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During the month of September 2011, we conducted surveys in Afghanistan, the United States, six Arab countries, and Iran in an effort to measure attitudes toward: the impact of the war in Afghanistan; concerns about the future of the country; and how Afghans see the world, their country, and their future.

Despite the obvious difficulties associated with polling in a country at war, several important observations come through quite clearly from these results.

First and foremost is the enormous gap in perceptions that the findings reveal between United States and Afghan attitudes toward the impact of the war on several areas of life. On the one hand, Afghans appear to hold rather strong negative views against the war and its impact on their lives, while U.S. attitudes, though leaning in a positive direction, reveal a striking ambivalence or lack of information about the war and its consequences.

For example, while no Afghans view NATO’s 10-year-long presence as having left their country “better off” than it was before—with 77% saying their country is “worse off” and 23% saying it is “the same”—views from the United States are all over the map. By a two to one margin, Americans feel that NATO has made Afghanistan “better off” (34% to 17%). But that leaves almost one-half of the U.S. respondents saying they believe that Afghanistan is “the same” or that they are “not sure” whether the country is “better off” or “worse off.”

Another observation that can be made at the outset is the partisan divide in U.S. perceptions of the war and its impact, with Republicans being inclined to see the war and its consequences more positively than Democrats.

“Despite “a brave face”...Afghans are worried about their future.”

When the survey takes a closer look examining specific areas of impact of the 10-year-long war, these same patterns of disconnect between Afghans and Americans, and between the two U.S. parties, can be observed. An overwhelming majority of Afghans find no positive gains in “political freedom,” “personal security,” “government services,” or “religious freedom.” Afghan views as to whether there have been improvements in “economic development,” “education,” “health care,” or “women’s rights” are divided, with minorities saying these areas have improved and a combined strong majority saying they have either been negatively impacted or are “the same” as they were before NATO entered. Interestingly, these views are held across all demographic groups in Afghanistan. For example, on the issue of economic development, 87% of Afghans say their country is “worse off,” compared to 40% of Americans who say they think NATO has made Afghanistan “better off.”

Despite “a brave face”...Afghans are worried about their future.
of women’s rights there is only a scant 2% difference between the attitude of men and women on the impact the war has had in this area.

In response to whether or not there have been improvements in all the areas of life under examination, Americans are divided, with Republicans inclined to see a more positive impact than Democrats, and one-half of all Americans in both parties either “not sure” or seeing no improvement at all.

This same disconnect can be seen when we ask “who benefited most from the war?” Three-quarters of Afghanis say the United States was the major beneficiary of the war—a view shared by most Arabs in the six other countries covered in this survey. At the same time, one-third of Americans say “the Afghani people” were the main beneficiaries, while a striking 41% of U.S. respondents say “no one” benefited or they are “not sure.”

The one area where there is, on the surface, somewhat of a convergence of views, is with regard to the expected departure of NATO forces in 2014. But here we note a striking set of conflicted Afghani attitudes. Americans overwhelmingly indicate “happiness” about the withdrawal, while Afghans are split, with 53% saying they are “happy” and 47% saying they are “worried.” The response to this question, however, appears to clash with other Afghani attitudes about their post-NATO future. After expressing a unanimous view that they are “optimistic” about their “post-NATO” future, 97% of Afghanis then tell us that they are concerned about “renewed fighting,” “economic deterioration,” “being dominated by a neighboring country,” and “losing religious freedom.”

The only two areas where a majority of Afghanis say they are unconcerned is with regard to the potential return of the Taliban (8 in 10 unconcerned) and al-Qaeda (7 in 10 unconcerned) following a NATO withdrawal. It is in response to these two questions that an interesting split occurs in Afghani views, with a majority of Shia Afghanis being the only demographic group in the country to say that they are concerned with the return of these two groups.

Conflicted Afghani attitudes can also be found in response to a series of questions measuring attitudes toward the United States. Ninety-seven percent say they have a negative view of the United States, and 84% say that the United States will make “a negative contribution to Afghanistan’s security and economic development.” But 83% then say that they see a role for the United States as “an investor in development” in the future, with a little more than a third seeing the United States having “a security presence” and one-quarter seeing a “special alliance” between the United States and Afghanistan!

The country that Afghanis appear to favor is Pakistan (96% “very favorable”). Strong majorities also have favorable views of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and China, and see them all making a contribution to their country in the future. Iran and India are seen in an unfavorable light, with the
positive views of a majority of Shia toward Iran accounting for the overall 14% of Afghanis who give that country a “very favorable rating.”

Only 16% of Afghanis are “satisfied with the pace and direction of political change” in the country, and only one-quarter see the country moving in the right direction. Almost all Afghanis covered in our survey hold a “very unfavorable” view of President Hamid Karzai, while his opponent in the last election, Abdullah Abdullah, receives a favorable rating from about one-third of the country. The highest favorable ratings go to Yunus Qanuni, followed by Mullah Omar and Jalauddin Haqqani. What was interesting to note here was the fact that these ratings were shared by every demographic group, with only scant differences in some regions.

******

While it is admittedly difficult to poll in wartime, this survey, even in some of the contradictory results it reveals, sheds important light on Afghani attitudes. While attempting to put a brave face on their post-NATO future and being none too shy about expressing their displeasure with the United States, Afghanis are not happy with their present situation and worried about their future. Even in their apparent refusal to criticize the Taliban or its leaders or to give even a single favorable rating to President Karzai, Afghanis reveal something about the current political dynamic at work in the country.

Finally, the partisan split in the United States over the war, though a factor that must be considered, is not as striking as the ambivalence toward, lack of attention to, or lack of information about the war that this survey reveals. Despite being America’s longest war, the fact that most Americans have no solid views about its impact is, at best, troubling.
I. Afghanistan: 10 Years Later

1. Better Off/Worse Off?

Question: In your opinion, are the Afghani people better off/worse off than they were before NATO entered?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After ten years of war, no Afghanis feel that they are better off than they were before NATO forces entered. American attitudes are divided, reflecting a lack of consensus about the war and its impact. Note that while, by a margin of four to one, Republicans feel that the war has left Afghanistan better off, one half of Republicans are “not sure” or think that no change has occurred.
2. What Has Improved, What Has Not

Question: Since NATO forces entered Afghanistan, how do you feel the following areas of life have been impacted?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political freedom</th>
<th>Economic development &amp; employment</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health Care</th>
<th>Personal safety &amp; security of Afghans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Impact</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations with neighboring countries</th>
<th>Administration of government services</th>
<th>Women's rights</th>
<th>Religious freedom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Impact</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In an effort to take a closer look at the impact of the war, a series of questions were posed both to Afghans and to Americans about how life in Afghanistan has been impacted in several areas since NATO forces entered the country. Taken as a whole, the responses to this series of questions demonstrate a few basic trends.

(1) In no area did Afghans find a positive impact. In three of the nine areas (political freedom, personal safety and security of Afghans, and religious freedom), the responses are overwhelmingly negative, without a single positive response. In all of the others, responses are either negative or divided between negative and no impact.

(2) Given the duration of the conflict and resources devoted to its operations, U.S. respondents display a striking ambivalence about the impact of the war. In each area of life covered in this series, between one in five and one in three Americans say they are “not sure” what the impact has been on life in Afghanistan.

(3) The U.S. partisan divide is clearly in evidence with respect to opinions about the impact of the war, with Republicans more likely to believe that the war has had a positive impact or, at the very least, to say that they are “not sure.” Meanwhile, Democrats are more likely to see the war as having had negative consequences.

(4) There is a deep disconnect between the perceptions of Afghans and Americans as to how the war has impacted life in Afghanistan.

*******************************************************************************

Afghans most frequently classify the impact of the war as negative on political freedom (86%), personal safety and security (72%), administration of government services (64%), and religious freedom (61%).

With respect to political freedom, twice as many Americans think that the impact has been positive rather than negative, but a full quarter of those in the United States are unsure about this impact. The partisan split is in evidence here, with Democrats twice as likely as Republicans to think the impact on political freedom has been negative (24% vs. 12%) and Republicans much more likely than Democrats to designate the impact as positive (43% vs. 30%). This same pattern is clear with respect to U.S. opinions about the impact on personal safety and security of Afghans (positive: Democrats 23% vs. Republicans 37%; negative: Democrats 35% vs. Republicans 20%) and on administration of government services (positive: Democrats 21% vs. Republicans 29%; negative: Democrats 32% vs. Republicans 17%). Opinions about religious freedom are less clearly partisan, with three in ten Americans overall thinking that there has been no impact in this area.
Afghans are most likely to see positive impacts on relations with neighboring countries (23%) and on women’s rights (22%), though at least one-quarter of Afghans identify negative impacts in these areas and more than half say there has been no impact.

Interestingly, U.S. respondents are least likely to identify positive impacts on Afghanistan’s relations with its neighbors (17%), with almost one-third of Americans saying they are unsure of what impact the last ten years may have had in this area. The same U.S. partisan split is seen with respect to opinions about the impact on women’s rights (positive: Democrats 29% vs. Republicans 39%; negative: Democrats 20% vs. Republicans 13%).

When considering some key domestic areas, Afghans are three or four times more likely to see the impact as negative than as positive (economic development and employment: 36% vs. 13%; education: 42% vs. 10%; health care: 50% vs. 12%). U.S. opinions with respect to these areas display the same pattern as discussed above, with Democrats and Republicans divided on the impacts, at least one quarter of Americans saying “not sure,” and another quarter stating that there has been no impact.

3. Who Benefited Most?

*Question: Who do you feel benefited most from the war in Afghanistan? (Choose two)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>KSA</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghani people</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warlords</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one/not sure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked who benefited the most from the war in Afghanistan, there are significant areas of commonality and divergence across the Arab and Muslim Worlds and the United States. More than three-quarters of Afghans say the United States is a chief beneficiary of the war. This view is widely shared in most of the Arab countries surveyed, particularly in Tunisia (91%), Jordan (79%), Egypt (75%), and Lebanon (72%). A plurality of Iranians (44%) also express the view that the United States benefited the most from the war, as do one-quarter of respondents in UAE and in the United States itself.
The second most frequently cited beneficiary of the war reported in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon is al-Qaeda, with the Taliban following close behind.

While half of Afghani respondents identify Pakistan as a chief beneficiary of the war, this view is not prevalent in any other country, though one-quarter of respondents in UAE and Iran concur. The benefit to Iran is also considered significant within Afghanistan, with 40% of respondents selecting it; but aside from UAE where one-third of respondents agree that Iran was the beneficiary of the war, this view is also not shared elsewhere in the region.

A significant number of respondents in all countries surveyed point to the benefit to Afghani warlords/political elites, a view held most strongly by Tunisians. More than one-quarter of Afghanis, Egyptians, and Arabs in the UAE also share this opinion, as do more than one-third of Iranians.

While no one surveyed in Afghanistan says the Afghani people have benefited the most from the war, they are the most frequently cited group of beneficiaries by respondents in the United States and UAE. More than one-quarter of Iranians concur with this view. Perhaps the most striking result relates to the apparent ambivalence displayed by a plurality of Americans with regard to the 10-year-old war in Afghanistan. Four in ten U.S. respondents either say that “no one” benefited from the war or that they are unsure who benefited.
II. Opinions about Withdrawal

1. Is Withdrawal a Positive or Negative?

*Question: American forces are scheduled to leave your country at the end of 2014. In your opinion is this withdrawal a positive or negative thing for your country?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From their response to this question, it might appear that Afghans are universally positive about the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. forces from their country at the end of 2014. Ninety-two percent say they are “very positive,” while the remaining 8% are “somewhat positive” about the withdrawal.

2. Optimism/Pessimism about the Short Term

*Question: How optimistic/pessimistic are you about the first two years after NATO forces leave Afghanistan?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>KSA</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Optimistic</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pessimistic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Optimistic” is the aggregation of “very optimistic” and “somewhat optimistic.” “Pessimistic” is the aggregation of “somewhat pessimistic” and “very pessimistic.” Percentages do not add to 100% because numbers were rounded.

*This question was not asked in the United States.*

When asked to consider the first two years after NATO forces leave Afghanistan, once again Afghans appear to be unanimously in their optimism. Meanwhile, respondents across the broader region are divided in their opinions. Most optimistic are Egyptians (61%), Iranians (56%), and respondents in UAE (51%), though each of these countries also have sizable contingents of those who are pessimistic about the future of Afghanistan, as well as those who are unsure. Respondents
in Tunisia and Lebanon are the most divided with about two-fifths expressing optimism, and between one-quarter and one-third expressing pessimism about the first two years after the NATO withdrawal. These two countries also have the highest percentages of respondents who were unsure (Lebanon: 38%; Tunisia: 25%). Jordan and Saudi Arabia are the most pessimistic (Jordan: 72%; Saudi Arabia: 43%), with fewer than one-third of respondents expressing optimism about the immediate aftermath of the NATO withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan.

3. Optimism/Pessimism about the Long Term

Question: How optimistic/pessimistic are you about the longer-term prospects for stability and progress in your country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very optimistic</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat optimistic</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat pessimistic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very pessimistic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Afghans' overwhelming optimism about the immediate aftermath of the NATO withdrawal is undiminished when asked about the longer term prospects for stability and progress in Afghanistan. Again, 100% of respondents in Afghanistan are optimistic about their country in the long term.

4. What Emotion Do You Feel about Withdrawal?

Question: When you think of this withdrawal, which emotion do you feel most?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness they will go</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry about the future</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the fact that Afghans appear to insist that the U.S. withdrawal is positive for their country and profess that they are optimistic about the future, they also appear to be quite conflicted about the withdrawal. Here they express views that appear to contradict their earlier assertions. Just over one-half (53%) say that they are happy that the U.S. forces are leaving, while just under half (47%) are worried about the future.
5. Concerns Once the NATO Forces Leave

Question: How great is your concern with each of the following once the NATO forces leave Afghanistan? (concerned/not concerned)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>KSA</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>19/79</td>
<td>27/51</td>
<td>77/4</td>
<td>60/18</td>
<td>40/39</td>
<td>20/45</td>
<td>49/24</td>
<td>49/24</td>
<td>41/41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
<td>30/68</td>
<td>21/53</td>
<td>78/4</td>
<td>59/21</td>
<td>42/35</td>
<td>11/36</td>
<td>48/22</td>
<td>48/22</td>
<td>42/38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed fighting</td>
<td>97/-</td>
<td>26/51</td>
<td>81/4</td>
<td>63/18</td>
<td>41/32</td>
<td>8/44</td>
<td>48/22</td>
<td>48/22</td>
<td>47/39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic deterioration</td>
<td>97/-</td>
<td>25/46</td>
<td>64/9</td>
<td>52/30</td>
<td>38/37</td>
<td>19/48</td>
<td>33/32</td>
<td>33/32</td>
<td>43/43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominated by neighboring country</td>
<td>98/-</td>
<td>20/53</td>
<td>60/10</td>
<td>50/29</td>
<td>22/53</td>
<td>10/57</td>
<td>24/43</td>
<td>24/43</td>
<td>46/43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lose religious freedom</td>
<td>97/-</td>
<td>30/43</td>
<td>40/15</td>
<td>44/30</td>
<td>29/48</td>
<td>7/57</td>
<td>36/31</td>
<td>36/31</td>
<td>47/39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: On a scale of 1-5 in which 1 is “very concerned” and 5 is “not concerned” the first number represents those who responded 1 and 2 and the second number represents those who responded 4 or 5.

Respondents in Afghanistan and across the region were asked about their degree of concern with possible outcomes related to the NATO forces departure from Afghanistan. Because respondents were asked to rate their concerns from 1–5, with 1 being “very concerned” and 5 being “not concerned,” this type of question measures intensity of concern or non-concern. The table displays the 1 and 2 ratings as indicating concern and the 4 and 5 ratings as indicating lack of concern. Overall, the results, which include sizable proportions of 3 ratings (meaning neither particularly concerned nor unconcerned), point to a lack of intensity of concern regarding Afghanistan.

Despite claiming optimism about the future, Afghans say that they are very worried about “renewed fighting,” “economic deterioration,” being “dominated by a neighbor,” and “losing religious freedom” following a withdrawal of NATO forces. The only two areas where they claim not to have concern is with the return of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This, however, may be a reflection on the internal political/fear situation within Afghanistan today.

Jordanians demonstrate the greatest concern in every area, except with regard to the potential loss of religious freedom in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabian responses follow a similar pattern to those expressed by Jordanians, with a lesser degree of intensity of concern. Respondents in Egypt and
Tunisia demonstrate the lowest levels of concern, perhaps due to the fact that they are more preoccupied with matters close to home. Respondents in Iran do display some intensity of opinion, but no consensus. Iranians appear to be concerned and unconcerned in equal numbers about the issues facing Afghanistan after NATO’s withdrawal, with no particular areas standing out as being of special concern. Lebanon and UAE have similarly divided responses. The issue that appears to generate the least concern across the region is whether or not Afghanistan might be “dominated by a neighboring country,” with less than a quarter of the respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, and UAE expressing any concern over this outcome.

The only areas where Americans show any concern is with the possibility that the Taliban or al-Qaeda may resurge or that fighting may break out once NATO leaves. Overall, American attitudes are quite similar to those of the Lebanese and Arabs in the UAE, with respondents demonstrating somewhat more concern than “no concern,” but no strong intensity of feeling in any area. This absence of intensity, while understandable in other countries in the region, is quite strange coming from the United States, which has been so deeply engaged in the war in Afghanistan for over a decade.

**5a. Concerns Once the NATO Forces Leave**

*Question: How great is your concern with each of the following once the NATO forces leave Afghanistan? (concerned/not concerned)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Concerned</th>
<th>Not Concerned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Very concerned</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Not concerned</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only one in five Afghanis are concerned about the return of the Taliban, while almost eight in ten are unconcerned. The deep divide between Sunni and Shia on this question is, however, striking; only 11% of Sunnis are concerned about the Taliban, while 56% of Shia express concern.
5b. Concerns Once the NATO Forces Leave

Question: How great is your concern with each of the following once the NATO forces leave Afghanistan? (concerned/not concerned)

Al-Qaeda will regain a foothold in the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Very concerned</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Not concerned</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked about concern with al-Qaeda regaining a foothold in Afghanistan, once again it appears that only Afghanis who are Shia are concerned with this potential outcome.

While, overall, three in ten Afghanis say that they are concerned about the potential for al-Qaeda to regain a foothold in their country, among Shia this concern is three times greater than it is among the Sunni (63% vs. 21%).
III. Looking at the United States & the World

1. Attitudes towards Other Countries

Question: Indicate your attitude—favorable/unfavorable—toward each of the following countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very favorable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat favorable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat unfavorable</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unfavorable</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very favorable</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat favorable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat unfavorable</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unfavorable</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Afghans were asked about their attitudes toward a number of different nations. There is a unanimity of opinion with regard to two countries: They view the United States unfavorably and Pakistan favorably. In both cases, the level of intensity is high, with almost all respondents choosing the “very unfavorable” toward the United States and “very favorable” for Pakistan.

Among the other countries rated, UAE is viewed most favorably, with 78% of Afghans saying they hold a “very favorable” or “somewhat favorable” view of the Emirates. In addition, there are no intense unfavorable views of UAE, with only 22% holding a “somewhat unfavorable” attitude toward the country.

Afghans’ attitudes toward China are generally positive, with more than six in ten respondents viewing the country favorably. India, on the other hand, is seen unfavorably by eight in ten Afghans, with no respondents rating their attitude toward India as “very favorable.” Finally, Afghani respondents’ view of Iran is even more unfavorable with 86% rating their attitude either “very unfavorable” (57%) or “somewhat unfavorable” (29%). There is a small contingent of Afghans who view Iran very favorably (14%); this group is predominantly Shia, 53% of whom view Iran very favorably.
2. Post-NATO: What Contribution Will Other Countries Make?

Question: When NATO leaves your country, do you feel that each of these neighboring or interested countries will make a positive or negative contribution to your country’s security and economic development?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>UAE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Impact</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Impact</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked about which countries would likely make a positive or negative contribution to Afghanistan’s security and economic development, Afghani respondents appear to believe that Pakistan will make the most positive contribution (98%) and the United States will make the most negative contribution (84%).

A number of other countries are seen as likely to make a positive contribution by sizable percentages of Afghans, including Saudi Arabia (67%), Tajikistan (51%), Uzbekistan (47%), and Turkmenistan (46%)—with no Afghans appearing to believe that any of these countries will have a negative impact. Majorities of Afghans also feel that UAE and China will make a positive contribution to their country’s security and economic development (66%; 50%), though smaller groups say that they feel that UAE and China will make a negative contribution (14%; 30%).

Iran and India are both seen as more likely to make a negative contribution than a positive contribution to Afghanistan’s security and economic development. Respondents are more than twice as likely to feel that India will make a negative contribution as a positive contribution (46% vs. 22%). They are four times as likely to think that Iran’s contribution will be negative rather than positive (60% vs. 15%); again, those who feel that Iran’s contribution will be positive are predominantly Shia, with 55% holding this view.
3. Future Role for the United States

Question: Which of the following roles do you see the United States playing in your country's future?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An investor in development</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A security presence</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A special alliance</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A source of foreign interference</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A normal relationship like any other country</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No role at all</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents could select as many answers as they wished.

Despite claiming to hold strong unfavorable views of the United States and expressing the belief that the United States will make a negative contribution to the future of their country, 83% of Afghans see the United States playing a role as an investor in development, a potentially positive role. However, more than seven in ten Afghani respondents think the United States will be a source of foreign interference. Smaller proportions of respondents think the United States will play roles as a security presence (39%) and a special alliance (26%).
1. Satisfaction with Pace and Direction of Political Change

*Question: How satisfied are you with the pace and direction of political change in your country?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Afghans appear to be generally satisfied with the pace and direction of political change in their country; almost two-thirds of respondents express some degree of satisfaction. However, the intensity of feeling on this issue is noticeably lacking, as respondents are three times more likely to be “somewhat satisfied” than “very satisfied.” Even among those Afghans who are dissatisfied none express that they are “very dissatisfied,” opting for “somewhat dissatisfied” instead.

2. Is Afghanistan on Right or Wrong Track?

*Question: Do you think your country is on the right or wrong track?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three-quarters of Afghans think their country is on the wrong track, while only one-quarter feel it is on the right track.
3. Democracy in Afghanistan

*Question:* Which of the following statements about democracy in your country best represents your own opinion?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Afghanistan Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would like my country to be a democracy and I think it will work well here.</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would like my country to be a democracy, but I don’t believe that democracy will work here.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not want my country to be a democracy because it won’t work.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than eight in ten Afghans want their country to be a democracy, and a strong majority (64%) believes that democracy will work in Afghanistan. Thirty-seven percent of respondents do not believe that democracy will work in Afghanistan, and about half of that number does not want their country to be a democracy.

4. Most Important Issues

*Question:* How important are the following issues facing your country today?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In order of importance among Afghans</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Expanding employment opportunities (84)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Improving the education system (77)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Protecting personal and civil rights (73)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (64)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Ending corruption and nepotism (61)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Lack of political debate on important issues (58)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Combating extremism and terrorism (56)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Advancing democracy (50)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Improving the health care system (50)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Political or governmental reform (48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Increasing rights for women (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each issue on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "most important" and 5 is "least important." Rankings are determined based on a composite score considering all five choices. Number in parentheses is the percentage of respondents who rate the issue "1."
When asked about the importance of a series of issues facing Afghanistan today, respondents feel that almost all of them are quite important. At the top of the heap, more than eight in ten Afghans believe that expanding employment opportunities is among the most important issues facing their country today. Other issues rated as “most important” by large majorities of respondents include improving the education system (77%), protecting personal and civil rights (73%), resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (64%), and ending nepotism and corruption (61%). The next tier of issues considered important are lack of political debate on important issues (58%), combating extremism and terrorism (56%), advancing democracy (50%), improving the health care system (50%), and political and governmental reform (48%). The issue deemed least important by respondents is increasing rights for women; only 7% of Afghani respondents rate this as “most important” and almost two-thirds give it a rather weak 3 (out of 5) in importance—with very little difference between the way men and women answer this question.

5. Rating Leaders

*Question: Indicate your attitude towards these leaders.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan Total</th>
<th>Hamid Karzai</th>
<th>Abdullah Abdullah</th>
<th>The Taliban</th>
<th>Ashraf Ghani</th>
<th>Yamas Qanuni</th>
<th>Jalaluddin Haqqani</th>
<th>Mohammed Qasim Fahim</th>
<th>Mullah Omar</th>
<th>George W. Bush</th>
<th>Barack Obama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very favorable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat favorable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat unfavorable</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unfavorable</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Afghani respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes toward leaders in their own country and in the United States. Several leaders are unanimously considered unfavorably, including Afghan president Hamid Karzai, Afghan vice-president Mohammed Qasim Fahim, former U.S. president George W. Bush, and current U.S. president Barack Obama.

Respondents display real intensity in their rejection of the U.S. presidents, with 97% saying their attitudes toward both are “very unfavorable.”
Other Afghani politicians fare only marginally better. Opposition leader Abdullah Abdullah is considered somewhat favorably by only about one-third of respondents, while former presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani only receives “somewhat favorable” ratings from 27% of respondents.

Those Afghani leaders whom respondents view favorably with unanimity include Tajik politician Yunus Qanuni, Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and insurgent leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. The “very favorable” ratings, demonstrating the intensity of these attitudes, are 87% for Qanuni, 76% for Omar, and 67% for Haqqani.

Attitudes toward the Taliban are quite favorable as well, with three-quarters of respondents saying they view the group very favorably. There is a sectarian divide in evidence, with Sunni respondents being far more likely to rate the Taliban favorably (89% favorable vs. 11% unfavorable), while a majority of Shia respondents look unfavorably on the Taliban (44% favorable vs. 56% unfavorable).

It is worth noting that when so many of the opinions provided are definitive and unanimous, it raises questions about how comfortable respondents may have been being honest in their assessments of their leaders. This, of course, is one of the consequences of polling in a region embroiled in long-standing conflict.
APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Zogby Research Services commissioned JZ Analytics to conduct surveys in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and additional online surveys in the United States, Tunisia, and Egypt. Various methodologies were utilized using trusted partners in the countries surveyed. The following methodologies were developed to most effectively contact the samples requested.

In Iraq, interviews were conducted from September 13-21, 2011, in Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Babil, Najaf, Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, Sulamaniya, and Arbil with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households from the six Iraqi governorates. The margin of error is +/-3.2 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on the 2007 projection of the 1997 general census, the most recent and comprehensive official census study conducted in the country.

In Lebanon, face-to-face interviews were conducted from September 12-29, 2011, in Beirut, Aley, Metn, Baabda, Tripoli, Tyre, Saida, and Chouf with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on a systematic random sample adopting a population proportionate weight based on the approximate estimated make-up/weight of the areas covered in each selected neighborhood.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Multi-stage stratified probability sampling was used to ensure a random, representative sample. However, broad demographic quotas were maintained at an aggregate (country) level to ensure that the sample was in line with the sample in earlier years. Interviews were conducted in Egypt from September 12-29, 2011, in Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Menia, Mansoura, and Asyut. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Tunisia, from September 12-29, 2011, in Tunis, Safaqis, Sousse, Bizerte, and Gafsa. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Jordan from September 12-29, 2011, in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, and Madaba. The margin of error is +/-4.4 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Iran from September 12-29, 2011, in Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, and Ahwaz. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Afghanistan from September 12-29, 2011, in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Baghlan, and Heart. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points.

In Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where door-to-door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. Adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was broadly representative and not skewed. Broad country level demographic quotas were followed to ensure the final sample has characteristics of the population. Interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia from September 12-29, 2011, in Riyadh, Buraydah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Dammam, and Khobar. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in UAE from September 12-29, 2011, in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and the North Emirates. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points.

In addition, JZ Analytics conducted online surveys of 1,054 adults in the United States on September 13-15, 2010, 602 adults in Egypt on September 15-19, 2010, and 531 adults in Tunisia, September 15-October 5, 2010. Using trusted interactive partner resources, thousands of adults were invited to participate in this survey. Each invitation is password coded and secure so that each respondent can only access the survey one time.

Based on information from census data, CIA fact books, and exit polls, complex weighting techniques are utilized to best represent the demographics of the population being surveyed. Weighted variables may include age, race, gender, region, party, education, and religion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>KSA</th>
<th>UAE*</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Egypt Online</th>
<th>Tunisia Online</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freq</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>freq</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>freq</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>freq</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>freq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1028</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 36</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36+</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in city</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live outside city</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than university</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University+</td>
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| * Includes approximately 350 Emiratis and 150 Arabs working in UAE. Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

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Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.
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Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.