

# MIDDLE EAST 2016

**CURRENT CONDITIONS  
& THE ROAD AHEAD**



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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between September 17 and October 10, 2016, Zogby Research Services (ZRS) conducted face-to-face personal interviews in eight countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran). A total of 7,173 adults were surveyed on their attitudes toward important countries that are playing critical roles in the Middle East, and the obstacles to peace and stability, the sources of conflict, and causes of extremism in the region. We also surveyed Iranian's satisfaction with their government's performance on a range of domestic and foreign policies. Because, in the past few years, ZRS has conducted similar polls in these same countries, we were able to measure changes in attitudes, where they occurred.

## I. Attitudes Toward Other Countries

- 1) **Saudi Arabia has the highest favorable ratings across the region**—everywhere but Iran. Saudi Arabia is also seen in all the Arab countries as making a positive contribution to “peace and stability.” And majorities in every country covered in the poll view good relations with Saudi Arabia as important—including Iran.
- 2) **Attitudes toward Iran continue to plummet in every country—including, for the first time, in Lebanon and Iraq**, where majorities now give Iran a net negative score. In no country does a majority of respondents see Iran playing a positive role in the region or view it as important to have good relations with that country.
- 3) **Once held in high esteem in every Arab country, Turkey has suffered declines in favorable attitudes in all countries covered in our survey**, with only Jordan and Lebanon now giving Turkey a net favorable rating and only Jordan and Saudi Arabia seeing Turkey as making a contribution to peace and stability in the Arab World.

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*Saudi Arabia has highest favorables across the region. Ratings for Turkey and Iran decline.*

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- 4) Despite being viewed by majorities everywhere as “not contributing to peace and stability,” favorable attitudes toward the United States have risen in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. At the same time, they have declined in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Iraqis continue to hold extremely negative views of the United States and its role in the region. Nevertheless, **the percentage of respondents who say that relations with the United States are important far exceeds the US's favorable ratings**—including between two-thirds and three-quarters of Lebanese, Emiratis, and Jordanians.
- 5) **Russia only scores a positive rating in Iran**. Across the Arab World and Turkey, strong majorities see Russia's role as negative.
- 6) Across the eight countries covered in the survey, only a handful of respondents have “somewhat favorable” views of Israel. None see Israel contributing to “peace and stability” and virtually none see any importance in having relations with Israel.

## II. Obstacles to Stability and Sources of Conflict

- 7) When asked to identify the greatest obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East **pluralities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey identify the “continuing occupation of Palestinian lands.”** Surprisingly, **in the other countries covered in the survey, that issue receives only scant mention.**

- 8) It is important to note that **the obstacles that rank highest in most countries and second in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are internal problems**—the “lack of representative government in some Arab countries” and “tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries.” These are followed by “the threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda” and “economic inequality and the lack of employment opportunities in some Arab countries.”
- 9) Although mentioned by about one in five respondents, Iranian and/or American interference in the Arab World still rank near the bottom of the list of obstacles. Interestingly, **negative assessments of the US and Iran’s roles are only ranked in the top tier in Iraq.**
- 10) **Despite frequently heard complaints about the lack of US leadership in the region, that issue places last in the list of obstacles cited by respondents.**
- 11) When turning to the way respondents assess the main factors behind instability and conflict in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, once again it appears that internal factors are viewed as holding the greatest importance.

**In Syria, the lack of representative government is seen as the main source of conflict** followed by Daesh/al Qaeda. In Libya, it’s tribal or regional rivalries followed by Daesh/al Qaeda. In Yemen, the main factors are seen to be tribal, regional, or sectarian rivalries, followed closely by the lack of representative government. And in Iraq, it’s Daesh followed by internal regional, sect, and ethnic rivalries.

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*Main internal obstacle to peace  
and stability: Lack of representative  
government in some countries,  
followed by Daesh and al Qaeda and  
domestic rivalries*

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- 12) **The US role is seen as a major contributing factor to instability mainly in Iraq. In no country is the lack of US leadership viewed as an issue creating instability.** Where “other countries” are seen to be a source of conflict, in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, respondents point mainly to the United States and Iran as the problems. In all countries, Russia is identified as a negative factor in Syria. And Saudi Arabia is also mentioned as a source of conflict in Yemen by Turks, Iraqis, Jordanians, Egyptians, and Iranians.

### **III. Causes of Extremism and How to Deal With the Threat**

- 13) **When looked at separately, the Arab countries and Turkey give very different responses than Iran does when asked to identify the main reasons why Muslims would join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria.** The former overwhelmingly see “outrage at the Assad regime” as the principal factor. This is followed by “anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogates” and the concern that “these [extremist] groups are attractive because of their fighting skills and the victories they have won.” Iranians, on the other hand, identify the concern that young Muslims are “being inspired by extremist preachers or websites” or are “frustrated with the life they are living in their own country and the desire for adventure.”
- 14) How best to stop the flow of young recruits who seek to join extremist groups in Syria? **Far and away the top two steps endorsed by Arab and Turkish respondents to dry up support for Daesh are to defeat them militarily and to “negotiate a solution leading to a national unity government without Bashar al Assad.”** The least favored option is a negotiated solution that would include Assad. Iranians agree with defeating Daesh, but also favor a solution that includes Assad in the government.

- 15) **In the case of Iraq, Arab and Turkish respondents identify the reasons why Daesh could win recruits as anger at “the sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad,” “the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogates,” and “the failure of other governments to be more ... effective in changing the policies of the government in Baghdad.”** Once again, Iranians see the role of extremist preachers and websites as a principal factor motivating young Muslims to fight with Daesh. The only area in which Iranians find agreement with the respondents from the Arab countries and Turkey is with respect to the negative role played by the sectarian policies pursued by the government in Baghdad.
- 16) For their part, Iraqi respondents display some slight differences along sectarian lines—but these are mainly matters of emphasis. Iraqis who are Shi’a list the “failure of other governments [to press for changes in] the policies of the government in Baghdad” and “outrage at the sectarian policies of the government” as the top two factors contributing to Daesh recruitment efforts, while Sunni Iraqis list “outrage at the sectarian policies of the government” and “anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogate militias.” Interestingly, there are only slight differences in the responses provided by Arab and Kurdish respondents.

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*Outrage at current regimes in Syria and Iraq and sectarian policies are seen as fueling recruitment by Daesh and other extremist groups.*

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- 17) Turning to the steps that should be taken to stop recruits from joining Daesh in Iraq, **Arabs and Turks favor “reforming the government in Iraq, making it representative of all the groups in the country”** as their first choice. This option is followed by militarily defeating Daesh and confronting Iran and its surrogates. Iranians agree with defeating Daesh and reforming the government in Baghdad but do not want to have their role in Iraq confronted. Instead they favor “more diplomacy to bring all parties together to defeat Daesh” as the way forward.

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*To stop the flow of new recruits by Daesh in Iraq and Syria, a military defeat of the group and establishment of reformed and more representative governments are endorsed.*

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- 18) For their part, Iraqis overwhelmingly choose reforming their government and defeating Daesh—with Sunni and Shi’a respondents largely agreeing. The only major difference between the two sects is over the need to confront Iran and its surrogates, with Sunnis seeing this step as significantly more important than their Shi’a compatriots.
- 19) **In assessing how best to stop extremist recruiting, there is near consensus in all the countries surveyed that the two most important steps to be taken are “changing the political and social circumstances ...**

that lead some young people to become attracted to extremist ideas” and then “countering the messages and ideas promoted by extremist groups.”

- 20) Iraq is the only country covered in the survey where a plurality of respondents are very concerned that they or their families “may be at risk from the threat of attacks from violent extremist groups.”
- 21) **When asked to assess the confidence they have in the work being done by various entities in combating extremist groups, respondents in every country covered in the survey give local police and intelligence agencies the highest grades.** Religious leaders receive high confidence scores in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and UAE, while only Emiratis demonstrate a high degree of confidence in the work being done by their country’s political leadership.

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*In every country, local police and intelligence agencies receive the highest grades for their work combating extremist groups.*

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#### IV. Iran

- 22) It appears that **Iranians remain restless and dissatisfied with the direction taken by their government.** When asked whether they believe they are better off or worse off than they were three years ago, only one-third of Iranians feel they are better off today.
- 23) In 2015, 81% of Iranians rated “investing in the economy and creating employment” as the most important priority for their government, followed by 75% who said the top priority should be “advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights.” While 51% are at least somewhat satisfied with the government’s economic performance, they are much less pleased with its performance in the second area. Only 30% are satisfied that democracy has been advanced. And while 59% hoped for improved relations with the United States, only 15% are satisfied with their government’s efforts in this area.
- 24) **Part of their dissatisfaction can be attributed to a weariness with their government’s involvement in regional conflicts.** In 2015, “giving support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen” was rated the lowest priority receiving the support of only 48% of Iranians. Support for these foreign involvements has steadily declined since 2014, dropping precipitously in each area: Syria from 90% to 24%; Lebanon from 88% to 43%; Iraq from 87% to 47%; and Yemen from 62% to 39%.

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*Part of Iranian dissatisfaction can be attributed to their government’s failure to advance democracy at home while continuing involvement in regional conflicts.*

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# RESULTS

## I. Attitudes Toward Other Countries

For each of the following countries, please tell us if your attitude is favorable or unfavorable.


		EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
United States	Favorable	38	52	35	28	28	6	21	12
	Unfavorable	62	46	65	72	69	94	79	87
Turkey	Favorable	33	56	79	35	41	30	—	35
	Unfavorable	67	44	21	65	59	70	—	64
Saudi Arabia	Favorable	<b>84</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>85</b>	—	<b>76</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>83</b>	36
	Unfavorable	16	41	15	—	23	31	17	62
Iran	Favorable	6	49	18	9	29	39	9	—
	Unfavorable	94	<b>51</b>	82	90	71	<b>61</b>	90	—
Russia	Favorable	49	33	35	24	40	28	10	57
	Unfavorable	51	67	65	76	59	71	87	43
Israel	Favorable	0	0	0	<1	0	0	0	2
	Unfavorable	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	97

Favorable is the aggregation of responses of “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable.” Unfavorable is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat unfavorable” and “very unfavorable.” Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of “not sure” are not included.

		EGYPT		LEBANON		JORDAN		KSA		UAE		IRAQ		TURKEY		IRAN	
		Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable
United States	2012	10	87	21	79	24	73	62	33	28	69	13	79	33	66	8	88
	2015	16	84	32	68	20	80	51	49			1	99				
	2016	38	62	52	46	35	65	28	72	28	69	6	94	21	79	12	87
Turkey	2012	89	9	49	50	68	27	71	24	58	38	41	55			69	28
	2015	50	50	83	17	90	10	74	26			80	20				
	2016	33	67	56	44	79	21	35	65	41	59	30	70			35	64
Saudi Arabia	2012	94	6	34	65	81	15			84	16	54	43	69	30	26	70
	2015	79	21	74	26	89	11			49	51						
	2016	84	16	57	41	85	15			76	23	68	31	83	17	36	62
Iran	2006	89	9			75	15	85	14	68	31						
	2008	69	14	71	28	44	55	72	25	56	41						
	2009	41	44	62	31	31	68	35	58	13	87						
	2011	37	63	63	37	23	77	6	80	22	70						
	2012	34	64	84	16	23	74	15	84	27	69	61	36	22	77		
	2015	32	68	72	28	28	72	23	77								
	2016	6	94	49	51	18	82	9	90	29	71	39	61	9	90		
Russia	2012	17	80	39	60	34	62	11	84	50	46	33	61	23	75	74	22
	2013	24	72	53	46	25	73	11	80	37	62						
	2016	49	51	33	67	35	65	24	76	40	59	28	71	10	87	57	43

Favorable is the aggregation of responses of “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable.” Unfavorable is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat unfavorable” and “very unfavorable.” Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of “not sure” are not included.

## Favorability Ratings: Turkey (2012–2016), Saudi Arabia (2012–2016), Iran (2008–2016)



**Saudi Arabia is the only country to receive consistently high ratings from all the Arab countries surveyed as well as from Turkey.** More than eight in 10 respondents in Jordan (85%), Egypt (84%), and Turkey (83%) hold a favorable view of the Kingdom, as well as three-quarters of those in the UAE, two-thirds in Iraq, and a majority in Lebanon. In Iran, 36% have a favorable opinion of Saudi Arabia. These views are somewhat in line with previous years' polling, with favorables up in the UAE, Iraq, and Turkey, and a decline evident in Lebanon.

Majorities in Jordan (79%) and Lebanon (56%) have favorable views of **Turkey**, while only about one-third of respondents in the other surveyed countries concur (UAE: 41%, Iran: 35%, Saudi Arabia: 35%, Egypt: 33%, Iraq: 30%). **This year's numbers represent a significant decline in Turkey's favorables across the board**, with the biggest declines seen in Saudi Arabia (from 74% to 35%), Iraq (from 80% to 30%), and Lebanon (from 83% to 56%).

A slim majority in Lebanon view the **United States** favorably (52%), while between one-quarter and one-third of respondents in Egypt (38%), Jordan (35%), Saudi Arabia (28%), and the UAE (28%) agree. Two in 10 respondents in Turkey hold a favorable view of the United States, while positive opinions are even scarcer in Iran (12%) and Iraq (6%). These favorable ratings in Iraq, Iran, and the UAE are consistent with past years' polling, but we find significant increases in favorability toward the United States in Egypt (from 16% to 38%), Lebanon (from 32% to 52%), and Jordan (from 20% to 35%) and steep declines in Saudi Arabia (from 51% to 28%) and Turkey (from 33% to 21%).

**Russia is viewed favorably by a majority only in Iran (57%),** though almost one-half of Egyptians (49%) and four in 10 respondents in the UAE (40%) also hold favorable views of Russia. One-quarter to one-third of respondents in Jordan (35%), Lebanon (33%), Iraq (28%), and Saudi Arabia (24%) also have positive opinions of Russia, while just 10% of those in Turkey are favorable. Views in Iraq, the UAE, and Jordan are fairly stable, while we find increases in favorability in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and declines in Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon.

About one-half of respondents in Lebanon view **Iran** favorably (49%), as do 39% of those in Iraq and 29% in the UAE. Favorability is very low in Jordan (18%), Turkey (9%), Saudi Arabia (9%), and Egypt (6%). **Only in the UAE has Iran's favorability remained stable; in all other countries we see significant declines from past polling.**

Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?									
		EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
The United States contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	6	11	6	3	6	1	4	2
	Somewhat agree	26	35	17	16	16	5	26	4
	Total agree	32	46	23	19	22	6	30	6
	Somewhat disagree	45	25	39	33	35	48	37	35
	Strongly disagree	23	29	38	48	42	46	33	56
	Total disagree	68	54	77	81	77	94	70	91
Turkey contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	17	19	30	20	20	12	50	8
	Somewhat agree	19	26	43	31	20	19	30	18
	Total agree	36	45	73	51	40	31	80	26
	Somewhat disagree	42	28	13	27	27	38	12	38
	Strongly disagree	22	26	14	20	33	31	5	30
	Total disagree	64	54	27	47	60	69	17	68
Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	37	51	39	51	71	28	11	12
	Somewhat agree	49	9	42	47	10	39	28	21
	Total agree	86	60	81	98	81	67	39	33
	Somewhat disagree	12	24	10	1	6	23	18	19
	Strongly disagree	2	16	10	2	13	10	43	41
	Total disagree	14	40	20	3	19	33	61	60
Iran contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	1	18	5	1	10	10	4	60
	Somewhat agree	4	22	11	7	14	13	6	18
	Total agree	5	40	16	8	24	23	10	78
	Somewhat disagree	55	15	28	36	25	43	36	15
	Strongly disagree	40	45	56	56	51	34	53	5
	Total disagree	95	60	84	92	76	77	89	20
Russia contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	11	8	2	3	2	13	1	22
	Somewhat agree	27	24	17	8	14	15	8	27
	Total agree	38	32	19	11	16	28	9	49
	Somewhat disagree	43	31	47	35	47	45	41	21
	Strongly disagree	19	36	34	53	37	26	49	28
	Total disagree	62	67	81	88	84	71	90	49
Israel contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Somewhat agree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total agree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Somewhat disagree	4	3	15	38	11	32	17	8
	Strongly disagree	96	97	85	61	89	68	83	90
	Total disagree	100	100	100	99	100	100	100	98

*Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included.*

**When asked if the same countries discussed above contribute to peace and stability in the region, responses closely track favorability ratings.** Again, we find Saudi Arabia receiving the most positive responses, with more than eight in 10 respondents in Egypt (86%), the UAE (81%), and Jordan (81%) as well as 67% in Iraq and 60% in Lebanon saying Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and stability in the region. Only in Turkey do we find a significant difference between the percentage who view the Kingdom favorably (83%) and who agree that it contributes to regional peace and stability (39%). Iranian respondents are least likely to say that Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World (33%).

**Aside from Saudi Arabia, only with respect to Turkey do majorities of respondents in any surveyed countries find positive contributions to peace and stability in the Arab World.** Seventy-three percent (73%) of those in Jordan and 51% of those in Saudi Arabia agree that Turkey contributes to regional peace, as do 45% in Lebanon, 40% in the UAE, and 36% in Egypt.

Russia is seen as a contributor to peace and stability in the Middle East by almost half of respondents in Iran (49%), as well as 38% of Egyptians; fewer than one-third of respondents in all other countries view Russia as helpful in this regard. Similarly, only in Lebanon does a significant percentage of respondents agree that the United States (46%) and Iran (40%) contribute to regional peace and stability, while fewer than one-third in all other surveyed countries agree.

Again, respondents in all countries surveyed are unanimous that Israel does not contribute to peace and stability in the region.

How important is it for your country to have good relations with each of the following countries?									
		EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
United States	Very important	8	35	16	19	34	8	13	11
	Somewhat important	37	39	51	27	41	8	33	22
	Total important	45	<b>74</b>	<b>67</b>	46	<b>75</b>	16	46	33
	Not very important	40	16	28	32	19	43	28	41
	Not important at all	13	10	4	19	6	41	26	25
	Total not important	53	26	32	51	25	84	54	66
Turkey	Very important	14	28	37	24	27	18		22
	Somewhat important	25	26	45	30	18	15		30
	Total important	39	54	82	54	45	33		52
	Not very important	36	29	11	24	25	37		32
	Not important at all	25	16	8	18	30	31		16
	Total not important	61	45	19	42	55	68		48
Saudi Arabia	Very important	36	55	70		70	31	30	18
	Somewhat important	50	4	11		8	37	47	34
	Total important	<b>86</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>81</b>		<b>78</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>52</b>
	Not very important	12	23	9		7	19	14	23
	Not important at all	2	18	11		14	12	7	22
	Total not important	14	41	20		21	31	21	45
Iran	Very important	2	23	5	4	17	10	8	
	Somewhat important	8	23	15	8	13	20	12	
	Total important	10	46	20	12	30	30	20	
	Not very important	53	26	33	45	18	34	45	
	Not important at all	37	29	47	40	52	36	35	
	Total not important	90	55	80	85	70	70	80	
Russia	Very important	22	14	9	15	8	33	6	27
	Somewhat important	47	42	20	28	33	14	18	38
	Total important	69	56	29	43	41	47	24	65
	Not very important	24	23	36	28	33	30	40	21
	Not important at all	7	21	35	27	26	22	36	13
	Total not important	31	44	71	55	59	52	76	34
Israel	Very important	<1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Somewhat important	2	1	0	0	1	0	1	5
	Total important	2	2	0	0	2	0	1	5
	Not very important	11	5	9	36	9	35	12	10
	Not important at all	87	94	91	64	90	64	87	81
	Total not important	98	99	100	100	99	99	99	91
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included.									

Across the board, majorities of respondents say that it is important to have good relations with Saudi Arabia, including 86% in Egypt, 81% in Jordan, 78% in the UAE, 77% in Turkey, 68% in Iraq, and 59% in Lebanon. Even in Iran a majority notes the importance of a good relationship with Saudi Arabia (52%), a significant jump from

the favorability rating given to Saudi Arabia by Iranians (36%) and the percentage of Iranians who think Saudi Arabia contributes to regional peace and stability (33%).

**With respect to both Russia and the United States, many more respondents note the importance of having good relations with these countries than hold favorable opinions of them or think they contribute positively to peace and stability in the region.** More than two-thirds of those in the UAE (75%), Lebanon (74%), and Jordan (67%), as well as almost half of those in Saudi Arabia (46%), Turkey (46%), and Egypt (45%), consider good relations with the United States important; in some cases these percentages are 20–40 points higher than favorability ratings. Only in Iran and Iraq do one-third or less of respondents think having a positive US relationship is important.

About two-thirds of Egyptians (69%) and Iranians (65%) consider good relations with Russia important, as do a majority of Lebanese (56%) and at least four in 10 respondents in Iraq (47%), Saudi Arabia (43%), and the UAE (41%). Again, in many of these countries, these numbers are significantly higher than the favorability ratings given to Russia.

The importance of having good relations with Turkey is noted by 82% of Jordanians, as well as majorities in Lebanon (54%), Saudi Arabia (54%), and Iran (52%). For Saudi Arabia and Iran, these percentages are 17-19 points higher than the favorability ratings respondents give to Turkey.

Only among the Lebanese do more than one-third of respondents consider having good relations with Iran important (46%).

Across the board, very few respondents in the surveyed countries feel that having a good relationship with Israel is important.



## II. Obstacles to Stability and Sources of Conflict

### A. Middle East

In your opinion, from the provided list, what would you say is the greatest obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East?							
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY
The continuing occupation of Palestinian lands	<b>41</b>	1	<1	<b>38</b>	1	8	<b>39</b>
Too much US interference in the Arab World	11	8	13	18	10	19	12
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	3	1	0	1	0	<1	1
Lack of representative government in some Arab countries	12	17	15	6	20	17	9
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity in some Arab countries	13	19	18	11	15	18	13
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	7	20	18	6	18	11	6
Iran's interference in Arab affairs	6	11	16	8	17	14	9
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	7	23	20	12	19	13	10
<i>Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>							

From the same list, in your opinion, which is the second greatest obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East?							
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY
The continuing occupation of Palestinian lands	1	3	<1	3	1	<1	3
Too much US interference in the Arab World	5	12	10	6	5	8	6
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	3	2	3	<1	8	1	1
Lack of representative government in some Arab countries	<b>27</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>25</b>
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity in some Arab countries	12	14	7	17	11	7	14
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	13	17	19	16	22	15	20
Iran's interference in Arab affairs	15	7	7	16	9	15	10
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	24	11	12	17	12	26	22
<i>Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>							

Respondents were asked to choose the greatest obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East, and then asked for their choice of second greatest obstacle. A plurality of respondents in Egypt (41%), Saudi Arabia (39%), and Turkey (39%) cite the continuing occupation of Palestine as the greatest obstacle to regional peace, though it is barely mentioned in the other countries surveyed. The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda is most frequently cited as the greatest obstacle among Lebanese (23%) and Jordanians (20%); in both of these countries, however, domestic rivalries, economic inequality, and the lack of representative governments in some Arab countries are close runners up for greatest obstacle. In the UAE, the same set of obstacles vie for the top position, with lack of representative government being named by 20%, followed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda (19%), and domestic rivalries (18%). Only in Iraq does US interference earn the position of greatest obstacle to peace and stability (19%), and even there it just edges out other concerns like economic inequality (18%) and the lack of representative government (17%).

It is worth noting that when asked for the second greatest obstacle to Middle East peace and stability pluralities in every surveyed country select the lack of representative government in some Arab countries, with the highest percentage of respondents choosing this factor in Jordan (42%), and between one-third and one-quarter choosing it everywhere else.

### Rank Order of Greatest Obstacles to Peace and Stability in the Middle East, by Country

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY
1	Occupation of Palestine	No representative government	No representative government	Occupation of Palestine	No representative government	No representative government	Occupation of Palestine
2	No representative government	Domestic rivalries	Domestic rivalries	No representative government	Domestic rivalries	Daesh/al Qaeda	No representative government
3	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Iran's interference	Daesh/al Qaeda
4	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	US interference	Economic inequality
5	Iran's interference	US interference	Iran's interference	Iran's interference	Iran's interference	Domestic rivalries	Domestic rivalries
6	Domestic rivalries	Iran's interference	US interference	US interference	US interference	Economic inequality	Iran's interference
7	US interference	Occupation of Palestine	Too little US leadership	Domestic rivalries	Too little US leadership	Occupation of Palestine	US interference
8	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Occupation of Palestine	Too little US leadership	Occupation of Palestine	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership

Considering together the choices made in each country for the two greatest obstacles to peace and stability, the lack of representative government in some countries is the most frequent selection overall, followed by the threat of groups like Daesh and al Qaeda; tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries; and economic inequality and the lack of employment opportunities in some Arab countries. The occupation of Palestine (the top overall choice in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), Iranian interference, and US interference represent the next tier when considering the overall pool of responses. **Very few respondents cite too little US leadership as a significant obstacle to Middle East peace and stability.**

## B. Libya

Identify the two most important factors that, in your opinion, have contributed to destabilization and conflict in Libya.								
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Too much US interference	33	34	29	19	29	25	28	40
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	11	3	3	2	3	15	10	6
Lack of representative government	31	23	22	45	24	32	31	37
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity	25	33	33	25	33	30	27	19
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	<b>40</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>51</b>
Interference by other governments	19	21	18	20	22	14	32	17
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	41	36	42	31	37	45	32	30

From the list below, which countries have interfered the most to cause destabilization and conflict in Libya? [Only asked of those who selected "Interference by other governments" in the previous question.]								
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
United States	<b>77</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>77</b>
Turkey	13	0	0	2	0	7	2	2
Egypt	6	22	30	14	11	22	31	25
Qatar	9	3	10	6	9	22	24	9
Saudi Arabia	1	1	1	0	1	1	11	16
UAE	4	16	16	21	0	12	29	28
Iran	40	22	41	18	24	31	41	4
China	8	0	9	1	3	0	0	4
France	35	10	12	38	8	11	27	32
U.K.	18	4	3	23	4	0	20	41

Respondents were asked to identify the top two most important factors that have contributed to destabilization and conflict in four countries in the Middle East: Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

With respect to Libya, majorities in five of the eight countries surveyed (Saudi Arabia: 57%, Jordan: 53%, UAE: 52%, Iran: 51%, and Lebanon: 50%) cite tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries as one of the most important factors contributing to the conflict; about four in 10 respondents in the other three countries concur (Egypt: 40%, Turkey: 39%, Iraq: 38%). The threat of groups like Daesh and al Qaeda is consistently seen as a significant factor in the Libyan conflict by respondents, and is the top factor identified by Iraqis (45%) and Egyptians (41%).

Overall, the next tier of factors identified by respondents that contribute to Libyan destabilization and conflict includes two internal factors (lack of representative government and economic inequality/lack of employment opportunity) as well as one external factor (too much US interference). These are cited consistently by about one-quarter to one-third of respondents in all countries, with additional concern in Saudi Arabia about the lack of representative government in Libya (45%) and in Iran about US interference (40%).

Of less concern in seven of the eight countries surveyed is interference by other governments; only in Turkey do more than one-quarter of respondents view this as a factor in the Libyan conflict (32%). These respondents point to the United States first and foremost, but also indicate interference by other countries as problematic.

The least important factor in all countries surveyed for the conflict in Libya is "too little US leadership." Only in Iraq and Egypt do more than one in 10 respondents cite this as an important contributing factor.

## C. Syria

Identify the two most important factors that, in your opinion, have contributed to destabilization and conflict in Syria.

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Too much US interference	20	29	30	18	20	23	27	38
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	6	12	18	7	13	9	4	8
Lack of representative government	<b>48</b>	30	29	<b>50</b>	31	<b>47</b>	<b>47</b>	30
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity	25	<b>42</b>	<b>37</b>	23	<b>36</b>	21	23	18
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	31	33	27	32	28	20	34	<b>43</b>
Interference by other governments	29	25	31	36	35	51	22	23
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	<b>42</b>	29	28	33	<b>36</b>	29	<b>43</b>	<b>40</b>

Rank Order of Factors Contributing to Destabilization and Conflict in Syria, by Country

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
1	Lack of representative government	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Lack of representative government	Economic inequality	Interference by other governments	Lack of representative government	Domestic rivalries
2	Daesh/al Qaeda	Domestic rivalries	Interference by other governments	Interference by other governments	Daesh/al Qaeda	Lack of representative government	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda
3	Domestic rivalries	Lack of representative government	Too much US interference	Daesh/al Qaeda	Interference by other governments	Daesh/al Qaeda	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference
4	Interference by other governments	Too much US interference	Lack of representative government	Domestic rivalries	Lack of representative government	Too much US interference	Too much US interference	Lack of representative government
5	Economic inequality	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Economic inequality	Domestic rivalries	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Interference by other governments
6	Too much US interference	Interference by other governments	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference	Too much US interference	Domestic rivalries	Interference by other governments	Economic inequality
7	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership

From the list below, which countries have interfered the most to cause destabilization and conflict in Syria?  
*[Only asked of those who selected "Interference by other governments" in the previous question.]*

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
United States	<b>82</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>72</b>	61	<b>75</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>82</b>
Turkey	7	9	17	12	23	20	3	23
Egypt	2	0	0	5	0	1	12	7
Qatar	3	0	0	7	1	14	19	6
Saudi Arabia	2	1	0	2	0	30	16	28
UAE	0	1	0	17	0	28	21	13
Iran	<b>84</b>	45	62	<b>71</b>	59	54	75	21
China	10	8	21	15	8	3	4	8
France	7	17	10	23	5	2	16	17
U.K.	9	1	<1	20	<1	1	22	19
Russia	49	<b>75</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>84</b>

The lack of representative government in Syria is cited by about one-half of the respondents in Saudi Arabia (50%), Egypt (48%), Iraq (47%), and Turkey (47%), and by about three in 10 respondents in Lebanon, Jordan, the UAE, and Iran, as one of the most important factors that has contributed to destabilization and conflict in Syria.

The second most frequently identified contributing factor to the Syrian conflict is the threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda, with particular concern noted by respondents in Turkey (43%), Egypt (42%), and Iran (40%).

Interference by other countries, particularly the United States, Russia, and Iran, as well as domestic rivalries comprise the next tier of factors cited by respondents as contributing to the Syrian conflict. Concern about foreign interference is identified by one-half of Iraqi respondents (51%), who are most likely to point to the United States and Russia as the interfering parties. Domestic rivalries are of concern to one-quarter to one-third of respondents overall, with even more Iranians (43%) citing this factor as significant in Syria.

Economic inequality and the lack of employment opportunities is cited as a significant contributing factor in the Syrian conflict by more than one-third of respondents in Lebanon (42%), Jordan (37%), and the UAE (36%).

The United States alone as a factor, either because of too much interference or too little leadership, are the factors least cited by respondents in all surveyed countries as contributing to destabilization and conflict in Syria. Too much US interference is of concern to more than one-quarter of respondents in Iran (38%), Jordan (30%), Lebanon (29%), and Turkey (27%), while too little US leadership is named by fewer than one in five respondents across the board.



## D. Iraq

Identify the two most important factors that, in your opinion, have contributed to destabilization and conflict in Iraq.								
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Too much US interference	38	32	<b>34</b>	36	23	21	29	<b>45</b>
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	3	4	1	2	7	4	3	3
Lack of representative government	25	30	29	32	20	<b>44</b>	31	30
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity	19	31	28	28	21	29	18	21
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	<b>51</b>	<b>42</b>	30	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>	28	<b>49</b>	<b>45</b>
Interference by other governments	25	20	25	14	33	23	23	17
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	<b>39</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>48</b>	39

### Two Most Important Factors Contributing to Destabilization and Conflict in Iraq, by Country

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
1	Domestic rivalries	Domestic rivalries	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference
2	Daesh/al Qaeda	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference	Domestic rivalries	Domestic rivalries	Lack of representative government	Daesh/al Qaeda	Domestic rivalries
3	Too much US interference	Too much US interference	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference	Interference by other governments	Economic inequality	Lack of representative government	Daesh/al Qaeda
4	Interference by other governments	Economic inequality	Lack of representative government	Lack of representative government	Too much US interference	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference	Lack of representative government
5	Lack of representative government	Lack of representative government	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Interference by other governments	Interference by other governments	Economic inequality
6	Economic inequality	Interference by other governments	Interference by other governments	Interference by other governments	Lack of representative government	Too much US interference	Economic inequality	Interference by other governments
7	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership

From the list below, which countries have interfered the most to cause destabilization and conflict in Iraq?  
*[Only asked of those who selected "Interference by other governments" in the previous question.]*

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
United States	<b>79</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>95</b>
Turkey	2	0	26	3	22	25	3	27
Egypt	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Qatar	<1	<1	1	0	2	2	10	0
Saudi Arabia	0	0	10	1	4	7	6	28
UAE	0	<1	1	0	0	0	16	35
Iran	<b>81</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>82</b>	27
China	3	0	0	8	0	0	13	22
France	21	0	0	3	0	1	8	0
U.K.	21	0	0	11	0	0	12	35

Majorities of respondents in the UAE (56%), Jordan (52%), and Iraq itself (52%) point to **groups like Daesh and al Qaeda as the most important contributing factor to destabilization and conflict in Iraq**. Significant percentages of respondents in the other five countries surveyed concur, including 48% in Saudi Arabia, 48% in Turkey, 42% in Lebanon, 39% in Egypt, and 39% in Iran.

**The second most popular response about contributing factors in the Iraqi conflict is tribal, ethnic, regional and other domestic rivalries**, which are noted by a majority in Egypt (51%) as well as at least four in 10 respondents in Turkey (49%), Iran (45%), Lebanon (42%), Saudi Arabia (40%), and the UAE (40%).

The next tier of responses includes too much US interference, which is particularly noted by Iranians (45%) and least cited by Iraqis themselves (21%), and the lack of representative government in Iraq, which is particularly concerning to Iraqis (44%).

Economic inequality and interference by other countries (in this case, the United States and Iran) are noted by fewer than one-third of respondents in all countries surveyed. And finally, few respondents identify too little US leadership as a significant contributing factor to the ongoing conflict and destabilization in Iraq.

## E. Yemen

Identify the two most important factors that, in your opinion, have contributed to destabilization and conflict in Yemen.

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Too much US interference	25	29	21	14	14	17	22	18
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	8	11	7	6	6	13	7	3
Lack of representative government	37	35	<b>42</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>41</b>	20	<b>44</b>	<b>40</b>
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity	23	36	32	17	33	19	31	32
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	<b>54</b>	36	<b>39</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>45</b>
Interference by other governments	16	21	26	24	28	<b>48</b>	19	25
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	37	30	35	23	35	39	32	39

From the list below, which countries have interfered the most to cause destabilization and conflict in Yemen?  
*[Only asked of those who selected "Interference by other governments" in the previous question.]*

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
United States	<b>77</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>66</b>
Turkey	1	0	0	4	0	7	3	5
Egypt	4	12	12	7	26	9	12	32
Qatar	0	1	0	2	1	6	7	22
Saudi Arabia	54	34	<b>57</b>	12	44	57	<b>75</b>	<b>72</b>
UAE	30	0	46	14	8	28	27	59
Iran	<b>67</b>	<b>72</b>	48	<b>62</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>69</b>	12
China	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
France	0	0	0	<1	0	0	0	0
U.K.	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0

**Domestic rivalries are identified as one of the most important contributing factors to destabilization and conflict in Yemen** by majorities in Saudi Arabia (65%) and Egypt (54%) as well as by more than four in 10 respondents in Turkey (46%), Iran (45%), Iraq (44%), and the UAE (42%).

A lack of representative government in Yemen is also seen as an important factor by a majority in Saudi Arabia (52%) and by significant percentages in Turkey (44%), Jordan (42%), the UAE (41%), and Iran (40%).

Groups like Daesh and al Qaeda are considered significant to the conflict by at most 39% of respondents (in Iran) and at least 23% (in Saudi Arabia) with an average of about one-third viewing these threats as important to Yemen's conflict.

Economic inequality and the lack of employment opportunities is cited by about one-third of respondents in Lebanon, the UAE, Jordan, Iran, and Turkey, and by fewer respondents in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Other foreign interference is less frequently identified, with fewer than one-quarter of respondents overall noting this as an important factor, except in Iraq where this is the most frequently cited contributing factor to Yemen's conflict (48%). Among those who say other countries' interference contributes to the destabilization and conflict in Yemen, the United States followed by Iran and then Saudi Arabia are most frequently pointed out as the responsible parties.

**Again, too little US leadership is the least cited factor across the board.**

### III. Causes of Extremism and How to Deal with the Threat

#### A. Causes of Extremism in Syria

Which, in your opinion, are the two most important factors that would cause a Muslim to join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria?								
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Outrage at the Assad regime	<b>50</b>	36	<b>48</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>52</b>	37
The suffering of fellow Muslims	26	34	19	22	15	18	28	41
These groups are attractive because of their fighting skills and the victories they have won	24	36	<b>46</b>	25	<b>50</b>	33	22	19
Being inspired by extremist preachers or websites to believe that the way of these groups is a true path for Muslims	28	31	33	22	32	<b>42</b>	33	<b>52</b>
Anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogates	27	37	<b>40</b>	<b>51</b>	39	28	25	5
Frustration with the life they are living in their own country and the desire for adventure	<b>44</b>	27	15	18	16	24	<b>40</b>	<b>45</b>

When respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey were asked to identify the top two reasons a Muslim would join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria, the number one answer overall is outrage at the Assad regime. Majorities in Saudi Arabia (62%), Iraq (56%), Turkey (52%), and Egypt (50%) point to this explanation, as do a plurality in Jordan (48%) and significant percentages in the UAE (47%) and Lebanon (36%).

The next tier of reasons that these Arab and Turkish respondents note for Muslims' joining extremist groups in Syria includes anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogates, the attractiveness of these groups because of their fighting skills and victories, and inspiration derived from extremist preachers or websites that the way of these groups is a true path for Muslims. Anger at sectarian policies pursued by Iran is cited by one-half of Saudi respondents (51%) and about four in ten respondents in Jordan (40%) and the UAE (39%). Viewing Daesh and Jabhat al Nusra as "winners" on the battlefield is particularly noted by respondents in the UAE (50%) and Jordan (46%). And for 42% in Iraq, a reason for Muslims to join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria is inspiration from extremist preachers and websites. About one-third of respondents in Turkey, Jordan, the UAE, and Lebanon also view extremist preachers and websites as a significant factor.

A less compelling reason for respondents in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, but noted more broadly by those in Egypt (44%) and Turkey (40%) is frustration with the life these Muslim recruits are living in their own countries and the desire for adventure.

Overall the factor least cited by respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey for Muslims to join Daesh and Jabhat al Nusra in Syria is the suffering of fellow Muslims.

For Iranian respondents, the top choices are quite different. A majority (52%) view the inspiration of extremist preachers and websites as the most important factor causing Muslims to join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria. Frustration with life in their own countries (45%) and the suffering of fellow Muslims (41%) are also seen as far more significant among Iranians than they are for Arab and Turkish respondents.

What, in your opinion, are the two most important steps that could be taken to stop the flow of young people from joining extremist groups in Syria?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
If Daesh were militarily defeated, it would dry up their support	31	27	26	58	30	44	41	53
If there were a negotiated solution leading to a national unity government <u>without</u> the participation of Bashar al Assad, it would dry up the support for extremist groups	31	31	31	32	37	43	29	25
If there were a negotiated solution leading to a national unity government with the participation of Bashar al Assad, it would dry up the support for extremist groups	10	20	18	15	16	13	18	32
There should be a crackdown on radical preachers and websites promoting extremist ideas	35	26	23	24	25	23	33	29
If other governments provided greater support for those fighting the Assad regime, it would dry up the support of extremist groups	21	27	30	18	30	27	19	32
There should be a crackdown on contributions going to extremist groups and a greater effort made to stop young recruits going to fight with Daesh	19	24	24	19	22	18	23	24
If Iran and its surrogates were more directly confronted, it would dry up support for extremist groups	38	25	26	21	21	17	25	3
If there were a greater effort at diplomacy to bring all parties (including Iran) together to defeat Daesh and promote peace and stability in Syria, it would dry up the support of extremist groups	14	19	22	14	18	14	12	3

### Two Most Important Steps to Stop Flow of Young People Joining Extremist Groups in Syria, by Country

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
1	Direct confrontation of Iran	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Military defeat of Daesh	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Military defeat of Daesh	Military defeat of Daesh	Military defeat of Daesh
2	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Military defeat of Daesh	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Military defeat of Daesh	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Negotiated solution with Assad
3	Military defeat of Daesh	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Other gov't support for fighting Assad
4	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Military defeat of Daesh	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites
5	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad
6	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Direct confrontation of Iran	Direct confrontation of Iran	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Crackdown on contributions to extremists
7	More diplomacy	Negotiated solution with Assad	More diplomacy	Negotiated solution with Assad	More diplomacy	More diplomacy	Negotiated solution with Assad	Direct confrontation of Iran
8	Negotiated solution with Assad	More diplomacy	Negotiated solution with Assad	More diplomacy	Negotiated solution with Assad	Negotiated solution with Assad	More diplomacy	More diplomacy



**When asked to choose the two most important steps that could be taken to stop the flow of young people joining extremist groups in Syria, the top choice by respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey is military defeat of Daesh, with a majority in Saudi Arabia (58%), as well as significant percentages in Iraq (44%) and Turkey (41%) endorsing this step.**

**Among the Arab countries and Turkey, the second most frequently endorsed step for curbing new members from joining extremist groups in Syria is a negotiated solution leading to a national unity government without the participation of Bashar al Assad.** This choice is most popular among Iraqis (43%) and in the UAE (37%), and is suggested by about one-third of respondents in all other countries surveyed (except Iran).

The other options as possible steps to stop the flow of new young people into extremist groups in Syria are selected by no more than one-third of the respondents in any surveyed country (with two minor exceptions in Egypt). The overall order of the relative importance of these steps is: crackdown on radical preachers and websites promoting extremist ideas (Egypt: 35%); other governments providing greater support for those fighting the Assad regime; more direct confrontation of Iran and its surrogates (Egypt: 38%); crackdown on contributions going to extremist groups and a greater effort made to stop young recruits going to fight with Daesh; greater effort at diplomacy to bring all parties (including Iran) together to defeat Daesh and promote peace and stability in Syria; and finally, a negotiated solution leading to a national unity government with the participation of Bashar al Assad.

Among Iranian respondents, the top choice is also a military defeat of Daesh, with 53% selecting this as an important step for halting recruitment of young people to Daesh in Syria. The other most popular steps endorsed by Iranians, however, include the least favored response in the other surveyed countries, a national unity government that includes Assad (32%), as well as other governments providing support for those fighting the Assad regime (32%).

## B. Causes of Extremism in Iraq

Which, in your opinion, are the two most important factors that would cause a Muslim to join Daesh in Iraq?								
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Outrage at sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad	59	25	35	60	35	40	59	39
The suffering of fellow Muslims	24	35	23	20	23	18	23	23
The attraction of Daesh because of their fighting skills and victories they have won	19	24	35	23	47	24	17	33
Being inspired by extremist preachers or websites to believe that the way of Daesh is a true path for Muslims	20	29	22	14	20	30	23	41
Anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogate militias	26	31	40	29	39	28	27	4
Failure of other governments to be more responsive and effective in changing the policies of the government in Baghdad.	38	28	22	38	19	41	30	24
Frustration with the life they are living in their own countries and the desire for adventure	14	28	23	16	17	18	21	37

Respondents were then asked to identify the top two reasons why a Muslim would join Daesh in Iraq. Again, we find that far and away the most frequently cited reason by respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey is outrage at the current government, in this case specifically outrage at the sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad. About six in 10 respondents in Saudi Arabia (60%), Turkey (59%), and Egypt (59%) point to this reason, as do more than one-third of respondents in Iraq (40%), Jordan (35%), and the UAE (35%).

The next tier of most frequently cited reasons why a Muslim would join Daesh in Iraq among Arab and Turkish respondents includes anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogate militias and the failure of other governments to be more responsive and effective in changing the policies of the government in Baghdad. The former (i.e., anger at Iranian sectarian policies) is the top choice of Jordanians (40%) and a significant number of those in the UAE (39%). The latter (i.e., the failure of other governments to effect change) is noted particularly in Iraq (41%), where it is the top choice, and in Egypt (38%) and Saudi Arabia (38%).

Among Arab and Turkish respondents, less frequently cited reasons for joining Daesh in Iraq include the attraction of Daesh because of their fighting skills and victories they have won, the suffering of fellow Muslims, being inspired by extremist preachers or websites to believe that the way of Daesh is a true path for Muslims, and frustration with the life they are living in their own countries and the desire for adventure. Perceiving Daesh as attractive because of their fighting skills and victories is the top reason cited by respondents in the UAE (47%); 35% of Jordanians also make this choice. The suffering of Muslims is noted by 35% in Lebanon. In all other cases, fewer than one-third of respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey select these options.

In Iraq, there are some differences of opinion based on sect. Among Sunni respondents, the top factor identified that would cause a Muslim to join Daesh in Iraq is outrage at the government in Baghdad's sectarian policies (44%). However, among Shi'a respondents the top factor cited is the failure of other governments to alter the sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad.

Again, for Iranian respondents the top choices are quite different. They point to the inspiration of extremist preachers and websites as the most compelling reason why Muslims would join Daesh in Iraq (41%), closely followed by outrage at the sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad (39%) and frustration with their day-to-day lives in their own countries (37%).

What, in your opinion, are the two most important steps that could be taken to stop the flow of young people from joining Daesh in Iraq?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
If Daesh were militarily defeated, it would dry up their support	34	31	40	67	34	45	48	49
If the government in Iraq were reformed making it responsive and representative of all groups in the country, it would dry up the support for extremist groups	55	38	41	36	41	52	42	43
There should be a crackdown on radical preachers and websites promoting extremist ideas	20	34	29	26	35	25	26	35
There should be a crackdown on contributions going to extremist groups and a greater effort made to stop young recruits going to fight with Daesh	30	33	27	28	26	30	32	31
If Iran and its surrogates were directly confronted, it would dry up support for extremist groups	44	39	39	27	42	27	34	<1
If there were a greater effort at diplomacy bringing all parties (including Iran) together to defeat Daesh and promote peace and stability in Iraq, it would dry up the support for extremist groups	17	25	24	17	23	20	18	42

### Two Most Important Steps to Stop Flow of Young People Joining Extremist Groups in Iraq, by Country

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
1	Reformed govt in Iraq	Direct confrontation of Iran	Reformed govt in Iraq	Military defeat of Daesh	Direct confrontation of Iran	Reformed govt in Iraq	Military defeat of Daesh	Military defeat of Daesh
2	Direct confrontation of Iran	Reformed govt in Iraq	Military defeat of Daesh	Reformed govt in Iraq	Reformed govt in Iraq	Military defeat of Daesh	Reformed govt in Iraq	Reformed govt in Iraq
3	Military defeat of Daesh	Crackdown on radical preachers/ websites	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/ websites	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Direct confrontation of Iran	More diplomacy
4	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/ websites	Direct confrontation of Iran	Military defeat of Daesh	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/ websites
5	Crackdown on radical preachers/ websites	Military defeat of Daesh	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/ websites	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/ websites	Crackdown on radical preachers/ websites	Crackdown on contributions to extremists
6	More diplomacy	More diplomacy	More diplomacy	More diplomacy	More diplomacy	More diplomacy	More diplomacy	Direct confrontation of Iran

**With respect to stemming new recruits to extremist groups in Iraq, respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey overall have two clear top choices: reform of the Iraqi Government to make it more responsive and representative of all groups in the country and a military defeat of Daesh.** Reform of the Iraqi Government has broad support and is selected as an important step by majorities in Egypt (55%) and Iraq (52%) as well as more than four in 10 respondents in Turkey (42%), the UAE (41%), and Jordan (41%). A military defeat of Daesh is viewed as an important step by two-thirds of Saudi respondents (67%) as well as almost one-half of those in Turkey (48%) and Iraq (45%).

About one-quarter to one-third of respondents in most Arab countries and Turkey view direct confrontation of Iran and its surrogates, a crackdown on contributions going to extremist groups and greater efforts to stop young recruits, and a crackdown on radical preachers and websites promoting extremist ideas as important steps to halt the growth of extremist groups in Iraq. While crackdowns on contributions and radical preachers and websites have fairly consistent support across the board, the direct confrontation of Iran and its surrogates is viewed as an important step by 44% in Egypt, 42% in the UAE, and by 39% in both Lebanon and Jordan. In Iraq there is a sectarian divide with respect to the need to confront Iran in order to stem the tide of new recruits into Daesh; 40% of Iraqi Sunni respondents say this is an important step, while only 19% of their Shi'a compatriots agree.

Fewer than one-quarter of respondents in all countries except Iran say that a greater effort at diplomacy bringing all parties (including Iran) together to defeat Daesh and promote peace and stability in Iraq would be an important step to stop young people from joining extremist groups in Iraq.

Among Iranians, the same two top choices are selected: military defeat of Daesh (49%) and reform of the Iraqi Government to make it more representative (43%). The third choice among Iranian respondents for stopping the flow of young recruits to extremist groups in Iraq is more diplomatic efforts to bring all parties together to defeat Daesh (42%).

## C. How to Deal With the Threat of Extremism

In order to stop the spread of extremism and the recruitment of young people from joining extremist groups, in your opinion, how important are each of the following?								
		EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY
Use of intelligence agencies and police to crack down on the groups and individuals spreading extremist ideas	Very important	49	45	54	42	42	42	50
	Somewhat important	38	22	30	31	31	38	36
	<b>Total important</b>	<b>87</b>	67	<b>84</b>	73	73	<b>80</b>	<b>86</b>
	Not very important	10	21	11	17	11	11	13
	Not important at all	4	12	5	10	15	9	<1
	<b>Total not important</b>	14	33	16	27	26	20	13
Cracking down on or discouraging young people from joining religion-based political parties since they can be 'gateways' to extremist political ideas	Very important	27	14	25	26	21	23	22
	Somewhat important	37	27	37	27	44	33	34
	<b>Total important</b>	64	41	62	53	65	56	56
	Not very important	23	39	23	32	24	31	30
	Not important at all	13	21	15	14	11	13	14
	<b>Total not important</b>	36	60	38	46	35	44	44
Countering the messages and ideas promoted by extremist groups and individuals and re-educating youth who have been attracted to their ideas	Very important	60	59	63	36	62	47	59
	Somewhat important	35	33	32	51	34	32	31
	<b>Total important</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>90</b>
	Not very important	5	7	5	11	3	18	7
	Not important at all	<1	<1	<1	2	0	3	3
	<b>Total not important</b>	5	7	5	13	3	21	10
Changing the political and social circumstances in different countries that lead some young people to become attracted to extremist ideas	Very important	67	64	66	57	64	62	62
	Somewhat important	29	33	33	36	35	33	31
	<b>Total important</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>93</b>
	Not very important	4	2	1	6	1	5	5
	Not important at all	<1	0	0	1	0	1	2
	<b>Total not important</b>	4	2	1	7	1	6	7
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.								

Respondents in all countries surveyed except Iran were asked to consider how to stop the spread of extremism and the recruitment of young people into extremist groups by rating the importance of: intelligence agencies and police cracking down on groups and individuals spreading extremist ideas; cracking down on or discouraging young people from joining religion-based political parties (like the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi groups) since they can be “gateways” to extremist political ideas; countering the messages and ideas promoted by extremist groups and individuals and re-educating youth who have been attracted to their ideas; and changing the political and social circumstances in different countries that lead some young people to become attracted to extremist ideas. There is broad support for all of these strategies.

**Across the board, respondents are almost unanimous (93%-99%) in their view that changing the political and social circumstances in different countries is important to stop the spread of extremism.**

**There is also broad agreement that it is important to counter the messages and ideas promoted by extremist groups and individuals and re-educate youth who have been attracted to these ideas.** This tactic is considered important by at least nine in 10 respondents in the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey, as well as 87% in Saudi Arabia and 79% in Iraq.

More than two-thirds of respondents across the board think it is important for intelligence agencies and police to crack down on individuals and groups spreading extremist ideas, with at least eight in 10 respondents holding this view in Egypt (87%), Turkey (86%), Jordan (84%), and Iraq (80%).

Finally, majorities in all countries except Lebanon say it is important to crack down and discourage young people from joining religion-based political parties, with the strongest views held by those in the UAE (65%), Egypt



(64%), and Jordan (62%). Only 41% of Lebanese respondents agree, while a majority say this is not an important strategy for stemming extremism.

How concerned are you that you or your family may be at risk from the threat of attacks from violent extremist groups?							
	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY
Very concerned	23	8	14	5	13	48	14
Somewhat concerned	43	39	45	41	39	46	47
Not concerned at all	34	53	42	54	47	6	38
<i>Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>							

Concern about the personal risk from attacks by violent extremist groups is somewhat variable across the seven countries surveyed. Majorities in Saudi Arabia (54%) and Lebanon (53%), as well as a plurality in the UAE (47%) are not concerned at all about being the victim of such attacks. And more than one-third of those in Jordan (42%), Turkey (38%), and Egypt (34%) are also unconcerned. Only in Iraq is a plurality (48%) very concerned about such threats of attack, with Shi'a respondents more concerned (52%) than their Sunni counterparts (41%). Those in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are the least likely to say they are very concerned (8% and 5%, respectively). However, about four in 10 respondents in all countries surveyed are somewhat concerned that they or their family may be at risk from the threat of attacks by violent extremist groups.

How confident are you with the work being done by the following institutions in your country to deal with the threat of violent extremist groups?								
		EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	KSA	UAE*	IRAQ	TURKEY
Police and intelligence agencies	Very confident	46	<b>65</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>82</b>	44	52
	Somewhat confident	39	31	26	37	17	54	32
	Not confident at all	15	4	3	1	2	2	15
Religious leaders	Very confident	28	<b>75</b>	35	<b>76</b>	68	35	35
	Somewhat confident	53	21	44	22	27	47	45
	Not confident at all	19	4	21	3	5	18	19
Political leadership	Very confident	30	38	20	43	<b>79</b>	20	35
	Somewhat confident	53	45	64	46	18	33	43
	Not confident at all	17	16	16	10	3	47	22
Non-government leaders in business, media, and education	Very confident	10	47	19	33	40	18	19
	Somewhat confident	41	36	46	48	46	58	54
	Not confident at all	49	18	35	19	15	25	27
<i>Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</i>								
<i>*Emirati citizens only.</i>								

When asked about their confidence in the work being done in their countries to deal with the threat of violent extremist groups, respondents overall express the most confidence in the work done by police and intelligence agencies. Majorities in the UAE (78%), Jordan (71%), Lebanon (65%), Saudi Arabia (62%), and Turkey (52%) say they are “very confident” in this work; a plurality in Egypt (46%) is also very confident in the work done by police and intelligence agencies to deal with the threat of violent extremist groups.


The work of religious leaders to deal with extremism is ranked second by respondents overall, with majorities in Saudi Arabia (76%), Lebanon (75%), and the UAE (56%) saying they are very confident. One-quarter to one-third of respondents in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt are also very confident. At most about two in 10 respondents are “not confident at all” in the work of religious leaders dealing with the threat of extremism among respondents in Jordan (21%), Egypt (19%), Turkey (19%), and Iraq (18%).

Only in the UAE does a majority (74%) feel very confident about the work of political leaders in dealing with the extremist threat. Aside from Iraq, where 47% of respondents say they are “not confident at all” in the work

of political leaders battling extremist groups, fewer than one-quarter of those in all other countries surveyed are not confident in their political leadership.

Finally, overall respondents express the least confidence in the work of non-governmental leaders in business, media, and education to deal with violent extremist in their countries. Only in Lebanon does a plurality (47%) say they are very confident. And almost one-half of respondents in Egypt (49%) as well as 35% in Jordan, 27% in Turkey, and 25% in Iraq say they are not at all confident in the work of non-governmental leaders to deal with the threat of violent extremist groups in their countries.

### Confidence in Your Country's Institutions Dealing with the Threat of Violent Extremist Groups, by Country



## IV. Iran

Are you better off or worse off than you were three years ago?		
	IRAN	
	2014*	2016
Better off	34	33
Worse off	36	33
The same	30	34
<i>*In 2014 respondents were asked to compare their current situation to five years ago: Are you better off or worse off than you were five years ago?</i>		

Iranians are evenly split on the question of overall satisfaction: whether they believe they are better or worse off today than they were three years ago. One-third say they are better off; one-third say they are worse off; and one-third say their situation has not changed. These numbers are basically the same as the last time we asked Iranians to assess their overall satisfaction.

Satisfaction with government's performance . . .		
IRAN		
Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Very satisfied	22
	Somewhat satisfied	29
	Total satisfied	51
	Somewhat dissatisfied	26
	Not satisfied at all	23
	Total dissatisfied	49
Advancing democracy and promoting personal and civil rights	Very satisfied	12
	Somewhat satisfied	18
	Total satisfied	30
	Somewhat dissatisfied	41
	Not satisfied at all	29
	Total dissatisfied	70
Improving relations with Arab Governments	Very satisfied	22
	Somewhat satisfied	13
	Total satisfied	35
	Somewhat dissatisfied	25
	Not satisfied at all	40
	Total dissatisfied	65
Improving relations with the US and the West	Very satisfied	8
	Somewhat satisfied	6
	Total satisfied	15
	Somewhat dissatisfied	45
	Not satisfied at all	40
	Total dissatisfied	85
Giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen	Very satisfied	27
	Somewhat satisfied	20
	Total satisfied	47
	Somewhat dissatisfied	15
	Not satisfied at all	38
	Total dissatisfied	53

One-half of Iranian respondents say they are satisfied with their government's performance with respect to improving the economy and creating employment opportunities. Opinion is also split when asked about satisfaction with the Iranian Government's performance when it comes to giving greater support to their allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen; 47% are satisfied, while 53% are not.


Satisfaction is even lower when asked about government performance in terms of improving relations with Arab Governments (35%) and advancing democracy and promoting personal and civil rights (30%). The lowest satisfaction ratings are associated with the government's performance with respect to improving relations with the United States and the West; only 15% of Iranian respondents are satisfied with this area.

In 2015, we asked Iranians about priorities for their government. At least three-quarters of respondents said that improving the economy (81%) and advancing democracy (75%) should be prioritized. About six in 10 said improving relations with Arab Governments (60%) and with the United States and the West (59%) should be prioritized. And almost one-half said providing more support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen should be a priority for their government (48%). It is instructive to compare these priorities to the satisfaction levels reported in the current survey. We find gaps, as shown in the graph below, between how significant Iranians view priorities for their government and their satisfaction in their government's performance.



How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in...?				
		IRAN		
		2014	2015	2016
Syria	Very important	43	23	10
	Somewhat important	47	49	14
	Total important	90	73	<b>24</b>
	Somewhat unimportant	6	19	38
	Not important at all	1	8	38
	Total not important	7	28	76
Lebanon	Very important	46	21	14
	Somewhat important	42	51	29
	Total important	88	72	<b>43</b>
	Somewhat unimportant	5	21	30
	Not important at all	5	8	27
	Total not important	10	28	57
Iraq	Very important	50	24	31
	Somewhat important	37	40	16
	Total important	87	64	<b>47</b>
	Somewhat unimportant	6	25	29
	Not important at all	4	11	25
	Total not important	10	36	53
Yemen	Very important	21	10	13
	Somewhat important	41	33	26
	Total important	62	43	<b>39</b>
	Somewhat unimportant	21	38	37
	Not important at all	15	19	24
	Total not important	36	57	61
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included.				

**Importance of Iran's Involvement in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen (2014–2016)**



**For Iranian respondents, this year's survey shows additional declines in the levels of importance they place on continued involvement of their government in each of the four major conflicts in the region.** They consider Iraq the most important of the four conflicts for continued Iranian involvement (47%), but a majority now considers even Iraq not important (53%). This is a decline from a high of 87% who considered involvement in Iraq important in 2014.

Involvement in Lebanon is viewed as important by 43% of Iranian respondents, down from 88% who held this view in 2014 and 72% who still held it in 2015.

Yemen, where there has been the least enthusiasm in previous polling, is now considered important by 39% of respondents in Iran, only a very slight decline from the 43% who said it was important in 2015.

**Finally, the importance of continued involvement in Syria has declined the most significantly among Iranian respondents, from a high of 90% in 2014 to just 24% who say it is important in the current survey.**

# Methodology and Demographics

## Methodology

The approach used for conducting the poll in the eight countries involved face-to-face, personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered in each country to cover a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative and comprised adult males and females, who were 15+ years of age. In the GCC countries, only citizens and Arab expatriates were covered.

In six of the eight countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran), random, door-to-door sampling utilizing a multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for selection of respondents in each country. In the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) where door-to-door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. However, adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was not skewed and was broadly representative.

COUNTRY	SAMPLE SIZE	MOE	DATES OF SURVEY	GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE
Egypt	1,030	±3.1	9/17/16–10/5/16	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban and rural), Menia (urban and rural), Asyut (urban and rural), Tanta (urban and rural)
Lebanon	623	±4	9/18/16–10/5/16	Beirut (East and West Beirut), Baabda, El Maten, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, Saayda
Jordan	634	±4	9/18/16–10/5/16	Amman City, Balqa, Madaba, Irbid, Jarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba
Saudi Arabia	1,068	±3.1	9/17/16–10/5/16	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Shammasyah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail and Hufuf
UAE	660	±3.9	9/18/16–10/10/16	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Iraq	1,057	±3.1	9/17/16–10/7/16	Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Karbala, Nassiriyah, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	1,056	±3.1	9/18/16–10/8/16	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Haymana, Ceyhan
Iran	1,055	±3	9/18/16–10/9/16	Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, Ahwaz

## Demographics (%)

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	SAUDI ARABIA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Male	51	50	51	56	64	51	52	51
Female	49	50	49	44	36	49	48	49
Under 30	43	33	42	38	35	44	34	41
30+	57	67	58	62	65	56	66	59
Sunni	89	27	95	85	88	37	86	6
Shi'a	1	30	3	15	12	63	9	94
Christian	10	37	2	—	<1	<1	5	—
Druze	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—
Live in city	67	88	79	84	86	63	73	73
Live outside city	33	12	21	16	14	37	27	27



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