

SIR BANIYAS FORUM

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Between August 24 and September 19, 2017, Zogby Research Services conducted face-to-face polls, surveying 7,800 adults in seven Arab countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), Iran and Turkey. We had been commissioned by the Sir Bani Yas Forum to explore attitudes toward a range of issues including the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, U.S. policies under the Trump Administration, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Iran Deal, refugees, and political Islam. We also surveyed Palestinians, Iranians, and Turks about developments within their countries. What follows is a summary of the findings.

1. Importance of Relations with Other Countries:

- **In almost every country the percentages of those who say it is important to have good relations with the United States and Russia are higher than they were in 2016.** The importance of relations with the United States has dramatically increased among Egyptians, Iraqis, and Turks, while Russia's importance has grown significantly for Emiratis and Turks.
- Iranians are the only respondents who view relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia as unimportant.
- Saudis and Emiratis overwhelmingly see relations with Iran as not important.

2. Role in Syria:

- Overall, **there is mostly dissatisfaction with the role other countries have played in the Syrian conflict.**
- **Russia's and Iran's roles are seen as negative everywhere except in Iran.**
- The U.S. role is only seen positively in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey.
- The Saudi role is only seen as positive in Jordan and the UAE.
- Turkey fares well in Jordan and the UAE.
- For their part, Egyptians see all of the countries involved as playing a very negative role in Syria.
- Respondents in every country except Iraq say that they believe that their government should play an active role in shaping the outcome of the conflict in Syria.
- Across the board, majorities say that there is no solution to the conflict in Syria that leaves Bashar al-Assad in power. This is true even in Iran.

3. Role in Iraq:

- Once again there is mostly dissatisfaction with the role other countries have played in Iraq. Only the United States gets positive scores anywhere, with these coming from Emiratis and Saudis.
- Overall, **Iran's role in Iraq is judged very harshly, including by Iraqis themselves.**
- **Iraqis are disapproving of almost everyone's role in their country,** except that of the United States where Iraqi opinion is divided.
- When asked for their opinion as to the best outcome for Iraq, **the most favored option in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey is an Iraqi government in Baghdad that represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation to keep the country unified.** Everywhere else (i.e., Jordan, Palestine, Iran, and Iraq itself), opinion is divided between this option and maintaining unity through a federation of autonomous regions.

- **The establishment of an independent Kurdish state is opposed by majorities everywhere, including by all groups in Iraq.**

4. Concern for Yemen:

- **The two most frequently cited concerns posed by the Yemen conflict are the presence of al Qaeda and the threat posed by Iran.** These are most strongly felt by Saudis and Emiratis. The humanitarian crisis facing the country is cited by about one-quarter of respondents in five countries.

5. U.S. Policies Under Trump:

- **The policies of the new Trump Administration toward any area of the Middle East are seen as positive only in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey.** Emiratis and Turks favor his policies toward Syria and Iraq; Emiratis and Saudis support his policies toward Iran.
- **Egyptians and Palestinians are the most negatively inclined** toward the Trump policies, with the attitudes of the Lebanese, Jordanians, and Iraqis mixed. Egyptians and Turks are the most opposed to the Trump policy toward Iran.
- **Strong majorities in every country except Turkey have no confidence that the Trump Administration will be able to achieve an Israeli/Palestinian peace.** Turks are divided on this matter.

6a. Israel/Palestine:

- **A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is strongly supported only by Egyptians, Saudis, and Emiratis.**
- A one-state solution only receives strong support in Iraq.
- **A high two in five respondents in Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan express the concern that no solution may be possible to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.**
- As to whether the Arab states and Israel should build an alliance to confront Iran and extremism, slight majorities in Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey agree, but only if Israel first ends its occupation of Palestinian lands. **Majorities in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE would still oppose such an alliance even if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories.**

6b. Palestinian Attitudes:

- **Over two-thirds of Palestinians are prepared to accept peace with Israel on the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative, but over one-quarter of Palestinians don't believe that Israel will agree to the terms of the API.**
- **There is a growing sense of despair among Palestinians,** with two in five saying they no longer believe that a peace agreement is possible.
- **Majorities of Palestinians are dissatisfied with both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas,** with a significantly greater number dissatisfied with Hamas.
- While about two-thirds of Palestinians say unity among the Palestinian parties is important and want the Palestinian Authority to make a determined effort to reach that goal, just about **two-thirds are not confident that unity will occur.**
- In 50 years of occupation, more than one-third of Palestinians report that they or members of their immediate family have suffered violence from the Israeli military and/or settlers. The percentages for Palestinians in Jerusalem are staggering: 54% from the military, 69% from settlers.

7a. Iran Deal:

- **Attitudes are deeply divided as to how to move forward with the JCPOA.** A slight majority in the UAE, and slight pluralities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq are in support of canceling the deal. The only country where a majority is in favor of enforcing the JCPOA is Turkey.
- A slight plurality in Egypt and Lebanon favor pressing Iran to participate in a regional framework to bring peace to the region.

7b. Iranian Attitudes:

- **There is an increase in Iranian satisfaction with the performance of their government** in improving the economy, supporting regional allies, and advancing rights although a majority are still dissatisfied with this last area.
- **Three-quarters of Iranians believe that while their country has met its obligations under the terms of JCPOA, the West has not lived up to its end of the deal.**
- **Possibly owing to this feeling that the JCPOA hasn't met their expectations, Iranians have increased their support for their government's involvement in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.** After a significant and steady decline in support for all of these involvements over the past two years, support for each of them is now back up to pre-JCPOA 2014 levels.

8. Turkish Attitudes:

- **Turkish respondents report being pleased with their government's role in improving their country's economy, but majorities are not satisfied with its performance in protecting their rights and improving ties with the United States and the West.**

9. Attitudes Toward Refugees:

- **The negative impact of Syrian refugees continues to weigh on Lebanese, Jordanians, and Turks.** The percentages of Lebanese and Jordanians who now feel that the refugees pose a security threat to their countries have somewhat declined since 2014. But while fewer Jordanians are concerned with the economic impact, the percentage of Lebanese with this concern has slightly increased. Overall, it is the Turks who say they have the greatest concern with the refugees' impact on their security and economy.

10. Political Islam:

- **Majorities in almost every country (except Palestine and Iran) believe that religious movements should restrict themselves to matters of "faith and guidance" and stay out of politics.**
- **Only Iranians believe that when religious movements have taken power, they make countries stronger and improve the lives of citizens.** Significant majorities in Egypt, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, and Turkey believe that governing religious movements make countries weaker and worse off. Jordanians and Lebanese are divided.
- Despite mixed or negative feelings toward religious movements in government, respondents give higher grades to the AKP in Turkey and Tunisia's Ennahda for having been effective in governance than they give to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Palestine's Hamas.

IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

How important is it that your country have good relations with ... ?

		EGYPT		LEBANON		JORDAN		PALESTINE	KSA		UAE		IRAQ		TURKEY		IRAN	
		2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017
US	Important	45	88	74	68	67	69	78	46	78	75	94	16	59	46	100	33	47
	Not important	53	12	26	32	32	31	22	51	23	25	6	84	41	54	0	66	53
Russia	Important	69	86	56	70	29	65	69	43	53	41	93	47	58	24	100	65	68
	Not important	31	14	44	30	71	35	31	55	47	59	7	52	42	76	0	34	32
Turkey	Important	39	67	54	67	82	77	80	54	35	45	99	33	65			52	59
	Not important	61	33	45	33	19	23	20	42	63	55	1	68	35			48	41
KSA	Important	86	93	59	63	81	76	81			78	97	68	61	77	73	52	45
	Not important	14	7	41	37	20	24	19			21	3	31	39	21	27	45	55
Iran	Important	10	46	46	57	20	54	57	12	10	30	10	30	53	20	84		
	Not important	90	54	55	43	80	46	43	85	89	70	90	70	47	80	16		

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included. Palestine was not included in the 2016 survey.

Overview

When asked about the importance of their country having good relations with a number of other countries, respondents largely recognize the value of maintaining good relations with most of the major and regional powers covered in this survey.

At least two-thirds of respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, the UAE, and Turkey say that having good relations with the United States, Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are important for their countries.

In every country respondents give increased importance from 2016 to 2017 to improved relations with the U.S. and Russia.

It is also worth noting **that respondents see relations with Russia and the United States as significantly more important in 2017 than they did in 2016.** Attitudes toward the importance of relations with the U.S. increased by 40 points in Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey, and by about 20 points in Saudi Arabia and the UAE; in the case of Russia, attitudes increased by 30 points or more in Jordan, the UAE, and Turkey.

Attitudes toward the importance of relations with Turkey and Saudi Arabia are mostly quite positive, except for a majority of Saudis who do not see relations with Turkey as important, and the majority of Iranians who do not see the importance of relations with Saudi Arabia.

Relations with Iran are seen as very important to Turkey and very unimportant to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

By country

For **Egyptians**, relations with Saudi Arabia are most important (93%), followed by the United States (88%) and Russia (86%).

For **Lebanese**, Russia, the United States, and Turkey rank highest in terms of the importance of good relations (70%, 68%, 67%, respectively). With respect to Saudi Arabia, we find a sectarian divide in Lebanon with about seven in 10 Sunni (72%) and Christian (79%) respondents saying good relations with the Kingdom are important, while just 47% of Shia respondents concur.

Three-quarters of **Jordanian** respondents say good relations with Turkey (77%) and Saudi Arabia (76%) are important, followed by the United States (69%) and Russia (65%).

About eight in 10 **Palestinians** view good relations with Saudi Arabia (81%), Turkey (80%), and the United States (78%) as important.

Almost all of the respondents in the **UAE** and **Turkey** view it as important to have good relations with most of the countries covered. They diverge, however, on the importance of good relations with Iran, with 84% of Turks saying this relationship is important while only 10% of Emiratis agree.

Opinions in **Iraq** are slightly more tempered across the board, with about six in 10 respondents viewing the relationships with the United States (59%), Russia (58%), Turkey (65%), and Saudi Arabia (61%) as important.

In **Saudi Arabia**, three-quarters say good relations with the United States are important (77%), but just 53% and 37% view relations with Russia and Turkey, respectively, as important.

Among **Iranian** respondents, two-thirds say having a good relationship with Russia is important, 59% view good relations with Turkey as important, and less than half say the same of relations with the United States (47%) and Saudi Arabia (45%).

In the case of relations with Iran, about half of the respondents in Egypt (46%), Lebanon (57%), Jordan (54%), Palestine (57%), and Iraq (53%) say that it is important for their countries to have good relations. Sunni and Shia respondents in Lebanon and Iraq are somewhat divided on the importance of having good relations with Iran, with Sunnis less enthusiastic (Lebanon: 50%; Iraq: 43%) and Shia respondents more so (Lebanon: 71%; Iraq: 59%). In Lebanon, it is worth noting that Christian respondents are aligned with their Sunni compatriots in lacking enthusiasm for good relations with Iran (51%). In Turkey, however, the relationship with Iran is viewed as more significant, with 84% of respondents saying it is important. On the other hand, **just one in 10 Saudis and Emiratis say having a good relationship with Iran is important.**

Comparing 2017 Survey to 2016 Survey

Comparing the current survey to responses from last year, we find significant increases in many countries. With respect to the United States, relations are considered important by percentages at least 10 points higher than last year in Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Iran. Good relations with Russia are important for percentages of respondents at least 10 points higher everywhere except Iran, where ratings are stable. The importance of good relations with Turkey is expressed by an increasing number of respondents (at least 10 points higher) in all countries except Saudi Arabia (where it declined by 17 points) and Iran (where it is stable). Good relations with Saudi Arabia are considered important by slightly higher percentages in Egypt and the UAE, while ratings are basically the same in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Finally, with respect to Iran, the percentages of those who consider good relations important have increased by at least 10 points since last year in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey, while the level has stayed the same in Saudi Arabia and dropped by 25 points in the UAE.

SYRIA

With regard to the conflict in Syria, of the list below, which countries do you believe are playing a positive role? Which countries do you believe are playing a negative role?

	EGYPT			LEBANON			JORDAN		
	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET
US	28	58	-30	25	39	-14	25	32	-7
Russia	25	61	-36	29	38	-9	9	58	-49
Iran	3	96	-93	27	41	-14	4	54	-50
Turkey	23	65	-42	35	22	+13	47	12	+35
KSA	46	49	-3	22	29	-7	49	9	+40
None	28	<1	+27	8	0	+8	9	0	-9

	PALESTINE			KSA			UAE		
	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET
US	7	51	-44	50	36	+14	64	23	+41
Russia	25	32	-7	16	72	-56	4	57	-53
Iran	15	39	-24	2	97	-95	6	84	-78
Turkey	35	14	+21	38	46	-8	38	24	+14
KSA	20	12	+8	71	14	+57	48	11	+37
None	28	11	+17	11	<1	+10	10	1	+9

	IRAQ			TURKEY			IRAN		
	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET
US	36	34	+2	70	20	+50	11	78	-67
Russia	25	49	-24	12	81	-69	51	23	+28
Iran	22	55	-33	7	88	-81	61	13	+48
Turkey	46	32	+14	97	1	+96	36	32	+4
KSA	30	41	-11	1	97	-96	15	37	-22
None	9	0	+9	3	0	+3	5	<1	+4

Overall, Turkey is viewed most favorably with respect to playing a positive role in the conflict in Syria. Those who say Turkey plays a positive role outnumber those who say it plays a negative role in Jordan (+35 points), Palestine (+21), Iraq (+14), the UAE (+14), and Lebanon (+13). There is near unanimity among Turks themselves (97% positive vs. 1% negative). Only in Egypt and Saudi Arabia are respondents far more likely to view Turkey as playing a negative role (Egypt: 23% positive vs. 65% negative; Saudi Arabia: 38% positive vs. 46% negative). Opinion about Turkey's role in Syria is divided in Iran (36% positive vs. 32% negative).

Opinions about the roles played by the United States and Saudi Arabia in the Syrian conflict are even more polarized. The United States is viewed by majorities as playing a positive role, and on

balance more positively, by respondents in Turkey (+50), the UAE (+41), and Saudi Arabia (+14). Alternatively, majorities say the United States plays a negative role in Iran (net -67), Palestine (net -44), and Egypt (net -30). And those in Lebanon and Jordan are also more likely to view the United States' role as negative (Lebanon: 25% pos vs. 39% neg; Jordan: 25% pos vs. 32% neg). Iraqis are divided on the U.S. role in Syria (36% vs. 34%).

There is sectarian division with respect to the U.S. role in Syria among respondents in Lebanon and Iraq. In Lebanon, Shia respondents are more likely to view the U.S. role as negative (pos: 20%, neg: 43%) in comparison to Sunni (pos: 30%, neg: 36%) and Christian respondents (pos: 25%, neg: 39%). Conversely, Iraqi Shia are more likely to view the U.S. role in Syria as positive (pos: 40%, neg: 29%) than their Sunni countrymen (pos: 29%, neg: 43%). Both Sunni and Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia view the United States as playing a positive role.

Saudi Arabia's role in the Syrian conflict is more likely to be viewed positively among Saudis themselves (+57), as well as in Jordan (+40), the UAE (+37), and Palestine (+8). On the other hand, the Saudi role is viewed more negatively in Turkey (-96), Iran (-22), Iraq (-11), and Lebanon (-7). Opinion is divided in Egypt (46% vs. 49%).

In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia is viewed negatively for its role in Syria by all religious groups. However, despite the overall view of Iraqis that Saudi Arabia's role in Syria is negative, among Sunni respondents, on balance, more feel that it plays a positive role (39%) than a negative one (24%); the reverse is true for Iraqi Shia respondents (pos: 26%, neg: 51%).

Only among Iranian respondents are the roles of Russia and Iran in the Syrian conflict more likely to be viewed positively. Fifty-one percent (51%) of Iranians say Russia plays a positive role (compared to 23% who say it is negative), and 61% say Iran itself plays a positive role (compared to 13% who say it is negative).

There is mostly dissatisfaction with the role other countries have played in the Syrian conflict.

The strongest negative sentiments about Iran's role in Syria are found among respondents in Saudi Arabia (97%), Egypt (96%), Turkey (88%), and the UAE (84%), with majorities in Jordan and Iraq also holding negative views. While both Sunni and Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia consider Iran's role in Syria overwhelmingly negative, there are sectarian differences in Lebanon and Iraq. A majority of Lebanese Shia respondents say Iran plays a positive role (57%) compared to just 14% of Sunni and 18% of Christian respondents who agree. And though on balance Iraqi Sunni and Shia respondents both hold negative views, Shia respondents are more likely to be positive about Iran's role in Syria than their Sunni counterparts (Sunni: 8% pos vs. 71% neg, Shia: 29% pos vs. 49% neg). (It is surprising and worth noting that Iraqi Shia view both the United States and Turkey as playing more positive roles in Syria than Iran.)

The strongest negative views of Russia’s role in Syria are found in Turkey (81%), Saudi Arabia (72%), and Egypt (61%), with majorities in Jordan and the UAE also viewing Russia as playing a negative role in the Syrian conflict.

Should your own government play an active role shaping the outcome of the conflict in Syria?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Yes	85	58	74		86	94	37	79	66
No	15	42	26		14	6	63	21	34

This question was not asked in Palestine.

Significant majorities in the UAE (94%), Saudi Arabia (86%), Egypt (85%), Turkey (79%), Jordan (74%), and Iran (66%), as well as in Lebanon (58%), think that their government should play an active role in shaping the outcome of the conflict in Syria. Only in Iraq does a majority disagree; just 37% believe the Iraqi government should be an active participant in determining the outcome in Syria.

Can there be a solution in Syria that leaves Bashar al-Assad in power?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Yes	18	42	24	31	33	21	41	21	44
No	82	58	76	65	67	79	59	79	56

Majorities in all nine countries surveyed do not believe that there can be a solution in Syria that leaves Bashar al-Assad in power. This view is strongest, with at least three-quarters saying Assad cannot be part of a solution in Syria, in Egypt (82%), the UAE (79%), Turkey (79%), and Jordan (76%). More than four in 10 respondents in Iran (44%), Lebanon (42%), and Iraq (41%) say Assad could remain in power; in Lebanon and Iraq Shia respondents are more likely than Sunni respondents to hold this view (Lebanon: 36% Sunni vs. 56% Shia; Iraq: 33% Sunni vs. 46% Shia).

Consensus is strong that there is no solution in Syria that leaves Bashar al-Assad in power—even among Iranians.

IRAQ

With regard to the conflict in Iraq, of the list below, which countries do you believe are playing a positive role? Which countries do you believe are playing a negative role?

	EGYPT			LEBANON			JORDAN		
	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET
US	28	58	-30	25	38	-13	22	47	-25
Russia	19	67	-48	18	42	-24	16	38	-22
Iran	<1	95	-94	31	34	-3	8	55	-47
Turkey	27	59	-32	36	24	+12	34	14	+20
KSA	42	43	-1	27	24	+3	30	20	+10
None	28	<1	+27	9	0	+9	19	0	+19

	PALESTINE			KSA			UAE		
	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET
US	10	55	-45	51	27	+24	80	12	+68
Russia	18	29	-11	20	67	-47	4	49	-45
Iran	14	42	-28	7	90	-83	0	100	-100
Turkey	22	14	+8	45	38	+7	33	23	+10
KSA	14	12	+2	69	14	+55	18	11	+7
None	38	10	-28	18	1	+17	11	0	+11

	IRAQ			TURKEY			IRAN		
	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE	NET
US	36	36	0	43	42	+1	23	59	-36
Russia	35	42	-7	30	58	-28	38	22	+16
Iran	36	46	-10	16	74	-58	69	11	+58
Turkey	32	46	-14	94	2	+92	34	41	-7
KSA	23	51	-28	2	98	-96	22	44	-22
None	11	1	+10	4	0	+4	4	0	+4

To begin, it is important to note that **Iraqis are disapproving of almost everyone's role in their country**, except that of the United States where Iraqi opinion is divided.

Iraqis disapprove of the role played by almost everyone—including Iran—in their country.

Overall, **Turkey is again most likely to be viewed as playing a positive role in the conflict in Iraq**, receiving net positive ratings in Lebanon (+12), the UAE (+10), Palestine (+8), and Saudi Arabia (+7),

and in Turkey itself (+92). On the other hand, negative views outnumber positive ones with respect to Turkey's role in the Iraq conflict among respondents in Egypt (-32), Jordan (-20), Iraq (-14), and Iran (-7).

In both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Sunni respondents are more likely than their Shia counterparts to view Turkey's role in Iraq as positive. Among Shia in both countries, majorities say Turkey plays a negative role (Iraq/Shia: 52%, KSA/Shia: 52%), while among Sunni in both countries there is a net positive view of Turkey's role (Iraq/Sunni: 40% pos vs. 37% neg, KSA/Sunni: 48% pos vs. 35% neg).

Nearly all countries are dissatisfied with the roles the U.S., Russia, Iran, Turkey and KSA have played in Iraq.

The United States is seen as playing a positive role by wide margins among Emiratis (+68) and Saudis (+24), while opinions are split in Iraq itself (36% positive vs. 36% negative) and in Turkey (43% positive vs. 42% negative). In the remaining five countries, respondents who say the United States plays a negative role outnumber those who view its role as positive (Palestine: -45, Iran: -36, Egypt: -30, Jordan: -25, Lebanon: -13).

Majorities of both Shia (52%) and Sunni (59%) respondents in Saudi Arabia say the U.S. role in Iraq is positive. However, in Iraq itself we find a sectarian divide, with Sunni respondents twice as likely to say the U.S. role is negative (24% pos vs. 47% neg) and Shia respondents more likely to view it as positive (42% pos vs. 30% neg).

Saudi Arabia's role in the Iraq conflict is more likely to be seen as positive than negative among Saudis themselves (+55), and in Jordan (+10) and the UAE (+7), while opinion is split in Egypt, Lebanon, and Palestine. Those who view Saudi Arabia's role negatively outnumber those who view it positively in Turkey (-96) and Iran (-22), and most notably in Iraq itself (23% positive vs. 51% negative).

On balance, Shia and Sunni respondents in Iraq both view Saudi Arabia's role as negative, with Iraqi Shia holding slightly more negative views (20% pos vs. 56% neg) than their Sunni counterparts (28% pos vs. 41% neg).

Only Iranian respondents are more likely to say that Russia and Iran play positive roles rather than negative roles, by 16 and 58 points respectively. Fewer than one in five respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE say Russia plays a positive role; about one-third of those in Iraq and Turkey agree. Shia respondents in Iraq are more likely than their Sunni compatriots to see Russia as playing a positive role (Shia: 44% vs. Sunni: 17%). The same divide is found among Shia and Sunni respondents in Saudi Arabia; however, there is a net negative view of Russia's role by both groups in Saudi Arabia (KSA/Sunni: 17% pos vs. 70% neg, KSA/Shia: 39% pos vs. 49% neg).

And Iran is viewed positively by even fewer respondents in most countries; only in Lebanon and Iraq where Iran is viewed as playing a positive role by many Shia respondents (47% in both countries) do more than three in 10 respondents overall say Iran’s role in Iraq is positive. Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia are also more positive about Iran’s role (42% vs. 51% neg), but Sunni respondents are so overwhelmingly negative toward Iran that only 7% of Saudis have a positive view of Iran’s role in Iraq.

Which is the best outcome for the future of Iraq?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
It is best that the Iraqi government in Baghdad be reformed so that it represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation in order to keep the country unified.	75	50	38	36	76	74	44	43	42
It is best for Iraq to recognize that national unity can best be maintained if the country becomes a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the government in Baghdad.	17	28	41	33	12	20	49	35	41
It is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible.	9	22	21	30	12	6	7	23	17
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.									

Three-quarters of respondents in Saudi Arabia (76%), Egypt (75%), and the UAE (74%) say that the best outcome for Iraq would be reform of the Iraqi government in Baghdad “so that it represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation in order to keep the country unified.” Pluralities in Lebanon (50%) and Turkey (43%) agree. Opinions are divided in Jordan, Palestine, Iran, and Iraq itself between this type of governmental reform leading to a unified country and the country becoming “a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the government in Baghdad” (Jordan: 38% reform vs. 41% federation, Palestine: 36% vs. 33%, Iran: 42% vs. 43%, Iraq: 44% vs. 49%).

Three in 10 Palestinian respondents say “it is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible,” a view shared by less than one-quarter of respondents in all other countries, including just 7% of Iraqis.

	IRAQ			
	SHIA	SUNNI	KURDS	ARABS
It is best that the Iraqi government in Baghdad be reformed so that it represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation in order to keep the country unified.	46	40	47	44
It is best for Iraq to recognize that national unity can best be maintained if the country becomes a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the government in Baghdad.	47	54	47	49
It is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible.	7	6	6	7

We find the same divide within each of the sects and ethnic groups in Iraq who are torn between a federation of autonomous regions and a reformed government in Baghdad, with only 6-7% saying unity is impossible. The only slight difference of opinion is that a majority of Sunni respondents prefer the federation of autonomous regions (54%) to a more representative government in Baghdad (40%), while Shia respondents are evenly split (46% reform vs. 47% federation).

What is the best outcome for the future of the Kurdistan Region?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
That it become an independent Kurdish state.	42	36	39	35	9	17	36	10	42
That it continue to operate as an autonomous region as part of the Iraqi state.	58	64	61	65	91	83	64	90	58

↓

	IRAQ	
	KURDS	ARABS
Independent state	45	35
Autonomous region	55	65

Majorities in all countries surveyed think that the Kurdistan Region should “continue to operate as an autonomous region as part of the Iraqi state.” This view is strongest in Saudi Arabia (91%), Turkey (90%), and the UAE (83%), with about six in 10 respondents in all other countries in agreement. The highest rates of agreement with the alternative option, “an independent Kurdish state,” are in Egypt (42%) and Iran (42%) as well as among Kurds in Iraq (45% compared to 35% of Iraqi Arabs).

Little support exists for Kurdish independence, including among all groups in Iraq.

[Note: While the percentage of Iraqi Kurds seeking an independent state may seem quite low in comparison to the recent referendum, please note that this poll was conducted nationwide in Iraq, while the referendum was held only in the autonomous region and included all Kurds whether or not they voted. In addition, our survey was completed a week prior to the referendum, and therefore does not reflect campaigns to sway voters in the lead up to the vote.]

YEMEN

When you consider the conflict in Yemen, in your opinion, which of the following is the most important concern?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
The presence of al Qaeda in the Arabian Gulf	22	29	23	17	44	21	27	35	33
The restoration of the legitimate government	14	25	27	31	10	29	21	15	30
The threat of Iranian interference	35	21	36	32	35	41	29	23	14
The humanitarian crisis	29	25	15	21	10	9	23	27	23
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.									

Overall the most frequently cited concern with respect to the conflict in Yemen is “the threat of Iranian interference,” the top choice in the UAE (41%), Jordan (36%), Egypt (35%), Palestine (32%), and Iraq (29%), though it is of the least concern to Iranians (14%) and Lebanese (21%). “The presence of al Qaeda in the Arabian Gulf” is the top concern for Saudis (44%) and in Turkey (35%), Iran (33%), and Lebanon (29%). The other two concerns, “restoration of the legitimate government” and “the humanitarian crisis,” are the third and fourth ranked concerns, but are still cited by as many as one-quarter of respondents in many countries.

US POLICIES UNDER TRUMP

With the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, with regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, do you see a positive or negative change in US policy or do you see it remaining the same or do you feel it is too early to tell?

The conflict in Syria

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
More positive	36	16	25	17	41	75	24	75	12
More negative	56	33	30	52	43	25	32	21	36
Remaining the same	4	29	26	25	16	<1	26	2	29
Too early to tell	4	23	19	6	<1	<1	19	3	23

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Three-quarters of respondents in the UAE and Turkey say the change in U.S. policy with respect to the Syrian conflict since the election of Donald Trump as president has been positive. On the other hand, majorities in Egypt (56%) and Palestine (52%) feel it has been a negative change. Respondents are split between considering changes in U.S. policy about Syria positive and negative in Saudi Arabia (41% vs. 43%), Jordan (25% vs. 30%), and Iraq (24% vs. 32%). Pluralities in Lebanon (33%) and Iran (36%) view U.S. policy in Syria under President Trump as a positive change, though majorities in both countries say either it has remained the same or it is too early to tell.

The conflict in Iraq

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
More positive	35	24	21	11	35	87	20	50	12
More negative	55	35	37	42	21	13	27	20	29
Remaining the same	6	29	26	39	43	0	29	23	32
Too early to tell	4	12	16	8	1	0	24	7	27

Eighty-seven percent (87%) of Emiratis view changes in U.S. policy under the Trump administration with respect to the conflict in Iraq as positive, as do half of all respondents in Turkey (50%). A majority in Egypt (55%), however, view these changes negatively, as do pluralities in Palestine (42%), Jordan (37%), and Lebanon (35%). Opinions in Saudi Arabia, in Iran, and particularly in Iraq itself are quite divided. Slight pluralities in all three countries say U.S. policy has remained the same (KSA: 43%, Iran: 32%, Iraq: 29%). In Saudi Arabia the remaining respondents lean toward a positive view of changes in U.S. policy in Iraq (35% vs. 21% negative), while the majority of Iraqis and Iranians are split between a negative view of U.S. policy under Trump toward Iraq (27% and 29%, respectively) and the view that it is too early to tell (24% and 27%, respectively).

US relations with your country

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
More positive	34	29	33	8	47	33	23	25	11
More negative	52	39	26	49	6	17	17	14	36
Remaining the same	7	15	21	32	34	46	33	50	35
Too early to tell	7	17	20	11	13	4	27	10	17
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.									

Almost half of Saudi respondents (47%) see changes in U.S.-Saudi relations since Trump's election as positive, with just 6% seeing the change as negative. On the other hand, about one-half of Egyptians (52%) and Palestinians (49%) view changes in U.S. relations with their countries since Trump's election as negative, as do a plurality in Lebanon (39%). Iranians are split between saying U.S.-Iran relations have become more negative (36%) or have stayed the same (35%). Majorities in Turkey (50%), the UAE (46%), and Iraq (33%) say their countries' relations with the United States have remained the same since the election of Donald Trump, though between one-quarter and one-third of respondents in each country see a positive change in relations (Turkey: 25%, UAE: 33%, Iraq: 23%). Finally, in Jordan, opinions are quite divided, with one-third saying the change in U.S. relations with Jordan have been positive, 26% saying the change is negative, 21% saying relations have remained the same, and 20% saying it is too early to tell.

US relations with the Muslim World

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
More positive	33	22	27	10	17	14	28	1	20
More negative	55	31	32	44	12	25	27	14	39
Remaining the same	6	31	23	32	36	23	21	27	30
Too early to tell	6	16	18	14	36	37	24	57	10
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.									

When asked about changes in U.S. policy since the election of Trump with respect to the Muslim World, a majority of respondents in Egypt (55%) and pluralities in Palestine (44%) and Iran (39%) say such changes are negative. Six in 10 Lebanese respondents are evenly split between those who view U.S. policy toward the Muslim World as negative (31%) and those who say they are the same as before Trump was elected (31%). A majority in Turkey (57%) and a plurality in the UAE (37%) maintain that it is too early to tell if changes in U.S. policy toward the Muslim World are positive or negative. And Saudis are split between those who say the policy has remained the same (36%) and those who think it is too early to tell (36%). Finally, majorities in Jordan and Iraq are split between viewing changes in U.S. policy toward the Muslim World as positive and negative (Jordan: 27% vs 32%, Iraq: 28% vs. 27%).

Dealing with Iran

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
More positive	2	27	28	12	48	55	28	8	
More negative	86	29	41	29	0	18	41	68	
Remaining the same	8	25	19	37	20	5	17	11	
Too early to tell	4	19	12	21	32	22	14	13	
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. This question was not asked in Iran.									

More than two-thirds of respondents in Egypt (86%) and Turkey (68%) say U.S. policy changes with respect to Iran since the election of Trump are negative, as do pluralities in Jordan (41%) and Iraq (41%). On the other hand, about one-half of respondents in the UAE (55%) and Saudi Arabia (48%) view these changes as positive. Palestinians and Lebanese are split on this question, with Lebanese respondents evenly divided among those who see the changes as positive (27%), negative (29%), and the same (25%), while Palestinians lean toward viewing the policy as remaining the same (37%) with others saying it is negative (29%) or too early to tell (21%).

ISRAEL-PALESTINE

The Trump Administration has indicated that it hopes to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From what you have seen so far, how confident are you that they will be able to make progress in their efforts?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Confident	7	40	35	34	18	1	39	52	39
Not confident	93	60	65	66	82	99	61	48	61

In eight of the nine countries surveyed majorities do not have confidence that the Trump Administration will make progress in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This lack of confidence is highest in the UAE (99%), Egypt (93%), and Saudi Arabia (82%), with at least six in 10 respondents saying they do not have confidence in Palestine (66%), Jordan (65%), Iraq (61%), Iran (61%), and Lebanon (60%). Only in Turkey does a slim majority (52%) say they are confident that the Trump Administration will be able to make progress in resolving the conflict.

With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which of the following options would you be more inclined to support?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
That the Palestinians have an independent state as part of a two-state solution	67	36	30	21	74	83	20	45	26
That there be a one-state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis	13	23	25	38	5	2	61	38	42
I don't believe a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis is possible.	20	40	45	41	21	15	20	17	32

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

When asked if they support a two-state solution or a one-state solution, or do not believe settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis is possible, **strong majorities in the UAE (83%), Saudi Arabia (74%), and Egypt (67%) continue to support an independent state of Palestine as part of a two-state solution;** a plurality of respondents in Turkey (45%) agree. A majority in Iraq (61%) as well as a plurality in Iran (42%) would be more inclined to support a one-state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis; 38% of respondents in Turkey and in Palestine itself also prefer a one-state solution. **At least four in 10 respondents, representing pluralities, in Jordan (45%), Lebanon (40%), and Palestine itself (41%) do not believe that a settlement of the conflict is possible;** one-third of Iranian respondents (32%) and about two in 10 respondents in all other countries surveyed also hold this view that no settlement is possible.

It has been suggested that an alliance between Israel and Arab governments would be useful in fighting extremist groups and combating Iran’s regional interference. Which of the following best describes your opinion?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Such a partnership would be desirable, but only if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative	59	40	35		48	48	51	54	
Such a partnership should not be pursued even if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative	34	43	52		50	50	43	21	
Such a partnership would be desirable and should be pursued whether or not Israel ends its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative	7	16	13		2	1	6	25	
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. This question was not asked in Palestine or Iran.									

Majorities in Egypt (59%), Turkey (54%), and Iraq (51%), as well as just under one-half of respondents in the UAE (48%) and Saudi Arabia (48%), say that **an alliance between Israel and Arab governments would be desirable for combating extremism and Iran’s interference, but “only if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative.”** On the other hand, one-half of those in Jordan (52%), the UAE (50%), and Saudi Arabia (50%), as well as 43% of respondents in Lebanon and Iraq, say that even if Israel ends its occupation, such a partnership should not be pursued. **There is minimal support for an alliance between Israel and Arab governments for combating extremism without a resolution in Palestine;** one-quarter in Turkey (25%) hold this view, with a scant number of respondents in other countries agreeing – 7% or less in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq.

PALESTINIAN ATTITUDES

In 2002 the Arab League unanimously endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative in which they agreed to establish normalized ties with Israel if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories and resolve the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?

	PALESTINE
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, and more effort should be made to achieve this goal.	41
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, but I don't believe that the Israelis will give up the territories.	27
Even if the Israelis agree to return all of the territories and agree to resolve the refugee issue, I am not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel.	32

Palestinians are quite divided in their views of the Arab Peace Initiative and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Overall, **two-thirds (68%) say they are “prepared for a just and comprehensive peace” if Israel meets the terms of the API, but while 41% think this is a goal worth pursuing, 27% “do not believe that the Israelis will give up the territories.”** The remaining one-third of Palestinian respondents (32%) are “not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel” even if the Israelis return all the territories and resolve the refugee issue.

Those respondents who support Fatah are more likely than those who support Hamas to say that more effort should be made to achieve a comprehensive peace with Israel through the API framework (Fatah: 43% vs. Hamas: 30%). On the other hand, Hamas supporters are twice as likely as Fatah supporters to say they are “not ready” for peace (Fatah: 28% vs. Hamas: 54%).

How do you rate your satisfaction with the overall performance of...?

		PALESTINE					
		OVERALL	FATAH	HAMAS	WEST BANK	GAZA	JERUSALEM
The Palestinian Authority	Satisfied	46	45	31	46	47	46
	Not satisfied	54	55	69	54	53	54
Hamas	Satisfied	31	16	81	30	30	43
	Not satisfied	69	84	19	70	70	57

Majorities of Palestinians are not satisfied with both the Palestinian Authority (54%) and Hamas (69%), with significantly less satisfaction with Hamas. Those who support Hamas are less likely than those who support Fatah to express satisfaction with the Palestinian Authority (Fatah: 45% vs. Hamas: 31%), but are far more likely to express satisfaction with Hamas (Fatah: 16% vs. Hamas: 81%). There is little difference in satisfaction ratings based on residence in the West Bank, Gaza, or Jerusalem, though those who live in Jerusalem are a bit more likely to say they are satisfied with Hamas (43%) than their compatriots in the West Bank (30%) or Gaza (30%).

How important is it that the major Palestinian parties achieve unity? How confident are you that the major Palestinian parties will achieve unity in the next few years?

		PALESTINE					
		OVERALL	FATAH	HAMAS	WEST BANK	GAZA	JERUSALEM
Importance of unity	Important	70	63	79	63	74	94
	Not important	30	37	21	37	26	6
Confidence in unity	Confident	37	36	41	34	41	39
	Not confident	63	64	59	66	59	61

Seven in 10 Palestinian respondents (70%) say that it is important that the major Palestinian parties achieve unity, but only half as many (37%) are confident that such unity will be achieved in the next few years. Hamas supporters and those who live in Jerusalem are most likely to feel that unity is important (Hamas: 79%; Jerusalem: 94%), but the low confidence in achieving unity is basically the same across political parties and areas of residence.

Growing Palestinian despair about the possibility of peace is clear, as is declining support for both PA and Hamas.

Which of the following, in your opinion, is the best course of action for the Palestinian Authority?

		PALESTINE					
		OVERALL	FATAH	HAMAS	WEST BANK	GAZA	JERUSALEM
To remain as it is		12	13	8	14	9	13
To make a determined effort to press for unity		65	70	56	62	70	59
To dissolve		23	18	36	24	20	28

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

About two-thirds of Palestinian respondents (65%) say the Palestinian Authority should “make a determined effort to press for unity,” while one-quarter say it should “dissolve” (23%) and just 12% want it “to remain as it is.”

Have you or any members of your immediate family suffered violence at the hand of...?

		PALESTINE					
		OVERALL	FATAH	HAMAS	WEST BANK	GAZA	JERUSALEM
Israeli military, police or border patrols, or Shin Bet	Yes	35	32	54	37	28	54
	No	65	68	46	63	72	46
Israeli settlers	Yes	30	24	47	34	16	69
	No	70	76	53	66	84	31

One-third of Palestinian respondents (35%) say they (or their immediate family members) have suffered violence at the hand of Israeli military, police or border patrols, or Shin Bet. Three in 10 say they have suffered violence at the hands of Israeli settlers. Hamas supporters and Palestinians from Jerusalem are most likely to say they have suffered violence (Hamas: military/police: 54%, settlers: 47%; Jerusalem: military/police: 54%, settlers: 69%).

IRAN

With regard to Iran, of the following policy recommendations, in your opinion, which is the most important policy that the Great Powers should pursue?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Continue to enforce the "Iran Deal" to limit Iran's nuclear ambitions	20	33	26	19	34	22	18	62	
Scrap the "Iran Deal" and impose tough sanctions on Iran in response to its meddling role in the region's conflicts	34	18	31	24	42	56	32	13	
Press Iran to participate in a regional security framework to help bring peace to the region	35	33	26	29	18	20	26	4	
Work more closely with and provide more assistance to the GCC countries to assist their efforts to contain Iran	10	16	17	28	6	2	24	21	
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. This question was not asked in Iran.									

Respondents were asked to consider four possible policies for the Great Powers with respect to Iran. Attitudes in most countries are quite mixed, with majorities in only two countries settling on one option: 62% in Turkey think there should be "continued enforcement of the 'Iran Deal' to limit Iran's nuclear ambitions" and 56% in the UAE want to "scrap the 'Iran Deal' and impose tough sanctions on Iran in response to its meddling role in the region's conflicts." A plurality of Saudis (42%) agree with Emiratis, though another one-third of respondents in Saudi Arabia (34%) would prefer to continue with the current Iran Deal.

There is no regional consensus on what to do with "Iran Deal."

The more mixed responses can be summarized as follows:

One-third of Egyptians (34%) want to impose tough sanctions and set aside the current deal, while another third (35%) would prefer to "press Iran to participate in a regional security framework to help bring peace to the region."

One-third of Lebanese respondents (33%) want to continue with the current deal, while another third (33%) want Iran to participate in a regional security framework.

Jordanians are split among continuing the current deal (26%), scrapping the current deal and replacing it with tough sanctions (31%), and the regional security framework including Iran (26%).

Finally, Palestinians and Iraqis are the most divided in their responses with varying levels of support for the three options presented thus far (i.e., current deal, new sanctions, security framework) and “working more closely with and providing more assistance to the GCC countries to assist their efforts to contain Iran.”

IRANIAN ATTITUDES

How satisfied are you with your government's performance with respect to each of the following?

		IRAN	
		2016	2017
Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Satisfied	51	62
	Not satisfied	49	38
Advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights	Satisfied	30	46
	Not satisfied	70	54
Giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen	Satisfied	47	60
	Not satisfied	53	40

We asked Iranian respondents to rate their satisfaction with their government's performance on several issues, repeating questions we asked them last year. About six in 10 respondents are satisfied with the government's investment "in improving the economy and creating employment" (62%) and "giving greater support to Iranian allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen" (60%). Just under one-half (46%) of Iranian respondents are satisfied with their government's work "advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights." In all cases, these rates of satisfaction are 10-16 points higher than last year's numbers.

Possibly motivated by "failure" of the West, Iranians now show increased support for their government's regional policies.

How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in...?

		IRAN			
		2014	2015	2016	2017
Syria	Important	90	73	24	69
	Not important	7	28	76	31
Lebanon	Important	88	72	43	67
	Not important	10	28	57	33
Iraq	Important	87	64	47	75
	Not important	10	36	53	25
Yemen	Important	62	43	39	58
	Not important	36	57	61	42

Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included.

For the last three years we have asked Iranian respondents how important it is to them that their government continues to be involved in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. **Between 2014 and 2016, attitudes were in decline**, with fewer respondents suggesting that continued involvement was important. **However, in the current survey, we find that attitudes toward government involvement in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon are way up from last year and back to the higher levels of 2014 and 2015**—ending a two-year decline. Involvement in Iraq is deemed most important, with three-quarters of Iranian respondents saying it is important; at least two-thirds feel the same with respect to Iran’s involvement in Lebanon (67%) and Syria (69%). Yemen, the conflict that has always ranked at the bottom for respondents, is considered important by 58% of Iranians in the current survey, close to the 62% who said it was important in 2014.

Which of the following best describes your opinion of the implementation of the nuclear deal?

	IRAN
I am satisfied with the implementation	24
Iran has met its obligations but the West has not yet met its obligations	46
Iran has met its obligations and the West will not do so because it is hostile to Iran	30

When asked about the implementation of the nuclear deal, 46% of Iranian respondents say that “Iran has met its obligations but the West has not yet met its obligations.” Three in 10 respondents (30%) go further, saying not only has Iran met its obligations, while the West has not, but also that “the West will not do so because it is hostile to Iran.” In other words, **more than three-quarters of Iranians fault Western countries for not meeting their obligations. Just one-quarter of Iranian respondents (24%) say they are “satisfied with the implementation.”**

TURKISH ATTITUDES

How satisfied are you with your government's performance with respect to each of the following?

		TURKEY
Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Satisfied	61
	Not satisfied	39
Advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights	Satisfied	44
	Not satisfied	56
Improving relations with the United States and the West	Satisfied	39
	Not satisfied	61

Respondents in Turkey were asked about their satisfaction with their government's performance on several issues. A majority (61%) is satisfied with this performance with respect to "investing in improving the economy and creating employment." On the other hand, only about four in 10 respondents are satisfied with their government's performance with respect to "advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights" (44%) and "improving relations with the United States and the West" (39%).

REFUGEES

Respondents in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey were asked about their attitudes toward the impact of Syrian refugees in their countries, questions we previously asked in 2014.

What is the impact of Syrian refugees coming into your country...

		LEBANON		JORDAN		TURKEY	
		2014	2017	2014	2017	2014	2017
On your country's security?	Positive	14	30	16	29	4	7
	Negative	55	42	61	38	39	89
	No impact	24	28	18	34	56	4
On your country's economy?	Positive	32	25	16	31	9	14
	Negative	36	46	58	35	56	76
	No impact	26	30	22	35	30	10

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Pluralities in Lebanon view the impact of Syrian refugees in their countries as negative with respect to both security (42%) and the economy (46%). While these numbers indicate a more tempered view of the impact of refugees on Lebanese security since 2014, with the “positive impact” rating increasing from 14% to 30%, it is a more negative view of their impact on the Lebanese economy (with the positive number falling 7 points and the negative number rising 10 points).

In Jordan, attitudes are quite mixed, with almost equal numbers of respondents saying that refugees have a positive, a negative, or no impact on both security and the economy. **Since 2014, we find an increase in positive attitudes and a decrease in negative attitudes with respect to the impact of Syrian refugees on both Jordanian security** (positive increase of 13 points, negative decrease of 23 points) **and the Jordanian economy** (positive increase of 15 points, negative decrease of 23 points).

In Turkey, however, we see hardening negative views since 2014. More than three-quarters of respondents say Syrian refugees have a negative impact on Turkey’s security (89%) and on the Turkish economy (76%).

POLITICAL ISLAM

Should religious movements restrict themselves to personal faith and spiritual guidance, or should they play a direct role in political life and governance?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Restrict themselves to personal faith and spiritual guidance.	81	59	56	39	85	84	41	84	66
Play a direct role in political life and governance	19	41	44	61	15	16	59	16	34

Majorities in all countries surveyed except Palestine and Iraq think that religious movements should “restrict themselves to personal faith and spiritual guidance.” This belief is strongest in Saudi Arabia (85%), the UAE (84%), Turkey (84%), and Egypt (81%), followed by Iran (66%), Lebanon (59%), and Jordan (56%). About six in 10 Palestinian (61%) and Iraqi (59%) respondents say that religious movements should “play a direct role in political life and governance.”

Majorities in most countries believe religious movements should stay out of politics and governing.

When religious movements and their supporters have taken power, in general, have they made their countries stronger or weaker?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
They have made their countries stronger.	19	52	47	26	16	16	29	4	58
They have made the countries weaker.	81	48	53	74	84	84	71	96	42

Respondents were asked about the effects that religious movements have had in countries where they have taken power. **Only in Lebanon and Iran do majorities say such movements make countries stronger** (Lebanon: 52%, Iran: 58%). The alternative view, that religious movements taking political power make countries weaker, is most prevalent in Turkey (96%), Saudi Arabia (84%), the UAE (84%), and Egypt (81%); more than seven in 10 respondents in Palestine (74%) and Iraq (71%) agree, as do 53% of Jordanians.

When religious movements do govern, have they in general improved the lives of citizens or made them worse?

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
They have improved the lives of citizens.	17	50	49	30	16	16	23	4	62
They have worsened the lives of citizens.	83	50	51	70	84	84	77	96	38

Similarly, when asked if governing religious movements improve the lives of citizens in their countries or make them worse, more than seven in 10 respondents in Turkey (96%), Saudi Arabia (84%), the UAE (84%), Egypt (83%), Iraq (77%), and Palestine (70%) say they make the lives of their citizens worse. Opinion is evenly split in Lebanon (50% vs. 50%) and Jordan (49% vs. 51%). **Only in Iran does a majority feel that governing religious movements in general improve the lives of citizens (62%).**

In which of the following cases have religious movements been effective in making their countries stronger and improving the quality of life? [Responses are ranked for each surveyed country.]

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	OVERALL RANK
Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood	4	2	3	5	2	3	5	4
Turkey under the AKP	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	1
Iran under the Ayatollah	2	1	5	3	4	2	3	3
Palestinian Authority under Hamas	5	5	4	4	5	5	4	5
Tunisia under Ennahda	3	3	2	2	3	4	1	2

Rankings are based on the percentage of respondents that deem each movement effective. These questions were not asked in Turkey or Iran.

Respondents were asked which governing religious movements have been effective in making countries stronger and improving citizens' quality of life. The table above shows rankings within each surveyed country based on the percentages of respondents who say the movement has been effective.

Despite mixed or negative feelings toward religious movements in government, respondents give higher grades to the AKP in Turkey and Tunisia's Ennahda for having been effective in governance. The AKP is deemed effective by 81% of respondents in Egypt, 70% of Emiratis, and 59% of Saudis. Ennahda in Tunisia is viewed as the next most effective religious movement that governed, with a top ranking by Iraqi respondents and second place rankings in Jordan and Palestine. Iran under the Ayatollah, ranked first by Lebanese respondents, follows as the next most effective religious movement that has governed. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in Palestine are deemed the least effective of these examples, with the lowest ranking among Egyptians, Lebanese, Saudis, and Emiratis.

While there is little variation in the attitudes of Sunni, Shia, and Christian respondents in Lebanon with respect to these governing religious movements, in Iraq there are some differences of opinion. Sunni Iraqis are most likely to view the AKP in Turkey (54%) and Ennahda in Tunisia (50%) as effective, with their lowest rating going to Iran under the Ayatollah (4%). On the other hand, among Shia Iraqis the most effective governing religious movements are deemed to be Ennahda (46%) and Iran

under the Ayatollah (44%), with the lowest percentage going to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which is only viewed as effective by 15% of Shia respondents in Iraq.

Do you agree or disagree that it is appropriate for Arab governments to provide financial support to religious institutions and movements outside the Middle East? for Arab individuals and groups to provide financial support to religious institutions and movements outside the Middle East?

		EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Arab governments	Agree	19	57	66	38	20	3	41		
	Disagree	81	43	34	62	80	97	59		
Arab individuals and groups	Agree	19	47	53	39	16	3	54		
	Disagree	81	53	47	61	84	97	46		
These questions were not asked in Turkey or Iran.										

At least eight in 10 respondents in the UAE (97%), Egypt (81%), and Saudi Arabia (80%) as well as about six in 10 Palestinians (62%) and Iraqis (59%) say that they do not think it is appropriate for Arab governments to provide financial support to religious institutions and movements outside the Middle East. On the other hand, majorities in Jordan (66%) and Lebanon (57%) do consider this appropriate.

With respect to Arab individuals and groups providing such support, again more than eight in 10 Emiratis (97%), Saudis (84%), and Egyptians (81%) as well as majorities in Palestine (61%) and Lebanon (53%) think this is inappropriate. Just over half of those in Iraq (53%) and Jordan (53%) say such financial support is appropriate.

Methodology

The approach used for conducting the poll involved face-to-face personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered in each country to cover a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative and was comprised of adult males and females who were 15+ years of age; in Palestine, adults ages 18 and up were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, only citizens and Arab expatriates were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where door-to-door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. However, adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was not skewed and was broadly representative. Since random, door-to-door sampling is possible in the remaining countries, a multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for selection of respondents in each country. In addition, 50 respondents were re-pollled in four countries to reconfirm responses and ascertain reasoning for particular responses.

COUNTRY	SAMPLE SIZE	MARGIN OF ERROR	DATES OF SURVEY	COVERAGE
Lebanon	625	±3.9	9/5 - 9/16/17	Beirut (East & West Beirut), Baabda, El Maten, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, Saayda
Jordan	634	±3.9	9/5 - 9/15/17	Amman City, Balqa, Madaba, Irbid, Jarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba
Iraq	1028	±3.0	9/5 - 9/17/17	Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Karbala, Nassiriyah, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	1034	±3.0	9/5 - 9/17/17	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Haymana, Ceyhan
KSA	1039	±3.0	9/5 - 9/17/17	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Shammasyah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail and Hufuf
UAE	436	±4.7	9/5 - 9/15/17	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Egypt	1037	±3.0	9/4 - 9/15/17	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban & rural), Menia (urban & rural), Asyut (urban & rural), Tanta (urban & rural)
Iran	1025	±3.1	9/5 - 9/19/17	Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, Ahwaz
Palestine	1016	±3.1	8/24 - 9/15/17	Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Hebron, Jericho, Tulkarem, Tubas, Qalqilya, Salfit, Gaza City, North Gaza, Deir Al-Balah, Khan Yunis, Rafah

Demographics

	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Male	51	50	53	50	56	49	50	50	51
Female	49	50	47	50	44	51	50	50	49
Under 30	42	35	44	47	39	56	45	32	33
30+	58	65	56	53	61	44	55	68	67
In city	57	88	78	70	83	86	66	73	78
Out of city	43	12	22	20 (village); 9 (refugee camp)	17	14	34	27	22
Sunni	89	25	96		85	91	35	85	6
Shia	1	29	2		15	9	65	15	94
Other religion	9 (Christian)	40 (Christian); 6 (Druze)	2 (Christian)						
Ethnicity							17 (Kurd); 75 (Arab); 8 (other)		

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