds stand to gain little – and lose a great deal - from the irrigation schemes proposed by the GAP.

Promises of millions of jobs ignore the jobs lost to inundation, the potential influx of better-educated workers from elsewhere in Turkey, and the quality of the jobs produced. The jobs promised by the “ancillary sector” supporting agro-industry are unlikely to be within reach of the largely illiterate population,<sup>36</sup> thus necessitating the migration of skilled workers from outside the region. Furthermore, urban workers in the newly created “free trade zones” stand to lose their rights as laborers in exchange for jobs.<sup>37</sup> Given the already unequal distribution of land and the further accumulation promised by irrigation, it is likely that more Kurds will be forced off their own land and into working for larger landowners, just as in the wake of the Indira Gandhi Canal irrigation project in India.<sup>38</sup> Thus, any jobs created by the GAP for the Kurds are likely to be a continuing social reminder of the unchecked and growing inequality that drove the initial Kurdish resistance. To add insult to injury, the Kurds who are not resettled stand to lose their livelihoods not only to large landowners, but also to the environmental damage of mass irrigation itself.

## V. Environmental Contradictions

Behind the political calculations that drive the cost-benefit analyses of the GAP dams are fundamental environmental contradictions. The GAP’s dams and subsequent massive increase in

---

<sup>34</sup> McCully, Patrick. 1996. p. 173-4.

<sup>35</sup> Sahan, Emel et al. 2001. p.6.

<sup>36</sup> McDowell, David. 1996. p. 435.

<sup>37</sup> Sahan, Emel et al. 2001. p.7.

<sup>38</sup> In the 1960s and 1970s, the Indian government gave hundreds of thousands of settlers free land along the canal, yet by 1989, two-fifths of the settlers had lost their land. (McCully, Patrick. 1996. p. 174.)

irrigation promise to degrade both the soil and water quality of the entire region, reducing long-term yields. This degradation will disproportionately harm the poor Kurds, who in turn will have even more reason to support the Kurdish resistance.

Soil degradation induced by irrigation is a well-known problem, and in the case of the GAP, the brunt of the initial impact will be borne by the already impoverished Kurds. As McCully notes, the improper and excessive irrigation that typically accompanies large dams tends to increase the salinity and alkalinity of soils, eventually forcing the land to be abandoned or requires an increasing use of fertilizers to maintain yields.<sup>39</sup> This problem is exacerbated by the already high salt levels found in arid and semi-arid areas<sup>40</sup> like the GAP region. Yet while the aforementioned large landowners and agro-industries may be able to afford increasing amounts of fertilizers, this will likely be beyond the reach of most poor Kurdish smallholders.

Water quality also stands to deteriorate in the wake of the GAP, causing a major public health hazard in a region with already low health indicators. The reservoirs created behind the GAP dams will trap upstream sewage and agricultural runoff, which contribute to eutrophication and ultimately the spread of infectious disease.<sup>41</sup> Even in the initial stages of the GAP construction the cases of malaria in the region doubled from 8,680 in 1990 to 18,676 in 1992. In one province, Sanliurfa (with a population of one million in 1990), in the middle of the irrigated plains of the GAP, malaria cases increased from 785 in 1990 to 5,125 in 1993. Other diseases are growing as well. In the same province, cases of leishmaniasis quadrupled to 1,955 in the same period 1990-1993.<sup>42</sup> While more recent data is unavailable, the Kurdish Human Rights Project predicts a similar pattern of disease in the wake of the Ilisu dam.<sup>43</sup> By virtue of geography, the majority of those affected by the declining water quality and associated disease will again be Kurds, who already suffer from poor health and access to healthcare.

The environmental degradation caused by the GAP will also have inevitable long-term negative effects for the whole region, but in the short-term, those least able to cope will be the Kurds. This means

---

<sup>39</sup> McCully, Patrick. 1996. p. 168-172.

<sup>40</sup> McCully, Patrick. 1996. p. 168.

<sup>41</sup> Kurdish Human Rights Project. 2007. p.4.; Sahan, Emel et al. 2001. p. 7.

<sup>42</sup> Aksoy, Serap et al. 1995. "The GAP Project in Southeastern Turkey: The Potential for Emergence of Diseases." *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 1(2): 61.

<sup>43</sup> Kurdish Human Rights Project. 2007. p.4.

that in addition to being excluded from the benefits of the GAP, they also bear the brunt of its costs – the social and environmental externalities of displacement and soil and water degradation, respectively. This reality means that the GAP will do ironically do little to appease and disarm the Kurdish population as it intends and much more to drive it back into resistance, both politically and militarily.

## VI. Geopolitical Impacts

Continuing building the GAP dams, such as the Ilisu, threatens to both further tarnish Turkey's image globally and sour relations with downstream Syria, which has shown its willingness to support the PKK in the past. Turkey cannot afford either geopolitical impact. Its ability to join the EU is at least partly conditional upon the "full implementation of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the protection of minorities,"<sup>44</sup> all of which have been violated in its treatment of the Kurds.<sup>45</sup> Increasing pressure from human rights groups globally, especially the Kurdish Human Rights Project, have forced Western governments to withdraw funding and condemn the Ilisu dam project in particular.<sup>46</sup>

Relations with downstream Syria and Iraq are threatened by not only the reduction of flows due to impoundment behind GAP dams, but also the increasing salinization of the runoff re-entering the flows.<sup>47</sup> Given that the full potential of GAP has yet to be realized, tensions are predicted to only increase.<sup>48</sup> While Iraq may pose a minor threat now, Syria has shown a great willingness to support the PKK in the past.<sup>49</sup> Increasing desperation over the diminishing quantity and quality of their water due to the GAP may encourage them to restart their support of the PKK if Turkey does not broker a compromise over their dams upstream. Thus, the continuation of the GAP project not only encourages unrest internally, but also brings external condemnation and may bring destabilizing support for the PKK insurgency from abroad.

---

<sup>44</sup> Morvaridi, B. 2004. "Resettlement, rights to development and the Ilisu Dam, Turkey." *Development and Change* 35(4): 725.

<sup>45</sup> McDowell, David. 1996.

<sup>46</sup> Kurdish Human Rights Project. 2007. p.2.

<sup>47</sup> McCully, Patrick 1996. p. 169.

<sup>48</sup> Sahan, Emel et al. 2001. p.20.

<sup>49</sup> McDowell, David. 1996. p. 420.

## VII. Conclusions and Recommendations

Instead of addressing the structural economic inequalities that provide fuel to the Kurdish resistance, the GAP actually actively exacerbates them. The Kurds that remain in the region see few of the benefits and the bulk of the environmental costs of the irrigation and dams. Even if economic development was purely a façade to excuse the mass deportation of PKK supporters (as a cynical reading of President Ozal’s statements might suggest) – and the dams are simply a disguised weapon – the results are likely to be disappointing for the Turkish state. Those who are involuntarily displaced experience economic and social destitution that simply reinforces their support for the PKK. This reality suggests that, whatever the true purpose – weapon or “development” – the GAP is failing miserably to quell the conflict.

If the GAP is a failed political tool, it is an even more unwise economic investment – stopping it now would save the Turkish state billions in both poorly planned projects and war costs. Both supply- and demand-side alternatives to the controversial Ilisu dam proposed by the GAP abound, but have generally been ignored by policymakers.<sup>50</sup> The dam itself is highly expensive for the energy it produces, and the total energy produced by the dam could be recovered at a lower cost by improving faulty electric transmission systems.<sup>51</sup>

With regard to the Kurdish question, the primary cause for conflict – economic inequality – is not addressed by the GAP. The only long-term fix is also the most politically difficult in Turkey: land reform. This would reduce the power of the *agha* class and allow the Kurds to “share in the benefits” Turkey so generously (if euphemistically) offers its downstream neighbors.

---

<sup>50</sup> Rohr, C. 1999. “War over water—The case of the Ilisu dam project in Turkey.” In *50th International Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Rustenburg/South Africa, September (mimeo)*, p. 2. <http://www.awiru.up.ac.za/pdf/rohrcarsren.pdf>.

<sup>51</sup> European Rivers Network. “Ilisu Dam Project.” *European Rivers Network*. <http://www.rivernet.org/turquie/ilisu.htm> (Accessed December 6, 2010).

## Bibliography

- Aksoy, Serap et al. 1995. "The GAP Project in Southeastern Turkey: The Potential for Emergence of Diseases." *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 1(2): 61.
- European Rivers Network. "Ilisu Dam Project." *European Rivers Network*. <http://www.rivernet.org/turquie/ilisu.htm> (Accessed December 6, 2010).
- "History of GAP." *Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration*. <http://www.gap.gov.tr/about-gap/history-of-gap> (Accessed December 6, 2010).
- Kurdish Human Rights Project. 2007. *The Ilisu Dam Project: A Flawed Plan is Revived Unchanged*. KHRP. [http://www.khrp.org/component/docman/doc\\_download/112-the-ilisu-dam-project-a-flawed-plan-is-revived-unchanged.html](http://www.khrp.org/component/docman/doc_download/112-the-ilisu-dam-project-a-flawed-plan-is-revived-unchanged.html)
- McCully, Patrick. 1996. *Silenced Rivers : The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams*. London; Atlantic Highlands N.J. USA: Zed Books.
- McDowall, David. 1996. *A Modern History of the Kurds*. London; New York; I.B. Tauris; In the U.S.A. and Canada distributed by St. Martin's Press.
- Morvaridi, Behrooz. 2004. "Resettlement, rights to development and the Ilisu Dam, Turkey." *Development and Change* 35(4): 719–741.
- Pope, Hugh. 1993. "Voice from grave airs a Kurdish solution: Ozal letter published advocating forced migration to defeat PKK." *The Independent*. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/voice-from-grave-airs-a-kurdish-solution-ozal-letter-published-advocating-forced-migration-to-defeat-pkk-1503951.html> (Accessed December 5, 2010).
- Ray, Binayak. 2008. *Water: The Looming Crisis in India*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Rohr, C. 1999. "War over water–The case of the Ilisu dam project in Turkey." In *Paper, 50th International Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Rustenburg/South Africa, September (mimeo)*, p. 2. <http://www.awiru.up.ac.za/pdf/rohrcarsren.pdf>.
- Sahan, Emel et al. 2001. "Case-Study: Southeastern Anatolia Project in Turkey – GAP." Seminar Report. Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. [http://www.eawag.ch/research\\_e/apec/Scripts/GAP07feb01.pdf](http://www.eawag.ch/research_e/apec/Scripts/GAP07feb01.pdf).
- World Bank. 1994. *Resettlement and Development: The Bankwide Review of Projects Involving Involuntary Resettlement 1986-1993*. World Bank.