



Looking to the Next Decade

Arab, Turkish & Iranian Opinion

Zogby RESEARCH
SERVICES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between August 25 and September 26, 2019, Zogby Research Services conducted face-to-face polls, surveying 8,315 adults in eight Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), Turkey, and Iran. We were commissioned by the Sir Bani Yas Forum to explore attitudes toward a range of issues including: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the roles played by different forces in the “Arab Spring” uprisings; the conflict in Syria; the defeat of Daesh; attitudes toward Iran; U.S. policy in the region; and, looking forward to the next decade, their expectations for their most dependable partners and their priorities for their country and for the region. We also surveyed Iraqis, Palestinians, and Iranians about developments within their countries. What follows is a summary of the most significant findings followed by a complete description of the results.

1. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

There is no question that there is a change in Arab attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

When asked to rank priority concerns the Arab World must address going forward, **justice for the Palestinians comes in last place out of the nine issues covered in the survey.** We also find a **substantial number of respondents in all countries saying that normalization with Israel would be desirable even if there were no Israeli-Palestinian peace. But this desire to normalize should not be overstated as it masks some degree of resignation and even some resentment.** The poll suggests that the main contributing factors are frustration with the Palestinian leadership, weariness with war, and the possibility of giving Arabs greater leverage to help secure rights for the Palestinians.

2. Palestinian Attitudes

Palestinians appear to feel abandoned by the United States and the Arab World and depressed by their current situation.

More than three-quarters say things are moving in the wrong direction. And one-half say they are worse off today than they were five years ago.

Palestinians find fault with both the United States and Israel and see only the Palestinian Authority (PA) as having made positive contributions to peace. While the role of the PA is seen more positively than Hamas by respondents in every region of the occupied lands including Gaza, a significant majority of all Palestinians want the competing factions to unify.

3. Arab Spring Countries

When evaluating the roles played by the various forces in the “Arab Spring” uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Sudan, **the military and popular movements in all four countries are given the highest positive scores** by our respondents. In **Egypt** the military is rated as playing the most positive role in six of the seven countries surveyed, while in **Sudan** the popular movement is rated highest in four of the seven.

The attitudes of Egyptians and Tunisians about the entities that have played positive roles in their own countries are particularly noteworthy. **In Egypt almost one-third of respondents say no party has played a positive role,** and only

one in eight say the popular movement has been a positive player. **In Tunisia, the roles played by the military and the popular movements are seen positively by slightly more than one-third.** Only one in five Egyptians and one in four Tunisians say that the political Islamist parties in their countries have played a positive role.

Also note that **the satisfaction and optimism ratings Egyptians give to the situation in their country are quite low, while the Tunisians are more positive.**

4. Syria

Attitudes toward Syria remain conflicted. **There is a growing acceptance that the Assad government has survived.** But many respondents see Syria under Assad remaining divided, with Russia and Iran playing important roles in the country. Between one-quarter and one-third of respondents in almost all countries surveyed see future clashes between Assad and the opposition or between Russia and Iran for influence in the country.

Opinion is divided as to whether Syria will have peace in the next 10 years.

5. Daesh

A strong majority of respondents in most of the countries covered in this survey feel **confident that Daesh has been defeated.** Only in Lebanon, Turkey, and Palestine are respondents not confident.

6. Iraqi Attitudes

As we have seen in past surveys, **the majority of Iraqis continue to favor a unified country led by a reformed government that pursues national reconciliation.** This view is held by all of Iraq's component groups: Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds.

Despite continued hardships, Iraqis appear to want to believe that the country is turning a corner toward achieving national unity. In a follow-up survey, many say that **recent demonstrations, which they support, have shaken their confidence in government institutions.** And they place **blame for the violence on outside players, some parties seeking advantage, and some undisciplined government forces.**

With regard to Daesh, one-half of Iraqis blame "outside interests for trying to destabilize" their country. Majorities credit their military and the PMU for defeating them, and two-thirds have confidence that the government in Baghdad is taking the right steps to prevent Daesh's reemergence. Nevertheless, despite this display of confidence, **a majority of Iraqis say that they are worse off today than they were five years ago, with an even greater number saying they expect their situation will be worse five years from now.**

Many Iraqis have soured on both the United States and Iran. They see a negative change in U.S. policy toward their country, and a majority express concern with Iran's role in their country, including almost one-half of the Shia community.

7. Attitudes Toward Iran

Far and away, the **greatest concern most respondents across the region express about Iran is with that country's nuclear program.** This is followed by **Iran's role in the Arab Gulf,** and then its involvement in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen in that order.

It is important to note that **the number one concern of the Lebanese is with Iran's involvement in their country, and the top concern of Iraqis is with Iran's involvement in their country.** These are both significant and new developments since past polling showed Iran was viewed more favorably in both countries. It is also noteworthy that Turkey's top concern with Iran is its involvement in Syria.

The issue that is least cited by respondents is Iran's ballistic missile program.

Looking to the next decade, slight majorities everywhere but Saudi Arabia and Tunisia say they have at least some confidence that there will be peace between the Arabs and Iran. Iraqis are divided on this matter, with a slight majority not confident that such a peace will exist.

8. Iranian Attitudes

As we have seen in past polls, **when Iran is under attack, public opinion appears to rally in support of their government and its policies, even if those policies are not in their interests.** This is certainly the case now, with more than six in 10 Iranians saying that U.S. policy has turned negative toward their country in the last three years and **one-half saying that U.S.-imposed sanctions have had an impact on their families.** As a result of these hardships, **one-half say that they are worse off than before. And less than one in five say they expect to be better off five years from now.**

Despite these negative views, a majority of Iranians claim to be satisfied with their government's handling of the economy and protection of civil and personal rights, and a greater number of Iranians than in previous years now support their country's involvement in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. But there is a sharp decline in Iranian support for involvement in Lebanon, with almost two-thirds now saying that involvement there is unimportant.

9. U.S. Policy

While two years ago there was some initial optimism that Trump administration policies toward some regional issues would move in a positive direction, that is no longer the case. **There is a sharp decline in respondents' views of U.S. policies toward Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Muslims.**

Respondents in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who early in the Trump administration saw positive changes in U.S. policy, are now less positive. The steepest drops in positive ratings are in Palestine, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The only exceptions are Jordan, where respondents give the United States a more positive score only in its relation to their country, and Saudi Arabia, where respondents now see a positive change in U.S. policy toward Syria.

10. The Next Decade: Most Dependable Allies

Reflecting the United States' slide in importance across the region, only respondents in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan view it as being their most dependable ally in the next decade. In Iraq, the top choice is Iran followed by China. In Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey, it is the European Union. And in Egypt, it is Saudi Arabia followed by Russia, while the Palestinians rate Turkey and the EU as somewhat dependable—but with only moderately passing scores—and appear to see no one else in their corner.

Looking to the next decade, Syria's closest neighbors—Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq—are very confident that there will be peace and an end to that country's conflict. The issues Arabs are most confident will be resolved are the defeat of religious extremist movements and the resolution of the issues that destabilized Arab countries during the Arab Spring.

Opinion is divided as to whether or not the next decade will see peace between Iran and the Arab states. And substantial majorities in five of the seven countries surveyed have no confidence that the Israel-Palestinian conflict will be resolved.

11. The Next Decade: My Country's Priorities

Only in the UAE and Tunisia do respondents say that they are better off now than they were five years ago (satisfaction) and that they expect to be better off five years from now (optimism). While UAE numbers are consistently high, the upward tick in both satisfaction and optimism in Tunisia is significant.

Both the satisfaction and optimism numbers are at significantly low levels in Egypt, as are the optimism numbers for Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

When asked to rank priority concerns they have for their country, in all seven countries covered **the top concerns include: increased employment opportunities, modernizing education, improving health care services, and strengthening their military and police.**

When asked whether they are confident that their countries could address these challenges in the next decade, there is moderate confidence that they will, except in Iraq where there is less confidence that the military and police will be strengthened.

12. The Next Decade: Priorities for the Region

When respondents were asked to rank the importance of issues facing the Arab World, far and away **the top-rated priorities are: investing more of the region's wealth and expertise in creating a more prosperous and stable Arab World, and promoting greater political unity among Arab states.** Down the list, tied for third place are promoting greater unity among Islamic countries and improving relations with the West, including the United States and the European Union.

Of respondents who selected these four objectives, two-thirds indicate they are confident the Arab World will achieve them in the next decade.

It is important to note that **the two lowest-rated priorities are improving relations with the countries of the East and South (including China, Russia, and Africa) and securing justice and rights for Palestinians.**

***Note:** There were a number of significant events that roiled the Middle East in the midst of our polling, which may have impacted the results. Especially worth noting are the bombing of oil fields in Saudi Arabia and the elections in Israel and Tunisia. As we were writing our report, demonstrations erupted in Iraq and Lebanon. The Iraqi demonstrations caused us to resurvey opinion in Iraq.*

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

As you consider each of the following governments or entities, tell me, in your opinion, those whom you feel are doing as much as they can to play a positive role in achieving an Israeli/Palestinian peace agreement. (Select all that apply.)

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
United States	7	23	36	13	24	34
Israeli government	5	<1	3	12	5	10
Palestinian Authority	47	65	33	66	47	24
Hamas	23	15	12	27	16	13
Arab countries	70	39	65	27	59	41
No response	10	13	9	0	7	9

Overall, Arab respondents in the six surveyed countries rank the Arab countries and the Palestinian Authority (PA) as their top two choices for governments or entities that are doing as much as they can to play a positive role in achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Respondents in Egypt (70%), Jordan (65%), Saudi Arabia (59%), and the UAE (41%) are most positive about the efforts of Arab countries, while those in Lebanon (65%) and Palestine (66%) are most certain about the positive role played by the PA.

The United States is viewed as playing a positive role by less than one-quarter of respondents in four of the six countries surveyed, though about one-third of Jordanians (36%) and Emiratis (34%) see the U.S. role as positive. Hamas is even less likely to be viewed as playing a positive role in achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, but about one-quarter of respondents in Palestine (27%) and Egypt (23%) do feel that Hamas' efforts are positive. **The role of the Israeli government is viewed least positively in all countries.**

Among Palestinian respondents, unsurprisingly, there is a divide between Fatah and Hamas supporters with respect to the roles played by the PA and Hamas in the peace process. Of Fatah supporters, 83% say the PA is playing a positive role (vs. 33% of Hamas supporters) and 15% say Hamas is doing so (vs. 59% of Hamas supporters). While there are differences in intensity of opinion among Palestinians based on their place of residence, majorities in all areas view the PA as playing a positive role (Jerusalem: 87%, Gaza: 61%, West Bank: 65%). Palestinians in all areas are far less likely to view Hamas (Jerusalem: 16%, Gaza: 25%, West Bank: 30%), Arab countries (Jerusalem: 9%, Gaza: 33%, West Bank: 26%), and the United States (Jerusalem: 0%, Gaza: 19%, West Bank: 12%) as playing positive roles in the peace process.

Now using the same group of governments and entities, tell me in your opinion, those whom you feel have played a negative role in efforts to achieve an Israeli/Palestinian peace agreement. (Select all that apply.)

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
United States	81	46	43	58	58	42
Israeli government	92	98	89	60	93	80
Palestinian Authority	22	0	8	15	21	20
Hamas	35	6	22	16	34	9
Arab countries	18	6	5	21	24	6
No response	1	1	<1	0	1	<1

When asked to identify governments and entities that have played a **negative role** in efforts to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, **respondents overwhelmingly select the Israeli government**, including more than nine in 10 Lebanese (98%), Saudis (93%), and Egyptians (92%), as well as 89% of Jordanians and 80% of Emiratis. In Palestine, 60% say the Israeli government has played a negative role in the pursuit of peace; an almost equal percentage (58%) say the role of the United States has also been negative. **The U.S. role is also widely cited as negative** in Egypt (81%) and Saudi Arabia (58%), with significant percentages of respondents in Lebanon (46%), Jordan (43%), and the UAE (42%) in agreement.

Hamas is viewed as playing a negative role in the achievement of an Israeli-Palestinian peace by about one-third of respondents in Egypt (35%) and Saudi Arabia (34%). Fewer than one-quarter of respondents in all surveyed countries view the Palestinian Authority and Arab countries as playing negative roles.

How confident are you that the Palestinians will have an independent state?						
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
Confident	48	40	55	58	48	44
Not confident	52	60	45	42	52	56
Confident is the aggregation of responses of “very confident” and “somewhat confident.” Not confident is the aggregation of responses of “not very confident” and “not confident at all.”						

Majorities in Palestine (58%) and Jordan (55%) express confidence that the Palestinians will have an independent state. Saudis and Egyptians are split but lean slightly negative (48% confident vs. 52% not confident). Majorities in Lebanon (60%) and the UAE (56%) are not confident that Palestinians will have an independent state.

Among Palestinians, confidence is highest among those in Jerusalem (78% vs. 48% in the West Bank and 66% in Gaza).

In 2002 the Arab League unanimously endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative in which they agreed to establish normalized ties with Israel if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories and resolve the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?													
	Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		KSA		UAE		Palestine		
	2015	2019	2015	2019	2015	2019	2015	2019	2015	2019	2017	2018	2019
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, and more effort should be made to achieve this goal.	8	15	26	8	37	43 ↑	19	45 ↑	23	37 ↑	41	37	44
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugee, but I don't believe that the Israelis will give up the territories.	26	31	45	52	40	23	45	21	58	46	27	31	31
Even if the Israelis agree to return all of the territories and agree to resolve the refugee issue, I am not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel.	66	54	30	40	24	34	36	34	19	17	32	32	24
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change since the 2015 survey.													

Pluralities in Saudi Arabia (45%), Palestine (44%), and Jordan (43%) say they are prepared for peace with Israel if Israel returns the occupied territories and solves the refugee issue, and they want more effort made to achieve this goal.

Among Palestinians, 61% of Jerusalem residents are prepared for peace and want more efforts made to achieve this goal, compared to 43% of West Bank residents and Gazans.

In Palestine, the percentage who are prepared for peace is consistent with our 2017 and 2018 polling (41% and 37%). In Saudi Arabia, these results represent a significant shift from our previous polling there in 2015, when just 19% said they were prepared for peace and wanted more effort made to achieve this goal.

There is also an increase in the percentage of Emiratis who are prepared for peace and want more effort put forth to achieve it, from 23% in 2015 to 37% in the current survey. Only 15% of Egyptians and 8% of Lebanese are prepared for peace if Israel returns the occupied territories and resolves the refugee issue.

A majority in Lebanon (52%) and a plurality in the UAE (46%) feel prepared for a comprehensive and just peace but do not believe Israel will give up territory; this is generally consistent with the 2015 survey. Between 21% and 31% in the other four countries surveyed are prepared for peace but do not think Israel will return any territory.

While only in Egypt does a majority (54%) say they are not ready for peace, more than one-third of respondents in Lebanon (40%), Jordan (34%), and Saudi Arabia (34%) are also not prepared for peace even if Israelis agree to return all the occupied territories and resolve the refugee issue. Among Palestinians, one-quarter of respondents (24%) are also not ready for peace; Hamas supporters are twice as likely as Fatah supporters to say they are not ready for peace (32% vs. 16%).

How likely is it that some Arab states will develop normalized relations with Israel even without peace between Israel and the Palestinians?						
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
Likely	59	37	52	72	53	64
Unlikely	41	63	48	28	47	36

Likely is the aggregation of responses of “very likely” and “somewhat likely.” Unlikely is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat unlikely” and “very unlikely.”

Majorities in five of the six surveyed countries say it is likely that some Arab states will develop normalized relations with Israel even without peace between Israel and the Palestinians, including 72% of Palestinians, 64% of Emiratis, 59% of Egyptians, 53% of Saudis, and 52% of Jordanians. Only in Lebanon do we find a majority (63%) saying this is unlikely.

How desirable is it that some Arab states will develop normalized relations with Israel even without peace between Israel and the Palestinians?						
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
Desirable	73	49	72	39	79	84
Undesirable	27	51	28	61	21	16

Desirable is the aggregation of responses of “very desirable” and “somewhat desirable.” Undesirable is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat undesirable” and “very undesirable.”

More than seven in 10 respondents in the UAE (84%), Saudi Arabia (79%), Egypt (73%), and Jordan (72%) also feel it is desirable that some Arab states will develop normalized relations with Israel even without peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Opinion is split in Lebanon (49% vs. 51%). Only among Palestinians does a majority (61%) say that normalization is undesirable; this opinion is strongest among respondents in the West Bank (71% vs. 56% in Gaza and 34% in Jerusalem).

Normalization

Because the results reported here regarding the likelihood and desirability of normalization were somewhat unexpected and seem to indicate a significant change in attitudes, we went back into the field to re-interview respondents in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in an effort to better understand the situation. We wanted them to put into their own words why they thought normalization without peace would be desirable. **What we found was that this desire to normalize should not be overstated since it masks frustration, some degree of resignation, and even some resentment.**

The most common themes that emerge in favor of Arab normalization are the economic benefits that may accrue and the fact that this will win favor from the United States. Almost one-half of the responses indicate a begrudging acceptance of normalization with the dominant themes being Arab weakness (e.g., “we do not have the power to say no” or “we should do this until we get our power back”) and the fact that the Arab World is distracted by so many other conflicts. **Notably, none of responses mention Iran.** This is important because in past polling when we have asked questions about whether or not normalization with Israel should be pursued, it was always asked in terms of developing ties with Israel in order to confront Iran. This, it appears, is not a factor. Economic benefits and ties with the United States are more significant reasons.

“If benefit means that we have to deal with Israel, then why not? It will be in the interests of my people and my country.”

“All Arab countries are working on this, even if they do not declare it publicly ... I am forced to this position, even if I am not completely satisfied with it.”

“Reaching good relations with Israel and therefore with the United States is important and positive for most countries nowadays.”

“Going to normalization...gives a chance for Palestine because the whole world is now busy with what is happening in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. I believe that if there is a convincing normalization process, there will be a good chance to establish a Palestinian state.”

“We have serious economic concerns... We are looking for a better life.”

“Admitting is a painful truth but we have to do this because there is no alternative...but there should be clear and separate borders, with each party seen as an independent country.”

“I do not want normalization, but our children and mothers die every day. Safety is better.”

“All evidence is that most Arabs have hidden ties...with Israel. It is better for them to declare such ties in front of the Palestinians. Better than hiding it... [But then goes on to add] This normalization should have clear and strict conditions that ensures the return of Palestinian lands, return of refugees and a Palestinian state”

“Arab countries will develop relations with Israel because they are under pressure from the USA.”

“I agree with this for a period of time, in order for us to regain our power and gradually get back our lands.”

After collecting these open-ended responses, we re-contacted a different subset of 229 of the original respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to ask a series of follow-up questions. We asked if each of the following is a major factor, a minor factor, or not a factor at all in their responses regarding the desirability of normalization:

- If more Arab states had normal ties with Israel, they would have greater leverage to apply pressure to help secure rights for Palestinians.
- I recognize that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict isn't going to be solved any time soon, but the killing has to stop so we should choose peace.
- Because Israel is an advanced economy and because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict isn't going to be solved any time soon, it's important that Arab states consider their own needs and take advantage of trade and investment opportunities in Israel.
- Because Iran threatens the region and Arab states and Israel share a concern with Iranian interference in the Arab World, relations with Israel would be in our interests.
- The Palestinians need to get their house in order. They aren't helping themselves.

In all five countries, the top reason given for desiring normalization is that the Palestinians are not helping themselves and need to get their own house in order. About two-thirds of the respondents say this is a major factor in pointing to the desirability of normalization. **About four in 10 respondents overall say a major factor in favor of normalization is that it would give Arab states more leverage to help secure rights for Palestinians.** The third most cited factor in favor of normalization is that the conflict is not going to be solved soon but the killing needs to stop; about one-quarter say this is a major factor. The two factors considered more minor by the follow-up respondents are the trade and investment opportunities in Israel that could aid the economies of the Arab states and threats of Iranian interference; about four in 10 say that economic advantages are not a factor and about one-half overall say concerns about Iran are a non-factor in considering normalization.

PALESTINIAN ATTITUDES

On the whole, are things in our country generally going in the right direction, or in the wrong direction?	
	Palestinians
Right direction	15
Wrong direction	78
Don't know/Refuse	7

Overall, Palestinian attitudes are quite negative, with more than three-quarters saying things are going in the wrong direction, while just 15% say things are generally going in the right direction.

How do you rate your satisfaction with the overall performance of ... ?			
		2017	2019
Palestinian Authority	Satisfied	46	72↑
	Dissatisfied	54	28
Hamis	Satisfied	31	51↑
	Dissatisfied	69	49

Satisfied is the aggregation of responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied." Dissatisfied is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat dissatisfied" and "not satisfied at all." Arrows indicate a significant change since the 2017 survey.

Palestinians were asked to rate their satisfaction with the overall performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas. More than seven in 10 respondents say they are satisfied with the PA's performance, an increase of 26 points

since 2017. And a majority (51%) now say they are satisfied with the performance of Hamas, an increase of 20 points since 2017.

The divide between Fatah and Hamas supporters is very clear here. Ninety-one percent (91%) of Fatah supporters are satisfied with the PA (vs. just 35% of Hamas supporters), while 87% of Hamas supporters are satisfied with the overall performance of Hamas (vs. 42% of Fatah supporters). It is worth noting that residents of Jerusalem are more satisfied with Hamas' performance (65%) than Gazans (47%) or residents of the West Bank (52%).

How important is it that the major Palestinian parties achieve unity? How confident are you that the major Palestinian parties will achieve unity in the next few years?			
		2017	2019
Importance of unity	Important	70	82↑
	Not important	30	18
Confidence in unity	Confident	37	58↑
	Not confident	63	42
Important is the aggregation of responses of "very important" and "somewhat important." Not important is the aggregation of responses of "not very important" and "not important at all." Confident is the aggregation of responses of "very confident" and "somewhat confident." Not confident is the aggregation of responses of "not very confident" and "not confident at all." Arrows indicate a significant change since the 2017 survey.			

In the current survey, 82% of Palestinian respondents say it is important for the major Palestinian parties to achieve unity, and 58% have confidence that they will achieve unity in the next few years. These percentages represent increases in both the importance Palestinians place on political unity (up 12 points from 2017) and their confidence that it can be achieved (up 21 points since 2017).

The importance of unity is strongly asserted by both respondents who support Fatah (87%) and those who support Hamas (82%); in fact, majorities of both groups say unity is "very important" (Fatah: 52%, Hamas: 59%). And supporters of both major parties are equally confident that unity will be achieved (Fatah 61% vs. Hamas 59%). Residents of Jerusalem are more likely to be confident about the prospects for unity than residents of the West Bank or Gaza (84% vs. 58%).

Which of the following, in your opinion, is the best course of action for the Palestinian Authority?		
	2017	2019
To remain as it is	12	20
To make a determined effort to press for unity	65	65
To dissolve	23	16
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.		

Despite the increased interest and confidence in political unity, there is no change in the percentage of Palestinian respondents (65%) who want the Palestinian Authority to make a determined effort to press for unity. There is, however, a slight decline in those who want the PA to dissolve (from 23% in 2017 to 16% in 2019) and a corresponding uptick in those who want the PA to remain as it is (from 12% to 20%).

Fatah supporters are more likely to want the PA to make a determined effort to press for unity (73%) than Hamas supporters (55%), while Hamas supporters are more likely to think the PA should dissolve (31%) than Fatah supporters (8%).

ARAB SPRING COUNTRIES

Which of the following have played or are playing a positive role in ... ? (Select all that apply.)								
		Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
Egypt	Popular movement	17	13	38	26	29	26	19
	Military	40	48	61	60	39	67	60
	Political Islamist parties	18	20	18	17	28	14	16
	Secular political elites	3	3	6	2	18	5	9
	None	40	31	11	17	22	10	13
Tunisia	Popular movement	34	28	57	35	31	30	27
	Military	37	42	41	57	29	57	34
	Political Islamist parties	24	23	26	38	30	13	28
	Secular political elites	28	29	37	21	18	8	10
	None	22	18	12	11	20	12	18
Algeria	Popular movement	36	32	40	47	38	21	26
	Military	49	63	26	45	29	46	51
	Political Islamist parties	8	8	20	12	31	25	18
	Secular political elites	9	7	18	18	22	6	5
	None	23	17	26	19	17	8	17
Sudan	Popular movement	51	46	52	50	26	30	43
	Military	30	42	52	35	30	57	47
	Political Islamist parties	2	11	10	19	27	24	11
	Secular political elites	8	15	12	20	19	9	5
	None	23	19	4	15	27	8	12

Respondents in seven countries were asked whether the popular movement, the military, political Islamist parties, and secular political elites have played or are playing a positive role in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Sudan, or if none of these has played a positive role. Looking at the results overall, the military and the popular movements in these countries are most likely to be viewed as having played positive roles.

With respect to Egypt, overall the military is viewed most positively, with at least six in 10 Saudis (67%), Lebanese (61%), Jordanians (60%), and Emiratis (60%) saying the military has played a positive role in Egypt. **The military is also the top choice among Tunisians (40%) and among respondents in Egypt itself (48%); it is noteworthy that this positive view of the military in Egypt is held by less than one-half of Egyptian respondents.** Almost four in 10 respondents in Lebanon (38%) and about one-quarter of those in Palestine (29%), Saudi Arabia (26%), and Jordan (26%) view the popular movement in Egypt as having played a positive role; just 13% of Egyptians surveyed agree. Only in Palestine are political Islamist parties viewed positively by at least one-quarter of the respondents (28%). And the secular political elites in Egypt are seen as playing a positive role in Egypt by less than 10% in six of the seven countries surveyed. **Significant percentages of Egyptians (31%) and Tunisians (40%) say none of these groups have played or is playing a positive role in Egypt.**

The military is also viewed as having played (or playing) a positive role in Tunisia by majorities of respondents in Jordan (57%) and Saudi Arabia (57%); it is also the group most frequently cited for playing a positive role by those in Egypt (42%), the UAE (34%), and Tunisia itself (37%). A majority in Lebanon (57%) view the Tunisian popular movement as positive, as do about one-third of respondents in Jordan, Tunisia, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia. In six of the seven surveyed countries (all except Saudi Arabia) between 23% and 38% of respondents say political Islamist parties have played a positive role in Tunisia. Similar percentages of respondents in Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon also view secular political elites as playing a positive role.

In Algeria, the military is thought of as having played a positive role by majorities in Egypt (63%) and the UAE (51%), as well as by almost half of the respondents in Tunisia (49%), Saudi Arabia (46%), and Jordan (45%). One-third or more in Jordan (47%), Lebanon (40%), Palestine (38%), Tunisia (36%), and Egypt (32%) say the Algerian popular movement has played a positive role in that country. More than one-quarter of Palestinians (31%) and one-quarter of Saudis (25%) see the political Islamist parties in Algeria playing a positive role, while Algeria’s secular political elites are not viewed as a positive force by at least one-quarter of respondents in any surveyed country.

Finally, with respect to Sudan, about one-half of respondents in Lebanon (52%), Tunisia (51%), Jordan (50%), and Egypt (46%) say the popular movement has played a positive role there, while similar percentages in Saudi Arabia (57%), Lebanon (52%), and the UAE (47%) view the military’s role in Sudan positively. Again, political Islamist parties are only viewed as playing a positive role in Sudan by about one-quarter of Palestinians (27%) and Saudis (24%), and this threshold is not met by secular political elites in any surveyed country.

SYRIA

Which of the following do you feel is the most likely outcome for Syria?									
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
The Assad government will return to full power over all of Syria.	19	35	20	49	28	31	22	35	53
The Assad government will hold power over parts of Syria with the rest of the country remaining under the control of opposition groups.	47	38	58	43	40	39	56	39	28
After a period of quiet, the opposition will reassert itself and clash again with the Assad government.	34	27	22	8	33	30	21	26	19

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

When asked to consider the most likely outcome in Syria, there is no clear consensus overall among respondents. However, about half of those in Lebanon (58%), the UAE (56%), and Tunisia (47%) say the most likely outcome is control of the country geographically divided between the Assad government and opposition groups. Alternatively, about one-half of those in Iran (53%) and Jordan (49%) think it is more likely that the Assad government will return to full power over all of Syria. Opinion is quite divided in Egypt, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The third possible option—that after a period of quiet, the opposition will reassert itself and clash again with the Assad government—was selected by at most one-third of respondents in Tunisia (34%), Palestine (33%), and Saudi Arabia (30%).

What in your opinion will be the future of Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria?									
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Russia and Iran will remain in Syria and together exert influence over the Assad government.	32	39	57	34	31	28	6	26	50
Russia and Iran will remain in Syria, but the Assad government will be in control over decisions that affect the future of the country.	36	41	19	44	43	50	61	23	33
Russia and Iran will clash over the role they will each play with respect to the Assad government.	32	20	24	22	26	22	33	51	17
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.									

Overall, **opinion is quite divided with respect to the future of Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria**. One-half or more of respondents in the UAE (61%) and Saudi Arabia (50%) as well as clear pluralities in Jordan (44%) and Palestine (43%) believe that Russia and Iran will remain in Syria, but the Assad government will be in control over decisions that affect the country's future. Alternatively, **one-half or more of respondents in Lebanon (57%) and Iran (50%) think that Russia and Iran will remain in Syria and together exert influence over the Assad government**. Finally, **one-half of Turkish respondents (51%) say Russia and Iran will clash** over the role they will each play with respect to the Assad government. In addition to these differing views country to country, within Tunisia and Egypt opinion is very divided among the three options for the future of Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria.

DAESH

How confident are you that Daesh has been defeated?										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Confident	65	55	33	79	42	82	62	73	29	72
Not confident	35	45	67	21	58	18	38	27	71	28
Confident is the aggregation of responses of "very confident" and "somewhat confident." Not confident is the aggregation of responses of "not very confident" and "not confident at all."										

Majorities in seven of the 10 countries surveyed express confidence that Daesh has been defeated, with the highest rates of confidence in Iraq (82%), Jordan (79%), the UAE (73%), and Iran (72%), followed by Tunisia (65%), Saudi Arabia (62%), and Egypt (55%). On the other hand, majorities are not confident that Daesh has been defeated in Turkey (71%), Lebanon (67%), and Palestine (58%).

IRAQI ATTITUDES

What is the best outcome for the future of Iraq?			
	2015	2018	2019
It is best that the Iraqi government in Baghdad be reformed so that it represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation in order to keep the country unified.	59	55	57
It is best for Iraq to recognize that national unity can best be maintained if the country becomes a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the government in Baghdad.	19	27	30
It is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible.	22	18	13

A solid majority of Iraqi respondents (57%) continues to believe that the best outcome for the future of their country is a reformed government that represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation to keep the country unified. This percentage is consistent with previous surveys (59% in 2015 and 55% in 2018). And this view is shared by majorities of all of Iraq's component groups: Sunnis (55%), Shia (62%), and Kurds (50%).

A downward trend continues with respect to those who believe that national unity is not possible; 13% hold that view in the current survey, down 5 points from 2018 and 9 points from 2015. Finally, there is a corresponding uptick among those who think national unity in Iraq should be achieved by making Iraq a federation of autonomous regions, from 19% in 2015 to 30% in the current survey.

At present, the Parliament in Iraq is apportioned on a sectarian basis to reflect the population of the country. In your opinion...	
	Iraqis
This a good thing for Iraq	65
This creates a situation which fosters division in the country	23
It makes no difference	13
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.	

Two-thirds of Iraqi respondents (65%) think that the sectarian basis for apportionment of parliamentary seats is a good thing. About one-quarter (23%) believe that this system fosters division in the country. The remaining 13% say it makes no difference.

How confident are you in the performance of each of the following institutions/entities in promoting national unity in your country?		
	Confident	Not confident
Central government in Baghdad	72	28
Police	69	31
Military	76	24
Judiciary	42	58
Parliament	70	30
The Kurdish Regional Government	63	37
PMU	49	51

Iraqis express considerable confidence in the performance of many of their institutions in promoting national unity. More than two-thirds of respondents say they are confident that the military (76%), central government in Baghdad (72%), the parliament (70%), and the police (69%) promote national unity in the country. There is slightly less but still significant confidence in the performance of the Kurdish Regional Government (63%) in promoting national unity. Opinion is split with respect to confidence in the performance of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) (49% confident vs. 51% not confident). And a majority of Iraqi respondents (58%) are not confident that the performance of the judiciary promotes national unity.

There is basic agreement between Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds on confidence in many of their country's institutions, though Sunni Arabs are slightly more confident in the promotion of national unity due to the performance of the central government (85% vs. 66%/73%), the police (79% vs. 65%/67%), and the military (86% vs.

74%/76%). Sunni Arabs are, however, significantly less confident about the performance of the PMU in promoting national unity (31% vs. 60%/53%).

Iraqi Confidence in Their Institutions Promoting National Unity

These high levels of confidence are somewhat unexpected based on the results of last year’s survey when about 20% of Iraqi respondents expressed confidence in the performance of military and police and just 6% in the parliament. We re-interviewed 43 Iraqi respondents to help clarify these responses. **What we found is that the addition of “promoting national unity” seems to have greatly impacted the responses. Efforts toward achieving national unity including the defeat of Daesh, attempts to bring the PMU under the command of the national military, and national elections appear to have strengthened the confidence of Iraqis in their institutions.**

However, it is worth noting that **two-thirds of those we re-interviewed say they have less confidence following the recent protests and the performance of the government in handling them. About three-quarters say they think the demands of the demonstrators are just**, though some do not agree with their tactics. Again, about two-thirds blame the recent violence on political parties using the situation for their own advantage, agents of foreign powers trying to weaken Iraq, and undisciplined government forces.

What, in your view, was the main cause of the emergence of Daesh?	
	Iraqis
Failure of the Iraqi military	22
Sectarian policies pursued by the government that bred resentment	20
Outside interests trying to destabilize Iraq	48
Radical remnants of the Ba’ath regime	2
Social and economic conditions in the country	8

Almost one-half of Iraqi respondents (48%) say the main cause of the emergence of Daesh was outside interests trying to destabilize Iraq. One in five blame the failure of the Iraqi military (22%) and sectarian policies pursued by the government that bred resentment (20%). Very few respondents think Daesh emerged because of social and economic conditions in the country (8%) or because of radical remnants of the Ba’ath regime (2%).

Of the forces listed below, which two are most responsible for the defeat of Daesh?	
	Iraqis
Iraqi military	63
Pesh Merga	34
PMU	56
Support from Iran	23
Support from the United States	24

When asked to select the two entities most responsible for the defeat of Daesh, majorities of Iraqi respondents point to the Iraqi military (63%) and the PMU (56%). One-third (34%) say the Pesh Merga was most responsible for defeating Daesh, and about one-quarter each credit support from Iran (23%) and support from the United States (24%).

Is the government in Baghdad taking the right steps to prevent the reemergence of Daesh?	
	Iraqis
Yes	64
No	30
Not sure	5
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.	

About **two-thirds of Iraqi respondents (64%) say the government in Baghdad is taking the right steps to prevent the reemergence of Daesh**, while 30% say it is not and 5% are not sure. Sunni Arab respondents are even more confident, with 76% saying the government is taking the right steps (vs. 60% of Shia Arabs and Kurds), while 37% of Shia Arabs and 35% of Kurds say the government is not taking the right steps to prevent the reemergence of Daesh (vs. 15% of Sunni Arabs).

ATTITUDES TOWARD IRAN

With regard to Iran, which of the following areas are of great concern to you? (Select all that apply.)								
Rank	Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Iraq	
1	Nuclear program	49	Involvement in Lebanon	57	Nuclear program	58	Involvement in Iraq	70
2	Involvement in Syria	30	Nuclear program	43	Involvement in Syria	42	Involvement in Arab Gulf	63
3	Involvement in Arab Gulf	29	Involvement in Arab Gulf	35	Involvement in Arab Gulf	38	Nuclear program	63
4	Involvement in Iraq	26	Involvement in Syria	28	Involvement in Lebanon	31	Involvement in Syria	54
5	Iran doesn't concern me	21	Involvement in Iraq	24	Involvement in Iraq	27	Involvement in Yemen	53
6	Involvement in Lebanon	19	Involvement in Yemen	17	Sectarian agenda	19	Sectarian agenda	47
7	Involvement in Yemen	13	Ballistic missile program	13	Involvement in Yemen	17	Involvement in Lebanon	45
8	Sectarian agenda	12	Sectarian agenda	8	Ballistic missile program	13	Ballistic missile program	12
9	Ballistic missile program	6	Iran doesn't concern me	8	Iran doesn't concern me at	9	Iran doesn't concern me	5

Rank	KSA		UAE		Turkey	
1	Involvement in the Arab Gulf	80	Nuclear program	83	Involvement in Syria	53
2	Nuclear program	76	Involvement in the Arab Gulf	50	Nuclear program	44
3	Involvement in Yemen	62	Involvement in Yemen	39	Involvement in Iraq	39
4	Involvement in Syria	30	Involvement in Syria	28	Involvement in Yemen	37
5	Sectarian agenda	28	Involvement in Iraq	22	Sectarian agenda	37
6	Involvement in Iraq	27	Sectarian agenda	22	Ballistic missile program	31
7	Ballistic missile program	16	Involvement in Lebanon	9	Involvement in Lebanon	30
8	Involvement in Lebanon	8	Ballistic missile program	9	Involvement in the Arab Gulf	23
9	Iran doesn't concern me at all	0	Iran doesn't concern me at all	8	Iran doesn't concern me at all	9

Respondents in six Arab countries and Turkey were asked about their greatest concerns with respect to Iran. **Overall, the issue of the most concern is Iran's nuclear program**, which is the top concern in Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, and the second most cited concern in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Iran’s various regional involvements are also of great concern, particularly to those countries most affected by these entanglements. Most worrisome overall are Iran’s involvement in Syria, which is the top concern in Turkey, ranks second in Egypt and Jordan, and is in the top tier of concerns in all countries surveyed, and its involvement in the Arab Gulf, which is the top concern in Saudi Arabia, ranks second in the UAE and Iraq, and ranks third in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan.

Iran’s involvements in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon are also of significant concern. Not surprisingly, for Iraqis, Iran’s involvement in their country is their greatest concern; this issue is also a top-tier concern in Egypt and Turkey. Iran’s involvement in Yemen is a top-tier issue of concern for Saudis, Emiratis, and Turks. For the Lebanese, Iran’s involvement in their concern is the issue of greatest concern; this is also a top-tier concern for Jordanians.

Iran’s sectarian agenda is not a top-tier concern in any surveyed country, but it ranks highest in Saudi Arabia (5th) and Turkey (5th).

Of the least concern to surveyed respondents overall is Iran’s ballistic missile program.

In six of the seven countries the percentages of those who say “Iran does not concern me at all” are in single digits; only in Egypt (21%) is there a significant percentage of respondents who are not concerned about Iran.

	Lebanon			Iraq		
	Sunni	Shia	Christian	Sunni Arabs	Shia Arabs	Kurds
Nuclear program	43	48	40	71	64	57
Involvement in Syria	23	31	31	93	27	69
Involvement in Iraq	20	24	27	100	46	88
Involvement in Lebanon	68	34	64	88	12	69
Involvement in Yemen	10	26	15	99	19	78
Involvement in the Arab Gulf	38	27	37	94	40	82
Ballistic missile program	13	13	12	13	10	11
Sectarian agenda	13	4	9	100	6	79
Iran doesn’t concern me at all	4	17	5	0	9	1

In Lebanon and Iraq, there are significant differences between Sunni and Shia attitudes on their areas of greatest concern with respect to Iran.

Among Iraqis, concern regarding Iran’s nuclear program is high for both Sunni and Shia Arabs and for Kurds, while concern regarding Iran’s ballistic missile program is quite low across the board. However, there are major differences when it comes to Iran’s sectarian agenda and Iran’s involvement in other countries. While almost all Sunni Arabs and strong majorities of Kurds express concern about Iran’s involvement in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Arab Gulf, among Shia Arabs concern about these engagements is much lower. It is worth noting that almost half of Iraqi Shia (46%) are concerned about Iranian involvement in their country.

In Lebanon, Sunni and Christian respondents are twice as concerned as their Shia counterparts about Iranian involvement in Lebanon.

It is also of interest that only 17% of Lebanese Shia and 9% of Iraqi Shia say that “Iran does not concern me at all.”

IRANIAN ATTITUDES

Have the U.S. sanctions had an impact on you and your family's economic status?	
	Iranians
A great impact	28
Some impact	27
Impact	55
Little impact	21
No impact at all	24
No impact	45

A majority of Iranian respondents (55%) say the U.S. sanctions have had an impact on their economic status and that of their family, while 45% say the sanctions have had little or no impact on them.

How do you rate your satisfaction with your government's performance in each of the following areas?					
		2016	2017	2018	2019
Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Satisfied	51	62	46	53↑
	Dissatisfied	49	38	54	47
Advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights	Satisfied	30	46	37	51↑
	Dissatisfied	70	54	63	49
Giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen	Satisfied	47	60	51	64↑
	Dissatisfied	53	40	49	36

Satisfied is the aggregation of responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied." Dissatisfied is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat dissatisfied" and "very dissatisfied." Arrows indicate significant change since earlier surveys.

After dips last year in satisfaction with their government's performance, Iranian attitudes have rebounded in the current survey. More than one-half of respondents (53%) are satisfied with their government's investment in improving the economy and creating employment, up 7 points from last year, though still below 2017's 62%. One-half (51%) are also satisfied with the advancement of democracy and protection of personal and civil rights by their government, the highest level we have seen to date. Finally, almost two-thirds of Iranians (64%) say they are satisfied with their government's support for their allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, up 13 points from last year.

How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in each of the following countries?							
		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Syria	Important	90	73	24	69	54	73↑
	Not important	7	27	76	31	46	27
Lebanon	Important	88	72	43	67	64	37↓
	Not important	10	28	57	33	36	63
Iraq	Important	87	64	47	75	65	83↑
	Not important	10	36	53	25	35	17
Yemen	Important	62	43	39	58	54	54
	Not important	36	57	61	42	46	46

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included. Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since earlier surveys.

As we have for the last five years, we asked Iranian respondents how important it is for their government to continue to be involved in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Only with respect to Yemen are Iranian attitudes stable from previous years' surveys; 54% in the current survey say it is important for Iran to continue to be involved in Yemen, a number consistent with 2017 and 2018. On the other hand, **respondents ascribe greater importance to Iranian involvement in Iraq and Syria than in recent surveys and significantly less importance to their government's involvement in Lebanon.**

Involvement in Syria is viewed as important by 73% of Iranian respondents, returning to the level last expressed in 2015. Similarly, the importance of Iranian involvement in Iraq is noted by 83% of respondents, a level last seen in the 2014 survey when 87% said it was important for Iran to be involved in Iraq. Finally, just 37% of respondents say their government's involvement in Lebanon is important, a precipitous drop since last year (64%) and a new low for Iran's engagement in Lebanon.

If given the choice between "investing in improving the economy" and "giving greater support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen," which should be the priority or are both equally important?	
	Iranians
Investing in improving the economy is a higher priority.	52
Giving greater support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen is a higher priority.	16
Both are equally important.	31
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.	

When asked which should be a higher priority, improving the economy or giving support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, a majority of Iranian respondents (52%) say investing in improving the economy is a higher priority. About one-third (31%) say both are equally important. Only 16% believe that giving greater support to their allies in other countries where Iran is involved should be a higher priority.

U.S. POLICY

Respondents in all 10 surveyed countries were asked about U.S. policy over the last three years with respect to regional issues. Specifically, they were asked to consider if the policy in each area has changed positively or negatively, has remained the same, or if it is not clear. Overall, the perception is that U.S. policy has changed negatively in all areas, particularly with respect to dealing with Iran. There is, however, some variability in opinion among the surveyed countries.

With regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, has there been a positive or negative change in U.S. policy in the past 3 years, or has it remained the same?: U.S. policy toward Syria										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Positive change	1	8	15	43↑	11	6	48	34↓	21↓	8
Negative change	31	19	18	32	60	47	12↓	21	42	45
Policy has remained the same	43	54	58	17	18	22	29	28	15	24
It is not clear	25	19	9	8	11	24	12	17	21	23
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.										

In terms of U.S. policy toward Syria, pluralities in three countries say there has been positive change over the last three years (Jordan: 43%, Saudi Arabia: 48%, UAE: 34%), while a majority of Palestinians (60%) and pluralities in Iraq (47%), Iran (45%), and Turkey (42%) say the change has been negative. Among Iraqis, a majority of Shia Arabs view

U.S. policy toward Syria as undergoing a negative change in the last three years (56%), while Sunni Arabs and Kurds less likely to agree (38% and 39%, respectively). Majorities in Egypt (54%) and Lebanon (58%) as well as a plurality in Tunisia (43%) feel that U.S. policy toward Syria has remained the same over the last three years.

Comparing these results to 2017 when we asked the same question, we find some slight shifting of opinion. Jordanians are more positive (from 25% positive in 2017 to 43% in 2019), while Turks and Emiratis are significantly less likely to view U.S. policy toward Syria positively (from 75% in 2017 to 34% in the UAE and 21% in Turkey in 2019).

With regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, has there been a positive or negative change in U.S. policy in the past 3 years, or has it remained the same?: U.S. policy toward Iraq										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Positive change	3	5↓	3↓	3↓	13	10↓	6↓	26↓	20↓	8
Negative change	35	28	75	40	52	50	29	21	34	41
Policy has remained the same	35	42	13	42	24	31	29	30	26	29
It is not clear	27	25	9	14	11	9	35	24	21	22

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. rows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.

With respect to U.S. policy toward Iraq, there is even less enthusiasm by respondents overall. In seven of the 10 countries surveyed (Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq itself) no more than one in 10 respondents view U.S. policy toward Iraq as having changed in a positive way in the last three years. Only in the UAE is more than one-quarter of respondents (26%) inclined to see a positive change in U.S. policy in Iraq. Majorities in Lebanon (75%), among Palestinians (52%), and in Iraq itself (50%) say the U.S. policy in that country has changed negatively. In Saudi Arabia, more than one-third of respondents (35%) say it is not clear.

While **there was a generally negative view of U.S. policy toward Iraq in our 2017 survey** as well, when comparing the results to the current survey, **we find significant declines in almost every country** in those who think there has been a positive policy change over the last three years. **The greatest drops in positive opinions are among respondents in the UAE (-61), Egypt (-32), Turkey (-30), and Saudi Arabia (-30).**

With regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, has there been a positive or negative change in U.S. policy in the past 3 years, or has it remained the same?: U.S. relations with your country										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Positive change	23	19	21	45↑	9	10	18	21	12	1
Negative change	21	10	6	7	67	50↑	30↑	33	47↑	61↑
Policy has remained the same	30	32	42	18	16	31	33	9	20	27
It is not clear	25	39	31	30	8	9	19	37↑	22	11

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.

When asked about how U.S. relations with their own country may have changed in the past three years, more than six in 10 Palestinians (67%) and Iranians (61%), as well as about one-half of Iraqis (50%) and Turks (47%), say there has been a negative change. In the UAE, opinion is quite divided with about one-third (37%) saying it is not clear, one-fifth (21%) saying there has been a positive change, and another third (33%) thinking the relationship has changed negatively. In four of the 10 countries there is significant ambivalence about U.S. relations with their countries; in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, majorities say either U.S. policy has remained the same or it is not clear.

Only in Jordan is there a positive slant to opinion; 45% of Jordanian respondents say there has been a positive change in U.S. relations with their country, though 30% say it is not clear.

Again, we see a negative turn in many countries since 2017. While Iraqis, Turks, and Iranians were quite ambivalent in 2017 with majorities saying relations had stayed the same or any change was not yet clear, in the current survey majorities of these respondents now say U.S. policy has produced a negative change in relations with their countries.

With regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, has there been a positive or negative change in U.S. policy in the past 3 years, or has it remained the same?: U.S. relations with the Muslim World										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Positive change	5	7	0	16	8	6	16	31	9	12
Negative change	39	29	55↑	25	64↑	63↑	45↑	32	56↑	46↑
Policy has remained the same	35	43	23	49	19	28	18	28	22	30
It is not clear	22	21	22	10	9	3	21	8	14	11

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.

Considering U.S. relations with the Muslim World as a whole, respondents tend to hold generally negative views, except in the UAE where opinion is split between those who see a positive change (31%), those who see a negative change (32%), and those who feel U.S. policy has remained the same (28%). Majorities in Palestine (64%), Iraq (63%), Turkey (56%), and Lebanon (55%), as well as clear pluralities in Saudi Arabia (45%) and Iran (46%) say they see a negative change in U.S. relations with the Muslim World. Pluralities in Egypt (43%) and Jordan (49%) see no change in this relationship based on U.S. policy over the last three years. Finally, in Tunisia opinions are divided, with 39% saying they see a negative change while 35% say there has been no change.

Since 2017 views have either become more ambivalent or remained mixed in Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. In Lebanon, there has been a significant shift toward seeing positive change in U.S. relations with the Muslim World. But the most notable comparison between the 2017 and 2019 data is the increase in the percentages of respondents in Palestine, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran who see U.S. relations with the Muslim World as having undergone a negative change over the last three years.

With regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, has there been a positive or negative change in U.S. policy in the past 3 years, or has it remained the same?: Dealing with Iran										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Positive change	3	5	7	14	8	3	11	31	2	1
Negative change	40	33	61↑	62↑	59↑	28	49↑	45↑	77	64
Policy has remained the same	21	39	15	15	21	30	27	9	6	25
It is not clear	36	22↑	17	10	12	39↑	13	15	15	11

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.

Overall, the U.S. policy regarding dealing with Iran is the area most likely to be viewed as having a negative change in the last three years. Majorities in Turkey (77%), Jordan (62%), Lebanon (61%), Palestine (59%), and Iran itself (64%), as well as pluralities in Saudi Arabia (49%), the UAE (45%), and Tunisia (40%) say they see a negative change in this area. Opinion is quite mixed in Egypt and Iraq with similar percentages in each country saying there has

been a negative change (33% and 28%, respectively), the policy has remained the same (39% and 30%), and it is not clear (22% and 39%). In seven of the 10 surveyed countries fewer than one in 10 respondents view U.S. policy dealing with Iran as moving in a more positive direction. The UAE is the only country where a significant percentage (31%) say they see positive change in U.S. policy dealing with Iran.

Looking back to the 2017 data, we find that opinions have become noticeably more negative on U.S. policy regarding Iran in Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and increasingly ambivalent in Egypt and Iraq. Only in Turkey has opinion remained stable, and quite negative.

Saudi and Emirati Attitudes: U.S. Policy Toward Iran

In an effort to better understand the change in Saudi and Emirati attitudes toward U.S. policy toward Iran, we resurveyed 102 Saudi and Emirati respondents. We asked them why they now view U.S. policy more negatively. **In Saudi Arabia, 15% said U.S. policy toward Iran was “too hard,” 43% said the United States was now “too soft on Iran,” while 42% said U.S. policy was “confused.” Among Emirati respondents, 29% said U.S. policy toward Iran was “too hard,” and equal percentage said it was “too soft,” and 43% said it was now a “confused” policy.**

The Trump administration has indicated that it hopes to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From what you have seen so far, how confident are you that they will be able to make progress in their efforts?

	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Confident	20	23↑	17↓	63↑	35	54↑	20	42↑	17↓	8↓
Not confident	80	77	83	37	65	46	80	58	83	92

Confident is the aggregation of responses of “very confident” and “somewhat confident.” Not confident is the aggregation of responses of “not very confident” and “not confident at all.” Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.

In eight of the 10 countries surveyed, majorities of respondents do not have confidence that the Trump administration will be able to make progress in their efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; more than three-quarters of respondents in Egypt (77%), Tunisia (80%), Saudi Arabia (80%), Turkey (83%), Lebanon (83%), and Iran (92%) lack confidence in this regard. Only in Jordan (63%) and Iraq (54%) do majorities have confidence that the Trump administration will make progress. Comparing these results to the 2017 survey, we find increased levels of confidence in Jordan (+28), Iraq (+15), the UAE (+41), and Egypt (+16), and decreased levels of confidence in Lebanon (-23), Turkey (-35), and Iran (-31). Among Palestinians and Saudis, attitudes are stable.

THE NEXT DECADE: MOST DEPENDABLE ALLIES

As you look to the next decade, which of the following countries do you believe would be the most dependable partners for your country? (Select all that apply.)																		
	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Palestine		Iraq		KSA		UAE		Turkey	
1	EU	73	KSA	56	EU	84	US	59	Turkey	42	Iran	45	US	80	US	60	EU	64
2	Turkey	42	Russia	49	US	40	China	45	EU	35	China	43	Russia	29	KSA	32	China	42
3	China	36	US	44	Turkey	36	EU	30	KSA	20	US	40	China	27	India	25	India	39
4	US	24	China	33	China	34	KSA	29	Russia	19	Russia	27	India	23	China	23	Russia	37
5	KSA	19	Japan	22	Japan	25	India	25	China	16	EU	24	Japan	17	Russia	21	Japan	32
6	Japan	18	EU	20	Russia	18	Turkey	25	Iran	16	India	21	EU	14	EU	21	US	20
7	Russia	15	India	16	KSA	17	Russia	23	US	15	Japan	18	Turkey	2	Japan	13	KSA	17
8	Iran	9	Iran	6	Iran	14	Japan	23	Japan	9	Turkey	5	Iran	0	Turkey	8	Iran	14
9	India	2	Turkey	0	India	5	Iran	2	India	6	KSA	3			Iran	3		

In eight Arab countries and Turkey, respondents were asked to consider the next decade and identify the countries they believe will be the most dependable partners for their country. **Overall, the three top choices are the United States, China, and the European Union, followed by Russia and Saudi Arabia. The least cited partners for dependability over the next decade are Turkey, Japan, India, and finally Iran.** In many countries, it is notable that the top choice for a dependable partner is cited by a majority of respondents while the subsequent choices are cited by fewer than one-third of the respondents.

The United States is the top choice for a dependable partner over the next 10 years by respondents in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Eight in 10 Saudis cite the United States as a partner they can count on, while about six in 10 Emiratis and Jordanians do the same. The United States is also a top-tier choice in Lebanon (2nd place, 40%), Egypt (3rd, 44%), and Iraq (3rd, 40%). It is one of the least favored partners by Palestinians (7th, 15%) and Turks (6th, 20%).

The European Union is considered the most dependable partner by respondents in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey. Among the Lebanese, 84% believe their country can count on the EU over the next decade, as do 73% of Tunisians and 64% of Turks. The EU is also a top-tier, though significantly less popular, choice in Palestine (2nd, 35%) and Jordan (3rd, 30%).

China is ranked second by respondents in Jordan (45%), Iraq (43%), and Turkey (42%), and third in Tunisia (36%) and Saudi Arabia (27%).

Looking at the next tier of choices for dependable partners over the next 10 years, **Russia** is the second-ranked choice in Egypt (49%) and Saudi Arabia (29%), and **Saudi Arabia** is the top choice for Egyptians (56%), the second most frequently cited partner in the UAE (32%), and the third place choice for Palestinians (20%). Saudi Arabia is the seventh choice in Turkey (17%) and last in Iraq, where just 3% of respondents think the Kingdom will be a dependable partner over the next decade.

Despite being a less popular choice overall, **Turkey** is the preferred partner by the Palestinians, with 42% saying they believe Turkey will be a dependable partner for them in the next decade. Similar percentages in Tunisia (42%) and Lebanon (36%) think Turkey will be a reliable partner for their countries, making it a second and third ranked choice,

respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, however, Turkey is viewed as a partner by very few respondents in the UAE (8%), Iraq (5%), and Saudi Arabia (2%), and is not noted as a dependable partner by any respondents in Egypt.

Only in Turkey are **India** and **Japan** regarded as reliable partners for the next decade; 39% of Turks cite India and 32% cite Japan as dependable partners. Neither India nor Japan is mentioned by more than one-quarter of respondents in any of the Arab countries surveyed.

Iran is the top choice for a dependable partner over the next decade by Iraqi respondents; 45% in Iraq select Iran, though there is a significant sectarian divide (28% of Sunni Arabs vs. 53% of Shia Arabs). Elsewhere, Iran is almost always near the bottom of the rankings, with single-digit percentages in five of the nine countries surveyed.

As you look to the next decade, how confident are you that ...?								
		Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Iraq	KSA	UAE
there will be peace and an end to conflict in Syria	Confident	20	45	80	66	75	53	22
	Not confident	80	55	20	34	25	47	78
religious extremist movements will be defeated	Confident	60	65	44	85	58	61	63
	Not confident	40	35	56	15	42	39	37
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be resolved	Confident	27	29	3	58	59	27	30
	Not confident	73	71	97	42	41	73	70
the issues that caused several Arab countries to become destabilized by popular uprisings will be resolved	Confident	61	65	23	55	48	71	52
	Not confident	39	35	77	45	52	29	48
there will be peace between Iran and Arab countries	Confident	31	52	55	50	45	26	58
	Not confident	69	48	45	50	55	74	42
Confident is the aggregation of responses of “very confident” and “somewhat confident.” Not confident is the aggregation of responses of “not very confident” and “not confident at all.”								

Respondents were asked about their confidence in a number of possible positive outcomes to regional challenges.

With respect to the conflict in Syria, its closest neighbors, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, express the most confidence that there will be peace and an end to the conflict. Three-quarters of respondents in Lebanon (80%) and Iraq (75%) have confidence in this outcome, as well as two-thirds of Jordanians. A slim majority (53%) in Saudi Arabia agrees. On the other hand, more than three-quarters of respondents in Tunisia (80%) and the UAE (78%), as well as a majority in Egypt (55%), do not have confidence that the Syrian conflict will find a peaceful resolution in the next decade.

There is greater agreement about the defeat of religious extremist movements, with about six in 10 respondents in Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, expressing confidence in this outcome. Jordanians are the most confident that religious extremism will be defeated; 85% hold this view. In Lebanon, however, only 44% are confident, while 56% are not confident that such movements will be defeated in the next 10 years.

With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, only in Jordan and Iraq are majorities confident that the conflict will be resolved in the next decade (58% and 59%, respectively). At least seven in 10 respondents in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE express a lack of confidence in this outcome. And an overwhelming 97% of Lebanese respondents say are not confident that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be resolved.

When asked about the issues that caused several Arab countries to become destabilized by popular uprisings, majorities in Saudi Arabia (71%), Egypt (65%), Tunisia (61%), and Jordan (55%) are confident there will be resolution in the

next decade. Opinion in Iraq and the UAE is divided. In Lebanon fewer than one-quarter of respondents (23%) are confident that the issues that led to destabilization of several Arab countries by popular uprisings will be resolved in the next decade.

With respect to the possibility of peace between Iran and Arab countries, opinions are quite divided in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Respondents in the UAE lean slightly toward having confidence that peace will be achieved (58%), while in Saudi Arabia and Tunisia majorities (74% and 69%, respectively) express a lack of confidence that Iran and Arab countries will achieve peace in the next decade.

THE NEXT DECADE: MY COUNTRY'S PRIORITIES

Are you "better off" or "worse off" than you were five years ago, or is your situation "about the same"?																		
	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Palestine		Iraq		KSA		UAE		Iran	
	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019
Better off	21	49↑	20	18	32	29	31	42↑	17	25	20	29	36	37	68	73	34	33
Worse off	59	35	64	44	39	44	39	35	49	50	55	53	29	50↑	6	16	33	50↑
About the same	20	15	16	38	28	27	30	23	33	25	25	18	36	14	25	11	33	17

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change since last year's survey.

Respondents in nine countries were asked if they are better off or worse off now than they were five years ago, or if their situation is about the same—a measure of satisfaction. **In six of the nine countries, pluralities say they are worse off now than they were five years ago;** at least one-half of respondents express dissatisfaction in Iraq (53%), Palestine (50%), Saudi Arabia (50%), and Iran (50%). In the remaining three countries we find at least a plurality saying they are better off: the UAE (73%), Tunisia (49%), and Jordan (42%).

Among Iraqis, it is worth noting that Sunni Arabs are almost unanimous (97%) in feeling that they are worse off now than they were five years ago, while only 21% of their Shia counterparts agree; Kurds in Iraq are also deeply dissatisfied with their current situation (75% say they are worse off). On the other hand, 48% of Shia Arabs in Iraq say they are better off now than five years ago compared to 18% of Kurds and no Sunni Arabs.

In comparing these results to last year's survey, **we find a uptick in satisfaction in Jordan** (from 31% saying better off in 2018 to 42% in 2019) and **a significant increase in satisfaction levels in Tunisia** (from 21% to 49%). On the other hand, **there is a significant increase in dissatisfaction among respondents in Saudi Arabia** (from 29% saying worse off in 2018 to 50% in 2019). It is worth noting that in Iran the level of dissatisfaction (50%) is the highest we have found in our polling from 2013 to the present.

Do you feel that you will be better off or worse off five years from now, or do you think your situation will be about the same?									
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Iran
Better off	42	22	11	16	27	20	21	53	19
Worse off	30	46	67	55	40	57	50	21	52
About the same	27	32	22	29	33	23	29	26	30

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

We also asked respondents in the same nine countries if they feel that five years from now they will be better or worse off, or if they think their situation will be about the same—a measure of optimism. **The only bright spots of optimism appear to be in the UAE, where 53% feel they will be better off in five years, and in Tunisia, where a plurality (42%) agree.**

Majorities in Lebanon (67%), Iraq (57%), Jordan (55%), and Iran (52%) feel they will be worse off in five years, as do pluralities in Saudi Arabia (50%), Egypt (46%), and Palestine (40%). One-quarter to one-third of respondents in every country feel their situation will be about the same five years from now.

In 2014, we asked the same question in Egypt and Iraq. While the Iraqi response in the current poll closely mirrors those 2014 results (better off: 20%, worse off: 48%, same: 27%), Egyptians have grown increasingly pessimistic. In 2014, 47% of Egyptian respondents said they would be better off in five years compared to just 22% in the current survey; and the 35% in 2014 who said they would be worse off has grown to 46% in 2019.

As you look to the future, which of the following issues are the most important for your country to address? (Select three.)														
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • creating more jobs for our expanding youth population • modernizing our educational system so that our country can compete in the world • improving our health care system • doing more to protect civil rights and personal freedom • doing more to advance equal rights for women • maintaining our traditional culture and religious values • doing more to combat religious extremism • strengthening our military and police to ensure our peace and security • doing more to promote unity among all the diverse communities in my country • ending corruption and nepotism • advancing democracy • political and governmental reform 														
	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Iraq		KSA		UAE	
1	education	60	education	47	jobs	62	jobs	54	democracy	46	military/police	46	military/police	50
2	jobs	58	jobs	41	military/police	43	military/police	50	military/police	45	jobs	43	education	48
3	health care	41	health care	32	civil rights	41	education	45	health care	31	democracy	40	jobs	39
4	military/police	26	military/police	30	education	35	health care	24	education	31	health care	37	health care	30
5	corruption	23	extremism	25	health care	26	extremism	23	jobs	29	education	36	extremism	28
6	extremism	22	corruption	24	extremism	25	democracy	22	unity/diversity	29	extremism	36	civil rights	27
7	democracy	19	political reform	24	trad. culture	24	civil rights	17	political reform	23	civil rights	19	women's rights	26
8	political reform	18	democracy	22	corruption	17	women's rights	16	trad. culture	20	corruption	13	democracy	22
9	trad. culture	16	civil rights	19	democracy	10	corruption	15	extremism	15	trad. culture	10	political reform	11
10	civil rights	10	trad. culture	17	political reform	9	political reform	14	corruption	11	political reform	10	unity/diversity	7
11	women's rights	3	unity/diversity	11	women's rights	7	trad. culture	12	civil rights	10	unity/diversity	6	corruption	7
12	unity/diversity	3	women's rights	10	unity/diversity	2	unity/diversity	9	women's rights	10	women's rights	5	trad. culture	5

Respondents in seven Arab countries were asked to identify the issues they feel are most important for their country to address. **Overall, the top issues are creating more jobs for youth and strengthening the military and police to ensure peace and security;** each of these issues is ranked either first or second in five of the seven countries surveyed. **Modernizing the educational system to make their country more competitive and improving the health care system are the other two most frequently selected issues of importance across the board.** This primacy of fundamental bread-and-butter issues like jobs, education, and health care is noteworthy.

The next tier of issues of importance includes several concerns about individual rights and the underpinnings of democratic societies: advancing democracy, combating religious extremism, protecting civil rights and personal freedom, ending corruption and nepotism, and political and governmental reform. The three issues of least concern to

respondents this year are maintaining traditional culture and religious values, advancing equal rights for women, and promoting unity among diverse communities in their country.

In Tunisia and Egypt, education has risen to the top spot, followed by jobs, health care, and strengthening the military and police. The 2018 Tunisian concern with combating extremism and Egyptians’ concern with ending corruption and political and governmental reform have taken a back seat to these issues of everyday life.

In Lebanon and Jordan, creating employment opportunities for youth is still the number one issue, followed by increasing peace and security by strengthening the military and police. Concern with modernizing the education system has risen significantly in both countries, and health care remains a top-tier issue. For the Lebanese, doing more to protect civil rights and personal freedom is of increased importance this year, up to the third spot.

In Iraq, advancing democracy has greatly increased in importance in the current survey, to the number one spot from ninth place in 2018, closely followed by ensuring peace and stability through a stronger military and police force. Education has also grown in importance, moving into the top tier of concerns in the current survey, along with improving the health care system.

For Saudis and Emiratis strengthening the military and police to ensure peace and security is the top-ranked issue of importance for their countries. Education remains important for respondents in the UAE, as is expanding employment opportunities for youth. In Saudi Arabia, employment is ranked second, followed by a concern with advancing democracy. In both countries, improving the health care system has moved into the top tier of concerns.

Now from the list of issues you consider most important for your country to address (responses to previous question), identify those issues you feel confident your country will be able to address in the next 10 years. (Select all that apply.)														
	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Iraq		KSA		UAE	
1	education	60	education	55	jobs	53	jobs	54	democracy	54	military/ police	76	military/ police	54
2	jobs	72	jobs	73	military/ police	67	military/ police	60	military/ police	49	jobs	70	education	65
3	health care	59	health care	50	civil rights	63	education	62	health care	65	democracy	65	jobs	62
4	military/ police	73	military/ police	87	education	57	health care	71	education	65	health care	68	health care	63

After selecting the three issues of most importance to their countries, respondents were asked how confident they are that their country will be able to address these issues in the next 10 years. The table above shows just the top four issues of importance in each country and the percentage of the respondents who selected these as important who also think their country will be able to address these issues in the next 10 years.

Across the board about 50-75% of respondents think the issues they identified as priorities will be addressed by their countries in the next decade, with a couple of exceptions. Fewer than one-half of Iraqis who say strengthening the military and police is important believe their country will address this, while 87% of Egyptians who point to the same priority are confident that their country will address it.

THE NEXT DECADE: PRIORITIES FOR THE REGION

As you look to the future, which of the following issues are the most important for the Arab World to address? (Select three.)

- promoting greater political unity among Arab states
- investing more of the region's wealth and expertise in creating a more prosperous and stable Arab World
- promoting greater unity among Islamic countries
- securing justice and rights for the Palestinian people
- working together to see the establishment of stable representative governments capable of achieving national unity in countries like: Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen
- confronting Iran's ambitions in the Arab World
- confronting groups that preach religious extremism
- improving relations with the West, including the United States and the European Union
- improving relations with countries in the East and South, including China, Russia and Africa

	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Iraq		KSA		UAE	
1	prosperity	61	prosperity	61	prosperity	52	political unity	56	prosperity	51	prosperity	46	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	47
2	unity/Islamic	47	political unity	55	relations w/ East/South	44	confront Iran	41	political unity	42	political unity	46	prosperity	43
3	political unity	44	unity/Islamic	44	relations w/ West	42	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	32	extremism	41	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	39	unity/Islamic	41
4	relations w/ West	34	Palestine	29	political unity	40	unity/Islamic	31	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	37	relations w/ West	36	confront Iran	41
5	extremism	32	extremism	29	extremism	34	Palestine	30	confront Iran	35	confront Iran	35	political unity	38
6	relations w/ East/South	30	relations w/ West	26	confront Iran	29	relations w/ West	30	relations w/ West	30	relations w/ East/South	32	relations w/ West	34
7	Palestine	28	confront Iran	22	unity/Islamic	22	prosperity	29	unity/Islamic	29	unity/Islamic	23	extremism	28
8	confront Iran	13	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	18	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	21	extremism	28	Palestine	20	extremism	22	relations w/ East/South	15
9	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	10	relations w/ East/South	16	Palestine	16	relations w/ East/South	24	relations w/ East/South	16	Palestine	20	Palestine	12

Respondents were also asked to select the three most important issues for the Arab World to address. **Overall, the top two issues are investing more of the region's wealth and expertise in creating a more prosperous and stable Arab World and promoting greater political unity among Arab states.** Creating a more prosperous and stable region is the most important issue in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and ranks second in the UAE. Political Arab unity is the number one issue in Jordan, and ranks second in Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and third in Tunisia.

The next tier of issues of importance includes the following: promoting greater unity among Islamic countries; improving relations with the West; supporting establishment of stable representative governments in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen; confronting Iran; and confronting groups that preach religious extremism. Islamic unity is a top-tier priority in Tunisia, Egypt, and the UAE. Improving relations with the West including the United States and the European Union is only among the top three most important issues in Lebanon. For respondents in the UAE, the most important issue for the Arab World to address is working together to help establish stable representative governments in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen; this is the third most important issue in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Confronting Iran is the second most important issue for the Arab World in Jordan, and confronting extremist groups is the third most important issue for the region in Iraq.

Overall, the least important priorities for the Arab World are improving relations with countries in the East and South, including China, Russia, and Africa, and securing justice and rights for the Palestinian people.

Now from the list of issues you consider most important for the region to address (responses to previous question), identify those issues you feel confident the Arab World will be able to address in the next 10 years. (Select all that apply.)

	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Iraq		KSA		UAE	
1	prosperity	62	prosperity	72	prosperity	50	political unity	59	prosperity	65	political unity	67	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	68
2	unity/Islamic	68	political unity	73	relations w/ East/South	48	confront Iran	59	political unity	69	prosperity	78	prosperity	65
3	political unity	46	unity/Islamic	70	relations w/ West	55	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	69	extremism	54	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	69	unity/Islamic	63

After selecting the three issues of most importance to the Arab World, respondents were asked how confident they are that the region will be able to address these issues in the next 10 years. The table above shows just the top three issues of importance in each country and the percentage of the respondents who selected these as important who also think the Arab World will be able to address these issues in the next 10 years.

Generally speaking, about two-thirds of the respondents who select each priority are confident that the Arab World will address the issue, with a few exceptions. In Lebanon, only about one-half think their priorities will be addressed by the region as a whole. And in Tunisia, less than half of the respondents who think political Arab unity is important are confident that the region will address it in the next decade. Similarly, only about half of the Iraqis who identify confronting religious extremism as a regional priority think the Arab World will address this in the coming years.

APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

The approach used for conducting the poll involved face-to-face personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered in each country to cover a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative and was comprised of adult males and females who were 15+ years of age; in Palestine, adults ages 18 and up were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, only citizens and Arab expatriates were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where door to door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. However, adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was not skewed and was broadly representative. Since random, door to door sampling is possible in the remaining countries, a multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for selection of respondents in each country.

Country	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Dates of Survey	Coverage
Lebanon	519	±4.3	9/5–9/21/19	Beirut (East & West Beirut), Tripoli, Nabatiyeh, Baalbek, Sayda (Sidon), Baabda, Zahlah
Jordan	520	±4.3	9/5–9/21/19	Amman City, Madaba, Irbid, Jarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba, As-Salt
Iraq	1035	±3.0	9/4–9/26/19	Baghdad, Ramadi, Baqubah, Arbil, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Najaf, Karbala, Nas-siriyah, Sulaimaniyah, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	1016	±3.1	9/3–9/24/19	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Erzurum, Samsun, Trabzon
KSA	838	±3.4	9/3–9/25/19	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dereya, Najran, Sakaka, Onayzah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Tabuk, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail and Hufuf
UAE	429	±4.7	9/4–9/20/19	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Egypt	1050	±3.0	9/3–9/23/19	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban & rural), Menia (urban & rural), Asyut (urban & rural), Tanta (urban & rural), Aswan, Qina, Port Said
Iran	1030	±3.1	9/4–9/26/19	Tehran, Mashhad, Esfahan, Tabriz, Shiraz, Rasht, Yazd, Kerman, Ahvaz
Tunisia	833	±3.4	9/3–9/23/19	Tunis, Bizerte, Sousse, Sfax, Kairouan, Gaafsa, Douz, Tataouine, Jendouba, Tozeur, Qabis (Gabes)
Palestine	1045	±3.0	8/25-9/10/19	Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Al-Bireh, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Hebron, Jericho, Tulkarem, Tubas, Qalqilya, Salfit, Gaza City, North Gaza, Deir Al-Balah, Khan Yunis, Rafah

Demographics

	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Male	50	50	50	54	51	51	50	50	50	51
Female	50	50	50	46	49	49	50	50	50	49
Under 30	29	41	32	43	45	47	56	44	31	31
30+	71	59	68	57	55	53	44	56	69	69
In city	69	43	88	90	72 (town)	83	85	69	75	75
Out of city	31	57	12	10	18 (village); 10 (refugee camp)	17	15	31	25	25
Sunni	99	89	27	95		85	90	42	80	8
Shia	1	2	28	3		15	10	58	20	92
Other religion		9 (Christian)	39 (Christian); 6 (Druze)	3 (Christian)	99 (Muslim); 1 (Christian)					
Ethnicity								17 (Kurd); 73 (Arab); 7 (Turk); 2 (Assyrian); 1 (other)	76 (Turk); 18 (Kurd); 7 (other)	



