


Zogby Research Services
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EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES in the Post-Tamarrud, Post-Morsi Era



During the second half of July, 2013, Zogby Research Services (ZRS) conducted a nationwide face-to-face survey of 5,042 Egyptian adults in an effort to learn how they are reacting to developments in the post-Tamarrud, post-Morsi era, as well as their assessment of the U.S.-Egypt relationship. This survey is a follow-up to the ZRS poll of 5,029 Egyptian adults that had been completed in May, 2013.

What we found in the July poll is that Egyptian attitudes toward both their internal political situation and their relationship with the United States are conflicted and in flux.

Back in May, 82% of all Egyptians told us that they had been hopeful at the time of the 2011 revolution, but by the time of our May survey that hope had evaporated, with only 36% saying they were still hopeful about developments in their country. In the July survey, following Tamarrud and the deposing of President Morsi, while the percentage of those saying they had been hopeful two years ago is similar to the May poll, the percentage of Egyptians who say they feel hopeful now has jumped to 68%. Significantly, this hopefulness is shared by those who support the Islamic parties (Freedom and Justice Party: 57% and Nour: 61%), those who have confidence in the opposition parties and movements (National Salvation Front: 76%, April 6th: 74%, and Tamarrud: 76%), and even those who do not express confidence in any party or movement (67%). In contrast, back in May, hope was near universal among those who supported the Islamic parties, while majorities of those who supported the opposition groups were disappointed. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

As we anticipated in May, however, Egyptians are not of one mind regarding the military intervention, with those who support the Islamic parties favoring a restoration of President Morsi to power, while those who support the Tamarrud movement and the secular parties maintain that the military made the correct decision to depose Morsi on July 3rd. Despite this division, a remarkable 93% of all adults still retain confidence in the military as an institution, an attitude shared by Egyptians across the political spectrum—Islamists and secularists alike. (See Table 5.) This support for the military in July remains virtually unchanged from the findings in our May survey in which we found that the military had the confidence of 94% of all Egyptians. This near unanimous level of support might be surprising given the drama that is currently unfolding in the streets of Cairo.

Also noteworthy is the degree to which the confidence in the military stands in contrast to the lack of confidence displayed in all of Egypt's political parties—none of which can claim the confidence of more than 25% of the public. In fact, the only entity to earn the support of more than one quarter of Egyptians is the Tamarrud movement, which has the confidence of 32% of those polled. (See Table 4.) Even with this strong support for the military, however, almost two-thirds of all Egyptians are in a “wait-and-see” mode as to whether the new interim government will fulfill its promise to deliver a new constitution and a more inclusive democracy in their country. It is important to note that among those respondents who do not express confidence in any

political party confidence in the interim government is particularly low, at levels similar to those who support the Islamic parties, in marked contrast to the stronger confidence of those who support the opposition groups. (See Table 12.)

Results from the July poll also demonstrate declining confidence in each of Egypt's major political parties, with the most significant decline in the number of respondents saying they have confidence in the National Salvation Front (from 1,111 in May to 597 in July). Though not a party, the Tamarrud movement earns the highest level of confidence (1,635 respondents), probably garnering support from those who have lost confidence in the other parties, including particularly the National Salvation Front which saw such a large drop in support. (See Table 3.)

What the July survey further reveals is that Egyptians are deeply conflicted about the role played by the United States. President Obama, who had earned high marks among Egyptians following his "Address to the Muslim World" delivered at the University of Cairo in 2009, has now dropped to a 3% positive rating. At the same time, confidence in the United States is at 1%. (See Table 5.)

Nevertheless, Egyptians are divided on the matter of how important it is for their country to have good relations with the United States, with 48% saying it is important and 51% saying it is not important. Interestingly, the only sub-groups in which a majorities agree that relations with the United States are important are the supporters of the Tamarrud movement and the National Salvation Front. (See Table 9.)

Two-thirds of all Egyptians feel that the United States was too supportive of President Morsi. And more than 8 in 10 feel that "Egypt was harmed by the U.S. policy of support for Morsi." (See Tables 6 and 7.) When asked about their reactions to the calls by some American politicians to "suspend U.S. aid until there is a legitimately elected government in Egypt," 18% respond that "it makes me happy," 24% say "it makes me angry," but 56% say they "don't care, because Egypt doesn't need U.S. aid." (See Table 10.) The reason for this negative attitude can be found in the responses given to the question: "Who has most benefited from the billions of dollars of U.S. assistance to Egypt?" Only 24% agree that either the Egyptian people or military have been the prime beneficiaries, while 21% say it is the United States and 48% say that it is Israel that has benefited most from the post-Camp David U.S. aid to Egypt. (See Table 11.)

One of the more revealing findings in the poll comes in the responses to the question: "To what extent do you feel that the United States understands Egypt and the Egyptian people?" Only 36% agree that the United States has some understanding, while 62% say that the United States has little or no understanding of Egypt and its people. (See Table 8.)

These results make clear the profound challenges facing both the Egyptian military and the United States in this critical period of Egypt's history. Regardless of the strong support it currently retains, the military establishment must deliver on its promise to restore order and to help to create a more inclusive political order with a new constitution and elections. This is what the public expects. Failure to deliver could have negative consequences.

For its part, the United States needs to understand that its role in Egypt has been seriously compromised by its past behavior. Especially in this extraordinarily volatile period, Egyptians do not have a favorable view of interference by the United States in what they feel are critical decisions they must make about the future direction of their country. Threats to suspend assistance ring false or hollow, especially when they are delivered by politicians whose motives are suspect since they are not seen as having been friendly to Egypt or to concerns shared by most Egyptians.

In this period, U.S. officials would do well to recall the more measured approach taken by President Obama in his post-Arab Spring May 2011 speech at the State Department. Back then he offered wise counsel noting that the United States didn't start the Arab Spring and couldn't direct its outcome. What he suggested the United States could do is provide assistance, where needed, to help grow the economies and build the infrastructures of these societies in the midst of the dramatic changes they were experiencing.

The July poll shows that the United States still has a reservoir of good will to draw on, with one-half of Egyptians still viewing relations with the United States as important. But with most Egyptians feeling that the United States doesn't understand their society or their needs, the United States ought not to squander its potential by attempting to impose itself and dictating terms in the internal affairs of Egypt.

1. When the Arab Spring began over two years ago, how hopeful were you that it would bring about positive change in Egypt?

	May 2013	July 2013						
	Total	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
Hopeful	82	84	87	86	80	83	82	85
Not hopeful	17	15	12	14	19	16	18	14

2. After Tamarrud and the military's action deposing President Morsi, what best describes how hopeful are you now about Egypt's future?

	May 2013	July 2013						
	Total	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
I am still hopeful	36	68	57	61	76	74	76	67
Neither hopeful nor disappointed	22	16	16	15	15	13	15	16
I am disappointed	41	14	23	20	7	10	8	13

3. Number of respondents who express confidence in...

	May 2013	July 2013
The Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood)	1308	1194
The Nour Party	1452	1118
The National Salvation Front	1111	597
The April 6th Movement	1250	1125
Tamarrud	-	1635
No confidence in any political party	1944	1387

4. Level of confidence in . . .

		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud
The Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood)	Confident	24	100	52	2	14	4
	Not confident	75		47	96	85	95
The Nour Party	Confident	22	48	100	13	16	13
	Not confident	77	51		87	83	86
The National Salvation Front	Confident	12	1	7	100	42	26
	Not confident	87	97	92		56	72
The April 6th Movement	Confident	22	13	17	80	100	35
	Not confident	74	83	80	20		63
Tamarrud	Confident	32	5	19	72	50	100
	Not confident	66	94	80	27	49	

5. Level of confidence in . . .								
		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence in Any
The army	Confident	93	88	92	99	96	100	91
	Not confident	6	11	7	1	3	0	7
Barack Obama	Confident	3	4	4	3	3	3	3
	Not confident	96	95	96	96	97	97	96
Ann Patterson	Confident	1	2	1	0	0	0	0
	Not confident	98	98	98	97	98	99	99
The United States of America	Confident	1	2	1		1	1	1
	Not confident	98	97	98	99	99	99	98

6. During the time Mohamed Morsi was president of Egypt, how do you evaluate U.S. policy toward the Morsi administration?								
		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence in Any
The US was too supportive of President Morsi		65	42	53	83	73	87	63
The US was not supportive enough of President Morsi		30	52	42	16	23	12	32
US support was just right		1	1	1		1		1

7. In your opinion, did Egypt benefit from US support toward the Morsi presidency or did that policy harm Egypt?								
		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence in Any
Egypt benefited from U.S. policy		12	15	14	14	13	12	10
Egypt was harmed by U.S. policy		82	81	81	81	81	82	83

8. To what extent do you feel that the United States understands Egypt and the Egyptian people?								
		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence in Any
The United States understands Egypt and the Egyptian people		21	21	22	24	24	20	20
The United States somewhat understands Egypt and the Egyptian people		15	12	15	16	16	19	14
The United States little understands Egypt and the Egyptian people		13	10	12	12	13	14	14
The United States has no understanding of Egypt and the Egyptian people		49	55	49	47	46	46	50

9. How important is it for Egypt to have a good relationship with the United States?							
	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence in Any
Important	48	40	44	54	48	54	48
Not important	51	58	54	44	51	45	50

10. Some U.S. officials have called for a suspension of US aid to Egypt until a legitimately elected government is in Egypt.							
	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence in Any
It makes me happy	18	15	15	21	19	20	18
It makes me angry	24	22	25	23	25	24	25
I don't care, Egypt doesn't need U.S. aid	56	60	57	55	55	55	53
Not sure	3	3	3	1	1	1	4

11. Since the Camp David Agreements were signed in 1979, Egypt has received billions of dollars in U.S. assistance. Who has benefited most from that aid?							
	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence in Any
The Egyptian people	4	3	5	4	4	3	6
The Egyptian military	19	20	22	18	22	20	18
The United States	21	23	19	20	21	21	21
Israel	48	46	48	51	48	51	47

12. Confidence that the interim government/military will make progress in ...								
		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No confidence
Amended constitution and new elections for a civilian government	Confident	33	11	19	65	47	75	14
	Not confident	64	85	76	34	51	24	81
Creating the framework for a more inclusive democracy in Egypt	Confident	36	13	21	71	51	78	16
	Not confident	62	85	77	28	48	22	80
Keeping us safe and restoring order	Confident	38	19	24	67	53	74	21
	Not confident	60	79	74	32	46	25	76

APPENDIX —METHODODOLOGY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Methodology

The approach used for conducting the poll involved face to face, in-home personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered to ensure a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative and comprised adult males and females, who were 18+ years of age. The interviews were conducted across a wide geography to ensure robust data and representation of a wide cross-section of Egyptians. Coverage included urban and rural areas across Upper & Lower Egypt as well as Frontier Governorates. The centres covered were Cairo, Giza, Shubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Mansoura, Tanta, Zagazig, Damanshour, Bani Suwayf, Asyut, Menia, Fayoum, Suhag, Aswan, Luxor, Sharm Al Shaikh, and Arish. Random sampling was done door to door using a multi-stage sampling methodology.

Demographics

Major Cities	37
Upper Egypt	22
Agricultural	36
Tourist	4
Illiterate	29
No formal education	12
Primary/Prep	21
Secondary/Incomplete university	4
Tech/Intermed/High	24
University or more	9
Muslim	91
Christian	9
Male	50
Female	50
Under 30	35
30-49	40
50+	25



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