



Arab, Turkish & Iranian Public Opinion 2011–2019

As prepared for the Sir Bani Yas Forum

**Arab, Turkish & Iranian
Public Opinion
2011–2019**

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PREFACE

Since 2011, we have been given the opportunity to poll public opinion across the Middle East for the Sir Bani Yas Forum (SBY) hosted in the UAE. We have surveyed Arab, Turkish, and Iranian attitudes on a wide range of issues including: the region's major conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and how Syria's neighbors are dealing with the refugee crisis spawned by that conflict; the role major external and local players have had in regional affairs, focusing on the United States, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia; how Arab publics have reacted to the Arab Spring and what impact these events have had on their attitudes and aspirations; Arab attitudes toward the increasingly worrisome phenomena of politicized religious groups from the Muslim Brotherhood to al Qaeda; changing perceptions of the threat posed by Iran; and how they viewed the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A word about our polling.

We have been polling across the Middle East and North Africa for more than two decades in an effort to better understand how the region's peoples see themselves, their views of other countries, and the impact that the policies pursued by those countries have on their lives. We poll because we believe that the public's opinions matter and we want them to be heard. Polling opens a window allowing us to listen to what people are saying.

What we learn when we listen is important for our understanding of the Middle East and North Africa. We come to understand that just as we know that all Americans are not of one mind when it comes to issues like the death penalty, immigration, or abortion, Arabs, Iranians, or Turks have divergent and sometimes even internally conflicted views on critical issues facing their countries or the region.



In the countries in which we conduct our surveys, we only use face-to-face polling. We hire fieldworkers and train them in the methodology we use in order to ensure our surveys include a representative sample of opinion reflecting the full range of demographics (e.g., gender, age, education, region, religion) in each country. We also define for our field teams the selection process to be utilized in conducting the interviews. In the end we are able to report on attitudes not only in each country as a whole but also on variations, where they exist, amongst different demographic groups.

What emerges from this body of data is a fascinating portrait of a region going through a transformational moment. While the outcome of this tumult is not yet clear, to some extent we can discern the region's direction from the evolving attitudes of its peoples. An examination of the data reveals their aspirations and their concerns, what they embrace and reject, and the confidence or lack thereof they have in the institutions that shape their lives.

This volume is a compilation of the surveys we conducted for SBY from 2011 to 2018 as well as the new 2019 survey. The appendix to this volume provides access to the specific questions pertinent to the six major topics covered by our polling over this decade: Iraq, the “Arab Spring” (in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen), Israel-Palestine, Iran, extremism, and Arabs’ views of other countries. These topics are considered in detail in the 2019 book entitled *The Tumultuous Decade: Arab Public Opinion and the Upheavals of 2010–2019*. The appendix can be used to find these questions in the contexts of the original surveys (2011–2018) as well as in the figures and pages of *The Tumultuous Decade*.

2011

Iraq: The War, Its Consequences & the Future
Political Concerns & Government
Social Media & the Arab Spring
Afghanistan: 10 Years Later



IRAQ:

The War, Its Consequences & the Future

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the month of September 2011, we conducted surveys in Iraq, six other Arab countries, the United States, and Iran in an effort to measure attitudes toward: the impact of the war in Iraq; concerns about the future of the country and the region in the aftermath of a U.S. withdrawal; and how Iraqis see the world, their country, and their future. After analyzing and comparing the data several important observations come through quite clearly from these results.

First and foremost are the often divergent attitudes of Iraq's three major demographic groupings: Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds. In the United States there is the deep partisan divide that separates the attitudes of Democrats and Republicans. Finally, there are the reactions of the respondents from the other six Arab countries covered in our surveys. For the most part, their attitudes toward Iraq are more negative about the war and more positive about Iraq's post-withdrawal prospects than Iraqis themselves. The only exception is Tunisia which is somewhat disengaged from external issues, most probably due to the fact that the poll was conducted during the lead-up to that country's first post-Arab Spring election.

All these patterns play out in response to the question about whether or not Iraqis today are "better off" or "worse off" than they were before American forces entered the country.

Iraqis are conflicted, with about one-half of both Shia and Sunni Arabs saying that they are "worse off," while 60% of Kurds say they are "better off." Overall, about one-quarter of all Iraqis say their situation is "the same." On the U.S. side, 58% of Republicans say Iraqis are "better off" compared with only 24% of Democrats who hold this view. A striking 44% of all Americans either are "not sure" or say things are "the same."

Meanwhile, about six in ten Jordanians, Saudis, and Lebanese see Iraqis "worse off," as do almost one-half of Arabs in the Emirates. Tunisians and Egyptians are outliers here, with Egyptians divided in their views as to whether or not Iraqis are "better off," and almost one-half of Tunisians saying that they believe that things are "the same" or that they are "not sure."

When we drilled down and looked more closely at how the war has impacted many areas of life in Iraq, this pattern of disconnect between the groups in Iraq and the political parties in the United States once again comes through quite clearly. Kurds, for example, say their lives have improved in every area considered. Ninety percent say "personal safety and security" has improved; 71% say education has improved; and even 53% say they are "freer." At the same time, 88% and 81% of Sunni and Shia Arabs, respectively, say "personal safety and security" has worsened; and more than one-half in each of the two communities agree that education and political freedom have also been negatively impacted.

Judging from their respective views, it would appear that Republicans and Democrats are looking at two different wars, with Republicans tending to see the war's impact as positive in every area, while Democrats largely judge the war as

having made life worse for Iraqis in most areas. And this leads to three-quarters of Democrats concluding that the “war was not worth it,” as opposed to a plurality of Republicans who say that it was worth it.

Looking forward, Americans and Iraqis seem to agree, at least on the surface, that the departure of American forces from Iraq is a “good thing.” By a margin of two to one Iraqis say the withdrawal is positive. Their numbers are identical to the views of U.S. Republicans. Eighty-seven percent of Democrats say that the anticipated withdrawal is positive. But when we ask what emotion is felt most when contemplating the departure of U.S. forces, this consensus breaks down. The U.S. numbers favoring withdrawal remain just as high, with almost three-quarters of Americans saying they are “happy” at the prospect. But this emotion is shared by only 22% of Iraqis. On this matter, Iraqi views can again be described as conflicted: 22% saying they are happy; 35% saying they are worried; and 30% saying they feel both emotions.

The reasons for this mixed Iraqi mood can be seen when we look more closely at a range of concerns as to what might unfold following an American withdrawal from Iraq. Almost six in ten Iraqis say they are concerned about the possibility that the following might occur: “civil war,” “the country will split into parts,” “increased terrorism,” “economic deterioration,” and the fear that Iraq “may be dominated by a neighboring country.”

U.S. attitudes toward each of these concerns might best be described as ambivalent, with only “increased terrorism” registering. And on the Arab side, only Jordan shares Iraqi concerns with the same degree of intensity as their neighbor.

Given all of this, we then asked in Iraq and the United States “if the internal security situation in Iraq were to require it and the Iraqi government agreed...should U.S. forces stay...”? What we found was that one-half of Americans say, “No. The troops should leave as soon as possible”—with 63% of Democrats holding this view. In Iraq, one-half want U.S. forces to stay “as long as was needed” with Shia, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds all concurring. And despite this Iraqi sense of foreboding, substantial majorities in all of the Arab countries polled, except Tunisia, declare that they are “optimistic” about Iraq’s post-withdrawal future.

When Iraqis look at the world and assess their attitudes toward other countries and their expectations as to the contribution that these countries can make to Iraq’s development, we find that only UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and China consistently receive high grades from all of Iraq’s communal groups. Iran and Kuwait receive negative ratings from all groups, while other countries in the region are viewed favorably by one or two groups and not trusted or feared by the others. For example, while the Kurds feel quite positively about the U.S. role, Arabs in Iraq do not. And while Turkey’s role and contribution is supported by the Arab side in Iraq, the Kurds give Turkey quite low favorable ratings.

Looking forward, Iraqis appear quite conflicted about what role they see for the United States. About 44% see either the United States as a future “source of foreign interference” or want it to have “no role at all” in their country. But about 54% see the United States as a future “investor in development,” “a security presence,” or a country with whom Iraq has either a “normal” or “special relationship.”

Examining how Iraqis view issues close to home can be quite instructive. About one in five Iraqis want a democracy and believe a democracy “will work” in their country. Another two in five say that they would like a democracy but they don’t “believe it will work.” At the same time, one in five “do not want a democracy” because they believe “it won’t work” in Iraq. Depending on how you add up these responses, it can either be said that six in ten Iraqis want their country to be a democracy, or six in ten Iraqis don’t believe that democracy will work in Iraq. This is the definition of

being conflicted. Most interesting is the virtual consensus on these views that exists among all of Iraq's ethnic and sect groups.

What are the main concerns of Iraqis? After all they have been through in the past several decades, it should be of no surprise that the top three are "expanding employment opportunities," "combating extremism and terrorism" and "ending corruption and nepotism," followed by "improving the educational system."

We asked Iraqis to evaluate their leaders and found that most are polarizing figures. Iraqi List coalition Iyad Allawi has the best overall rating of any Iraqi political figure receiving strong support from Sunni Arabs and Kurds. He, however, is not viewed favorably by Shia Arabs. The current Prime Minister, Nuri al Maliki, is more polarizing with quite limited support from Sunni Iraqis. In fact his numbers across the board are strikingly similar to those received by cleric, Moqtada al Sadr, except that al Sadr does better among Shia, and receives approximately the same ratings as al Maliki among Sunni Arabs and only slightly worse among Kurds.

Iraqis are a conflicted and divided people, but who can blame them? After decades of ruthless rule, they endured an invasion and occupation, suffered from terror and ethnic cleansing, and while the trappings of a democracy have been set-up, it remains in a gestational state. Iraqis appear to both want the occupation to end, but have great concerns about what will follow. The problem for them is that the American public wants an end to this war, and, it appears, most of Iraq's neighbors are neither equipped to help, nor would their help be welcomed. An additional problem, of course, was the troubled outcome of the last election, which left Iraq with a leader who is not supported by many in the country.

Despite the optimism expressed by some of Iraq's neighbors, Iraqis have legitimate concerns about the post-withdrawal period.

IRAQ: 8 YEARS LATER

1. Better Off/Worse Off?

Do you think that the Iraqi people are better off/worse off than they were before American forces entered their country?									
	Iraq	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	US	Iran
Better Off	30	37	25	16	22	31	30	39	25
Worse Off	42	41	61	66	57	20	48	18	52
Same/Not sure	23/6	13/9	14/-	16/2	3/18	49/-	17/6	30/14	20/3

	Iraq				United States		
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd	Total	Democratic	Republican
Better Off	30	29	15	60	39	24	58
Worse Off	42	46	55	4	18	26	10
Same	23	24	24	14	30	36	23
Not sure	6	1	7	22	14	14	9

In assessing and comparing Iraqi, American, and regional attitudes toward the impact of the war in Iraq and expectations about what will transpire following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country, we can observe a few rather consistent patterns that emerge from the data. In the first place, Iraqi attitudes are deeply divided between Arabs and Kurds and between Shia and Sunni Arabs. U.S. attitudes toward the war and its impact are also divided with wide gaps between Democrats and Republicans. Finally, we can note that broader Arab opinion, while fairly uniform in opposition to the U.S. involvement in Iraq, in some instances reflects even greater pessimism about the consequences of the war than among the Iraqi people themselves.

When asked if their situation is better, worse, or the same as it was before the United States entered their country, Iraqis are more likely to say that they are worse off today. Among Sunni respondents 55% say Iraqis are worse off, with only 15% saying they are better off. Sixty percent of Kurds, on the other hand, say that Iraqis are better off and only 4% that they are worse off. Shia respondents mirror the overall national figures, with 29% saying that Iraqis are better off and 46% saying worse off.

Across the region, respondents in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon have a dimmer view than Iraqis as a whole, with 66%, 61%, and 57% respectively finding Iraq's situation worse today than it was before the United States entered. In Egypt and UAE, the opinions are slightly more tempered, but pluralities still think Iraq is worse off. Iran's respondents mirror Iraqis' views.

Only among Tunisian and U.S. respondents do you find pluralities that feel Iraq is better off (30%; 39%), while only about 20% of the respondents in these countries think Iraq is worse off. Most striking, however, is the number of people in Tunisia and the United States who think Iraq's situation is the same as it was before United States entered the country or are unsure about the situation (49%; 44%). The partisan divide among U.S. respondents is very much in

evidence here as 58% of Republicans think Iraq is better off, while less half that number of Democrats agree (24%); and only one in ten Republicans think Iraq is worse off, while 26% of Democrats believe this to be the case.

2. Better/Worse Since the 2006 Surge

When you compare the situation in Iraq today with the situation before the surge of U.S. forces, is it doing better off, worse off or the same?								
	Iraq	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	Iran
Better Off	34	5	30	25	28	26	33	26
Worse Off	16	76	48	42	42	9	51	53
Same	43	20	22	23	10	65	16	21

	Iraq			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
Better Off	34	38	15	50
Worse Off	16	13	30	3
Same	43	44	48	25

Twice as many Iraqis think that their country is better off now than it was before the surge of U.S. forces in 2006 (34% vs. 16%), but a plurality think the situation is the same (43%). The Shia respondents basically mirror the overall respondent pool in their opinions, while the minority Kurdish and Sunni communities hold divergent views. The Kurds in Iraq believe the situation is improved by a wide margin, with 50% saying Iraq is better off, 25% saying it is the same, and only 3% saying it is worse off. Among Sunnis, however, twice as many believe that Iraq is worse off now than it was before the 2006 surge (30% worse vs. 15% better), and almost half think there is no change.

Only Tunisia, among other nations in the region surveyed, has more respondents who feel that Iraq is better off now than worse off before the surge (26% vs. 9%), but almost two-thirds of Tunisians think the situation is the same. The strongest opinion about the aftermath of the surge is found in Egypt where three-quarters of respondents think Iraq is worse off and only 5% think it is better off. Majorities in UAE and Iran agree that Iraq is worse off, while less than half of respondents in Jordan (48%), Saudi Arabia (42%), and Lebanon (42%) concur. In all of these countries, between one-quarter and one-third of respondents think Iraq is better off.

3. What Has Improved, What Has Not

Since U.S. forces entered Iraq, how do you feel the following areas of life have been impacted?							
	Iraq				United States		
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd	Total	Democratic	Republican
Political freedom	33/48/16	30/53/15	29/54/14	53/12/20	50/18/11	37/26/16	67/10/6
Economic development and employment	17/66/13	14/74/10	4/80/10	52/7/30	29/30/18	19/41/20	43/19/17
Education	25/47/20	20/53/23	12/58/17	71/1/16	35/20/20	29/28/24	48/10/17

Since U.S. forces entered Iraq, how do you feel the following areas of life have been impacted?

	Iraq				United States		
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd	Total	Democratic	Republican
Healthcare	20/48/28	18/49/29	9/63/25	46/23/25	27/21/19	19/30/22	39/9/17
Personal safety and security	18/72/8	7/81/10	1/88/9	90/6/2	33/35/13	22/46/16	51/21/9
Relations with neighboring countries	21/54/19	12/55/25	4/77/14	87/5/5	21/32/30	18/39/18	27/26/18
Government	16/59/17	14/64/18	3/69/18	48/22/22	34/26/14	25/36/15	46/16/14
Women's rights	26/37/26	28/41/25	9/42/34	48/17/10	38/16/22	31/24/23	52/8/21
Religious freedom	39/36/14	47/35/12	24/47/17	36/20/16	29/19/26	24/25/28	39/14/21
* Positive/negative/no impact							

Overall, Iraqis do not identify any area of life has been positively impacted since the United States entered Iraq. In every area measured in this survey, the patterns outlined at the outset hold true. Sunni Arabs are the most negative about the impact of the war. Kurds are the most positive. In fact, in most instances, Kurds have the only positive assessment of developments in Iraq. The only area where Shia judge the impact of the war to have been positive is with regard to religious freedom. Largely as a result of these Shia numbers in this one area, a slight plurality of Iraqis say that the war has contributed to religious freedom (39% positive vs. 36% negative vs. 14% no impact).

Majorities of Iraqi respondents say that the impact of the war has been negative with respect to their personal safety and security (72%), economic development and employment (66%), administration of government services (59%), and relations with neighboring countries (54%). One-half feel there has been a negative impact on political freedom (as opposed to one-third who say that political freedom has advanced). Similarly almost one-half of Iraqis feel the impact on education has been negative. The results are more mixed in terms of women's rights (26% positive, 37% negative, 26% no impact).

Among the majority Shia and the minority Sunni and Kurds, opinions are quite varied. Not surprisingly, Sunni respondents are most likely to see the impacts to life in Iraq since the United States entered as negative, particularly in the areas of personal safety and security (88%), economic development and employment (80%), and relations with neighboring countries (77%). Kurds in Iraq, on the other hand, tend to see positive impacts in every area, especially with respect to personal security (90%), relations with neighboring countries (87%), and education (71%). Among the Shia majority, respondents mirror the overall Iraqi responses, with one exception: almost half of Shia respondents see a positive impact on religious freedom (47% positive vs. 35% negative).

In comparison, the opinions of U.S. respondents are generally mixed, largely because of a partisan divide, with Democrats tending to see the war as having had a more negative impact and Republicans still hoping to see this long and costly war in a positive light.

This dichotomy is particularly evident with respect to economic development and employment, health care, personal safety and security, and administration of government services. Respondents from both parties find more positive than negative impact on political freedom (Dems: 37% vs. 26%; Reps: 67% vs. 10%) and women's rights (Dems: 31% vs. 24%; Reps: 52% vs. 8%). Democrats are evenly split on the impact on education and religious freedom, but Republicans definitively see positive impacts in both of these areas (39% vs. 9%; 39% vs. 14%). Republicans are evenly split on the

impact on relations with neighboring countries, while Democrats are twice as likely to see the impact on this area as negative (18% vs. 39%).

4. Who Benefited Most?

Who benefited the most from the war in Iraq?									
	Iraq	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	US	Iran
Iraqi people	4	2	2	16	8	-	35	39	21
U.S.	48	88	66	58	86	81	47	22	50
Iran	54	35	28	27	10	54	25	5	-
Israel	18	56	30	37	72	23	35	12	46
Al-Qaeda	27	11	44	28	6	10	12	17	11
Iraqi elites	40	5	15	21	8	32	25	-	22
No one	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-
KSA	4	2	5	6	3	-	8	3	27
Turkey	6	1	10	11	2	-	12	1	21

Note: Respondents could select up to two groups or countries.

When asked who benefited the most from the war in Iraq, Iraqis most frequently point to Iran (54%), the United States (48%), and Iraqi elites (40%). Additionally, more than one-quarter of Iraqis see al-Qaeda as a chief beneficiary of the war. Only 4% think the Iraqi people benefited the most from the war.

A majority of respondents across the region feel that the United States was the chief beneficiary of the war in Iraq, including in Egypt (88%), Lebanon (86%), Tunisia (81%), Jordan (66%), Saudi Arabia (58%), and Iran (50%). In UAE, the United States is also the most frequently identified beneficiary, with 47% of respondents selecting it. Large proportions of respondents in Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE also see Israel as a major beneficiary of the war (72%, 56%, 46%, 37%, and 35%). Iran is often cited as having benefited by respondents in Tunisia (54%) and Egypt (35%). Al-Qaeda is seen as a chief beneficiary by 44% of Jordanians and 28% of respondents in Saudi Arabia. The only country in the region where the Iraqi people are identified by more than a quarter of respondents as benefiting from the war is UAE (35%).

In the United States, the most frequent response to this question is that “no one benefited” from the war in Iraq (40%). Slightly less than that, 39% of Americans, see the Iraqi people as a chief beneficiary of the war. Twenty-two percent of U.S. respondents identify the United States as having benefited from the war.

5. Was It Worth It?

Do you feel the war in Iraq was worth it?			
	United States		
	Total	Democratic	Republican
Yes	26	17	43
No	56	75	32
Not Sure	18	8	25

When U.S. respondents are asked if the war was worth it, they are more than twice as likely to say “no, it was not worth it” than they are to say “yes.” The division between the two political parties is stark. Three-quarters of Democrats say the war in Iraq was not worth it, while only one-third of Republicans agree. Forty-three percent of Republicans say the war was worth it, and one full quarter are not sure.

OPINIONS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL

1. Is Withdrawal a Positive or Negative?

American forces are scheduled to leave your country at the end of this year. In your opinion is this withdrawal a positive or negative thing for your country?							
	Iraq				United States		
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd	Total	Democratic	Republican
Positive	60	68	48	45	74	87	59
Negative	30	24	39	35	13	4	29
Not Sure	10	7	11	20	14	7	19

All groups surveyed agree that the U.S. withdrawal scheduled for the end of the year is a positive thing. Overall, Iraqis are twice as likely to see the withdrawal as positive rather than negative, though this opinion is strongest among Shia respondents (68% positive vs. 24% negative). Among Sunnis and Kurds attitudes are more conflicted, with more than one-third in each group seeing the withdrawal as negative (39%, 35%), and two in ten Kurdish respondents saying that they are “not sure.”

In the United States, almost three-quarters of respondents see the withdrawal as a positive, though this opinion is far stronger among Democrats (87%) than among Republicans (59%). Almost two in ten Republicans are not sure if the withdrawal is a positive or a negative.

2. What Emotion Do You Feel about Withdrawal?

When you think of this withdrawal, which emotion do you feel most?							
	Iraq				United States		
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd	Total	Democratic	Republican
Happiness	22	26	14	20	72	86	57
Worry	35	29	45	37	20	9	36
Both	30	32	31	20	-	-	-

Despite the strong tendency to see the U.S. withdrawal as a positive thing, many Iraqis are worried about it as well, with all three Iraqi communal groups displaying conflicted emotions. Overall, thirty-five percent of Iraqi respondents say they are worried about the impending withdrawal, only 22% are happy, and 30% are both worried and happy. Shia

respondents are in equal measure happy (26%) and worried (29%), with one-third of this group saying they feel both emotions. Sunnis are three times more likely to be worried (45%) than to be happy (14%); Kurds are almost twice as likely to be worried (37%) as happy (20%).

In the United States, 72% of respondents overall are happy about the withdrawal, while only 20% express worry. Again, Democrats are more likely to Republicans to express these views (Dems: 86% happy vs. 9% worried; Reps: 57% happy vs. 36% worried).

3. Post Withdrawal Concerns

How great is your concern with each of the following once the United States leaves Iraq?									
	Iraq	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	US	Iran
Civil War	65/20	30/43	68/7	47/29	46/34	18/34	22/67	38/32	44/45
Split into parts	60/21	27/52	49/13	52/27	43/39	20/36	14/75	27/44	41/43
Terrorism	58/19	25/50	62/9	41/35	44/37	19/63	18/63	48/24	39/45
Economic deterioration	57/19	27/38	48/14	39/33	46/32	12/54	27/54	28/38	38/48
Lose religious freedom	47/24	27/44	36/28	25/49	33/44	19/36	19/62	34/34	42/41
Dominated by neighboring country	60/30	21/59	52/20	49/19	29/50	7/75	25/55	25/44	42/45

Note: Respondents were asked to rate their concern on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "very concerned" and 5 is "not concerned." "Concerned" here is the aggregation of "1" and "2" responses, while "unconcerned" is the aggregation of "4" and "5" responses. Percentages do not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded, and the percentage responding "3" has not been included.
* Concerned/unconcerned

The people of Iraq tend to be quite concerned about the post-U.S.-withdrawal period. Strong majorities of Iraqi respondents are concerned about the following possible consequences in the aftermath of a U.S. withdrawal from their country: civil war (65%), the country splitting into parts (60%), being dominated by a neighboring country (60%), terrorism (58%), and economic deterioration and employment (57%). The potential for a loss of religious freedom is the only issue rating concern from less than a majority of Iraqi (47%).

Among those surveyed throughout the region, deep concern for the future of Iraq following a withdrawal of U.S. forces appears to be felt only in Jordan, and to somewhat lesser degree in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. In Egypt, Tunisia, and UAE respondents largely say they are not concerned about post-withdrawal Iraq. And in Iran, attitudes are split right down the middle between being concerned and being unconcerned.

Pluralities of U.S. respondents are concerned about terrorism (48 vs. 24%) and about Iraq falling into civil war (38% vs. 32%). They are evenly divided between concerned and not concerned with respect to the potential for Iraqis to lose religious freedom (34% vs. 34%). Finally, U.S. respondents tend to be less concerned about Iraq being dominated by a neighboring country (25% vs. 44%), Iraq being split into parts (27% vs. 44%), and economic deterioration (28% vs. 38%). In each of these three cases, Iraqis are at least twice as likely to be concerned as Americans.

4. U.S. View

If the internal security situation in Iraq were to require it and the Iraqi government agreed, in your opinion should U.S. forces stay one more year, as long as possible or leave as soon as possible?			
United States			
	Total	Democratic	Republican
1 Year	13	11	19
Stay as long as needed	22	12	33
Leave ASAP	47	63	30

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded, and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.

Overall, almost half of U.S. respondents think that even if the internal Iraqi security situation required it and the Iraqi government requested it, U.S. forces should still leave immediately. Democrats are twice as likely to assert this opinion as Republicans (63% vs. 30%). Only 22% of Americans say U.S. forces should “stay as long as needed,” with Republicans almost three times as likely to say this as Democrats (33% vs. 12%).

5. Iraqi Views

How long should the U.S. forces stay?				
Iraq				
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
1 year	10	9	9	19
As long as needed	47	42	56	51
Leave ASAP	29	34	24	20

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded, and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.

In contrast to the view of Americans, when Iraqis are asked how long U.S. forces should remain in their country, almost one-half of Iraqis say that they would want the United States to “stay as long as needed.” On this matter, all of Iraq’s communal groups agree with 56% of Sunnis, 42% of Shia and 51% of Kurds all sharing this view.

6. Optimism/Pessimism about Next 2 Years

Optimism/Pessimism about Next 2 Years							
	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	Iran
Optimistic	66	67	75	55	20	76	60
Pessimistic	23	18	11	24	80	14	29
Not Sure	11	15	12	21	-	8	11

Note: "Optimistic" is the aggregation of "very optimistic" and "somewhat optimistic." "Pessimistic" is the aggregation of "somewhat pessimistic" and "very pessimistic." Percentages do not add to 100% because numbers were rounded.

Despite the worry felt by Iraqis about the post-withdrawal period, their concern with the unrest that may occur, and the feeling of nearly one-half that the United States should "stay as long as is needed," strong majorities in six of the seven Middle East countries covered in this survey indicate that they are optimistic about Iraq's future following the departure of U.S. forces from that country. In all countries across the region, except Tunisia, respondents are quite optimistic about the first two years after U.S. forces leave. At least two-thirds of respondents in UAE (76%), Saudi Arabia (75%), Jordan (67%), and Egypt (66%) say they are optimistic. In Lebanon and Iran, respondents are twice as likely to say they are optimistic as to say they are pessimistic (55% vs. 24%, 60% vs. 29%). Respondents in Tunisia, however, are four times more likely to be pessimistic (80%) than optimistic (20%).

LOOKING AT THE UNITED STATES & THE WORLD

1. What Contribution Will Other Countries Make?

Did the following make a positive or negative contribution to Iraq?							
	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	Iran
U.S.	4/89	5/92	14/82	15/73	12/55	25/70	10/80
Iran	8/49	17/66	3/82	31/40	2/56	31/59	37/4
KSA	31/13	23/44	39/5	21/43	26/7	33/41	27/54
Turkey	37/8	7/70	13/64	26/25	14/9	28/44	28/58
China	6/14	20/4	31/7	14/11	5/3	43/12	30/43
UAE	18/10	11/21	40/8	27/13	34/-	55/3	26/56

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded, and the percentage responding “not sure” has not been included.
* Positive/negative

When given a list of countries and asked whether each has made a positive or negative contribution to Iraq, the overwhelming majority of respondents in every country around the region agrees that the United States has made a negative contribution. This is particularly true in Jordan (92%), Egypt (89%), Saudi Arabia (82%), and Iran (80%). One-quarter of respondents in UAE see the United States as making a positive contribution to Iraq, the highest of any country polled, but 70% in the Emirates view the U.S. role as negative.

Iran is also seen as having made a negative contribution by at least a plurality in all nations polled, except, of course, in Iran itself where 37% of respondents see their country as having played a positive role in Iraq. Only 4% in Iran see their contribution to Iraq as having been negative. Among other nations, Saudi Arabia (82%) and Jordan (66%) are the most critical of Iran. Almost one-third of respondents in Lebanon and UAE see Iran as making a positive contribution, though 40% and 59% of respondents respectively find Iran a negative contributor.

Turkey's contribution to Iraq is more likely to be viewed as negative by respondents in Jordan (70%), Saudi Arabia (64%), Iran (58%), and UAE (44%). Egyptians, on the other hand, are more likely to view Turkey as a positive contributor (37% positive vs. 8% negative). Very few Tunisians have a strong opinion on Turkey's contribution to Iraq as only 14% see it as positive and 9% as negative. In fact, with the exception of their critical assessment of the U.S. and Iranian roles, Tunisians are the least inclined to hold any view on these matters among the Arabs we surveyed across the region.

The question of China's contribution does not seem to spark intense interest as fewer than one quarter of respondents view China as either positive or negative.

Saudi Arabia is only seen as a positive contributor to Iraq by pluralities in Tunisia (26%) and Egypt (31%) as well as by those within its borders (39%). The scales are tipped the other way in Iran, Jordan, and Lebanon, where respondents are twice as likely to see Saudi Arabia as a negative contributor rather than a positive one. In UAE, respondents are slightly more likely to view Saudi Arabia's contribution as negative (33% positive vs. 41% negative).

Finally, UAE's contribution to Iraq is more likely to be viewed as positive by a majority of those within its borders (55%), as well as by respondents in Saudi Arabia (40%), Tunisia (34%), Lebanon (27%), and Egypt (18%). The only exceptions are among respondents in Iran and Jordan. They are twice as likely to see UAE as a negative contributor than as a positive contributor to Iraq.

2. Favorable/Unfavorable

Indicate your attitude toward the following countries.				
	Iraq			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
U.S.	26/67	25/68	7/88	63/37
KSA	39/48	30/62	59/26	49/51
Iran	26/66	41/52	2/90	5/83
Turkey	43/48	53/40	40/47	5/81
UAE	65/29	58/36	67/25	88/8
China	46/43	45/46	36/43	71/25

Note: "Favorable" is the aggregation of "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable." "Unfavorable" is the aggregation of "somewhat unfavorable" and "very unfavorable." Percentages do not add to 100% because numbers were rounded, and the percentage responding "not sure" has not been included.
* Favorable/unfavorable

When asked about their attitudes toward a series of countries, Iraqi respondents only view UAE and China favorably. Almost two-thirds of Iraqis see UAE favorably, including strong majorities of Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds; Kurds are the most likely to rate UAE favorably (88%). Opinions about China are more divided among subgroups with Shia evenly split in their attitudes, Sunnis more likely to view China unfavorably, but Kurds far more likely to view China favorably (71% vs. 25%).

Two-thirds of respondents in Iraq rate the United States and Iran unfavorably, with just one-quarter rating these countries favorable.

In the case of the United States, the attitudes of the Shia majority closely mirror the overall split, while Sunnis even more overwhelmingly consider the United States unfavorably (7% vs. 88%). Kurds, on the other hand, are far more likely to have a favorable opinion of the United States (63% vs. 37%). In the case of Iran, majorities of Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds all hold unfavorable views, with Sunni and Kurdish unfavorable opinions at very high levels (90% and 83%) while Shia opinion is a bit more divided (41% favorable vs. 52% unfavorable).

Overall, Iraqis are more likely to hold unfavorable opinions of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, though there are considerable percentages of Iraqis who lean the other way. With respect to Saudi Arabia, Shia are twice as likely to hold an unfavorable view (30% vs. 62%), while Sunni opinion is exactly the opposite (59% vs. 26%). Kurds are evenly divided in their views of Saudi Arabia. With respect to Turkey, Shia are slightly more likely to hold favorable opinions (53% vs. 40%), while Sunnis are slightly more likely to lean the other way (40% vs. 47%). Kurds have very strong unfavorable opinions about Turkey (81%).

3. Countries Making Positive/Negative Impact

When the U.S. leaves your country, do you feel that each of these neighboring or interested countries will make a positive or negative contribution to your country's security and economic development?				
	Iraq			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
Iran	20/67/8	33/51/10	1/87/6	4/92/2
Kuwait	16/54/21	22/55/19	3/68/22	14/30/26
Turkey	38/31/22	44/27/21	42/17/28	5/73/13
Jordan	44/17/27	36/24/31	54/8/23	58/4/15
Syria	28/25/30	22/34/31	40/12/28	33/8/32
KSA	37/29/23	16/44/30	59/8/17	82/7/9
Qatar	36/14/39	22/20/47	49/6/33	72/5/14

* Positive/negative/no impact

Looking to the future, following the withdrawal of U.S. forces, Iraqis were asked to assess the positive or negative roles they believe regional neighbors would play in their country's security and economic development. The responses expose Iraq's sectarian and ethnic rifts, but also reveal a few interesting points of consensus. For example, Jordan, Iran, and Kuwait are the only three countries on which there is agreement among all of Iraq's groups. All feel that Jordan would make a positive contribution to Iraq's future, while all hold the view that Iran's and Kuwait's contributions would be negative.

Overall, Jordan receives the highest positive rating—with 44% of Iraqis saying they believe Jordan would play a positive role in their country. Iran receives the most negative assessment, followed by Kuwait—with 67% of Iraqis saying that Iran would play a negative role in their future (with around 90% of Sunni Arabs and Kurds saying this, along with 51% of Shia Arabs) and 54% of all Iraqis holding the same view about Kuwait.

Iraq's divisions come through in assessing the roles of other countries. For example, while Arabs give a positive assessment to the future role they expect Turkey to play; Kurds overwhelmingly do not agree. And while Sunni Arabs and Kurds agree that they expect a positive future contribution from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Syria; Shia Iraqis do not share this view.

4. Future Role for the United States

Which of the following roles do you see the United States playing in your country's future?				
	Iraq			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
Investor in development	12	13	5	18
Security presence	14	13	9	27
Special alliance	15	17	11	14
Source of foreign interference	33	31	51	20
Normal relationship	13	16	11	5
No role at all	11	10	12	15

Still looking forward, Iraqis were asked what role they envisioned for the United States. Despite this being a “forced choice” among six options, the results reveal a pattern.

Overall, Iraqis are divided with 54% choosing roles for the United States that make a positive contribution to the country, while another 44% say they either see the United States as “source of foreign interference” or having “no role at all” in Iraq’s future. The negative assessment is shared by Sunni(51%) and Shia (31%) Arabs. Kurds, on the other hand, seek a more positive future relationship with the United States, with almost two-thirds holding these views.

A CLOSER LOOK AT ISSUES & LEADERS

1. Democracy: Can It Work?

Which of the following statements about democracy in your country best represents your own opinion?				
	Iraq			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
I would like my country to be a democracy and it would work here	21	23	12	23
I would like my country to be a democracy but it won't work here	41	44	38	35
I do not want my country to be a democracy because it will not work here	20	19	27	14
I do not want my country to be a democracy because it is not a good form of government	5	5	9	-
None/Not sure	13	10	14	27

When asked about the prospects for democracy in their country, Iraqis are deeply conflicted. About one in five Iraqis want a democracy and believe it can work in their country. Another two in five say that they would like a democracy, but they don't believe it will work. At the same time, one in five do not want a democracy because they believe it won't work in Iraq. Depending on how you add up the numbers then, either six in ten Iraqis want their country to be a democracy, or six in ten Iraqis don't believe that democracy will work in Iraq. Most interesting is the virtual consensus that exists across the board with the notable exception of the 27% of Kurds who are "not sure."

2. Confidence in the Future

How optimistic/pessimistic are you about the long-term prospects for stability and progress in your country?				
	Iraq			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
Very optimistic	9	10	2	20
Somewhat optimistic	46	59	27	32
Somewhat pessimistic	23	17	34	22
Very pessimistic	8	3	18	9

When asked to express their confidence in the future of Iraq, Shia and Kurds tend to agree. Both of these groups (and therefore Iraqis overall) are optimistic about the long-term prospects for Iraq, but slightly more than one-half of Sunni Arabs are pessimistic. It is interesting to note that seven in ten Iraqis choose to temper this response by choosing "somewhat" optimistic or pessimistic, rather than describing their confidence more intensely as "very" optimistic or pessimistic.

3. Ba'ath Party

Do you believe the Ba'ath party members should continue to be excluded from politics?				
	Iraq			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
All former members	29	33	6	56
High-ranking only	36	42	31	23
No, they should not	19	12	38	1

On the question of whether Ba'ath Party members should continue to be excluded from politics, opinions of Arabs and Kurds differ. Fifty-four percent of Shia Arabs and 69% of Sunni Arabs would agree to a less than total ban on all Ba'ath party members. While they are not in total agreement, the differences between them are not as great as the differences between Arab opinion and that of Kurds, more than half of whom want all former Ba'athists banned.

4. Most Important Issues

How important are the following issues facing your country today?	
In order of importance among Iraqis	
1	Expanding employment opportunities
2	Combating extremism and terrorism
3	Ending corruption and nepotism
4	Improving the education system
5	Political or governmental reform
6	Protecting personal and civil rights
7	Improving the health care system
8	Advancing democracy
9	Increasing rights for women
10	Lack of political debate on important issues
11	Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Note: Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each issue on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "most important" and 5 is "least important." Rankings are determined based on a composite score considering all five choices.

When asked about the importance of a series of issues facing Iraq today, the most significant issue to emerge is expanding employment opportunities, followed by combating extremism and terrorism. These two issues are, by far, the most important to Shia and Sunni Arabs alike. Protecting personal and civil rights is the most important issue for Kurds, followed by improving the education system. One additional difference to note is that when looking at increasing rights for women, Shia respondents find this issue much more important than Kurds.

5. Attitudes Toward Iraqi Leaders

Indicate your attitude toward these leaders.				
	Iraq			
	Total	Shia	Sunni	Kurd
Nuri al Maliki	37/57	51/44	7/81	19/71
Iyad Allawi	40/50	25/70	69/16	49/26
Ammar al Hakim	26/64	39/55	5/87	11/58
Moqtada al Sadr	38/50	59/32	5/78	10/67
Jalal Talabani	23/69	23/72	5/84	57/35

Note: "Favorable" is the aggregation of "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable." "Unfavorable" is the aggregation of "somewhat unfavorable" and "very unfavorable." Percentages do not add to 100% because numbers were rounded, and the percentage responding "not sure" has not been included.
* Favorable/unfavorable

Leader of the Iraqi List coalition Iyad Allawi has the best overall rating of any Iraqi figure, with four in ten Iraqis overall viewing him favorably. Allawi has strong support from Sunnis (69%) and Kurds (49%).

The Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki is a more polarizing figure with support from only Shia (51% favorable). In fact, al Maliki's numbers are strikingly similar to Moqtada al Sadr, though al Sadr does slightly better among Shia, the same among Sunni, and only slightly worse among Kurds. About one-quarter of Iraqis view Ammar al Hakim favorably, with this limited support coming primarily from Shia. President Jalal Talabani has the lowest favorability rating of the Iraqi leaders we asked about, with 23% of Iraqis overall seeing him as favorable. While 57% of Kurds view Talabani favorably, his numbers among Shia (23%) and Sunni (5%) are far lower.

APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

Zogby Research Services commissioned JZ Analytics to conduct surveys in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and additional online surveys in the United States, Tunisia, and Egypt. Various methodologies were utilized using trusted partners in the countries surveyed. The following methodologies were developed to most effectively contact the samples requested.

In Iraq, interviews were conducted from September 13-21, 2011, in Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Babil, Najaf, Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, Sulamaniya, and Arbil with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households from the six Iraqi governorates. The margin of error is +/-3.2 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on the 2007 projection of the 1997 general census, the most recent and comprehensive official census study conducted in the country.

In Lebanon, face-to-face interviews were conducted from September 12-29, 2011, in Beirut, Aley, Metn, Baabda, Tripoli, Tyre, Saida, and Chouf with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on a systematic random sample adopting a population proportionate weight based on the approximate estimated make-up/weight of the areas covered in each selected neighborhood.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Multi-stage stratified probability sampling was used to ensure a random, representative sample. However, broad demographic quotas were maintained at an aggregate (country) level to ensure that the sample was in line with the sample in earlier years. Interviews were conducted in Egypt from September 12-29, 2011, in Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Menia, Mansoura, and Asyut. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Tunisia, from September 12-29, 2011, in Tunis, Safaqis, Sousse, Bizerte, and Gafsa. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Jordan from September 12-29, 2011, in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, and Madaba. The margin of error is +/-4.4 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Iran from September 12-29, 2011, in Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, and Ahwaz. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Afghanistan from September 12-29, 2011, in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Baghlan, and Herat. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points.

In Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where door-to-door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. Adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was broadly representative and not skewed. Broad country level demographic quotas were followed to ensure the final sample has characteristics of the population. Interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia from September 12-29, 2011, in Riyadh, Buraydah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Dammam, and Khobar. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in UAE from September 12-29, 2011, in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and the North Emirates. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points.

In addition, JZ Analytics conducted online surveys of 1,054 adults in the United States on September 13-15, 2010, 602 adults in Egypt on September 15-19, 2010, and 531 adults in Tunisia, September 15- October 5, 2010. Using trusted interactive partner resources, thousands of adults were invited to participate in this survey. Each invitation is password coded and secure so that each respondent can only access the survey one time.

Based on information from census data, CIA fact books, and exit polls, complex weighting techniques are utilized to best represent the demographics of the population being surveyed. Weighted variables may include age, race, gender, region, party, education, and religion.

	Jordan		Egypt		Lebanon		Tunisia		KSA		UAE*		Iran		Egypt Online		Tunisia Online	
	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%
Total	516	100	1028	100	500	100	831	100	821	100	509	100	1017	100	602	100	531	100
Under 36	317	61	601	59	288	58	397	49	506	62	306	60	646	64	478	79	392	74
36+	199	49	427	52	212	42	434	52	315	38	203	40	371	37	124	21	139	26
Live in city	385	79	989	96	469	94	796	96	650	79	356	70	635	62	539	90	440	83
Live outside city	131	21	39	4	31	6	12	1	171	21	153	30	382	38	47	8	80	15
Less than university	408	79	874	85	343	69	464	56	643	78	290	57	637	63	85	14	107	21
University+	108	21	154	15	155	31	367	44	178	22	219	43	380	37	509	86	412	79
Sunni	390	76	939	91	110	22	784	94	722	88	486	96	47	5	503	89	496	97
Shia					175	35	-	-	40	5	16	3	969	95				
Christian	26	5	89	9	180	36									60	11	10	2
Druze	-	-	-	-	35	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Male	262	51	518	50	252	50	416	50	460	56	374	74	542	53	331	55	265	50
Female	254	49	510	50	248	50	415	50	361	44	135	27	475	47	271	45	266	50

* Includes approximately 350 Emiratis and 150 Arabs working in UAE. Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	Iraq	
	freq	%
Total	1000	100
Under 25	168	17
25-36	208	21
36+	384	38
Urban	696	70
Rural	304	30
Less than university	884	88
University+	116	12
Married	660	66
Single	227	28
Divorce/widowed/separated	63	6
Arabic	848	85
Kurdish	139	14
Assyrian	9	1
Shia	612	61
Sunni	375	38
Male	529	53
Female	471	47

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	Afghanistan	
	freq	%
Total	837	100
Under 36	530	63
36+	307	37
Live in city	837	100
Live outside city	-	-
Less than university	-	-
University+	-	-
None/ Primary	700	84
Tech/Secondary	84	10
Professional/Higher	53	6
Employed	337	40
Not employed	500	60
Sunni	661	79
Shia	176	21
Male	426	51
Female	411	49

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	U.S. Online	
	freq	%
Total	1054	100
18-29	217	22
30-49	355	36
50-64	246	25
65+	168	17
East	231	22
South	272	26
Central Great Lakes	314	30
West	231	22
No College Degree	650	62
College Degree+	399	38
Liberal	219	21
Moderate	337	32
Conservative	408	39
White	717	68
Hispanic	137	13
African American	126	12
Asian	42	4

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

POLITICAL CONCERNS & GOVERNMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nine months into the “Arab Spring,” we surveyed public opinion in seven Arab countries and Iran, asking over 6,000 respondents about their primary political concerns and their degree of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the pace of change taking place in their countries.

The results vary from country to country, providing an important look into the unique set of concerns confronting each. We have conducted similar surveys every other year since 2001, and the differences that can be discerned between the 2011 poll and those that preceded it are noteworthy.

In 2009, for example, in most countries the “close to home” issues of: “expanding employment opportunities,” “improving the health care system,” and “improving the educational system,” ranked among the top four concerns of most respondents in most countries. Their rank order would vary from country to country, but these were the basic priorities of a majority of Arabs. Also in the mix of top concerns would be issues of particular concern to the country in question. “Ending corruption and nepotism,” for example, was a major issue in Egypt; while in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE “resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict” scored high.

In late 2011, there appears to be what we might call an “Arab Spring effect” at work across the Middle East and North Africa. “Expanding employment” is still the number one concern in every Arab country, with the exception of the UAE. But there are now other issues that are looming large across the political landscape. “Ending corruption and nepotism” is now a major concern in four of the seven Arab countries. And in most countries, issues like “political reform,” “advancing democracy,” and “protecting personal and civil rights” have broken into the top tier of concerns in almost every country.

It may be interesting to note that the one country where virtually no change occurred was in Egypt, where the top four issues of 2009 (employment, education, health care, and corruption) remain the top four concerns of 2011, albeit in a slightly different order. It appears that the Egyptian revolt had more to do with people’s needs. They wanted a non-corrupt government that could provide for the basic needs of life. It was in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and UAE, that the political issues of “reform” and “rights” broke through.

Meanwhile in Iran, with the exception of employment being the number one issue, the rest of the top tier list are all democracy-related concerns.

It is worth noting that the only countries where women’s rights are prominent are Tunisia and the UAE. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a top concern in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. And while combating terrorism and extremism is a significant concern in five of the seven Arab countries, it is dead last in Iran.

How do Arabs and Iranians judge the performance of their governments? Not surprisingly the highest satisfaction rates come in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This has historically been the case, despite the new sets of issues being raised. It appears that nothing has diminished the sense in both countries that things are on the “right track.” More worrisome are the low satisfaction levels in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran.

While the fundamentals remain the same—people will want jobs, the ability to raise and provide for their families, be educated and have the chance to advance, and receive health care when they need it —there can be no doubt that the “Arab Spring” has introduced a new vocabulary and new concerns into the Arab political discourse. How governments respond to these new concerns in the years to come will be important to watch.

YOUR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONCERNS

1. Most Important Issues

On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 is “most important” and 5 is “least important,” how important are the following issues facing your country today?

- Expanding employment opportunities
- Combating extremism and terrorism
- Political or governmental reform
- Ending corruption and nepotism
- Improving the health care system
- Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- Protecting personal and civil rights
- Improving the education system
- Increasing rights for women
- Lack of political debate on important issues
- Advancing democracy

	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Iran
Terrorism	91 (3)	78 (5)	63 (8)	39 (5)	24 (8)	3 (11)	70 (2)	10 (11)
Political reform	64 (6)	75 (6)	74 (3)	41 (4)	26 (4)	5 (9)	49 (6)	30 (4)
End corruption	53 (8)	79 (4)	76 (2)	47 (3)	36 (3)	3 (10)	61 (3)	24 (5)
Health care	61 (7)	81 (3)	59 (7)	20 (6)	20 (7)	15 (4)	48 (5)	15 (9)
Israel/Palestine	9 (11)	69 (8)	45 (10)	51 (2)	41 (2)	23 (2)	19 (11)	16 (10)
Civil rights	15 (10)	70 (7)	69 (4)	15 (8)	23 (6)	24 (1)	48 (7)	34 (3)
Education	22 (9)	86 (2)	60 (6)	19 (9)	17 (10)	13 (8)	54 (4)	16 (8)
Women's rights	89 (4)	51 (11)	52 (9)	14 (10)	12 (11)	16 (6)	38 (9)	26 (7)
Political debate	83 (5)	65 (10)	43 (11)	9 (11)	19 (9)	17 (3)	36 (10)	25 (6)
Democracy	92 (2)	69 (9)	64 (5)	21 (7)	26 (5)	15 (7)	41 (8)	32 (2)
Employment	92 (1)	92 (1)	82 (1)	68 (1)	43 (1)	8 (5)	73 (1)	46 (1)

Note: Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each issue on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “most important” and 5 is “least important.” The percentage given here for each issue represents the percentage of respondents who rated that issue a “1,” indicating a high intensity response. Overall rankings are given in parentheses; rank was determined based on a composite score considering all five choices.

Rankings of Most Important Issues, 2011 (and 2009)

Rank	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan
1	Employment	Employment (2)	Employment (1)	Employment (4)
2	Democracy	Education (3)	End corruption (4)	Israel/Palestine (1)
3	Terrorism	Health care (1)	Political reform (5)	End corruption (3)
4	Women's rights	End corruption (4)	Civil rights (7)	Political reform (9)
5	Political debate	Terrorism (5)	Democracy (8)	Terrorism (8)
6	Political reform	Political reform (9)	Education (9)	Health care (5)
7	Health care	Civil rights (7)	Health care (6)	Democracy (6)
8	End corruption	Israel/Palestine (6)	Terrorism (2)	Civil rights (7)
9	Education	Democracy (8)	Women's rights (11)	Education (2)
10	Civil rights	Political debate (11)	Israel/Palestine (3)	Women's rights (10)
11	Israel/Palestine	Women's rights (10)	Political debate (10)	Political debate (11)

* Numbers in parentheses are 2009 rankings.

Rank	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Iraq	Iran
1	Employment (2)	Civil rights (5)	Employment	Employment
2	Israel/Palestine (3)	Political debate (11)	Terrorism	Democracy
3	End corruption (6)	Health care (3)	End corruption	Civil rights
4	Democracy (7)	Israel/Palestine (2)	Education	Political reform
5	Civil Rights (8)	Employment (4)	Health care	End corruption
6	Political reform (10)	Women's rights (6)	Political reform	Political debate
7	Health care (1)	Democracy (10)	Civil rights	Women's rights
8	Terrorism (5)	Education (1)	Democracy	Education
9	Political Debate (11)	Political reform (9)	Women's rights	Health care
10	Education (4)	End corruption (7)	Political debate	Israel/Palestine
11	Women's rights (9)	Terrorism (8)	Israel/Palestine	Terrorism

* Numbers in parentheses are 2009 rankings.

Tunisia

“Expanding employment opportunities,” “advancing democracy,” and “combating extremism and terrorism” are considered the most important issues facing Tunisia by more than nine in ten respondents. These are followed closely by “increasing rights for women” (Tunisia being the only country surveyed where women’s rights was widely considered an important issue) and “lack of political debate on important issues.” Jobs are, of course, the number one issue in Tunisia, as they are across the region. Concerns with democracy and protecting women’s rights are clearly the unfinished work of the revolution.

Egypt

The core issues that drive Egypt’s citizens today remain the basic concerns of life (i.e., jobs, education, and health care), just as they were in 2009. “Combating corruption and nepotism” was, and still is, also a major concern, while “democracy” is not. The only major shift in the priority political concerns of Egyptians is in the increased importance

of political reform. In sum, Egyptians want a government, free of corruption, that provides for the basic needs of its citizens.

Lebanon

Expanding employment remains the most important issue among Lebanese in 2011, as it was in 2009. There has, however, been a significant shift in other priorities. “Combating corruption and nepotism” and reforming government have now become increasingly important, as have “protecting personal and civil rights” and “advancing democracy.” More external concerns like fighting terrorism and “resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” have decreased in importance.

Jordan

Once again, “expanding employment opportunities” is the number one concern in Jordan, as it is across the region. At the same time, the importance of “improving the educational system” has fallen dramatically as a priority concern. The other significant shift here is the increasing importance of political reform, likely inspired by the uprisings throughout the region in the last year.

Saudi Arabia

In Saudi Arabia, issues considered particularly important in 2009, including improving the health care and educational systems have dropped precipitously in importance, while concerns like “combating corruption and nepotism,” “advancing democracy,” and “political reform” have taken center stage in the region. “Expanding employment opportunities” and “resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” continue to hold sway among Saudi respondents.

UAE

In UAE, the number one issue of 2009, “improving the educational system,” has been supplanted by concerns of “protecting personal and civil rights.” The importance of the “lack of political debate on important issues” has also risen dramatically in the last two years, another indication that the impact of the Arab Spring is being felt beyond the borders of the countries where uprisings took place.

Iraq

Many of the most important issues facing Iraq are the basic concerns of day-to-day life (i.e., jobs, schools, and health care). “Combating extremism and terrorism” and “ending corruption and nepotism” are also viewed as priorities, as the difficult work of building a stable and safe Iraq for all her citizens continues.

Iran

After the paramount concern with “expanding employment opportunities,” Iranians rate a range of issues that all involve making fundamental change in their government and political climate as the most important priorities. “Advancing democracy,” “protecting personal and civil rights,” “advancing political reform,” “ending corruption and nepotism,” “lack of political debate on important issues,” and “increasing women’s rights” are closely ranked as important by Iranian respondents.

2. Satisfaction with Government Change

Are you satisfied, not satisfied with the pace of change in your government?								
	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	Iraq	Iran
Satisfied	78	78	90	30	59	88	39	30
Not satisfied	20	20	7	62	41	9	53	53

When asked if they are satisfied with the pace and direction of change in their governments, majorities of respondents in Saudi Arabia (90%), UAE (88%), Egypt (78%), Jordan (78%), and Tunisia (59%) express satisfaction. Majorities are dissatisfied with the pace and direction of governmental change in Lebanon (30% satisfied vs. 62% not satisfied), Iraq (39% satisfied vs. 53% not satisfied), and Iran (30% satisfied vs. 53% not satisfied).

3. Right or Wrong Track

Do you feel your country is on the right or wrong track?								
	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	Iraq	Iran
Right track	78	73	87	25	54	88	31	37
Wrong track	16	12	3	60	-	9	56	43
Not sure	-	-	-	-	47	-	-	20

Wide majorities of respondents in UAE (88%), Saudi Arabia (87%), Egypt (78%), and Jordan (73%) think that their countries are on the right track. In Tunisia, a slim majority holds this view (54%), but the remaining 47% say they are unsure, not that they are on the wrong track. Majorities of respondents in Lebanon and Iraq think that their countries are on the wrong track (60%; 56%), while only one-quarter to one-third of respondents in each of these countries think they are on the right track. In Iran, the picture is slightly murkier; almost equal numbers think the country is on the right track (37%) and the wrong track (43%), while the remaining 20% are unsure.

APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

Zogby Research Services commissioned JZ Analytics to conduct surveys in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and additional online surveys in the United States, Tunisia, and Egypt. Various methodologies were utilized using trusted partners in the countries surveyed. The following methodologies were developed to most effectively contact the samples requested.

In Iraq, interviews were conducted from September 13-21, 2011, in Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Babil, Najaf, Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, Sulamaniya, and Arbil with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households from the six Iraqi governorates. The margin of error is +/-3.2 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on the 2007 projection of the 1997 general census, the most recent and comprehensive official census study conducted in the country.

In Lebanon, face-to-face interviews were conducted from September 12-29, 2011, in Beirut, Aley, Metn, Baabda, Tripoli, Tyre, Saida, and Chouf with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on a systematic random sample adopting a population proportionate weight based on the approximate estimated make-up/weight of the areas covered in each selected neighborhood.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Multi-stage stratified probability sampling was used to ensure a random, representative sample. However, broad demographic quotas were maintained at an aggregate (country) level to ensure that the sample was in line with the sample in earlier years. Interviews were conducted in Egypt from September 12-29, 2011, in Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Menia, Mansoura, and Asyut. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Tunisia, from September 12-29, 2011, in Tunis, Safaqis, Sousse, Bizerte, and Gafsa. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Jordan from September 12-29, 2011, in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, and Madaba. The margin of error is +/-4.4 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Iran from September 12-29, 2011, in Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, and Ahwaz. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Afghanistan from September 12-29, 2011, in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Baghlan, and Herat. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points.

In Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where door-to-door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. Adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was broadly representative and not skewed. Broad country level demographic quotas were followed to ensure the final sample has characteristics of the population. Interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia from September 12-29, 2011, in Riyadh, Buraydah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Dammam, and Khobar. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in UAE from September 12-29, 2011, in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and the North Emirates. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points.

In addition, JZ Analytics conducted online surveys of 1,054 adults in the United States on September 13-15, 2010, 602 adults in Egypt on September 15-19, 2010, and 531 adults in Tunisia, September 15- October 5, 2010. Using trusted interactive partner resources, thousands of adults were invited to participate in this survey. Each invitation is password coded and secure so that each respondent can only access the survey one time.

Based on information from census data, CIA fact books, and exit polls, complex weighting techniques are utilized to best represent the demographics of the population being surveyed. Weighted variables may include age, race, gender, region, party, education, and religion.

	Jordan		Egypt		Lebanon		Tunisia		KSA		UAE*		Iran		Egypt Online		Tunisia Online	
	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%
Total	516	100	1028	100	500	100	831	100	821	100	509	100	1017	100	602	100	531	100
Under 36	317	61	601	59	288	58	397	49	506	62	306	60	646	64	478	79	392	74
36+	199	49	427	52	212	42	434	52	315	38	203	40	371	37	124	21	139	26
Live in city	385	79	989	96	469	94	796	96	650	79	356	70	635	62	539	90	440	83
Live outside city	131	21	39	4	31	6	12	1	171	21	153	30	382	38	47	8	80	15
Less than university	408	79	874	85	343	69	464	56	643	78	290	57	637	63	85	14	107	21
University+	108	21	154	15	155	31	367	44	178	22	219	43	380	37	509	86	412	79
Sunni	390	76	939	91	110	22	784	94	722	88	486	96	47	5	503	89	496	97
Shia					175	35	-	-	40	5	16	3	969	95				
Christian	26	5	89	9	180	36									60	11	10	2
Druze	-	-	-	-	35	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Male	262	51	518	50	252	50	416	50	460	56	374	74	542	53	331	55	265	50
Female	254	49	510	50	248	50	415	50	361	44	135	27	475	47	271	45	266	50

* Includes approximately 350 Emiratis and 150 Arabs working in UAE. Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	Iraq	
	freq	%
Total	1000	100
Under 25	168	17
25-36	208	21
36+	384	38
Urban	696	70
Rural	304	30
Less than university	884	88
University+	116	12
Married	660	66
Single	227	28
Divorce/widowed/ separated	63	6
Arabic	848	85
Kurdish	139	14
Assyrian	9	1
Shia	612	61
Sunni	375	38
Male	529	53
Female	471	47

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	Afghanistan	
	freq	%
Total	837	100
Under 36	530	63
36+	307	37
Live in city	837	100
Live outside city	-	-
Less than university	-	-
University+	-	-
None/ Primary	700	84
Tech/Secondary	84	10
Professional/Higher	53	6
Employed	337	40
Not employed	500	60
Sunni	661	79
Shia	176	21
Male	426	51
Female	411	49

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	U.S. Online	
	freq	%
Total	1054	100
18-29	217	22
30-49	355	36
50-64	246	25
65+	168	17
East	231	22
South	272	26
Central Great Lakes	314	30
West	231	22
No College Degree	650	62
College Degree+	399	38
Liberal	219	21
Moderate	337	32
Conservative	408	39
White	717	68
Hispanic	137	13
African American	126	12
Asian	42	4

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

SOCIAL MEDIA & THE ARAB SPRING

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Internet and its offspring, social media, have had a transformative impact on global and inter-personal communication. The exact nature of that impact and its consequences, with specific focus on the contemporary Arab World, were the subject of a comprehensive study undertaken by Zogby Research Services for the Sir Bani Yas Forum.

As part of this study, during the month of September we conducted a survey of 4,100 Arabs in six countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) and 1,000 individuals in Iran. We also conducted two online surveys (of more than 1,100 adults split between Tunisia and Egypt), a comprehensive review of Facebook and Twitter use in Tunisia and Egypt (during the period December, 2010, to March, 2011), a review of traditional media coverage of the Arab Spring in Arab media, and a survey of overall Internet and social media penetration across the Arab region.

The questions for which we sought answers included: how widespread are Internet and social media activity? What are the demographics of users? How are they using the Internet and social media? How reliable do users consider the information they receive from social media? Have these information/communication vehicles impacted reliance on more traditional media? And what was the impact of these tools on the Arab Spring?

I. INTERNET ACCESS

The past decade witnessed a dramatic expansion of Internet accessibility around the world, and the Arab region was no exception. Ten years ago, with the exception of the UAE, Internet penetration in most Arab countries was in the low single digits. In 2000, for example, less than 1% of Egyptians and less than 3% of Tunisians and Jordanians had Internet access. By 2008, Internet penetration had grown to include about one quarter of the population in each of these countries. Today, it is more than a third, with significantly greater numbers in urban areas.

II. SOCIAL MEDIA

Beyond providing instant access to a world-wide web of information, a by-product of the Internet has been the development of “social media” which has created a communication vehicle linking individuals to networks of family, friends, and like-minded associates.

Newspapers went online inviting reader comments, religious leaders did as well, so too did groups of individuals seeking support for any and all causes they might espouse. With the development of YouTube, Facebook, and later Twitter, the ability to create one’s own platforms for communication and discussion grew exponentially. Anyone could download and post a video on YouTube, create a Facebook page or a Twitter account, and begin the process of sharing information and communicating with anyone who chose to join in and participate. An individual with a point of view

could find an audience, and opinions could be expressed and debated on any topic.

A review of both hard data and our polling results of the most frequently visited Internet sites in each of the countries covered in this study finds a near even split between social media and informational sites. Facebook, YouTube, Google, and Yahoo/Maktoob top the charts in every country, with Windows Live, a social media site, having a significant presence in most countries.

It should be obvious, but still worth noting, that the uses put to the Internet, in general, and social media, in particular, are varied. What comes through quite clearly in our polling across the region is the fact that most Arabs who use social media do so for social and informational reasons. From our survey results we learn that the principal uses of social media are “communicating with family and friends” and “as a source of news and information.” “Becoming involved in politics” was only cited as an important use in Tunisia. A review of the most popular Facebook pages in each country demonstrates the wide-ranging interests of Arabs across the region. There are the very popular sports chat-rooms, the sites of religious figures offering advice to the faithful, commercial product information and service sites, in addition to the widely publicized political sites.

But what of the political role played by these media tools? What role did they play and how influential was their role in the recent uprisings across the region?

We witnessed the power of the Internet and social media in American politics first with MoveOn.org, an anti-war group that quickly built up a huge support base of young left-leaning followers. They were able to organize “flash meet-ups” of supporters by sending messages calling on them to spontaneously demonstrate at designated sites. This group was influential in powering the Howard Dean presidential bid in 2004.

But it was with Barack Obama’s campaign in 2008 that the power of social media as a political/communications tool grew in prominence. One example that comes to mind was the way social media transformed a defeat into a powerful victory. Obama’s concession speech following his loss in the New Hampshire primary was quite good. But not as great as it became when his words (which included the tagline “Yes we can!”) were put into a music video accompanied by a number of popular entertainment figures. The video “Yes we can” was posted on YouTube and within three days was seen by more than three million viewers. As it spread, it was eventually seen by more than ten million and became an anthem for the campaign. The Obama campaign’s use of the Internet to share information, to organize voters, and to raise money became the stuff of legends. But there are limits to the effectiveness and the sustainability of these tools and this too must be considered.

Much the same occurred in the Arab Spring. During the past decade, both Tunisia and Egypt, for example, witnessed tremendous growth in both Internet access and participation in various forms of social media.

It was, for example, this ever-expanding social media network, and the ability it provided for communication and organization that helped Egypt’s April 6th Movement grow. For years, Egypt’s opposition movements had been hampered by their inability to get their message out and organize supporters because of their limited access to mainstream media. But with the growth of social media, that blockage was removed and space was created for them to communicate and connect with a growing base of support.

The development of the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said,” dedicated to a young man alleged to have died in prison, a victim of torture by the police who held him, grew quickly to include hundreds of thousands of fans. The

growth of this page, itself, tells a story of the power of this medium.

It was a small group of friends, organized by Wael Ghonim who first put this page together and administered it. As the page's fan base expanded, reflecting the widespread rage that existed against abusive police practices, the authorities attempted to stamp it out. When Wael was arrested, "We Are All Khaled Said" had 600,000 fans. After his release, 12 days later, and his dramatic appearance on Egyptian TV, the page's fan base grew to 800,000. Today it has 1.7 million fans.

The network of like-minded individuals created by this page and other similar sites, not only allowed organizers to communicate with each other, sharing news and information, it also provided a platform enabling them to mobilize for political action, without needing to rely on other forms of media, to which they had limited or no access. Much like the MoveOn.org "meet-ups," organizers announced a demonstration asking "fans" to sign up. One early effort drew a half million demonstrators, about one hundred thousand of whom had signed up online.

The use of YouTube also proved invaluable. Videos of organizers like Asmaa Mahfouz urging Egyptians to demonstrate spread virally (not unlike the Obama videos) reaching hundreds of thousands. Ms. Mahfouz's Twitter account currently has more than 100,000 followers.

YouTube was not only a means of communicating; it also provided an opportunity for organizers to create a synergy between social media and more traditional media. Videos were downloaded and sent to international satellite media, bringing the immediacy of the demonstrations and the repression they encountered to a world audience. In turn, important news coverage of unfolding events were downloaded and "tweeted" or posted online and viewed by hundreds of thousands of "fans."

In Tunisia and Egypt demonstrators and the public at large followed news of the events in their own countries on many forms of media. In our survey we found that far from eclipsing the public's reliance on traditional media, use of these forms of media complemented one another.

A cautionary note: While social media sites proved to be helpful tools for protest organizers, a review of press accounts in mainstream media shows that these sources greatly inflated the role of social media, going so far as to term the events of the Arab Spring as "The Facebook Revolution." Many of the protest leaders, and the majority of respondents to our region-wide survey, had a more cautious interpretation. Therefore, a few additional observations are in order.

First, the protesters were not alone in using social media. The ruling party in Egypt established an "electronic army" of their own and in a survey of social media "conversations" occurring during the first few months of 2011, we find that on some days the volume of Facebook and Twitter activity generated by the government far exceeded that being produced by the protesters.

Second, in the end their intensity and commitment alone couldn't make the difference for the protesters. Other factors like strong personal ties, and organizing capacity and strategy were far more important. For example, a tally of social media messaging in the lead up to Egypt's "Constitutional Reform" referendum, showed the supporters of the reforms proposed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) clearly winning the "Facebook" vote over the protest leaders who opposed the reforms. The intensity, media prowess, and "street smarts" of the protesters were able to win the day in Tahrir Square, but they were unable to win the vote on the Constitution. Here, the organizing capacity and the extensive reach of the political parties (including the Muslim Brotherhood) who supported the SCAF proposals won the vote by a rather decisive margin of 77% to 23%.

Organizers like Ahmad Maher of Egypt's April 6th Movement understood both the power and the limits of social media. He and other organizers in Egypt object to calling their efforts a "Facebook revolution." It was invaluable as a communication tool and as a means of broadening their base, but, as he told me, "To advance, we must go beyond social media. We must find new ways to reach people and be relevant to them where they are on the streets."

Our survey found Arabs across the region demonstrating some agreement on this point. Overall, more than one-half (53%) agree with the proposition that with regard to the Arab Spring "social media accelerated a process that was already underway," and 10% claim that "social media had little or no impact on the uprisings" as opposed to the 37% who claim that "the recent uprisings...could not have occurred without the role played by social media."

III. IMPACT ON TRADITIONAL MEDIA

With so much attention paid to the role of social media in the Arab Spring, the impact of the dramatic events of the first quarter of 2011 on traditional media has been given short shrift. What our survey across the Arab region reveals is that traditional sources of information and news (e.g., television, newspapers, etc.) remained dominant throughout the Arab Spring and beyond. This was true among both Arabs who are online and searching web-based information sources, and Arabs who are without Internet access. There has been some movement away from reliance on traditional media, especially among younger or university-educated Arabs. But even with these two demographic groups, traditional media remains the dominant source of news.

Among the venues available to the information consuming public, it is television that is the most frequented and is considered the most reliable source, with satellite TV networks rated highest in Egypt and Tunisia, and local or national TV seen as more reliable in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Overall, across the region, these two television sources split the market. Newspapers come next on the reliability scale, with reliance on "talking to family and friends" close behind. Interestingly, Internet news sites and social media sites (specifically Facebook and Twitter) rated fairly low on the reliability scale. The bottom line here is that for many Arabs "the jury is still out" on the trustworthiness and objectivity of Internet- and social media-derived news. Coming in last place in the reliability rankings are Western media outlets. Only in Tunisia were Western networks watched in large numbers. But while Tunisians watched these outlets more than they watched their state-controlled networks during the Arab Spring, they weren't and aren't the most trusted sources of news. And in what may be one of the more interesting findings of this survey, we found that while 29% of Arabs overall report now using social media more frequently to get news and information, a significantly higher 49% report now using traditional media more often for news and information.

What follows is a narrative presentation of the results of two sets of polls we conducted across the Arab World and in Iran. The first set were 5,100 face-to-face surveys conducted in Tunisia (831), Egypt (1,028), Lebanon (500), Jordan (516), Saudi Arabia (821), UAE (509), and Iran (1,017) during the time period September 13 to October 5, 2011. They were conducted in largely urban areas (survey methodology can be found in Appendix B).

The second set of surveys, found in Appendix A were conducted with online users in Tunisia and Egypt in September, 2011.

INTERNET ACCESS

1. Internet Penetration

Percentage of population with Internet access							
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
2000	2.7	0.6	7.9	2.6	2.2	23.6	0.9
2004	8.5	4	9	11.6	10	30	7.5
2007	17	12.5	18.7	20	30	61	9.4
2008	22.5	18	22.5	23	36	72	10
2010	36.8	26.7	31	38	41	78	13

Internet access has expanded at an extraordinary pace across the Arab World. In 2000 the penetration rate, as a percentage of the overall population, was in the low single digits—everywhere but UAE. By 2010, the rates were up to an average of one-third of the overall population—with access rates more than double these national averages in urban areas.

The above table demonstrates this growth and the steady and dramatic increases that have occurred over time.

While rates have increased among Arabs, Iran, after a good start at the beginning of the decade, has stalled and stagnated.

2. Top Five Web Sites by Country

Rank	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE*	Iran
1	Facebook	Facebook	Facebook	Facebook	Google	Yahoo	Google
2	Google	Google	Google	Google	YouTube	Google	Yahoo
3	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube	Facebook	YouTube	Blogfa
4	Yahoo	Yahoo	Windows Live	Yahoo	Windows Live	Facebook	Peyvandha
5	Blogger	Yum7	Yahoo	Windows Live	Yahoo	Orkut	Mihanblog

Source: Alexa.com

* Compiled by *The Dubai Expat Diaries* using Alexa traffic rankings

The use of Internet for both information and communication can be seen in the listing of sites most visited in each country. Overall, the choices are split between information/portal sites like Google or Yahoo and the most popular social media sites: Facebook, YouTube, and Windows Live. A closer look at the uses made of the Internet and social media reveals varied activity, including: seeking news and information, shopping, conversations with family and friends, sports, and conducting business.

Because of tight controls on the Internet in Iran, access to Facebook and other sites are restricted (although ways have been found to circumvent these controls). The most popular sites in Iran are of local origin.

3. On the Web?

Do you have access to the Internet?						
Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
70	61	78	76	81	87	73

Note: Urban users only.

	Arab Aggregate*	Gender		Education		Age	
	Total	Male	Female	No Univ	Univ+	Under 25	Over 36
Yes	74	76	71	68	87	84	64

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.
Note: Urban users only.

Since our survey was conducted in mainly urban concentrations across the region (see Methodology note in Appendix B), reported Internet access rates are significantly higher than they are nationwide. Not surprisingly, university-educated respondents are considerably more likely to have access to the Internet than those with less education (88% to 67%); this gap is most significant in Tunisia and Egypt. In addition, younger respondents are far more likely to have Internet access than even slightly older adults (under 25: 85%; over 36: 62%); the widest margins between respondents under 25 and those over 36 are in Lebanon and Jordan.

4. Where Do You Access?

Where do you most frequently access the Internet?							
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
At my home	86	85	71	72	84	95	62
An Internet cafe or other public location	5	9	9	15	8	4	7
At the home of a friend or family member	7	3	2	7	0	0	2
At my place of work	0	2	13	6	1	0	8
On my mobile phone, with Internet access	2	1	5	0	8	1	12
At school or a library	0	0	0	0	0	0	9

5. How Do You Access?

Which of the following do you own? (Multiple answers possible)									
	Arab Aggregate*	Internet Access?		Gender		Education		Age	
	Total	Yes	No	Male	Female	No Univ	Univ+	Under 25	Over 36
Personal computer, with Internet access	65	88	0	66	63	60	77	72	57
Personal computer, without Internet access	13	8	28	12	14	14	10	13	14
Mobile phone, with Internet access	29	36	9	31	27	27	33	34	23
Mobile phone, without Internet access	81	77	95	81	82	83	77	78	85

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

Two-thirds of Arabs living in urban areas (where these surveys were conducted) report owning personal computers. The numbers of Arabs who are accessing the Internet on “smart phones” is growing—with rates averaging 40% in some countries. Lower numbers in Tunisia and Egypt bring the overall average down to just under 30%. And note that while a growing number own, and presumably use them, these devices do not appear to be where individuals most frequently access the Internet.

SOCIAL MEDIA USE

1. Social Media Sites

Have you ever used* any of the following social media sites? (*Note: "Use" does not suggest actual membership, which may be a smaller number.)							
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Facebook	94	99	98	68	77	93	42
Twitter	12	33	27	20	38	59	18
YouTube	36	100	63	75	81	99	26
Koora.com	5	16	7	3	12	23	0
Myegy.com	3	28	0	2	5	8	0
Yallakora.net	1	18	0	2	20	17	0
Mediafire.com	0	10	1	10	11	15	0
4shared.com	4	6	4	11	11	14	0

Iran	
35	LinkedIn
32	Blogfa.com
31	Mihanblog.com
39	persianblog.ir
30	Cloob.com
33	blogsky.com

Facebook Demographics by Country						
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE
# of FB users (in millions)	2.7	8.9	1.3	1.9	4.5	2.6
FB users as % of total population	26	11	31	30	18	53
FB users as % of those with Internet access	76	52	129	110	46	69
18-24	39	41	36	42	36	46
25-34	29	28	29	25	33	22
Male/Female	59/41	64/36	54/46	58/42	69/31	67/33
Source: Socialbakers.com						

As was established from the data I.2, Facebook and YouTube are the top two social media sites overall, with almost three times as much reported use as their nearest competitors. YouTube has a high rank among all subgroups, but is noticeably favored among young people. Twitter is consistently the next highest ranking site. Also notable is the heavy usage of Koora and YallaKoora, two sports-related sites.

[Note: The "Facebook demographics" are "official statistics," not results from our polling. However, polling numbers, though reporting "use" (not membership) still largely track this data, except in the case of Iran, where, for example, our respondents report much greater traffic in "Facebook" than this data would indicate, most likely owing to the means they use to access this site.]

How often do you use social media sites?

	Arab Aggregate*	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Frequently	75	81	85	78	61	67	71	47
Occasionally	23	16	13	18	37	30	25	28
Rarely	3	3	1	5	2	2	4	26

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

Note: "Frequently" is the aggregation of "more than once a day" and "once a day." "Occasionally" is the aggregation of "several times a week" and "once a week." "Rarely" is the aggregation of "less than once a week" and "never."

Amongst those Arab respondents who affirmed that they use social media, three-quarters report that this use has become woven into their daily routine, as they use social media sites at least once a day, rather than a weekly or occasional visit. Across age, gender, and education level, social media has become broadly and frequently utilized in the Arab World, with little variation across demographic groups or countries. Iran has the lowest reported rate of social media use, with those reporting frequent use almost 30 points less than the Arab average and more than one quarter of respondents reporting only rare use. And use of social media in Iran is significantly less than it is in all the Arab countries covered in our survey.

2. Why Do You Use Social Media?

Do you use social media sites for the following reasons?

	Arab Aggregate*	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Communicating with friends and family	83	59	94	96	84	85	87	69
Meeting new people	63	29	69	58	80	76	67	55
Expressing my views	69	75	68	65	47	69	87	18
Become involved in politics	37	68	44	23	11	25	37	10
As a source of news or information	75	88	91	58	69	71	57	43
For business (e.g., professional networking, or for marketing a product or service)	17	8	19	36	28	16	4	0

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

Do you use social media sites for the following reasons?							
	Internet Access?	Gender		Education		Age	
	Yes	Male	Female	No Univ	Univ+	Under 25	Over 36
Communicating with friends and family	83	83	84	85	80	86	80
Meeting new people	63	65	60	65	57	66	57
Expressing my views	69	71	67	67	74	69	70
Become involved in politics	37	36	37	34	43	33	43
As a source of news or information	75	72	77	74	76	75	75
For business (e.g., professional networking, or for marketing a product or service)	17	19	16	17	19	18	16

The ways individuals report using social media vary quite significantly across the seven nations. Strong majorities in all countries report that communicating with family and friends is a reason for their use of social media (83% of Arab respondents overall). Almost all respondents in Egypt and Lebanon affirm this as a reason for using social media sites (94%; 96%). In Tunisia, on the other hand, 6 in 10 say that they use social media to communicate with family and friends.

In all countries except Tunisia, majorities cite meeting new people as a reason for using social media. More than three-quarters of those in Jordan and Saudi Arabia affirm this use, while less than one-third of Tunisians report this reason for using social media. Younger respondents (those under 25) and those without university education are more likely to report that they use social media because they want to meet new people.

In Tunisia and Egypt, about 9 in 10 respondents report using social media sites as a source of news and information, which is far more than in the other countries surveyed. In Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, those who are university educated are more likely to say they use social media because it is a means to access news and information.

Overall, about seven in ten Arab respondents say they use social media as a means of expressing their views. The lowest rates of response for this use are found in Jordan (47%) and Iran (18%).

Tunisia is the only country surveyed where a majority of respondents (68%) say that they use social media to become involved in politics; overall, just over one-third of Arab respondents report this use of social media. In Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran less than one-quarter of respondents report using social media for political engagement. Interestingly, political activity and age are correlated; those over age 36 are more likely than those under 25 to become involved in politics through social media (over 36: 43%, under 25: 33%). Also, women in Tunisia (74%) report slightly more political activity through social media sites than men (62%); the reverse is true in Lebanon (men: 27%, women: 19%).

Business and professional networking are not major reasons for social media use in any of the countries surveyed, but some respondents in Lebanon (36%) and Jordan (28%) do report this use. It is more likely among men than women (Lebanon: 43%/29%, Jordan: 31%/24%), those over 36 (about four in ten in each country), and the university-educated (particularly in Jordan: 45% vs. 23% without university education).

When you use social media sites, do you tend to do the following?

	Arab Aggregate*	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Read other people's posts or follow posted links	73	20	81	86	89	87	84	70
Post information (e.g., blog entries, updates, tweets, links to articles, upload videos or photos)	74	74	68	56	80	71	93	38
Communicate directly with friends (e.g., send messages, chat)	89	81	89	96	92	90	89	75
Connect with groups or organizations	28	7	31	19	17	30	67	30

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

	Gender		Education		Age	
	Male	Female	No Univ	Univ+	Under 25	Over 36
Read other people's posts or follow posted links	73	73	75	68	77	67

When asked about activities they tend to do when using social media sites, respondents are fairly consistent across all countries surveyed. Direct communication with friends is the most frequently cited activity. Overall, almost nine in ten Arab respondents report that they communicate directly with friends.

Posting information and reading the information posted by others are also common activities claimed by more than seven in ten respondents overall. In Iran, only 38% post information. In Arab countries, those who are younger than 25, tend to read others' posts more commonly than those who older than 36 (77% vs. 66%). In Tunisia only one in five respondents say they tend to read other's posts when using social media sites, while in all other Arab countries surveyed more than 70% of respondents use these sites to read others' posted information. Connecting with organizations and groups is the least common category of activity, with less than one-third of respondents in most countries saying that they use social media in this way. Of those surveyed in UAE, however, two-thirds use social media to connect with groups and organizations.

3. Government Monitoring of Social Media

How concerned are you that social media sites like Facebook and Twitter may be monitored by the government?							
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Concerned	56	31	41	19	66	39	28
Not concerned	44	66	57	81	34	50	70

	Arab Aggregate*	Internet Access?	
		Yes	No
Concerned	43	50	24
Not concerned	54	48	71

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

When asked if they are concerned that social media sites like Facebook and Twitter may be monitored by the government, overall 43% of respondents in the six Arab nations surveyed are very or somewhat concerned and 54% are only a little or not concerned. Among those who have access to the Internet a slim majority are concerned with this potential monitoring, while among those without Internet access three times as many people are not concerned as are concerned about this issue.

Age is another significant factor, as younger respondents express greater concern about this potential government scrutiny, particularly in Egypt, Tunisia, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. In Tunisia, university educated respondents are more concerned than those with less education (63% vs. 50%).

In Iran, only 28% of respondents say they are concerned about government monitoring of social media sites, while seven in ten say they are unconcerned.

Does the concern that government may be monitoring social media sites limit people's use of Facebook, Twitter or other forms of social media?							
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Yes	30	27	38	86	80	26	65
No	70	73	62	14	20	74	35

When asked if potential government monitoring of social media sites limits people's use of these sites, we can observe considerable variations among the respondents from the seven nations surveyed. Jordanians and Saudis are far more likely to believe that people do limit their use of social media because of potential government scrutiny (86%; 80%) than Lebanese (38%), Tunisians (30%), Egyptians (27%), and those in the UAE (26%). The low figures in Tunisia and Egypt may indicate that after the uprisings in these countries respondents assume that their fellow countrymen will not be limited by fear of their governments from using social media.

Although only 28% of Iranian respondents say they are concerned about government monitoring of social media sites (see above), almost two-thirds of Iranians say that they believe that concern about government monitoring limits use of social media.

4. Social Media and the Arab Spring

Which of the following statements most closely reflects your opinion?								
	Arab Aggregate*	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
The recent uprisings in the Arab world could not have occurred without the role played by social media	37	6	46	32	39	62	29	27
Social media sites accelerated a process that was already underway	53	89	48	48	44	34	48	61
Social media sites had very little or no impact on the recent uprisings in the Arab world	10	5	6	20	17	4	23	12

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

Opinions about the role social media played in recent uprisings in the Arab World are quite divided. Overall, 37% of Arab respondents believe that the recent uprisings in the Arab World could not have occurred without the role played by social media sites, 53% think that social media sites accelerated a process that was already underway, and just 10% feel that social media sites had very little or no impact on the uprisings.

But these overall figures belie deep disparities among the nations surveyed. In Tunisia, 89% of respondents say that social media accelerated a process that was already underway; this is almost twice as high as the incidence of this opinion in other nations surveyed. In Egypt, opinion is evenly divided between those who agree that social media was essential to the uprisings (46%) and those who believe that social media was an accelerant on an existing process (48%). The strongest opinion about social media being essential to the Arab Spring is held by those surveyed in Saudi Arabia (62%). A denial that social media played any role is held by fewer than one-quarter of each nation's respondents.

In Iran, more than one quarter of respondents think that social media was essential to the uprisings, six in ten think social media accelerated a process already underway, and just 12% think social media had no impact.

5. Arab Spring's Impact on Your Reliance on Social Media

Have the recent uprisings in the Arab World had an impact on your reliance on social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs etc) for news information?

With Internet Access	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
I now use social media for news more often	40	62	17	41	37	33	20
I now use social media for news less often	44	24	8	1	26	33	25
There has been no impact	3	14	71	51	38	35	45
I don't use social media	13	0	4	8	0	0	10

	Arab Aggregate*	Education		Age	
	Total	No Univ	Univ+	Under 25	Over 36
I now use social media for news more often	29	28	33	37	23
I now use social media for news less often	18	15	25	18	18
There has been no impact	23	22	26	27	19
I don't use social media	29	34	17	19	40

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

Respondents were asked how the recent uprisings in the Arab World have impacted their reliance on social media for news information. Overall, 29% of Arab respondents say they now use social media more often, 18% said they use it less often, and 23% said it had no impact on their social media use for news information. (Twenty-nine percent are not users of social media at all.) Across all Arab countries surveyed, those that are younger and more educated now use social media for news more often, while those who are older without a university education are more likely not to use social media at all.

More interesting observations can be found by taking a closer look at the 18% of respondents who say they now use social media for news less often. While this group reports using social media for news less often, the recent uprisings have not affected their overall use. Ninety percent of this group still uses social media at least once a day, including 58% of them who report using Twitter. Three-quarters of this group use social media sites to communicate with family and friends, and 40% use it to get involved in politics (a higher rate than respondents overall). More than eight in ten respondents in this group say they are better informed about news since the advent of the Internet and social media site, and two-thirds find Internet news very or somewhat reliable. This group is comprised disproportionately of Tunisians (34%) and Egyptians (23%) who are, overall, significant users of social media. So rather than assuming that decreased use of social media sites for news indicates some kind of rejection of this vehicle, a more likely interpretation is that Tunisians and Egyptians, as well as others in the Arab world, who were extremely engaged with social media in order to get immediate news during the uprisings, have now decreased their reliance on using social media simply for news, and are now using this media for other purposes.

6. Do the Internet and Social Media Make You Better Informed?

Do you agree or disagree that you are better informed about news since the advent of Internet and social media sites?								
	Arab Aggregate*	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Agree	82	88	83	66	91	78	83	55
Disagree	12	0	15	28	3	15	16	44
Not sure	6	12	2	6	6	8	0	2

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.
Table only includes those with Internet access.

More than eight in ten Arab respondents with Internet access agree that they are better informed about news since the advent of the Internet and social media sites. Those who agree are more likely to be under 25 and university educated.

Those in Jordan and Tunisia are the most likely to feel they are better informed using social media (91%, 88%), while those in Lebanon and Iran are least likely to think so (66%, 55%). These rankings are closely aligned with the rankings of countries with respect to opinions about the reliability of Internet news and social media sites (see Section III.5 above). Again, the demographics of those who see these sources as reliable are similar to those who feel that they are better informed since the advent of the Internet and social media: they are more likely to be younger and university educated. One interesting difference, however, is that the opinions about being better informed are far stronger than those about reliability across the board.

7. Does Social Media Make Political Involvement Easier?

Do you agree or disagree that social media has made it easier to get involved in politics?								
	Arab Aggregate*	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Agree	71	80	84	78	90	60	35	18
Disagree	24	9	12	15	9	38	64	59
Not sure	4	10	4	7	1	2	1	23

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.
Table only includes those with Internet access.

More than seven in ten Arab respondents with Internet access agree that social media has made it easier to get involved in politics. Jordan has the highest rate of agreement (90%). In Tunisia and Jordan, those who agree are more likely to be university educated and under 25. Respondents in the UAE hold the opposite view, with almost two-thirds of those surveyed saying that they disagree that social media has made it easier to get involved in politics. Iranians are also skeptical, with only 18% agreeing that social media facilitates political involvement, 59% in disagreement, and almost one-quarter saying they are unsure.

8. Does Social Media Make Expressing Your Views Easier?

Do you agree or disagree that social media has made it easier for people to express their views and share information?								
	Arab Aggregate	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Agree	88	81	87	89	96	88	90	55
Disagree	8	9	8	6	3	10	8	25
Not sure	5	10	6	5	1	3	2	20

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.
Table only includes those with Internet access.

Overall, 88% of Arab respondents with Internet access agree that social media has made it easier for people to express their views and share information. Age and education levels only appear to make a difference in Tunisia and UAE; in these two countries those who agree were more likely to be younger with more education. Only 55% of Iranian respondents agree, while one-quarter disagree, and 20% are unsure about the impact of social media on the ability of people to express their views and share information.

9. Social Media and the Arab Spring

With which of the following statements do you most agree?							
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Social media sites helped the international community better understand recent developments in the Arab world	70	75	45	53	65	32	39
Social media sites were responsible for spreading misinformation about recent developments in the Arab world	0	7	36	32	22	30	56
Social media sites had little or no impact in communicating information about recent developments in the Arab world	30	18	18	16	13	38	6

	Arab Aggregate*	Internet Access?		Gender		Education		Age	
	Total	Yes	No	Male	Female	No Univ	Univ+	Under 25	Over 36
Social media sites helped the international community better understand recent developments in the Arab world	61	66	45	60	62	59	64	66	57
Social media sites were responsible for spreading misinformation about recent developments in the Arab world	18	20	13	18	18	18	19	18	17
Social media sites had little or no impact in communicating information about recent developments in the Arab world	21	14	41	22	20	23	17	16	25

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

More than six in ten Arab respondents overall tend to see the role of social media as a positive force in spreading information about the recent developments in the Arab World to the international community. Those who feel that social media had no impact in this area are more likely to have no Internet access and be over 36. Egypt and Tunisia have the highest rates of agreement that social media helped the international community better understand Arab developments (75%, 70%), while Iran and UAE have the lowest rates of agreement that social media played this positive role (39%,32%). Conversely, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, and UAE have the highest rates of agreement that social media sites were responsible for spreading misinformation about recent developments in the Arab world (56%, 37%, 32%, 30%).

TRADITIONAL MEDIA USE

1. Did You Follow the Arab Spring Using Traditional Media?

How closely did you follow events that unfolded earlier this year in Tunisia and Egypt by using traditional media (e.g., television, radio, newspapers, etc.)?								
	Arab Aggregate*	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Frequently	81	91	85	60	64	87	89	77
Occasionally	15	9	14	18	36	9	11	20
Rarely	4	0	1	6	0	4	0	2

*"Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.
 Note: "Frequently" is the aggregation of "more than once a day" and "once a day." "Occasionally" is the aggregation of "several times a week" and "once a week."
 "Rarely" is the aggregation of "less than once a week" and "never."

Traditional media is still a critical information source for the vast majority of people in the six Arab nations surveyed and Iran. When asked how closely they had followed recent events in Tunisia and Egypt by using traditional media like television, radio, and newspapers, overall 81% of the Arab respondents and 77% of Iranians reported at least daily use of such media, while an additional 15% of Arab respondents and 20% of Iranians reported at least weekly use. The frequency of traditional media use is not affected by access to the Internet; that is, Internet users are just as likely as non-Internet users to have followed the events in Tunisia and Egypt using traditional media. In an overall comparison, those over 36 do tend to use traditional media more than their younger compatriots, that being the only demographic where a significant difference can be detected.

Looking at the results in individual countries, one finds that Tunisians, Egyptians, and those in Saudi Arabia and UAE, regardless of Internet access, age, gender, or education, are more likely (by a 25 point margin) than Lebanese and Jordanians to have made use of traditional media to follow the events that unfolded this year using traditional media at least once a day in comparison to those in Lebanon and Jordan. Among the frequent users in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, there are no significant differences with respect to age, gender, Internet access, or education. However, the at-least-daily consumers of traditional media in Lebanon and Jordan are more likely to be male, over 36, and not to have access to the Internet.

2. Your Choice for News and Information

What are the two most important ways that you follow news and information about events in your country? (Choose two)							
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Satellite television networks	65	76	43	42	32	18	0
National or local television networks	20	41	85	62	58	56	53
Newspapers	13	14	13	27	33	48	57
Internet news sites	9	28	19	38	24	9	29
Facebook/Twitter/ other social media sites	62	23	9	3	10	15	3
Talking to friends and family	27	18	25	28	42	53	59

	Arab Aggregate*	Internet Access?		Gender		Education		Age	
	Total	Yes	No	Male	Female	No Univ	Univ+	Under 25	Over 36
Satellite television networks	50	45	64	48	52	52	44	47	53
National or local television networks	50	44	66	50	50	53	43	47	51
Newspapers	23	24	22	26	20	23	25	20	24
Internet news sites	22	26	8	22	21	21	23	26	18
Facebook/Twitter/other social media sites	23	29	6	23	23	18	35	28	22
Talking to friends and family	31	29	34	31	31	31	29	30	30

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

Among those surveyed in the six Arab nations, the most commonly cited means of following news and information about events in their countries are satellite television networks and national or local television networks (50%; 50%). Talking to friends and family (31%) is also an important way people follow the news in their home countries. Less than one-quarter of respondents reported using newspapers, Internet news sites, and social media sites as sources for national news. Access to the Internet, education level, and age are all significant factors in these choices, as those who cited relying mainly on television are 50% more likely not to have Internet access, about 20% more likely not to have a university education, and slightly more likely to be over 36. Social media users, on the other hand, are twice as likely to be university educated and somewhat more likely to be under 25.

Tunisians and Egyptians are more likely than other Arabs from other nations surveyed to report getting most of the information about events in their country from satellite television networks (65%; 76%), while those in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and UAE report a heavier reliance on national and local television networks (85%, 62%, 58%, 56%).

Amongst Tunisians, the second most frequently cited source of information on local news is social media (62%); the respondents who cite social media as a source are more likely to be university educated (76% vs. 51%), under 25 (71% vs. 57% over 36), male (66% vs. 57% female), and, of course, to have Internet access (81%). Although only 23% of Egyptians say social media sites are one of their two most important ways of following national news, Egyptians follow much the same pattern as Tunisians: having Internet access, being younger, and having a university education. (Gender is not a factor in Egypt.)

Social media sites are not frequently used as a source of national news for respondents in the other countries surveyed (UAE: 15%, Saudi Arabia: 10%, Lebanon: 9%, Jordan: 3%). However, Internet news sites are more significant in Jordan (38%), Egypt (28%), and Saudi Arabia (24%) than in Tunisia (9%) and UAE (9%).

In Iran, talking to family and friends (59%), newspapers (57%), and national/local television networks (53%) are the three most important ways that respondents follow news about events in their country. Fewer than one-third use Internet sites, and just 3% use social media sites, to follow national news.

3. How Did You Follow the Arab Spring?

What are the two most important ways that you followed the news of the recent uprisings in the Arab world? (Choose two)							
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Satellite television networks	82	77	54	91	73	56	8
National or local television networks	0	39	72	23	18	15	51
Newspapers	16	16	14	10	20	31	50
Internet news sites	13	24	19	52	42	33	27
Facebook/Twitter/ other social media sites	56	26	12	6	13	20	21
Talking to friends and family	33	18	25	19	33	45	44

Demographics of Tunisian and Egyptian Media Users									
	Total	Internet Access?		Gender		Education		Age	
		Yes	No	Male	Female	No Univ	Univ+	Under 25	Over 36
Tunisia	56	73	17	56	56	48	66	66	51
Egypt	26	41	4	27	26	24	40	35	20

	Arab Aggregate*	Internet Access?		Gender		Education		Age	
	Total	Yes	No	Male	Female	No Univ	Univ+	Under 25	Over 36
Satellite television networks	73	70	83	73	73	75	70	73	75
National or local television networks	26	19	46	25	28	29	19	24	29
Newspapers	18	17	20	19	16	18	17	14	20
Internet news sites	29	36	11	30	28	28	32	34	24
Facebook/Twitter/other social media sites	24	31	8	24	25	21	34	28	22
Talking to friends and family	28	27	32	28	28	28	27	25	31

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

When asked specifically about how they had followed the news of the recent uprisings in the Arab world, Arab respondents overall relied predominantly on satellite television (73%). Note the extremely low use of satellite television reported in Iran. Other sources comprise a second tier: Internet news sites (29%), family and friends (28%), national or local television (26%), and social media (24%). Newspapers are the least frequently cited source for news about the Arab Spring (18%), though they are one of the top sources for news in Iran (50%).

Those who cite satellite television as their preferred news source are somewhat more likely not to have Internet access, those who cite national or local networks are more than twice as likely not to have Internet access, and are less likely to have a university education. Those who cite either Internet news sites or social media sites are more likely to be under 25 and to have university educations.

In Tunisia, social media sites are much more significant, with 56% of respondents citing them as a principle news source about the uprisings. These respondents are more likely to be university educated (66% vs. 48%) and younger (66% vs. 51%), a pattern that is seen in Egypt as well. Gender is not a factor among those who used social media sites for news of the uprisings.

Internet news sites were very important for following news of the uprisings in the Arab World: Jordan (52%), Saudi Arabia (42%), and UAE (33%), particularly among those under 25.

Talking to family and friends was particularly significant in UAE (45%), Iran (44%), and Saudi Arabia (33%).

4. Arab Spring's Impact on Your Reliance on Traditional Media

Have the recent uprisings in the Arab World had an impact on your reliance on more traditional media sources (television, newspapers, radio etc) for news information?							
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
I now use traditional media sources more often	65	54	33	46	44	39	42
I now use traditional media sources less often	34	32	9	7	18	29	37
There has been no impact	1	14	58	47	35	20	22
I don't use traditional media sources	0	1	0	0	3	13	0

	Arab Aggregate*	Internet Access?		Age	
	Total	Yes	No	Under 25	Over 36
I now use traditional media for news more often	49	45	60	43	53
I now use traditional media for news less often	24	26	15	26	22
There has been no impact	25	28	18	29	22
I don't use traditional media sources	2	1	6	2	4

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

Overall, the recent uprisings had a positive impact on the reliance on traditional media for news information, with almost half of Arab respondents (49%) reporting that they use traditional media more often now. This is particularly true among those without Internet access and those over 36, but it is also the case that 45% of those with Internet access and 43% of those under 25 say they use traditional media more often now. And note that this 49% of all Arabs who report using traditional media more often for news is significantly higher than the 29% who reported (in II.5) now using social media more often for news.

Respondents in Tunisia and Egypt are the most likely to report an increased use of traditional media for news information (65%; 54%), with high numbers also reporting a reduction in their use of traditional media for news (one-third in each). In Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran pluralities say the uprisings have caused them to use traditional media more often, though not insignificant percentages report decreased use (Saudi Arabia: 18%, UAE: 29%, Iran: 37%). In Jordan, equal numbers of respondents say they use traditional media more often (46%) and that the uprisings have had no impact on their use of traditional media (47%). In Lebanon, just one-third of respondents (the lowest of any nation surveyed) say they are using traditional media for news information more now, with almost six in ten respondents reporting that the recent uprisings had no impact on their use of these sources.

5. Reliability of Different Media Sources

How reliable do you think the information is that you receive from each of the following sources?									
		Arab Aggregate*	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
National TV	Reliable	62	100	70	59	85	53	61	78
	Not reliable	27	0	28	38	15	47	39	22
Satellite TV	Reliable	66	99	73	37	53	57	55	5
	Not reliable	32	1	25	56	47	43	45	3**
Western TV	Reliable	41	84	31	27	22	44	24	5
	Not reliable	48	14	55	46	78	49	56	3**
Newspapers	Reliable	72	85	68	53	89	74	58	69
	Not reliable	19	15	21	24	11	19	27	31
Internet news	Reliable	54	69	48	37	72	56	39	36
	Not reliable	19	1	5	23	20	33	46	37
FB/Twitter/etc	Reliable	40	69	41	30	27	30	32	20
	Not reliable	30	1	12	32	57	47	53	47
Family & friends	Reliable	71	92	87	66	40	56	69	74
	Not reliable	27	8	11	27	60	44	31	27

Note: "Reliable" is the percentage of respondents who rated information from source as very or somewhat reliable. "Not reliable" is the percentage of respondents who rated information from source as not very reliable or not reliable at all. Percentages may not add up to 100% because the Not sure/I don't use ratings are not included.

* "Arab Aggregate" is the aggregation of the six Arab countries surveyed.

**In Iran, 92% of respondents say they do not watch satellite television networks or Western television networks.

Ranking of information sources by reliability														
	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		KSA		UAE		Iran	
	Internet Access	No Internet Access												
National TV	1	1	6	2	2	1	2	1	5	2	3	1	1	1
Satellite TV	2	1	3	3	6	4	4	3	2	2	4	2	6	7
Western TV	6	5	7	4	7	5	7	7	6	5	7	6	6	6
Newspapers	7	4	3	5	3	3	1	1	1	1	2	4	3	3
Internet news	4	7	2	6	4	6	2	5	4	7	5	5	4	4
FB/Twitter/etc	5	6	5	7	5	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	5	5
Family & friends	3	3	1	1	1	2	5	4	3	4	1	3	2	2

Note: Rankings are determined by putting in order the percentages of respondents in each country (with and without Internet access) who say that the sources are very or somewhat reliable.

People in the six Arab countries were asked about how reliable they think the information is that they receive from a

variety of sources. Overall, newspapers and “talking to family and friends” are considered the most reliable sources of information, with more than seven in ten Arab respondents rating them either very or somewhat reliable. Satellite and national or local television networks are also generally thought to be reliable by more than six in ten respondents. A majority of Arab respondents overall rate Internet news sites as reliable, though more than one-quarter of those surveyed are not sure or do not use this source. Western television networks are deemed reliable by 41% of respondents, but this source ranked first in unreliability ratings, with 48% of respondents finding Western television to be not very or not at all reliable. Finally, social media sites are considered reliable by 40% of Arab respondents, but 30% of those surveyed are not sure or do not use these sites.

Newspapers are considered most reliable by those surveyed in Jordan (89%) and Tunisia (85%). Countries where newspapers are not as highly rated include UAE (58% reliable, 27% not reliable) and Lebanon (53% reliable, 24% not reliable).

More than two-thirds of respondents in Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, UAE, and Lebanon think that their family and friends are a reliable source of information, but distrust of relying on these personal connections for accurate information are quite high in Jordan (60% not reliable), Saudi Arabia (44%), UAE (31%), and Lebanon (27%). The sizable group of Jordanians who do not find family and friends to be reliable sources of information are more likely to be university educated and over 36.

Views of reliability of satellite television networks and national or local television networks are generally consistent within most Arab country. Virtually all Tunisians, for example, find both sources to be either very or somewhat reliable, while about seven in ten Egyptians find both sources to be reliable. A smaller majority in Saudi Arabia and UAE also have consistent views on these types of television networks. This, however, is not the case in Lebanon or Jordan. National or local networks are considered reliable by 59% of Lebanese, while 56% of Lebanese report finding satellite TV unreliable. Eighty-five percent of Jordanians rate national or local TV as reliable, but only 53% feel the same way about satellite TV (and 47% saying that it is unreliable).

Western television is deemed reliable only in Tunisia (85% vs. 15% unreliable), while respondents in all other countries disagree. Large groups in Jordan (78%), UAE (56%), Egypt (55%), Saudi Arabia (49%), and Lebanon (46%) reporting that they see Western TV networks as unreliable.

The Iranian numbers, particularly with respect to television, are striking, with respondents saying that they only believe that local TV, talking to family and friends, and newspapers as reliable sources of news. The 92% who say that they “do not watch” either Western TV or other satellite channels coming from outside Iran is quite high.

Majorities of respondents in Jordan, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia think that Internet news sites are reliable; in Jordan and Tunisia, these respondents are more likely to be under 25 and university educated. Those surveyed in UAE are the least impressed by the reliability of Internet news sites, with 46% saying they are not very or not at all reliable; unexpectedly, these respondents are also more likely to be under 25 and university educated. More than four in ten respondents in Egypt and Lebanon said they were unsure or do not use Internet news sites; in both countries, this group is far more likely to be over 36, without a university education, and lacking Internet access.

Almost seven in ten Tunisians, many of whom are younger than 25 and university educated, think that social media sites are reliable, while less than one-third of those surveyed in Iran, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan agree. In fact, majorities in Jordan and UAE consider social media sites unreliable as sources of information. Sizable groups

either are unsure or do not use social media sites for information in Egypt (47%) and Lebanon (38%); as with Internet news sites, these respondents are far more likely to be over 36, without a university education, and lacking Internet access.

When looking at the relative rankings of information reliability based on respondents' access to the Internet, a few additional findings become apparent. First, not surprisingly, those with Internet access consider Internet news sites to be reliable sources of information and rate these sites higher than many other information sources. This is particularly evident in Egypt and Jordan, where Internet news sites hold the number two spot in reliability rankings for those with Internet access, while they are much farther down the list for those without Internet access. Second, national television networks are considered far less reliable by those with Internet access, particularly by respondents in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Finally, there is little disparity between the opinions of those with Internet access and those without it with respect to the reliability of social media sites and Western media sites, both of which tend to languish toward the bottom of these rankings.

APPENDIX A—ONLINE SURVEY DATA: TUNISIA & EGYPT

I. Facebook

1. Why did you join Facebook?

	Tunisia	Egypt
To communicate with family and friends	61	66
To meet new people	34	34
To express my views	14	17
To get news or information	48	34
To become involved in politics	3	6
For business (e.g., professional networking or to market a product or service)	7	6

Primary reasons for joining Facebook in both Tunisia and Egypt are “to communicate with family and friends” and “to get news and information.” “Meeting new people” is also ranked high.

2. Now that you are a member of Facebook, how helpful to you, personally, has Facebook been for: Communicating with family and friends

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	59	59
Somewhat helpful	33	32
Not helpful	2	2
I don't use it for this	6	7

Meeting new people

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	33	35
Somewhat helpful	46	40
Not helpful	5	6
I don't use it for this	16	19

Expressing my views

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	45	53
Somewhat helpful	41	35
Not helpful	5	4
I don't use it for this	9	8

Getting news or information

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	62	57
Somewhat helpful	31	35
Not helpful	5	5
I don't use it for this	3	3

Becoming involved in politics

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	20	33
Somewhat helpful	33	31
Not helpful	15	12
I don't use it for this	32	24

Professional networking or marketing a product or service

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	21	26
Somewhat helpful	34	33
Not helpful	12	11
I don't use it for this	33	31

In both Tunisia and Egypt, Facebook is seen as very helpful in serving the two functions for which most people join—“communicating with friends and family” and “getting news and information.” Respondents also find Facebook helpful as a way to “meet new people.” And while “expressing my views” isn't a major reason cited for joining Facebook, it is rated helpful in this area. Facebook is rated much less helpful for getting involved in politics or conducting business.

3. When you use Facebook, how often do you tend to: Read other people's posts or follow posted links

	Tunisia	Egypt
Frequently	50	56
Sometimes	41	36
Rarely	9	5
Never	1	2

Post information (e.g., blog entries, updates, links, to articles, upload videos or photos)

	Tunisia	Egypt
Frequently	38	34
Sometimes	42	44
Rarely	16	16
Never	3	6

Communicate directly with friends (e.g., send messages, chat)

	Tunisia	Egypt
Frequently	59	57
Sometimes	30	31
Rarely	9	9
Never	2	2

Connect with groups or organizations

	Tunisia	Egypt
Frequently	16	16
Sometimes	29	31
Rarely	31	27
Never	25	27

Once again respondents make clear that the main use to which they put Facebook is “communicating with family and friends,” followed closely by “reading other people's posts and following their links.”

4. How many Facebook friends do you have on your account?

	Tunisia	Egypt
1-50	32	33
51-100	23	23
101-200	22	19
200-400	15	12
More than 400	9	13

How often do you log on to Facebook?

	Tunisia	Egypt
More than once a day	62	57
Once a day	23	20
A few times a week	13	18
Once a week	2	2
Once a month	1	1
Less than once a month	0	2

Numbers given here compare favorably with international averages compiled by Facebook. Interestingly, the average Facebook user has 130 friends and more than 50% of active users log on to Facebook daily.

5. Why don't more people in your country use Facebook?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Language barrier	10	17
It is too expensive to go online	28	14
Privacy concerns	25	35
Lack of Internet access	35	33
Not enough time	34	36
Not interested	30	49
Lack of tech knowledge	33	51
The authorities in my country block access to Facebook	3	1

II. Twitter

1. Why did you join Twitter?

	Tunisia	Egypt
To communicate with family and friends	20	31
To meet new people	34	33
To express my views	31	33
To get news or information	53	44
To become involved in politics	7	13
For business (e.g., professional networking or to market a product or service)	24	15

The primary reason given for getting a Twitter account is “to get news and information.” Other reasons given some priority were “meeting new people” and “expressing my views.”

2. Now that you are a member of Twitter, how helpful to you, personally, has Twitter been for:

Communicating with family and friends

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	18	15
Somewhat helpful	26	36
Not helpful	22	22
I don't use it for this	33	27

Meeting new people

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	15	17
Somewhat helpful	42	46
Not helpful	17	10
I don't use it for this	25	27

Expressing my views

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	30	31
Somewhat helpful	38	44
Not helpful	15	10
I don't use it for this	18	15

Getting news or information

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	44	32
Somewhat helpful	31	36
Not helpful	9	11
I don't use it for this	16	21

Becoming involved in politics

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	22	18
Somewhat helpful	32	30
Not helpful	12	18
I don't use it for this	34	33

Professional networking or marketing a product or service

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very helpful	25	22
Somewhat helpful	23	33
Not helpful	19	10
I don't use it for this	33	34

When asked how helpful Twitter has been in serving a variety of functions, it was rated most helpful in “getting news and information” and as a vehicle for self-expression.

3. How many followers do you have on Twitter?

	Tunisia	Egypt
0-10	64	63
11-30	18	13
31-50	4	8
51-100	5	7
101-300	6	7
301-1000	3	1
More than 1000	0	1

How many people do you follow on Twitter?

	Tunisia	Egypt
0-10	63	54
11-30	13	16
31-50	4	10
51-100	10	10
101-300	6	5
301-1000	2	4
More than 1000	2	1

Once again data here compares favorably with international averages. The average Twitter user has 27 followers and follows approximately the same number.

4. Do you personally tweet, or do you use Twitter mainly to read other people's tweets?

	Tunisia	Egypt
I personally tweet	21	14
I mainly read others' tweets	50	48
Both	29	39

5. Why aren't more people in your area on Twitter?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Language barrier	13	34
It is too expensive to go online	25	15
Privacy concerns	17	15
Lack of internet access	20	27
Not enough time	21	30
Not interested	50	59
Lack of tech knowledge	39	62
The authorities in my country block access to Twitter	1	1

III. Social Media General

1. Have you ever used any of the following social media sites?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Facebook	93	95
Twitter	31	46
MySpace	19	20
Orkut	2	3
YouTube	86	89
LinkedIn	18	18
Flickr	9	13
Blogspot.com	11	12
Koora.com	14	19
Fatakat.com	4	30
Myegy.com	14	53
Triadnt.net	2	4
Yallakora.net	3	25
Jeeran.com	3	8
Mediafire.com	17	41
4share4e.com	29	39

2. How concerned are you that social media sites like Facebook and Twitter may be monitored by the government?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Very concerned	23	15
Somewhat concerned	28	24
A little concerned	15	16
Not concerned	27	41
Don't know	7	4

Does the concern that government may be monitoring social media sites limit people's use of Facebook, Twitter or other forms of social media?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Yes	61	47
No	39	53

3. Which of the following statements most closely reflects your opinion?

	Tunisia	Egypt
The recent uprisings in the Arab world could not have occurred without the role played by social media.	31	33
Social media sites accelerated a process that was already underway.	63	62
Social media sites had very little or no impact on the recent uprisings in the Arab world.	6	5

4. Do you agree or disagree that you are better informed about news since the advent of the Internet and social media sites?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Agree	79	87
Disagree	5	3
Not sure	16	10

5. With which of the following statements do you most agree?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Social media sites helped the international community better	81	79
Social media sites were responsible spreading misinformation	15	15
Social media sites had little or no impact in communicating	4	6

IV. Media Use

1. How closely did you follow events that unfolded earlier this year?

	Tunisia	Egypt
More than once a day	71	65
Once a day	12	16
Several times a week	11	11
Once a week	2	2
Less than once a week	2	3
Never	2	2

2. What are the two most important ways that you follow news and information about events in your country?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Satellite television networks	66	69
National or local television networks	15	9
Newspapers	6	13
Internet news sites	31	45
Facebook/Twitter/other social media sites	62	42
Talking to friends and family	9	10

3. What are the two most important ways that you followed the news of the recent uprisings in the Arab world?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Satellite television networks	73	74
National or local television networks	14	10
Newspapers	5	14
Internet news sites	33	46
Facebook/Twitter/other social media sites	57	39
Talking to friends and family	8	9

4. Did you use social media sites to follow the recent uprisings in the Arab world?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Yes	86	76
No	14	24

5. Do you read newspapers ...?

	Tunisia	Egypt
Online	31	37
In print	19	12
Both	28	38
I do not read the newspaper	23	14

6. Do you visit any of the following sites?

	Tunisia
Facebook.com	89
Google .com	89
Youtube.com	76
Yahoo.com	60
Blogspot.com	11
Live .com	14
Aljazeera.net	52
Bbc.com	13
Tunisia-sat.com	28
Wikipedia.org	43
Msn.org	18
Megaupload.com	24
Babylon.com	4
Twitter.com	22
Mosaiquefm.net	45

	Egypt
Facebook.com	88
Google .com	89
Youtube.com	83
Yahoo.com	73
Blogspot.com	13
Live .com	11
Aljazeera.net	32
Bbc.com	23
Fatakat.com	26
Maktoob.com	38
Myegym.com	39
Mediafire. com	31
Masrawy.com	46
Yallakora.com	22
Ahram.org.eg	20
Youm7.com	51

7. Which of the following Internet sites do you most often go to for news?

Tunisia	
Facebook.com	83
Google .com	59
Youtube.com	41
Yahoo.com	26
Blogspot.com	2
Live .com	4
Aljazeera.net	40
Bbc.com	6
Tunisia-sat.com	12
Wikipedia.org	8
Msn.org	4
Megaupload.com	2
Babylon.com	0
Twitter.com	5
Mosaiquefm.net	21

Egypt	
Facebook.com	65
Google .com	44
Youtube.com	33
Yahoo.com	25
Blogspot.com	2
Live .com	2
Aljazeera.net	28
Bbc.com	16
Fatakat.com	4
Maktoob.com	10
Myegym.com	3
Mediafire. com	1
Masrawy.com	24
Yallakora.com	6
Ahram.org.eg	15
Youm7.com	43

8. Have the recent uprisings in the Arab World had an impact on your reliance on social media (Facebook, Twitter, blogs etc) for news information?

	Tunisia	Egypt
I now use social media for news more often	63	56
I now use social media for news less often	15	10
There has been no impact	18	30
I don't use social media	4	4

9. How reliable do you think the information is that you receive from the following sources?

		Tunisia	Egypt
National TV	Reliable	56	46
	Not reliable	40	46
	Not sure/I don't watch it	5	8
Satellite TV	Reliable	81	84
	Not reliable	17	13
	Not sure/I don't watch it	2	3
Western TV	Reliable	67	58
	Not reliable	26	30
	Not sure/I don't watch it	7	12
Newspapers	Reliable	47	65
	Not reliable	43	31
	Not sure/I don't watch it	9	5
Internet news	Reliable	77	84
	Not reliable	19	14
	Not sure/I don't watch it	3	2
FB/Twitter/etc	Reliable	73	74
	Not reliable	23	23
	Not sure/I don't watch it	4	3
Talking to family & friends	Reliable	68	67
	Not reliable	29	30
	Not sure/I don't watch it	3	3
Note: "Reliable" is the percentage of respondents who rated information from source as very or somewhat reliable. "Not reliable" is the percentage of respondents who rated information from source as not very reliable or not reliable at all.			

APPENDIX B—METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

Zogby Research Services commissioned JZ Analytics to conduct surveys in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and additional online surveys in the United States, Tunisia, and Egypt. Various methodologies were utilized using trusted partners in the countries surveyed. The following methodologies were developed to most effectively contact the samples requested.

In Iraq, interviews were conducted from September 13-21, 2011, in Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Babil, Najaf, Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, Sulamaniya, and Arbil with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households from the six Iraqi governorates. The margin of error is +/-3.2 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on the 2007 projection of the 1997 general census, the most recent and comprehensive official census study conducted in the country.

In Lebanon, face-to-face interviews were conducted from September 12-29, 2011, in Beirut, Aley, Metn, Baabda, Tripoli, Tyre, Saida, and Chouf with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on a systematic random sample adopting a population proportionate weight based on the approximate estimated make-up/weight of the areas covered in each selected neighborhood.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Multi-stage stratified probability sampling was used to ensure a random, representative sample. However, broad demographic quotas were maintained at an aggregate (country) level to ensure that the sample was in line with the sample in earlier years. Interviews were conducted in Egypt from September 12-29, 2011, in Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Menia, Mansoura, and Asyut. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Tunisia, from September 12-29, 2011, in Tunis, Safaqis, Sousse, Bizerte, and Gafsa. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Jordan from September 12-29, 2011, in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, and Madaba. The margin of error is +/-4.4 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Iran from September 12-29, 2011, in Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, and Ahwaz. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Afghanistan from September 12-29, 2011, in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Baghlan, and Herat. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points.

In Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where door-to-door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. Adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was broadly representative and not skewed. Broad country level demographic quotas were followed to ensure the final sample has characteristics of the population. Interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia from September 12-29, 2011, in Riyadh, Buraydah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Dammam, and Khobar. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in UAE from September 12-29, 2011, in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and the North Emirates. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points.

In addition, JZ Analytics conducted online surveys of 1,054 adults in the United States on September 13-15, 2010, 602 adults in Egypt on September 15-19, 2010, and 531 adults in Tunisia, September 15- October 5, 2010. Using trusted interactive partner resources, thousands of adults were invited to participate in this survey. Each invitation is password coded and secure so that each respondent can only access the survey one time.

Based on information from census data, CIA fact books, and exit polls, complex weighting techniques are utilized to best represent the demographics of the population being surveyed. Weighted variables may include age, race, gender, region, party, education, and religion.

	Jordan		Egypt		Lebanon		Tunisia		KSA		UAE*		Iran		Egypt Online		Tunisia Online	
	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%
Total	516	100	1028	100	500	100	831	100	821	100	509	100	1017	100	602	100	531	100
Under 36	317	61	601	59	288	58	397	49	506	62	306	60	646	64	478	79	392	74
36+	199	49	427	52	212	42	434	52	315	38	203	40	371	37	124	21	139	26
Live in city	385	79	989	96	469	94	796	96	650	79	356	70	635	62	539	90	440	83
Live outside city	131	21	39	4	31	6	12	1	171	21	153	30	382	38	47	8	80	15
Less than university	408	79	874	85	343	69	464	56	643	78	290	57	637	63	85	14	107	21
University+	108	21	154	15	155	31	367	44	178	22	219	43	380	37	509	86	412	79
Sunni	390	76	939	91	110	22	784	94	722	88	486	96	47	5	503	89	496	97
Shia					175	35	-	-	40	5	16	3	969	95				
Christian	26	5	89	9	180	36									60	11	10	2
Druze	-	-	-	-	35	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Male	262	51	518	50	252	50	416	50	460	56	374	74	542	53	331	55	265	50
Female	254	49	510	50	248	50	415	50	361	44	135	27	475	47	271	45	266	50

* Includes approximately 350 Emiratis and 150 Arabs working in UAE. Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	Iraq	
	freq	%
Total	1000	100
Under 25	168	17
25-36	208	21
36+	384	38
Urban	696	70
Rural	304	30
Less than university	884	88
University+	116	12
Married	660	66
Single	227	28
Divorce/widowed/separated	63	6
Arabic	848	85
Kurdish	139	14
Assyrian	9	1
Shia	612	61
Sunni	375	38
Male	529	53
Female	471	47

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	Afghanistan	
	freq	%
Total	837	100
Under 36	530	63
36+	307	37
Live in city	837	100
Live outside city	-	-
Less than university	-	-
University+	-	-
None/ Primary	700	84
Tech/Secondary	84	10
Professional/Higher	53	6
Employed	337	40
Not employed	500	60
Sunni	661	79
Shia	176	21
Male	426	51
Female	411	49

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	U.S. Online	
	freq	%
Total	1054	100
18-29	217	22
30-49	355	36
50-64	246	25
65+	168	17
East	231	22
South	272	26
Central Great Lakes	314	30
West	231	22
No College Degree	650	62
College Degree+	399	38
Liberal	219	21
Moderate	337	32
Conservative	408	39
White	717	68
Hispanic	137	13
African American	126	12
Asian	42	4

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

AFGHANISTAN:

10 Years Later

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the month of September 2011, we conducted surveys in Afghanistan, the United States, six Arab countries, and Iran in an effort to measure attitudes toward: the impact of the war in Afghanistan; concerns about the future of the country; and how Afghans see the world, their country, and their future.

Despite the obvious difficulties associated with polling in a country at war, several important observations come through quite clearly from these results.

First and foremost is the enormous gap in perceptions that the findings reveal between United States and Afghani attitudes toward the impact of the war on several areas of life. On the one hand, Afghans appear to hold rather strong negative views against the war and its impact on their lives, while U.S. attitudes, though leaning in a positive direction, reveal a striking ambivalence or lack of information about the war and its consequences.

For example, while no Afghans view NATO's 10-year-long presence as having left their country "better off" than it was before—with 77% saying their country is "worse off" and 23% saying it is "the same"—views from the United States are all over the map.

By a two to one margin, Americans feel that NATO has made Afghanistan "better off" (34% to 17%). But that leaves almost one-half of the U.S. respondents saying they believe that Afghanistan is "the same" or that they are "not sure" whether the country is "better off" or "worse off."

Another observation that can be made at the outset is the partisan divide in U.S. perceptions of the war and its impact, with Republicans being inclined to see the war and its consequences more positively than Democrats.

When the survey takes a closer look examining specific areas of impact of the 10-year-long war, these same patterns of disconnect between Afghans and Americans, and between the two U.S. parties, can be observed. An overwhelming majority of Afghans find no positive gains in "political freedom," "personal security," "government services," or "religious freedom." Afghani views as to whether there have been improvements in "economic development," "education," "health care," or "women's rights" are divided, with minorities saying these areas have improved and a combined strong majority saying they have either been negatively impacted or are "the same" as they were before NATO entered. Interestingly, these views are held across all demographic groups in Afghanistan. For example, on the issue of women's rights there is only a scant 2% difference between the attitude of men and women on the impact the war has had in this area.

In response to whether or not there have been improvements in all the areas of life under examination, Americans are divided, with Republicans inclined to see a more positive impact than Democrats, and one-half of all Americans in both parties either "not sure" or seeing no improvement at all.

This same disconnect can be seen when we ask “who benefited most from the war?” Three-quarters of Afghans say the United States was the major beneficiary of the war—a view shared by most Arabs in the six other countries covered in this survey. At the same time, one-third of Americans say “the Afghani people” were the main beneficiaries, while a striking 41% of U.S. respondents say “no one” benefited or they are “not sure.”

The one area where there is, on the surface, somewhat of a convergence of views, is with regard to the expected departure of NATO forces in 2014. But here we note a striking set of conflicted Afghani attitudes. Americans overwhelmingly indicate “happiness” about the withdrawal, while Afghans are split, with 53% saying they are “happy” and 47% saying they are “worried.” The response to this question, however, appears to clash with other Afghani attitudes about their post-NATO future. After expressing a unanimous view that they are “optimistic” about their “post-NATO” future, 97% of Afghans then tell us that they are concerned about “renewed fighting,” “economic deterioration,” “being dominated by a neighboring country,” and “losing religious freedom.”

The only two areas where a majority of Afghans say they are unconcerned is with regard to the potential return of the Taliban (8 in 10 unconcerned) and al-Qaeda (7 in 10 unconcerned) following a NATO withdrawal. It is in response to these two questions that an interesting split occurs in Afghani views, with a majority of Shia Afghans being the only demographic group in the country to say that they are concerned with the return of these two groups.

Conflicted Afghani attitudes can also be found in response to a series of questions measuring attitudes toward the United States. Ninety-seven percent say they have a negative view of the United States, and 84% say that the United States will make “a negative contribution to Afghanistan’s security and economic development.” But 83% then say that they see a role for the United States as “an investor in development” in the future, with a little more than a third seeing the United States having “a security presence” and one-quarter seeing a “special alliance” between the United States and Afghanistan!

The country that Afghans appear to favor is Pakistan (96% “very favorable”). Strong majorities also have favorable views of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and China, and see them all making a contribution to their country in the future. Iran and India are seen in an unfavorable light, with the positive views of a majority of Shia toward Iran accounting for the overall 14% of Afghans who give that country a “very favorable rating.”

Only 16% of Afghans are “satisfied with the pace and direction of political change” in the country, and only one-quarter see the country moving in the right direction. Almost all Afghans covered in our survey hold a “very unfavorable” view of President Hamid Karzai, while his opponent in the last election, Abdullah Abdullah, receives a favorable rating from about one-third of the country. The highest favorable ratings go to Yunus Qanuni, followed by Mullah Omar and Jalauddin Haqqani. What was interesting to note here was the fact that these ratings were shared by every demographic group, with only scant differences in some regions.

While it is admittedly difficult to poll in wartime, this survey, even in some of the contradictory results it reveals, sheds important light on Afghani attitudes. While attempting to put a brave face on their post-NATO future and being none too shy about expressing their displeasure with the United States, Afghans are not happy with their present situation and worried about their future. Even in their apparent refusal to criticize the Taliban or its leaders or to give even a single favorable rating to President Karzai, Afghans reveal something about the current political dynamic at work in the country.

Finally, the partisan split in the United States over the war, though a factor that must be considered, is not as striking as the ambivalence toward, lack of attention to, or lack of information about the war that this survey reveals. Despite being America’s longest war, the fact that most Americans have no solid views about its impact is, at best, troubling.

AFGHANISTAN: 10 YEARS LATER

1. Better Off/Worse Off?

In your opinion, are the Afghani people better off/worse off than they were before NATO entered?					
	Afghanistan		United States		
	Total		Total	Democratic	Republican
Better	-		27	22	39
Worse	78		17	25	9
Same	22		38	39	36
Not sure	-		18	14	17

After ten years of war, no Afghans feel that they are better off than they were before NATO forces entered. American attitudes are divided, reflecting a lack of consensus about the war and its impact. Note that while, by a margin of four to one, Republicans feel that the war has left Afghanistan better off, one half of Republicans are “not sure” or think that no change has occurred.

2. What Has Improved, What Has Not

Since NATO forces entered Afghanistan, how do you feel the following areas of life have been impacted?																				
	Political freedom				Economic development & employment				Education				Health Care				Personal safety & security of Afghans			
	Afghanistan		United States		Afghanistan		United States		Afghanistan		United States		Afghanistan		United States		Afghanistan		United States	
	Total	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican	Total	Democrat	Republican	Total	Democrat	Republican	Total	Democrat	Republican	Total	Democrat	Republican	Total	Democrat	Republican
Positive	-	34	30	43	13	24	20	31	10	32	27	42	12	24	18	34	-	27	23	37
Negative	86	17	24	12	36	22	30	15	42	16	22	9	50	17	24	8	72	28	35	20
No Impact	14	24	25	23	50	28	29	29	46	25	27	23	38	26	29	24	28	22	23	22
Not sure	-	25	21	22	1	26	22	25	1	27	24	25	-	33	28	35	-	22	18	21

Since NATO forces entered Afghanistan, how do you feel the following areas of life have been impacted?

	Relations with neighboring countries				Administration of government services				Women's rights				Religious freedom			
	Afghanistan	United States			Afghanistan	United States			Afghanistan	United States			Afghanistan	United States		
	Total	Total	Democratic	Republican	Total	Total	Democratic	Republican	Total	Total	Democratic	Republican	Total	Total	Democratic	Republican
Positive	23	17	15	20	3	23	21	29	22	31	29	39	-	24	25	28
Negative	26	28	32	24	64	24	32	17	25	17	20	13	61	18	20	15
No Impact	51	24	25	20	32	20	22	19	53	28	28	26	39	31	30	32
Not sure	-	32	27	35	-	32	25	34	-	24	23	22	-	28	25	26

In an effort to take a closer look at the impact of the war, a series of questions were posed both to Afghans and to Americans about how life in Afghanistan has been impacted in several areas since NATO forces entered the country. Taken as a whole, the responses to this series of questions demonstrate a few basic trends.

- (1) In no area did Afghans find a positive impact. In three of the nine areas (political freedom, personal safety and security of Afghans, and religious freedom), the responses are overwhelmingly negative, without a single positive response. In all of the others, responses are either negative or divided between negative and no impact.
- (2) Given the duration of the conflict and resources devoted to its operations, U.S. respondents display a striking ambivalence about the impact of the war. In each area of life covered in this series, between one in five and one in three Americans say they are “not sure” what the impact has been on life in Afghanistan.
- (3) The U.S. partisan divide is clearly in evidence with respect to opinions about the impact of the war, with Republicans more likely to believe that the war has had a positive impact or, at the very least, to say that they are “not sure.” Meanwhile, Democrats are more likely to see the war as having had negative consequences.
- (4) There is a deep disconnect between the perceptions of Afghans and Americans as to how the war has impacted life in Afghanistan.

Afghans most frequently classify the impact of the war as negative on political freedom (86%), personal safety and security (72%), administration of government services (64%), and religious freedom (61%).

With respect to political freedom, twice as many Americans think that the impact has been positive rather than negative, but a full quarter of those in the United States are unsure about this impact. The partisan split is in evidence here, with Democrats twice as likely as Republicans to think the impact on political freedom has been negative (24% vs.

12%) and Republicans much more likely than Democrats to designate the impact as positive (43% vs. 30%). This same pattern is clear with respect to U.S. opinions about the impact on personal safety and security of Afghanis (positive: Democrats 23% vs. Republicans 37%; negative: Democrats 35% vs. Republicans 20%) and on administration of government services (positive: Democrats 21% vs. Republicans 29%; negative: Democrats 32% vs. Republicans 17%). Opinions about religious freedom are less clearly partisan, with three in ten Americans overall thinking that there has been no impact in this area.

Afghanis are most likely to see positive impacts on relations with neighboring countries (23%) and on women's rights (22%), though at least one-quarter of Afghanis identify negative impacts in these areas and more than half say there has been no impact.

Interestingly, U.S. respondents are least likely to identify positive impacts on Afghanistan's relations with its neighbors (17%), with almost one-third of Americans saying they are unsure of what impact the last ten years may have had in this area. The same U.S. partisan split is seen with respect to opinions about the impact on women's rights (positive: Democrats 29% vs. Republicans 39%; negative: Democrats 20% vs. Republicans 13%).

When considering some key domestic areas, Afghanis are three or four times more likely to see the impact as negative than as positive (economic development and employment: 36% vs. 13%; education: 42% vs. 10%; health care: 50% vs. 12%). U.S. opinions with respect to these areas display the same pattern as discussed above, with Democrats and Republicans divided on the impacts, at least one quarter of Americans saying "not sure," and another quarter stating that there has been no impact.

3. Who Benefited Most?

Who do you feel benefited most from the war in Afghanistan? (Choose two)									
	Afghanistan	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	US	Iran
Afghani people	-	5	1	19	10	-	40	33	27
Warlords	26	27	15	21	16	75	29	19	36
Pakistan	50	10	7	16	14	5	26	8	26
India	3	4	3	14	3	5	23	1	32
Iran	40	16	3	19	14	7	32	3	-
U.S.	76	75	79	54	72	91	26	26	44
Taliban	2	30	35	21	20	2	10	8	18
al-Qaeda	3	33	58	36	42	16	15	7	18
No one/not sure	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41	-

When asked who benefited the most from the war in Afghanistan, there are significant areas of commonality and divergence across the Arab and Muslim Worlds and the United States. More than three-quarters of Afghanis say the United States is a chief beneficiary of the war. This view is widely shared in most of the Arab countries surveyed, particularly in Tunisia (91%), Jordan (79%), Egypt (75%), and Lebanon (72%). A plurality of Iranians (44%) also express the view that the United States benefited the most from the war, as do one-quarter of respondents in UAE and in the United States itself.

The second most frequently cited beneficiary of the war reported in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon is al-Qaeda, with the Taliban following close behind.

While half of Afghani respondents identify Pakistan as a chief beneficiary of the war, this view is not prevalent in any other country, though one-quarter of respondents in UAE and Iran concur. The benefit to Iran is also considered significant within Afghanistan, with 40% of respondents selecting it; but aside from UAE where one-third of respondents agree that Iran was the beneficiary of the war, this view is also not shared elsewhere in the region.

A significant number of respondents in all countries surveyed point to the benefit to Afghani warlords/political elites, a view held most strongly by Tunisians. More than one-quarter of Afghanis, Egyptians, and Arabs in the UAE also share this opinion, as do more than one-third of Iranians.

While no one surveyed in Afghanistan says the Afghani people have benefited the most from the war, they are the most frequently cited group of beneficiaries by respondents in the United States and UAE. More than one-quarter of Iranians concur with this view. Perhaps the most striking result relates to the apparent ambivalence displayed by a plurality of Americans with regard to the 10-year-old war in Afghanistan. Four in ten U.S. respondents either say that “no one” benefited from the war or that they are unsure who benefited.

OPINIONS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL

1. Is Withdrawal a Positive or Negative?

American forces are scheduled to leave your country at the end of 2014. In your opinion is this withdrawal a positive or negative thing for your country?	
	Afghanistan Total
Very positive	92
Somewhat positive	8
Somewhat negative	-
Very negative	-
Not sure	-

From their response to this question, it might appear that Afghans are universally positive about the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. forces from their country at the end of 2014. Ninety-two percent say they are “very positive,” while the remaining 8% are “somewhat positive” about the withdrawal.

2. Optimism/Pessimism about the Short Term

How optimistic/pessimistic are you about the first two years after NATO forces leave Afghanistan?								
	Afghanistan	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	Iran
Optimistic	100	61	21	33	39	43	51	56
Pessimistic	-	20	72	43	23	33	37	29
Not Sure	-	19	8	14	38	25	12	15

Note: “Optimistic” is the aggregation of “very optimistic” and “somewhat optimistic.” “Pessimistic” is the aggregation of “somewhat pessimistic” and “very pessimistic.” Percentages do not add to 100% because numbers were rounded.
 * This question was not asked in the United States.

When asked to consider the first two years after NATO forces leave Afghanistan, once again Afghans appear to be unanimous in their optimism. Meanwhile, respondents across the broader region are divided in their opinions. Most optimistic are Egyptians (61%), Iranians (56%), and respondents in UAE (51%), though each of these countries also have sizable contingents of those who are pessimistic about the future of Afghanistan, as well as those who are unsure. Respondents in Tunisia and Lebanon are the most divided with about two-fifths expressing optimism, and between one-quarter and one-third expressing pessimism about the first two years after the NATO withdrawal. These two countries also have the highest percentages of respondents who were unsure (Lebanon: 38%; Tunisia: 25%). Jordan and Saudi Arabia are the most pessimistic (Jordan: 72%; Saudi Arabia: 43%), with fewer than one-third of respondents expressing optimism about the immediate aftermath of the NATO withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan.

3. Optimism/Pessimism about the Long Term

How optimistic/pessimistic are you about the longer-term prospects for stability and progress in your country?	
	Afghanistan Total
Very optimistic	82
Somewhat optimistic	18
Somewhat pessimistic	-
Very pessimistic	-
Not sure	-

Afghanis' overwhelming optimism about the immediate aftermath of the NATO withdrawal is undiminished when asked about the longer term prospects for stability and progress in Afghanistan. Again, 100% of respondents in Afghanistan are optimistic about their country in the long term.

4. What Emotion Do You Feel about Withdrawal? :

When you think of this withdrawal, which emotion do you feel most?				
	Afghanistan	United States		
	Total	Total	Democratic	Republican
Happiness they will go	53	72	82	65
Worry about the future	47	15	9	23
Not sure	-	13	8	13

Despite the fact that Afghanis appear to insist that the U.S. withdrawal is positive for their country and profess that they are optimistic about the future, they also appear to be quite conflicted about the withdrawal. Here they express views that appear to contradict their earlier assertions. Just over one-half (53%) say that they are happy that the U.S. forces are leaving, while just under half (47%) are worried about the future.

Americans, on the other hand, are decidedly happy about the planned withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan, with more than seven in ten holding this emotion and only 15% saying that they are worried about the future. Democrats are more likely than Republicans to be happy about the withdrawal (82% vs. 65%) and far less likely to worry about the future (9% vs. 23%).

5. Concerns Once the NATO Forces Leave

How great is your concern with each of the following once the NATO forces leave Afghanistan? (concerned/not concerned)									
	Afghanistan	Egypt	Jordan	KSA	Lebanon	Tunisia	UAE	US	Iran
Taliban	19/79	27/51	77/4	60/18	40/39	20/45	49/24	49/24	41/41
al-Qaeda	30/68	21/53	78/4	59/21	42/35	11/36	48/22	48/22	42/38
Renewed fighting	97/-	26/51	81/4	63/18	41/32	8/44	48/22	48/22	47/39
Economic deterioration	97/-	25/46	64/9	52/30	38/37	19/48	33/32	33/32	43/43
Dominated by neighboring country	98/-	20/53	60/10	50/29	22/53	10/57	24/43	24/43	46/42
Lose religious freedom	97/-	30/43	40/15	44/30	29/48	7/57	36/31	36/31	47/39

Note: On a scale of 1-5 in which 1 is "very concerned" and 5 is "not concerned." The first number represents those who responded 1 and 2 and the second number represents those who responded 4 or 5.

Respondents in Afghanistan and across the region were asked about their degree of concern with possible outcomes related to the NATO forces departure from Afghanistan. Because respondents were asked to rate their concerns from 1–5, with 1 being “very concerned” and 5 being “not concerned,” this type of question measures intensity of concern or non-concern. The table displays the 1 and 2 ratings as indicating concern and the 4 and 5 ratings as indicating lack of concern. Overall, the results, which include sizable proportions of 3 ratings (meaning neither particularly concerned nor unconcerned), point to a lack of intensity of concern regarding Afghanistan.

Despite claiming optimism about the future, Afghans say that they are very worried about “renewed fighting,” “economic deterioration,” being “dominated by a neighbor,” and “losing religious freedom” following a withdrawal of NATO forces. The only two areas where they claim not to have concern is with the return of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This, however, may be a reflection on the internal political/fear situation within Afghanistan today.

Jordanians demonstrate the greatest concern in every area, except with regard to the potential loss of religious freedom in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabian responses follow a similar pattern to those expressed by Jordanians, with a lesser degree of intensity of concern. Respondents in Egypt and Tunisia demonstrate the lowest levels of concern, perhaps due to the fact that they are more preoccupied with matters close to home. Respondents in Iran do display some intensity of opinion, but no consensus. Iranians appear to be concerned and unconcerned in equal numbers about the issues facing Afghanistan after NATO’s withdrawal, with no particular areas standing out as being of special concern. Lebanon and UAE have similarly divided responses. The issue that appears to generate the least concern across the region is whether or not Afghanistan might be “dominated by a neighboring country,” with less than a quarter of the respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, and UAE expressing any concern over this outcome.

The only areas where Americans show any concern is with the possibility that the Taliban or al-Qaeda may resurge or that fighting may break out once NATO leaves. Overall, American attitudes are quite similar to those of the Lebanese and Arabs in the UAE, with respondents demonstrating somewhat more concern than “no concern,” but no strong intensity of feeling in any area. This absence of intensity, while understandable in other countries in the region, is quite strange coming from the United States, which has been so deeply engaged in the war in Afghanistan for over a decade.

5a. Concerns Once the NATO Forces Leave

How great is your concern with each of the following once the NATO forces leave Afghanistan? (concerned/not concerned)			
-The Taliban will return to take over the country			
	Afghanistan		
	Total	Sunni	Shia
(1) Very concerned	19	10	55
(2)	1	1	1
(3)	2	2	1
(4)	19	21	11
(5) Not concerned	60	67	32
Not Sure	-	-	-

Only one in five Afghans are concerned about the return of the Taliban, while almost eight in ten are unconcerned. The deep divide between Sunni and Shia on this question is, however, striking; only 11% of Sunnis are concerned about the Taliban, while 56% of Shia express concern.

5b. Concerns Once the NATO Forces Leave

How great is your concern with each of the following once the NATO forces leave Afghanistan? (concerned/not concerned)			
-Al-Qaeda will regain a foothold in the country			
	Afghanistan		
	Total	Sunni	Shia
(1) Very concerned	20	12	50
(2)	10	9	13
(3)	2	2	2
(4)	13	15	6
(5) Not concerned	55	62	30
Not Sure	-	-	-

When asked about concern with al-Qaeda regaining a foothold in Afghanistan, once again it appears that only Afghans who are Shia are concerned with this potential outcome.

While, overall, three in ten Afghans say that they are concerned about the potential for al-Qaeda to regain a foothold in their country, among Shia this concern is three times greater than it is among the Sunni (63% vs. 21%).

LOOKING AT THE UNITED STATES & THE WORLD

1. Attitudes Toward Other Countries

Indicate your attitude—favorable/unfavorable—toward each of the following countries.						
	Afghanistan Total					
	United States	Pakistan	Iran	India	UAE	China
Very favorable	-	96	14	-	24	29
Somewhat favorable	-	4	1	21	54	33
Somewhat unfavorable	3	-	29	46	22	23
Very unfavorable	97	-	57	34	-	15

	Sunni	Shia
Very favorable	4	53
Somewhat favorable	-	3
Somewhat unfavorable	32	14
Very unfavorable	64	-

Afghanis were asked about their attitudes toward a number of different nations. There is a unanimity of opinion with regard to two countries: They view the United States unfavorably and Pakistan favorably. In both cases, the level of intensity is high, with almost all respondents choosing the “very unfavorable” toward the United States and “very favorable” for Pakistan.

Among the other countries rated, UAE is viewed most favorably, with 78% of Afghanis saying they hold a “very favorable” or “somewhat favorable” view of the Emirates. In addition, there are no intense unfavorable views of UAE, with only 22% holding a “somewhat unfavorable” attitude toward the country.

Afghanis’ attitudes toward China are generally positive, with more than six in ten respondents viewing the country favorably. India, on the other hand, is seen unfavorably by eight in ten Afghanis, with no respondents rating their attitude toward India as “very favorable.” Finally, Afghani respondents’ view of Iran is even more unfavorable with 86% rating their attitude either “very unfavorable” (57%) or “somewhat unfavorable” (29%). There is a small contingent of Afghanis who view Iran very favorably (14%); this group is predominantly Shia, 53% of whom view Iran very favorably.

2. Post-NATO: What Contribution Will Other Countries Make?

When NATO leaves your country, do you feel that each of these neighboring or interested countries will make a positive or negative contribution to your country's security and economic development?										
	Afghanistan Total									
	US	India	Pakistan	Iran	Turkmenistan	Tajikistan	Uzbekistan	China	Saudi Arabia	UAE
Positive	-	22	98	15	46	51	47	50	67	66
Negative	84	46	-	60	-	-	-	30	-	14
No Impact	16	32	2	25	54	49	53	20	33	20

	Sunni	Shia
Positive	4	55
Negative	68	29
No Impact	28	16

When asked about which countries would likely make a positive or negative contribution to Afghanistan's security and economic development, Afghani respondents appear to believe that Pakistan will make the most positive contribution (98%) and the United States will make the most negative contribution (84%).

A number of other countries are seen as likely to make a positive contribution by sizable percentages of Afghans, including Saudi Arabia (67%), Tajikistan (51%), Uzbekistan (47%), and Turkmenistan (46%)—with no Afghans appearing to believe that any of these countries will have a negative impact. Majorities of Afghans also feel that UAE and China will make a positive contribution to their country's security and economic development (66%; 50%), though smaller groups say that they feel that UAE and China will make a negative contribution (14%; 30%).

Iran and India are both seen as more likely to make a negative contribution than a positive contribution to Afghanistan's security and economic development. Respondents are more than twice as likely to feel that India will make a negative contribution as a positive contribution (46% vs. 22%). They are four times as likely to think that Iran's contribution will be negative rather than positive (60% vs. 15%); again, those who feel that Iran's contribution will be positive are predominantly Shia, with 55% holding this view.

3. Future Role for the United States

Which of the following roles do you see the United States playing in your country's future?	
	Afghanistan Total
An investor in development	83
A security presence	39
A special alliance	26
A source of foreign interference	71
A normal relationship like any other country	-
No role at all	-
Note: Respondents could select as many answers as they wished.	

Despite claiming to hold strong unfavorable views of the United States and expressing the belief that the United States will make a negative contribution to the future of their country, 83% of Afghans see the United States playing a role as an investor in development, a potentially positive role. However, more than seven in ten Afghani respondents think the United States will be a source of foreign interference. Smaller proportions of respondents think the United States will play roles as a security presence (39%) and a special alliance (26%).

A CLOSER LOOK AT ISSUES & LEADERS

1. Satisfaction with Pace and Direction of Political Change

How satisfied are you with the pace and direction of political change in your country?	
	Afghanistan Total
Very satisfied	16
Somewhat satisfied	48
Somewhat dissatisfied	37
Very dissatisfied	-

Afghanis appear to be generally satisfied with the pace and direction of political change in their country; almost two-thirds of respondents express some degree of satisfaction. However, the intensity of feeling on this issue is noticeably lacking, as respondents are three times more likely to be “somewhat satisfied” than “very satisfied.” Even among those Afghanis who are dissatisfied none express that they are “very dissatisfied,” opting for “somewhat dissatisfied” instead.

2. Is Afghanistan on Right or Wrong Track?

Do you think your country is on the right or wrong track?	
	Afghanistan Total
Right track	24
Wrong track	75
Not sure	1

Three-quarters of Afghanis think their country is on the wrong track, while only one-quarter feel it is on the right track.

3. Democracy in Afghanistan:

Which of the following statements about democracy in your country best represents your own opinion?	
	Afghanistan Total
I would like my country to be a democracy and I think it will work well here.	64
I would like my country to be a democracy, but I don't believe that democracy will work here.	19
I do not want my country to be a democracy because it won't work.	18

More than eight in ten Afghans want their country to be a democracy, and a strong majority (64%) believes that democracy will work in Afghanistan. Thirty-seven percent of respondents do not believe that democracy will work in Afghanistan, and about half of that number does not want their country to be a democracy.

4. Most Important Issues

How important are the following issues facing your country today?	
In order of importance among Afghans	
1	Expanding employment opportunities (84)
2	Improving the education system (77)
3	Protecting personal and civil rights (73)
4	Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (64)
5	Ending corruption and nepotism (61)
6	Lack of political debate on important issues (58)
7	Combating extremism and terrorism (56)
8	Advancing democracy (50)
9	Improving the health care system (50)
10	Political or governmental reform (48)
11	Increasing rights for women (7)

Note: Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each issue on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “most important” and 5 is “least important.” Rankings are determined based on a composite score considering all five choices. Number in parentheses is the percentage of respondents who rate the issue “1.”

When asked about the importance of a series of issues facing Afghanistan today, respondents feel that almost all of them are quite important. At the top of the heap, more than eight in ten Afghans believe that expanding employment opportunities is among the most important issues facing their country today. Other issues rated as “most important” by large majorities of respondents include improving the education system (77%), protecting personal and civil rights (73%), resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (64%), and ending nepotism and corruption (61%). The next tier of issues considered important are lack of political debate on important issues (58%), combating extremism and terrorism (56%), advancing democracy (50%), improving the health care system (50%), and political and governmental reform (48%). The issue deemed least important by respondents is increasing rights for women; only 7% of Afghani respondents rate this as “most important” and almost two-thirds give it a rather weak 3 (out of 5) in importance—with very little difference between the way men and women answer this question.

5. Rating Leaders

Indicate your attitude toward these leaders.										
	Afghanistan Total									
	Hamid Karzai	Abdullah Abdullah	The Taliban	Ashraf Ghani	Yunus Qanuni	Jalaluddin Haqqani	Mohammad Qasim Fahim	Mullah Omar	George W. Bush	Barack Obama
Very favorable	-	-	77	-	87	67	-	76	-	-
Somewhat favorable	-	32	2	27	13	33	-	24	-	-
Somewhat unfavorable	16	52	2	49	-	-	18	-	3	3
Very unfavorable	84	15	19	24	-	-	82	-	97	97

Afghani respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes toward leaders in their own country and in the United States. Several leaders are unanimously considered unfavorably, including Afghan president Hamid Karzai, Afghan vice-president Mohammed Qasim Fahim, former U.S. president George W. Bush, and current U.S. president Barack Obama.

Respondents display real intensity in their rejection of the U.S. presidents, with 97% saying their attitudes toward both are “very unfavorable.”

Other Afghani politicians fare only marginally better. Opposition leader Abdullah Abdullah is considered somewhat favorably by only about one-third of respondents, while former presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani only receives “somewhat favorable” ratings from 27% of respondents.

Those Afghani leaders whom respondents view favorably with unanimity include Tajik politician Yunus Qanuni, Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and insurgent leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. The “very favorable” ratings, demonstrating the intensity of these attitudes, are 87% for Qanuni, 76% for Omar, and 67% for Haqqani.

Attitudes toward the Taliban are quite favorable as well, with three-quarters of respondents saying they view the group very favorably. There is a sectarian divide in evidence, with Sunni respondents being far more likely to rate the Taliban favorably (89% favorable vs. 11% unfavorable), while a majority of Shia respondents look unfavorably on the Taliban (44% favorable vs. 56% unfavorable).

It is worth noting that when so many of the opinions provided are definitive and unanimous, it raises questions about how comfortable respondents may have been being honest in their assessments of their leaders. This, of course, is one of the consequences of polling in a region embroiled in long-standing conflict.

APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

Zogby Research Services commissioned JZ Analytics to conduct surveys in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and additional online surveys in the United States, Tunisia, and Egypt. Various methodologies were utilized using trusted partners in the countries surveyed. The following methodologies were developed to most effectively contact the samples requested.

In Iraq, interviews were conducted from September 13-21, 2011, in Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Babil, Najaf, Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, Sulamaniya, and Arbil with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households from the six Iraqi governorates. The margin of error is +/-3.2 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on the 2007 projection of the 1997 general census, the most recent and comprehensive official census study conducted in the country.

In Lebanon, face-to-face interviews were conducted from September 12-29, 2011, in Beirut, Aley, Metn, Baabda, Tripoli, Tyre, Saida, and Chouf with respondents aged 18 and above living in both urban and rural households. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points. The sample is randomly drawn based on a systematic random sample adopting a population proportionate weight based on the approximate estimated make-up/weight of the areas covered in each selected neighborhood.

Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Multi-stage stratified probability sampling was used to ensure a random, representative sample. However, broad demographic quotas were maintained at an aggregate (country) level to ensure that the sample was in line with the sample in earlier years. Interviews were conducted in Egypt from September 12-29, 2011, in Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Menia, Mansoura, and Asyut. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Tunisia, from September 12-29, 2011, in Tunis, Safaqis, Sousse, Bizerte, and Gafsa. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Jordan from September 12-29, 2011, in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, and Madaba. The margin of error is +/-4.4 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Iran from September 12-29, 2011, in Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, and Ahwaz. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in Afghanistan from September 12-29, 2011, in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Baghlan, and Herat. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points.

In Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where door-to-door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. Adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was broadly representative and not skewed. Broad country level demographic quotas were followed to ensure the final sample has characteristics of the population. Interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia from September 12-29, 2011, in Riyadh, Buraydah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Dammam, and Khobar. The margin of error is +/-3.5 percentage points. Interviews were conducted in UAE from September 12-29, 2011, in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and the North Emirates. The margin of error is +/-4.5 percentage points.

In addition, JZ Analytics conducted online surveys of 1,054 adults in the United States on September 13-15, 2010, 602 adults in Egypt on September 15-19, 2010, and 531 adults in Tunisia, September 15- October 5, 2010. Using trusted interactive partner resources, thousands of adults were invited to participate in this survey. Each invitation is password coded and secure so that each respondent can only access the survey one time.

Based on information from census data, CIA fact books, and exit polls, complex weighting techniques are utilized to best represent the demographics of the population being surveyed. Weighted variables may include age, race, gender, region, party, education, and religion.

	Jordan		Egypt		Lebanon		Tunisia		KSA		UAE*		Iran		Egypt Online		Tunisia Online	
	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%
Total	516	100	1028	100	500	100	831	100	821	100	509	100	1017	100	602	100	531	100
Under 36	317	61	601	59	288	58	397	49	506	62	306	60	646	64	478	79	392	74
36+	199	49	427	52	212	42	434	52	315	38	203	40	371	37	124	21	139	26
Live in city	385	79	989	96	469	94	796	96	650	79	356	70	635	62	539	90	440	83
Live outside city	131	21	39	4	31	6	12	1	171	21	153	30	382	38	47	8	80	15
Less than university	408	79	874	85	343	69	464	56	643	78	290	57	637	63	85	14	107	21
University+	108	21	154	15	155	31	367	44	178	22	219	43	380	37	509	86	412	79
Sunni	390	76	939	91	110	22	784	94	722	88	486	96	47	5	503	89	496	97
Shia					175	35	-	-	40	5	16	3	969	95				
Christian	26	5	89	9	180	36									60	11	10	2
Druze	-	-	-	-	35	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Male	262	51	518	50	252	50	416	50	460	56	374	74	542	53	331	55	265	50
Female	254	49	510	50	248	50	415	50	361	44	135	27	475	47	271	45	266	50

* Includes approximately 350 Emiratis and 150 Arabs working in UAE. Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	Iraq	
	freq	%
Total	1000	100
Under 25	168	17
25-36	208	21
36+	384	38
Urban	696	70
Rural	304	30
Less than university	884	88
University+	116	12
Married	660	66
Single	227	28
Divorce/widowed/separated	63	6
Arabic	848	85
Kurdish	139	14
Assyrian	9	1
Shia	612	61
Sunni	375	38
Male	529	53
Female	471	47

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	Afghanistan	
	freq	%
Total	837	100
Under 36	530	63
36+	307	37
Live in city	837	100
Live outside city	-	-
Less than university	-	-
University+	-	-
None/ Primary	700	84
Tech/Secondary	84	10
Professional/Higher	53	6
Employed	337	40
Not employed	500	60
Sunni	661	79
Shia	176	21
Male	426	51
Female	411	49

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

	U.S. Online	
	freq	%
Total	1054	100
18-29	217	22
30-49	355	36
50-64	246	25
65+	168	17
East	231	22
South	272	26
Central Great Lakes	314	30
West	231	22
No College Degree	650	62
College Degree+	399	38
Liberal	219	21
Moderate	337	32
Conservative	408	39
White	717	68
Hispanic	137	13
African American	126	12
Asian	42	4

Note: Total may not equal 100% due to rounding.

2012

Is Peace Possible?



IS PEACE POSSIBLE?

2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the month of September, 2012, we conducted an extensive survey of public opinion among: Israeli Jews and Arabs; Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan; and the American Jewish community. The polls were conducted exclusively for the Sir Bani Yas Forum. Overall we surveyed: 1,061 Israeli Jews; 414 Israeli Arabs; 1,264 Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; 497 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon; 489 Palestinian refugees in Jordan; and 500 Jewish Americans. We asked all groups the same questions in order to measure and compare their attitudes toward the problems and the prospects of reaching an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord.

A surface review of the results establishes the enormous challenges confronting peacemaking efforts. Wide gaps separate Israeli Jewish and Palestinian opinion making it appear that, at present, no easy agreement can be reached on issues as fundamental as: the location of borders, the disposition of Israeli settlements and settlers, the resolution of the refugee issue, and the status of Jerusalem.

Israelis and Palestinians hold widely divergent views on most of these issues. For example, while one-half of Israeli Jews claim that it is their right to build settlements wherever they please, three-quarters of all Palestinians say that all of the construction in the occupied lands is illegal and they maintain that settlements should be evacuated.

Similar difficulties exist with regard to the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and villages, with majorities of Palestinians supporting that right and two-thirds of Israelis strongly opposed. An even greater gap in attitudes exists with regard to the proposition that Jerusalem is the “undivided capital of Israel.”

Demographics Described

In addition to the “top-line” findings in our report, the survey revealed several important demographic realities unique to each subgroup covered in the survey.

1. Israeli Jews are deeply divided, not so much by party, but by demographics. Israelis who self-describe as secular (60% of the population) hold dramatically different views from their compatriots who are Orthodox or self-describe as “traditional or nationalist” (37% of the population). Secular Israelis are more willing to take risks for peace and to acknowledge Palestinian rights. Orthodox Israelis are not so inclined. Similarly, settlers who live beyond the Green Line in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have more hardline views than Jews living in Israel.

2. Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, interestingly, do not display these internal differences and this, itself, is important to note. In reviewing the responses to question after question, we find virtually no differences between young and old, university educated and those who have not received higher education, religious versus secular, men and women, etc. There are only slight variations in the attitudes of those who live in Gaza, the West Bank, or East Jerusalem. And on very few questions there are some very minor differences between those who are

refugees and those who are not. Most importantly, we do not see differences on almost all issues between those who say they are supporters of Fatah and those who support Hamas. This is significant to note because unlike in Israel where the differences in attitudes of the political parties are driven by the demographic groups who form the base of each party, it appears the demographic and attitudinal make-up of the major Palestinian parties are virtually the same.

There is one final and troubling observation that must be made about the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. What comes through in the polling data is that about one-third of these Palestinians appear to have lost faith in the peace process, and have become profoundly cynical and quite negative. In question after question this group makes it clear they no longer believe in promises, trust Israelis, or believe that any resolution is possible. It may be possible to get one more chance to move this group, but it would be wise to use that chance carefully.

3. Israeli Arabs are often overlooked in discussions of peacemaking, but our polling indicates that this may be a mistake, since the size of the Israeli Arab community and their attitudes indicate that they could play a consequential role.

When asked to rate the importance of the opinions of various parties to the conflict, Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza each overvalue their own importance and undervalue the importance of the “other side.” But both groups surprisingly agree that the opinions of Israeli Arabs are the second most important to be considered in any discussion of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. And yet Israeli Arabs, who are 20% of Israel’s population, are almost never brought into the conversation by any side—and while hardline Israelis reject any role for this community, it is clear from our polling that other Israelis do not.

A review of Israeli Arab attitudes establishes that they are more moderate and more forward-looking on most issues than either Israeli Jews or Palestinians from the occupied lands. They are more open to a solution that says Jerusalem is the capital for both the Israelis and Palestinians. They are more willing to take risks for peace and more supportive of the Arab Peace Initiative and the Clinton Plan than any other group.

More than 40 years ago, Palestinian novelist Ghassan Kanafani stated that in his opinion the Arabs in Israel were the most interesting and politically advanced portion of the Palestinian community. Someday, he said, they will lead the way. From a review of the data, he may be right.

4. Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan have also been sidelined in discussions about Israeli-Palestinian peace. Israelis refuse to accept them as a legitimate part of the Palestinian constituency, and after the PLO was forced out of Jordan and Lebanon and then relocated in Ramallah following Oslo, the refugees have been “out of sight, out of mind.”

Yet, as the survey demonstrates, the role of the refugees remains critical to a final peace arrangement. What comes through so clearly is how important the issue of “the right of return” of the refugees is to Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The refugees may be ignored in peace talks, but they are not forgotten by ordinary Palestinians.

It is also important that Palestinian refugees be invested in the discussion so that they will be invested in the outcome. It would be a tragic mistake to assume that an agreement can be reached without them or at their expense, or that the Israeli-Palestinian issue is just, as the Israelis have insisted for decades, a West Bank and Gaza issue.

What the data makes clear is that despite the hardships the refugees have endured and despite not being directly involved in the peace talks, their thinking has evolved. They still cling to their rights and still desire to return home.

But when confronted with the possibility that they may not be able to return and when given concrete options for the future, they are open to picking from among these options.

The bottom line is that better than ignoring the refugees or presenting them with a fait accompli it would be important to work with this community early in the process to get their ideas and get them invested in the proposed solution.

5. American Jews – Although not a direct party to the conflict, lobbies claiming to speak on behalf of American Jews play a critical role in Washington decision-making and so an examination of their attitudes is useful. Several observations can be made:

- a. On most issues American Jews are less hardline than Israeli Jews. They are, for example, more willing to see Jerusalem as the capital of two states, more willing to recognize the rights of Palestinian refugees, and less inclined to support settlement construction in the West Bank.
- b. They are not a monolith. In general, when American Jews think of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 28% say that they “support whatever policies are advocated by the Israeli government”; 42% say that they “have their own views of what the Israeli government should do and support policies that agree with their own beliefs”; and 29% say that they “do not believe my views should play a role.” When asked to identify which organization they most support: only 23% say the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC); 33% identify with American Jewish groups that side with Israel’s peace camp; and 32% say that “this is not a matter of great concern to me.”
- c. This leads to a division in how American Jews see their role in U.S. politics. They are evenly divided over whether the U.S. government should side with Israel or steer a “middle course” between Israel and Palestine. And if the U.S. government were to pressure Israel to freeze settlement construction: 36% would support such a move, 28% would be neutral, and 32% would oppose it.

American Jews are not a single-issue constituency. They say that in an election for public office if they agreed with a candidate on most issues but disagreed with that candidate’s views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 49% would still vote for that candidate while only 33% would not.

What We Learn

1. A Cautionary Note

As with any poll measuring opinion on a controversial topic, the data can be picked over and used in any number of ways. Opponents of peacemaking on the Israeli side can point to the fact that only 25% of Palestinians are willing to “take risks for peace” or that 35% of Palestinians in the occupied lands see settlements as a serious impediment to peace. Likewise Palestinians can point to the 41% of Israelis who say that they are opposed to a “Palestinian state that is independent, sovereign, and contiguous” or the 47% of Israelis who insist that it is the right of Israel to “build anywhere it pleases in the land it currently holds.”

Looking at the responses to individual questions can provide “grist for the mill” of opponents of peace. But playing “gotcha” politics would be a misuse of the findings. To observe that there are deep divisions between the two sides – or that many Palestinians have lost hope and become cynical, while many Israelis have hardened their views—is simply to note the obvious. What is required is to probe more deeply into the findings. As the data shows, there are many areas

where some common ground can be found or, at least, where impediments to consensus can be identified, providing ideas that can advance peacemaking efforts.

2. Two States: Still the Only Viable Option

The first and most telling point of consensus is that a two-state solution remains the only viable option that is acceptable, albeit with differences, to both sides.

The one-state solution is rejected by all parties, including Palestinian refugees. Other options like absorbing Palestinians into Israel where they would have autonomy but not equal rights (which some would argue would be the outcome of the current path being pursued by Israel) is rejected not only by Palestinians, but by a substantial majority of Israelis. All parties also reject a Palestinian confederation with Jordan.

Israeli Arabs are the most supportive of the 1967 borders being used to define the boundaries between Israel and a future Palestinian state. A plurality of Palestinians in the occupied territories and refugees in Jordan also support the 1967 lines. Refugees in Lebanon say they reject this option. But when refugees in Lebanon and Jordan are asked to rate how important it is to them to see a Palestinian state located in “all of the West Bank and Gaza,” with a capital in Jerusalem, 97% of refugees in Jordan say it is important as do 77% of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

The border Israelis least oppose is “the current location of the separation barrier”; it is opposed by 28% which is 14 points lower than any other option proposed. What is not clear, however, is whether it is the matter of the “barrier” itself, or the barrier’s “current route” that drives this response. If it is the security provided by the barrier, and not its route, then it should be possible to move this barrier making it more accommodating to Palestinian needs.

What is clear is that Israelis and Palestinians want separation. Israelis want security and Palestinians want independence and sovereignty. The polling data also shows that both sides agree with the notion that security arrangements that provide guarantees for both are important. Somewhat surprisingly, Israelis and Palestinians both agree that the future Palestinian state should have control of its borders so it can freely trade with other countries.

The task left for peacemakers will be to further test the possible combinations of borders, swaps, and the role of a security barrier or other forms of security arrangements that create the right mix for all sides.

3. Trust Is an Issue

After four and a half decades of occupation, including two decades of a failed Oslo peace process marred by dramatic settlement expansion and devastating violence, both Israelis and Palestinians have been shaken. Mutual trust has been broken.

This becomes especially clear when both sides are asked what issues are most important to them and what behavior they each want to see from the other side. What both ask for are signs of trust. For example, what Israelis most want is for Palestinians to recognize Israel as a “Jewish state” and what Palestinians most want is for Israel to recognize the rights of Palestinian refugees. Said another way, when asked what they identified as the biggest obstacle to making peace, both agreed that it was their “lack of trust in the intentions of the other side” and “the refusal of the other side to accept our right to self-determination.”

When asked what behaviors from the other side would make them believe that peace was more likely, Israelis responded with “renouncing violence” and “recognizing Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.” What the

Palestinians most wanted to see was Israel recognizing Palestinian self-determination and the right to an independent state, ending the siege of Gaza, and stopping settlement activity on the West Bank.

What is important to note, however, is that what the polling data shows in every instance is what the Palestinians most want from Israelis, the Israelis are least willing to give, and what the Israelis most want from the Palestinians, the Palestinians are least willing to give at the present time. This, however, should not be the end of the story. These “trust issues” can be separated into behavioral matters (e.g., “renouncing violence and controlling violent elements” or “removing roadblocks, the blockade of Gaza, etc.”) and existential concerns (e.g., “recognizing Israel as a Jewish state” or “acknowledging responsibility for the refugee problem”). The behavioral issues can and should be addressed first. But since the existential concerns may create hurdles too high to climb at the beginning of the process, it might be advisable to put off addressing them until a later stage.

4. The Whole Is More Acceptable Than the Parts

Taken individually, attitudes are far apart and rigid. But when options are presented, “trade-offs” offered or issues paired, both Israelis and Palestinians display greater flexibility. For example, our survey finds that only 26% of Israeli Jews feel that it is possible that any Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement can be reached in the next five years. But should the “Palestinian leadership unify their ranks, renounce violence, and pledge to suppress elements that use violent means,” the percentage of Israelis who see peace as “more likely” doubles. Similarly, the numbers of Palestinians who see peace as more likely would increase significantly should Israel “freeze settlement construction and indicate a willingness to move a large number of settlers from the West Bank” or “remove roadblocks, the blockade of Gaza, and other restrictions to the travel and commerce.”

While most Palestinians accept the framework of the Arab Peace Initiative (API) offered by the Arab League, most Israelis reject it. When asked whether they support or oppose each individual part of the API, the Israelis register their opposition. But when all the pieces are put together and coupled with the Arab League’s commitment to normalize relations with Israel, Israeli opposition drops dramatically and support rises. Forty nine percent of Israeli Jews supported and only fifteen percent strongly opposed this proposition: “In exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and an agreed solution to the refugee problem, the Arab states will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over and will sign a comprehensive peace agreement and establish normal relations with the state of Israel.”

Much of the same may be true with regard to the other sensitive “final status” issues. For example, a majority of Israeli Jews and Arabs support the Clinton Plan approach to settlements: “A sovereign, viable Palestinian state coexisting with a secure state of Israel; Palestinians will have sovereignty over Gaza and a vast majority of the West Bank; settlement blocs in the West Bank will be incorporated into Israel with land swaps to compensate for such annexation.”

The same formula is rejected by Palestinians in the occupied lands and by an even greater number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan. When, however, the same issue is reframed to say “Several settlement blocs will be annexed by Israel; those that are not will be dismantled and settlers relocated either into the annexed blocs or within Israel” (even without a mention of “land swaps”), Palestinian opposition drops significantly.

Our findings demonstrate a remarkable flexibility on the part of Palestinian refugees as they work through the painful compromises dealing with the existential issue of their “right to return.” Israeli Jews, on the other hand, appear to demonstrate little interest in making any accommodation in this matter. They reject acknowledging any responsibility for

the refugee issue and also deny any “right to return” for the refugee population. Israelis, however, do want the normalization provided by the Arab Peace Initiative—understanding that this includes the condition of “an agreed solution to the refugee issue.” This may provide an incentive easing the way to some accommodation.

Jerusalem is another difficult knot to untie, with no party (other than Israeli Arabs) indicating flexibility. Israelis want the city to remain “the undivided capital of Israel,” a position overwhelmingly rejected by all Palestinians. It is interesting to note that Israelis maintain this position despite strong majorities acknowledging that they see as unimportant or do not even know the location of Arab areas that are included in the Israeli annexed “greater Jerusalem.” For their part, the Palestinians reject not only Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel, but also its division into East and West and the Clinton formula for Jerusalem. What has not been tried is an approach that sees Jerusalem as an undivided city with two capitals. This idea would most likely be met with resistance, although our data suggests that this option may face somewhat less opposition than most other proposed solutions for Jerusalem.

The data clearly points to the difficulty in attempting to find separate solutions to each piece of the puzzle. But the Palestinian and Israeli Jewish responses to the Arab Peace Initiative and the Israeli acceptance of some of the Clinton parameters establish that a comprehensive vision that presents not only the compromise needed for a solution, but also makes clear the trade-offs and benefits and provides international backing may be the only way to proceed. Such a comprehensive approach must include a vision of the future so compelling that people are drawn to it, especially when it is contrasted with a portrait of what the future would look like if nothing is done. It will not be easy and as our data demonstrates between 15% and 30% will most likely oppose any proposal, either out of fear, lack of trust, ideology or cynicism. But with both a unified Palestinian leadership and an Israeli leadership committed to peace, and an international leadership not only presenting a comprehensive plan, but also willing to work to sell it, peace may be possible.

—Dr. James Zogby

WHOSE OPINIONS MATTER MOST

2012

Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very important and 5 meaning not important at all, please tell me how important the opinions of each of the following should be when it comes to addressing the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace.

		Important	Not Important
How important are the opinions of Israeli Jews?	Israeli Jews	95	1
	Israeli Arabs	77	14
	Pal. WB/Gaza	57	31
	Refugees in Lebanon	46	46
	Refugees in Jordan	57	34
	Jewish Americans	81	10
How important are the opinions of Israeli Arabs?	Israeli Jews	68	15
	Israeli Arabs	69	15
	Pal. WB/Gaza	67	18
	Refugees in Lebanon	55	31
	Refugees in Jordan	59	31
	Jewish Americans	65	16
How important are the opinions of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza?	Israeli Jews	59	24
	Israeli Arabs	89	7
	Pal. WB/Gaza	83	7
	Refugees in Lebanon	75	13
	Refugees in Jordan	96	2
	Jewish Americans	54	25
How important are the opinions of Palestinian Refugees?	Israeli Jews	32	43
	Israeli Arabs	71	21
	Pal. WB/Gaza	83	7
	Refugees in Lebanon	78	12
	Refugees in Jordan	95	3
	Jewish Americans	42	29
How important are the opinions of U.S. Government?	Israeli Jews	58	17
	Israeli Arabs	64	28
	Pal. WB/Gaza	44	39
	Refugees in Lebanon	47	44
	Refugees in Jordan	60	27
	Jewish Americans	56	18

Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very important and 5 meaning not important at all, please tell me how important the opinions of each of the following should be when it comes to addressing the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace.

		Important	Not Important
How important are the opinions of Arab League?	Israeli Jews	30	44
	Israeli Arabs	44	39
	Pal. WB/Gaza	49	29
	Refugees in Lebanon	49	40
	Refugees in Jordan	63	20
	Jewish Americans	30	43
How important are the opinions of American Jewish community?	Israeli Jews	45	21
	Israeli Arabs	19	70
	Pal. WB/Gaza	28	56
	Refugees in Lebanon	-	-
	Refugees in Jordan	-	-
	Jewish Americans	58	20

*Respondents were asked to rate the importance on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very important” and 5 is “not important at all.” “Important” here is the aggregation of “1” and “2” responses, while “not important” is the aggregation of “4” and “5” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “3” has not been included.

Negotiations are not seen by any of the parties as a “two-way street.” When asked about how they rate the importance of various groups’ opinions when it comes to addressing the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace, each side overvalues the importance of its own opinion and undervalues the importance of the other side. For example, Israeli Jews rate their own opinions 36 points higher than the opinions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, they see Palestinian opinions only as important as those of the U.S. government. Further, Israeli Jews see little importance in including the voices of Palestinian refugees (32%), judging the opinions of American Jews as more important (45%).

Among Israeli Jews there is significant variation in their views based on age and religious affiliation, with those under age 25 and those identifying as Orthodox being far more likely to undervalue the opinions of Palestinians. For example, two-thirds of Orthodox Israeli Jews say that the opinions of Palestinian refugees are not important in addressing the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace. But, Israeli Jews over age 36 are more likely to see the opinions of Israeli Arabs (73%) and Palestinians (63%) as important. The same is true of Israeli Jews that identify themselves as secular, with 76% seeing the opinions of Israeli Arabs as important and 67% seeing the opinions of Palestinians as important. These demographic groups are divided on issues throughout the survey, with younger respondents and those identifying as Orthodox being less inclined toward compromise or taking risks for peace.

Israeli Jews by Subgroup

Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very important and 5 meaning not important at all, please tell me how important the opinions of each of the following should be when it comes to addressing the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace.			
		Important	Not Important
How important are the opinions of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza?	Under 25	49	46
	Over 36	63	20
	Secular	67	17
	Orthodox	40	42
How important are the opinions of Palestinian refugees?	Under 25	30	49
	Over 36	34	38
	Secular	38	34
	Orthodox	16	66
How important are the opinions of Israeli Arabs?	Under 25	56	28
	Over 36	73	11
	Secular	76	9
	Orthodox	47	31

Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza rate the importance of their opinions 26 points higher than the opinions of Israeli Jews (57%). Palestinians judge Israeli Jewish opinion at the same level of importance as Israeli Jews rate Palestinian opinions (59%). But note that about two-thirds of both Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza and Israeli Jews rate the opinions of Israeli Arabs as second in importance, right after themselves (Israeli Jews, 68%; Palestinians, 67%). Further, while Israeli Jews seriously undervalue the importance of the opinions of refugees, the opinions of these Palestinians are extremely important to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (83%) and to Israeli Arabs (71%). The passage of time has not erased the bond.

A majority of Israelis, both Arabs (64%) and Jews (58%), as well as a majority of refugees in Jordan (60%) consider the opinions of the U.S. government to be important. The opinions of the Arab League, however, are considered far less important by all groups. Only refugees in Jordan rate the Arab League important on the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Among all Palestinian groups surveyed, the opinions of the Arab League are considered equal in importance to the opinion of the U.S. government.

The opinions of the American Jewish community are considered important by 45% of Israeli Jews, but by just 28% of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. Although Israeli Arabs rate the importance of the opinions of Israeli Jews more highly than their own opinions (77% vs. 69%), they overwhelmingly dismiss the importance of American Jewish opinion with just 19% saying this community's opinions are important and 70% saying they are not important.

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUES

The following elements are all discussed as a part of an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following elements in the peace negotiations.

		Support	Neutral	Opposed
For there to be peace, the Palestinian state must be independent, sovereign, and contiguous.	Israeli Jews	36	23	41
	Israeli Arabs	89	3	8
	Pal. WB/Gaza	84	9	6
	Refugees in Lebanon	60	24	17
	Refugees in Jordan	81	4	15
	Jewish Americans	31	36	28
For there to be peace, Israel must be recognized by the Palestinians as a Jewish state.	Israeli Jews	89	7	4
	Israeli Arabs	36	15	48
	Pal. WB/Gaza	20	24	56
	Refugees in Lebanon	4	6	89
	Refugees in Jordan	34	8	58
	Jewish Americans	73	9	17
For there to be peace, both Israelis and Palestinians must agree that Jerusalem will be the capital of the two states.	Israeli Jews	32	15	54
	Israeli Arabs	71	13	17
	Pal. WB/Gaza	25	22	54
	Refugees in Lebanon	8	7	85
	Refugees in Jordan	13	11	76
	Jewish Americans	43	27	27
For there to be peace, the rights of the Palestinian refugees must be recognized.	Israeli Jews	19	23	57
	Israeli Arabs	91	5	4
	Pal. WB/Gaza	82	10	8
	Refugees in Lebanon	61	22	18
	Refugees in Jordan	71	6	23
	Jewish Americans	36	29	29
For there to be peace, the agreement must be accepted and supported by the Arab League.	Israeli Jews	24	31	45
	Israeli Arabs	50	18	32
	Pal. WB/Gaza	54	25	21
	Refugees in Lebanon	39	27	34
	Refugees in Jordan	33	37	29
	Jewish Americans	46	23	27

The following elements are all discussed as a part of an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following elements in the peace negotiations.

		Support	Neutral	Opposed
For there to be peace, the Palestinian state must be demilitarized.	Israeli Jews	62	21	18
	Israeli Arabs	12	16	72
	Pal. WB/Gaza	12	17	71
	Refugees in Lebanon	3	4	93
	Refugees in Jordan	24	4	72
	Jewish Americans	48	29	17
For there to be peace, the Palestinians must be in control of their borders so that they are able to trade with the outside world.	Israeli Jews	62	21	17
	Israeli Arabs	91	3	6
	Pal. WB/Gaza	73	13	14
	Refugees in Lebanon	58	26	17
	Refugees in Jordan	70	4	26
	Jewish Americans	48	27	22
For there to be peace, there must be an international peacekeeping presence in the Palestinian state that provides security guarantees to both Israel and Palestine.	Israeli Jews	66	21	14
	Israeli Arabs	35	26	39
	Pal. WB/Gaza	36	24	40
	Refugees in Lebanon	-	-	-
	Refugees in Jordan	-	-	-
	Jewish Americans	-	-	-

*Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "completely opposed," 3 is "neutral," and 5 is "in full support." "Support" here is the aggregation of "5" and "4" responses, "neutral" are the "3" responses, and "opposed" is the aggregation of "2" and "1" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

Israeli Jews and Arabs, Palestinians within the occupied territories, and refugees in Lebanon and Jordan were asked about their support for a variety of possible elements in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. The results indicate that respondents on both sides give greater weight to the importance of having their own rights recognized and less weight to the importance of recognizing the rights of the other side. For example, while 84% Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support an independent, sovereign, and contiguous state of Palestine, only 36% of Israeli Jews support this idea. Conversely, 89% of Israeli Jews support the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state by Palestinians (their top concern), while just 20% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support this.

While their strongest support lies with the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, Israeli Jews are most opposed to recognition of the rights of Palestinian refugees (57% oppose) and recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of two states (54% oppose). On the other hand, for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the top concerns include the recognition of the Palestinian right to an independent state (84% support) and recognition of the rights of Palestinian refugees (82% support). And these Palestinians' main opposition lies with a demilitarized Palestine (71% oppose), recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (56% oppose), and Jerusalem as the capital of two states (54% oppose).

The gaps between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are clear. The main points that divide Israeli Jews and these Palestinians are recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (support: Israeli Jews, 89%, vs. Palestinians, 20%),

the rights of refugees (support: Israeli Jews, 19%, vs. Palestinians, 82%), and a demilitarized Palestinian state (support: Israeli Jews, 62%, vs. Palestinians, 12%). Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are even more opposed to recognizing Israel as a Jewish state (4% support, 89% oppose) and to a demilitarized Palestine (3% support, 93% oppose). Refugees in Jordan tend to have more moderate responses, particularly those who are university-educated. For example, 64% of university-educated refugees in Jordan support Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.

However, some areas of agreement also emerge between Israelis and West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. Both sides reject Jerusalem as the capital of two states (support/oppose: Israeli Jews, 32%/54%, vs. Palestinians, 25%/54%). Both sides support ensuring that the borders of a Palestinian state are open for trade (support: Israeli Jews, 62%, vs. Palestinians, 72%).

Israeli Arabs are outliers on several issues. They express the strongest support of all groups surveyed for open Palestinian borders (91%), recognition of the rights of Palestinian refugees (91%), and an independent Palestinian state (89%). Among Arabs surveyed, they have the least opposition (and highest support) for recognizing Israel as a Jewish state (36% support, 48% oppose). And, most significantly, Israeli Arabs are the only group surveyed who support Jerusalem being the capital of two states (71%).

I am now going to read you two statements, please tell which of the two best represents your own view.

	Israeli Jews	Israeli Arabs	Pal. WB/ Gaza	Refugees in Lebanon	Refugees in Jordan
Statement A. We should be willing to take risks and make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace.	51	89	25	22	43
Statement B. We should not have to give up any of our demands to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace.	49	11	75	78	57

Israeli Jews

	A	B
Under 25	29	71
Over 36	60	40
Orthodox	19	81
Traditional/National/Other	30	70
Secular	66	34
Native Israelis	47	53
Veteran Immigrants	68	32
New Immigrants (post-1989)	55	45
East Jerusalem/outside of Green Line	34	66
Within Green Line	55	45

Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza

	A	B
Under 25	26	74
Over 36	24	76
Fatah	26	74
Hamas	25	75
No University	25	75
University Educated	27	74
West Bank	25	75
Gaza	24	76
East Jerusalem	32	68

Three-quarters of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza do not see why they should give up their demands to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace. Israeli opinion, however, is evenly divided between not giving up their demands (49%) and seeing the need to take risks and make sacrifices for peace (51%). While Palestinian opinion is remarkably consistent regardless of age, education, political party, region, and other demographic factors, among Israelis, there is considerable variation based on age, religious affiliation, region, and immigration status. Those who are more likely to say that Israelis should not have to give up their demands to achieve peace include the Orthodox (81%), those under age 25

(71%), and those living in East Jerusalem or outside of the Green Line (66%). The groups more willing to take risks for peace include immigrants living in Israel since before 1989 (68%), secular Jews (66%), and those over age 36 (60%).

Israeli Arabs strongly believe that risks and sacrifice are necessary ingredients to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace (89%). Overall, a majority of Palestinian refugees in Jordan do not want to give up their demands for peace (57%); however, again, we see that among university-educated refugees in Jordan, 71% are willing to take risks and make sacrifices for peace. More than three-quarters of refugees in Lebanon (78%) say that they do not want to give up their demands to achieve peace.

In your opinion, how likely is it that an agreement can be reached in the next five years to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?						
	Israeli Jews	Israeli Arabs	Pal. WB/ Gaza	Refugees in Lebanon	Refugees in Jordan	Jewish Americans
Likely and Possible	26	34	48	30	27	35
Unlikely and Impossible	70	49	46	58	68	61

*Respondents were given the following options: "very likely," "possible," "unlikely," and "impossible." Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding "don't know" has not been included.

Israeli Jews		
	Likely & Possible	Unlikely & Impossible
Under 25	18	79
25-36	18	78
Over 36	30	64
Orthodox	17	77
Secular	29	67
Traditional/ National/ Other	23	74
Native Israelis	24	71
Veteran Immigrants	35	61
New Immigrants (post 1989)	28	68

Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza		
	Likely & Possible	Unlikely & Impossible
Under 25	46	48
25-36	49	45
Over 36	47	45
Fatah	51	44
Hamas	48	46
No University	48	45
University Educated	47	46
West Bank	50	44
Gaza	44	48
East Jerusalem	48	47

Israeli Jews, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, and Israeli Arabs all view peace as unlikely in the next five years. Israeli Jews and refugees in Jordan show the greatest pessimism that an agreement can be reached in the next five years to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (70% and 68%, respectively, saying peace is unlikely or impossible). Overall, 29% of Israeli Jews say it is impossible and 24% say it is possible that a peace agreement can be reached in the next five years. The most pessimistic views are held by Orthodox Jews (24% unlikely and 52% impossible) and younger respondents (under 25: 38% unlikely and 41% impossible; 25-36: 34% unlikely and 44% impossible). The most optimism is seen among veteran immigrants (35% say very likely or possible).

Palestinians in the occupied territories are the group most optimistic about the prospects for peace; though divided, they lean slightly toward peace being possible (48% say very likely or possible, while 46% say unlikely or impossible). Again, there is little or no variation among Palestinian demographic groups on this question; across age, political party affiliation, education, and region, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are almost evenly split between optimism and pessimism on the likelihood of peace in the next five years.

MAIN PROBLEMS

2012

Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is very serious, please tell me how serious an obstacle to achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement are each of the following.

		Serious	Neutral	Not Serious
The willingness of the other side to make peace	Israeli Jews	65	13	22
	Israeli Arabs	87	8	4
	Pal. WB/Gaza	65	17	18
	Refugees in Lebanon	76	12	13
	Refugees in Jordan	71	7	22
	Jewish Americans	75	10	13
The willingness of my side to make peace	Israeli Jews	49	23	28
	Israeli Arabs	89	7	5
	Pal. WB/Gaza	74	15	12
	Refugees in Lebanon	78	10	12
	Refugees in Jordan	74	6	20
	Jewish Americans	51	21	27
The willingness of international leadership to assist in making peace	Israeli Jews	32	39	29
	Israeli Arabs	79	16	5
	Pal. WB/Gaza	63	21	16
	Refugees in Lebanon	79	10	11
	Refugees in Jordan	66	9	26
	Jewish Americans	39	31	28
Continued expansion of settlements	Israeli Jews	41	23	37
	Israeli Arabs	87	4	8
	Pal. WB/Gaza	46	19	35
	Refugees in Lebanon	80	10	10
	Refugees in Jordan	63	6	31
	Jewish Americans	52	25	17
The continued threat of violence from Palestinians	Israeli Jews	79	12	8
	Israeli Arabs	64	18	17
	Pal. WB/Gaza	43	26	32
	Refugees in Lebanon	57	21	23
	Refugees in Jordan	42	8	50
	Jewish Americans	73	12	13

Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is very serious, please tell me how serious an obstacle to achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement are each of the following.

		Serious	Neutral	Not Serious
The continued threat of violence from the Israeli military and settlers	Israeli Jews	36	24	41
	Israeli Arabs	89	4	7
	Pal. WB/Gaza	44	19	38
	Refugees in Lebanon	81	9	9
	Refugees in Jordan	58	6	36
	Jewish Americans	41	22	32
The hardship and polarization that result from the occupation	Israeli Jews	42	25	33
	Israeli Arabs	85	8	7
	Pal. WB/Gaza	43	22	35
	Refugees in Lebanon	77	13	10
	Refugees in Jordan	63	11	26
	Jewish Americans	47	23	23
Our lack of trust in the intentions of the other side	Israeli Jews	71	16	13
	Israeli Arabs	72	19	10
	Pal. WB/Gaza	46	22	31
	Refugees in Lebanon	79	17	3
	Refugees in Jordan	62	15	24
The compromises we are asked to make are too difficult	Israeli Jews	63	22	15
	Israeli Arabs	79	15	6
	Pal. WB/Gaza	49	21	30
	Refugees in Lebanon	91	5	4
	Refugees in Jordan	64	12	24
Refusal of the other side to accept our right to self-determination	Israeli Jews	78	13	8
	Israeli Arabs	87	5	8
	Pal. WB/Gaza	50	18	33
	Refugees in Lebanon	91	4	5
	Refugees in Jordan	65	11	24
	Jewish Americans	50	29	14

*Respondents were asked rate the seriousness of each obstacle using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “not serious at all” and 5 is “very serious.” “Not serious” here is the aggregation of “1” and “2” responses, “neutral” are the “3” responses, and “serious” is the aggregation of “4” and “5” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

When asked to rate the seriousness of a number of obstacles to peace, all sides find fault in the other side’s willingness to make peace, with two-thirds or more of both Israeli Jews and all Palestinians saying this is a serious obstacle. Palestinians, whether from the West Bank and Gaza or refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, however, are more willing to fault themselves as well, with at least 74% “saying the willingness of my side to make peace” is a serious obstacle, compared to only 49% of Israeli Jews who see their own side’s reluctance as a problem. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are more willing to equally find fault in the continued threat of violence from Palestinians (43% say it’s a serious obstacle) and the continued threat of violence from the Israel military and settlers (44% say it’s a serious obstacle).

Most serious to Israeli Jews are the continued threat of violence from Palestinians (79%) and “the refusal of the other side to accept our right to self-determination” (78%). Most serious to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are “the willingness of my side to make peace” (74%) and “the willingness of the other side to make peace” (65%). Both Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the occupied territories rate the following obstacles as equally problematic: settlement expansion (serious for 46% of Palestinians and 41% of Israelis); the hardships created by the occupation (serious for 43% of Palestinians and 42% of Israelis); and the lack of trust they have in each other (serious for 46% of Palestinians and 41% of Israelis).

Israeli Jews and Palestinian refugees are quite concerned with the refusal of the other side to accept their right to self-determination (serious for 78% of Israeli Jews, 65% of refugees in Jordan, and 91% of refugees in Lebanon) and with their belief that the compromises they are being asked to make are too difficult (serious for 63% of Israeli Jews, 64% of refugees in Jordan, and 91% of refugees in Lebanon). Palestinians in the territories are less concerned with both issues (self-determination: 40%; compromises: 49%).

Israeli Arabs and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon see all of the obstacles presented as serious barriers to reaching a peace agreement at higher levels than other groups. For refugees in Lebanon, the continued threat of violence from the Israeli military and settlers (81%) and the continued expansion of settlements (80%) are the most serious impediments to peace. Among Israeli Arabs, almost nine in ten respondents view the threat of Israeli violence and the willingness of both sides to make peace as serious problems. Settlement expansion (88%), and the Israeli refusal to accept Palestinian rights to self-determination (87%) are also significant concerns for Israeli Arabs. Finally, the most significant obstacles to peace for refugees in Jordan are the same as those for Palestinians in the occupied territories: willingness of their own side (74%) and the other side (71%) to make peace.

WHAT IF ...

For each of the following scenarios, respondents were asked if the circumstances described would make them more or less likely to believe that a peace agreement could be reached, or if it could make no difference in their view.

		More likely	Less likely	No change in my view
If the Palestinian leadership were to unify their ranks and come forward willing to negotiate a two state solution based on the '67 borders with agreed land swaps and an end to the conflict, would that make you...	Israeli Jews	46	37	17
	Israeli Arabs	60	24	16
	Pal. WB/Gaza	46	39	16
	Refugees in Lebanon	61	21	18
	Refugees in Jordan	52	23	25
	Jewish Americans	52	14	30
If the Israeli leadership were to come forward willing to negotiate a two state solution based on the '67 borders with agreed land swaps and an end to the conflict, would that make you...	Israeli Jews	44	38	18
	Israeli Arabs	58	29	13
	Pal. WB/Gaza	51	34	15
	Refugees in Lebanon	49	30	21
	Refugees in Jordan	57	18	25
	Jewish Americans	60	11	26
If the US and European Union were to demonstrate a clear resolve to pursue Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and achieve a peace agreement in 5 years, would that make you...	Israeli Jews	35	43	22
	Israeli Arabs	68	19	13
	Pal. WB/Gaza	50	34	16
	Refugees in Lebanon	48	27	25
	Refugees in Jordan	51	25	24
	Jewish Americans	50	7	42
If the Palestinian leadership were to unify their ranks renounce violence and pledge to suppress elements that use violent means, would that make you...	Israeli Jews	53	35	12
	Israeli Arabs	55	28	17
	Pal. WB/Gaza	44	39	18
	Refugees in Lebanon	49	28	23
	Refugees in Jordan	40	11	48
	Jewish Americans	67	5	25
If an Israeli government were to announce that it will freeze all settlement construction and indicate a willingness to remove a large number of settlers from the West Bank, would that make you...	Israeli Jews	39	38	23
	Israeli Arabs	88	8	4
	Pal. WB/Gaza	56	31	14
	Refugees in Lebanon	50	29	21
	Refugees in Jordan	56	20	24
	Jewish Americans	49	10	38

For each of the following scenarios, respondents were asked if the circumstances described would make them more or less likely to believe that a peace agreement could be reached, or if it could make no difference in their view.

		More likely	Less likely	No change in my view
If an Israeli government were to remove road-blocks, the blockade of Gaza, and other restrictions to travel and commerce in the occupied territories, would that make you...	Israeli Jews	25	47	29
	Israeli Arabs	78	13	9
	Pal. WB/Gaza	56	31	13
	Refugees in Lebanon	52	27	21
	Refugees in Jordan	60	16	24
	Jewish Americans	38	18	42
If the Palestinian leadership were to unify their ranks and recognize Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, would that make you...	Israeli Jews	58	30	12
	Israeli Arabs	53	36	11
	Pal. WB/Gaza	35	42	22
	Refugees in Lebanon	34	41	25
	Refugees in Jordan	39	13	48
	Jewish Americans	80	3	16
If an Israeli government were to recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and their right to an independent state, would that make you...	Israeli Jews	38	38	23
	Israeli Arabs	89	7	4
	Pal. WB/Gaza	54	29	17
	Refugees in Lebanon	71	17	13
	Refugees in Jordan	60	16	24
	Jewish Americans	54	10	34

* "More likely" is the aggregation of "much more likely" and "somewhat more likely" responses, and "less likely" is the aggregation of "somewhat less likely" and "much less"

Respondents were asked a series of “what if” statements to determine what might improve the prospect for peace. Israeli Jews and all groups of Palestinians would see peace as more likely should the other side come forward with a clear statement of an intention to accept the 1967 borders and land swaps. For Israelis, 46% believe peace would be more likely if the Palestinian leadership were to unify their ranks and come forward willing to negotiate a two state solution based on the 1967 borders with agreed land swaps and an end to the conflict (37% say less likely and 17% say it would make no difference). For Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 51% believe peace would be more likely if the Israeli leadership were to come forward willing to negotiate a two state solution based on the 1967 borders with agreed land swaps and an end to the conflict (34% say less likely and 15% say it would make no difference). Among Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, 57% and 49%, respectively, say that such a statement from Israel would make them believe that peace is more likely.

Israeli Jews are the group least open to U.S. and E.U. involvement, while all groups of Palestinians are more receptive to this idea.

All the scenarios presented move the needle in a positive direction for Palestinians—except for the option of the Palestinian leadership recognizing Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, which receives low scores among all Palestinians. That scenario is, however, the “what if” that most moves the Israeli side in a positive direction (58% more likely, 30% less likely). In addition, a majority of Israeli Jews believe peace would be more likely if the Palestinian

leadership unified and renounced violence (53%). And note that about one-third of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza see all options as less likely to bring about a peace agreement.

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are moved in a positive direction by the Israeli government freezing settlement construction and expressing a willingness to remove a large number of settlers (56%); by lifting the Gaza siege and other travel and trade restrictions in the territories (56%); and by Israel recognizing the right of Palestinians to self-determination and an independent state (54%).

Attitudes among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are even more moved by the idea of Israel accepting Palestinian self-determination (71% more likely to believe in a peace agreement being reached). Among refugees in Jordan, their belief in a peace agreement is most positively impacted by Israel lifting the Gaza siege (60%) and Israeli leadership saying they are willing to negotiate a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and land swaps (57%).

Israeli Arabs are the group that is the most moved in a positive direction by all the “what if” scenarios. Most impactful for them are the acceptance of Palestinian self-determination by Israel (89%) and a settlement freeze (88%).

Unfortunately, the scenarios most negatively received by Israeli Jews are precisely those that Palestinians find most hopeful: lifting the siege on Gaza (only 25% of Israelis are more likely to believe in peace agreement); a settlement freeze (39%); and Israeli recognition of Palestinian self-determination (38%).

CLINTON PLAN

2012

In 2000, then U.S. President Bill Clinton proposed the outlines for an agreement. It contained the following items:

- A sovereign, viable Palestinian state coexisting with a secure state of Israel. Palestinians will have sovereignty over Gaza and a vast majority of West Bank. Settlement blocs in the West Bank will be incorporated into Israel with land swaps to compensate for such annexation.
- A solution to the Palestinian refugee issue that provides them with compensation and gives them the choice to return to a new Palestinian state or relocate in third countries including Israel, subject to those states' agreement.
- A security solution that includes an international presence, a non-militarized Palestinian state and guarantees for Israel that do not come at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty or territorial integrity.
- A solution to Jerusalem under which it will be the capital of both Israel and Palestine and in which Arab neighborhoods will be Palestinian and Jewish neighborhoods will be Israeli. Palestinians will have sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif and Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall.

Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how you feel about the Clinton Plan.

		Support	Neutral	Opposed
What is your opinion regarding a peace agreement based on this formula?	Israeli Jews	35	25	40
	Israeli Arabs	57	18	24
	Pal. WB/Gaza	33	25	42
	Refugees in Lebanon	10	29	61
	Refugees in Jordan	12	14	75
	Jewish Americans	42	30	22

*Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "completely opposed," 3 is "neutral," and 5 is "in full support." "Support" here is the aggregation of "5" and "4" responses, "neutral" are the "3" responses, and "opposed" is the aggregation of "2" and "1" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

Using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following elements of the Clinton Plan.

		Support	Neutral	Opposed
A sovereign viable Palestinian state coexisting with a secure state of Israel; Palestinians will have sovereignty over Gaza and a vast majority of West Bank; settlement blocs in the West Bank will be incorporated into Israel with land swaps to compensate for such annexation.	Israeli Jews	51	20	30
	Israeli Arabs	69	16	15
	Pal. WB/Gaza	39	21	41
	Refugees in Lebanon	21	11	68
	Refugees in Jordan	14	16	69
A solution to the Palestinian refugee issue that provides them with compensation and gives them the choice to return to a new Palestinian state or relocate in third countries including Israel, subject to those states' agreement.	Israeli Jews	26	23	51
	Israeli Arabs	71	8	21
	Pal. WB/Gaza	37	22	41
	Refugees in Lebanon	29	8	63
	Refugees in Jordan	34	9	57

Using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following elements of the Clinton Plan.

		Support	Neutral	Opposed
A security solution that includes an international presence, a non-militarized Palestinian state and guarantees for Israel that do not come at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty or territorial integrity.	Israeli Jews	57	23	20
	Israeli Arabs	27	18	55
	Pal. WB/Gaza	18	18	65
	Refugees in Lebanon	8	17	75
	Refugees in Jordan	2	4	94
A solution to Jerusalem under which it will be the capital of both Israel and Palestine and in which Arab neighborhoods will be Palestinian and Jewish neighborhoods will be Israeli. Palestinians will have sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif and Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall.	Israeli Jews	30	19	51
	Israeli Arabs	71	13	16
	Pal. WB/Gaza	18	14	68
	Refugees in Lebanon	17	13	70
	Refugees in Jordan	10	10	80

*Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “completely opposed,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “in full support.” “Support” here is the aggregation of “5” and “4” responses, “neutral” are the “3” responses, and “opposed” is the aggregation of “2” and “1” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

The Clinton Plan is not overwhelmingly supported by any side. About one-third of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support the Clinton Plan (35% and 33%, respectively), while 25% of each group are neutral and a plurality of each group (40% of Israelis and 42% of Palestinians) are opposed to the plan. Israeli Arabs have the strongest support for the Clinton Plan of any group surveyed with 57% saying they support the plan overall. Palestinian refugees are the least supportive with just 12% of those in Jordan and 10% of those in Lebanon supporting the plan, and sizable majorities in opposition (in Lebanon: 61% oppose; in Jordan: 75% oppose).

A majority of Israeli Jews approve of two aspects of the Clinton Plan: two coexisting states, with Gaza and the “vast majority” of the West Bank under Palestinian control, some settlement blocs being incorporated into Israel and land swaps as compensation (51% support); and security based on an international presence, a non-militarized Palestine, and security guarantees for Israel (57% support).

Israeli Arabs are the most supportive of the Clinton Plan, with about seven in ten supporting three aspects of the plan: two states with land swaps (69%); refugee compensation and a choice of returning to a new Palestinian state or relocating to third countries including Israel (71%); and a divided Jerusalem as capital of two states (71%). The security plan, which Israeli Jews support with a solid majority, is strongly opposed by Israeli Arabs (27% support, 55% oppose).

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are divided on two provisions of the Clinton Plan: the two-state solution with land swaps is supported by 39% and opposed by 41%; and the refugee plan allowing for compensation and return to Palestine or relocation elsewhere is supported by 37% and opposed by 41%. The other two aspects of the plan, the security solution and Jerusalem, are rejected by about two-thirds of these Palestinians (65% and 68%, respectively).

Palestinian refugees are even more strongly opposed to all provisions of the Clinton Plan. Their strongest opposition is to the security plan which calls for a non-militarized state and an international presence (75% in Lebanon and 94% in Jordan oppose) and the provision about Jerusalem (70% in Lebanon and 80% in Jordan oppose). About one-third of refugees support the proposed resolution to the refugee issue (29% in Lebanon and 34% in Jordan support), but majorities of refugees in both countries are opposed to this component of the plan (63% in Lebanon and 57% in Jordan oppose).

ARAB LEAGUE PLAN

2012

In 2002, the Arab League endorsed a peace plan, which they ratified again in 2007. It contained the following elements:

- A full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories to the pre-June 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem
- An agreed solution for the Palestinian refugee problem
- In exchange, the Arab states will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over and will sign a comprehensive peace agreement and establish normal relations with the state of Israel

Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how you feel about the Arab League peace plan.				
		Support	Neutral	Opposed
What is your opinion regarding a peace agreement based on this formula?	Israeli Jews	22	25	53
	Israeli Arabs	74	12	15
	Pal. WB/Gaza	61	20	20
	Refugees in Lebanon	10	39	51
	Refugees in Jordan	56	14	30
	Jewish Americans	21	29	47
A full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories to the pre-June 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.	Israeli Jews	17	18	65
	Israeli Arabs	77	16	8
	Pal. WB/Gaza	71	14	16
	Refugees in Lebanon	28	12	60
	Refugees in Jordan	46	10	44
An agreed solution for the Palestinian refugee problem.	Israeli Jews	38	29	33
	Israeli Arabs	87	8	5
	Pal. WB/Gaza	74	13	13
	Refugees in Lebanon	48	15	37
	Refugees in Jordan	59	6	35
In exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and an agreed solution to the refugee problem, the Arab states will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over and will sign a comprehensive peace agreement and establish normal relations with the state of Israel.	Israeli Jews	49	24	27
	Israeli Arabs	86	9	4
	Pal. WB/Gaza	41	25	35
	Refugees in Lebanon	19	19	62
	Refugees in Jordan	44	18	38

Overall, the Arab Peace Initiative (API) offered by the Arab League is supported by 74% of Israeli Arabs, 61% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and 56% of refugees in Jordan. It faces strong opposition, however, from Israeli Jews (22% support, 53% oppose) and refugees in Lebanon (10% support, 51% oppose).

When looking at the specifics of the plan, the vague formula of “an agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee problem” receives the strongest support from all groups. A full withdrawal to pre-1967 borders and the establishment of

a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem is strongly supported by Palestinians in the territories (71% support) and Israeli Arabs (77% support), but rejected by Israeli Jews (65% oppose) and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (60% oppose). Normalization of Israeli-Arab relations in exchange for peace is generally agreed to by Israelis and Palestinians, except for refugees in Lebanon.

Israeli Arabs display strong support when asked about the individual pieces of the plan, with 87% supporting “an agreed solution for the Palestinian refugee problem,” 86% supporting a comprehensive peace agreement and normalized relations between Israel and the Arab states, and 77% supporting Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories to pre-1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza express strong support for two of the three provisions: 74% support a resolution to the refugee problem and 71% support Israeli withdrawal and the creation of Palestine using '67 borders. However, Palestinians show less support for the provision related to a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states (41% support, 35% oppose).

Israeli Jews stand firmly in opposition to the basis of the API, a full Israeli withdrawal and establishment of Palestine in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem (17% support, 65% oppose). Opinion is mixed with regard to the refugee solution with 38% in support and 33% opposed. But when told that should all elements of the API be implemented that the Arab states will “normalize relations” with Israel, support increases and opposition significantly declines (49% support, 27% oppose).

Palestinian refugees in Jordan are divided when asked about the specific provisions of the API. Their strongest support is for the resolution of the refugee problem (59% support, 35% oppose). Opinion is closer to even with regard to a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab states (44% support, 38% oppose) and a Palestinian state drawn along '67 borders in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem (46% support, 44% oppose).

Among refugees in Lebanon, there is a plurality in support of only one provision: 48% support an agreed solution for the Palestinian refugee problem (with 37% opposing). Only 28% of refugees in Lebanon support the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem (with 60% in opposition). Finally, 19% support normalizing relations and a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab states (with 62% in opposition).

JERUSALEM

2012

Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very important and 5 meaning not important at all, when you think of Jerusalem how important do each of the following locations factor into your thoughts?

		Important	Not Important	Don't know of location
Al-Haram Al-Sharif	Israeli Jews	27	38	36
	Israeli Arabs	92	8	1
	Pal. WB/Gaza	99	1	0
	Refugees in Lebanon	99	1	0
	Refugees in Jordan	96	4	0
	Jewish Americans	44	26	30
Temple Mount	Israeli Jews	85	14	2
	Israeli Arabs	67	26	7
	Pal. WB/Gaza	68	25	7
	Refugees in Lebanon	71	15	15
	Refugees in Jordan	61	25	14
	Jewish Americans	78	11	11
The Western Wall	Israeli Jews	94	4	1
	Israeli Arabs	76	22	2
	Pal. WB/Gaza	91	8	1
	Refugees in Lebanon	73	18	10
	Refugees in Jordan	73	20	7
	Jewish Americans	93	4	3
Ramot Alon	Israeli Jews	52	21	26
	Israeli Arabs	38	34	29
	Pal. WB/Gaza	30	43	27
Ras Al'Amud	Israeli Jews	33	43	25
	Israeli Arabs	73	24	2
	Pal. WB/Gaza	95	4	2
	Jewish Americans	34	20	46
Ma'ale Adumim	Israeli Jews	75	21	4
	Israeli Arabs	35	39	26
	Pal. WB/Gaza	37	42	21
	Jewish Americans	34	19	48
Silwan	Israeli Jews	38	47	15
	Israeli Arabs	70	29	1
	Pal. WB/Gaza	87	8	4
	Jewish Americans	24	18	58

*Respondents were asked to rate the importance with the following options: "very important," "somewhat important," "not so important," and "not important at all," or "don't know of location." "Important" here is the aggregation of "very important" and "somewhat important" responses, while "not important" is the aggregation of "not so important" and "not important at all" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

When asked about specific locations in Jerusalem, Israeli Jews are deeply concerned with the importance of the Western Wall and the Temple Mount; 94% and 85%, respectively, say these sites are important. These sites are also considered important by Palestinians, particularly the Western Wall which is considered important by 91% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and about three-quarters of Israeli Arabs (76%) and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (73%) and Jordan (73%). The Temple Mount is rated as important by about two-thirds of Palestinians in the territories (68%) and Israeli Arabs (67%).

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are most concerned with al-Haram al-Sharif (100%), Ras al'Amud (95%), and Silwan (87%). Israelis, however, are far less concerned with these sites (important: al-Haram al-Sharif, 27%; Ras Al'Amud, 33%; Silwan, 38%). In fact, many Israelis surveyed claim not to know the location of al-Haram al-Sharif (36%), Ras al'Amud (25%), or the settlement Ramot Alon (26%). Similarly, many Palestinians and Israeli Arabs do not appear to know about Ramot (27% and 29%, respectively) or Ma'ale Adumim (21% and 26%, respectively).

There have been several different options proposed for Jerusalem. Now using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following proposals.				
		Support	Neutral	Opposed
Jerusalem will remain the undivided capital of Israel.	Israeli Jews	70	19	11
	Israeli Arabs	2	3	95
	Pal. WB/Gaza	7	6	87
	Refugees in Lebanon	3	11	86
	Refugees in Jordan	1	7	92
	Jewish Americans	67	19	12
Jerusalem should be divided on the basis of the 1967 lines, with West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.	Israeli Jews	15	20	66
	Israeli Arabs	70	12	17
	Pal. WB/Gaza	22	17	61
	Refugees in Lebanon	10	18	72
	Refugees in Jordan	18	14	68
Jerusalem should be divided in accordance with the Clinton parameters, where Arab sections of the city are Palestinian, and Jewish sections of the city are Israeli.	Israeli Jews	28	22	50
	Israeli Arabs	68	13	19
	Pal. WB/Gaza	15	15	69
	Refugees in Lebanon	12	15	73
	Refugees in Jordan	6	11	83
	Jewish Americans	29	27	41
Jerusalem should be an international city with no Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty over it.	Israeli Jews	10	13	77
	Israeli Arabs	2	14	58
	Pal. WB/Gaza	9	13	78
	Refugees in Lebanon	10	19	71
	Refugees in Jordan	3	5	92
	Jewish Americans	21	16	61
*Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "completely opposed," 3 is "neutral," and 5 is "in full support." "Support" here is the aggregation of "5" and "4" responses, "neutral" are the "3" responses, and "opposed" is the aggregation of "2" and "1" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.				

Finding a solution to the problem of Jerusalem will be difficult. Palestinians and Israelis hold deeply opposite views on Jerusalem as an “undivided capital of Israel,” with about nine in ten Palestinians overall rejecting this (87% in the territories, 86% in Lebanon, 92% in Jordan) and 70% of Israeli Jews in support. The two sides, however, equally reject three other options:

1. A Jerusalem divided between East and West is opposed by 66% of Israeli Jews, 61% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 72% of refugees in Lebanon, and 68% of refugees in Jordan.
2. The Clinton Plan’s approach to dividing Jerusalem between Arab and Jewish sections is opposed by 50% of Israeli Jews and 69% of Palestinians in the West Bank—and even greater percentages of refugees in Lebanon (73%) and Jordan (83%).
3. Jerusalem as an international city is the least popular option overall, with opposition from 77% of Israeli Jews, 78% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 71% of refugees in Lebanon, and 92% of refugees in Jordan.

Israeli Arabs tend to be supportive of the two possible divisions of Jerusalem: East and West (70% support) or using the Clinton parameters (68% support), but strongly oppose Jerusalem as an undivided capital of Israel (95% oppose) as well as an international city (58% oppose).

One idea that may still be explored is the option of Jerusalem as an undivided city with two capitals, since there is somewhat less hostility to this arrangement.

REFUGEES

There have been several different options proposed to address the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Now using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following proposals.

		Support	Neutral	Opposed
All Palestinian refugees should be granted the full right to return to their original homes in Israel (pre-1948 Palestine). All Palestinian refugees, including those who choose not to return, are entitled to compensation.	Israeli Jews	3	12	85
	Israeli Arabs	93	3	4
	Pal. WB/Gaza	80	9	11
	Refugees in Lebanon	72	1	27
	Refugees in Jordan	52	4	43
	Jewish Americans	15	21	59
Israel should acknowledge its responsibility for creating the Palestinian refugee problem and allow a symbolic number to return to Israel. Palestinians have the right of return only to a newly created Palestinian state.	Israeli Jews	19	19	62
	Israeli Arabs	43	21	36
	Pal. WB/Gaza	51	21	28
	Refugees in Lebanon	41	8	51
	Refugees in Jordan	37	10	53
	Jewish Americans	21	24	47

Israel has no responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem. Neighboring countries, including a future Palestinian state, should resettle them permanently.	Israeli Jews	63	18	19
	Israeli Arabs	5	3	92
	Pal. WB/Gaza	18	14	68
	Refugees in Lebanon	5	8	86
	Refugees in Jordan	16	5	79
	Jewish Americans	35	27	34
*Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “completely opposed,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “in full support.” “Support” here is the aggregation of “5” and “4” responses, “neutral” are the “3” responses, and “opposed” is the aggregation of “2” and “1” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.				

As with Jerusalem, there are deeply held opposing views regarding the issue of Palestinian refugees. Israelis clearly reject a scenario in which Palestinians have a full right to return to their homes in Israel, or the right to compensation if they choose not to return (85% oppose). Further, Israelis appear to accept only return of refugees to a future Palestinian state (63% support), rejecting even a symbolic return of some refugees to Israel (62% oppose).

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza demonstrate strong support for the full right to return (80% support), while reaction to a symbolic return of some refugees is mixed (51% support, 28% oppose). These Palestinians reject limiting the right to return to a future Palestinian state (68% oppose).

The views of Israeli Arabs are more emphatic than those of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, with 93% supporting a full right of return or compensation and 92% opposing return of refugees only to a future Palestinian state. Their opinions are mixed with respect to an acknowledgement of responsibility by Israel for the refugee problem and a symbolic return of some refugees to Israel (43% support, 36% oppose).

Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan clearly reject the proposal of limiting return to a Palestinian state (86% in Lebanon and 79% in Jordan oppose), and also have mixed opinions on a symbolic return with majorities in both countries opposing this plan (support/oppose: 41%/51% in Lebanon, 37%/53% in Jordan). Their views on full right to return are divided between the two groups. Refugees in Lebanon support the full right to return (72%), while only a slim majority of refugees in Jordan agree (52%) with a sizable percentage of opposition (43%).

These scenarios were presented with multiple components, making some of the responses difficult to parse. When refugees in the West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, and Jordan were asked about the importance of each specific piece of a possible resolution to the refugee issue, the picture is somewhat clearer.

Please tell me how important are each of the following:			
		Important	Not Important
The right of refugees to return to their homes or towns or villages	Pal. WB/Gaza	96	2
	Refugees in Lebanon	94	3
	Refugees in Jordan	97	2
The right of refugees to receive compensation for all that they have lost	Pal. WB/Gaza	83	8
	Refugees in Lebanon	89	6
	Refugees in Jordan	97	2

Please tell me how important are each of the following:

		Important	Not Important
That Israel acknowledges wrongdoing in creating refugees in 1948	Pal. WB/Gaza	90	4
	Refugees in Lebanon	76	13
	Refugees in Jordan	94	1

*Respondents were asked to rate the importance of these issues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very important,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “not important at all.” “Important” here is the aggregation of “1” and “2” responses, and “not important” is the aggregation of “4” and “5” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “3” is not included.

All three groups of refugees surveyed strongly assert the importance of the rights of refugees in general to return to their homes or towns or villages (West Bank/Gaza: 96%, Lebanon: 94%, Jordan: 97%), the rights of refugees to receive compensation for all of that they have lost (West Bank/Gaza: 83%, Lebanon: 89%, Jordan: 97%), and Israel’s acknowledgement of wrongdoing in creating refugees in 1948 (West Bank/Gaza: 90%, Lebanon: 76%, Jordan: 94%).

Please tell me how important are each of the following:

		Important	Not Important
That you return to your home or town or village	Pal. WB/Gaza	92	5
	Refugees in Lebanon	88	10
	Refugees in Jordan	97	2
That you will be able to live in a Palestinian state in the West Bank or Gaza	Pal. WB/Gaza	83	7
	Refugees in Lebanon	68	18
	Refugees in Jordan	96	2
That you be given compensation for all that you have lost	Pal. WB/Gaza	73	13
	Refugees in Lebanon	86	8
	Refugees in Jordan	96	3

*Respondents were asked to rate the importance of these issues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very important,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “not important at all.” “Important” here is the aggregation of “1” and “2” responses, and “not important” is the aggregation of “4” and “5” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “3” is not included.

But when asked about their personal hopes and aspirations, refugees say it is important that they be able to return to their home or town or village (West Bank/Gaza: 92%, Lebanon: 88%, Jordan: 97%), that they be able to live in a Palestinian state (West Bank/Gaza: 83%, Lebanon: 68%, Jordan: 96%), and that they be given compensation for all that they have lost (West Bank/Gaza: 73%, Lebanon: 86%, Jordan: 96%).

Please tell me how important are each of the following:

		Important	Not Important
If circumstances prevent or delay your return to your home, town, or village, that you remain where you are as a citizen of the new Palestinian state	Pal. WB/Gaza	66	13
If circumstances prevent or delay your return to your home, town, or village, that you be given Lebanese citizenship	Refugees in Lebanon	41	44
If circumstances prevent or delay your return to your home, town, or village, that you retain Jordanian citizenship	Refugees in Jordan	77	7

Please tell me how important are each of the following:			
		Important	Not Important
If circumstances prevent or delay your return to your home, town, or village, that you be given the opportunity to emigrate and become a citizen in another country	Pal. WB/Gaza	43	35
	Refugees in Lebanon	42	46
	Refugees in Jordan	81	5
*Respondents were asked to rate the importance of these issues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "very important," 3 is "neutral," and 5 is "not important at all." "Important" here is the aggregation of "1" and "2" responses, and "not important" is the aggregation of "4" and "5" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding "3" is not included.			

It is interesting to note, however, that when asked to reflect on realities that may prevent these hopes from coming true, refugees tend to temper their expectations. Refugees were asked, for example, about possible scenarios if circumstances prevent or delay their return to their home, town or village. Among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 66% would accept staying where they are as citizens of the new Palestinian state. In Lebanon, 41% would accept Lebanese citizenship, and in Jordan, 77% would accept retaining their Jordanian citizenship. When asked how important it would be to be given the opportunity to emigrate and become a citizen in another country, 43% of Palestinians in the territories, 42% of refugees in Lebanon and 81% of refugees in Jordan say this would be important, if unable to return to their homes.

Please tell me how hopeful you are in the following outcomes:			
		Hopeful	Not Hopeful
That you will be living in an independent Palestinian state	Refugees in Lebanon	83	14
	Refugees in Jordan	73	17
That you will be able to return to your town or village	Refugees in Lebanon	76	19
	Refugees in Jordan	66	27
of "1" and "2" responses, and "not hopeful" is the aggregation of "4" and "5" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding "3" is			

Despite the fact that less than a third of refugees in Lebanon and Jordan say that a peace agreement is likely or even possible in the next five years, these groups remain strikingly hopeful that they will ultimately live in an independent Palestinian state (Lebanon: 83%, Jordan: 73%) and that they will be able to return to their towns or villages (Lebanon: 76%, Jordan: 66%).

Please tell me how important are each of the following:			
		Important	Not Important
A Palestinian state in all of the West Bank and Gaza, with Jerusalem as its capital	Refugees in Lebanon	77	14
	Refugees in Jordan	97	2
The right of refugees to return to a Palestinian state	Refugees in Lebanon	96	2
	Refugees in Jordan	96	2
*Respondents were asked to rate the importance of these issues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "very important," 3 is "neutral," and 5 is "not important at all." "Important" here is the aggregation of "1" and "2" responses, and "not important" is the aggregation of "4" and "5" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding "3" is not included.			

Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan express strong support for a Palestinian state in all of the West Bank and Gaza, with Jerusalem as its capital is important (Lebanon: 77%, Jordan: 97%). Further, they strongly insist (almost unanimously) that it is important that refugees have the right to return to a Palestinian state (Lebanon: 96%, Jordan: 96%).

Refugees in Lebanon: Attitudes Compared 2005/2012

	2005		2012	
	Important	Not Important	Important	Not Important
Right to return to their homes	83	11	88	10
If not, emigrate to another country	38	51	42	46
If not, return to Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza	35	50	68	18
If not, receive Lebanese citizenship	13	79	41	44
That there be a Palestinian state in all of the West Bank/Gaza with Jerusalem as its capital	52	34	77	14
That you will be able to live in Palestinian state in West Bank/Gaza	21	79	68	18

Back in 2005, we conducted a similar survey of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. There was a deeper pessimism and less willingness to entertain alternatives than we found in our 2012 survey. About the same percentage of Palestinians in Lebanon believed that it was possible for there to be a Palestinian state in five years time (2005: 29%; 2012: 30%). In 2005, about one half of refugees in Lebanon thought it was important for there to be a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with Jerusalem as its capital, and only 21% thought it was important that one day they might live in that Palestinian state. It simply was not “home” to them. Today, 77% of refugees in Lebanon believe such a Palestinian state is important, and 68% are hopeful that they might live in that state. And they are much more open to accepting other options, as well, such as accepting citizenship in Lebanon or emigrating to another country.

SETTLEMENTS

With which of the following statements do you most agree:						
	Israeli Jews	Israeli Arabs	Pal. WB/Gaza	Refugees in Lebanon	Refugees in Jordan	Jewish Americans
Statement A. Israel has a right to build wherever it pleases in the land it currently holds.	47	1	4	4	0	32
Statement B. Settlements in the occupied territories create a problem for any peace agreement with the Palestinians and there will need to be a negotiated agreement on which settlements Israel will annex and which it will evacuate.	45	25	22	17	5	46
Statement C. All settlements are illegal under international law and should be evacuated.	8	74	75	79	95	12
Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.						

There are deep divisions on the matter of settlements, with Israeli Jews themselves divided between insisting that it is Israel's right to build wherever it pleases in the land it currently holds (47%) and the position that settlements create a problem for any peace agreement and there will need to be a negotiated agreement on which settlements Israel will annex and which it will evacuate (45%). Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, and Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, all overwhelmingly say settlements are illegal under international law and should be evacuated (75%, 79%, 95%, and 74%, respectively).

Several proposals have been advanced to resolve the settlement issue. Now using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following proposals.				
		Opposed	Neutral	Support
All settlements east of 1967 borders must be removed and settlers relocated within Israel.	Israeli Jews	58	24	19
	Israeli Arabs	7	8	85
	Pal. WB/Gaza	21	15	64
	Refugees in Lebanon	33	19	49
	Refugees in Jordan	32	9	58
	Jewish Americans	49	30	15
Several settlements blocs will be annexed by Israel; those that are not will be dismantled and settlers relocated either into the annexed blocs or within Israel.	Israeli Jews	34	23	44
	Israeli Arabs	29	27	44
	Pal. WB/Gaza	32	28	40
	Refugees in Lebanon	40	27	33
	Refugees in Jordan	38	11	51
	Jewish Americans	26	36	29

Several proposals have been advanced to resolve the settlement issue. Now using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following proposals.

		Opposed	Neutral	Support
All settlers should be allowed to remain in the West Bank under Palestinian sovereignty, if they so choose.	Israeli Jews	48	26	26
	Israeli Arabs	64	16	20
	Pal. WB/Gaza	66	19	15
	Refugees in Lebanon	46	22	32
	Refugees in Jordan	43	13	44
	Jewish Americans	33	31	31

*Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “completely opposed,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “in full support.” “Support” here is the aggregation of “5” and “4” responses, “neutral” are the “3” responses, and “opposed” is the aggregation of “2” and “1” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

When asked about possible solutions for the settlements problem, respondents make a few things perfectly clear. No agreement is possible on the removal of all settlements and the evacuation of settlers to Israel. Among Israeli Jews, 58% oppose the removal of all settlements east of the 1967 borders and the relocation of settlers into Israel. It may appear as surprising that one-third of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (33%) and Jordan (32%) as well as 21% of Palestinians in the territories are also opposed to this proposal. In the case of the refugees, opposition may be based on an objection not only to the settlements, but also to the settlers themselves. The refugees who come from villages in what is now Israel may simply not want to see settlers rewarded by relocating them to areas that were the sites of their ancestral lands. There is little support for settlers being allowed to remain in the West Bank under Palestinian sovereignty, if they so choose. Half of Israeli Jews (48%) and two-thirds of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (66%) and Israeli Arabs (64%) are opposed to this idea.

It may be possible, however, to find enough support from all sides on attaching some settlement blocs to Israel and evacuating the rest. When asked about their support for the annexation of several settlement blocs by Israel and the dismantling of all other settlements, about two-thirds of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the territories either support or are neutral with respect to this proposal (Israelis: 44% support and 23% neutral; Palestinians: 40% support and 28% neutral). The percentages of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians refugees are similar, with between 60-70% of these groups being either supportive or neutral.

BORDERS

Several proposals have been advanced with regard to the location of the border between Israel and a future Palestinian state. Now using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following proposals.

		Support	Neutral	Opposed
The 1967 border.	Israeli Jews	11	22	67
	Israeli Arabs	74	9	17
	Pal. WB/Gaza	47	22	31
	Refugees in Lebanon	18	34	48
	Refugees in Jordan	41	23	36
The 1967 border with agreed upon territorial exchanges.	Israeli Jews	34	25	42
	Israeli Arabs	57	15	28
	Pal. WB/Gaza	35	23	42
	Refugees in Lebanon	24	25	51
	Refugees in Jordan	38	25	37
The current location of the separation barrier should become the final border.	Israeli Jews	32	40	28
	Israeli Arabs	4	5	91
	Pal. WB/Gaza	14	22	64
	Refugees in Lebanon	5	13	82
	Refugees in Jordan	33	16	51
A fairer and more viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be the creation of a single state in which all citizens have equal rights.	Israeli Jews	12	22	66
	Israeli Arabs	39	20	41
	Pal. WB/Gaza	34	20	47
	Refugees in Lebanon	20	17	63
	Refugees in Jordan	15	38	46
A fairer and more viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be absorption of Palestinians into the state of Israel where they will enjoy significant autonomy but not the equal right to vote.	Israeli Jews	6	18	76
	Israeli Arabs	5	10	84
	Pal. WB/Gaza	16	19	65
	Refugees in Lebanon	4	25	71
	Refugees in Jordan	30	12	57
A fairer and more viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be the creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.	Israeli Jews	26	37	37
	Israeli Arabs	21	15	64
	Pal. WB/Gaza	15	18	67
	Refugees in Lebanon	17	19	64
	Refugees in Jordan	39	19	42

*Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “completely opposed,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “in full support.” “Support” here is the aggregation of “5” and “4” responses, “neutral” are the “3” responses, and “opposed” is the aggregation of “2” and “1” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

Respondents were presented with a variety of proposals for the location of a border between Israel and a future Palestinian state. All the options, save one (the 1967 border with agreed upon territorial exchanges), are opposed by about two-thirds of one or more of the groups surveyed. This leaves the option of the 1967 borders with land swaps as the only proposal with any promise of winning the necessary support.

Using the 1967 lines as the borders between Israel and a Palestinian state is rejected by 67% of Israeli Jews, as well as by almost half of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (48% oppose). Using the current location of the separation barrier as the final border is opposed by 64% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and even greater numbers of Israeli Arabs (91%) and refugees in Lebanon (82%). This proposal does not garner much support from Israeli Jews either; only 32% say they support the separation barrier as a final border.

Several proposals that are not based on two states, Israel and Palestine, are also opposed by significant majorities. First, the creation of a single state in which all citizens have equal rights is opposed by two-thirds of Israel Jews (66%) as well as 47% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 41% of Israeli Arabs, 63% of refugees in Lebanon, and 46% of refugees in Jordan. The absorption of Palestinians into the state of Israel with significant autonomy but without equal voting rights is roundly rejected by Israelis and Palestinians alike. Three-quarters of Israeli Jews (76%) oppose this proposal, as do 84% of Israeli Arabs, 65% of Palestinians in the territories, 71% of refugees in Lebanon, and 57% of refugees in Jordan. Finally, the option of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation is rejected by Palestinians (67%) as well as by Israeli Arabs (64%) and refugees in Lebanon (64%) and Jordan (42%).


APPENDIX A—METHODODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

2012

		Israeli Jews n=1,061	Israeli Arabs n=414	Pal. WB/ Gaza n=1,264	Lebanon Refugees n=497	Jordan Refugees n=489
Age Group	Under25	16%	16%	25%	22%	17%
	25-36	23%	31%	41%	33%	34%
	Over36	61%	52%	34%	45%	48%
Gender	Male	49%	53%	50%	60%	61%
	Female	51%	47%	50%	40%	40%
Education	Elementary or less	1%	3%	15%	21%	12%
	Intermediate/Secondary/Technical	46%	52%	51%	59%	50%
	University or more	53%	46%	34%	21%	38%
Marital Status	Married	65%	48%	67%	56%	69%
	Single	24%	48%	29%	41%	26%
	Divorced/widowed/separated	12%	4%	5%	3%	5%
Number of Children	One	13%	7%	14%	14%	7%
	Two	33%	14%	21%	24%	26%
	Three	29%	20%	13%	14%	13%
	Four	11%	28%	11%	9%	16%
	Five or more	6%	20%	24%	20%	28%
	None	8%	10%	17%	19%	9%
	Refuse	-	1%	-	-	-
Children in House- hold	One	21%	12%	16%	18%	9%
	Two	28%	23%	27%	33%	34%
	Three	19%	28%	18%	21%	16%
	Four	7%	16%	13%	10%	17%
	Five or more	4%	6%	20%	14%	20%
	None	22%	15%	6%	4%	4%
Employment Status	Employed	79%	62%	39%	65%	63%
	Not employed	21%	39%	61%	35%	37%
Religion	Secular	-	27%	-	-	-
	Religious	-	26%	-	-	-
	Traditional	-	33%	-	-	-
	Other	-	14%	-	-	-
Religion	Secular	60%	-	-	-	-
	Traditional	16%	-	-	-	-
	National religious	11%	-	-	-	-
	Orthodox	11%	-	-	-	-
	Other answers	1%	-	-	-	-
Religion	Secular	-	-	2%	12%	-
	Pious	-	-	59%	25%	25%
	Traditionalist	-	-	38%	61%	61%
	Religious activist	-	-	2%	3%	14%

2013

Egyptian Attitudes
Iranian Attitudes
Israel & Palestine: 20 Years After Oslo



EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2013

This poll represents the third time since May 2013 that we have conducted a nationwide survey of Egyptian public opinion. It has been a momentous and tumultuous time for Egypt. During this period our polling has opened a window, allowing us to better understand and track the Egyptian people's changing attitudes toward developments as they unfold: how they view their government and institutions; areas of agreement and disagreement; and their hopes for the future.

MAY 2013: In our May survey we found Egyptian society deeply polarized. Three-quarters expressed both concern with the way the Morsi government was monopolizing power and fear that the Muslim Brotherhood was attempting to impose its ideology on the country.

Egyptians had lost the hope they had in 2011 that positive change would result from their revolution. While 82% said they had been hopeful in 2011, now only 36% retained that hope. The military had the overwhelming support of all segments of Egyptian society (94%), but the country was divided on whether they wanted the military to intervene (44% in favor, 56% opposed). Almost all Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) supporters opposed this action, but 60% of other Egyptians wanted the military to assume control. Overall, the favored options for what to do next were national dialogue (87%) and scrapping the constitution (64%). Of these options, those with confidence in the FJP supported dialogue, but they were nearly unanimous in their opposition to scrapping the constitution, an option that was supported by more than 85% of the rest of the country.

What was clear from that May survey was that the continuing behavior of the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party had alienated three-quarters of all Egyptians. While there were differences as to how to end their rule, it was evident that most Egyptians wanted change.

JULY 2013: In July, following the deposing of the Morsi government, we found that despite continuing division over the military's July 3rd action, many Egyptians felt a renewed sense of hope (68%) and the military still retained an overall 93% positive rating. However, given the tumult and violence that followed the end of the FJP rule, the public was not fully convinced that the interim government would succeed in being able to carry out their "roadmap for change." Only one-third of Egyptians expressed confidence that this government would be able to amend the constitution, create an inclusive democracy, and restore order in the country. At that point, most Egyptians were in a "wait and see" mode.

SEPTEMBER 2013: In our September survey, we find that public opinion in Egypt has become more conflicted and even more polarized. Overall, 60% of Egyptians remain hopeful about the country's future and 83% believe that the situation will improve in the next few years, but the continuing violence has taken a toll. A plurality (46%) of all Egyptians believe that the situation in their country has become worse, not better, since the Morsi government was deposed. Eighty percent (80%) of FJP supporters express this view. But only about one-half of the rest of the country

feels that Egypt is better off, with nearly one in five saying that the situation is the same as it was before the military intervened.

The military remains the institution in which Egyptians have the greatest confidence, but their positive rating has declined to 70%, owing to a sharp drop in support from those who identify with the Muslim Brotherhood's FJP and a slight decline in support among liberals and those Egyptians who associate with none of the country's parties.

The country is split down the middle in its view of the military's July 3rd deposing of the Morsi government. The FJP, of course, is unanimous in finding the military's action incorrect, while almost two-thirds of the rest of Egyptians support the deposing of Morsi.

Between July and September, confidence in the interim government of Adly Mansour has increased, with between 43% and 51% now saying that they believe that this government can follow the "roadmap" and restore order to the country – with almost two-thirds of non-FJP supporters now expressing this view.

During the past month, the Muslim Brotherhood's party has consolidated its strength, while at the same time alienating itself from many other Egyptians. Support for the FJP has leveled off at 34%, up from May's 28%. And 79% of all Egyptians still want national reconciliation as the desired goal for Egypt. But now one-half of those who do not support FJP identify the Muslim Brotherhood as the main obstacle to reconciliation and more than 60% of non-FJP supporters want the Brotherhood to be banned from Egyptian politics.

The July poll found Egyptians deeply dissatisfied with the role the United States has played in their country. In September we asked Egyptians about their attitudes toward other countries. Israel, the United States, and Iran received the lowest ratings (0% for Israel, 4% for the U.S., and 9% for Iran), with Saudi Arabia and the UAE viewed positively by more than one-half of all Egyptians. Turkey was favored by only one-third of Egyptians, with Qatar receiving a positive rating from less than one-fifth.

There can be no doubt that Egyptians face real challenges and must address difficult questions as they move forward. Other than retaining optimism about their future, desiring national reconciliation, and continuing to support their military institution, there is very little else on which most Egyptians agree. With the FJP continuing to have the support of about one-third of the country, some effort to achieve national reconciliation will be important. At this point, it appears that the choices made by both the military and the Muslim Brotherhood will be decisive in shaping Egypt's near-term future.

Egypt's other political parties remain weak, with the largest percentage of Egyptians showing confidence in the Tamarrud movement, which is not a party. If the next election is to produce an outcome that reflects the concerns and aspirations of a substantial number of Egyptians, the organizers of the Tamarrud movement will have to use their discipline and skill to either strengthen the existing parties or transform their movement into an electoral force that can effectively compete.

The real short-term test for Egypt will be the ability of the interim government to produce a new constitution, pave the way for new elections leading to a civilian government, while keeping Egyptians safe and restoring order in the country. To the degree that all parties can find common ground in achieving these goals, the optimism of Egyptians may be rewarded. Should these issues be resolved, Egypt can then focus on the business of meeting what our polls have consistently demonstrated are the country's most pressing needs – rebuilding the economy and creating jobs and opportunities for Egypt's youth. But should the violence continue, the polarization will deepen, and Egypt will continue to a troubled future.

ANALYSIS

2013

Confidence in Political Parties and Groups

	May 2013	July 2013	September 2013
The Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood)	26	24	34
The Nour Party	29	22	10
The National Salvation Front	22	12	13
The April 6th Movement	25	22	20
Tamarrud	-	32	35
No confidence in any political party	39	27	17

		Level of confidence in . . .					
		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud
The Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood)	Confident	34	100	34	20	28	2
	Not confident	59	-	65	78	72	97
The Nour Party	Confident	10	10	100	37	23	14
	Not confident	86	86	-	63	76	84
The National Salvation Front	Confident	13	8	49	100	44	25
	Not confident	84	91	46	-	55	73
The April 6th Movement	Confident	20	16	48	69	100	34
	Not confident	74	79	50	29	-	63
Tamarrud	Confident	35	2	50	69	59	100
	Not confident	62	97	50	30	40	-

For the third time this year, we asked respondents about their confidence in the major political parties and groups in Egypt. What the results indicate is that there is a “sorting out” underway. At this point, Egyptians are more likely to have chosen sides and so the percentage of those who have “no confidence” in any party or group continues to decline, from 39% in May to just 17% in September. There is also considerably less overlap among groups that there was in May. For example, in May 88% of those who had confidence in the Nour Party also had confidence in the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP); today, just 34% of Nour supporters also support the Brotherhood’s party.

Tamarrud retains the largest percentage of confidence (35%), garnering additional support as the National Salvation Front and the April 6th movement have lost some supporters. The Muslim Brotherhood has consolidated some support, including the addition of support from liberals who do not endorse the current crackdown; the Freedom and Justice Party enjoys the confidence of 34% of respondents, an increase of 8 points since May. The Nour Party and the National Salvation Front (NSF) are in free fall, with support dwindling to just 10% and 13% respectively.

Attitudes From Tahrir Square to Tamarrud and Into the Future

When Hosni Mubarak left power over two years ago, how hopeful were you that it would bring about positive change in Egypt?							
	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
Hopeful	90	90	90	88	88	90	93
Not hopeful	10	10	10	12	12	10	7

Nine in ten respondents say that when Mubarak left power more than two years ago they were hopeful that it would bring about positive change in Egypt. This view is consistent across the political landscape from those who are confident in the FJP to those whose confidence lies with the Tamarrud movement.

In your opinion, which statement best describes the action taken by the military on July 3rd?							
	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
It was correct decision for army to depose Morsi and lay out a roadmap leading to amended constitution and new elections.	46	2	57	71	59	96	49
It was incorrect for army to depose Morsi. He was the legitimately elected president.	51	95	43	27	40	4	47

Egyptians are divided on the question of whether the military's action on July 3rd to depose President Morsi was correct or incorrect. Overall, 46% say it was correct to depose Morsi and lay out a roadmap leading to an amended constitution and new elections, while 51% say he was the legitimately elected president and should not have been deposed. But this split is entirely between those with confidence in the Freedom and Justice Party, 95% of whom say it was incorrect, and Tamarrud supporters, 96% of whom say it was correct.

After Tamarrud and the military's action deposing President Morsi, what best describes how hopeful are you now about Egypt's future?									
	May 2013	July 2013	September 2013						
	Total	Total	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
I am still hopeful	36	68	60	41	65	69	67	82	66
Neither hopeful nor disappointed	22	16	28	38	25	26	24	17	23
I am disappointed	41	14	11	19	9	3	8	1	11

A majority of Egyptians are still hopeful about Egypt's future (60%). Although the percentage has dropped since July (68%), it remains significantly higher than it was before Tamarrud (36%). Looking at the most recent survey, those with confidence in Tamarrud are most likely to say they are still hopeful (82%), while those with confidence in the Freedom and Justice Party are least likely to say so (41%). However, it is worth noting that even among these Muslim Brotherhood supporters, only 19% say they are disappointed about Egypt's future.

In your opinion, is Egypt better off or worse off as a result of the June 30th Tamarrud and July 3rd military action?

	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
Better Off	35	2	49	58	49	75	34
Worse Off	46	80	40	26	35	8	48
About the same	18	17	11	17	17	17	18

Overall, 35% of respondents say Egypt is better off following the June 30th Tamarrud and July 3rd military action, while 46% say the country is worse off. Those who have some degree of confidence in the Muslim Brotherhood are largely convinced that Egypt is worse off following July 3rd (2% better vs. 80% worse). Others are divided, except for those who identify with Tamarrud, who think Egypt is better off by a wide margin (75% vs. 8%).

Egypt will be better in the next few years...

	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
Optimistic	83	72	82	91	86	96	85
Pessimistic	15	27	16	7	12	2	14

Still, there is an overwhelming sense of optimism in considering the next few years. Overall, 83% say Egypt will be better in a few years, and this sentiment is widely shared regardless of political leaning with 72% of FJP supporters and 96% of Tamarrud supporters in agreement.

Confidence in Egyptian Leaders

Level of confidence in . . .

		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
Adly Mansour	Confident	39	5	47	60	51	79	40
	Not confident	58	92	47	36	48	18	55
Abdel Fattah El Sisi	Confident	46	5	58	70	60	94	49
	Not confident	52	93	42	30	39	5	49
Mohamed Morsi	Confident	44	85	39	28	37	6	34
	Not confident	54	12	61	71	62	94	64
Muhammed El Baradei	Confident	6	8	9	2	2	3	5
	Not confident	88	87	88	94	95	93	91

Abdel Fattah El Sisi has the strongest support of the four leaders we measured (46%), but overall confidence in him remains below 50% because of strong opposition by FJP (93% not confident) and weak support from those who have no confidence in any party or group (49% confident). El Sisi has the overwhelming confidence of those who have also confidence in Tamarrud (94%), as well as considerable backing from supporters of the National Salvation Front (70%) and April 6th (60%).

Again, those who support FJP have no confidence in Adly Mansour; just 5% are confident in him. Those who are confident in the Tamarrud are very supportive of Mansour (79%), while supporters of the Nour, National Salvation Front, and the April 6th movement are divided. Those with no confidence in any political group tend to have less confidence in Mansour (40% vs. 55%).

Overall, Morsi’s level of support (44%) is similar to El Sisi’s; however, his base of support is the exact opposite, with 85% of those with confidence in the Freedom and Justice Party expressing confidence in him and at least six in ten respondents whose confidence rests in the other groups saying they have no confidence in him.

Muhamed El Baradei has lost support across the board, with just 6% of respondents saying they have confidence in him.

Confidence in Institutions

		Level of confidence in . . .						
		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
The army	Confident	70	48	76	87	84	99	65
	Not confident	24	42	23	12	14	1	33
Judiciary	Confident	54	28	70	82	74	91	48
	Not confident	42	67	30	18	25	7	49
Police	Confident	49	19	63	74	66	88	47
	Not confident	50	80	37	25	33	12	53

Confidence in the army has dropped from 93% in July to 70% in September. Not surprisingly, the biggest decline is from those who have confidence in the Muslim Brotherhood (88% in July to 48% in September); those with no confidence in any political group have also lost some of their faith in the army, with confidence falling from 91% in July to 65% in September.

Confidence in the judiciary has also fallen somewhat in recent months, with 67% overall expressing confidence in May and 54% expressing the same in September. Again, this decline is due to a reversal among Muslim Brotherhood supporters, from 61% confident in May to 28% in September, and among those with “no confidence,” from 65% to 48%.

While confidence in the police overall is basically stable (52% in May to 49% in September), those with confidence in the Muslim Brotherhood’s party have lost confidence (from 58% to 19%), while those who have confidence in the other political groups have gained confidence.

Confidence in the Interim Government

		The Interim Government of Adly Mansour						
		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
Confident		42	12	52	61	54	79	38
Not confident		52	82	40	34	41	16	54

Confidence that the interim government/ military will make progress in . .

		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
Implementing the roadmap that will lead to an amended constitution and new elections for a civilian government	Confident	44	9	57	69	59	86	42
	Not confident	53	87	41	30	39	12	54
Creating the framework for a more inclusive democracy in Egypt	Confident	43	9	54	66	57	83	41
	Not confident	54	87	43	31	42	13	55
Keeping us safe and restoring order	Confident	51	16	69	80	68	93	49
	Not confident	45	78	31	18	32	6	47

With the exception of FJP supporters, Egyptians are still in “wait-and-see” mode about Adly Mansour’s government. Overall, 42% have confidence in this interim government, including 79% of those who identify with Tamarrud and just 12% of Freedom and Justice Party supporters; of those with no confidence in any political group, 38% have confidence in the Mansour government.

Since July, the interim government has raised the overall confidence levels with respect to “implementing the roadmap that will lead to an amended constitution and new elections for a civilian government” by 11 points, “creating the framework for a more inclusive democracy in Egypt” by 7 points, and “keeping us safe and restoring order” by 13 points. The biggest increases in confidence are among those with no confidence in any political group, from 14%, 16%, and 21% in July, to 42%, 41%, and 49% in September, respectively, for the three issues mentioned above (i.e., roadmap for constitution and elections, more inclusive democracy, and safety and order).

The Muslim Brotherhood and National Reconciliation

Regarding the future of the Muslim Brotherhood, with which of the following statements do you most agree?

	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
It is important that an agreed formula be found to include the Muslim Brotherhood in politics.	42	77	62	45	51	15	31
The Muslim Brotherhood should be banned from politics.	50	15	36	53	45	83	58

How important a goal should achieving national reconciliation be for the future of Egypt?

	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
Important	79	89	83	76	80	68	79
Not important	21	11	17	24	20	32	21

Which element presents the biggest obstacle to national reconciliation?

	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
The military	23	49	28	15	20	2	16
The Muslim Brotherhood	35	4	41	54	44	72	32
The mood of the people	16	16	18	16	18	16	20
All of the above	17	28	5	7	10	2	20

When asked about the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood in politics and support for national reconciliation, respondents express somewhat contradictory views. A slight majority wants the Muslim Brotherhood banned from politics (50% vs. 42% who think there should be an agreed upon formula for inclusion), while almost eight in ten say national reconciliation is an important goal.

With respect to the inclusion of the Brotherhood in Egyptian politics, the poll numbers reflect the public positions taken by the groups. Those who have confidence in April 6th and the National Salvation Front are divided; Freedom and Justice Party and Nour Party supporters want a formula for inclusion; and those with confidence in the Tamarrud are strongly in favor of banning the Muslim Brotherhood. Those with no confidence in any group are also in favor of excluding the Brotherhood from politics (58% vs. 31%).

Yet, 79% of respondents across the political spectrum favor national reconciliation, saying it is an important goal. Those with confidence in the Tamarrud are the least supportive, but are still two-to-one in favor of reconciliation (68% vs. 32%)

When asked which element presents the biggest obstacle to national reconciliation, only those with confidence in Tamarrud exclusively blame the Muslim Brotherhood (72%). Those with confidence in the Freedom and Justice Party blame the military (49%). Pluralities of all other groups blame the Muslim Brotherhood, with about one in five also blaming the military.

Responsibility for Egypt's Current Problems

Do you find the following responsible for the current problems facing Egypt today?

		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
The Mubarak government	At fault	98	98	99	98	98	97	98
	Not at fault	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
The Morsi government	At fault	83	66	87	88	81	97	89
	Not at fault	15	31	12	11	15	2	9
The Adly Mansour government	At fault	34	57	34	20	28	8	36
	Not at fault	60	36	64	74	68	88	57

Of the following, which do you hold most responsible for the current problems facing Egypt?

	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
The Mubarak government	70	81	80	73	65	49	82
The Morsi government	26	11	15	27	30	50	14
The Adly Mansour government	4	8	5	-	5	1	4

Almost universally, respondents say the Mubarak government is at fault for the problems facing Egypt today. The Morsi government gets slightly less blame from most groups; only those with confidence in the Tamarrud blame both Mubarak and Morsi the same. Even two-thirds of FJP supporters say that the Morsi government is at fault for the current situation. Overall, only one-third of respondents say the Adly Mansour government is at fault; among supporters of the Brotherhood, however, a majority blame Mansour for the country's current problems.

When asked which of the three governments is most responsible, respondents across the political spectrum point to Mubarak's government (70% overall), except for those with confidence in the Tamarrud who are split between holding Mubarak and Morsi responsible (49% vs. 50%).

Favorable/Unfavorable

Favorability of each of the following

		Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
The United States	Favorable	4	9	6	4	10	2	1
	Unfavorable	94	91	94	96	90	96	99
The European Union	Favorable	10	12	4	13	11	11	4
	Unfavorable	86	86	93	85	86	86	91
Israel	Favorable	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Unfavorable	98	100	100	100	100	100	95
Iran	Favorable	9	11	21	16	10	8	9
	Unfavorable	84	82	77	80	84	86	86
Saudi Arabia	Favorable	58	25	66	71	67	92	64
	Unfavorable	42	74	34	28	33	7	36
UAE	Favorable	52	17	66	72	64	91	55
	Unfavorable	47	82	34	27	35	9	43
Qatar	Favorable	19	35	17	15	17	3	16
	Unfavorable	79	63	82	84	80	95	80
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	Favorable	27	27	19	28	25	26	27
	Unfavorable	67	67	76	67	67	66	67
Turkey	Favorable	36	62	35	22	28	7	28
	Unfavorable	61	34	64	77	69	91	69

The United States and Israel receive little or no favorable ratings from Egyptian respondents (4% and 0%, respectively). The European Union and Iran do only slightly better; about one in ten overall view them favorably. With respect to Iran, respondents who identify with the various political groups are basically in agreement, except those with confidence in the Nour who give Iran slightly higher favorables (21%).

More than half of Egyptians have a favorable view of Saudi Arabia and UAE, with strong favorables from all groups except the Muslim Brotherhood (25% and 17%, respectively). Qatar is favored by only one in five respondents. Even among supporters of the Freedom and Justice Party only 35% have a favorable view of Qatar, despite the substantial economic and political support Qatar gave the Muslim Brotherhood.

One-third of respondents have a favorable view of Turkey, though among those with confidence in the FJP 62% rate Turkey favorably.

Only about one-quarter of respondents, both overall and among the political groups, have a positive view of the International Monetary Fund.

Thoughts on Emigration

All in all, are you satisfied with your prospects in Egypt or have you thought of emigrating to another country?							
	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
I am satisfied	60	48	67	69	64	70	65
I have thought of emigrating	16	22	12	9	14	12	15
I am unsatisfied but emigration is not a realistic option for me	24	30	21	22	22	18	20

If so, where?							
	Total	FJP	Nour	NSF	April 6	Tamarrud	No Confidence
Another Arab country	65	62	63	53	62	59	78
Europe	19	20	6	18	10	20	16
The United States	6	4	13	24	8	12	3
Latin America	2	5	13	6	5		
Asia	7	10	6		15	8	3

Six in ten respondents say they are satisfied with their prospects in Egypt, while 16% say they have thought of emigrating and 24% are unsatisfied but could not realistically emigrate. These numbers are fairly consistent across the political spectrum, though FJP supporters are the least likely to say they are satisfied with their prospects (48%).

Of those who have considered emigration, two-thirds would move to another Arab country and 19% would choose Europe.

APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

Methodology

The approach used for conducting the poll involved 1,405 face-to-face, in-home personal interviews conducted September 16-28, 2013. A multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for the selection of respondents. The sample obtained was nationally representative and comprised adult males and females, who were 18+ years of age. The interviews were conducted in both urban and rural areas to ensure robust data and representation of a wide cross-section of Egyptians. The centres covered were Cairo, Giza, Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Mansura, Tanta, Shubra Al Kheemah, Asyut, Menia, and Bani Suwayf. Based on a confidence interval of 95%, the margin of error is +/- 2.7 percentage points. This means that all other things being equal, the identical survey repeated will have results within the margin of error 95 times out of 100.

Throughout the analysis, data in the tables may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of “not sure” are not shown. In addition, for the purposes of analysis and data presentation, some responses have been aggregated. For example, responses of “very favorable” and “somewhat favorable” are aggregated into “Favorable,” while responses of “somewhat unfavorable” and “very unfavorable” are aggregated into “Unfavorable.”

Demographics

Live in city	57
Live outside city	43
Illiterate	27
No formal education	12
Primary/Prep	20
Secondary/Incomplete university	6
Tech/Intermed/High	25
University or more	9
Muslim	90
Christian	10
Male	50
Female	50
Under 30	37
30-49	39
50+	24

IRANIAN ATTITUDES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On August 3, 2013, Hassan Rouhani took office as president of Iran. Shortly thereafter, from August 26 to September 22, 2013, we surveyed 1,205 adults across Iran in an effort to better understand the Iranian public's attitude toward their newly elected president—and how the views of those who supported Rouhani differ from those who opposed his election. We also wanted to learn: how Iranians rank their political priorities; their confidence in the Rouhani government's commitment to addressing these priorities; their attitudes toward Iran's foreign policy in the Arab World; and how they view their country's nuclear program.

Our poll found that with Rouhani's win Iranians, especially Rouhani supporters, have expectations that their situation will improve. Overall, our poll found that only 36% of all Iranians say they are better off now than they were five years ago, and 43% say they are worse off. But with Rouhani's victory, 43% now expect that they will be better off during the next four years under a Rouhani administration—with 65% of Rouhani's supporters maintaining this optimistic view of their future prospects.

One-half of Iranians say that they supported Rouhani's victory, with the rest of our respondents saying that they either opposed him or felt that the election didn't matter because nothing will change in their country.

Political priorities

When asked to rank their top political priorities, the issue of employment tops the list (29%). It is important to note that all of the other top tier priorities are political reform issues: advancing democracy (24%); protecting personal and civil rights (23%); increasing rights for women (19%); ending corruption (18%); and political or governmental reform (18%). It is also useful to note that at the very bottom of the list are: improving relations with the United States and the West (5%); continuing the nuclear enrichment program (6%); and resolving the stand-off that exists over Iran's nuclear program so that economic sanctions can be lifted (7%).

These numbers track the findings of our 2011 Sir Bani Yas poll where we found the rank order of political priorities to be: (1) expanding employment opportunities; (2) advancing democracy; (3) protecting personal and civil rights; (4) political or governmental reform; and (5) ending corruption and nepotism.

Of all the Middle East countries in which we have surveyed the public's priorities, Iran remains the unique case where concern with political reform issues consistently trumps most other issues—clear evidence of a deep dissatisfaction with the existing political order.

On all of these issues there is a division of opinion as to whether or not the new government will be committed to addressing them. Almost three-quarters of those who supported Rouhani are confident that he is committed to addressing the various political priority issues covered in the survey, while only a third of those who did not support his election share that confidence.

Foreign policy

When asked what motivates their country's foreign policy, the greatest percentage of respondents (76%) identifies "protecting vulnerable Shia communities" as the most important factor. Next comes "ensuring our nation's security" (63%), followed by "maximizing our regional influence" (59%) and "creating a more stable Middle East" (56%).

But Iranian opinion is divided when asked to identify whether their country's policies in several Arab countries have had a positive or negative impact. For example, slight majorities say that Iran's involvement in Syria and Iraq has been negative, while just one-half of Iranians say that their involvement in Lebanon and Bahrain has been positive (with 45% saying that their country's involvement in both cases has been negative). Only in Yemen and non-Arab Afghanistan do majorities of Iranians find their country's involvement to have had a positive impact.

Nuclear program

Iranians rank their country's nuclear program as one of their lowest priority concerns. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds say that they support the goal of their country having a nuclear weapon either because Iran is "a major country" and should have one (31%) or because "as long as other countries have nuclear weapons, we need them too" (36%). Only 29% apparently agree with their spiritual leader's professed position that "nuclear weapons are always wrong and so no country, including my own, should have them."

It is also important to note that only 36% of Iranians say that sanctions have had an impact on their lives. This, or national pride, may be the reason why a majority of Iranians (96%) agree with the statement that "maintaining the right to advance a nuclear program is worth the price being paid in economic sanctions and international isolation."

Interestingly, those who self-identify as Rouhani supporters are more inclined to support Iran's right to a nuclear weapon (76%) than Rouhani opponents (61%). And Rouhani's backers also hold the more hardline view with respect to negotiations on the nuclear program (61% to 46%). This appears to contradict the notion that Rouhani's supporters might hold more moderate views on the nuclear issue than those who opposed his election.

Conclusion

Iran is a divided country, but not in the way it is understood in the West. For the most part, Iranians agree on the political priorities facing their country. While supporters of the new president have significantly higher expectations that he will address those priorities than do those who opposed his election, all Iranians share the same concerns and will judge the new administration on its ability to create jobs and advance needed political reform.

Iranians are divided on foreign policy with almost one-half of the country seeing their government's role in most foreign adventures having a negative impact. The new president, therefore, will be expected to address these concerns, especially in Syria and Iraq where dissatisfaction appears to be highest.

Finally, a substantial percentage of Iranians support their country's nuclear program, with a sizable majority claiming that they should have the right to possess a nuclear weapon. Possibly out of a strong sense of national pride, a majority does not appear inclined to surrender their nuclear program either to end sanctions or to improve ties with the West, both of which are among their lowest priorities. In negotiations with the international community, the Rouhani government may operate under some restraints. Our poll shows that these will come not only from the spiritual leader, but also from the opinions of the Iranian public.

ANALYSIS

Better Off/Worse Off

Are you better off/worse off than you were 5 years ago?				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/Not Sure
Better off	36	31	40	39
Worse off	43	52	37	29
About the same	18	13	21	27

Do you feel you will be better off/worse off during the next 4 years under a Rouhani administration?				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/Not Sure
Better off	43	65	22	21
Worse off	27	13	37	46
The same	22	15	30	21

A plurality of Iranian respondents (43%) say they are worse off today than they were five years ago, while just over one-third (36%) say they are better off. Looking to the future, Iranians are slightly more optimistic, with 43% saying they expect to be better off during the next four years under a Rouhani administration and 27% saying they feel they will be worse off.

Those who supported Rouhani are more likely to say they are worse off today (52% vs. 37% of non-supporters) and three times more likely to expect to be better off under a Rouhani administration (65% vs. 22% of non-supporters).

Political Priorities

Two top priority concerns you want your government to address this year				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
Expanding employment opportunities	29	27	29	35
Advancing democracy	24	23	26	28
Protecting personal and civil rights	23	22	25	20
Increasing rights for women	19	19	19	19
Ending corruption and nepotism	18	18	17	18
Political or governmental reform	18	18	17	17

2013

Two top priority concerns you want your government to address this year

	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
Improve health care system	14	14	13	13
Improving the education system	12	12	11	16
Improving relations with our Arab neighbors	10	11	9	7
Combating extremism and terrorism	8	9	8	6
Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict	7	8	7	8
Resolving the stand-off that exists for our nuclear program so we can end economic sanctions against my country	7	7	7	6
Continuing our nuclear enrichment program	6	6	6	6
Improving relations with the United States and the West	5	6	5	2

Just as was the case in our 2011 poll, in Iran “reform” issues trump other concerns. In short, Iranians want political change. The top six issues that respondents want their government to address this year are: expanding employment opportunities (29%), advancing democracy (24%), protecting personal and civil rights (23%), increasing rights for women (19%), ending corruption and nepotism (18%), and political or governmental reform (18%).

Improving the health care system (14%) and the education system (12%) are in the next tier of priorities for Iranian respondents. Less important are issues related to foreign policy like relations with Arab neighbors (10%) and the United States and the West (5%), and resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (7%), as well as issues related to Iran’s nuclear program (continuing enrichment: 6% and ending sanctions: 7%) and combating extremism and terrorism (8%).

These priorities are quite consistent across most demographic groups as well as between Rouhani supporters and non-supporters, though men and women have different top priorities. Men are most concerned with expanding employment opportunities (44% vs. 14% among women), while women’s top priority for government is increasing women’s rights (31% vs. 7% among men).

Confidence in the Government’s Commitment to Issues

Extent of confidence in government’s commitment to ...		
Expanding employment opportunities	Confident	51
	Neither	15
	Not confident	32
Political or governmental reform	Confident	49
	Neither	16
	Not confident	30

Extent of confidence in government's commitment to ...		
Improving the health care system	Confident	51
	Neither	14
	Not confident	32
Protecting personal and civil rights	Confident	50
	Neither	12
	Not confident	35
Increasing rights for women	Confident	46
	Neither	15
	Not confident	33
Advancing democracy	Confident	54
	Neither	15
	Not confident	26
Combating extremism and terrorism	Confident	51
	Neither	13
	Not confident	30
Ending corruption and nepotism	Confident	50
	Neither	15
	Not confident	30
Resolving the Israeli Palestinian conflict	Confident	56
	Neither	9
	Not confident	29
Improving the education system	Confident	53
	Neither	14
	Not confident	28
Continuing our nuclear enrichment program	Confident	52
	Neither	13
	Not confident	29
Resolving the stand-off that exists for our nuclear program so we can end economic sanctions against my country	Confident	55
	Neither	11
	Not confident	30
Improving relations with our Arab neighbors	Confident	54
	Neither	11
	Not confident	30
Improving relations with the United States and the West	Confident	51
	Neither	14
	Not confident	31

When Iranians were asked how confident they are that these issues will be addressed, the results for each issue are the same. Overall, about one-half are confident that the government is committed to addressing these issues and one-third

are not. Among Rouhani supporters, three-quarters are confident in the government's commitment; among his opponents, about one-half are not confident that the government is committed to addressing these issues.

Models of Development and Progress

In your opinion, is the Iranian model a good one for other countries in the region to emulate?				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
Yes	49	59	40	34
No	44	33	52	57

Which of the following countries is the model for development and progress that you would most like to see your country emulate?				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
UAE	13	14	12	13
Turkey	18	19	16	24
Egypt	1	1	1	1
China	16	13	19	20
Russia	19	21	18	14
United States	16	17	16	12
Sweden	8	6	10	10
None of the above	7	7	8	5

Respondents are split on whether the Iranian model is a good one for other countries in the region to emulate or not (49% vs. 44%). Rouhani supporters are more likely to say Iran is a good model (59%) than those who do not support the president (40%).

When asked to select one country as a model for development and progress for Iran to emulate, respondents choose Russia (19%), Turkey (18%), China (16%), and the United States (16%) most frequently.

Foreign Policy

My government's actions in the region are primarily . . .					
		Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
			Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
focused on ensuring our nation's security.	Agree	63	81	51	35
	Disagree	31	16	40	57
aimed at creating a more stable Middle East.	Agree	56	66	50	35
	Disagree	36	26	40	59
aimed at protecting vulnerable Shia.	Agree	76	86	68	68
	Disagree	20	11	27	28
aimed at maximizing our regional influence.	Agree	59	56	61	57
	Disagree	32	35	30	35

Iranians appear to believe that their government's foreign policy is primarily motivated by protecting vulnerable Shia (76%) and ensuring their nation's security (63%). More than eight in ten Rouhani supporters agree that these are the primary motivators of the Iranian government (protecting Shia: 86%, ensuring security: 81%), while those who do not support Rouhani are far less likely to agree (protecting Shia: 68%, ensuring security: 51%). Majorities also say that the Iranian government is motivated by maximizing their regional influence (59%) and creating a more stable Middle East (56%).

Positive or negative impact on developments in . . .					
		Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
			Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
Syria	Positive	44	49	41	39
	Negative	54	49	57	60
	No impact	1	1	1	-
Bahrain	Positive	50	54	45	50
	Negative	45	42	49	47
	No impact	3	3	4	2
Lebanon	Positive	50	55	44	50
	Negative	44	41	48	46
	No impact	4	3	5	3
Iraq	Positive	41	47	36	32
	Negative	52	48	55	63
	No impact	3	2	5	2
Afghanistan	Positive	55	56	52	61
	Negative	32	31	32	33
	No impact	9	10	11	4
Yemen	Positive	57	58	56	56
	Negative	32	32	32	34
	No impact	7	7	7	7

Respondents were asked to consider the impact of their government's policies on the developments in a number of countries. With respect to Bahrain and Lebanon, Iranians are largely split on whether the impact of their government's policy is positive or negative (50% vs. 45% and 50% vs. 44%, respectively). Opinion leans toward the impact on Syria and Iraq being negative (44% vs. 54% and 41% vs. 52%, respectively). But respondents are most decided on the positive impact that Iran's government has had on developments in Yemen (57% vs. 32%) and Afghanistan (55% vs. 32%). It is interesting to note that supporters of Rouhani are more positive than his opponents on the impact of past policies of the Iranian government.

What effect have sanctions had on your government's determination to exert regional influence?				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
They have limited its determination	39	42	37	35
They have increased its determination	38	36	39	43
They have had no effect	21	20	23	21

What effect have sanctions had on your government's ability to exert regional influence?				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
They have limited its ability	39	39	39	34
They have increased its ability	39	38	41	39
They have had no effect	18	17	17	24

Iranian respondents are split on the impact that sanctions have had both on their government's determination (39% vs. 38%) and their government's ability (39% vs. 39%) to exert regional influence.

Iran's Nuclear Program

Which of the following statements comes closer to your views?				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
Statement A: My country is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes.	37	37	39	32
Statement B: My country has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.	55	55	52	62

What is your opinion on nuclear weapons?				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
My country should have nuclear weapons because it is a major nation.	31	38	25	27
As long as other countries have nuclear weapons, we need them also.	36	38	36	30
Nuclear weapons are always wrong and so no country, including my own, should have them.	29	20	35	42

Do you agree or disagree that maintaining the right to advance a nuclear program is worth the price being paid in economic sanctions and international isolation?				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
Agree	96	97	95	96
Disagree	4	3	5	4

	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
Strongly agree	52	61	46	42
Somewhat agree	44	36	49	54

A majority of respondents (55%) believe that their country seeks to produce a nuclear weapon, and this view is consistent across all demographic and political groups.

Most Iranians seem to want their country to possess a weapon either because they are a major nation (31%) or because others do (36%). Less than one-third of respondents (29%) say that “nuclear weapons are always wrong and so no country ... should have them.” Rouhani opponents are about twice as likely as Rouhani supporters to oppose the pursuit of nuclear weapons (35% vs. 20%), indicating again that those opposed to Rouhani do not appear to be the hardliners.

There is a strong general consensus that the nuclear program is worth the price in sanctions—with 96% of respondents agreeing that the right to advance their program is worth the price in economic sanctions and international isolation. Among Rouhani supporters, 61% strongly agree with this sentiment, compared to 46% of his opponents who strongly agree.

Impact of Sanctions

What impact have international sanctions had on you and your family?				
	Total	Reaction to Rouhani election		
		Support	Not Support	Doesn't matter/ Not Sure
"We have felt an impact."	36	33	38	40
"We have felt no impact."	42	44	39	40
Neither	18	16	19	17

A plurality (42%) say they and their families have felt no impact from international sanctions, while one-third (36%) say they have felt the impact of sanctions.

2013

APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

Methodology

The approach used for conducting the poll involved 1,205 face to face, in-home personal interviews conducted August 26-September 22, 2013. A multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for the selection of respondents. The sample obtained was nationally representative and comprised adult males and females, who were 15+ years of age. The interviews were conducted in both urban and rural areas, including Tehran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, and Ahwaz, to ensure robust data and representation of a wide cross-section of Iranians. Based on a confidence interval of 95%, the margin of error is +/- 2.9 percentage points. This means that all other things being equal, the identical survey repeated will have results within the margin of error 95 times out of 100.

Throughout the analysis, data in the tables may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of “not sure” are not shown. In addition, for the purposes of analysis and data presentation, some responses have been aggregated. For example, responses of “very positive” and “somewhat positive” are aggregated into “Positive,” while responses of “somewhat negative” and “very negative” are aggregated into “Negative.”

Demographics

Male	51
Female	49
15-34	54
35+	46
Live in city	68
Live outside city	32
Sunni	9
Shia	89
Other religion	2

ISRAEL & PALESTINE:

20 Years After Oslo

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As Israelis and Palestinians look back at the 20 years that have elapsed since their leaders signed the Oslo Accords in Washington, there are areas where their perceptions sharply differ, others in which they find agreement, and a few areas where the attitudes of both communities are somewhat conflicted.

DISAGREEMENT

It is clear that several deep differences exist in how each community assesses a number of key issues: (1) which party benefited most from the Accords; (2) why the Accords didn't succeed; (3) how constructive were the roles played by their respective leaderships; (4) their confidence in each other's commitment to a two-state solution; (5) and the role played by the United States in the process.

1. Who benefited from Oslo:

Sixty-eight percent (68%) of Israelis are convinced that Palestinians were the main beneficiaries of Oslo, while 64% of Israelis say that they were harmed by the Accords. On the other side, 75% of Palestinians maintain that the Israelis were Oslo's big winners, with 49% of Palestinians asserting that their interests were harmed by the Accords.

2. Palestinians didn't do enough:

Eighty-nine percent (89%) of Israelis feel that the Palestinians could have done more to make the Accords work, while a plurality of Palestinians feel that their side did everything that was required of them (45% vs. 37% who say they could have done more).

3. Constructive or destructive roles played by Israeli and Palestinian leaders:

Palestinians give very high marks to the constructive roles played by their leadership: Arafat (90%), Abbas (81%), and Fayyad (66%). They give positive but lower scores to the roles played by Hamas' leadership (in the mid-50% range).

Israelis, on the other hand, give lower grades to the constructive roles played by their leaders: Rabin (69%), Peres (65%), and Sharon (50%). Pluralities of Israelis view some of their other leaders as playing destructive roles: Netanyahu (47%) and Barak (48%).

No Palestinian leader is seen as constructive by Israelis and no Israeli leader is seen as constructive by Palestinians.

4. Confidence in each other's commitment to peace:

Fifty percent (50%) of Palestinians are confident that their society is committed to a two-state solution, but believe that only 26% of Israelis are committed to this goal. On the other hand, 57% of Israelis say they are committed to a two-state solution, but believe that only 28% of Palestinians share this goal.

5. The role of the United States:

A majority of Palestinians see the role of every U.S. president since the Oslo signing as destructive: Clinton (58%), Bush (73%), and Obama (70%). Conversely, majorities or pluralities of Israelis see the role of these U.S. presidents as constructive: Clinton (68%), Bush (54%), and Obama (45%).

AGREEMENT

There are areas where Israelis and Palestinians find agreement. Both parties acknowledge: (6) that they were hopeful when the Accords were signed, but have since lost hope; (7) that Oslo was not a positive development in their relationship; and (8) that in their assessment a two-state solution is not even a feasible solution at this time. They also agree: that (9) Israel and (10) the United States didn't do enough to make Oslo work; that (11) Palestinian and Israeli violence or use of force contributed to reducing their collective confidence in the prospects for peace; and (12) that the failure of Camp David harmed the process.

6. Hopeful at the beginning:

Majorities of both Palestinians (61%) and Israelis (54%) say that they were hopeful when the Accords were signed.

7. Twenty years later, Oslo was not a positive development:

Twenty years later only 18% of Palestinians and 19% of Israelis view Oslo as a positive development in the history of their relationship.

8. A two-state solution is desirable but no longer feasible:

Both Israelis and Palestinians agree that a two-state solution is a desirable outcome—with a plurality of 47% of Palestinians and 74% of Israelis agreeing.

Both sides also maintain that they are confident that their side is interested in “a just and lasting two-state solution— with 50% of Palestinians and 57% of Israelis agreeing. Both sides, however, maintain the belief that the other side is not committed.

But only (34%) of Palestinians and (36%) of Israelis now see a two-state solution as feasible.

9. Israelis could have done more:

Israelis and Palestinians may disagree as to whether Palestinians did enough to make Oslo work, but both sides agree that Israel did not do enough – with 59% of Palestinians and 49% of Israelis concurring.

10. The United States also could have done more:

Both Palestinians (57%) and Israelis (63%) agree that the United States could have done more to make the Accords work.

11. Violence from both sides reduced confidence in peace:

Majorities or strong pluralities of both Israelis and Palestinians agree that their violent actions or use of force contributed to reducing their confidence in the prospect for peace, including: suicide bombings, rocket fire from Gaza, the second Intifada, the election of Hamas, settlement construction, Israel's reconquest of the West Bank, the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, and Baruch Goldstein's massacre of Palestinians in Hebron. All of this indicates a shared understanding of the negative role played by violence or the use of force in sapping their confidence in the prospect of peace.

12. Failure at Camp David harmed the prospects for peace:

Sixty-two percent (62%) of both Palestinians and Israelis said that the impasse at Camp David reduced their confidence in the peace process.

CONFLICTED

There are other areas where the reactions of Israelis and Palestinians are somewhat conflicted or ambivalent. For example, respondents display a mixture of positive and negative attitudes toward: (13) the Arab Peace Initiative; (14) the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza; (15) and the current negotiations initiated by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.

13. Arab Peace Initiative:

Both Palestinians and Israelis are split in their attitudes toward the Arab Peace Initiative. Thirty-eight (38%) of Palestinians say it reduced their confidence in the peace process, while 37% said it strengthened their commitment to the peace process. For Israelis it was 30% to 42%.

14. Withdrawal from Gaza:

The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and removal of Gaza settlements reduced the confidence of 45% of Palestinians, but 38% said this strengthened their commitment to peace. Forty-eight percent (48%)—of Israelis say this development reduced their confidence, while 41% say it strengthened their commitment to the prospect of peace.

15. Current negotiations:

Secretary Kerry's effort doesn't receive a resounding endorsement from the Palestinians. Only a slight plurality of Palestinians (41%) say they are either hopeful it might work or are at least willing to wait and see what the outcome will be. At the same time, 39% of Israelis are hopeful and 40% are willing to wait for the outcome.

And 49% of Palestinians and 55% of Israelis say they are inclined to support an agreement if it is endorsed by their leaders—with only 28% of Palestinians and 19% of Israelis saying that they will reject it even if their leadership say otherwise.

CONCLUSION

From the results of this poll, it is clear that the past 20 years have taken a toll on the confidence both Palestinians and Israelis have in the peace process that began with the 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords, and the trust each side has in the other's commitment to peace. Both sides admit that many of their own actions have contributed to creating this negative environment. This may be one of the most positive signs emerging from the results of this poll.

The Palestinian and Israeli leaders engaged in the current round of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, therefore, face a real challenge. They must produce an agreement that will be accepted by wary publics on both sides, and they must be able to convince their constituents that this peace process will be different.

Unlike our 2012 Sir Bani Yas survey of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion, this year's poll did not explore, in any detail, what the parties will or will not accept, at this point, in a final or interim peace agreement. These questions require future survey work.

But what this year's results do establish is that finding a solution is more difficult not only because physical conditions have made map-drawing more complicated. The ground today is also less fertile than it was the first time around, having been polluted during the past 20 years by the ill-will created and negative behaviors of both sides that sapped confidence and trust of both Palestinians and Israelis.

A Note on “Age”:

In reporting the poll results, we used age as the principal metric with which to compare the responses of Israelis and Palestinians. We did so for two reasons. First, after reviewing all of the data, age was the only demographic characteristic that appeared to make a measurable difference. And second, we thought it would be relevant to compare the views of those older Israelis and Palestinians who were “of age” at the time of the signing of the Accords and had, therefore, direct personal experience of the events of the past two decades with the views of their younger compatriots whose information about Oslo and the years after the signing are based on “received knowledge.”

Using age as the metric, we note that younger Israelis, those under 34 years of age (34% of the sample), consistently demonstrate more hardline views than do older Israelis. By 15 to 20 points, those under 34 years old are more negative about Oslo, about Palestinians, and about the prospects for peace. On the other side, we find that the views of younger Palestinians (51% of the sample) more closely track the attitudes of those who are more than 34 years old. When, however, there are differences, we often find younger Palestinians more positively inclined toward peace.

ANALYSIS

2013

As you recall your feelings in 1993 at the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords, how hopeful were you back then that there would be a resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict?		
	Palestinians (age: 34+)	Israelis (age: 34+)
Hopeful	61	54
Not hopeful	28	37
Do not recall	12	10

A majority of Palestinians (61%) and Israelis (54%) age 34 and over (who were, therefore, at least 14 years old in 1993) recall feeling hopeful that there would be a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords. Just under one-third of Palestinians (28%) and just over one-third of Israelis (37%) in this age group say they were not hopeful in 1993 that the conflict would be resolved. These numbers closely reflect the polling data available from 1993 when, for example, 60% of Palestinians said they thought the Accords were a realistic step leading toward a Palestinian state¹ and 61% of Israelis supported the agreement.²

Given what you have heard about the Oslo Accords signed between Israelis and Palestinians in 1993, how positive a development was that agreement in the search for peace?		
	Palestinians (age: 18–33)	Israelis (age: 18–33)
Positive	65	34
Not positive	26	52
Do not know	9	15

When younger Palestinian and Israeli respondents (those between 18 and 33) are asked about what they have heard about the Oslo Accords, a divide is evident. Almost two-thirds (65%) of younger Palestinians believe that the agreement was a positive development in the search for peace, while just one-third (34%) of younger Israelis agree.

Comparing the reactions of those who lived through Oslo and those who have only heard about it as they have grown up, it is worth noting that while the attitudes of younger Palestinians track older Palestinians, younger and older Israelis hold opposite views (younger: 34% positive vs. 52% not positive; older: 54% hopeful vs. 37% not hopeful). This establishes a pattern that plays out throughout the survey, with Palestinian attitudes consistent across age groups and younger Israelis expressing more hardline views than their elders.

1 Jerusalem Media and Communications Center. (September, 1993). Public Opinion Poll No. 3: On Palestinian Attitudes on PLO-Israel Agreement, September 19-21, 1993. <http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=503>
 2 Poll was conducted by Mina Zemach of the Dahaf Research Institute and its results were published in *Yediot Achronot*. See Leon, Dan. (1995). Israeli public opinion polls on the peace process. *Palestine-Israel Journal*, 2(1). <http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=676>

In the period right after the signing of the agreement between Arafat and Rabin, do you recall taking any action expressing your support for or against the agreement?

	Palestinians (age: 34+)	Israelis (age: 34+)
Participated in a demonstration in support of the Israeli-Palestinian accords	8	5
Wrote an article or a letter in support of the accords	5	1
Spoke publicly in favor of the accord	10	13
Engaged in a joint Israeli/Palestinian effort to show support for peace	5	2
Participated in a demonstration in opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian accords	5	5
Wrote an article or a letter in opposition to the accords	2	2
Spoke publicly in opposition to the accords	6	7
I did not engage in any activity either for or against the accords.	51	68
Not sure	14	5

There are slightly more actions reported by Palestinians in support of the Accords than by Israelis, while the percentages of those reporting actions in opposition to the agreement are about the same. Among those who were at least 14 in 1993, 51% of Palestinian respondents and 68% of Israeli respondents did not engage in any activity either for or against the Accords in the period immediately following the Oslo signing.

Looking back at the last 20 years, did the Israelis benefit from the Oslo Accords, or were they harmed by this agreement?

	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Benefited	75	76	74	24	18	27
Harmed	14	15	12	64	72	60
Not sure	12	9	14	12	10	13

Looking back at the last 20 years, did the Palestinians benefit from the Oslo Accords, or were they harmed by this agreement?

	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Benefited	40	41	38	68	71	66
Harmed	49	51	47	19	17	20
Not sure	11	7	14	14	12	15

Three-quarters of Palestinian respondents feel that Israelis benefited from the Oslo Accords, while just 14% say Israelis were harmed. Just 40% of Palestinians say their own community has benefited from the agreement, while half say they have been harmed (49%). Among Palestinians there is very little difference in opinion between younger and older respondents; this is common throughout the survey.

On the other hand, only one-quarter of Israelis (24%) say they have benefited from Oslo, while 64% say they have been harmed by it. Conversely, 68% of Israeli respondents believe Palestinians were the beneficiaries of the agreement and

just 19% think that community was harmed by it. Among Israelis younger respondents are more likely to see the Oslo Accords as a negative for Israel; this is also seen throughout the survey.

2013

Looking back at the 20 years since the Oslo Accords were signed, did each of the following groups do everything that was required of them to make the Accords work, or could they have done more to make them work?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Israelis	Did everything that was required of them	20	19	20	40	49	36
	Could have done more	59	58	59	49	35	56
	Not sure	22	23	21	11	16	8
Palestinians	Did everything that was required of them	45	43	47	2	2	2
	Could have done more	37	40	33	89	84	91
	Not sure	18	17	20	10	15	7
The United States	Did everything that was required of them	18	23	12	17	16	17
	Could have done more	57	54	59	63	57	66
	Not sure	26	23	30	20	26	17

Respondents were asked to consider if Israelis, Palestinians, and the United States each did everything that was required of them to make the Oslo Accords work or if they could have done more.

Twenty percent of Palestinians think that Israelis did everything required, while twice as many Israelis (40%) say they did everything they could to make the Accords work. But 49% of Israelis acknowledge that they could have done more, an opinion shared by 59% of Palestinians. Interestingly, among older Israeli respondents, 56% say they could have done more to make Oslo work, compared to just 35% of respondents ages 18-33.

With respect to Palestinian efforts to make the Accords work, while 45% of Palestinians say they did everything required of them, just 2% of Israelis agree. On this question, younger Palestinians appear more critical of their own community, with 43% saying they did everything they could but 40% saying they could have done more. Older Israelis are the most emphatic (91%) that Palestinians could have done more to make the agreement work.

Considering the efforts of the United States, Palestinians and Israelis agree that the United States did not do everything required of it to make the Accords work. Just 18% of Palestinians and 17% of Israelis think U.S. efforts met this standard, while 57% of Palestinians and 63% of Israelis think the U.S. efforts could have gone further to make the agreement work.

At this point, how hopeful are you that an Israeli/Palestinian peace is possible?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Hopeful		39	38	40	35	25	39
Not hopeful		57	57	57	64	74	59
Not sure		4	5	3	1	0	2

At this point, among both Palestinians and Israelis, hope is in short supply. Thirty-nine percent (39%) of Palestinian respondents and 35% of Israeli respondents say they are hopeful that an Israeli-Palestinian peace is possible, while 57% of Palestinians and 64% of Israelis are not hopeful. Hopefulness is lowest among younger Israelis, among whom 25% are hopeful and 74% are not.

Given the following events that occurred during the past 20 years, how significant an impact has each of them had on your outlook toward the prospects for peace?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Baruch Goldstein's massacre of Arab worshipers at the Ibrahim Mosque in 1994	Reduced confidence	75	72	78	57	52	59
	Strengthened commitment	11	10	11	18	11	20
The closure of Jerusalem in 1993	Reduced confidence	65	55	75	37	29	41
	Strengthened commitment	11	17	5	13	10	15
Suicide bombers striking inside Israel	Reduced confidence	65	63	68	84	89	82
	Strengthened commitment	15	15	14	11	5	14
The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995	Reduced confidence	59	51	66	56	53	58
	Strengthened commitment	18	25	11	20	12	23
The election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister in 1996	Reduced confidence	66	63	69	50	40	54
	Strengthened commitment	10	12	9	24	24	24
The construction of Har Homa on Jabal Abu Ghneim	Reduced confidence	66	61	71	42	30	48
	Strengthened commitment	6	6	7	16	13	17
The Wye River Agreements in 1998	Reduced confidence	45	41	50	33	31	33
	Strengthened commitment	16	14	18	26	15	31
The impasse at Camp David in 2000	Reduced confidence	62	57	68	62	53	66
	Strengthened commitment	8	8	9	13	9	14
The Second Intifada	Reduced confidence	76	76	76	82	85	80
	Strengthened commitment	17	16	17	12	6	15
Israeli military retaking the West Bank in 2002	Reduced confidence	84	84	84	53	49	54
	Strengthened commitment	7	7	7	26	25	27
The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002	Reduced confidence	38	37	40	33	30	34
	Strengthened commitment	37	39	35	36	29	39
The death of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat	Reduced confidence	81	79	83	30	29	30
	Strengthened commitment	11	12	11	42	42	42
The election of Hamas in 2006	Reduced confidence	66	67	65	75	72	76
	Strengthened commitment	14	13	16	13	10	14
The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the removal of Gaza's settlements	Reduced confidence	45	43	47	48	58	44
	Strengthened commitment	38	41	35	41	32	46
The construction of the West Bank barrier	Reduced confidence	76	75	77	43	45	42
	Strengthened commitment	9	9	9	37	30	40
Rocket fire from Gaza and the Israeli/Gaza war of 2008/9	Reduced confidence	74	74	73	82	86	81
	Strengthened commitment	16	15	16	13	8	14

Given the following events that occurred during the past 20 years, how significant an impact has each of them had on your outlook toward the prospects for peace?

		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
The reelection of Barack Obama as president of the United States in 2012, and his 2013 visits to Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem	Reduced confidence	59	56	62	40	41	39
	Strengthened commitment	20	23	16	33	28	35

We asked respondents to consider a series of events that have occurred in the 20 years since the Oslo Accords were signed and tell us how significant an impact each of them has had on their outlook toward the prospects for peace. For each event, they told us if the event had reduced their confidence in or had strengthened their commitment to peace, or if they did not recall it. For each side, a number of patterns emerge from these responses.

On the Palestinian side, all of the events in question were more likely to reduce their confidence in peace than to strengthen their commitment to peace. Those most likely to reduce Palestinian confidence in the prospects for peace were events that represented an intensification of occupation—for example, the Israeli military re-occupying the West Bank in 2002 (84%), the construction of the West Bank barrier (76%), the massacre of 29 Muslim worshipers by Baruch Goldstein in 1994 (75%), construction of Har Homa on Jabal Abu Ghneim (66%), and the closure of Jerusalem in 1993 (65%). For each of these events, the differential between Palestinian and Israeli responses is significant, with the number of Israelis saying they reduced confidence in the prospects for peace 18 to 33 points lower (e.g., only 43% of Israelis say the construction of the West Bank barrier reduced their confidence in peace).

The death of Arafat also had a very significant impact on Palestinian confidence in the possibilities for peace (81% say it reduced their confidence in peace); this is likely because of his central role as a revered leader and a symbol of Palestinian national aspirations. However, this event was the most positive for Israelis, with 42% saying it strengthened their commitment to peace and just 30% saying it reduced their confidence in the prospects for peace.

Israelis are most likely to see violence and threats to their security as most significant in diminishing their confidence in peace. For example, at least eight in ten respondents say that suicide bombers striking inside Israel (84%), the Second Intifada (82%), and rocket fire from Gaza and the Israeli-Gaza war in 2008-2009 (82%) reduced their confidence in peace. Palestinians also felt these events reduced their confidence in peace, particularly the Second Intifada (76%) and the Israeli-Gaza war (74%).

Events related directly to the peace process itself often have had a similar impact on the views of Palestinians and Israelis. For example, the Camp David impasse in 2000 reduced confidence in peace for 62% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis; the assassination of Rabin was deemed significant by majorities of both sides (Palestinians: 59%; Israelis: 56%). The Wye River Agreements of 1998 reduced Palestinian confidence in peace for 45% of respondents, while only 33% of Israeli respondents agreed; however, this event seems largely forgotten, with 29% of both sides saying they do not recall this event, including 43% of younger Israelis and 36% of younger Palestinians.

The elections of those hostile to the peace process were seen as reducing confidence in peace, though with greater intensity by those on the other side. For example, the election of Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel in 1996 reduced

the confidence of 50% of Israelis and 66% of Palestinians in the prospects for peace, while the election of Hamas in 2006 made 65% of Palestinians and 75% of Israelis feel that peace was less likely.

There were very mixed reactions on both sides to two additional events: the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the removal of Gaza settlements in 2005 and the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, with relatively high numbers of respondents saying these events strengthened their commitment to peace. Among Palestinians 45% say the Gaza evacuation reduced their confidence in peace, while 38% say their commitment to peace was strengthened. On the Israeli side, 48% say the withdrawal reduced confidence and 41% say it strengthened their commitment to peace. Thirty-seven percent (37%) of Palestinians and 36% of Israelis say the Arab Peace Initiative strengthened their commitment to peace, while 38% of Palestinians and 33% of Israelis say it reduced their confidence in the prospects for peace.

Finally, the re-election of Barack Obama as U.S. president in 2012 and his subsequent visits to Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem in 2013 were not particularly positive, with 59% of Palestinians and 40% of Israelis saying they diminished their confidence in peace.

One additional observation here is that a significant portion of respondents, particularly younger Israelis, do not recall some of these events in the 20 years since Oslo. Among these Israelis under age 34, 48% do not recall the closure of Jerusalem in 1993, 43% do not recall Wye, 32% do not recall the construction of Har Homa, 27% do not recall the Camp David impasse of 2000, 25% do not recall the Arab Peace Initiative, and 19% do not recall the Hebron massacre by Baruch Goldstein in 1994. Given their extremely negative view about the prospects for peace today (74% say they are not hopeful about Israeli-Palestinian peace being achieved), their lack of knowledge about some of these important events is troubling.

The role played by the following figures in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since Oslo?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Yitzhak Rabin	Constructive	33	32	34	69	55	75
	Destructive	53	53	53	24	33	20
Shimon Peres	Constructive	16	16	16	65	50	72
	Destructive	72	71	74	25	33	22
Benjamin Netanyahu	Constructive	11	11	12	41	46	38
	Destructive	81	81	81	47	41	49
Ehud Barak	Constructive	11	12	9	34	28	36
	Destructive	80	78	82	48	50	47
Ariel Sharon	Constructive	10	11	9	50	39	54
	Destructive	83	81	85	42	52	37
Ehud Olmert	Constructive	13	13	12	39	25	45
	Destructive	77	76	78	37	41	36
Tzipi Livni	Constructive	17	16	19	40	23	47
	Destructive	66	69	64	30	38	26
Yasser Arafat	Constructive	90	90	90	17	14	18
	Destructive	8	7	8	70	69	70

The role played by the following figures in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since Oslo?

		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Mahmoud Abbas	Constructive	81	81	81	16	10	19
	Destructive	13	12	14	54	52	56
Salam Fayyad	Constructive	66	65	67	16	11	19
	Destructive	21	21	21	43	43	43
Ismail Haniyeh	Constructive	58	55	60	5	3	5
	Destructive	24	27	22	71	67	73
Khaled Meshal	Constructive	53	49	57	4	5	4
	Destructive	29	32	26	69	62	72
King Hussein	Constructive	53	50	57	55	35	64
	Destructive	34	36	32	19	30	13
Bill Clinton	Constructive	31	31	31	68	56	73
	Destructive	58	58	57	16	21	14
George W. Bush	Constructive	14	14	14	54	46	57
	Destructive	73	73	73	21	24	20
Barack Obama	Constructive	15	15	15	45	39	48
	Destructive	70	69	70	34	38	32

Respondents were then asked about the role of Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. leaders in the peace process since Oslo. In general, Palestinians view Israeli leaders with extreme skepticism, with majorities finding all of them destructive to the peace process. Yitzhak Rabin has the highest ratings among Palestinians, and still only one-third see his role as constructive, while 53% say it was destructive. Israelis have an equally dim view of Palestinian leadership, with just 17% saying Arafat was constructive to the peace process and ratings diminishing from there. Large numbers of younger Israelis, in particular, are not familiar with Palestinian leaders and their roles in the peace process, including Fayyad (39%), Abbas (31%), and Meshal (27%).

When considering their own leaders, respondents have far more positive views. Nine in ten Palestinian respondents say Arafat was constructive to the peace process, and 81% say Abbas has been constructive too. Majorities say Fayyad (66%), Haniyeh (58%), and Meshal (53%) have also aided the cause of peace. Majorities of Israelis view Rabin (69%), Peres (65%), and Sharon (50%) as constructive to peace, and pluralities say Livni (40%) and Olmert (39%) have also been constructive. Among Israelis, Netanyahu and Barak, however, are more likely to be seen as destructive to the peace process (47% and 48%, respectively) than as constructive (41% and 34%, respectively). There are significant differences between older and younger Israelis with respect to their views of their own leaders, with younger Israelis less likely to see them as playing constructive roles in the peace process.

Majorities of both Palestinians (53%) and Israelis (55%) view King Hussein as having played a constructive role in the peace process. Among older Israelis, 64% say Hussein was constructive to peace, while only 35% of younger Israelis agree.

In considering American leadership, Israelis rate former President Clinton (68%) most constructive to peace, with diminishing ratings for former President Bush (54%) and President Obama (45%). Palestinians also see U.S. presidents

becoming increasing less constructive, though their ratings start at a significantly lower level (Clinton: 31%, Bush: 14%, and Obama: 15%).

Since Oslo, which of the following has happened to you personally?			
	Palestinians		
	Total	Young	Old
I have a family member or close friend who was killed or wounded by Israeli soldiers or settlers	20	18	22
I was wounded by Israeli soldiers or settlers	6	6	7
I have a family member or close friend who was imprisoned by Israel	23	20	26
I was imprisoned by Israel	7	5	9
I have had land or property confiscated or destroyed by Israeli authorities or settlers	11	12	11

Since Oslo, which of the following has happened to you personally?			
	Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old
I have a family member or close friend who was killed or wounded by Palestinian violence	21	32	16
I have been wounded by Palestinian violence	2	5	1
I have a family member or close friend who was forced to abandon their home	18	25	15
I was forced to abandon my home	2	3	2

About one in five Palestinians and Israelis say they have a family member or close friend who was killed or wounded by the other side in the conflict since Oslo. Younger Israelis are twice as likely as older Israelis to say they have been impacted in this way (32% vs. 16%). In addition, six percent of Palestinians say they have personally been wounded by Israelis soldiers or settlers, while 2% of Israelis say they have been wounded by Palestinian violence.

Among Palestinians, 23% say they have a family member or close friend who has been imprisoned by Israel and 7% say they themselves have been imprisoned in the last 20 years.

We also asked respondents to consider the impact of the conflict since Oslo on the homes and property of Palestinians and Israelis. Eleven percent (11%) of Palestinian respondents have had land or property confiscated or destroyed by Israeli authorities or settlers. Among Israelis, 18% say they have a family member or close friend who was forced to abandon their home and 2% say this has happened to them personally. Again, younger Israelis are far more likely than older Israelis to say they know someone who has had to abandon their home (25% vs. 15%).

In your opinion in evaluating the past two decades, should the Oslo Agreement be seen as a positive or negative development in the history of the Israeli/Palestinian relationship?						
	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Positive	18	14	23	19	12	22
Negative	37	35	40	37	48	32
It made no difference	22	22	22	37	40	31

Fewer than one in five Palestinians (18%) and Israelis (19%) think that the Oslo Agreement should be seen as a positive development in the history of Israeli-Palestinian relations. On both sides, those ages 18 to 33 are less likely than those 34 and over to see Oslo as a positive (Palestinians: 14% vs. 23%, Israelis: 12% vs. 22%). Almost twice as many respondents on both sides view Oslo as a negative development (Palestinians: 37%, Israelis: 37%), and Israelis are equally likely to say that Oslo has made no difference in the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians (37%). About one in five Palestinians say that Oslo has made no difference (22%).

How would each of the following affect your confidence?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
The Palestinians commit to non-violence and take steps to control any violent elements	Make me confident	35	30	41	50	47	51
	Make me less confident	33	31	34	14	15	14
	No effect on my confidence	16	17	14	32	30	35
The Israelis commit to end all new settlement construction	Make me confident	31	33	28	30	26	32
	Make me less confident	36	32	41	33	36	32
	No effect on my confidence	15	13	18	30	30	30
The Palestinians accept Israel as a Jewish State	Make me confident	6	5	7	68	65	69
	Make me less confident	22	20	23	10	10	10
	No effect on my confidence	51	49	53	17	16	20
The Israelis accept negotiations based on the 1967 borders	Make me confident	24	26	22	26	18	29
	Make me less confident	36	32	40	51	57	48
	No effect on my confidence	17	16	18	15	15	17
The US were to present a clear peace plan for two states based on the Clinton Parameters and the Arab Peace Initiative and were to commit to put its full weight and guarantee behind its implementation	Make me confident	24	26	23	37	27	42
	Make me less confident	32	30	34	31	34	30
	No effect on my confidence	21	19	22	20	17	25

For Palestinians, there is little that could make them more confident in the peace process. About one-third of Palestinians would be more confident in peace and another third would be less confident in peace: if Palestinians committed to non-violence and took steps to control violent elements (35% vs. 33%) and if Israelis committed to ending all new settlement construction (31% vs. 36%). The scales tip toward being less confident with respect to Israel accepting negotiations based on the 1967 borders (more/less: 24%/36%) and the United States presenting a clear plan and committing fully to its implementation (24%/32%). Finally, a majority of Palestinians (51%) think that accepting Israel as a Jewish state would have no effect on their confidence in peace.

On the Israeli side, majorities believe that certain Palestinian actions would make them more confident in peace. If Palestinians accepted Israel as a Jewish state (the option that moves the needle the least for Palestinians), 68% of Israelis say they would be more confident in peace. And a Palestinian commitment to nonviolence coupled with steps to control violent elements would make 50% of Israelis more confident. U.S. involvement in the peace process and Israel's ending new settlement construction bring about more divided conclusions, with about a third saying they would be more and a third saying they would be less confident. Israel's accepting the 1967 borders as the basis for negotiations

only makes 26% say they would be more confident, while it would make a majority (51%) feel less confident in the prospects for peace.

In your opinion, how desirable is it to have a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?						
	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Desirable	47	45	48	74	57	81
Undesirable	40	37	44	23	38	16

In your opinion, at this point in time, how feasible is it to achieve a two-state solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict?						
	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Feasible	34	32	35	36	25	41
Unfeasible	54	49	58	62	74	56

Overall, both sides are more likely to see a two-state solution as desirable than undesirable, though Israelis (74% vs. 23%) are far more positive about this than Palestinians (47% vs. 40%). Older Israelis are particularly in favor of this solution (81%), while younger Israelis are less enthusiastic (57%).

Despite this belief in the desirability of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, only about one-third of Palestinians and Israelis feel that such a solution is feasible at this point, while majorities (54% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis) think a two-state solution is not feasible. On the Palestinian side, there is little difference based on age; however, among Israelis, younger respondents are less likely to see two states as a feasible solution at this time (25%) compared to older respondents (41%).

How confident are you that the following group is interested in a just and lasting two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Israeli public	Confident	26	24	28	57	45	62
	Not confident	59	56	62	40	50	35
Palestinian public	Confident	50	46	54	28	21	32
	Not confident	35	35	36	68	75	65

Both Israelis and Palestinians are skeptical that the other side in the conflict is interested in a just and lasting two-state solution. Majorities on both sides say they are confident that their own community is interested in this solution (Israelis: 57%, Palestinians: 50%), while only one-quarter of respondents are confident that the other side is interested in such an outcome (Israelis: 28%, Palestinians: 26%). Younger Israelis are less confident that the Israeli public wants a two-state solution (45%) than older Israelis (62%).

How confident are you that each of the following groups is interested in a just and lasting two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?							
		Palestinians			Israelis		
		Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
Government of Benjamin Netanyahu	Confident	19	19	18	32	27	35
	Not confident	65	60	70	63	66	61
Government of Mahmoud Abbas	Confident	48	46	51	14	13	14
	Not confident	36	33	40	80	77	81
Obama Administration	Confident	20	20	19	45	36	48
	Not confident	65	59	72	49	54	47

This lack of confidence in the other side is even more pronounced when considering the commitments of the Israeli and Palestinian governments. More than six in ten respondents on both sides are not confident that the Netanyahu government is committed to a just and lasting two-state solution (Palestinians: 65%, Israelis: 63%). One-third of Israelis (32%) are confident in their government’s commitment; only 19% of Palestinians agree.

And while almost half of Palestinians (48%) are confident that the government of Mahmoud Abbas is committed to a two-state solution, 80% of Israeli respondents say they are not confident that the Abbas government is committed to this outcome.

There is also little confidence in the commitment of the U.S. government. Israelis are twice as likely as Palestinians to be confident in the Obama administration’s commitment to a just and lasting two-state solution, with 45% of Israelis and just 20% of Palestinians expressing this. Younger Israelis, however, are less likely than older Israelis to feel confident in the U.S. government’s commitment to a two-state solution (36% vs. 48%).

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has re-launched Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. How hopeful are you that these negotiations will produce an agreement that will lead to an Israeli-Palestinian peace?

	Palestinians			Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old	Total	Young	Old
I am hopeful	11	9	13	39	26	45
I am not hopeful	40	40	39	16	24	12
I am willing to wait and see what the outcome will be	31	29	32	40	42	39

There is very little hope among Palestinians that the talks recently re-launched by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will produce an agreement leading to a resolution of the conflict. Just 11% of Palestinian respondents say they are hopeful, while 40% say they are not hopeful and 31% say they will wait and see. On the Israeli side, 39% are hopeful that these new talks will give rise to an agreement that will lead to an Israeli-Palestinian peace; 16% say they are not hopeful and 40% want to wait and see.

If an agreement is reached and is endorsed by President Abbas, would you be inclined to support this agreement?

	Palestinians		
	Total	Young	Old
I would support a peace agreement if it was endorsed by President Abbas	49	55	43
I would not support a peace agreement even if it was endorsed by President Abbas	28	28	28

If an agreement is reached and is endorsed by Prime Minister Netanyahu, would you be inclined to support this agreement?

	Israelis		
	Total	Young	Old
I would support a peace agreement if it was endorsed by PM Netanyahu	55	39	63
I would not support a peace agreement even if it was endorsed by PM Netanyahu	19	33	13

Among both Palestinians and Israelis, about half (Palestinians: 49%, Israelis: 55%) say they would support a peace agreement if it was endorsed by their leader, Palestinian President Abbas or Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. On the Palestinian side, younger respondents are more likely to say they would support such an agreement than older respondents (55% vs. 43%). But among Israelis, the reverse is true, with 39% of younger respondents and 63% of older respondents saying they would support a peace agreement if it was endorsed by Netanyahu.

APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

2013

Methodology

The approach used for conducting the poll involved face-to-face, in-home personal interviews of 1,000 Israeli adults and 1,000 Palestinian adults during the month of August 2013. A multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for selection of respondents. The sample obtained was nationally representative and comprised adult males and females, who were 18+ years of age. Based on a confidence interval of 95%, the margin of error for 1,000 is +/- [3.2] percentage points. This means that all other things being equal, the identical survey repeated will have results within the margin of error 95 times out of 100.

Throughout the analysis, data in the tables may not add up to 100% because of rounding and/or because responses of “not sure” are not shown. In addition, for the purposes of analysis and data presentation, some responses have been aggregated. For example, responses of “very constructive” and “somewhat constructive” are aggregated into “Constructive,” while responses of “somewhat destructive” and “very destructive” are aggregated into “Destructive.”

Demographics

Israelis

Born in Israel	81
Emigrated to Israel before 1993	16
Emigrated to Israel after 1992	3
Male	50
Female	50
Secular	61
Traditional	18
Religious	12
Orthodox	8
Other	1
18-33	34
34+	66

Palestinians

City	73
Village	18
Refugee camp	10
Male	49
Female	51
Secular	4
Pious	58
Traditionalist	37
18-33	51
34+	49

2014

Today's Middle East: Pressures & Challenges



TODAY'S MIDDLE EAST:

Pressures & Challenges

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From September 4 to October 3, 2014, Zogby Research Services conducted face-to-face polling in eight Middle East countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Turkey). A total of 7,567 adults were surveyed on their attitudes toward: the still unfolding developments of the Arab Spring; the role played by the Muslim Brotherhood; the conflict in Syria; the future of Iraq; the regional role played by Iran; the impact of other countries on the region; and concern with the growth of sectarianism. We also asked Iranians for their opinions on their own government's foreign and domestic policies. Because ZRS had surveyed regional views on similar issues in 2011 and 2012, and had conducted an internal poll of Iranians in 2013, we have a body of data with which we can compare attitudes over the past four years.

2014

I. Arab Spring

1. Since 2011 across the Arab World **there has been a souring of attitudes about the “Arab Spring.”** In the five Arab countries surveyed in both 2011 and 2014, the percentage of those who say the region is better off has declined, while **the percentage of those who say the region is worse off has increased.** The most significant negative assessments of the Arab Spring's impact on the region come from Jordanians and Egyptians. Only in the UAE do a majority of respondents give a positive assessment of developments in the region and their country since the Arab Spring began in 2011—largely owing, in all probability, to the general state of well-being among citizens and residents in the Emirates.
2. When asked to assess whether countries impacted by the Arab Spring are better off or worse off than they were five years ago, attitudes are mixed. **Tunisia is rated as a significant success story in three of the seven countries surveyed.** Yemen scores well in Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (but note that half of this survey took place before Houthi rebels overran Sanaa, unsettling the arrangement that had been in place in Yemen for the past few years). **Egypt is viewed as much better off only in the UAE,** which has invested heavily in the success of the newly elected government there.
3. When asked to project prospects for success in the next five years, once again Tunisia leads the way, with four of the seven countries surveyed expressing confidence that Tunisia will be much better off. Prospects for success in Egypt are rated high in three of the surveyed countries—with those in Saudi Arabia and the UAE expressing the greatest optimism in Egypt's future. **Syria and Libya are not given much chance for progress in the next five years.**

II. The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood

1. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are the only countries where a majority of respondents give the Muslim Brotherhood positive ratings for their roles in Egypt and Tunisia. Attitudes in Jordan are positive, though less so. **Only Arabs in the UAE give the Muslim Brotherhood's role strong negatives in both instances.**
2. It is interesting to note that **Egyptian attitudes toward the Muslim Brotherhood are divided,** with positive and negative attitudes nearly even. This continues the trend we have observed in Egypt since the 2013 crackdown on

the group.

3. **In no country other than Turkey do respondents see the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in their country as positive.**

III. Syria

1. When asked what outcome they most favor for Syria, **half or more of the respondents in five of the eight countries support victory for the internationally recognized Syrian opposition.** The only outliers are the Lebanese and Iranians (where majorities favor the regime of Bashar al Assad) and **Turkey (where a strong plurality favors victory for Jabhat al Nusra, followed by the Islamic Front).**
2. Pluralities or majorities in **four of the seven countries surveyed say the worst outcome for Syria would be Assad's remaining in power,** followed closely by the fear that Syria would fragment into sect- or ethnic-based entities. In all countries except Iran and Lebanon, concern for these two outcomes far outweighs concern that Syria might fall under the control of extremists.
3. **There is little hope for a negotiated solution to the Syrian conflict. Only respondents in Saudi Arabia express any confidence in a negotiated solution.**
4. When asked to assess the impact of a number of foreign powers on the situation in Syria, **respondents give the United States the poorest scores.** It is rated negatively in every country covered in the poll. The United States garners its lowest negative rating from Iran, where one-half of respondents say the United States has no impact on Syria. (Note that this poll was conducted after the United States began bombing ISIS targets in Iraq, but largely before the bombing of ISIS targets in Syria.) **The next poorest rating is received by Iran.** It earns positive, though declining, scores only from the Lebanese. Next in line is Qatar which receives negative scores from respondents in four countries.
5. Turkey receives mixed ratings, scoring strong positives in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, and only registering negative scores in Egypt and Iran. Saudi Arabia's impact on Syria is viewed positively by Egypt and the UAE, and negatively in all the other countries surveyed.
6. Majorities in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq say that **the influx of Syrian refugees has had a negative impact** on their country's security. A majority of Turks say the refugees have had no impact on security. The Jordanians and Turks appear to have the strongest feelings as to whether these refugees have had a negative impact on the economies of their countries. Lebanese have mixed views on this subject, while nearly equal numbers of Iraqis say the impact of the Syrian refugees on their national economy has been negative or has had no impact at all.
7. **There is near universal concern with the threat posed by ISIS,** with Turkey, Iran, and Iraq expressing the greatest fears. Egyptians and Arabs in the UAE agree that ISIS poses a threat to the region, but are divided as to whether the group is a threat to their countries. Conversely, Jordanians and Lebanese see ISIS as less of a threat to the region as a whole, but are more concerned by the danger it poses to their own countries. Saudis appear to be the least concerned by the threat from ISIS to the region or to their country.
8. **Only majorities in Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq support the involvement of Western nations in efforts to combat ISIS.** Iranians are divided, while majorities in all other countries are opposed.

IV. The Future of Iraq

1. With the exception of Iran and Lebanon, either a strong majority or a plurality of respondents in all other countries say that **the best outcome for Iraq is a strong centralized Iraqi government.** This option is also the one preferred by most Iraqis, regardless of sect. Pluralities in Lebanon and Iran prefer a loose federation of entities in Iraq.
2. Only the Lebanese and those in Saudi Arabia favor independence for the Kurds. Strong majorities everywhere else are opposed.
3. There is **very little confidence in any country surveyed other than Iran that Iraq will be better off in the next**

five years.

V. How Others See Iran and Its Policies

1. **Iran is seen as playing a mostly negative role by respondents in most countries.** The strongest negative ratings come from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. Iran also receives mostly negative ratings from Iraqis. Even in Lebanon, where Iran has continually been given higher positive ratings than any other Arab country, Iran's role receives significantly lower scores in the current survey than it did in 2012.
2. Only majorities in Lebanon and Iraq say that their countries have good relations with Iran and affirm that they want relations to improve. In every other country covered in the survey, almost two-thirds or more of all respondents say that their countries have poor relations with Iran. Most express little desire to see relations improve with Iran.
3. **Majorities in every country, except Iraq, say that they believe that Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.** Iraqis, who in 2012 overwhelmingly believed that Iran intended to produce a nuclear weapon, are now divided on the question. In 2012, Lebanon was the only country believing that Iran's program was peaceful. They no longer believe that to be true. At the same time, with the exception of Lebanon and Iraq, the percentage of respondents who believe that Iran's intent is peaceful has increased, by as much as 20 points in most countries.
4. Almost two-thirds or more in five of the seven countries surveyed do not believe that Iran's President Hassan Rouhani has led Iran to play a more positive role in the region. Those in Saudi Arabia are more divided, though a plurality still gives a negative assessment to his role. Two-thirds of Lebanese believe Rouhani has moved the country in a more positive direction.
5. **In none of the countries surveyed do respondents hold any hope that the negotiations between the United States and Iran will succeed.** In five of the seven surveyed, almost two-thirds feel the talks will fail.

VI. How Iranians View Their Country and Its Policies

1. There has been little change in Iranian attitudes about developments in their country. Only about one-third feel the situation today is better than it was five years ago, with slightly more than that retaining some hope for positive change in the future.
2. Despite the absence of significant accomplishments in his domestic or foreign policy agendas, **President Hassan Rouhani appears to retain the support of one-half of the electorate.** When we polled Iranians one year ago, confidence in the new president's commitment to address a series of pressing concerns was slightly above 50%. Today, when respondents were asked to rate Rouhani's job performance, we find his positive numbers remain just over 50%, reflecting the fact that Iranians remain divided in their attitudes toward the president. The only area where Rouhani receives a slightly higher score is in the perception that he has improved ties with the Arab World (56%-42%). The two areas where he receives his lowest ratings are in advancing women's rights and expanding employment opportunities.
3. One year ago, the Iranian public appeared to be only mildly supportive of their government's foreign policy engagements. Today, however, they appear to have fallen in line, especially embracing the government's involvements in Syria and Iraq. **Almost nine in 10 support the regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria.**
4. While a majority of respondents in almost every other country covered in this survey favors a strong central government in Iraq (the option supported by Iraqis), Iranians do not. Instead, they favor a loose federation or an Iraq divided into three parts. Interestingly, Iranians are the only respondents who hold out some hope that the situation in Iraq might improve in the next five years.
5. Only Iranians give Russia a positive rating for its involvement in Syria and Middle East.

6. In the past year, the **Iranian public's support for their country's right to possess nuclear weapons has increased** from 68% to 87%, while the percentage of those opposed has dropped from 29% in 2013 to only 14% in 2014. But while support for nuclear weapons has increased, there has been a significant decrease in the percentage of Iranians who agree that advancing their country's nuclear program is worth the price they pay because of sanctions.

VII. Impact of Other Countries on the Peace and Stability of the Arab World

1. Across the board, the **United States, followed by Russia, China, and Iran, receive the poorest scores** with overwhelming majorities believing that all these countries have a negative impact on the region. Russia receives its only positive score from Iranians. China's only positive rating comes from Egyptians. Iran is viewed favorably only by Lebanese.
2. **The United States**, which had seen its numbers spike upward in 2012 (in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon), **suffered a precipitous decline in the perception of its role in 2014. Iran has also suffered a decline in several countries**, most notably in Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq.
3. **Turkey fares better than most others.** Interestingly, Turks themselves rate their own country's impact in the Middle East as 28 points more negative in 2014.
4. Saudi Arabia's impact is seen as positive by Egyptians and Arabs in the Emirates, but its role is seen as negative in every other country. And Qatar is seen as playing only a somewhat positive role by those in Saudi Arabia and the Lebanese.

VIII. Concern with Christians and Other Non-Muslim Minorities. And Concern with the Rise of Sectarian Division

1. **In five of the eight countries, majorities say that they are concerned with the situation of Christians and other non-Muslim minorities in the Arab World**—with the greatest concern coming from all segments of the Lebanese and Egyptians.
2. **In every country other than the UAE, two-thirds or more of all respondents are concerned with the growth of sectarian divisions in the Arab World.** Arabs in the UAE are divided on this question. However, when compared with results from a similar poll conducted in 2012 in all countries, **there is a noticeable decline in the percentage of respondents who express concern with the growth of sectarian divisions in the region.** This is most notable in the UAE and Turkey, and surprisingly in Lebanon and Iraq—where the decline has been significant. **Majorities in six of the eight countries surveyed feel that the conflict in Syria has contributed to an increase in sectarian tensions and radicalization** in their country.
3. Even with this decline in concern, **there remains a deep divide in attitudes expressed by Sunni and Shia Muslims in all countries** (Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey). Most notable differences occur in response to questions regarding: Iran's and Saudi Arabia's roles in Syria (Shia Muslims seeing Iran playing a positive role, with Sunni Muslims seeing Saudi as having a more positive impact); and the best and worst outcomes for Syria (Shia expressing support for the Assad regime, while Sunni Muslims support the Syrian opposition).
4. **There are, however, significant areas where the views of Sunni and Shia converge.** Both groups agree that the fragmentation of Syria into sect or ethnic regions would be a bad outcome for the country. And both agree that the conflict in Syria has fueled a dangerous increase in sectarianism in the region.

N.B. *In all tables, please note that percentages in the columns may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included. Also note that the survey's samples in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates include both citizens and residents. See the demographics table on page 35 for more details.*

ARAB SPRING

A. Impact on the Arab World and My Country

Table 1. In your view, is the Arab World “better off” or “worse off” following the Arab Spring or is it too early to tell?*

	Lebanon		Jordan		Egypt		KSA		UAE		Iraq	Turkey
	2011	2014	2011	2014	2011	2014	2011	2014	2011	2014	2014	2014
Better off	39	34	31	14	39	30	40	39	65	53	16	13
Worse off	24	34	14	43	12	43	9	38	15	29	32	38
Too early	29	30	40	40	45	22	48	9	4	14	47	46

*In 2011, the question was worded: “In your view, is the Arab world better off or worse off following the uprisings that occurred in Tunisia and Egypt and have since spread elsewhere in the region?”

In all five Arab countries surveyed in both 2011 and 2014 about the impact of the Arab Spring on the Arab World, the percentage of those who say the region is better off has declined, while the percentage of those who say the region is worse off has increased. Arabs in the Emirates remain the most positive, with a majority (53%) saying the Arab World is better off following the Arab Spring, while 29% say it is worse off. In Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, opinion on the impact of the Arab Spring on the region are evenly split between those who say it is better off and those who say it is worse off (34%-34% and 39%-38%, respectively).

However, respondents in Jordan and Egypt have the most significant negative assessment of the regional situation, with 43% in each saying the Arab World is worse off; 14% and 30%, respectively, feel the region is better off. Those surveyed in Iraq and Turkey also lean toward a negative view of the Arab Spring, with two to three times as many respondents saying the Arab World is worse off than better off (Iraq: 16% better vs. 32% worse; Turkey: 13% better vs. 38% worse).

In several countries surveyed, sizable percentages of respondents are reserving judgment saying it is still too early to tell (Iraq: 47%, Turkey: 46%, Jordan: 40%).

Table 2. As a result of the Arab uprisings that began in Tunisia and Egypt, the situation in my country has gotten

	Lebanon		Jordan		Egypt		KSA		UAE		Iraq	Turkey
	2011	2014	2011	2014	2011	2014	2011	2014	2011	2014	2014	2014
Better	28	31	18	31	47	30	47	30	46	59	25	26
Worse	28	34	25	15	16	29	4	19	13	23	41	22
It has had no impact	28	31	58	47	35	29	46	45	20	12	28	40

When asked about how their own country has been impacted post-Tunisia and Egypt, the responses are mixed. Again, Arabs in the Emirates are the most positive, with a majority (59%) saying the situation in their country is better, up from 46% who felt positively in 2011. Jordanians are also more positive today than they were in 2011 (31% say “better” in current poll vs. 18% in 2011), though 47% say the Arab uprisings have not had an impact on their country. On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the percentages of those who say the situation in their country has gotten better dropped precipitously (from 47% in 2011 to 30% in 2014 in both countries). In Lebanon, attitudes remain ambivalent, with almost equal thirds saying “better,” “worse,” and “no impact.” Only one-quarter of respondents in Iraq (25%) and Turkey (26%) feel the Arab Spring has made the situation in their countries better, though Iraqis are more likely than Turks to feel it has made things worse (41% vs. 22%).

B. Assessments of Arab Spring Countries

Table 3. Is each of the following countries “better off” or “worse off” than it was before the Arab Spring, or is it “too early to tell”?

		Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
Egypt	Better off	29	25	42	38	60	19	23
	Worse off	36	35	37	44	28	37	50
	Too early to tell	31	36	18	15	9	37	23
Tunisia	Better off	31	27	38	82	82	23	46
	Worse off	38	42	35	6	11	47	22
	Too early to tell	28	27	25	8	4	24	19
Libya	Better off	32	26	5	14	12	18	27
	Worse off	37	37	82	73	81	40	36
	Too early to tell	28	33	11	9	4	36	29
Yemen	Better off	33	47	9	39	39	48	28
	Worse off	38	25	50	28	27	26	47
	Too early to tell	26	22	35	27	29	19	19

Once again, when asked if individual countries are better or worse off than before the Arab Spring, respondents’ attitudes are ambivalent. Only Tunisia is seen as a significant success story in three of the seven countries surveyed (Saudi Arabia: 82%, UAE: 82%, Turkey: 46%). Opinion is split in Egypt (38% better off vs. 35% worse off), and leans negatively in Lebanon (31% vs. 38%), Jordan (27% vs. 42%), and Iraq (23% vs. 47%).

Interestingly, Yemen is considered better off by almost half of the respondents in Jordan (47%) and Iraq (48%) and by pluralities in Saudi Arabia (39%) and UAE (39%). (It should be noted that more than half of this survey took place before Houthi rebels overran Sanaa, unsettling the arrangement that had been in place for the past few years.) Lebanese respondents are split on Yemen since the Arab Spring, with 33% saying the country is better off and 38% saying it is worse off. Those in Turkey and Egypt, however, have a decidedly more negative assessment, with about half in both countries saying Yemen is worse off (47% and 50%, respectively).

Egypt is viewed as much better off only in the UAE (60%), which has invested heavily in the success of the new government of President Sisi. Egyptians themselves hold a more tempered view, with 42% saying they are better off and 38% saying they are worse off. Pluralities in the other countries surveyed feel that Egypt is worse off (Turkey: 50%, Saudi Arabia: 44%, Iraq: 37%, Lebanon: 36%, Jordan: 35%).

Libya is consistently seen as worse off than before the Arab Spring, with the strongest negative opinions in Egypt (82%), UAE (81%), and Saudi Arabia (73%), and by at least a plurality in all other countries surveyed (Iraq: 40%, Lebanon: 37%, Jordan 37%, Turkey: 36%).

C. Projections for Success in the Next Five Years

Table 4. In your opinion, will each of the following countries be “better off” or “worse off” in five years?

		Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
Egypt	Better off	37	17	47	69	66	10	24
	Worse off	31	36	35	16	25	34	49
	About the same	28	43	14	13	7	52	24
Tunisia	Better off	30	30	58	79	80	29	54
	Worse off	38	30	15	7	12	26	29
	About the same	27	35	24	10	4	38	11
Libya	Better off	28	21	21	20	25	19	38
	Worse off	44	42	57	65	63	39	35
	About the same	25	31	20	12	8	36	22
Syria	Better off	28	14	19	4	4	12	16
	Worse off	46	50	62	74	79	47	64
	About the same	23	32	17	17	13	36	16
Yemen	Better off	33	34	30	34	41	37	23
	Worse off	28	29	28	27	18	29	51
	About the same	35	31	38	29	35	28	17

Here again, Tunisia leads the way, with majorities of respondents in four of the seven countries surveyed saying that Tunisia will be better off in five years. Respondents in the UAE (80%) and Saudi Arabia (79%) are the most optimistic about Tunisia’s future, followed by Egypt (58%) and Turkey (54%). There is considerably more ambivalence in Lebanon (30% better off vs. 38% worse off), Jordan (30% vs. 30%), and Iraq (29% vs. 26%).

Prospects for success in Egypt are rated high in three of the surveyed countries, with respondents in Saudi Arabia (69%) and UAE (66%) expressing the greatest optimism. Almost half of Egyptians also have hope in a better future (47%), while one-third are more pessimistic (35%). The Lebanese lean toward optimism (37% vs. 31%), but less than one-quarter of respondents in Turkey (24%), Jordan (17%), and Iraq (10%) are confident in improvement in Egypt in the next five years.

Attitudes toward Yemen’s future are generally ambivalent, with opinion split in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Arabs in the Emirates are more hopeful (41% say better off), while a majority of respondents in Turkey (51%) say Yemen will be worse off in five years.

Respondents in the seven countries surveyed give Syria and Libya little chance for progress in the next five years. About half of those in Lebanon (46%), Iraq (47%), and Jordan (50%) think Syria will be worse off in five years, with even greater pessimism expressed by those in Egypt (62%), Turkey (64%), Saudi Arabia (74%), and the UAE (79%). With respect to Libya, majorities in Saudi Arabia (65%), the UAE (63%), and Egypt (57%) think it will be worse off, with concurrence from pluralities in Lebanon (44%), Jordan (42%), and Iraq (39%). Only in Turkey is opinion on Libya’s future more evenly divided (38% vs. 35%).

THE ROLE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

2014

Table 5. Has the role of the Muslim Brotherhood been positive or negative in each of the following countries?

		Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
Egypt	Positive	24	42	43	53	22	32	51
	Negative	51	34	44	27	68	39	33
	No impact	21	22	11	12	2	26	10
Tunisia	Positive	39	37	48	55	25	31	55
	Negative	38	31	31	29	68	21	28
	No impact	19	19	17	7	3	31	11
Your country	Positive	15	30		20	18	29	53
	Negative	45	36		8	38	28	32
	No impact	36	24		71	37	28	10

Only in Saudi Arabia and Turkey do majorities feel that the Muslim Brotherhood has played a positive role in Egypt and Tunisia. A majority of respondents in Turkey (53%) also feel that the Brotherhood has been positive in their country. Only one in five respondents in Saudi Arabia thinks the Brotherhood’s role in the Kingdom has been positive; 71% say it has had no impact there.

Attitudes in Jordan also lean positive with respect to the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in Egypt (42% vs. 34% negative) and Tunisia (37% vs. 31% negative). These same respondents lean in the other direction with respect to its role in their own country (30% vs. 36%).

Two-thirds of respondents in the UAE say the Brotherhood’s role in both countries has been negative (68% in both). While Arabs in the Emirates do not feel it has played a positive role in their own country (only 18% say so), they are evenly split between labelling the Brotherhood a negative force (39%) or its playing no role at all (37%) in the UAE.

In the three other countries surveyed, opinion is mixed. In Lebanon, respondents are evenly split about its role in Tunisia (39% vs. 38%), but are twice as likely to say it has been a negative force in Egypt as to say it is a positive one (24% positive vs. 51% negative). In Iraq, respondents lean toward a negative assessment with respect to Egypt (32% vs. 39%), a positive assessment with respect to Tunisia (31% vs. 21%), and an even split with respect to their own country (29% vs. 28%).

Interestingly, in Egypt, attitudes are divided with positive and negative attitudes toward the Muslim Brotherhood’s role there nearly even (43% vs. 44%). This reflects an increase in support for the role of the Brotherhood continuing the trend we have observed in Egypt since the 2013 crackdown on the group. With respect to Tunisia, Egyptians lean toward assessing the Muslim Brotherhood’s role as positive (48%) rather than negative (31%).

SYRIA

A. Desired Outcome

Table 6. In the conflict raging in Syria, whom do you most favor?

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Government of Bashar al Assad	68	32	18	16	14	44	13	87
The Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Free Syrian Army	25	56	62	49	50	53	23	11
The Islamic Front	5	7	12	8	12	2	24	1
Jabhat Al Nusra	2	4	5	13	11	1	40	1
The Islamic State	1	1	2	2	13	0	0	0
No one	0	0	1	12	0	0	0	0

When asked what outcome they most favored for Syria, about half of the respondents in five of the eight countries say they support victory for the internationally recognized Syrian opposition. This support is strongest in Egypt (62%), followed by Jordan (56%), Iraq (53%), the UAE (50%), and Saudi Arabia (49%). The runner-up in all of these countries is Bashar al Assad, though only in Iraq (44%) and Jordan (32%) does this support rise to significant levels.

The outliers are Iran and Lebanon, where majorities favor the regime of Bashar al Assad (87% and 68%, respectively), and Turkey, where a strong plurality favors victory for Jabhat al Nusra (40%) followed by the Islamic Front (24%).

Table 6a. Sunni vs. Shia Opinion: Choosing sides in the Syrian conflict

	Lebanon		KSA		UAE		Iraq		Turkey		Iran	
	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia
Government of Bashar al Assad	38	84	2	58	12	31	20	58	4	74	50	91
The Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Free Syrian Army	38	14	58	24	51	42	75	40	25	6	30	8
The Islamic Front	14	1	9	4	11	14	2	1	26	9	10	<1
Jabhat Al Nusra	8	-	15	7	10	13	2	1	45	11	10	<1
The Islamic State	3	-	3	<1	15	-	<1	<1	-	-	-	-

With regard to the Syrian conflict, there are notable differences of opinion between Sunni and Shia Muslims in each of the six countries surveyed that have significant communities of both sects. Strong majorities of Shia respondents in Iran (91%), Lebanon (84%), Turkey (74%), Iraq (58%), and Saudi Arabia (58%) side with Assad, while his support among Sunni respondents is minimal (e.g., Saudi Arabia: 2%, Turkey: 4%), except in Lebanon (38%) and Iran (50%). On the other hand, majorities of Sunni respondents in Iraq (75%), Saudi Arabia (58%), and the UAE (51%) favor the Syrian opposition.

B. Worst Outcome

Table 7. In your opinion, which of the following would be the worst outcome in Syria?

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Bashar al Assad remains in control of Syria	16	46	42	58	56	33	27	5
The Islamic State or like-minded groups win control of Syria	39	18	24	8	10	26	13	47
Syria fragments into sect- and ethnic-based regions	43	32	30	33	33	37	46	44
Not sure	3	4	4	1	1	3	14	3

When asked what would constitute the worst possible outcome in Syria, majorities in Saudi Arabia (58%) and the UAE (56%) say Assad remaining in power, as do pluralities in Jordan (46%) and Egypt (42%). About a third of respondents in these four countries say the worst outcome would be the fragmentation of Syria into sect- or ethnic-based entities. This fear of a divided Syria is considered the worst outcome by pluralities in Turkey (46%) and Iraq (37%), though an Assad regime is also feared by 33% in Iraq and 27% in Turkey. Among respondents in Lebanon and Iran opinion is basically split on the worst outcome between “extremist groups win control of Syria” (39% and 47%, respectively) and fragmentation by sect or ethnicity (43% and 44%, respectively).

Table 7a. Sunni vs. Shia Opinion: The worst outcome in Syria

	Lebanon		KSA		UAE		Iraq		Turkey		Iran	
	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia
Bashar al Assad remains in control of Syria	31	6	68	26	58	36	57	20	30	8	20	3
The Islamic State or like-minded groups win control of Syria	25	47	7	14	10	14	17	32	10	30	28	49
Syria fragments into sect- and ethnic-based regions	42	45	24	59	31	49	24	44	45	53	46	44

Again, we find a difference of opinion between Sunni and Shia on the worst possible outcome in Syria. Sunni respondents are far more likely than Shia respondents to choose Assad’s remaining in power as the worst outcome; this option was selected by majorities of Sunnis in Saudi Arabia (68%), the UAE (58%), and Iraq (57%).

Of note, however, is the real concern both Sunni and Shia have regarding the possible fragmentation of Syria. We find similar levels of unease in both communities in Iran (46% of Sunni vs. 44% of Shia), Lebanon (42% Sunni vs. 45% Shia), and Turkey (45% Sunni vs. 53% Shia). It is the top choice for Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia (59%), the UAE (49%), and Iraq (44%), and the second choice (behind Assad’s continuing rule) for Sunni respondents in these three countries (24%, 31%, 24%, respectively).

C. A Negotiated Solution

Table 8. Is it still possible to find a negotiated solution to the conflict in Syria which includes the participation of both the Assad government and the Syrian Opposition?

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Yes	25	25	42	61	35	23	31	42
No	44	51	54	32	62	64	63	53
Not sure	31	23	4	7	3	13	6	5

Only in Saudi Arabia is there much hope that a negotiated solution is still possible for Syria, with 61% saying it is possible. Majorities in almost all of the other countries surveyed say it is not possible, with the strongest negative views in Iraq (64%), Turkey (63%), and the UAE (62%). A plurality of respondents in Lebanon (44%) also think a negotiated solution is not possible; about one-third of Lebanese respondents express uncertainty on this question.

D. Impact of Other Countries on Syria

Table 9. In your opinion, what impact has each of the following had on Syria?

		Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
United States	Positive	7	10	15	9	9	8	6	6
	Negative	57	52	63	83	79	51	78	44
	No impact	30	30	21	7	11	31	15	47
	Not sure	6	8	1	2	2	9	1	3
Russia	Positive	32	18	30	25	45	18	16	55
	Negative	28	42	40	59	38	39	59	15
	No impact	36	35	28	11	15	39	23	25
	Not sure	5	5	2	5	3	4	2	5
Turkey	Positive	37	51	31	59	39	64	68	27
	Negative	30	29	42	19	37	12	18	41
	No impact	27	17	26	19	20	23	10	28
	Not sure	6	2	1	3	4	1	4	4
Iran	Positive	44	19	11	15	12	35	18	77
	Negative	27	56	58	73	55	42	50	4
	No impact	23	15	30	5	27	14	25	15
	Not sure	6	10	1	7	6	9	7	4
KSA	Positive	22	20	50	70	56	31	21	12
	Negative	36	35	21	12	12	34	27	62
	No impact	36	42	28	14	29	33	47	22
	Not sure	5	3	1	3	3	2	5	4
Qatar	Positive	20	32	21	38	29	29	31	12
	Negative	49	34	48	29	42	24	18	59
	No impact	26	31	30	28	24	28	49	26
	Not sure	6	3	2	5	5	19	3	3

Respondents in the eight countries surveyed were asked about the impact of the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar on Syria. While the assessments are generally negative, each country surveyed identifies one country as having a predominantly positive impact on Syria. For Lebanon, it is Iran; for Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq,

it is Turkey; for Egypt and the UAE, it is Saudi Arabia; and for Iran, it is Russia. (Turkey's respondents only find their own country to be having a positive impact on Syria.)

Overall, the United States receives the poorest scores, being rated negatively in every country covered in the poll. Interestingly, Iran is the only country surveyed where the United States does not earn a negative rating from a majority of respondents (44%), though almost one-half of Iranians (48%) say the United States has no impact on Syria. (Note: This poll was conducted largely before the bombing of ISIS targets in Syria.) The strongest negative opinions of the U.S. impact on Syria come from respondents in Saudi Arabia (83%), the UAE (79%), and Turkey (78%).

Iran is viewed as having a negative impact on Syria by every other country surveyed except Lebanon. Majorities in Saudi Arabia (73%), Egypt (58%), Jordan (56%), the UAE (55%), and Turkey (50%), as well as a plurality in Iraq (42%), rate it negatively. Among the Lebanese, 44% say Iran's impact in Syria has been positive, while 27% say it has been negative.

Opinion about Russia's impact on Syria is, as noted above, seen as positive by a majority of respondents in Iran (55%), as well as by a plurality of Arabs in the UAE (45%) and the Lebanese (32%). The other five countries view Russia negatively in this regard, with the strongest negative ratings coming from respondents in Turkey (59%) and Saudi Arabia (59%).

Turkey's impact on Syria receives mixed reviews from the survey's respondents. Majorities in Iraq (64%), Saudi Arabia (59%), and Jordan (51%) say Turkey has been a positive force in Syria, with a plurality in Lebanon agreeing (37%). Opinion in the UAE is split (39% positive vs. 37% negative). However, among those in Egypt and Iran more than four in 10 view Turkey's impact as negative.

Saudi Arabia's impact on Syria is viewed positively by majorities in Egypt (50%) and the UAE (56%), and largely negatively by those in Iran (62%). In the other four countries, opinion leans negative; however, sizable percentages of respondents in Turkey (47%), Jordan (42%), Lebanon (36%), and Iraq (33%) think the Kingdom has had no impact on Syria.

Finally, in terms of its impact on Syria, Qatar fares poorly among respondents in Lebanon (49% negative), Egypt (48%), the UAE (42%), and particularly Iran (59%), while registering only mildly positive scores in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Turkey, and an even split in Jordan.

Table 9a. Sunni vs. Shia Opinion: The roles of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Syria

		Lebanon		KSA		UAE		Iraq		Turkey		Iran	
		Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia
The role of Iran in Syria	Positive	26	58	1	58	2	83	16	46	10	76	51	81
	Negative	47	15	86	34	62	8	63	30	55	14	23	2
	No impact	22	23	6	5	30	7	8	18	28	8	24	14
The role of Saudi Arabia in Syria	Positive	39	12	79	43	60	33	36	28	22	17	21	11
	Negative	22	42	<1	47	10	21	26	38	28	21	64	62
	No impact	35	38	16	9	27	42	35	32	47	47	12	23

When asked about the roles of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Syria, Sunni respondents are far more likely to say Iran's role is negative and Saudi Arabia's role is positive, while Shia respondents are more likely to say the opposite—that Iran plays a positive role while Saudi Arabia plays a negative one.

Shia respondents in the UAE (83%), Iran (81%), Turkey (76%), Saudi Arabia (58%), Lebanon (58%), and Iraq (46%) predominantly view Iran's role in Syria as positive, while their Sunni counterparts in five of the six countries (all except Iran itself) see Iran as a negative factor in Syria.

With respect to Saudi Arabia's role, at least pluralities of Sunni respondents in the UAE (60%), Lebanon (39%), and Iraq (36%), as well as in Saudi Arabia itself (79%), see the Kingdom's role as positive, while Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia (47%), Lebanon (42%), and Iraq (38%) are most likely to say the Kingdom's role in Syria is negative. There are two exceptions to this pattern: Half of Turks, both Sunni and Shia, think Saudi Arabia does not have a significant impact on Syria. And more than six in 10 Iranians, regardless of sect, say the Kingdom's role in Syria is negative.

E. Impact of Syrian Conflict on Your Country

Table 10. Has the conflict in Syria contributed to an increase of sectarian tensions and radicalization in your country?

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Yes	70	69	44	79	60	63	34	51
No	21	26	53	14	38	34	59	45

Majorities in six of the eight countries surveyed feel that the conflict in Syria has contributed to an increase in sectarian tensions and radicalization in their country. This opinion is most pervasive in Saudi Arabia (79%), Lebanon (70%), and Jordan (69%), followed by Iraq (63%), the UAE (60%), and Iran (51%). Among respondents in Turkey and Egypt, however, majorities say that the Syrian conflict has not furthered sectarian division in their countries (59% and 53%, respectively).

Table 10a. Sunni vs. Shia Opinion: Syrian conflict increasing sectarian tensions in your country

	Lebanon		KSA		UAE		Iraq		Turkey		Iran	
	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia
Yes	71	71	80	77	60	60	72	58	33	40	56	50
No	20	19	14	14	38	40	26	38	61	47	39	46

On this question, in five of the six countries, we find agreement among Sunni and Shia respondents that the conflict in Syria has fueled a dangerous increase in sectarianism in their country. In the one exception, Turkey, respondents are more likely to say that the Syrian conflict has not contributed to an increase in sectarian tensions in their country, and this tendency is shared by both Sunni and Shia respondents.

F. Impact of Refugees

Table 11. What is the impact of Syrian refugees coming into your country ...

		Lebanon	Jordan	Iraq	Turkey
on your country's security?	Positive	14	16	6	4
	Negative	55	61	50	39
	No impact	24	18	37	56
on your country's economy?	Positive	32	16	10	9
	Negative	36	58	40	56
	No impact	26	22	43	30

Majorities in Lebanon (55%), Jordan (61%), and Iraq (50%), say that the influx of Syrian refugees has had a negative impact on their countries' security, while a majority of Turks (56%) say the refugees have had no impact on security in Turkey.

Respondents in Jordan and Turkey hold the strongest opinions about the impact of these refugees on their national economies, with 58% of Jordanians and 56% of Turks saying the impact has been negative. Lebanese have mixed views on this subject (32% positive vs. 36% negative), while among Iraqis only 10% say the impact of the Syrian refugees on their economy has been positive and nearly equal numbers say it has been negative (40%) or has not been an impact at all (43%).

G. Impact of ISIS

Table 12. Does ISIS (now calling itself “Islamic State”) pose a threat...

		Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
to the region?	Very grave threat	39	33	42	36	55	48	55	53
	Somewhat of a threat	45	27	22	48	28	16	35	32
	No threat at all	9	35	24	13	14	16	7	12
to your country?	Very grave threat	50	42	32	23	41	53	47	63
	Somewhat of a threat	34	16	30	54	40	14	29	23
	No threat at all	11	35	26	20	16	23	16	11

Respondents in all eight countries surveyed were asked if ISIS, also known as Islamic State, poses a threat to the region and to their own countries. Respondents in Iran, Turkey, and Iraq say that ISIS poses the greatest threat to both. Majorities in Iran say ISIS is a very grave threat to the region (53%) and their country (63%). Respondents in Turkey and Iraq also assess ISIS as a very grave threat to the region (55% and 48%, respectively) and their countries (47% and 53%, respectively).

Egyptians and Arabs in the UAE feel that ISIS poses a grave threat to the region (42% and 55%, respectively), but are divided as to whether the group is a threat to their countries. In Egypt, 32% say ISIS is a grave threat to their country, while 30% feel it is only somewhat of a threat. In the UAE, 41% label ISIS a grave threat to their country, and 40% say it is somewhat of a threat.

Conversely, Jordanians and Lebanese see ISIS as less of a threat to the region as a whole, but are more concerned by the danger it poses to their own countries. In Jordan, ISIS is considered by 33% to be a grave threat to the region and by 42% to be a grave threat to their country. In Lebanon, ISIS is identified as a grave threat to the region by 39% and to their country by 50%.

Those in Saudi Arabia appear to be the least concerned by the threat from ISIS to the region or their country, with about half of the respondents saying ISIS is somewhat of a threat to the region (48%) and their country (54%), while only 36% say it poses a grave threat to the region and 23% a grave threat to the Kingdom.

Table 13. Do you support direct Western-led military intervention to combat ISIS?

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Yes	40	29	59	26	40	51	84	47
No	51	63	34	65	58	43	8	44

Turkey stands out for its support of direct Western-led military intervention to combat ISIS, with 84% of respondents saying they support such an effort. Majorities in Egypt (59%) and Iraq (51%) agree, while Iranians are split on this question (47% vs. 44%). On the other hand, Western military intervention is opposed by majorities in Lebanon (51%), the UAE (58%), Jordan (63%), and Saudi Arabia (65%).

THE FUTURE OF IRAQ

A. Desired Outcome

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Partition into three separate countries	20	16	7	9	3	18	8	31
A loose federation of regions	40	37	9	32	34	29	21	41
A strongly centralized country	34	45	81	57	59	49	69	24
Not sure	6	2	2	2	4	5	2	4

With the exception of those in Iran and Lebanon, respondents are most likely to say that the best outcome for Iraq is a strong centralized Iraqi government. The strongest support for a centralized government comes from Egypt (81%), Turkey (69%), the UAE (59%), and Saudi Arabia (57%). This option is also the one most preferred by Iraqis (49%). Pluralities in Lebanon (40%) and Iran (41%) prefer a loose federation of regions as the best future for the Iraqi state. Partition into three separate countries is the least preferred option in all countries surveyed, except Iran (31%).

B. An Independent Kurdistan?

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Support	56	30	12	53	22	30	13	46
Oppose	44	70	88	47	79	70	87	55

Note: Support is an aggregation of the responses “very supportive” and “somewhat supportive.” Oppose is an aggregation of the responses “somewhat opposed” and “very opposed.”

When asked how supportive they are of an independent state of Kurdistan in Iraq, only in Lebanon (56%) and Saudi Arabia (53%) do a majority of respondents favor independence for the Kurds. Strong majorities everywhere else are opposed, with the most intense opposition from Egyptians (88%), Turks (87%), and Arabs in the UAE (79%).

C. Iraq’s Future

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Better off	31	25	17	19	29	20	18	44
Worse off	35	46	36	46	33	48	37	31
About the same	29	28	41	26	31	27	40	20
Not sure	5	1	7	9	7	5	5	4

Fewer than one-third of respondents in all the countries surveyed, except Iran, are optimistic that Iraq will be better off in five years; among Iranians, a plurality (44%) hold this view. Pessimism is highest in Iraq itself (48% say “worse off”), Saudi Arabia (46%), and Jordan (46%).

HOW OTHERS SEE IRAN AND ITS POLICIES

A. Iran's Role in Other Countries: 2012–2014

Table 17. Does Iran play a positive or negative role in each of these Arab countries?

		Lebanon		Jordan		Egypt		KSA		UAE		Turkey		Iraq	
		2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014
Syria	Positive	72	44	13	20	12	11	9	17	24	13	9	16	54	35
	Negative	19	28	80	55	67	56	81	68	69	55	67	52	33	43
Lebanon	Positive	85	74	47	37	21	13	13	13	27	15	13	10	67	45
	Negative	14	21	48	58	51	43	80	72	61	57	53	47	25	38
Iraq	Positive	75	41	19	13	18	7	14	9	20	12	12	9	64	44
	Negative	19	34	64	69	62	61	74	76	67	61	62	56	30	47
Bahrain	Positive	70	33	12	14	20	9	18	12	18	10	16	7	56	34
	Negative	22	27	71	60	52	35	68	71	68	43	58	52	31	42
Yemen*	Positive	67	24	11	13	3	9	12	14	16	7	8	5	62	32
	Negative	17	25	80	58	57	36	70	45	71	44	61	51	29	45

* in 2012, "Arab Gulf region"

Respondents were asked if Iran plays a positive or negative role in five Arab countries; this question was also asked of respondents in a survey conducted in September-October 2012. Overall, **Iran is seen as playing a mostly negative role by most respondents in most countries.**

The strongest negative ratings come from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. At most one in five of these respondents says Iran plays a positive role in any of the countries, with one exception (37% of Jordanians say Iran plays a positive role in Lebanon). Negative ratings for Iran average 66% in Saudi Arabia, 60% from Jordanians, 52% from Arabs in the UAE, 51% from Turks, and 46% from Egyptians.

The responses of Iraqis are mixed, with more than 40% of respondents assessing Iran's role as negative in each of the five countries except in the case of Lebanon where 45% of Iraqis say Iran plays a positive role and 38% say negative.

Note that the plurality of Iraqis who now say Iran plays a negative role in Iraq represents a significant shift since 2012.

Lebanese respondents are the most positive about Iran's role, particularly in Lebanon itself (74% positive vs. 21% negative) and in Syria (44% vs. 28%), with more mixed assessments about Iran's role in Iraq (41% vs. 34%), Bahrain (33% vs. 27%), and Yemen (24% vs. 25%).

In comparison to the 2012 responses, Iran's positive ratings have decreased in this current survey, most noticeably in the assessments of Iraqi and Lebanese respondents. In 2012, a majority of Iraqis said Iran played a positive role in each of the five countries, while the 2014 numbers are 20 to 30 points lower. Though the assessment of Lebanese respondents regarding Iran's role in their own country only dropped by 11 points (from 85% positive to 74%), their ratings dropped by 30 to 40 points with respect to Iran's role elsewhere (e.g., in Iraq from 75% positive to 41%).

Table 18. During the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s behavior in the region has moved in a more positive direction.

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
Agree	68	21	33	39	27	32	24
Disagree	29	75	65	47	65	64	70

Note: Agree is an aggregation of the responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree.” Disagree is an aggregation of the responses “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree.”

In five of the seven countries surveyed, more than six in 10 respondents do not feel that President Hassan Rouhani has led Iran to play a more positive role in the region. This sentiment is strongest in Jordan (75%) and Turkey (70%), and is shared by majorities in Egypt, the UAE, and Iraq. Respondents in Saudi Arabia are more divided on this issue, with a plurality (47%) saying Iran has not moved in a more positive direction under Rouhani, while 39% say its behavior has changed for the better. Among Lebanese respondents, however, two-thirds (68%) believe that Rouhani has moved his country in a more positive direction.

B. Relations with Iran

Table 19. Are relations between your country and Iran positive or negative?

	Lebanon		Jordan		Egypt		KSA		UAE		Turkey		Iraq	
	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014
Positive	97	75	11	24	23	27	0	7	39	20	0	32	92	56
Negative	2	19	83	71	74	72	97	90	57	66	95	61	7	41

Note: Positive is an aggregation of the responses “very positive” and “somewhat positive.” Negative is an aggregation of the responses “somewhat negative” and “very negative.”

Table 20. Should your country have friendlier relations with Iran?

	Lebanon		Jordan		Egypt		KSA		UAE		Turkey		Iraq	
	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014
Agree	82	75	26	31	40	35	50	33	41	35	21	37	66	55
Disagree	17	21	67	68	59	63	44	49	55	53	74	57	32	41

Note: Agree is an aggregation of the responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree.” Disagree is an aggregation of the responses “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree.”

Only in Lebanon and Iraq do majorities say that their countries have good relations with Iran (75% and 56% positive, respectively) and affirm that they want relations to improve (75% and 55% agree, respectively). In every other country covered in the survey, at least six in 10 respondents (and often far more) say that their countries have poor relations with Iran, with the highest negative responses from Saudi Arabia (90%), Egypt (72%), and Jordan (71%). Majorities in most of these countries do not want to have friendlier relations with Iran, with only about one-third of respondents expressing that they do desire improved relations.

In comparison to 2012, there has been a decrease in the percentages of respondents who want friendlier relations in five of the seven countries surveyed, including Saudi Arabia (from 50% to 33%) and Iraq (from 66% to 55%), as well as Lebanon (by 7 points), UAE (by 6), and Egypt (by 5). There has been an uptick in the desire for better relations with Iran in Turkey (from 21% to 37%) and in Jordan (from 26% to 31%).

C. Iran's Nuclear Program

Table 21. Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?

	Lebanon		Jordan		Egypt		KSA		UAE		Turkey		Iraq	
	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014
Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes.	80	33	11	39	15	26	4	23	17	41	8	30	12	13
Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons.	18	59	87	58	85	69	95	71	78	53	87	62	85	45

Majorities in every country, except Iraq (45%), say that they believe that Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons. This belief is strongest among respondents in Saudi Arabia (71%), Egypt (69%), and Turkey (62%). In every country except Lebanon, however, the percentage of respondents who hold this opinion has dropped by 15-40 points. The decline is most precipitous in Iraq (from 85% in 2012 to 45% in the current survey), followed by Jordan (29 point decline), UAE (-25), Turkey (-25), and Saudi Arabia (-24). Iraqis, who in 2012 overwhelmingly believed that Iran intended to produce a nuclear weapon (85%), are now divided on the question, with 42% of respondents saying they are “not sure.”

At the same time, with the exception of Lebanon and Iraq, the percentages of respondents who believe that Iran's intent is peaceful have increased, dramatically in some countries. For example, in Jordan this view is now held by 39% of respondents, compared to just 11% who held it in 2012. Similar jumps are seen in the UAE (from 17% in 2012 to 41% in 2014) and in Turkey (from 8% in 2012 to 30% in 2014).

Also of note: **In 2012, Lebanon alone believed that Iran's program was peaceful (80%); the current survey finds that this is no longer the case.** The percentage of Lebanese now holding this view dropped 47 points to 33%, while the percentage of Lebanese respondents who now believe Iran wants to build nuclear weapons has more than tripled (from 18% to 59%). This appears to reflect the general sobering of Lebanese attitudes toward Iran, which are also seen in the decline in the positive assessment that they give to Iran's regional role. (See Table 30, p. 29).

Table 22. How confident are you that the negotiations between the United States and Iran will succeed in removing the potential threat caused by Iran's nuclear program?

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
Confident	32	28	45	36	38	20	28
Not confident	64	65	53	61	59	75	68

Note: Confident is an aggregation of the responses “very confident” and “somewhat confident.” Not confident is an aggregation of the responses “not very confident” and “not at all confident.”

A majority in every country surveyed is not confident that the negotiations between the United States and Iran will succeed in removing the potential threat caused by Iran's nuclear program. This lack of confidence is strongest in Iraq (75%), Turkey (68%), Jordan (65%), and Lebanon (64%).

HOW IRANIANS VIEW THEIR COUNTRY AND ITS POLICIES

A. Satisfaction and Optimism

Table 23. Are you better off/worse off than you were 5 years ago?		
	2013	2014
Better off	36	34
Worse off	43	36
About the same	18	30

In 2013 and again in the current survey, Iranian respondents were asked to assess their current situation compared to five years ago, a measure of satisfaction. We find little change in Iranian attitudes. Only about one-third (34%) feel the situation today is better than it was five years ago, and an equal number say they are worse off (36%), while 30% say there has been no change.

Table 24. Do you feel you will be better off/worse off during the next 3 years under a Rouhani administration?		
	2013	2014
Better off	43	41
Worse off	27	23
About the same	22	30

Note: In 2013, the question was asked regarding “the next 4 years under a Rouhani administration.”

When asked to consider if they will be better or worse off during the next few years under a Rouhani administration, a measure of optimism, Iranian respondents appear to retain slightly more hope for positive change in the future than satisfaction with their current situation. Forty-one percent (41%) say they feel they will be better off in the next three years compared to 23% who say worse off and 30% who say they will be about the same. Again, these numbers are quite similar to those reported in 2013.

B. Assessing the Rouhani Administration

Table 25. How do you rate the job performance of Rouhani with respect to each of the following issues?		
	Excellent/Good	Fair/Poor
Overall	54	44
Expanding employment opportunities	49	48
Advancing democracy	52	47
Increasing rights of women	48	50
Ending corruption and nepotism	53	45
Political and governmental reform	51	48
Improving Iran’s standing in the world	51	48
Improving relations with the U.S. and the West	50	48
Improving relations with Arab neighbors	56	42
Protecting personal/civil rights	50	49

In 2013, when we polled Iranians, confidence in the new president's commitment to address a series of pressing concerns was slightly above 50%. In the current survey, we find that Iranians are still divided in the confidence they have in the president. When we asked Iranian respondents to rate Rouhani's job performance on the same series of concerns, we find that a similar percentage, just above 50%, consider Rouhani to be doing an "excellent" or "good" job. His performance is assessed most positively with respect to improving relations with Iran's Arab neighbors (56% say excellent or poor) and his overall performance (54%), while he receives his lowest ratings for increasing the rights of women (48%) and expanding employment opportunities (49%).

C. Iran's Foreign Policy Impact

Table 26. Has your country had a positive or negative impact on developments in each of the following countries?

		2013	2014
Syria	Positive	44	72
	Negative	54	8
	No impact	1	16
Bahrain	Positive	50	54
	Negative	45	7
	No impact	3	34
Lebanon	Positive	50	68
	Negative	44	9
	No impact	4	15
Iraq	Positive	41	77
	Negative	52	5
	No impact	3	11
Yemen	Positive	57	52
	Negative	32	5
	No impact	7	35

Last year and again in the current survey, we asked Iranians to assess their country's impact on developments in five Arab countries. In 2013, the results were decidedly mixed, with respondents split on Iran's impact in Bahrain and Lebanon, leaning negative on their country's policies toward Syria and Iraq, and leaning positive with respect to Iran's impact on Yemen. In the current poll, however, Iranians are far more supportive of their government's foreign policy engagements, with more than two-thirds of respondents saying Iran is having a positive impact on Iraq (77%), Syria (72%), and Lebanon (68%). Majorities also say Iran is having a positive influence on developments in Bahrain (54%) and Yemen (52%). Significantly, those who do not rate their country's impact as positive in the current poll are far more likely to say Iran is having "no impact" than to say the impact is negative.

Table 27. How important is it for your country to be involved in each of the following countries?

	Important	Not important
Syria	90	7
Bahrain	82	16
Lebanon	88	10
Iraq	87	10
Yemen	62	36

Note: Important is an aggregation of the responses "very important" and "somewhat important." Not important is an aggregation of the responses "somewhat unimportant" and "not important at all."

Iranian respondents consider their country’s involvement in each of these countries to be important. They are most emphatic with respect to Iran’s involvement in Syria (90%), Lebanon (88%), and Iraq (87%), as well as Bahrain (82%). Involvement in Yemen is considered important by 62% of respondents and not important by 36%.

D. Iran’s Nuclear Program

Table 28. What is your opinion on nuclear weapons?

	2013	2014
My country should have nuclear weapons because it is a major nation.	31	49
As long as other countries have nuclear weapons, we need them also.	36	38
Nuclear weapons are always wrong and so no country, including my own, should have them.	29	14

In 2013 and again in 2014, we asked Iranians for their opinions on nuclear weapons. Overall, in the past year, the Iranian public’s support for their country’s right to possess nuclear weapons has increased from 67% to 87%, while the percentage of those opposed dropped from 29% in 2013 to only 14% in 2014. Almost half of the respondents (49%) say Iran “should have nuclear weapons because it is a major nation.”

Table 29. Do you agree or disagree that maintaining our right to a nuclear program is worth the price being paid in economic sanctions and international isolation?

	2013	2014
Agree	96	64
Disagree	4	36

Note: Agree is an aggregation of the responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree.” Disagree is an aggregation of the responses “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree.”

In 2013, Iranians were nearly unanimous (96%) in saying that maintaining their right to a nuclear program was worth the price being paid in economic sanctions and international isolation. In the current survey, we see a significant decline in this sentiment, though a majority of Iranians is still in agreement (64%) that their nuclear program is worth the price in sanctions.

IMPACT OF OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE ARAB WORLD

2014

Table 30. Contributes to Peace and Stability in the Region

		Lebanon			Jordan			Egypt			KSA			UAE			Turkey		Iraq		Iran
		2011	2012	2014	2011	2012	2014	2011	2012	2014	2011	2012	2014	2011	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2014
U.S.	Agree	16	34	13	5	83	14	10	50	19	24	74	9	8	81	9	15	7	40	28	4
	Disagree	84	64	84	95	13	82	89	49	81	71	24	88	87	17	89	84	90	56	65	94
Iran	Agree	57	81	64	22	23	14	32	25	11	4	15	23	12	23	16	15	17	63	42	98
	Disagree	42	16	33	72	70	85	68	75	88	95	83	74	80	71	80	84	78	34	57	0
Turkey	Agree	85	52	60	58	74	30	65	87	32	76	73	86	61	64	74	96	69	49	49	49
	Disagree	15	46	36	35	19	66	35	12	66	21	23	10	28	34	19	1	29	48	47	48
KSA	Agree	61	35	10	57	87	33	82	94	68	99	84	76	66	66	81	72	39	55	31	15
	Disagree	39	63	43	42	11	65	17	5	31	1	14	18	25	30	14	26	52	43	61	82
Russia	Agree		16	36		31	10		18	39		25	24		39	33	15	15	22	20	77
	Disagree		82	59		68	86		80	60		72	74		59	65	84	82	76	77	21
Qatar	Agree			49		47			25			52			42		42		38	27	
	Disagree			48		52			74			44			53		54		58	70	
China	Agree			24		8			55			15			19		29		22	38	
	Disagree			70		88			44			74			77		64		75	60	

Note: Agree is an aggregation of “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree.” Disagree is an aggregation of “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree.” The 2011 survey asked about the United States, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. In 2012, we added Russia; and for the current survey, we added Qatar and China.

In 2011, 2012, and again in the current survey, we asked respondents if several countries contribute to peace and stability in the Arab World. Overall, in the most recent results we find that the United States, followed by Russia, China, and Iran, receive the poorest scores with overwhelming majorities believing that all of these countries have a negative impact on the region. There are just three exceptions: Three-quarters of Iranian respondents (77%) agree that Russia contributes to peace and stability in the Middle East; a majority of Egyptians (55%) view China’s contribution positively; and about two-thirds of Lebanese respondents (64%) view Iran’s role in the region favorably.

At least eight in 10 respondents in seven of the eight countries surveyed feel that the United States does not contribute to the region’s peace and stability. (Among Iraqis, 65% view the United States’ role negatively.) These 2014 figures reflect a precipitous decline in the perception of the U.S. role in the region, after a significant spike upward in 2012. The drop is most noticeable among those in Saudi Arabia (from 74% in 2012 to 9% in 2014) and in the UAE (from 81% to 9%), Jordanians (from 83% to 14%), and Egyptians (50% to 19%).

Comparing the 2012 survey to this one, Iran’s positive marks also suffered a decline in several countries, most notably in Lebanon (81% to 64%), Iraq (63% to 42%), and Egypt (25% to 11%). When reviewing the results by sect, we find that the decline amongst the Lebanese was relatively evenly distributed between Sunni (from 73% in 2012 to 52% in 2014) and Shia (from 91% to 76%). In Iraq, however, we see a precipitous decline in Shia numbers, from 88% in 2012 to 54% in the current survey, while Sunni agreement that Iran contributes to the regional peace and stability actually rose from 10% in 2012 to 20% in 2014.

Turkey fared better than most others, with majorities in Saudi Arabia (86%), the UAE (74%), and Lebanon (60%) agreeing that Turkey contributes to the region's peace and stability. Attitudes are split amongst Iranians (49% vs. 48%) and Iraqis (49% vs. 47%). Comparing Turkey's positive ratings in 2012 to those received in this survey, we find that it suffered a serious decline among Egyptians (from 87% to 32%) and Jordanians (from 74% to 30%). Interestingly, Turks themselves rated their own country's impact 27 points lower in 2014 (from 96% to 69%).

Saudi Arabia's contribution to the region's peace and stability is seen positively by Egyptians (68%) and Arabs in the Emirates (81%), but its role is seen negatively in every other country, particularly by Iranians (15%) and the Lebanese (10%). The positive impact of the Kingdom declined significantly from 2012 to 2014 in Jordan (87% to 33%), Turkey (72% to 39%), and Iraq (55% to 31%), but rose significantly among Arabs in the UAE (66% to 81%).

In the current survey, Qatar is seen as playing a somewhat positive role by those in Saudi Arabia (52% vs. 44%), but it received mixed ratings in Lebanon (49% vs. 48%) and Jordan (47% vs. 52%) and lower scores in every other country, with the least positive scores from Egypt (25%) and Iran (27%).

CONCERN WITH CHRISTIANS AND OTHER NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES, AND CONCERN WITH THE RISE OF SECTARIAN DIVISION

A. Christians and Other Non-Muslim Minorities

Table 31. How concerned are you with the situation of Christians and other non-Muslim minorities in the Middle East?

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Concerned	81	35	76	53	54	33	53	24
Not concerned	19	65	24	47	46	67	47	76

Note: Concerned is an aggregation of the responses “very concerned” and “somewhat concerned.” Not concerned is an aggregation of the responses “somewhat unconcerned” and “not concerned at all.”

In five of the eight countries, majorities say that they are concerned with the situation of Christians and other non-Muslim minorities in the Arab World, with the greatest concern coming from Lebanese (81%) and Egyptians (76%). Slimmer majorities in the UAE (54% vs. 46% not concerned), Turkey (53% vs. 47%), and Saudi Arabia (53% vs. 47%) also lean toward concern about religious minorities. Only among respondents in Iran (76%), Iraq (67%), and Jordan (65%) are majorities not concerned about these groups.

B. Rise of Sectarian Division

Table 32. How concerned are you that sectarian division is growing across the region?

	Lebanon		Jordan		Egypt		KSA		UAE		Turkey		Iraq	
	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014	2012	2014
Concerned	100	65	87	79	83	70	82	79	65	46	83	68	97	64
Not concerned	0	35	9	21	15	30	14	22	25	54	12	32	0	36

Note: Concerned is an aggregation of the responses “very concerned” and “somewhat concerned.” Not concerned is an aggregation of the responses “somewhat unconcerned” and “not at all concerned.”

In every country, other than the UAE, more than six in 10 respondents are concerned with heightened sectarian divisions in the Arab World. Concern is strongest in Saudi Arabia (79%) and Jordan (79%). Arabs in the UAE are divided on this question with 46% expressing concern and 54% saying they are not concerned. In all countries, respondents indicate a decline in the concern with sectarian division between 2012 (when this question was previously asked) and the current survey. This is most notable in UAE (from 65% in 2012 to 46% in 2014) and Turkey (from 83% to 68%), and surprisingly in Lebanon (from 100% to 65%) and Iraq (from 97% to 64%).

C. Sectarian Division and the Conflict in Syria

Sectarian divisions are particularly evident in responses to questions in the survey regarding the conflict in Syria. In this area, **we find deep divides in attitudes expressed by Sunni and Shia Muslims in all countries** that have significant communities of both sects (Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey). For example, when asked about Iran's and Saudi Arabia's roles in Syria, Shia Muslims see Iran playing a positive role, while Sunni Muslims view Saudi Arabia as having a more positive impact. (See Table 9a.) And when respondents select whom they most favor in the Syrian conflict and what the worst possible outcome of that conflict would be, Shia express support for the Assad regime, while Sunni show support for the Syrian opposition. (See Table 6a and Table 7a.)

There are, however, significant areas where the views of Sunni and Shia converge. Both groups agree that the fragmentation of Syria into sect or ethnic regions would be a bad outcome for the country. (See Table 7a.) And both agree that the conflict in Syria has contributed to an increase in sectarian tensions and radicalization in their countries. (See Table 10a.)

APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

Demographics

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA *	UAE *	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Male	49	50	50	56	67	51	50	50
Female	51	50	50	44	33	49	50	50
Under 25	17	23	20	26	18	23	17	25
25-36	28	28	31	32	42	32	27	29
Over 36	55	49	50	42	40	46	56	46
Sunni	28	95	90	75	88	36	87	11
Shia	27	2	1	14	12	63	13	89
Christian	40	2	9	5	0	0	0	0
Druze	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
Live in city	86	85	58	83	84	64	74	78
Live outside city	14	15	42	17	16	36	26	22
Citizens				70	40			
Residents				30	60			

* The samples in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are not evenly divided between male and female subjects because of the disproportionate number of males in these populations with the inclusion of residents (who are predominantly male) in addition to citizens.

The geographic coverage for the opinion research was as follows:

- Lebanon—East Beirut, West Beirut, Baabda, El Maten, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, Saayda
- Jordan—Amman City, Balqa, Madaba, Irbid, Jarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba
- Egypt—Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban), Mansura (rural), Menia (urban), Menia (rural), Asyut (urban), Asyut (rural), Tanta (urban), Tanta (rural)
- KSA—Riyadh, Buraydah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Shammasyah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail, Hufuf
- UAE—Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, Umm Al Quwain
- Iraq—Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Karbala, Nassiriyah, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, Fallujah, As Samawah
- Turkey—Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Haymana, Ceyhan
- Iran—Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, Ahwaz

Sample sizes, margins of error, and fieldwork dates:

Country	Sample Size	Margin of Error (MOE)	Fieldwork Dates
Lebanon	816	MOE +/- 3.4 percentage points	Sept. 4–28, 2014
Jordan	821	MOE +/- 3.4 percentage points	Sept. 4–30, 2014
Egypt	1,014	MOE +/- 3.1 percentage points	Sept. 5–25, 2014
KSA	1,024	MOE +/- 3.1 percentage points	Sept. 6–29, 2014
UAE	824	MOE +/- 3.4 percentage points	Sept. 5–26, 2014
Iraq	1,025	MOE +/- 3.1 percentage points	Sept. 5–Oct. 3, 2014
Turkey	1,026	MOE +/- 3.1 percentage points	Sept. 5–30, 2014
Iran	1,017	MOE +/- 3.1 percentage points	Sept. 5–27, 2014

Sampling Methodology:

In each country, the selected study centers were stratified depending on the predominant social class/income levels of the people residing in various areas (and in case of Beirut, the religious clusters). This is because in most cities/towns, people of a specific social class/income segment/religious grouping tend to stay in clusters. These strata were further sub-divided into blocks of roughly equal size, based on available data about population. Thereafter, blocks were selected at random depending on the sample size for that center and keeping in mind the social class/religious cluster distribution. A pre-assigned number of starting points were used for each selected block and sampling within the blocks was undertaken using right hand rule method. Within each selected household that agreed to participate, we took an inventory of all family members over 18 years of age and randomly selected one adult to be interviewed in a way that ensured that both genders had an equal chance of inclusion, with no one allowed to self-select into the sample.

2015

Middle East 2015: Current and Future Challenges



MIDDLE EAST 2015:

Current and Future Challenges

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the month of September 2015, Zogby Research Services conducted face-to-face polls, surveying 7,400 adults in six Arab countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) and Iran and Turkey. We had been commissioned by the Sir Bani Yas Forum to explore attitudes toward a range of crises across the region including: the conflicts raging in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya; the situation in Palestine; the formation and utilization of a Joint Arab Force; the P5+1 agreement with Iran; and the threat posed by and the root causes of religious extremism. We also surveyed Iranians and Iraqis about developments within their countries and their expectations for the future.

What follows are our findings.

I. Four Conflicts

Iraq:

- **Majorities in every country covered in the survey agree that Daesh, in the first place, followed by the failure of the government in Baghdad to represent all Iraqis are the major factors causing conflict in Iraq.**
- Majorities in every country but Lebanon and Iraq itself also see Iran as a significant factor.
- **Among Iraqis there is a deep divide** with at least eight in 10 Sunni Arabs pointing principally to Iran and the failure of the government in Baghdad as the major causes of conflict. While fewer than three in 10 Sunnis see Daesh as a major factor behind the conflict, three-quarters of Shia Arabs point to Daesh as the major problem disrupting the country.
- When it comes to identifying the best outcome for the future of Iraq, in every country, except Lebanon and Iran, majorities support the creation of “a representative central government that can unify the country.” That same view is shared by at least pluralities of Iraqis of all sects and ethnicities.

Syria:

- **Majorities in every country, except Iran, point to the regime of Bashar al Assad as a major cause of the conflict raging in Syria.** Extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh are also held responsible for the continuing conflict by majorities in all countries surveyed.
- The involvement of Iranian-backed groups and Russia are identified as problems everywhere but Lebanon, with respect to the former, and Iran, with respect to the latter.
- As for the best outcome for Syria, Lebanon and Iran are the outliers. Strong majorities in every other country support “negotiations leading to a national unity government without Bashar al Assad.” On the other hand, one-half of Lebanese and Iranians favor either the establishment of a loose federation of regions or the partition of Syria.

Libya:

- Strong majorities in every country say that **the two main factors causing the conflict in Libya are tribal loyalties**

and the presence of extremist Islamist groups.

- Majorities in all countries, except Lebanon, project a “strong central government” as the way to stabilize Libya. Lebanese are divided between that option and the establishment of a loose federation of regions.

Yemen:

- **The attempt by the Houthis and former President Saleh to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hadi is held to be the principal factor that prompted the conflict in Yemen in all countries except Lebanon and Iran.** These two outliers point to tribal rivalries as the major cause of the conflict in Yemen.
- There is substantial agreement across the board that the best solution for Yemen is “negotiations leading to a strong central government that can stabilize a unified Yemen.”

II. PALESTINE

Summary: The situation in Palestine is seen as an important concern for overwhelming majorities in every country surveyed. While Israel’s continued unwillingness to make peace has caused some erosion in Arab support for the Arab Peace Initiative (API), two-thirds or more of respondents in four of the six countries continue to support the API. But only in the UAE and Lebanon do respondents support Arab governments making confidence-building gestures to encourage Israel to make peace. Finally, in most Arab countries substantial majorities are in favor of their governments supporting Palestinian reconciliation and unity and providing more financial support to Palestinians.

The Arab Peace Initiative (API):

- As a result of Israel’s negative behavior since the Arab League endorsed its initiative for a comprehensive peace with Israel in 2002, **there has been some erosion in Arab public opinion’s support for the API.** Nevertheless, between two-thirds to three-quarters of all respondents in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are still supportive of this goal—although pluralities do not believe that Israel is ready for peace. Only in Egypt and Iraq do majorities say that even if Israel accepts the API, they are “not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel.”
- While more than three-quarters of Arabs in the UAE support Arab governments initiating some form of confidence-building measures to encourage Israel to make peace, that same percentage of Egyptians, Saudis, and Iraqis believe that Arab governments should refuse such contact until Israel makes peace with the Palestinians. Lebanese and Jordanians are divided.
- There is **strong support**, almost across the board, for Arab governments **to provide financial support to the Palestinian Authority and to support Palestinian efforts to achieve national reconciliation and unity.** Iraqis are divided on the issue of financial support.

III. ARAB JOINT ACTION

Summary: Substantial majorities in every Arab country support the development of a Joint Arab Force (JAF). Of those who agree, majorities in all but the UAE think that their governments should supply manpower to such a force, and majorities everywhere but Lebanon and Iraq believe that their governments should provide financial support for the effort. Additionally, there is strong support for the JAF playing either a peace-keeping or combat role, when needed. Strong majorities also express support for deploying such a force in either Syria or Iraq, with Palestine also considered a priority in four of the six countries.

Forming a Joint Arab Force (JAF):

- Strong majorities across the board support the formation of a JAF to be deployed in conflict zones across the Arab region. In Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq there is some slight hesitation, with three in 10 disagreeing.

- Of those who agree with the formation of the JAF, majorities everywhere but the UAE would support their countries' supplying manpower to the JAF. And majorities in every country except Lebanon and Iraq agree to provide financial support.
- Strong majorities also would agree to seeing the JAF deployed to play either a combat or peace-keeping role, with the latter being the preferred option in four of the six countries.
- **When asked where they would see such a JAF deployed, majorities across the board pick Syria and Iraq**, with strong support for Palestine in four of the six countries covered in the survey.

IV. THE P5+1 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

Summary: Respondents in most countries are not in support of the P5+1 agreement with Iran, feeling that the deal is good for Iran, but not for the region, and that it will not, in any case, succeed in limiting Iran's nuclear weapon's program. Opinions are divided as to whether Iran will use sanctions relief to improve its economy or to support its interference in the region.

- A substantial majority of respondents in UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are not supportive of the P5+1 deal with Iran. While a slight majority in Jordan is also opposed to the deal, a majority of Lebanese and Turks are supportive.
- A significant majority of Egyptians, Saudis, Arabs in the UAE, and Jordanians feel that the deal will only be good for Iran and not the Arab states; Lebanese and Turks are divided on this matter. And in every country but Turkey, majorities are not confident that the deal will succeed in limiting Iran's nuclear weapons program.
- **Across the board, respondents express concern with both Iran's nuclear program and its involvement in the region.** And Egyptians and Saudis express the greatest concern that Iran will use its relief from the sanctions to support its military and political interference in the region. Only in Lebanon does a substantial majority believe that Iran will use sanctions relief to invest in improving its domestic situation. Respondents in other countries are divided in their opinion on this question.

V. EXTREMISM

Summary: Religious extremism is viewed as a serious challenge by respondents in every country, but there are some differences in attitudes as to what causes such extremism and how best to defeat it. **Daesh and al Qaeda lead the list** of groups that are identified as the most serious problems facing the region, although **the Gulf States and Egypt also identify groups supported by Iran as problematic.** It is not surprising that "ideas promoted by extremist religious figures and groups," "corrupt, repressive and unrepresentative governments," and "a lack of education" are identified as the major drivers causing religious extremism. But what is surprising is that "anger at the U.S." and "foreign occupation" rank last. And while Saudi Arabia and Turkey receive better grades than others for the role they play in combating sectarian violence, the United States and Iran receive the lowest scores.

Extremist groups:

- Asked to rate the seriousness of the problem posed by several groups: Daesh, the Muslim Brotherhood, al Qaeda, and militias supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG), majorities in all countries agree that Daesh and al Qaeda pose serious problems for the region. Attitudes are most intense in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Turkey.
- A strong majority of respondents in most countries also agree that groups supported by the IRG pose a serious problem. The outliers are in Lebanon and Iraq where one-third to one-half say that these groups do not pose a problem.

- **A strong majority of respondents in the UAE see the Muslim Brotherhood as a serious problem**, while a strong majority in Turkey holds that the Brotherhood is no problem at all. About one-half of Egyptians, Iraqis, and Jordanians also feel that the Brotherhood is not a serious problem, as compared to only one-quarter of the respondents in these countries who say that the group is a serious problem.

The drivers of religious extremism:

- Respondents were given a list of eight factors that might account for driving religious extremist behavior: corrupt, repressive and unrepresentative governments; foreign occupations/interventions; religious figures and groups promoting extremist ideas; support from foreign countries; anger at the United States; alienation of young people; poverty and lack of opportunity; and a lack of education. In almost every instance but one (“anger at the United States”), majorities in every country identify each of these factors as a “driver”—but with such differences in intensity that it is necessary to rank them in order of their degree of intensity. While the rankings vary from country to country, several observations can be made.
- In almost all the countries, **the top tier of factors identified as driving religious extremism include: religious figures and groups promoting extremist ideas, corrupt, repressive and unrepresentative governments, and a lack of education.**
- **The bottom tier in almost every country include: anger at the United States, foreign occupations, and the alienation of youth.** It is interesting to note that despite being identified as an important factor by majorities in four of the eight countries, “**anger at the United States**” is ranked as the least important driver of extremism in every country.
- It is also worth noting that the rank order of “drivers” are identical in only two countries: Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The way to defeat extremist groups:

- In every country surveyed with the exception of Iran, majorities hold that **the most important ways to go about defeating violent extremist groups involve “changing the political and social realities that cause young people to be attracted to extremist ideas” followed by “countering the messages and ideas”** of the extremist groups.
- Respondents in the UAE most strongly support the use of military and police force to defeat extremist groups, an approach also strongly supported by Egyptians and Turks.

Role played in combating extremist sectarian violence:

- **The U.S. role in combating extremism is viewed as extremely negative in every country**, followed by Iran, which also gets negative scores across the board (except in Lebanon where attitudes on Iran’s role are split down the middle).
- Attitudes are divided on the roles played by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Three countries give Turkey and the UAE very positive scores, while Saudi Arabia’s role is viewed very positively in four countries.

VI. IRAQ (INTERNAL)

Summary: Iraq remains a deeply divided society with the three major component groups in the country (Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds) agreeing on very little.

They are divided in the level of confidence they demonstrate toward: the various institutions that exist in the country; the effectiveness of the various groups fighting against Daesh; and which group should be given the lead role in that fight.

There are, however, two notable areas where there is a convergence of views across the sectarian and ethnic divides: in identifying the principal factor causing the conflict in the country (“a government in Baghdad that doesn’t represent all Iraqis”) and in identifying the outcome that represents the best future for Iraq (“a representative central government that can unify the country”).

Cause of the conflict:

- **A majority of Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds all agree that a principal cause of the conflict in Iraq is the fact that the central government has not represented all Iraqis.** While Shia and Kurds also point to Daesh as a principal cause, Sunnis disagree. At the same time, almost nine in 10 Sunnis and one-half of Kurds point to Iran as a source of the conflict, but less than one-fourth of Shia concur.

Confidence and effectiveness of groups fighting Daesh:

- When asked to rate their confidence in the central government, the military, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), their local tribal leadership, Daesh and the international coalition fighting Daesh: **Sunnis say they have no confidence in any of these entities;** Shia have confidence only in the military and the PMU; Kurds only have confidence in the same two groups, but to a lesser degree. And all Iraqi sub-groups agree that they have very little confidence in both their tribal leadership and the international coalition fighting Daesh.
- When asked to rate the effectiveness of the various entities fighting Daesh – the U.S.-led coalition, Iran, the Iraqi military, the PMU, and the Kurds: Shia rate all of them as effective except the U.S.-led coalition, while a majority of Kurds and Sunni Arabs only rate Kurdish fighters as effective.
- **The U.S.-led coalition, in other words, is rated ineffective by all groups of Iraqis.**

Iraq’s future:

- **Majorities in all sectarian and ethnic groups say that the best way to ultimately resolve the conflict in Iraq is by “forming a more inclusive, representative government.”** And at least pluralities in all groups also maintain that the best future for Iraq lies not in partition or federation but in a “representative central government that can unify the country.”
- But these shared aspirations, while important to note, are tempered by the reality that overall fewer than three in 10 Iraqis have confidence that “in the next five years Iraqis will be able to form a government that is accepted by all segments of Iraqi society.”

VII. IRAN (INTERNAL)

Summary: **Iranians demonstrate a set of conflicting attitudes** in the aftermath of the P5+1 deal. They are overwhelmingly supportive of the deal, but are not pleased that their government accepted limits on its nuclear program. **They want their government to now focus resources on building the economy, increasing political freedoms,** and improving ties with the United States and their Arab neighbors, but they still support involvement in Syria, Iraq, etc. (though with lower levels of support than in 2014).

On the P5+1 deal and their nuclear program:

- **There is very strong support for the P5+1 deal,** with eight in 10 Iranians saying they approve of the agreement and believe that it is in the best interests of their country.
- This support is tempered by the fact that more than **two-thirds of Iranians believe it was a “bad idea” for the government to have “accepted limits on its nuclear program.”** And more than two-thirds also maintain that their country should have nuclear weapons either because Iran “is a major nation” or because “as long as other countries have nuclear weapons, we need them too.” As disturbing as this might be, this figure represents a

substantial decline in the percentage of Iranians who, in 2014, felt that their country should have nuclear weapons.

Aftermath of the “deal”:

- Overall, there is a degree of optimism about the future in the post-agreement era with about one-half of Iranians believing that their situation will improve in the next three years, as opposed to only one in five who believe it will worsen. However, it is worth noting that these “better off/worse off” numbers are about the same as they were in 2013 and 2014.
- When asked what their government’s top priority should be at this point, far and away it is “investing in the economy and creating employment” (81%) and “advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights” (75%). Six in 10 say it should be improving ties with the United States and the West and Arab countries. **Less than half want the government to give “greater support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.”**

Iran’s regional role:

- Despite this apparent shift in priorities, about seven in 10 still say their government’s involvement in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq are important. Only about four in 10 feel the same about involvement in Yemen and Afghanistan.
These percentages, however, reflect a substantial drop in support over the past year. In 2014, almost nine in 10 Iranians supported involvement in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, while six in 10 were in favor of involvement in Yemen.
- A potentially revealing finding: when Iranians are asked about how they envision their country’s regional role, **only two in 10 express the belief that Iran “should be the dominant player in the Gulf region.” More than four in 10 say that Iran “should not be involved in the region” and should instead focus on internal matters**, while another almost four in 10 say their government “should develop peaceful relations based on equality with other countries in the region.”

FOUR CONFLICTS


1. Iraq

Table 1: Cause of Conflict in Iraq: Government in Baghdad
How significant is the role played by a government in Baghdad that does not represent all Iraqis in causing conflict in Iraq?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Iran	Turkey
Significant	97	64	70	85	100	63	53	79
Not significant	3	37	30	16	<1	37	47	21

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

The sentiment that a significant factor causing the conflict in Iraq is “the government in Baghdad does not represent all Iraqis” is considerably stronger among Sunnis.




Majorities of respondents in all countries surveyed say the fact that the government in Baghdad does not represent all Iraqis is a significant factor in causing the conflict in Iraq. This sentiment is strongest in UAE (100%), Egypt (97%), and Saudi Arabia (85%), followed by Turkey (79%) and Jordan (70%). In Lebanon and Iraq itself, more than six in 10 respondents say the lack of representation in the government is a significant causal factor for the overall conflict; in both countries, however, this sentiment is considerably stronger among Sunni respondents (Lebanon: 71% of Sunni vs. 54% of Shia; Iraq: 80% of Sunni vs. 57% of Shia). Among Kurds in Iraq, 61% note that this is a significant cause of the Iraq conflict. A slim majority in Iran (53%) also note the lack of representation in the government in Baghdad as a significant causal factor of the conflict in Iraq.

Table 2: Cause of Conflict in Iraq: Iranian Involvement
How significant is the role played by Iranian involvement in causing conflict in Iraq?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
Significant	94	41	72	75	85	42	82
Not significant	6	59	28	25	15	58	18

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

A major difference of opinion exists between Sunni and Shia respondents on the significance of Iranian involvement as a cause of the conflict in Iraq.



In five of the seven countries surveyed, large majorities consider Iranian involvement a significant factor in the Iraqi conflict: Egypt (94%), UAE (85%), Turkey (82%), Saudi Arabia (75%), and Jordan (72%). On the other hand, majorities in Lebanon (59%) and Iraq (58%) say Iranian involvement is not a significant factor. Again, we see a difference of opinion between Sunni and Shia respondents in these two countries. Among Sunni respondents, 63% in Lebanon and 87% in Iraq say Iranian involvement is a significant causal factor for the Iraqi conflict, while just 23% of Lebanese Shia and 24% of Iraqi Shia agree. In addition, the opinion of Iraqi Kurds splits this difference, with 52% noting the significance of Iranian involvement.

Table 3: Cause of Conflict in Iraq: Daesh

How significant is the role played by Daesh* in causing conflict in Iraq?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Iran	Turkey
Significant	97	83	76	91	100	61	88	94
Not significant	3	17	24	9	<1	39	12	6

*In Iraq, respondents were asked about “Sunni extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh.”

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

Daesh is considered a significant factor in causing the Iraqi conflict by at least nine in 10 respondents in the UAE (100%), Egypt (97%), Turkey (94%), and Saudi Arabia (91%), followed by large majorities in Iran (88%), Lebanon (83%), and Jordan (76%), and 61% in Iraq itself. While there is little difference of opinion between Sunni and Shia respondents in Lebanon related to this factor (Sunni: 77% vs. Shia: 86%), there is considerable distance between the sects in Iraq, with 29% of Sunnis, 74% of Shia, and 60% of Kurds saying “Sunni extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh” are a significant factor in causing the conflict in Iraq.

Among sects in Iraq, considerable difference of opinion exists concerning the role of Sunni extremist groups as a cause of the conflict in Iraq.





Table 4: Best Future for Iraq

Which of the following outcomes do you feel represents the best future for Iraq?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Iran	Turkey
A representative central government that can unify the country	89	36	58	67	69	59	32	78
The establishment of a loose federation of regions	10	46	32	31	28	19	40	15
Partition into three separate countries	1	18	10	2	3	22	28	7

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

In Iraq, Shia respondents are more favorable toward a representative central government than their Sunni and Kurdish counterparts.



When asked about the outcome that would represent the best future for Iraq, majorities in Egypt (89%), Turkey (78%), UAE (69%), Saudi Arabia (67%), Iraq (59%), and Jordan (58%) say the best outcome would be “a representative central government that can unify the country,” while pluralities in Lebanon (46%) and Iran (40%) opt for “the establishment of a loose federation of regions.” “Partition into three separate countries” is the least favored outcome in all countries surveyed, though 28% of those in Iran select this as the best choice. In Iraq, Shia respondents are more favorable toward a representative central government (68%) than their Sunni (41%) and Kurdish (52%) counterparts. Also of note are the more than one-third of Sunni Iraqis (36%) who favor partition.

2. Syria

Table 5: Cause of Conflict in Syria: Bashar al Assad

How significant is the role played by the regime of Bashar al Assad in causing conflict in Syria?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran	Turkey
Significant	96	60	74	82	99	23	85
Not significant	4	41	26	18	1	77	15

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

A majority in all countries surveyed on this issue except Iran say that the regime of Bashar al Assad is a significant factor causing the conflict in Syria. There is near unanimity in the UAE (99%) and Egypt (96%); in both of these countries more than eight in 10 respondents call this factor “very significant” (83% and 84%, respectively). Strong majorities in Turkey (85%), Saudi Arabia (82%), and Jordan (74%) agree. In Lebanon, 60% of respondents also feel al Assad is a

significant causal factor of the conflict in Syria, though this opinion is more prevalent among Sunni respondents (74%) than among Shia (55%) and Christians (56%). Only in Iran does the opposing view prevail; 77% of Iranians say al Assad is not a significant factor in causing the Syrian conflict.

Table 6: Cause of Conflict in Syria: Sunni Extremist Groups Like al Qaeda and Daesh

How significant is the role played by Sunni extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh in causing conflict in Syria?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran	Turkey
Significant	96	79	77	79	95	90	83
Not significant	4	21	23	21	5	10	17

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

There is even greater agreement regarding the significance of Sunni extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh in causing the conflict in Syria, with more than three-quarters of respondents in all countries surveyed holding this view. The widest majorities are found in Egypt (96%, with 71% saying “very significant”), UAE (95%), Iran (90%), and Turkey (83%), followed by Saudi Arabia (79%), Lebanon (79%), and Jordan (77%).

Table 7: Cause of Conflict in Syria: Iranian-Backed Groups

How significant is the role played by Iranian-backed groups like Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in causing conflict in Syria?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Turkey
Significant	96	35	74	88	84	81
Not significant	4	65	26	12	16	19

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

With respect to Iranian-backed groups like Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, about three-quarters or more of those in Egypt (96%), Saudi Arabia (88%), UAE (84%), Turkey (81%), and Jordan (74%) believe these groups are a significant factor in causing the Syrian conflict. A majority in Lebanon (65%), however, disagree, saying they are not significant. Lebanese opinion is split by sect, with 53% of Sunni respondents saying Iranian-backed groups are a significant factor in the Syrian conflict, while just 20% of Shia respondents and 33% of Christians agree.

Table 8: Cause of Conflict in Syria: Turkish and GCC Involvement

How significant is the role played by Turkish and GCC involvement in causing conflict in Syria?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Iran
Significant	47	25	26	50
Not significant	53	75	74	50

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

Turkish and GCC involvement is not widely considered a significant factor in causing the conflict in Syria. Iranian opinion is evenly divided on this question (50% significant vs. 50% not significant), and Egyptian opinion is also split (47% vs. 53%). Only about one-quarter of respondents in Jordan (26%) and Lebanon (25%) say that Turkish and GCC involvement is a significant factor in the Syrian conflict.

Table 9: Cause of Conflict in Syria: Russia's Support of al Assad**How significant is the role played by the backing Russia gives to al Assad in causing conflict in Syria?**

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran	Turkey
Significant	90	65	68	95	100	32	81
Not significant	10	35	33	5	<1	68	19

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses "very significant" and "somewhat significant." Not significant is the aggregation of the responses "not that significant" and "not significant at all."

Everywhere but Iran, majorities of respondents say the backing Russia gives to al Assad is a significant factor in causing the Syrian conflict. This view is strongest in the UAE (100%), Saudi Arabia (95%), Egypt (90%), and Turkey (81%); in the UAE and Egypt about three-quarters of respondents say it is a "very significant" factor. About two-thirds of those in Jordan (68%) and Lebanon (65%) view Russia's backing of al Assad as significant to the conflict. Two-thirds of Iranians (68%) disagree, saying this is not a significant causal factor.

Table 10: Best Future for Syria**Which of the following outcomes do you feel represents the best future for Syria?**

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran	Turkey
Negotiations leading to a national unity government without the participation of Bashar al Assad	88	36	58	74	97	15	90
Negotiations leading to a national unity government with the participation of Bashar al Assad	2	14	12	2	0	35	4
The establishment of a loose federation of regions	8	38	24	23	4	37	6
The partition of the country	2	12	6	1	0	13	0

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

There is a strong belief among those in UAE (97%), Turkey (90%), Egypt (88%), and Saudi Arabia (74%) that the best outcome for Syria would be "negotiations leading to a national unity government without the participation of Bashar al Assad." A majority of Jordanians (58%) agree. Lebanese respondents are split between favoring a national unity government without al Assad's involvement (36%) and "the establishment of a loose federation of regions" (38%). Iranian opinion is split between the loose federation of regions (37%) and "negotiations leading to a national unity government with the participation of Bashar al Assad" (35%); this latter option is favored by less than one in seven respondents in all other countries. The option with the least support in all surveyed countries is partition of the country.

3. LIBYA

Table 11: Cause of Conflict in Libya: Tribal Rivalries**How significant is the role played by tribal rivalries in causing conflict in Libya?**

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Turkey
Significant	97	67	72	86	100	89
Not significant	3	33	28	14	1	11

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses "very significant" and "somewhat significant." Not significant is the aggregation of the responses "not that significant" and "not significant at all."

There is broad agreement in the six countries surveyed on the Libyan conflict that tribal rivalries are a significant causal factor. There is near unanimity in the UAE (100%) and Egypt (97%), followed by Turkey (89%) and Saudi Arabia (86%), and then Jordan (72%) and Lebanon (67%). The intensity of opinion is the only major variance, with one-third of Lebanese and Jordanian respondents viewing Libyan tribal rivalries as “very significant” compared to more than two times that many respondents in the UAE (92%), Egypt (78%), and Turkey (72%) noting the same.

Table 12: Cause of Conflict in Libya: Egyptian and GCC Involvement

How significant is the role played by Egyptian and GCC involvement in causing conflict in Libya?

	Lebanon	Jordan	Turkey
Significant	43	39	65
Not significant	57	61	35

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

Almost two-thirds of respondents in Turkey (65%) say that Egyptian and GCC involvement is a significant cause of the conflict in Libya. Among those in Lebanon and Jordan, however, only about four in 10 respondents note this a significant causal factor (Lebanon: 43%, Jordan: 39%).

Table 13: Cause of Conflict in Libya: Extremist Islamist Groups

How significant is the role played by extremist Islamist groups in causing conflict in Libya?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Turkey
Significant	75	73	77	83	96	69
Not significant	25	27	23	17	4	31

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

There is broad agreement, by more than two-thirds of all respondents, that extremist Islamist groups are a significant factor in causing the conflict in Libya. This view is strongest in the UAE (96%), where 81% say it is a “very significant” factor, followed by Saudi Arabia (83%), Jordan (77%), Egypt (75%), Lebanon (73%), and Turkey (69%). Majorities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey also say these groups are “very significant.”

In Lebanon, where we find the lowest intensity of this opinion, with 29% calling extremist groups in Libya “very significant,” there are also some disparities by sect. Sunni respondents are the least likely to hold the view that these groups are significant (62%), while Shia (75%), Christian (78%), and Druze (84%) respondents are more likely to say so.

Table 14: Best Solution for Conflict in Libya

What is the best solution to the conflict in Libya?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Turkey
A strong central government that can stabilize a unified country	85	43	56	72	92	80
The establishment of a loose federation of regions	14	41	38	24	7	17
The partition of the country	<1	17	6	5	<1	4

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

“A strong central government that can stabilize a unified” Libya is the best solution to the conflict according to majorities in the UAE (92%), Egypt (85%), Turkey (80%), Saudi Arabia (72%), and Jordan (56%). In Lebanon, opinion is split between those who favor a strong central government (43%) and those who favor “the establishment of a loose federation of regions” (41%); 38% of Jordanians concur that a loose federation would be the best solution in Libya. Partition of Libya is not considered a good solution by a sizable percentage of respondents in any country surveyed except Lebanon where 17% select this option.

4. YEMEN

Table 15: Cause of Conflict in Yemen: Attempted Overthrow of Government

How significant is the role played by the attempt by the Houthis and former President Saleh to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hadi in causing conflict in Yemen?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Significant	98	50	80	82	100	25
Not significant	2	50	20	18	<1	75

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.”
Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

When asked about the significance of the attempt by the Houthis and former president Saleh to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hadi, respondents in four of the six countries surveyed on the Yemeni conflict overwhelmingly say this is a significant causal factor. There is near unanimity in the UAE (100%) and Egypt (98%), where 90% and 87% of respondents, respectively, say it is a “very significant” factor. More than eight in 10 respondents in Saudi Arabia (82%) and Jordan (80%) concur. The Lebanese are evenly split on this question, though Sunni (60%) and Christian (55%) respondents are more likely to identify this as a significant factor than their Shia counterparts (36%). Finally, three-quarters of Iranians say the overthrow attempt is not a significant causal factor in the Yemeni conflict.

Table 16: Cause of Conflict in Yemen: Lack of Representation in Hadi Government

How significant is the role played by the failure of the Hadi government to represent all segments of Yemeni society in causing conflict in Yemen?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Significant	59	57	54	68	98	55
Not significant	42	43	46	33	2	45

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.”
Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

Majorities in all countries surveyed agree that the failure of the Hadi government to represent all segments of Yemeni society is a significant factor in causing the conflict in Yemen. However, while more than two-thirds of respondents in the UAE and Saudi Arabia point to this as a significant factor, majorities are slimmer elsewhere, with at least four in 10 respondents in Jordan, Iran, Egypt, and Lebanon saying this is not a significant factor in the conflict. In Lebanon, we again find more Sunni (65%) and Christian (54%) than Shia (47%) respondents noting this as a significant factor.

Table 17: Cause of Conflict in Yemen: Tribal Rivalries**How significant is the role played by tribal rivalries in causing conflict in Yemen?**

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Significant	64	72	75	78	94	67
Not significant	36	28	25	22	6	33

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

There is more consistent agreement that tribal rivalries are a significant factor causing conflict in Yemen, with more than two-thirds of respondents holding this view in five of the six countries surveyed including the UAE (94%), Saudi Arabia (78%), Jordan (75%), Lebanon (72%), and Iran (67%), as well as 64% of Egyptians.

Table 18: Cause of Conflict in Yemen: Iranian Involvement**How significant is the role played by Iranian involvement in causing conflict in Yemen?**

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE
Significant	95	35	71	71	88
Not significant	5	65	29	29	13

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

Iranian involvement is viewed as a significant causal factor by at least seven in 10 respondents in Egypt (95%), the UAE (88%), Saudi Arabia (71%), and Jordan (71%). The opposite point of view, that Iranian involvement is not significant to the Yemeni conflict, is held by 65% of Lebanese. Among the Lebanese, the sectarian divide is again notable, with 59% of Sunni respondents saying Iran is significant to the Yemeni conflict, while just 22% of Shia and 28% of Christians agree.

Table 19: Cause of Conflict in Yemen: GCC Involvement**How significant is the role played by GCC involvement in causing conflict in Yemen?**

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Iran
Significant	89	49	33	64
Not significant	11	51	67	36

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Significant is the aggregation of the responses “very significant” and “somewhat significant.” Not significant is the aggregation of the responses “not that significant” and “not significant at all.”

Among Egyptians, 89% say GCC involvement is a significant factor in causing conflict in Yemen; 64% of Iranians agree. The Lebanese are split on this question with 49% saying GCC involvement is significant, while 51% say it is not. Finally, just one-third of Jordanians note this as a significant causal factor of conflict in Yemen, with two-thirds saying it is not significant.

Table 20: Best Solution to Conflict in Yemen
What is the best solution to the conflict in Yemen?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iran
Negotiations leading to a strong central government that can stabilize a unified country	96	72	86	89	97	66
The partition of the country	4	28	14	11	3	34

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Overwhelmingly, respondents in all six countries agree that the best solution to the conflict in Yemen is “negotiations leading to a strong central government that can stabilize a unified country.” This opinion is strongest in the UAE (97%), Egypt (96%), Saudi Arabia (89%), and Jordan (86%). Though more than two-thirds of respondents in Lebanon (72%) and Iran (66%) agree, each has a sizable percentage who feel partition of Yemen could be the best solution (28% and 34%, respectively).

PALESTINE

Table 21: View of Arab Peace Initiative, 2009* and 2015

In 2002 the Arab League unanimously endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative in which they agreed to establish normalized ties with Israel if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories and resolve the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?

	Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		KSA		UAE		Iraq
	2009	2015	2009	2015	2009	2015	2009	2015	2009	2015	2015
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, and more effort should be made to achieve this goal.	14	8	34	26	36	37	37	19	10	23	14
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, but I don't believe that the Israelis will give up the territories.	52	26	47	45	49	40	44	45	70	58	27
Even if the Israelis agree to return all of the territories and agree to resolve the refugee issue, I am not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel.**	8	66	18	30	13	24	18	36	8	19	59
Not sure	22	N/A	2	N/A	2	N/A	1	N/A	12	N/A	N/A


* Zogby International, Six-Nation Arab Opinion Poll, November 1-18, 2009. Sample size: 3,989 adults.

** In 2009, this option was "Even if the Israelis return all of the territories occupied in 1967 peacefully, the Arabs should continue to fight Israel no matter what the outcome."

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

2015

In both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, you can see a marked increase from 2009 to 2015 in the percentage of respondents who are not prepared for peace with Israel.



In our most recent polling, more than one-third of Jordanian respondents (37%) say they are prepared for peace with Israel if it agrees to the Arab Peace Initiative, and they want effort to be made to achieve that goal. About one-quarter of those in Lebanon (26%) and UAE (23%) agree.

A majority of those in the UAE (58%) and pluralities in Lebanon (45%), Saudi Arabia (45%), and Jordan (40%) say they are prepared for peace with Israel, but do not believe that the Israelis will give up the territories. One-quarter of respondents in Iraq (27%) and Egypt (26%) agree.

Finally, majorities in Egypt (66%) and Iraq (59%) are not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel, even if Israel agrees to the Arab Peace Initiative. Significant percentages in Saudi Arabia (36%), Lebanon (30%), and Jordan (24%) also say they are not ready for peace.

Comparing the current data to the results of polling in 2009 on the same question, we find that in all countries surveyed there have been marked increases in the percentages of respondents who are not prepared for peace with Israel. In Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE these increases are about twofold (Lebanon: 18% to 30%, Jordan: 13% to 24%, Saudi Arabia: 18% to 36%, UAE: 8% to 19%), while in Egypt we find an exponential rise (8% to 66%).

Table 22: Arab Governments and Israel
With which statement do you most agree?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq
Arab governments should initiate confidence-building gestures toward Israel in order to encourage Israel to make peace with the Palestinians.	25	54	49	27	77	14
Arab governments should continue to refuse contact with Israel until Israel makes peace with the Palestinians.	75	46	51	73	23	86

More than three-quarters of respondents in the UAE (77%) say Arab governments should initiate confidence-building gestures toward Israel to encourage Israel to make peace with the Palestinians. A majority of Lebanese (54%) agree. However, at least seven in 10 respondents in Iraq (86%), Egypt (75%), and Saudi Arabia (73%) think that Arab governments should continue to refuse contact with Israel until Israel makes peace with the Palestinians.

Opinion in Jordan is evenly split between those who think Arab governments should attempt to boost the confidence of Israel to encourage peace (49%) and those who think Arab governments should continue to refuse contact with Israel (51%).

Table 23: Financial Assistance for Palestinians

How important would it be for your government to provide more financial assistance to support the Palestinians under occupation?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA*	UAE*	Iraq
Important	96	80	86	93	100	48
Not important	4	20	14	7	<1	52

* KSA and UAE citizens only.

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Important is the aggregation of the responses "very important" and "somewhat important." Not important is the aggregation of the responses "not so important" and "not important at all."

With the exception of Iraqis, there is broad agreement among respondents that it is very important for their governments to provide more financial assistance to support the Palestinians under occupation. There is near unanimity

among Emiratis (100%), of whom 97% say it is “very important,” followed by high numbers of Egyptians (96%), Saudis (93%), Jordanians (86%), and Lebanese (80%) who think their governments should provide more financial support to the Palestinians. In Iraq, opinion is split between 48% who say it is important for their governments to participate in this way and 52% who say it is not important.


Table 24: Support for Palestinian National Reconciliation and Unified Governance
How important would it be for your government to support Palestinian efforts to achieve national reconciliation and unified governance?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA*	UAE*	Iraq
Important	98	76	87	93	100	71
Not important	2	24	13	7	<1	29

* KSA and UAE citizens only.
 Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Important is the aggregation of the responses “very important” and “somewhat important.” Not important is the aggregation of the responses “not so important” and “not important at all.”

When asked about the importance of their governments’ supporting Palestinian efforts to achieve national reconciliation and unified governance, at least seven in 10 respondents in all countries surveyed say it is important, including 100% of Emiratis, 98% of Egyptians, 93% of Saudis, and 87% of Jordanians, followed by 76% of Lebanese and 71% of Iraqis.

A majority of respondents agree it is very important to provide financial assistance to occupied Palestine and support Palestinian efforts to achieve national reconciliation.



2015

ARAB JOINT ACTION

Table 25: Development of Joint Arab Force

Do you agree or disagree with the idea of developing a joint Arab force to deploy in conflict zones across the Arab region?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA*	UAE*	Iraq
Agree	93	71	70	84	89	67
Disagree	7	29	30	16	11	33

*KSA and UAE citizens only.

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Agree is the aggregation of the responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree.” Disagree is the aggregation of the responses “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree.”

When asked about developing a joint Arab force to deploy in conflict zones across the Arab region, majorities in all six countries surveyed agree to this idea. The strongest support comes from Egyptians (93%), Emiratis (89%), and Saudis (84%), followed by the Lebanese (71%), Jordanians (70%), and Iraqis (67%). It is noteworthy that among Iraqis the level of agreement varies by sect; Sunni respondents (80%) are more likely to agree to the development of a joint Arab force than their Shia counterparts (60%).

Table 26: Your Country’s Contribution to Joint Arab Force

What should your country contribute to the formation of a joint Arab force?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA*	UAE*	Iraq
Manpower	29	37	31	23	2	36
Financial support	18	22	27	34	65	17
Manpower and financial support	50	27	32	40	33	27
No contribution from my country	3	14	10	3	1	20

*KSA and UAE citizens only.

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Those who agree with the idea of developing a joint Arab force were asked what their country should contribute to the formation of a joint Arab force: manpower, financial support, both of these, or no contribution.

Emiratis are the most consistent in their response, with 98% saying the UAE should contribute financial support and about one-third of these (33%) saying manpower should also be contributed to this effort. About three-quarters of Saudis also view financial support from their country as an appropriate contribution, with 40% overall saying manpower should also be contributed.

Among Egyptians, more than three-quarters (79%) say their country should contribute manpower to a joint Arab force, and 50% say financial support should also be contributed.

Opinion is somewhat mixed in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. About one-third of those in Lebanon (37%) and Iraq (36%) say manpower is the appropriate contribution for their countries, and an additional one-quarter in each of these countries say they should contribute both manpower and financial support. Jordanians are almost evenly split among those who would see their country contribute manpower (31%), financial support (27%), or both (32%). There is a significant

percentage of respondents in each of these three countries who feel their countries should not contribute to a joint Arab force (Iraq: 20%, Lebanon: 14%, Jordan: 10%).

Table 27: Use of a Joint Arab Force
If such a force were to be formed, should it be...

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA*	UAE*	Iraq
Deployed only in a peace-keeping role in Arab countries, when needed.	18	39	33	29	16	38
Deployed in a combat role in Arab countries, when needed.	23	24	22	24	47	29
Available to be deployed to play either role, when needed to provide peace and security in Arab countries.	60	37	45	48	37	33

*KSA and UAE citizens only
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Those who agree with the idea of a joint Arab force were asked if such a force should be deployed only for peace-keeping, only for combat, or for either role when needed. An exclusively peace-keeping role is favored by at least one-third of respondents in Lebanon (39%), Iraq (38%), and Jordan (33%), as well as 29% of Saudi citizens. Fewer than two in 10 Egyptians (18%) and Emiratis (16%) think a joint Arab force should be limited in deployment to peace-keeping.

An exclusively combat role in Arab countries is favored by 47% of citizens in the UAE, 29% of those in Iraq, and less than one-quarter of Lebanese (24%), Saudi (24%), Egyptian (23%), and Jordanian (22%) respondents.

A majority of Egyptians (60%) and pluralities of those in Jordan (45%) and Saudi Arabia (48%) think that a joint Arab force should be available to be deployed in either a peace-keeping or a combat role in Arab countries, when needed. There is agreement about these dual roles from 37% of those in the UAE, as well as 37% of Lebanese and 33% of Iraqis. There is little variance in these opinions by sect in Lebanon; however, among Iraqis, one-half of Shia respondents would see such a force limited to peace-keeping operations, compared to just 20% of Sunni respondents.

Table 28: Conflict Deployments for Joint Arab Force
If such a force were to be formed, in which of the following conflicts should it be deployed?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA*	UAE*	Iraq
Iraq	79	69	80	66	50	79
Syria	94	75	65	75	82	74
Libya	68	42	25	38	14	22
Yemen	55	55	13	34	15	25
Palestine	77	73	91	65	47	37

*KSA and UAE citizens only

A majority of respondents who agree with the development of a joint Arab force think that such a force should be deployed in Iraq and Syria. With respect to Iraq, support for deployment is highest in Jordan (80%), Iraq itself (79%), and Egypt (79%), and lowest among citizens in the UAE (50%). With respect to Syria, support for deployment is highest among Egyptians (94%) and Emiratis (82%), and lowest among Jordanians (65%).

In four of the six countries, majorities would favor deployment of a joint Arab force in Palestine, including Jordan (91%), Egypt (77%), Lebanon (73%), and Saudi Arabia (65%). There is considerably less support from citizens in the UAE (47%) and Iraq (37%).

Two-thirds of Egyptians (68%) would see a joint Arab force deployed in Libya, while there is significantly less support for such action elsewhere including 42% of Lebanese, 38% of Saudis, and less than one-quarter of Jordanians (25%), Iraqis (22%), and Emiratis (14%).

Finally, majorities in Egypt (55%) and Lebanon (55%) would support deployment in Yemen, but about one-third or fewer of respondents agree in Saudi Arabia (34%), Iraq (25%), UAE (15%), and Jordan (13%).

Only among Saudi nationals do we find a significant sectarian divide, where Sunni respondents are less likely than their Shia counterparts to support deployment in any conflict, with as much as 19 points dividing them. The greatest differences are with respect to deployment in Iraq (Sunni: 63% vs. Shia: 82%) and Libya (Sunni: 35% vs. Shia: 54%).

Table 29: Important Concerns for Your Government

Do you agree or disagree that the situation in ... should be an important concern for your government?

		Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA*	UAE*	Turkey
Iraq	Agree	93	79	80	90	100	98
	Disagree	7	21	20	10	0	3
Syria	Agree	96	82	78	92	99	92
	Disagree	4	18	22	9	1	8
Libya	Agree	93	75	68	85	97	96
	Disagree	7	25	32	15	3	4
Yemen	Agree	92	73	74	86	96	89
	Disagree	8	27	27	14	4	11
Palestine	Agree	96	81	85	92	98	86
	Disagree	4	19	15	8	2	14

*KSA and UAE citizens only

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Agree is the aggregation of the responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree.” Disagree is the aggregation of the responses “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree.”

When asked about the situations in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Palestine, there is broad agreement among respondents that these are important concerns for their governments. At least two-thirds of respondents in all countries surveyed on these questions (in many cases far more), note the importance of these situations for their governments.

THE P5+1 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

Table 30: Support for Iran-P5+1 Nuclear Agreement

How supportive are you of the nuclear agreement concluded between the P5+1 and Iran?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Turkey
Supportive	37	63	47	38	9	55
Not supportive	63	37	53	62	91	45

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Supportive is the aggregation of the responses “very supportive” and “somewhat supportive.” Not supportive is the aggregation of the responses “not so supportive” and “not supportive at all.”

Majorities of respondents in Lebanon (63%) and Turkey (55%) are supportive of the nuclear agreement made between the P5+1 and Iran. In Jordan, opinion leans toward opposition, with 47% in support and 53% not in support of the agreement. Majorities in Egypt (63%) and Saudi Arabia (62%), and nine in 10 respondents in the UAE (91%), are not supportive of the agreement. A majority of those in the UAE (66%) say they are “not supportive at all.”

Table 31: Opinion of Iran-P5+1 Nuclear Agreement

Is the nuclear agreement reached between the P5+1 and Iran ... ?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Turkey
Good for everyone in the region, Iran and the Arab States	23	51	35	31	21	52
Only good for Iran, but bad for the Arab States	77	49	66	69	79	48

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Opinion is split in Lebanon and Turkey with regard to whose interests are served by the agreement. In both of these countries, a slim majority (51% and 52%, respectively) say the agreement is “good for everyone in the region, Iran and the Arab States.” On the other hand, at least two-thirds of those in the UAE (79%), Egypt (77%), Saudi Arabia (69%), and Jordan (66%) say the agreement is “only good for Iran, but bad for the Arab States.”

In Lebanon, we find that Shia respondents are more likely to view the agreement as positive for both Iran and the Arab States (66%) than their Sunni (51%) and Christian (37%) counterparts.

Table 32: Confidence in Iran-P5+1 Nuclear Agreement

How confident are you that the agreement will succeed in limiting Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapons program?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Turkey
Confident	37	44	43	32	13	54
Not confident	63	57	57	68	87	46

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Confident is the aggregation of the responses “very confident” and “somewhat confident.” Not confident is the aggregation of the responses “not so confident” and “not confident at all.”

Majorities in all countries surveyed except Turkey are not confident that the agreement will succeed in limiting Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapons program, with the greatest lack of confidence in the UAE (87%), followed by Saudi Arabia (68%), Egypt (63%), Jordan (57%), and Lebanon (57%). Among the Lebanese, a slim majority of Shia respondents (52%) do have confidence in the agreement’s ability to limit Iran’s nuclear program, while Sunni (42%) and

Christian (37%) respondents are less likely to have this confidence. Only in Turkey does an overall majority (54%) have confidence that the agreement will limit Iran's nuclear weapons program.

Table 33: Concerns About Iran
In your opinion, what is of greater concern?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Turkey
Iran's involvement in other countries in the region	14	21	31	23	24	18
Iran's nuclear program	16	37	37	29	20	12
Both equally	44	8	23	34	38	59
Iran is not a problem	26	33	9	14	18	10

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

When asked to consider which is of greater concern, Iran's involvement in other countries in the region or Iran's nuclear program, opinion is mixed. Pluralities in Lebanon (37%) and Jordan (37%) are more concerned about Iran's nuclear program, though about one-third of Jordanians are more concerned by Iran's regional involvements and one-third of Lebanese say Iran is not a problem. Pluralities in Turkey (59%), Egypt (44%), UAE (38%), and Saudi Arabia (34%) are equally concerned with Iran's nuclear program and their regional involvement.

Table 34: Use of Sanctions Relief by Iran
Now that a nuclear deal with Iran has been reached, which do you believe is most likely to occur?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Turkey
Iran will primarily use sanctions relief to invest in improving its economy and domestic situation.	10	66	54	34	52	48
Iran will primarily use sanctions relief to support its military and political interference in regional affairs.	90	34	46	66	48	52

In Lebanon and Jordan, majorities believe that Iran will primarily use sanctions relief to invest in improving its economy and domestic situation (66% and 54%, respectively). Taking the contrary view are 90% of Egyptians and 66% of those in Saudi Arabia who believe that Iran will primarily use sanctions relief to support its military and political interference in regional affairs. Respondents in the UAE and Turkey are split on this issue (52% vs. 48% and 48% vs. 52%, respectively).

EXTREMISM

Table 35: Extremist Groups

On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “a serious problem” and 5 being “no problem at all”), how serious a problem is each of the following groups?

		Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Iran	Turkey
Daesh	Problem	100 (1)	58 (1)	65 (2)	88 (1)	100 (1)	76 (1)	74 (1)	95 (2)
	Not a problem	<1	11	17	4	0	13	5	2
Muslim Brotherhood	Problem	25 (3)	42 (3)	27 (4)	23 (4)	68 (4)	26 (4)	54 (3)	12 (4)
	Not a problem	51	20	57	46	10	52	19	81
Al Qaeda	Problem	97 (2)	52 (2)	71 (1)	85 (2)	97 (2)	60 (2)	71 (2)	98 (1)
	Not a problem	1	8	15	4	0	15	5	1
Militias and groups supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard	Problem	97 (2)	19 (4)	64 (3)	81 (3)	88 (3)	41 (3)		85 (3)
	Not a problem	1	49	17	8	7	36		14

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding, and because responses of “3” are not included. Problem is the aggregation of the responses of 1 and 2. Not a problem is the aggregation of the responses of 4 and 5. The rank of each group in each country by level of “problem” ratings appears in parentheses.

Respondents in all eight countries were asked about their opinions of four groups: Daesh, the Muslim Brotherhood, al Qaeda, and militias and groups supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. They were asked to rate how serious a problem each of these groups is on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is “a serious problem” and 5 is “no problem at all.” The above table shows the percentages of respondents who selected 1 or 2 (“problem”) and 4 or 5 (“not a problem”) for each group, as well as a ranking of how problematic the four groups are from the perspective of respondents in each of the eight countries.

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Iran	Turkey
1	Daesh	Daesh	Al Qaeda	Daesh	Daesh	Daesh	Daesh	Al Qaeda
2	Al Qaeda Militias+	Al Qaeda	Daesh	Al Qaeda	Al Qaeda	Al Qaeda	Al Qaeda	Daesh
3	MB	MB	Militias+	Militias+	Militias+	Militias+	MB	Militias+
4		Militias+	MB	MB	MB	MB		MB

Majorities of respondents in all eight countries identify both Daesh and al Qaeda as problematic. In six of the eight countries, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, respondents rank Daesh as the most problematic followed by al Qaeda. In Turkey and Jordan, al Qaeda is identified as most problematic followed by Daesh. When looking more deeply at subgroups in Lebanon, we find that Christians are more likely to view al Qaeda and Daesh as a problem (60% and 68%, respectively) than their Sunni (44% and 51%) and Shia (46% and 49%) counterparts. In Iraq we find

that Shia are more likely to view these two groups as a problem (al Qaeda: 67%, Daesh: 80%) than their Sunni countrymen (al Qaeda: 45%, Daesh: 67%).

Overall, militias and groups supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are ranked third among the four groups in terms of being a problem. But opinions with respect to these groups are the most variable among the eight countries. More than eight in 10 respondents in Egypt (97%), UAE (88%), Turkey (85%), and Saudi Arabia (81%) say these groups are a serious problem; a majority in Jordan (64%) agree. However, opinion is divided in Iraq (problem: 41% vs. not a problem: 36%). This split is largely along sectarian lines; Sunni respondents in Iraq are far more likely to say these groups are a problem (78% vs. 13%) than their Shia counterparts (22% vs. 47%). Finally, about one-half of those in Lebanon (49%) do not feel these groups are a problem, while just 19% call groups supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard a problem. A sectarian gap is also evident among the Lebanese, where Shia (12% vs. 57%) and Christian (18% vs. 51%) respondents say these groups are not a problem by margins of three or four to one, while Sunni respondents are basically split (30% vs. 35%).

The Muslim Brotherhood is the group least likely of these four to be identified as a problem in all countries except Lebanon. Majorities of respondents in the UAE (68%) and Iran (54%) say the Brotherhood is a problem, and a plurality in Lebanon agrees (42% vs. 20% who say it is not a problem). About one-quarter of respondents in Jordan (27%), Iraq (26%), Egypt (25%), and Saudi Arabia (23%), and just 12% in Turkey say the Muslim Brotherhood is a problem. Again, looking at the differences among sectarian groups, we find Shia in Iraq twice as likely as their Sunni counterparts to see the Brotherhood as problematic (32% vs. 15%). Similarly, Lebanese Shia and Christians are more likely than Sunnis in their country to say the Muslim Brotherhood is a problem (Shia: 50%, Christian: 45%, Sunni: 31%).

Table 36: Drivers of Religious Extremism

On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “a very important factor” and 5 being “not an important factor at all”), how important a role do each of the following play in driving religious extremism?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Iran	Turkey
1	Foreign funding	Lack of education	Lack of education	Corrupt gov'ts	Corrupt gov'ts	Poverty	Religious ideas	Corrupt gov'ts
2	Poverty	Religious ideas	Corrupt gov'ts	Religious ideas	Religious ideas	Corrupt gov'ts	Lack of education	Youth alienation
3	Corrupt gov'ts (tie)	Corrupt gov'ts	Religious ideas	Lack of education	Lack of education	Religious ideas	Youth alienation	Poverty
4	Religious ideas (tie)	Foreign occupations (tie)	Poverty	Poverty	Poverty	Foreign occupations	Poverty	Religious ideas
5	Foreign occupations	Foreign funding (tie)	Youth alienation	Foreign funding	Foreign funding	Youth alienation	Foreign funding	Lack of education
6	Lack of education	Poverty	Foreign occupations	Youth alienation	Youth alienation	Lack of education	Foreign occupations	Foreign occupations
7	Youth alienation	Youth alienation	Foreign funding	Foreign occupations	Foreign occupations	Foreign funding	Corrupt gov'ts	Foreign funding
8	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.	Anger at U.S.

Note: Rankings are based on the percentage of respondents who rate the factor as either 1 or 2.

Respondents were asked to rate the importance of eight factors that drive religious extremism:

- Corrupt, repressive, and unrepresentative governments
- Foreign occupations/interventions
- Religious figures and groups promoting extremist ideas and/or incorrect religious interpretations
- Foreign countries providing funding and training
- Anger at the United States
- The alienation and frustration of young people
- Poverty/lack of opportunity
- Lack of education

Overall, majorities in most countries rate all of these factors as important. “Corrupt, repressive, and unrepresentative governments” and “religious figures and groups promoting extremist ideas and/or incorrect religious interpretations” are the top two most important factors in driving religious extremism. Corrupt governments is the highest rated factor in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Turkey, and places second in Jordan and Iraq. Religious ideas is the highest rated only in Iran, but places second in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.

“Lack of education” and “poverty/lack of opportunity” are the next two highest rated factors driving religious extremism. Lack of education is noted as the most important factor by Lebanese and Jordanians, and is in the second position in Iran. Poverty is recognized as the most important factor driving religious extremism by Iraqis, and is ranked second by Egyptians.

“Foreign countries providing funding and training,” “the alienation and frustration of young people,” and “foreign occupations/interventions” are generally rated in the bottom half of factors driving religious extremism. However, foreign funding is the top factor among Egyptians, and the alienation of youth is ranked high in Turkey and Iran.

“Anger at the United States” is the least important factor in all countries surveyed, though majorities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Turkey do note it as important.

Table 37: Defeating Violent Extremist Groups

On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “the most important” and 5 being “the least important”), how important are the following to the effort to defeat violent extremist groups?

		Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Iran	Turkey
Use of military and police force	Most Important	95	32	47	78	97	59	47	93
	Least important	2	47	44	15	<1	27	34	3
Countering the messages and ideas promoted by recruiters for extremist groups	Most Important	95	52	57	82	98	65	48	85
	Least important	1	24	17	8	1	14	31	11
Changing the political and social realities that cause young people to be attracted to extremist ideas	Most Important	97	55	61	83	96	74	42	92
	Least important	<1	22	26	9	1	16	31	6

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding, and because responses of “3” are not included. Most important is the aggregation of responses of 1 and 2. Least important is the aggregation of responses of 4 and 5.

Majorities in seven of the eight countries surveyed say that “changing the political and social realities that cause young people to be attracted to extremist ideas” is important to defeating violent extremist groups. There is near unanimity in Egypt (97%) and UAE (96%), followed by high levels of agreement in Turkey (92%), Saudi Arabia (83%), and Iraq (74%). Changing the realities of young people’s lives is also considered the most important effort by Jordanians (61%) and Lebanese (55%). Only in Iran is this strategy called important by less than a majority (42%).

“Countering the messages and ideas promoted by recruiters for extremist groups” is also considered important by majorities in all countries surveyed except Iran (where 48% say it’s important).

The “use of military and police force” is deemed important by almost all respondents in UAE (97%), Egypt (95%), and Turkey (93%), and majorities in Saudi Arabia (78%) and Iraq (59%). Less than half of the respondents in Jordan (47%) and Iran (47%) and one-third of those in Lebanon (32%) call use of the military and police important for defeating violent extremist groups.

Table 38: Combating Extremist Sectarian Violence

How do you evaluate the role played by each of the following countries in combating extremist sectarian violence?

		Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Iran	Turkey
United States	Positive	16	17	31	15	11	10	7	22
	Negative	85	83	69	85	89	90	93	78
UAE	Positive	86	39	60	79		25	15	16
	Negative	14	61	40	21		75	85	84
Turkey	Positive	53	50	74	59	63	43	38	
	Negative	47	50	26	42	38	57	62	
Iran	Positive	5	50	1	14	11	36		23
	Negative	95	50	99	86	89	64		77
Saudi Arabia	Positive	92	40	68		91	39	13	84
	Negative	8	61	32		9	61	87	16

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Positive is the aggregation of the responses “a very positive role” and “a somewhat positive role.” Negative is the aggregation of the responses “a somewhat negative role” and “a very negative role.”

Turkey gets the most consistently positive reviews for its role in combating extremist sectarian violence, including majorities in Jordan (74%), UAE (63%), Saudi Arabia (59%), and Egypt (53%). Opinion is evenly split in Lebanon, while majorities in Iraq (57%) and Iran (62%) view Turkey’s role as negative.

The roles of Saudi Arabia and the UAE are viewed positively by wide margins in some countries. Saudi Arabia’s top ratings come from Egypt (92%), UAE (91%), and Turkey (84%), and a majority in Jordan (68%), while four in 10 respondents in Lebanon (40%) and Iraq (39%) and just 13% in Iran think the Kingdom’s role is positive. The UAE’s top ratings come from Egypt (86%), Saudi Arabia (79%), and Jordan (60%), while 39% of Lebanese and fewer than one-quarter of respondents in Iraq (25%), Turkey (16%), and Iran (15%) see the UAE as playing a positive role in combating extremist sectarian violence.

The roles of the United States and Iran in combating extremist sectarian violence are viewed the most negatively. In Jordan, 31% of respondents view the United States’ role as positive; in the other seven countries surveyed fewer than one-quarter of respondents see the U.S. role as positive. With respect to Iran, Lebanese opinion is evenly split between

positive and negative, and 36% of Iraqis view Iran's role as positive, while fewer than one-quarter of respondents in the other countries surveyed agree.

IRAQ (INTERNAL)


Table 39: Confidence in Leaders/Groups in Iraq

On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 meaning "great confidence" and 5 meaning "no confidence at all") how much confidence do you have in each of the following?

Rank			All Iraqis	Sunni	Shia	Kurds
1	The Iraqi military	Confident	55	17	68	52
		Not confident	26	48	17	28
2	Popular Mobilization Units	Confident	48	6	61	47
		Not confident	37	71	26	38
3	The leadership of the central government in Baghdad	Confident	19	5	24	19
		Not confident	55	74	48	59
4	My local/tribal leadership	Confident	18	14	20	16
		Not confident	50	48	48	51
5	The effort being made by the international coalition fighting Daesh	Confident	15	2	19	16
		Not confident	71	90	65	72
6	The leadership of the Kurdish Regional Government	Confident	14	17	12	19
		Not confident	42	15	54	34
7	Daesh	Confident	6	16	3	5
		Not confident	88	74	93	88

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding, and because responses of "3" are not included. Confident is the aggregation of the responses of 1 and 2. Not confident is the aggregation of the responses of 4 and 5. The leaders/groups are listed in rank order based on the percentages of 1 and 2 responses.

A deep sectarian divide exists in the confidence Iraqis feel toward the military and the Popular Mobilization Units.



Iraqis were asked to rate their confidence in a number of groups operating in their country. The only group to earn the confidence of a majority of Iraqis is the military (55%); a close second is taken by the Popular Mobilization Units (48%). In both cases, however, there is a deep sectarian divide at work. While among Shia 68% have confidence in the military and 61% have confidence in the Popular Mobilization Units, among Sunnis just 17% and 6%, respectively, share this confidence. (Kurds have a fair degree of confidence in both of these groups—military: 52% and PMUs: 47%.)


No other leadership or group garners the confidence of 20% of the Iraqi people. The confidence level for the leadership of the central government in Baghdad is 19% (S Sunni: 5%, Shia: 24%, Kurds: 19%), for local and tribal leadership 18% (S Sunni: 14%, Shia: 20%, Kurds: 16%), for the effort being made by the international coalition fighting Daesh 15% (S Sunni: 2%, Shia: 19%, Kurds: 16%), for the leadership of the Kurdish Regional Government 14% (S Sunni: 17%, Shia: 12%, Kurds: 19%), and for Daesh just 6% having confidence (S Sunni: 16%, Shia: 3%, Kurds: 5%) and 88% saying they have no confidence.

Table 40: Effective Actors Against Daesh
How effective have each of the following actors been in the conflict against Daesh?

RANK			All Iraqis	Sunni	Shia	Kurds
1	The forces of the Kurdish Regional Government	Effective	57	60	55	60
		Ineffective	43	40	45	40
2	Popular Mobilization Units	Effective	50	7	67	42
		Ineffective	50	93	33	58
3	The central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military	Effective	47	18	60	38
		Ineffective	53	82	40	63
4	Iran	Effective	45	5	61	39
		Ineffective	55	95	39	61
5	The U.S.-led international coalition	Effective	15	21	13	22
		Ineffective	85	79	88	78

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Effective is the aggregation of the responses “very effective” and “somewhat effective.” Ineffective is the aggregation of the responses “somewhat ineffective” and “very ineffective.” The leaders/groups are listed in rank order based on the percentages of “effective” responses.

Shia respondents are far more likely to find the Popular Mobilization Units, Iran, Baghdad’s central government, and the Iraqi military effective than their Sunni counterparts.



When asked to rate the effectiveness of five actors in the conflict against Daesh, Iraqis rate the forces of the Kurdish Regional Government (57%) highest, followed by the Popular Mobilization Units (50%), the central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military (47%), and Iran (45%). The U.S.-led international coalition is ranked last with just 15% of Iraqis saying it has been effective.

Again, we find a significant sectarian divide on these questions. Shia respondents are far more likely to find the Popular Mobilization Units effective than their Sunni counterparts (67% vs. 7%), and the same is true for Iran (61% vs. 5%) and the central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military (60% vs. 18%).

Table 41: Leading Struggle Against Daesh

Which of the following actors should be given the lead role in the struggle against Daesh?

	All Iraqis	Sunni	Shia	Kurd
The central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military	43	23	52	33
The Popular Mobilization Units	18	3	25	16
The forces of the Kurdish Regional Government	17	37	7	23
The local tribal leadership	16	26	13	18
The U.S.-led international coalition	6	11	4	11

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Despite the effectiveness ratings (see Table 40), when asked which of the actors should be given the lead role in the struggle against Daesh, a plurality of Iraqi respondents (43%) point to the central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military. Fewer than one in five respondents say the lead role should fall to the Popular Mobilization Units (18%), the forces of the Kurdish Regional Government (17%), and the local tribal leadership (16%). Only 6% of respondents say the U.S.-led international coalition should have the lead role in fighting Daesh.

While more than one-half of Shia respondents (52%) say the lead role should be given to the Iraqi government and military, just one-quarter of Sunnis (23%) and one-third of Kurds (33%) agree. Among Sunnis, the top choice for leading the struggle against Daesh is Kurdish forces (37%), though only 7% of Shia Iraqis agree. There are similar divides when it comes to the Popular Mobilization Units (Sunni: 3% vs. Shia: 25%) and local tribal leadership (Sunni: 26% vs. Shia: 13%).

Table 42: Best Resolution for Conflict in Iraq

What is the best way to ultimately resolve the conflict that is taking place in Iraq?

	All Iraqis	Sunni	Shia	Kurds
Forming a more inclusive, representative government	60	79	53	58
Greater use of military force to defeat Daesh	25	5	31	26
Partition of the country	16	16	16	16

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Overall, six in 10 Iraqis say the best way to resolve the conflict in their country is the formation of a more inclusive, representative government. Sunni respondents are even more likely to select this as the ultimate resolution (79% vs. Shia: 53% vs. Kurds: 58%). One-quarter of Iraqis say the conflict would best be resolved by the greater use of military force to defeat Daesh, a view held by about one-third of Shia respondents (31%), one-quarter of Kurds (26%), and just

5% of Sunnis. Partition of the country is the least favored option, with just 16% of respondents saying it is the best way to resolve Iraq’s conflict; support for this option is identical among all three subgroups.

Table 43: Iraqi Government in Next Five Years

How confident are you that in the next 5 years Iraqis will be able to form a government that is accepted by all segments of Iraqi society?

	All Iraqis	Sunni	Shia	Kurds
Confident	29	15	33	31
Not confident	71	85	67	70

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Confident is the aggregation of the responses “very confident” and “somewhat confident.” Not confident is the aggregation of the responses “not so confident” and “not confident at all.”

Overall, 29% of Iraqis have confidence that they will be able to form a government that is accepted by all segments of Iraqi society in the next five years, while 71% do not have confidence in this possibility. Shia (33%) and Kurdish (31%) respondents are twice as likely to be optimistic as their Sunni counterparts (15%).

IRAN (INTERNAL)

Table 44: Iranian Support for Nuclear Agreement	
How supportive are you of the nuclear agreement concluded between your country and the P5+1?	
	Iran
Supportive	80
Not supportive	20

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Supportive is the aggregation of the responses “very supportive” and “somewhat supportive.” Not supportive is the aggregation of the responses “not so supportive” and “not supportive at all.”

Eight in 10 Iranian respondents are supportive of the nuclear agreement concluded between Iran and the P5+1, with one-third saying they are “very supportive,” while 20% are not supportive of the agreement.

Table 45: Iranian Interests and the Nuclear Agreement	
In your opinion, were your country’s interests served by this agreement?	
	Iran
Agree	81
Disagree	19

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Agree is the aggregation of the responses “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree.” Disagree is the aggregation of the responses “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree.”

And when asked if they think Iran’s interests were served by the agreement, responses mirror the levels of support noted above, with eight in 10 agreeing that their country’s interests were served.

Table 46: Opinion on Iran’s Accepting Limits on Nuclear Program	
Was it a good or bad idea for your government to have accepted limits on its nuclear program?	
	Iran
A good idea	32
A bad idea	68

Despite their support of the agreement and their belief that their country’s interests were served by the agreement (noted above), Iranians are still twice as likely to say that their government’s acceptance of limits on its nuclear program was a bad idea (68%) rather than a good idea (32%).

Table 47: Priorities for Iranian Government			
Now that some of the international sanctions imposed against your country will be lifted, how much of a priority should each of the following be for your government? Answer from 1 to 5 (with 1 being a “most important priority” to 5 “not a priority”).			
Rank			Iran
1	Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Priority	81
		Not a priority	4
2	Advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights	Priority	75
		Not a priority	6

2015

3	Improving relations with Arab governments	Priority	60
		Not a priority	14
4	Improving relations with the United States and the West	Priority	59
		Not a priority	16
5	Giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen	Priority	48
		Not a priority	23

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding, and because responses of “3” are not included. Priority is the aggregation of the responses of 1 and 2. Not a priority is the aggregation of the responses of 4 and 5. The priorities are listed in rank order based on the percentages of 1 and 2 responses.

More than eight in 10 respondents identify “investing in improving the economy and creating employment” as an important priority for their government.



Iranian respondents were asked to rate a series of government policies on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “a most important priority” and 5 is “not a priority.” A clear picture of the Iranian people’s priorities for their government emerges from their responses. More than eight in 10 respondents identify “investing in improving the economy and creating employment” as an important priority, while just 4% say it should not be a priority for their government. Three-quarters of Iranians say “advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights” is an important priority, while just 6% say it is not. General foreign policy priorities are ranked third and fourth: “improving relations with Arab governments” (60%) and “improving relations with the United States and the West” (59%). And, finally, 48% of Iranian respondents say “giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen” should be a government priority.

Table 48: Opinion on Iran’s Having Nuclear Weapons
Which best reflects your opinion on your country having nuclear weapons?

	2014	2015
My country should have nuclear weapons because it is a major nation.	49	20
As long as other countries have nuclear weapons, we need them also.	38	49
Nuclear weapons are always wrong and so no country, including my own, should have them.	14	32

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

In our most recent polling, one-third of Iranian respondents say that nuclear weapons are wrong and no country should have them (32%). The remaining two-thirds are divided between those who say that Iran should have nuclear weapons either because other countries do (49%) or because it is a major nation (20%).

There has been a shift in these opinions since 2014’s polling on the same issue, when less than half the number of respondents said “nuclear weapons are wrong” (14%) and more than twice as many respondents noted Iran’s being a major nation as the justification for having nuclear weapons (49% in 2014 vs. 20% in 2015).

There has been a shift in Iranians’ opinions of their country having nuclear weapons since 2014.




Table 49: Better Off/Worse Off

Do you feel that you will be better off or worse off in the next 3 years, or do you feel that your situation will be about the same?

	2013	2014	2015
Better off	43	41	46
Worse off	27	23	21
About the same	22	30	33

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

According to the current survey, almost half of Iranians (46%) believe that their situation will be better in the next three years as a result of this agreement, more than twice as many who say they will be worse off (21%). The remaining one-third say their situation will be about the same (33%).

These numbers are quite similar to those from 2013 and 2014, though they may reflect a slight trend of growing optimism among Iranians, with an uptick in those saying they expect to be better off in the next three years and a decrease in those who say they will be worse off.

Table 50: Iran-U.S. Relations

Do you feel that in the next three years your country’s relations with the United States will...?

	Iran
Significantly improve	32
Slightly improve	32
Worsen	13
Stay the same	24

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

2015

Almost two-thirds of Iranian respondents feel that Iran's relations with the United States will improve in the next three years because of the agreement (significantly improve: 32% and slightly improve: 32%). One-quarter say that Iranian-U.S. relations will stay the same. Just 13% feel the relationship will worsen because of this agreement.

Table 51: Iran's Role in the Region	
Which best reflects your view of your country's future role in the region?	
	Iran
My country should be the dominant player in the Gulf region.	19
My country should develop peaceful relations based on equality with other countries in the Gulf region.	37
My country should not be involved in the Gulf region. It should focus on internal matters: building our economy and our society.	44


When asked about their view of Iran's future role in the region, a plurality of respondents (44%) say they hold the view that Iran should not be involved in the Gulf region, but rather should focus on internal matters including building their economy and society. This opinion is closely followed by the view (37%) that Iran should develop peaceful relations based on equality with its Gulf region neighbors. Fewer than one in five respondents (19%) hold the view that Iran should be the dominant player in the Gulf region.

Table 52: Iran's Regional Involvement				
How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in each of the following countries?				
Rank			2014	2015
1	Syria	Important	90	73
		Not important	7	27
2	Lebanon	Important	88	72
		Not important	10	28
3	Iraq	Important	87	64
		Not important	10	36
4	Bahrain	Important	82	57
		Not important	16	44
5	Yemen	Important	62	43
		Not important	36	57
6	Afghanistan	Important	N/A	38
		Not important	N/A	62

Note: Important is the aggregation of the responses "very important" and "somewhat important." Not important is the aggregation of the responses "not so important" and "not important at all." Rank order is by percentage of respondents in 2015 who rated the involvement important.

2015

The only alteration in rank between 2014 and 2015 is the increased importance of government involvement in Lebanon.



In both 2014 and 2015, Iranians were asked to rate the importance of their government's continued involvement in six countries. In the most recent polling, the top two selections are Syria (73%) and Lebanon (72%), followed by Iraq (64%) and Bahrain (57%). Less than one-half of Iranians say that it is important for their government to continue its involvement in Yemen (43%) and Afghanistan (38%).

The percentages of respondents saying these involvements are important were higher across the board in 2014 than in 2015.

2015

APPENDIX A—METHODODOLOGY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Demographics

	Lebanon	Jordan	Egypt	KSA *	UAE *	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Male	50	50	50	55	67	50	50	51
Female	50	50	50	45	33	50	50	49
Under 30	35	45	39	40	37	45	32	38
Over 30	65	55	61	60	63	55	68	62
Sunni	27	91	89	88	85	33	85	5
Shia	28	2	1	12	10	67	15	95
Christian	39	2	10	0	5	-	-	-
Druze	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Live in city	89	79	65	83	86	66	76	76
Live outside city	11	21	35	17	14	34	24	24

* The samples in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are not evenly divided between male and female subjects because of the disproportionate number of males in these populations with the inclusion of residents (who are predominantly male) in addition to citizens.

Geographic Coverage

Country	Coverage
Lebanon	Beirut (East & West Beirut), Baabda, El Maten, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, Saayda
Jordan	Amman City, Balqa, Madaba, Irbid, Zarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba
Egypt	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban & rural), Menia (urban & rural), Asyut (urban & rural), Tanta (urban & rural)
KSA	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Shammasyah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail and Hufuf
UAE	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Iraq	Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Karbala, Nassiriyah, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Haymana, Ceyhan
Iran	Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, Ahwaz

Sample Sizes, Dates of Survey, Margins of Error


Country	Sample Size	Dates of Survey	MOE
Lebanon	823	September 4–22, 2015	±3.5
Jordan	822	September 4–22, 2015	±3.5
Egypt	1,030	September 3–18, 2015	±3.1
KSA	1,035	September 3–22, 2015	±3.1
UAE	832	September 4–22, 2015	±3.5
Iraq	1,033	September 4–23, 2015	±3.1
Turkey	1,037	September 3–23, 2015	±3.1
Iran	1,027	September 4–20, 2015	±3.1

Sampling Methodology

In each country, the selected study centers were stratified depending on the predominant social class/income levels of the people residing in various areas (and in case of Beirut, the religious clusters). This is because in most cities/towns, people of a specific social class/income segment/religious grouping tend to stay in clusters. These strata were further sub-divided into blocks of roughly equal size, based on available data about population. Thereafter, blocks were selected at random depending on the sample size for that center and keeping in mind the social class/religious cluster distribution. A pre-assigned number of starting points were used for each selected block and sampling within the blocks was undertaken using right hand rule method. Within each selected household that agreed to participate, we took an inventory of all family members over 18 years of age and randomly selected one adult to be interviewed in a way that ensured that both genders had an equal chance of inclusion, with no one allowed to self-select into the sample.

2016

Middle East 2016: Current Conditions & the Road Ahead



MIDDLE EAST 2016:

Current Conditions & the Road Ahead

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between September 17 and October 10, 2016, Zogby Research Services (ZRS) conducted face-to-face personal interviews in eight countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran). A total of 7,173 adults were surveyed on their attitudes toward important countries that are playing critical roles in the Middle East, and the obstacles to peace and stability, the sources of conflict, and causes of extremism in the region. We also surveyed Iranian's satisfaction with their government's performance on a range of domestic and foreign policies. Because, in the past few years, ZRS has conducted similar polls in these same countries, we were able to measure changes in attitudes, where they occurred.

I. Attitudes Toward Other Countries

- **Saudi Arabia has the highest favorable ratings across the region**—everywhere but Iran. Saudi Arabia is also seen in all the Arab countries as making a positive contribution to “peace and stability.” And majorities in every country covered in the poll view good relations with Saudi Arabia as important—including Iran.
- **Attitudes toward Iran continue to plummet in every country—including, for the first time, in Lebanon and Iraq**, where majorities now give Iran a net negative score. In no country does a majority of respondents see Iran playing a positive role in the region or view it as important to have good relations with that country.
- **Once held in high esteem in every Arab country, Turkey has suffered declines in favorable attitudes in all countries covered in our survey**, with only Jordan and Lebanon now giving Turkey a net favorable rating and only Jordan and Saudi Arabia seeing Turkey as making a contribution to peace and stability in the Arab World.
- Despite being viewed by majorities everywhere as “not contributing to peace and stability,” favorable attitudes toward the United States have risen in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. At the same time, they have declined in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Iraqis continue to hold extremely negative views of the United States and its role in the region. **Nevertheless, the percentage of respondents who say that relations with the United States are important far exceeds the US's favorable ratings**—including between two-thirds and three-quarters of Lebanese, Emiratis, and Jordanians.
- **Russia only scores a positive rating in Iran.** Across the Arab World and Turkey, strong majorities see Russia's role as negative.
- Across the eight countries covered in the survey, only a handful of respondents have “somewhat favorable” views of Israel. None see Israel contributing to “peace and stability” and virtually none see any importance in having relations with Israel.

II. Obstacles to Stability and Sources of Conflict

- When asked to identify the greatest obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East **pluralities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey identify the “continuing occupation of Palestinian lands.”** Surprisingly, **in the other**

countries covered in the survey, that issue receives only scant mention.

- It is important to note that **the obstacles that rank highest in most countries and second in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are internal problems**—the “lack of representative government in some Arab countries” and “tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries.” These are followed by “the threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda” and “economic inequality and the lack of employment opportunities in some Arab countries.”
- Although mentioned by about one in five respondents, Iranian and/or American interference in the Arab World still rank near the bottom of the list of obstacles. Interestingly, **negative assessments of the US and Iran’s roles are only ranked in the top tier in Iraq.**
- **Despite frequently heard complaints about the lack of US leadership in the region, that issue places last in the list of obstacles cited by respondents.**
- When turning to the way respondents assess the main factors behind instability and conflict in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, once again it appears that internal factors are viewed as holding the greatest importance.
- **In Syria, the lack of representative government is seen as the main source of conflict** followed by Daesh/al Qaeda. In Libya, it’s tribal or regional rivalries followed by Daesh/al Qaeda. In Yemen, the main factors are seen to be tribal, regional, or sectarian rivalries, followed closely by the lack of representative government. And in Iraq, it’s Daesh followed by internal regional, sect, and ethnic rivalries.
- **The US role is seen as a major contributing factor to instability mainly in Iraq. In no country is the lack of US leadership viewed as an issue creating instability.** Where “other countries” are seen to be a source of conflict, in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, respondents point mainly to the United States and Iran as the problems. In all countries, Russia is identified as a negative factor in Syria. And Saudi Arabia is also mentioned as a source of conflict in Yemen by Turks, Iraqis, Jordanians, Egyptians, and Iranians.

III. Causes of Extremism and How to Deal With the Threat

- **When looked at separately, the Arab countries and Turkey give very different responses than Iran does when asked to identify the main reasons why Muslims would join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria.** The former overwhelmingly see “outrage at the Assad regime” as the principal factor. This is followed by “anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogates” and the concern that “these [extremist] groups are attractive because of their fighting skills and the victories they have won.” Iranians, on the other hand, identify the concern that young Muslims are “being inspired by extremist preachers or websites” or are “frustrated with the life they are living in their own country and the desire for adventure.”
- How best to stop the flow of young recruits who seek to join extremist groups in Syria? **Far and away the top two steps endorsed by Arab and Turkish respondents to dry up support for Daesh are to defeat them militarily and to “negotiate a solution leading to a national unity government without Bashar al Assad.”** The least favored option is a negotiated solution that would include Assad. Iranians agree with defeating Daesh, but also favor a solution that includes Assad in the government.
- **In the case of Iraq, Arab and Turkish respondents identify the reasons why Daesh could win recruits as anger at “the sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad,” “the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogates,” and “the failure of other governments to be more ... effective in changing the policies of the government in Baghdad.”** Once again, Iranians see the role of extremist preachers and websites as a principal factor motivating young Muslims to fight with Daesh. The only area in which Iranians find agreement with the respondents from the Arab countries and Turkey is with respect to the negative role played by the sectarian

policies pursued by the government in Baghdad.

- For their part, Iraqi respondents display some slight differences along sectarian lines—but these are mainly matters of emphasis. Iraqis who are Shi'a list the “failure of other governments [to press for changes in] the policies of the government in Baghdad” and “outrage at the sectarian policies of the government” as the top two factors contributing to Daesh recruitment efforts, while Sunni Iraqis list “outrage at the sectarian policies of the government” and “anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogate militias.” Interestingly, there are only slight differences in the responses provided by Arab and Kurdish respondents.
- Turning to the steps that should be taken to stop recruits from joining Daesh in Iraq, **Arabs and Turks favor “reforming the government in Iraq, making it representative of all the groups in the country”** as their first choice. This option is followed by militarily defeating Daesh and confronting Iran and its surrogates. Iranians agree with defeating Daesh and reforming the government in Baghdad but do not want to have their role in Iraq confronted. Instead they favor “more diplomacy to bring all parties together to defeat Daesh” as the way forward.
- For their part, Iraqis overwhelmingly choose reforming their government and defeating Daesh—with Sunni and Shi'a respondents largely agreeing. The only major difference between the two sects is over the need to confront Iran and its surrogates, with Sunnis seeing this step as significantly more important than their Shi'a compatriots.
- **In assessing how best to stop extremist recruiting, there is near consensus in all the countries surveyed that the two most important steps to be taken are “changing the political and social circumstances ... that lead some young people to become attracted to extremist ideas” and then “countering the messages and ideas promoted by extremist groups.”**
- Iraq is the only country covered in the survey where a plurality of respondents are very concerned that they or their families “may be at risk from the threat of attacks from violent extremist groups.”
- **When asked to assess the confidence they have in the work being done by various entities in combating extremist groups, respondents in every country covered in the survey give local police and intelligence agencies the highest grades.** Religious leaders receive high confidence scores in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and UAE, while only Emiratis demonstrate a high degree of confidence in the work being done by their country's political leadership.

IV. Iran

- It appears that **Iranians remain restless and dissatisfied with the direction taken by their government.** When asked whether they believe they are better off or worse off than they were three years ago, only one-third of Iranians feel they are better off today.
- In 2015, 81% of Iranians rated “investing in the economy and creating employment” as the most important priority for their government, followed by 75% who said the top priority should be “advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights.” While 51% are at least somewhat satisfied with the government's economic performance, they are much less pleased with its performance in the second area. Only 30% are satisfied that democracy has been advanced. And while 59% hoped for improved relations with the United States, only 15% are satisfied with their government's efforts in this area.
- **Part of their dissatisfaction can be attributed to a weariness with their government's involvement in regional conflicts.** In 2015, “giving support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen” was rated the lowest priority receiving the support of only 48% of Iranians. Support for these foreign involvements has steadily declined since 2014, dropping precipitously in each area: Syria from 90% to 24%; Lebanon from 88% to 43%; Iraq from 87% to 47%; and Yemen from 62% to 39%.

RESULTS

I. Attitudes Toward Other Countries

For each of the following countries, please tell us if your attitude is favorable or unfavorable.									
		Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
United States	Favorable	38	52	35	28	28	6	21	12
	Unfavorable	62	46	65	72	69	94	79	87
Turkey	Favorable	33	56	79	35	41	30	—	35
	Unfavorable	67	44	21	65	59	70	—	64
Saudi Arabia	Favorable	84	57	85	—	76	68	83	36
	Unfavorable	16	41	15	—	23	31	17	62
Iran	Favorable	6	49	18	9	29	39	9	—
	Unfavorable	94	51	82	90	71	61	90	—
Russia	Favorable	49	33	35	24	40	28	10	57
	Unfavorable	51	67	65	76	59	71	87	43
Israel	Favorable	0	0	0	<1	0	0	0	2
	Unfavorable	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	97


Favorable is the aggregation of responses of "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable." Unfavorable is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat unfavorable" and "very unfavorable." Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included.

		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		KSA		UAE		Iraq		Turkey		Iran	
		Favorable	Unfavorable														
United States	2012	10	87	21	79	24	73	62	33	28	69	13	79	33	66	8	88
	2015	16	84	32	68	20	80	51	49			1	99				
	2016	38	62	52	46	35	65	28	72	28	69	6	94	21	79	12	87
Turkey	2012	89	9	49	50	68	27	71	24	58	38	41	55			69	28
	2015	50	50	83	17	90	10	74	26			80	20				
	2016	33	67	56	44	79	21	35	65	41	59	30	70			35	64
Saudi Arabia	2012	94	6	34	65	81	15			84	16	54	43	69	30	26	70
	2015	79	21	74	26	89	11			49	51						
	2016	84	16	57	41	85	15			76	23	68	31	83	17	36	62
Iran	2006	89	9			75	15	85	14	68	31						
	2008	69	14	71	28	44	55	72	25	56	41						
	2009	41	44	62	31	31	68	35	58	13	87						
	2011	37	63	63	37	23	77	6	80	22	70						
	2012	34	64	84	16	23	74	15	84	27	69	61	36	22	77		
	2015	32	68	72	28	28	72	23	77								
Russia	2012	17	80	39	60	34	62	11	84	50	46	33	61	23	75	74	22
	2013	24	72	53	46	25	73	11	80	37	62						
	2016	49	51	33	67	35	65	24	76	40	59	28	71	10	87	57	43

Favorable is the aggregation of responses of "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable." Unfavorable is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat unfavorable" and "very unfavorable." Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included.

2016

Favorability Ratings: Turkey (2012–2016), Saudi Arabia (2012–2016), Iran (2008–2016)



Saudi Arabia is the only country to receive consistently high ratings from all the Arab countries surveyed as well as from Turkey. More than eight in 10 respondents in Jordan (85%), Egypt (84%), and Turkey (83%) hold a favorable view of the Kingdom, as well as three-quarters of those in the UAE, two-thirds in Iraq, and a majority in Lebanon. In Iran, 36% have a favorable opinion of Saudi Arabia. These views are somewhat in line with previous years' polling, with favorables up in the UAE, Iraq, and Turkey, and a decline evident in Lebanon.

Majorities in Jordan (79%) and Lebanon (56%) have favorable views of **Turkey**, while only about one-third of respondents in the other surveyed countries concur (UAE: 41%, Iran: 35%, Saudi Arabia: 35%, Egypt: 33%, Iraq: 30%). **This year's numbers represent a significant decline in Turkey's favorables across the board**, with the biggest declines seen in Saudi Arabia (from 74% to 35%), Iraq (from 80% to 30%), and Lebanon (from 83% to 56%).

A slim majority in Lebanon view the **United States** favorably (52%), while between one-quarter and one-third of respondents in Egypt (38%), Jordan (35%), Saudi Arabia (28%), and the UAE (28%) agree. Two in 10 respondents in Turkey hold a favorable view of the United States, while positive opinions are even scarcer in Iran (12%) and Iraq (6%). These favorable ratings in Iraq, Iran, and the UAE are consistent with past years' polling, but we find significant increases in favorability toward the United States in Egypt (from 16% to 38%), Lebanon (from 32% to 52%), and Jordan (from 20% to 35%) and steep declines in Saudi Arabia (from 51% to 28%) and Turkey (from 33% to 21%).

Russia is viewed favorably by a majority only in Iran (57%), though almost one-half of Egyptians (49%) and four in 10 respondents in the UAE (40%) also hold favorable views of Russia. One-quarter to one-third of respondents in Jordan (35%), Lebanon (33%), Iraq (28%), and Saudi Arabia (24%) also have positive opinions of Russia, while just 10% of those in Turkey are favorable. Views in Iraq, the UAE, and Jordan are fairly stable, while we find increases in favorability in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and declines in Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon.

2016

About one-half of respondents in Lebanon view **Iran** favorably (49%), as do 39% of those in Iraq and 29% in the UAE. Favorability is very low in Jordan (18%), Turkey (9%), Saudi Arabia (9%), and Egypt (6%). **Only in the UAE has Iran's favorability remained stable; in all other countries we see significant declines from past polling.**

Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?									
		Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
The United States contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	6	11	6	3	6	1	4	2
	Somewhat agree	26	35	17	16	16	5	26	4
	Total agree	32	46	23	19	22	6	30	6
	Somewhat disagree	45	25	39	33	35	48	37	35
	Strongly disagree	23	29	38	48	42	46	33	56
	Total disagree	68	54	77	81	77	94	70	91
Turkey contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	17	19	30	20	20	12	50	8
	Somewhat agree	19	26	43	31	20	19	30	18
	Total agree	36	45	73	51	40	31	80	26
	Somewhat disagree	42	28	13	27	27	38	12	38
	Strongly disagree	22	26	14	20	33	31	5	30
	Total disagree	64	54	27	47	60	69	17	68
Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	37	51	39	51	71	28	11	12
	Somewhat agree	49	9	42	47	10	39	28	21
	Total agree	86	60	81	98	81	67	39	33
	Somewhat disagree	12	24	10	1	6	23	18	19
	Strongly disagree	2	16	10	2	13	10	43	41
	Total disagree	14	40	20	3	19	33	61	60
Iran contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	1	18	5	1	10	10	4	60
	Somewhat agree	4	22	11	7	14	13	6	18
	Total agree	5	40	16	8	24	23	10	78
	Somewhat disagree	55	15	28	36	25	43	36	15
	Strongly disagree	40	45	56	56	51	34	53	5
	Total disagree	95	60	84	92	76	77	89	20
Russia contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	11	8	2	3	2	13	1	22
	Somewhat agree	27	24	17	8	14	15	8	27
	Total agree	38	32	19	11	16	28	9	49
	Somewhat disagree	43	31	47	35	47	45	41	21
	Strongly disagree	19	36	34	53	37	26	49	28
	Total disagree	62	67	81	88	84	71	90	49
Israel contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	Strongly agree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Somewhat agree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total agree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Somewhat disagree	4	3	15	38	11	32	17	8
	Strongly disagree	96	97	85	61	89	68	83	90
	Total disagree	100	100	100	99	100	100	100	98

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included.

2016

When asked if the same countries discussed above contribute to peace and stability in the region, responses closely track favorability ratings. Again, we find Saudi Arabia receiving the most positive responses, with more than eight in 10 respondents in Egypt (86%), the UAE (81%), and Jordan (81%) as well as 67% in Iraq and 60% in Lebanon saying Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and stability in the region. Only in Turkey do we find a significant difference

between the percentage who view the Kingdom favorably (83%) and who agree that it contributes to regional peace and stability (39%). Iranian respondents are least likely to say that Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World (33%).

Aside from Saudi Arabia, only with respect to Turkey do majorities of respondents in any surveyed countries find positive contributions to peace and stability in the Arab World. Seventy-three percent (73%) of those in Jordan and 51% of those in Saudi Arabia agree that Turkey contributes to regional peace, as do 45% in Lebanon, 40% in the UAE, and 36% in Egypt.

Russia is seen as a contributor to peace and stability in the Middle East by almost half of respondents in Iran (49%), as well as 38% of Egyptians; fewer than one-third of respondents in all other countries view Russia as helpful in this regard. Similarly, only in Lebanon does a significant percentage of respondents agree that the United States (46%) and Iran (40%) contribute to regional peace and stability, while fewer than one-third in all other surveyed countries agree.

Again, respondents in all countries surveyed are unanimous that Israel does not contribute to peace and stability in the region.

How important is it for your country to have good relations with each of the following countries?									
		Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
United States	Very important	8	35	16	19	34	8	13	11
	Somewhat important	37	39	51	27	41	8	33	22
	Total important	45	74	67	46	75	16	46	33
	Not very important	40	16	28	32	19	43	28	41
	Not important at all	13	10	4	19	6	41	26	25
	Total not important	53	26	32	51	25	84	54	66
Turkey	Very important	14	28	37	24	27	18		22
	Somewhat important	25	26	45	30	18	15		30
	Total important	39	54	82	54	45	33		52
	Not very important	36	29	11	24	25	37		32
	Not important at all	25	16	8	18	30	31		16
	Total not important	61	45	19	42	55	68		48
Saudi Arabia	Very important	36	55	70		70	31	30	18
	Somewhat important	50	4	11		8	37	47	34
	Total important	86	59	81		78	68	77	52
	Not very important	12	23	9		7	19	14	23
	Not important at all	2	18	11		14	12	7	22
	Total not important	14	41	20		21	31	21	45
Iran	Very important	2	23	5	4	17	10	8	
	Somewhat important	8	23	15	8	13	20	12	
	Total important	10	46	20	12	30	30	20	
	Not very important	53	26	33	45	18	34	45	
	Not important at all	37	29	47	40	52	36	35	
	Total not important	90	55	80	85	70	70	80	

2016

Russia	Very important	22	14	9	15	8	33	6	27
	Somewhat important	47	42	20	28	33	14	18	38
	Total important	69	56	29	43	41	47	24	65
	Not very important	24	23	36	28	33	30	40	21
	Not important at all	7	21	35	27	26	22	36	13
	Total not important	31	44	71	55	59	52	76	34
Israel	Very important	<1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Somewhat important	2	1	0	0	1	0	1	5
	Total important	2	2	0	0	2	0	1	5
	Not very important	11	5	9	36	9	35	12	10
	Not important at all	87	94	91	64	90	64	87	81
	Total not important	98	99	100	100	99	99	99	91
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included.									

Across the board, majorities of respondents say that it is important to have good relations with Saudi Arabia, including 86% in Egypt, 81% in Jordan, 78% in the UAE, 77% in Turkey, 68% in Iraq, and 59% in Lebanon. Even in Iran a majority notes the importance of a good relationship with Saudi Arabia (52%), a significant jump from the favorability rating given to Saudi Arabia by Iranians (36%) and the percentage of Iranians who think Saudi Arabia contributes to regional peace and stability (33%).

With respect to both Russia and the United States, many more respondents note the importance of having good relations with these countries than hold favorable opinions of them or think they contribute positively to peace and stability in the region. More than two-thirds of those in the UAE (75%), Lebanon (74%), and Jordan (67%), as well as almost half of those in Saudi Arabia (46%), Turkey (46%), and Egypt (45%), consider good relations with the United States important; in some cases these percentages are 20–40 points higher than favorability ratings. Only in Iran and Iraq do one-third or less of respondents think having a positive US relationship is important.

About two-thirds of Egyptians (69%) and Iranians (65%) consider good relations with Russia important, as do a majority of Lebanese (56%) and at least four in 10 respondents in Iraq (47%), Saudi Arabia (43%), and the UAE (41%). Again, in many of these countries, these numbers are significantly higher than the favorability ratings given to Russia.

The importance of having good relations with Turkey is noted by 82% of Jordanians, as well as majorities in Lebanon (54%), Saudi Arabia (54%), and Iran (52%). For Saudi Arabia and Iran, these percentages are 17-19 points higher than the favorability ratings respondents give to Turkey.

Only among the Lebanese do more than one-third of respondents consider having good relations with Iran important (46%).

Across the board, very few respondents in the surveyed countries feel that having a good relationship with Israel is important.

II. Obstacles to Stability and Sources of Conflict

A. Middle East

In your opinion, from the provided list, what would you say is the greatest obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East?							
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
The continuing occupation of Palestinian lands	41	1	<1	38	1	8	39
Too much US interference in the Arab World	11	8	13	18	10	19	12
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	3	1	0	1	0	<1	1
Lack of representative government in some Arab countries	12	17	15	6	20	17	9
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity in some Arab countries	13	19	18	11	15	18	13
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	7	20	18	6	18	11	6
Iran's interference in Arab affairs	6	11	16	8	17	14	9
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	7	23	20	12	19	13	10

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

From the same list, in your opinion, which is the second greatest obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East?							
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
The continuing occupation of Palestinian lands	1	3	<1	3	1	<1	3
Too much US interference in the Arab World	5	12	10	6	5	8	6
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	3	2	3	<1	8	1	1
Lack of representative government in some Arab countries	27	34	42	24	32	28	25
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity in some Arab countries	12	14	7	17	11	7	14
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	13	17	19	16	22	15	20
Iran's interference in Arab affairs	15	7	7	16	9	15	10
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	24	11	12	17	12	26	22

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Respondents were asked to choose the greatest obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East, and then asked for their choice of second greatest obstacle. A plurality of respondents in Egypt (41%), Saudi Arabia (39%), and Turkey (39%) cite the continuing occupation of Palestine as the greatest obstacle to regional peace, though it is barely mentioned in the other countries surveyed. The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda is most frequently cited as the greatest obstacle among Lebanese (23%) and Jordanians (20%); in both of these countries, however, domestic rivalries, economic inequality, and the lack of representative governments in some Arab countries are close runners up for greatest obstacle. In the UAE, the same set of obstacles vie for the top position, with lack of representative government being named by 20%, followed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda (19%), and domestic rivalries (18%). Only in Iraq does US interference earn the position of greatest obstacle to peace and stability (19%), and even there it just edges out other concerns like economic inequality (18%) and the lack of representative government (17%).

It is worth noting that when asked for the second greatest obstacle to Middle East peace and stability pluralities in every surveyed country select the lack of representative government in some Arab countries, with the highest percentage of respondents choosing this factor in Jordan (42%), and between one-third and one-quarter choosing it everywhere else.

Rank Order of Greatest Obstacles to Peace and Stability in the Middle East, by Country

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
1	Occupation of Palestine	No representative government	No representative government	Occupation of Palestine	No representative government	No representative government	Occupation of Palestine
2	No representative government	Domestic rivalries	Domestic rivalries	No representative government	Domestic rivalries	Daesh/al Qaeda	No representative government
3	Daesh/al Qaeda	Iran's interference	Daesh/al Qaeda				
4	Economic inequality	US interference	Economic inequality				
5	Iran's interference	US interference	Iran's interference	Iran's interference	Iran's interference	Domestic rivalries	Domestic rivalries
6	Domestic rivalries	Iran's interference	US interference	US interference	US interference	Economic inequality	Iran's interference
7	US interference	Occupation of Palestine	Too little US leadership	Domestic rivalries	Too little US leadership	Occupation of Palestine	US interference
8	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Occupation of Palestine	Too little US leadership	Occupation of Palestine	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership

Considering together the choices made in each country for the two greatest obstacles to peace and stability, the lack of representative government in some countries is the most frequent selection overall, followed by the threat of groups like Daesh and al Qaeda; tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries; and economic inequality and the lack of employment opportunities in some Arab countries. The occupation of Palestine (the top overall choice in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), Iranian interference, and US interference represent the next tier when considering the overall pool of responses. **Very few respondents cite too little US leadership as a significant obstacle to Middle East peace and stability.**

B. Libya

Identify the two most important factors that, in your opinion, have contributed to destabilization and conflict in Libya.								
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Too much US interference	33	34	29	19	29	25	28	40
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	11	3	3	2	3	15	10	6
Lack of representative government	31	23	22	45	24	32	31	37
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity	25	33	33	25	33	30	27	19
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	40	50	53	57	52	38	39	51
Interference by other governments	19	21	18	20	22	14	32	17
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	41	36	42	31	37	45	32	30

From the list below, which countries have interfered the most to cause destabilization and conflict in Libya? <i>[Only asked of those who selected "Interference by other governments" in the previous question.]</i>								
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
United States	77	85	97	77	94	78	80	77
Turkey	13	0	0	2	0	7	2	2
Egypt	6	22	30	14	11	22	31	25
Qatar	9	3	10	6	9	22	24	9
Saudi Arabia	1	1	1	0	1	1	11	16
UAE	4	16	16	21	0	12	29	28
Iran	40	22	41	18	24	31	41	4
China	8	0	9	1	3	0	0	4
France	35	10	12	38	8	11	27	32
U.K.	18	4	3	23	4	0	20	41

Respondents were asked to identify the top two most important factors that have contributed to destabilization and conflict in four countries in the Middle East: Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

With respect to Libya, majorities in five of the eight countries surveyed (Saudi Arabia: 57%, Jordan: 53%, UAE: 52%, Iran: 51%, and Lebanon: 50%) cite tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries as one of the most important factors contributing to the conflict; about four in 10 respondents in the other three countries concur (Egypt: 40%, Turkey: 39%, Iraq: 38%). The threat of groups like Daesh and al Qaeda is consistently seen as a significant factor in the Libyan conflict by respondents, and is the top factor identified by Iraqis (45%) and Egyptians (41%).

Overall, the next tier of factors identified by respondents that contribute to Libyan destabilization and conflict includes two internal factors (lack of representative government and economic inequality/lack of employment opportunity) as well as one external factor (too much US interference). These are cited consistently by about one-quarter to one-third of respondents in all countries, with additional concern in Saudi Arabia about the lack of representative government in Libya (45%) and in Iran about US interference (40%).

Of less concern in seven of the eight countries surveyed is interference by other governments; only in Turkey do more than one-quarter of respondents view this as a factor in the Libyan conflict (32%). These respondents point to the United States first and foremost, but also indicate interference by other countries as problematic.

The least important factor in all countries surveyed for the conflict in Libya is “too little US leadership.” Only in Iraq and Egypt do more than one in 10 respondents cite this as an important contributing factor.

C. Syria

Identify the two most important factors that, in your opinion, have contributed to destabilization and conflict in Syria.								
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Too much US interference	20	29	30	18	20	23	27	38
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	6	12	18	7	13	9	4	8
Lack of representative government	48	30	29	50	31	47	47	30
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity	25	42	37	23	36	21	23	18
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	31	33	27	32	28	20	34	43
Interference by other governments	29	25	31	36	35	51	22	23
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	42	29	28	33	36	29	43	40

Rank Order of Factors Contributing to Destabilization and Conflict in Syria, by Country

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
1	Lack of representative government	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Lack of representative government	Economic inequality	Interference by other governments	Lack of representative government	Domestic rivalries
2	Daesh/al Qaeda	Domestic rivalries	Interference by other governments	Interference by other governments	Daesh/al Qaeda	Lack of representative government	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda
3	Domestic rivalries	Lack of representative government	Too much US interference	Daesh/al Qaeda	Interference by other governments	Daesh/al Qaeda	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference
4	Interference by other governments	Too much US interference	Lack of representative government	Domestic rivalries	Lack of representative government	Too much US interference	Too much US interference	Lack of representative government
5	Economic inequality	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Economic inequality	Domestic rivalries	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Interference by other governments
6	Too much US interference	Interference by other governments	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference	Too much US interference	Domestic rivalries	Interference by other governments	Economic inequality
7	Too little US leadership							

2016

From the list below, which countries have interfered the most to cause destabilization and conflict in Syria? [Only asked of those who selected "Interference by other governments" in the previous question.]

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
United States	82	61	72	61	75	82	91	82
Turkey	7	9	17	12	23	20	3	23
Egypt	2	0	0	5	0	1	12	7
Qatar	3	0	0	7	1	14	19	6
Saudi Arabia	2	1	0	2	0	30	16	28
UAE	0	1	0	17	0	28	21	13
Iran	84	45	62	71	59	54	75	21
China	10	8	21	15	8	3	4	8
France	7	17	10	23	5	2	16	17
U.K.	9	1	<1	20	<1	1	22	19
Russia	49	75	75	68	75	76	90	84

The lack of representative government in Syria is cited by about one-half of the respondents in Saudi Arabia (50%), Egypt (48%), Iraq (47%), and Turkey (47%), and by about three in 10 respondents in Lebanon, Jordan, the UAE, and Iran, as one of the most important factors that has contributed to destabilization and conflict in Syria.

The second most frequently identified contributing factor to the Syrian conflict is the threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda, with particular concern noted by respondents in Turkey (43%), Egypt (42%), and Iran (40%).

Interference by other countries, particularly the United States, Russia, and Iran, as well as domestic rivalries comprise the next tier of factors cited by respondents as contributing to the Syrian conflict. Concern about foreign interference is identified by one-half of Iraqi respondents (51%), who are most likely to point to the United States and Russia as the interfering parties. Domestic rivalries are of concern to one-quarter to one-third of respondents overall, with even more Iranians (43%) citing this factor as significant in Syria.

Economic inequality and the lack of employment opportunities is cited as a significant contributing factor in the Syrian conflict by more than one-third of respondents in Lebanon (42%), Jordan (37%), and the UAE (36%).

The United States alone as a factor, either because of too much interference or too little leadership, are the factors least cited by respondents in all surveyed countries as contributing to destabilization and conflict in Syria. Too much US interference is of concern to more than one-quarter of respondents in Iran (38%), Jordan (30%), Lebanon (29%), and Turkey (27%), while too little US leadership is named by fewer than one in five respondents across the board.

D. Iraq

Identify the two most important factors that, in your opinion, have contributed to destabilization and conflict in Iraq.

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Too much US interference	38	32	34	36	23	21	29	45
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	3	4	1	2	7	4	3	3
Lack of representative government	25	30	29	32	20	44	31	30
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity	19	31	28	28	21	29	18	21

Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	51	42	30	40	40	28	49	45
Interference by other governments	25	20	25	14	33	23	23	17
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	39	42	52	48	56	52	48	39

Two Most Important Factors Contributing to Destabilization and Conflict in Iraq, by Country

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
1	Domestic rivalries	Domestic rivalries Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Daesh/al Qaeda	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference
2	Daesh/al Qaeda		Too much US interference	Domestic rivalries	Domestic rivalries	Lack of representative government	Daesh/al Qaeda	Domestic rivalries
3	Too much US interference	Too much US interference	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference	Interference by other governments	Economic inequality	Lack of representative government	Daesh/al Qaeda
4	Interference by other governments	Economic inequality	Lack of representative government	Lack of representative government	Too much US interference	Domestic rivalries	Too much US interference	Lack of representative government
5	Lack of representative government	Lack of representative government	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Economic inequality	Interference by other governments	Interference by other governments	Economic inequality
6	Economic inequality	Interference by other governments	Interference by other governments	Interference by other governments	Lack of representative government	Too much US interference	Economic inequality	Interference by other governments
7	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership	Too little US leadership

2016

From the list below, which countries have interfered the most to cause destabilization and conflict in Iraq? [Only asked of those who selected "Interference by other governments" in the previous question.]

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
United States	79	87	73	88	75	97	77	95
Turkey	2	0	26	3	22	25	3	27
Egypt	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Qatar	<1	<1	1	0	2	2	10	0
Saudi Arabia	0	0	10	1	4	7	6	28
UAE	0	<1	1	0	0	0	16	35
Iran	81	75	81	93	71	71	82	27
China	3	0	0	8	0	0	13	22
France	21	0	0	3	0	1	8	0
U.K.	21	0	0	11	0	0	12	35

Majorities of respondents in the UAE (56%), Jordan (52%), and Iraq itself (52%) point to **groups like Daesh and al Qaeda as the most important contributing factor to destabilization and conflict in Iraq**. Significant percentages of respondents in the other five countries surveyed concur, including 48% in Saudi Arabia, 48% in Turkey, 42% in Lebanon, 39% in Egypt, and 39% in Iran.

The second most popular response about contributing factors in the Iraqi conflict is tribal, ethnic, regional and other domestic rivalries, which are noted by a majority in Egypt (51%) as well as at least four in 10 respondents in Turkey (49%), Iran (45%), Lebanon (42%), Saudi Arabia (40%), and the UAE (40%).

The next tier of responses includes too much US interference, which is particularly noted by Iranians (45%) and least cited by Iraqis themselves (21%), and the lack of representative government in Iraq, which is particularly concerning to Iraqis (44%).

Economic inequality and interference by other countries (in this case, the United States and Iran) are noted by fewer than one-third of respondents in all countries surveyed. And finally, few respondents identify too little US leadership as a significant contributing factor to the ongoing conflict and destabilization in Iraq.

E. Yemen

Identify the two most important factors that, in your opinion, have contributed to destabilization and conflict in Yemen.

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Too much US interference	25	29	21	14	14	17	22	18
Too little US leadership in the Arab World	8	11	7	6	6	13	7	3
Lack of representative government	37	35	42	52	41	20	44	40
Economic inequality and lack of employment opportunity	23	36	32	17	33	19	31	32
Tribal, ethnic, regional or other domestic rivalries	54	36	39	65	42	44	46	45
Interference by other governments	16	21	26	24	28	48	19	25
The threat posed by groups like Daesh and al Qaeda	37	30	35	23	35	39	32	39

From the list below, which countries have interfered the most to cause destabilization and conflict in Yemen? [Only asked of those who selected "Interference by other governments" in the previous question.]

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
United States	77	60	59	74	59	76	72	66
Turkey	1	0	0	4	0	7	3	5
Egypt	4	12	12	7	26	9	12	32
Qatar	0	1	0	2	1	6	7	22
Saudi Arabia	54	34	57	12	44	57	75	72
UAE	30	0	46	14	8	28	27	59
Iran	67	72	48	62	58	67	69	12
China	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
France	0	0	0	<1	0	0	0	0
U.K.	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0

Domestic rivalries are identified as one of the most important contributing factors to destabilization and conflict in Yemen by majorities in Saudi Arabia (65%) and Egypt (54%) as well as by more than four in 10 respondents in Turkey (46%), Iran (45%), Iraq (44%), and the UAE (42%).

A lack of representative government in Yemen is also seen as an important factor by a majority in Saudi Arabia (52%) and by significant percentages in Turkey (44%), Jordan (42%), the UAE (41%), and Iran (40%).

Groups like Daesh and al Qaeda are considered significant to the conflict by at most 39% of respondents (in Iran) and at least 23% (in Saudi Arabia) with an average of about one-third viewing these threats as important to Yemen’s conflict.

Economic inequality and the lack of employment opportunities is cited by about one-third of respondents in Lebanon, the UAE, Jordan, Iran, and Turkey, and by fewer respondents in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Other foreign interference is less frequently identified, with fewer than one-quarter of respondents overall noting this as an important factor, except in Iraq where this is the most frequently cited contributing factor to Yemen’s conflict (48%). Among those who say other countries’ interference contributes to the destabilization and conflict in Yemen, the United States followed by Iran and then Saudi Arabia are most frequently pointed out as the responsible parties.

Again, too little US leadership is the least cited factor across the board.

III. Causes of Extremism and How to Deal with the Threat

A. Causes of Extremism in Syria

Which, in your opinion, are the two most important factors that would cause a Muslim to join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria?								
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Outrage at the Assad regime	50	36	48	62	47	56	52	37
The suffering of fellow Muslims	26	34	19	22	15	18	28	41
These groups are attractive because of their fighting skills and the victories they have won	24	36	46	25	50	33	22	19
Being inspired by extremist preachers or websites to believe that the way of these groups is a true path for Muslims	28	31	33	22	32	42	33	52
Anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogates	27	37	40	51	39	28	25	5
Frustration with the life they are living in their own country and the desire for adventure	44	27	15	18	16	24	40	45

When respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey were asked to identify the top two reasons a Muslim would join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria, the number one answer overall is outrage at the Assad regime. Majorities in Saudi Arabia (62%), Iraq (56%), Turkey (52%), and Egypt (50%) point to this explanation, as do a plurality in Jordan (48%) and significant percentages in the UAE (47%) and Lebanon (36%).

The next tier of reasons that these Arab and Turkish respondents note for Muslims’ joining extremist groups in Syria includes anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogates, the attractiveness of these groups because

of their fighting skills and victories, and inspiration derived from extremist preachers or websites that the way of these groups is a true path for Muslims. Anger at sectarian policies pursued by Iran is cited by one-half of Saudi respondents (51%) and about four in ten respondents in Jordan (40%) and the UAE (39%). Viewing Daesh and Jabhat al Nusra as “winners” on the battlefield is particularly noted by respondents in the UAE (50%) and Jordan (46%). And for 42% in Iraq, a reason for Muslims to join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria is inspiration from extremist preachers and websites. About one-third of respondents in Turkey, Jordan, the UAE, and Lebanon also view extremist preachers and websites as a significant factor.

A less compelling reason for respondents in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, but noted more broadly by those in Egypt (44%) and Turkey (40%) is frustration with the life these Muslim recruits are living in their own countries and the desire for adventure.

Overall the factor least cited by respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey for Muslims to join Daesh and Jabhat al Nusra in Syria is the suffering of fellow Muslims.

For Iranian respondents, the top choices are quite different. A majority (52%) view the inspiration of extremist preachers and websites as the most important factor causing Muslims to join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria. Frustration with life in their own countries (45%) and the suffering of fellow Muslims (41%) are also seen as far more significant among Iranians than they are for Arab and Turkish respondents.

What, in your opinion, are the two most important steps that could be taken to stop the flow of young people from joining extremist groups in Syria?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
If Daesh were militarily defeated, it would dry up their support	31	27	26	58	30	44	41	53
If there were a negotiated solution leading to a national unity government <u>without</u> the participation of Bashar al Assad, it would dry up the support for extremist groups	31	31	31	32	37	43	29	25
If there were a negotiated solution leading to a national unity government with the participation of Bashar al Assad, it would dry up the support for extremist groups	10	20	18	15	16	13	18	32
There should be a crackdown on radical preachers and websites promoting extremist ideas	35	26	23	24	25	23	33	29
If other governments provided greater support for those fighting the Assad regime, it would dry up the support of extremist groups	21	27	30	18	30	27	19	32
There should be a be crackdown on contributions going to extremist groups and a greater effort made to stop young recruits going to <u>fight</u> with Daesh	19	24	24	19	22	18	23	24
If Iran and its surrogates were more directly confronted, it would dry up support for extremist groups	38	25	26	21	21	17	25	3
If there were a greater effort at diplomacy to bring all parties (including Iran) together to defeat Daesh and promote peace and stability in Syria, it would dry up the support of extremist groups	14	19	22	14	18	14	12	3

Two Most Important Steps to Stop Flow of Young People Joining Extremist Groups in Syria, by Country

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
1	Direct confrontation of Iran	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Military defeat of Daesh	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Military defeat of Daesh	Military defeat of Daesh	Military defeat of Daesh
2	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Military defeat of Daesh	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Military defeat of Daesh	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Negotiated solution with Assad
3	Military defeat of Daesh	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Other gov't support for fighting Assad
4	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Military defeat of Daesh	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites
5	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Negotiated solution <u>without</u> Assad				
6	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Direct confrontation of Iran	Direct confrontation of Iran	Other gov't support for fighting Assad	Crackdown on contributions to extremists
7	More diplomacy	Negotiated solution with Assad	More diplomacy	Negotiated solution with Assad	More diplomacy	More diplomacy	Negotiated solution with Assad	Direct confrontation of Iran
8	Negotiated solution with Assad	More diplomacy	Negotiated solution with Assad	More diplomacy	Negotiated solution with Assad	Negotiated solution with Assad	More diplomacy	More diplomacy

When asked to choose the two most important steps that could be taken to stop the flow of young people joining extremist groups in Syria, the top choice by respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey is military defeat of Daesh, with a majority in Saudi Arabia (58%), as well as significant percentages in Iraq (44%) and Turkey (41%) endorsing this step.

Among the Arab countries and Turkey, the second most frequently endorsed step for curbing new members from joining extremist groups in Syria is a negotiated solution leading to a national unity government without the participation of Bashar al Assad. This choice is most popular among Iraqis (43%) and in the UAE (37%), and is suggested by about one-third of respondents in all other countries surveyed (except Iran).

The other options as possible steps to stop the flow of new young people into extremist groups in Syria are selected by no more than one-third of the respondents in any surveyed country (with two minor exceptions in Egypt). The overall order of the relative importance of these steps is: crackdown on radical preachers and websites promoting extremist ideas (Egypt: 35%); other governments providing greater support for those fighting the Assad regime; more direct confrontation of Iran and its surrogates (Egypt: 38%); crackdown on contributions going to extremist groups and a greater effort made to stop young recruits going to fight with Daesh; greater effort at diplomacy to bring all parties (including Iran) together to defeat Daesh and promote peace and stability in Syria; and finally, a negotiated solution leading to a national unity government with the participation of Bashar al Assad.

Among Iranian respondents, the top choice is also a military defeat of Daesh, with 53% selecting this as an important step for halting recruitment of young people to Daesh in Syria. The other most popular steps endorsed by Iranians, however, include the least favored response in the other surveyed countries, a national unity government that includes Assad (32%), as well as other governments providing support for those fighting the Assad regime (32%).

B. Causes of Extremism in Iraq

Which, in your opinion, are the two most important factors that would cause a Muslim to join Daesh in Iraq?								
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Outrage at sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad	59	25	35	60	35	40	59	39
The suffering of fellow Muslims	24	35	23	20	23	18	23	23
The attraction of Daesh because of their fighting skills and victories they have won	19	24	35	23	47	24	17	33
Being inspired by extremist preachers or websites to believe that the way of Daesh is a true path for Muslims	20	29	22	14	20	30	23	41
Anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogate militias	26	31	40	29	39	28	27	4
Failure of other governments to be more responsive and effective in changing the policies of the government in Baghdad.	38	28	22	38	19	41	30	24
Frustration with the life they are living in their own countries and the desire for adventure	14	28	23	16	17	18	21	37

Respondents were then asked to identify the top two reasons why a Muslim would join Daesh in Iraq. Again, we find that far and away the most frequently cited reason by respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey is outrage at the current government, in this case specifically outrage at the sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad. About six in 10 respondents in Saudi Arabia (60%), Turkey (59%), and Egypt (59%) point to this reason, as do more than one-third of respondents in Iraq (40%), Jordan (35%), and the UAE (35%).

The next tier of most frequently cited reasons why a Muslim would join Daesh in Iraq among Arab and Turkish respondents includes anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogate militias and the failure of other governments to be more responsive and effective in changing the policies of the government in Baghdad.

The former (i.e., anger at Iranian sectarian policies) is the top choice of Jordanians (40%) and a significant number of those in the UAE (39%). The latter (i.e., the failure of other governments to effect change) is noted particularly in Iraq (41%), where it is the top choice, and in Egypt (38%) and Saudi Arabia (38%).

Among Arab and Turkish respondents, less frequently cited reasons for joining Daesh in Iraq include the attraction of Daesh because of their fighting skills and victories they have won, the suffering of fellow Muslims, being inspired by extremist preachers or websites to believe that the way of Daesh is a true path for Muslims, and frustration with the life they are living in their own countries and the desire for adventure. Perceiving Daesh as attractive because of their fighting skills and victories is the top reason cited by respondents in the UAE (47%); 35% of Jordanians also make this

choice. The suffering of Muslims is noted by 35% in Lebanon. In all other cases, fewer than one-third of respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey select these options.

In Iraq, there are some differences of opinion based on sect. Among Sunni respondents, the top factor identified that would cause a Muslim to join Daesh in Iraq is outrage at the government in Baghdad’s sectarian policies (44%). However, among Shi’a respondents the top factor cited is the failure of other governments to alter the sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad.

Again, for Iranian respondents the top choices are quite different. They point to the inspiration of extremist preachers and websites as the most compelling reason why Muslims would join Daesh in Iraq (41%), closely followed by outrage at the sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad (39%) and frustration with their day-to-day lives in their own countries (37%).

What, in your opinion, are the two most important steps that could be taken to stop the flow of young people from joining Daesh in Iraq?								
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
If Daesh were militarily defeated, it would dry up their support	34	31	40	67	34	45	48	49
If the government in Iraq were reformed making it responsive and representative of all groups in the country, it would dry up the support for extremist groups	55	38	41	36	41	52	42	43
There should be a crackdown on radical preachers and websites promoting extremist ideas	20	34	29	26	35	25	26	35
There should be a crackdown on contributions going to extremist groups and a greater effort made to stop young recruits going to fight with Daesh	30	33	27	28	26	30	32	31
If Iran and its surrogates were directly confronted, it would dry up support for extremist groups	44	39	39	27	42	27	34	<1
If there were a greater effort at diplomacy bringing all parties (including Iran) together to defeat Daesh and promote peace and stability in Iraq, it would dry up the support for extremist groups	17	25	24	17	23	20	18	42

Two Most Important Steps to Stop Flow of Young People Joining Extremist Groups in Iraq, by Country

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
1	Reformed govt in Iraq	Direct confrontation of Iran	Reformed govt in Iraq	Military defeat of Daesh	Direct confrontation of Iran	Reformed govt in Iraq	Military defeat of Daesh	Military defeat of Daesh
2	Direct confrontation of Iran	Reformed govt in Iraq	Military defeat of Daesh	Reformed govt in Iraq	Reformed govt in Iraq	Military defeat of Daesh	Reformed govt in Iraq	Reformed govt in Iraq
3	Military defeat of Daesh	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Direct confrontation of Iran	More diplomacy
4	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Direct confrontation of Iran	Military defeat of Daesh	Direct confrontation of Iran	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites
5	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Military defeat of Daesh	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Crackdown on contributions to extremists	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Crackdown on radical preachers/websites	Crackdown on contributions to extremists
6	More diplomacy	Direct confrontation of Iran						

With respect to stemming new recruits to extremist groups in Iraq, respondents in the Arab countries and Turkey overall have two clear top choices: reform of the Iraqi Government to make it more responsive and representative of all groups in the country and a military defeat of Daesh. Reform of the Iraqi Government has broad support and is selected as an important step by majorities in Egypt (55%) and Iraq (52%) as well as more than four in 10 respondents in Turkey (42%), the UAE (41%), and Jordan (41%). A military defeat of Daesh is viewed as an important step by two-thirds of Saudi respondents (67%) as well as almost one-half of those in Turkey (48%) and Iraq (45%).

About one-quarter to one-third of respondents in most Arab countries and Turkey view direct confrontation of Iran and its surrogates, a crackdown on contributions going to extremist groups and greater efforts to stop young recruits, and a crackdown on radical preachers and websites promoting extremist ideas as important steps to halt the growth of extremist groups in Iraq. While crackdowns on contributions and radical preachers and websites have fairly consistent support across the board, the direct confrontation of Iran and its surrogates is viewed as an important step by 44% in Egypt, 42% in the UAE, and by 39% in both Lebanon and Jordan. In Iraq there is a sectarian divide with respect to the need to confront Iran in order to stem the tide of new recruits into Daesh; 40% of Iraqi Sunni respondents say this is an important step, while only 19% of their Shi'a compatriots agree.

Fewer than one-quarter of respondents in all countries except Iran say that a greater effort at diplomacy bringing all parties (including Iran) together to defeat Daesh and promote peace and stability in Iraq would be an important step to stop young people from joining extremist groups in Iraq.

Among Iranians, the same two top choices are selected: military defeat of Daesh (49%) and reform of the Iraqi Government to make it more representative (43%). The third choice among Iranian respondents for stopping the flow of young recruits to extremist groups in Iraq is more diplomatic efforts to bring all parties together to defeat Daesh (42%).

C. How to Deal With the Threat of Extremism

In order to stop the spread of extremism and the recruitment of young people from joining extremist groups, in your opinion, how important are each of the following?								
		Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
Use of intelligence agencies and police to crack down on the groups and individuals spreading extremist ideas	Very important	49	45	54	42	42	42	50
	Somewhat important	38	22	30	31	31	38	36
	Total important	87	67	84	73	73	80	86
	Not very important	10	21	11	17	11	11	13
	Not important at all	4	12	5	10	15	9	<1
	Total not important	14	33	16	27	26	20	13
Cracking down on or discouraging young people from joining religion-based political parties since they can be 'gateways' to extremist political ideas	Very important	27	14	25	26	21	23	22
	Somewhat important	37	27	37	27	44	33	34
	Total important	64	41	62	53	65	56	56
	Not very important	23	39	23	32	24	31	30
	Not important at all	13	21	15	14	11	13	14
	Total not important	36	60	38	46	35	44	44
Countering the messages and ideas promoted by extremist groups and individuals and re-educating youth who have been attracted to their ideas	Very important	60	59	63	36	62	47	59
	Somewhat important	35	33	32	51	34	32	31
	Total important	95	92	95	87	96	79	90
	Not very important	5	7	5	11	3	18	7
	Not important at all	<1	<1	<1	2	0	3	3
	Total not important	5	7	5	13	3	21	10
Changing the political and social circumstances in different countries that lead some young people to become attracted to extremist ideas	Very important	67	64	66	57	64	62	62
	Somewhat important	29	33	33	36	35	33	31
	Total important	96	97	99	93	99	95	93
	Not very important	4	2	1	6	1	5	5
	Not important at all	<1	0	0	1	0	1	2
	Total not important	4	2	1	7	1	6	7

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Respondents in all countries surveyed except Iran were asked to consider how to stop the spread of extremism and the recruitment of young people into extremist groups by rating the importance of: intelligence agencies and police cracking down on groups and individuals spreading extremist ideas; cracking down on or discouraging young people from joining religion-based political parties (like the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi groups) since they can be “gateways” to extremist political ideas; countering the messages and ideas promoted by extremist groups and individuals and re-educating youth who have been attracted to their ideas; and changing the political and social circumstances in different countries that lead some young people to become attracted to extremist ideas. There is broad support for all of these strategies.

Across the board, respondents are almost unanimous (93%-99%) in their view that changing the political and social circumstances in different countries is important to stop the spread of extremism.

There is also broad agreement that it is important to counter the messages and ideas promoted by extremist groups and individuals and re-educate youth who have been attracted to these ideas. This tactic is considered

important by at least nine in 10 respondents in the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey, as well as 87% in Saudi Arabia and 79% in Iraq.

More than two-thirds of respondents across the board think it is important for intelligence agencies and police to crack down on individuals and groups spreading extremist ideas, with at least eight in 10 respondents holding this view in Egypt (87%), Turkey (86%), Jordan (84%), and Iraq (80%).

Finally, majorities in all countries except Lebanon say it is important to crack down and discourage young people from joining religion-based political parties, with the strongest views held by those in the UAE (65%), Egypt (64%), and Jordan (62%). Only 41% of Lebanese respondents agree, while a majority say this is not an important strategy for stemming extremism.

How concerned are you that you or your family may be at risk from the threat of attacks from violent extremist groups?							
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey
Very concerned	23	8	14	5	13	48	14
Somewhat concerned	43	39	45	41	39	46	47
Not concerned at all	34	53	42	54	47	6	38
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.							

Concern about the personal risk from attacks by violent extremist groups is somewhat variable across the seven countries surveyed. Majorities in Saudi Arabia (54%) and Lebanon (53%), as well as a plurality in the UAE (47%) are not concerned at all about being the victim of such attacks. And more than one-third of those in Jordan (42%), Turkey (38%), and Egypt (34%) are also unconcerned. Only in Iraq is a plurality (48%) very concerned about such threats of attack, with Shi'a respondents more concerned (52%) than their Sunni counterparts (41%). Those in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are the least likely to say they are very concerned (8% and 5%, respectively). However, about four in 10 respondents in all countries surveyed are somewhat concerned that they or their family may be at risk from the threat of attacks by violent extremist groups.

How confident are you with the work being done by the following institutions in your country to deal with the threat of violent extremist groups?								
		Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE*	Iraq	Turkey
Police and intelligence agencies	Very confident	46	65	71	62	82	44	52
	Somewhat confident	39	31	26	37	17	54	32
	Not confident at all	15	4	3	1	2	2	15
Religious leaders	Very confident	28	75	35	76	68	35	35
	Somewhat confident	53	21	44	22	27	47	45
	Not confident at all	19	4	21	3	5	18	19
Political leadership	Very confident	30	38	20	43	79	20	35
	Somewhat confident	53	45	64	46	18	33	43
	Not confident at all	17	16	16	10	3	47	22
Non-government leaders in business, media, and education	Very confident	10	47	19	33	40	18	19
	Somewhat confident	41	36	46	48	46	58	54
	Not confident at all	49	18	35	19	15	25	27
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.								
*Emirati citizens only.								


When asked about their confidence in the work being done in their countries to deal with the threat of violent extremist groups, respondents overall express the most confidence in the work done by police and intelligence agencies. Majorities in the UAE (78%), Jordan (71%), Lebanon (65%), Saudi Arabia (62%), and Turkey (52%) say they are “very confident” in this work; a plurality in Egypt (46%) is also very confident in the work done by police and intelligence agencies to deal with the threat of violent extremist groups.

The work of religious leaders to deal with extremism is ranked second by respondents overall, with majorities in Saudi Arabia (76%), Lebanon (75%), and the UAE (56%) saying they are very confident. One-quarter to one-third of respondents in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt are also very confident. At most about two in 10 respondents are “not confident at all” in the work of religious leaders dealing with the threat of extremism among respondents in Jordan (21%), Egypt (19%), Turkey (19%), and Iraq (18%).

Only in the UAE does a majority (74%) feel very confident about the work of political leaders in dealing with the extremist threat. Aside from Iraq, where 47% of respondents say they are “not confident at all” in the work of political leaders battling extremist groups, fewer than one-quarter of those in all other countries surveyed are not confident in their political leadership.

Finally, overall respondents express the least confidence in the work of non-governmental leaders in business, media, and education to deal with violent extremist in their countries. Only in Lebanon does a plurality (47%) say they are very confident. And almost one-half of respondents in Egypt (49%) as well as 35% in Jordan, 27% in Turkey, and 25% in Iraq say they are not at all confident in the work of non-governmental leaders to deal with the threat of violent extremist groups in their countries.

Confidence in Your Country's Institutions Dealing with the Threat of Violent Extremist Groups, by Country



2016

IV. Iran

Iran: Are you better off or worse off than you were three years ago?		
	2014*	2016
Better off	34	33
Worse off	36	33
The same	30	34

*In 2014 respondents were asked to compare their current situation to five years ago: Are you better off or worse off than you were five years ago?

Iranians are evenly split on the question of overall satisfaction: whether they believe they are better or worse off today than they were three years ago. One-third say they are better off; one-third say they are worse off; and one-third say their situation has not changed. These numbers are basically the same as the last time we asked Iranians to assess their overall satisfaction.


Satisfaction with government's performance...		
Iran		
Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Very satisfied	22
	Somewhat satisfied	29
	Total satisfied	51
	Somewhat dissatisfied	26
	Not satisfied at all	23
	Total dissatisfied	49
Advancing democracy and promoting personal and civil rights	Very satisfied	12
	Somewhat satisfied	18
	Total satisfied	30
	Somewhat dissatisfied	41
	Not satisfied at all	29
	Total dissatisfied	70
Improving relations with Arab Governments	Very satisfied	22
	Somewhat satisfied	13
	Total satisfied	35
	Somewhat dissatisfied	25
	Not satisfied at all	40
	Total dissatisfied	65
Improving relations with the US and the West	Very satisfied	8
	Somewhat satisfied	6
	Total satisfied	15
	Somewhat dissatisfied	45
	Not satisfied at all	40
	Total dissatisfied	85
Giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen	Very satisfied	27
	Somewhat satisfied	20
	Total satisfied	47
	Somewhat dissatisfied	15
	Not satisfied at all	38
	Total dissatisfied	53

One-half of Iranian respondents say they are satisfied with their government’s performance with respect to improving the economy and creating employment opportunities. Opinion is also split when asked about satisfaction with the Iranian Government’s performance when it comes to giving greater support to their allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen; 47% are satisfied, while 53% are not.

Satisfaction is even lower when asked about government performance in terms of improving relations with Arab Governments (35%) and advancing democracy and promoting personal and civil rights (30%). The lowest satisfaction ratings are associated with the government’s performance with respect to improving relations with the United States and the West; only 15% of Iranian respondents are satisfied with this area.

In 2015, we asked Iranians about priorities for their government. At least three-quarters of respondents said that improving the economy (81%) and advancing democracy (75%) should be prioritized. About six in 10 said improving relations with Arab Governments (60%) and with the United States and the West (59%) should be prioritized. And almost one-half said providing more support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen should be a priority for their government (48%). It is instructive to compare these priorities to the satisfaction levels reported in the current survey. We find gaps, as shown in the graph below, between how significant Iranians view priorities for their government and their satisfaction in their government’s performance.

Comparison of Iranian Priorities from 2015 and Satisfaction in Government Performance from 2016



2016


Iran: How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in...?

		2014	2015	2016
Syria	Very important	43	23	10
	Somewhat important	47	49	14
	Total important	90	73	24
	Somewhat unimportant	6	19	38
	Not important at all	1	8	38
	Total not important	7	27	76
Lebanon	Very important	46	21	14
	Somewhat important	42	51	29
	Total important	88	72	43
	Somewhat unimportant	5	21	30
	Not important at all	5	8	27
	Total not important	10	28	57
Iraq	Very important	50	24	31
	Somewhat important	37	40	16
	Total important	87	64	47
	Somewhat unimportant	6	25	29
	Not important at all	4	11	25
	Total not important	10	36	53
Yemen	Very important	21	10	13
	Somewhat important	41	33	26
	Total important	62	43	39
	Somewhat unimportant	21	38	37
	Not important at all	15	19	24
	Total not important	36	57	61

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included.

2016

Importance of Iran's Involvement in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen (2014-2016)



For Iranian respondents, this year's survey shows additional declines in the levels of importance they place on continued involvement of their government in each of the four major conflicts in the region. They consider Iraq the most important of the four conflicts for continued Iranian involvement (47%), but a majority now considers even Iraq not important (53%). This is a decline from a high of 87% who considered involvement in Iraq important in 2014.

Involvement in Lebanon is viewed as important by 43% of Iranian respondents, down from 88% who held this view in 2014 and 72% who still held it in 2015.

Yemen, where there has been the least enthusiasm in previous polling, is now considered important by 39% of respondents in Iran, only a very slight decline from the 43% who said it was important in 2015.

Finally, the importance of continued involvement in Syria has declined the most significantly among Iranian respondents, from a high of 90% in 2014 to just 24% who say it is important in the current survey.

APPENDIX A—METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

Methodology

The approach used for conducting the poll in the eight countries involved face-to-face, personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered in each country to cover a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative and comprised adult males and females, who were 15+ years of age. In the GCC countries, only citizens and Arab expatriates were covered.

In six of the eight countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran), random, door-to-door sampling utilizing a multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for selection of respondents in each country. In the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) where door-to-door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. However, adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was not skewed and was broadly representative.

Country	Sample Size	MOE	Dates of Survey	Geographic Coverage
Egypt	1,030	±3.1	9/17/16–10/5/16	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban and rural), Menia (urban and rural), Asyut (urban and rural), Tanta (urban and rural)
Lebanon	623	±4	9/18/16–10/5/16	Beirut (East and West Beirut), Baabda, El Maten, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, Saayda
Jordan	634	±4	9/18/16–10/5/16	Amman City, Balqa, Madaba, Irbid, Jarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba
Saudi Arabia	1,068	±3.1	9/17/16–10/5/16	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Shammasyah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail and Hufuf
UAE	660	±3.9	9/18/16–10/10/16	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Iraq	1,057	±3.1	9/17/16–10/7/16	Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Karbala, Nassiriyah, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	1,056	±3.1	9/18/16–10/8/16	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Haymana, Ceyhan
Iran	1,055	±3	9/18/16–10/9/16	Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, Ahwaz

Demographics (%)

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Saudi Arabia	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Male	51	50	51	56	64	51	52	51
Female	49	50	49	44	36	49	48	49
Under 30	43	33	42	38	35	44	34	41
30+	57	67	58	62	65	56	66	59
Sunni	89	27	95	85	88	37	86	6
Shi'a	1	30	3	15	12	63	9	94
Christian	10	37	2	—	<1	<1	5	—
Druze	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—
Live in city	67	88	79	84	86	63	73	73
Live outside city	33	12	21	16	14	37	27	27

2017

Public Opinion 2017

SIR BANI YAS FORUM

**PUBLIC
OPINION
2017**

PUBLIC OPINION 2017

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between August 24 and September 19, 2017, Zogby Research Services conducted face-to-face polls, surveying 7,800 adults in seven Arab countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), Iran and Turkey. We had been commissioned by the Sir Bani Yas Forum to explore attitudes toward a range of issues including the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, U.S. policies under the Trump Administration, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Iran Deal, refugees, and political Islam. We also surveyed Palestinians, Iranians, and Turks about developments within their countries. What follows is a summary of the findings.

1. Importance of Relations with Other Countries:

In almost every country the percentages of those who say it is important to have good relations with the United States and Russia are higher than they were in 2016. The importance of relations with the United States has dramatically increased among Egyptians, Iraqis, and Turks, while Russia's importance has grown significantly for Emiratis and Turks.

Iranians are the only respondents who view relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia as unimportant.

Saudis and Emiratis overwhelmingly see relations with Iran as not important.

2. Role in Syria:

Overall, **there is mostly dissatisfaction with the role other countries have played in the Syrian conflict.**

Russia's and Iran's roles are seen as negative everywhere except in Iran.

The U.S. role is only seen positively in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey.

The Saudi role is only seen as positive in Jordan and the UAE.

Turkey fares well in Jordan and the UAE.

For their part, Egyptians see all of the countries involved as playing a very negative role in Syria.

Respondents in every country except Iraq say that they believe that their government should play an active role in shaping the outcome of the conflict in Syria.

Across the board, majorities say that there is no solution to the conflict in Syria that leaves Bashar al-Assad in power. This is true even in Iran.

3. Role in Iraq:

Once again there is mostly dissatisfaction with the role other countries have played in Iraq. Only the United States gets positive scores anywhere, with these coming from Emiratis and Saudis.

Overall, **Iran's role in Iraq is judged very harshly, including by Iraqis themselves.**

Iraqis are disapproving of almost everyone's role in their country, except that of the United States where Iraqi opinion is divided.

When asked for their opinion as to the best outcome for Iraq, **the most favored option in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey is an Iraqi government in Baghdad that represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation to keep the country unified.** Everywhere else (i.e., Jordan, Palestine, Iran, and Iraq itself), opinion is divided between this option and maintaining unity through a federation of autonomous regions.

The establishment of an independent Kurdish state is opposed by majorities everywhere, including by all groups in Iraq.

4. Concern for Yemen:

The two most frequently cited concerns posed by the Yemen conflict are the presence of al Qaeda and the threat posed by Iran. These are most strongly felt by Saudis and Emiratis. The humanitarian crisis facing the country is cited by about one-quarter of respondents in five countries.

5. U.S. Policies Under Trump:

The policies of the new Trump Administration toward any area of the Middle East are seen as positive only in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey. Emiratis and Turks favor his policies toward Syria and Iraq; Emiratis and Saudis support his policies toward Iran.

Egyptians and Palestinians are the most negatively inclined toward the Trump policies, with the attitudes of the Lebanese, Jordanians, and Iraqis mixed. Egyptians and Turks are the most opposed to the Trump policy toward Iran.

Strong majorities in every country except Turkey have no confidence that the Trump Administration will be able to achieve an Israeli/Palestinian peace. Turks are divided on this matter.

6a. Israel/Palestine:

A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is strongly supported only by Egyptians, Saudis, and Emiratis.

A one-state solution only receives strong support in Iraq.

A high two in five respondents in Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan express the concern that no solution may be possible to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As to whether the Arab states and Israel should build an alliance to confront Iran and extremism, slight majorities in Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey agree, but only if Israel first ends its occupation of Palestinian lands. **Majorities in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE would still oppose such an alliance even if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories.**

6b. Palestinian Attitudes:

Over two-thirds of Palestinians are prepared to accept peace with Israel on the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative, but over one-quarter of Palestinians don't believe that Israel will agree to the terms of the API.

There is a growing sense of despair among Palestinians, with two in five saying they no longer believe that a peace agreement is possible.

Majorities of Palestinians are dissatisfied with both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, with a significantly greater number dissatisfied with Hamas.

While about two-thirds of Palestinians say unity among the Palestinian parties is important and want the Palestinian Authority to make a determined effort to reach that goal, just about **two-thirds are not confident that unity will occur.**

In 50 years of occupation, more than one-third of Palestinians report that they or members of their immediate family have suffered violence from the Israeli military and/or settlers. The percentages for Palestinians in Jerusalem are staggering: 54% from the military, 69% from settlers.

7a. Iran Deal:

Attitudes are deeply divided as to how to move forward with the JCPOA. A slight majority in the UAE, and slight pluralities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq are in support of canceling the deal. The only country where a majority is in favor of enforcing the JCPOA is Turkey.

A slight plurality in Egypt and Lebanon favor pressing Iran to participate in a regional framework to bring peace to the region.

7b. Iranian Attitudes:

There is an increase in Iranian satisfaction with the performance of their government in improving the economy, supporting regional allies, and advancing rights although a majority are still dissatisfied with this last area.

Three-quarters of Iranians believe that while their country has met its obligations under the terms of JCPOA, the West has not lived up to its end of the deal.

Possibly owing to this feeling that the JCPOA hasn't met their expectations, Iranians have increased their support for their government's involvement in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. After a significant and steady decline in support for all of these involvements over the past two years, support for each of them is now back up to pre-JCPOA 2014 levels.

8. Turkish Attitudes:

Turkish respondents report being pleased with their government's role in improving their country's economy, but majorities are not satisfied with its performance in protecting their rights and improving ties with the United States and the West.

9. Attitudes Toward Refugees:

The negative impact of Syrian refugees continues to weigh on Lebanese, Jordanians, and Turks. The percentages of Lebanese and Jordanians who now feel that the refugees pose a security threat to their countries have somewhat declined since 2014. But while fewer Jordanians are concerned with the economic impact, the percentage of Lebanese with this concern has slightly increased. Overall, it is the Turks who say they have the greatest concern with the refugees' impact on their security and economy.

10. Political Islam:

Majorities in almost every country (except Palestine and Iran) believe that religious movements should restrict themselves to matters of "faith and guidance" and stay out of politics.

Only Iranians believe that when religious movements have taken power, they make countries stronger and improve the lives of citizens. Significant majorities in Egypt, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, and Turkey believe that governing religious movements make countries weaker and worse off. Jordanians and Lebanese are divided.

Despite mixed or negative feelings toward religious movements in government, respondents give higher grades to the AKP in Turkey and Tunisia's Ennahda for having been effective in governance than they give to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Palestine's Hamas.

IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

		How important is it that your country have good relations with ... ?																
		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Palestine	KSA		UAE		Iraq		Turkey		Iran	
		2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017
US	Important	45	88	74	68	67	69	78	46	78	75	94	16	59	46	100	33	47
	Not important	53	12	26	32	32	31	22	51	23	25	6	84	41	54	0	66	53
Russia	Important	69	86	56	70	29	65	69	43	53	41	93	47	58	24	100	65	68
	Not important	31	14	44	30	71	35	31	55	47	59	7	52	42	76	0	34	32
Turkey	Important	39	67	54	67	82	77	80	54	35	45	99	33	65			52	59
	Not important	61	33	45	33	19	23	20	42	63	55	1	68	35			48	41
KSA	Important	86	93	59	63	81	76	81			78	97	68	61	77	73	52	45
	Not important	14	7	41	37	20	24	19			21	3	31	39	21	27	45	55
Iran	Important	10	46	46	57	20	54	57	12	10	30	10	30	53	20	84		
	Not important	90	54	55	43	80	46	43	85	89	70	90	70	47	80	16		

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included. Palestine was not included in the 2016 survey.

Overview

When asked about the importance of their country having good relations with a number of other countries, respondents largely recognize the value of maintaining good relations with most of the major and regional powers covered in this survey.

At least two-thirds of respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, the UAE, and Turkey say that having good relations with the United States, Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are important for their countries.

It is also worth noting **that respondents see relations with Russia and the United States as significantly more important in 2017 than they did in 2016**. Attitudes toward the importance of relations with the U.S. increased by 40 points in Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey, and by about 20 points in Saudi Arabia and the UAE; in the case of Russia, attitudes increased by 30 points or more in Jordan, the UAE, and Turkey.

Attitudes toward the importance of relations with Turkey and Saudi Arabia are mostly quite positive, except for a majority of Saudis who do not see relations with Turkey as important, and the majority of Iranians who do not see the importance of relations with Saudi Arabia.

Relations with Iran are seen as very important to Turkey and very unimportant to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

By country

For **Egyptians**, relations with Saudi Arabia are most important (93%), followed by the United States (88%) and Russia (86%).

For **Lebanese**, Russia, the United States, and Turkey rank highest in terms of the importance of good relations (70%, 68%, 67%, respectively). With respect to Saudi Arabia, we find a sectarian divide in Lebanon with about seven in 10

Sunni (72%) and Christian (79%) respondents saying good relations with the Kingdom are important, while just 47% of Shia respondents concur.

Three-quarters of **Jordanian** respondents say good relations with Turkey (77%) and Saudi Arabia (76%) are important, followed by the United States (69%) and Russia (65%).

About eight in 10 **Palestinians** view good relations with Saudi Arabia (81%), Turkey (80%), and the United States (78%) as important.

Almost all of the respondents in the **UAE** and **Turkey** view it as important to have good relations with most of the countries covered. They diverge, however, on the importance of good relations with Iran, with 84% of Turks saying this relationship is important while only 10% of Emiratis agree.

Opinions in **Iraq** are slightly more tempered across the board, with about six in 10 respondents viewing the relationships with the United States (59%), Russia (58%), Turkey (65%), and Saudi Arabia (61%) as important.

In **Saudi Arabia**, three-quarters say good relations with the United States are important (77%), but just 53% and 37% view relations with Russia and Turkey, respectively, as important.

Among **Iranian** respondents, two-thirds say having a good relationship with Russia is important, 59% view good relations with Turkey as important, and less than half say the same of relations with the United States (47%) and Saudi Arabia (45%).

In the case of relations with Iran, about half of the respondents in Egypt (46%), Lebanon (57%), Jordan (54%), Palestine (57%), and Iraq (53%) say that it is important for their countries to have good relations. Sunni and Shia respondents in Lebanon and Iraq are somewhat divided on the importance of having good relations with Iran, with Sunnis less enthusiastic (Lebanon: 50%; Iraq: 43%) and Shia respondents more so (Lebanon: 71%; Iraq: 59%). In Lebanon, it is worth noting that Christian respondents are aligned with their Sunni compatriots in lacking enthusiasm for good relations with Iran (51%). In Turkey, however, the relationship with Iran is viewed as more significant, with 84% of respondents saying it is important. On the other hand, **just one in 10 Saudis and Emiratis say having a good relationship with Iran is important.**

Comparing 2017 Survey to 2016 Survey

Comparing the current survey to responses from last year, we find significant increases in many countries. With respect to the United States, relations are considered important by percentages at least 10 points higher than last year in Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Iran. Good relations with Russia are important for percentages of respondents at least 10 points higher everywhere except Iran, where ratings are stable. The importance of good relations with Turkey is expressed by an increasing number of respondents (at least 10 points higher) in all countries except Saudi Arabia (where it declined by 17 points) and Iran (where it is stable). Good relations with Saudi Arabia are considered important by slightly higher percentages in Egypt and the UAE, while ratings are basically the same in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Finally, with respect to Iran, the percentages of those who consider good relations important have increased by at least 10 points since last year in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey, while the level has stayed the same in Saudi Arabia and dropped by 25 points in the UAE.

SYRIA

With regard to the conflict in Syria, of the list below, which countries do you believe are playing a positive role? Which countries do you believe are playing a negative role?									
	Egypt			Lebanon			Jordan		
	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net
US	28	58	-30	25	39	-14	25	32	-7
Russia	25	61	-36	29	38	-9	9	58	-49
Iran	3	96	-93	27	41	-14	4	54	-50
Turkey	23	65	-42	35	22	+13	47	12	+35
KSA	46	49	-3	22	29	-7	49	9	+40
None	28	<1	+27	8	0	+8	9	0	-9

	Palestine			KSA			UAE		
	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net
US	7	51	-44	50	36	+14	64	23	+41
Russia	25	32	-7	16	72	-56	4	57	-53
Iran	15	39	-24	2	97	-95	6	84	-78
Turkey	35	14	+21	38	46	-8	38	24	+14
KSA	20	12	+8	71	14	+57	48	11	+37
None	28	11	+17	11	<1	+10	10	1	+9

	Iraq			Turkey			Iran		
	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net
US	36	34	+2	70	20	+50	11	78	-67
Russia	25	49	-24	12	81	-69	51	23	+28
Iran	22	55	-33	7	88	-81	61	13	+48
Turkey	46	32	+14	97	1	+96	36	32	+4
KSA	30	41	-11	1	97	-96	15	37	-22
None	9	0	+9	3	0	+3	5	<1	+4

Overall, Turkey is viewed most favorably with respect to playing a positive role in the conflict in Syria. Those who say Turkey plays a positive role outnumber those who say it plays a negative role in Jordan (+35 points), Palestine (+21), Iraq (+14), the UAE (+14), and Lebanon (+13). There is near unanimity among Turks themselves (97% positive vs. 1% negative). Only in Egypt and Saudi Arabia are respondents far more likely to view Turkey as playing a negative role (Egypt: 23% positive vs. 65% negative; Saudi Arabia: 38% positive vs. 46% negative). Opinion about Turkey's role in Syria is divided in Iran (36% positive vs. 32% negative).

Opinions about the roles played by the United States and Saudi Arabia in the Syrian conflict are even more polarized. The United States is viewed by majorities as playing a positive role, and on balance more positively, by

respondents in Turkey (+50), the UAE (+41), and Saudi Arabia (+14). Alternatively, majorities say the United States plays a negative role in Iran (net -67), Palestine (net -44), and Egypt (net -30). And those in Lebanon and Jordan are also more likely to view the United States' role as negative (Lebanon: 25% pos vs. 39% neg; Jordan: 25% pos vs. 32% neg). Iraqis are divided on the U.S. role in Syria (36% vs. 34%).

There is sectarian division with respect to the U.S. role in Syria among respondents in Lebanon and Iraq. In Lebanon, Shia respondents are more likely to view the U.S. role as negative (pos: 20%, neg: 43%) in comparison to Sunni (pos: 30%, neg: 36%) and Christian respondents (pos: 25%, neg: 39%). Conversely, Iraqi Shia are more likely to view the U.S. role in Syria as positive (pos: 40%, neg: 29%) than their Sunni countrymen (pos: 29%, neg: 43%). Both Sunni and Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia view the United States as playing a positive role.

Saudi Arabia's role in the Syrian conflict is more likely to be viewed positively among Saudis themselves (+57), as well as in Jordan (+40), the UAE (+37), and Palestine (+8). On the other hand, the Saudi role is viewed more negatively in Turkey (-96), Iran (-22), Iraq (-11), and Lebanon (-7). Opinion is divided in Egypt (46% vs. 49%).

In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia is viewed negatively for its role in Syria by all religious groups. However, despite the overall view of Iraqis that Saudi Arabia's role in Syria is negative, among Sunni respondents, on balance, more feel that it plays a positive role (39%) than a negative one (24%); the reverse is true for Iraqi Shia respondents (pos: 26%, neg: 51%).

Only among Iranian respondents are the roles of Russia and Iran in the Syrian conflict more likely to be viewed positively. Fifty-one percent (51%) of Iranians say Russia plays a positive role (compared to 23% who say it is negative), and 61% say Iran itself plays a positive role (compared to 13% who say it is negative).

The strongest negative sentiments about Iran's role in Syria are found among respondents in Saudi Arabia (97%), Egypt (96%), Turkey (88%), and the UAE (84%), with majorities in Jordan and Iraq also holding negative views. While both Sunni and Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia consider Iran's role in Syria overwhelmingly negative, there are sectarian differences in Lebanon and Iraq. A majority of Lebanese Shia respondents say Iran plays a positive role (57%) compared to just 14% of Sunni and 18% of Christian respondents who agree. And though on balance Iraqi Sunni and Shia respondents both hold negative views, Shia respondents are more likely to be positive about Iran's role in Syria than their Sunni counterparts (Sunni: 8% pos vs. 71% neg, Shia: 29% pos vs. 49% neg). (It is surprising and worth noting that Iraqi Shia view both the United States and Turkey as playing more positive roles in Syria than Iran.)

The strongest negative views of Russia's role in Syria are found in Turkey (81%), Saudi Arabia (72%), and Egypt (61%), with majorities in Jordan and the UAE also viewing Russia as playing a negative role in the Syrian conflict.

Should your own government play an active role shaping the outcome of the conflict in Syria?									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Yes	85	58	74		86	94	37	79	66
No	15	42	26		14	6	63	21	34
This question was not asked in Palestine.									

Significant majorities in the UAE (94%), Saudi Arabia (86%), Egypt (85%), Turkey (79%), Jordan (74%), and Iran (66%), as well as in Lebanon (58%), think that their government should play an active role in shaping the outcome of the conflict in Syria. Only in Iraq does a majority disagree; just 37% believe the Iraqi government should be an active participant in determining the outcome in Syria.

Can there be a solution in Syria that leaves Bashar al-Assad in power?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Yes	18	42	24	31	33	21	41	21	44
No	82	58	76	65	67	79	59	79	56

Majorities in all nine countries surveyed do not believe that there can be a solution in Syria that leaves Bashar al-Assad in power. This view is strongest, with at least three-quarters saying Assad cannot be part of a solution in Syria, in Egypt (82%), the UAE (79%), Turkey (79%), and Jordan (76%). More than four in 10 respondents in Iran (44%), Lebanon (42%), and Iraq (41%) say Assad could remain in power; in Lebanon and Iraq Shia respondents are more likely than Sunni respondents to hold this view (Lebanon: 36% Sunni vs. 56% Shia; Iraq: 33% Sunni vs. 46% Shia).

IRAQ

With regard to the conflict in Iraq, of the list below, which countries do you believe are playing a positive role? Which countries do you believe are playing a negative role?									
	Egypt			Lebanon			Jordan		
	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net
US	28	58	-30	25	38	-13	22	47	-25
Russia	19	67	-48	18	42	-24	16	38	-22
Iran	<1	95	-94	31	34	-3	8	55	-47
Turkey	27	59	-32	36	24	+12	34	14	+20
KSA	42	43	-1	27	24	+3	30	20	+10
None	28	<1	+27	9	0	+9	19	0	+19

	Palestine			KSA			UAE		
	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net
US	10	55	-45	51	27	+24	80	12	+68
Russia	18	29	-11	20	67	-47	4	49	-45
Iran	14	42	-28	7	90	-83	0	100	-100
Turkey	22	14	+8	45	38	+7	33	23	+10
KSA	14	12	+2	69	14	+55	18	11	+7
None	38	10	-28	18	1	+17	11	0	+11

	Iraq			Turkey			Iran		
	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net	Positive	Negative	Net
US	36	36	0	43	42	+1	23	59	-36
Russia	35	42	-7	30	58	-28	38	22	+16
Iran	36	46	-10	16	74	-58	69	11	+58
Turkey	32	46	-14	94	2	+92	34	41	-7
KSA	23	51	-28	2	98	-96	22	44	-22
None	11	1	+10	4	0	+4	4	0	+4

To begin, it is important to note that **Iraqis are disapproving of almost everyone's role in their country**, except that of the United States where Iraqi opinion is divided.

Overall, **Turkey is again most likely to be viewed as playing a positive role in the conflict in Iraq**, receiving net positive ratings in Lebanon (+12), the UAE (+10), Palestine (+8), and Saudi Arabia (+7), and in Turkey itself (+92). On the other hand, negative views outnumber positive ones with respect to Turkey's role in the Iraq conflict among respondents in Egypt (-32), Jordan (-20), Iraq (-14), and Iran (-7).

In both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Sunni respondents are more likely than their Shia counterparts to view Turkey's role in Iraq as positive. Among Shia in both countries, majorities say Turkey plays a negative role (Iraq/Shia: 52%, KSA/Shia: 52%), while among Sunni in both countries there is a net positive view of Turkey's role (Iraq/Sunni: 40% pos vs. 37% neg, KSA/Sunni: 48% pos vs. 35% neg).

The United States is seen as playing a positive role by wide margins among Emiratis (+68) and Saudis (+24), while opinions are split in Iraq itself (36% positive vs. 36% negative) and in Turkey (43% positive vs. 42% negative). In the remaining five countries, respondents who say the United States plays a negative role outnumber those who view its role as positive (Palestine: -45, Iran: -36, Egypt: -30, Jordan: -25, Lebanon: -13).

Majorities of both Shia (52%) and Sunni (59%) respondents in Saudi Arabia say the U.S. role in Iraq is positive. However, in Iraq itself we find a sectarian divide, with Sunni respondents twice as likely to say the U.S. role is negative (24% pos vs. 47% neg) and Shia respondents more likely to view it as positive (42% pos vs. 30% neg).

Saudi Arabia's role in the Iraq conflict is more likely to be seen as positive than negative among Saudis themselves (+55), and in Jordan (+10) and the UAE (+7), while opinion is split in Egypt, Lebanon, and Palestine. Those who view Saudi Arabia's role negatively outnumber those who view it positively in Turkey (-96) and Iran (-22), and most notably in Iraq itself (23% positive vs. 51% negative).

On balance, Shia and Sunni respondents in Iraq both view Saudi Arabia's role as negative, with Iraqi Shia holding slightly more negative views (20% pos vs. 56% neg) than their Sunni counterparts (28% pos vs. 41% neg).

Only Iranian respondents are more likely to say that Russia and Iran play positive roles rather than negative roles, by 16 and 58 points respectively. Fewer than one in five respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE say Russia plays a positive role; about one-third of those in Iraq and Turkey agree. Shia respondents in Iraq are more likely than their Sunni compatriots to see Russia as playing a positive role (Shia: 44% vs. Sunni: 17%). The same divide is found among Shia and Sunni respondents in Saudi Arabia; however, there is a net negative view of Russia's role by both groups in Saudi Arabia (KSA/Sunni: 17% pos vs. 70% neg, KSA/Shia: 39% pos vs. 49% neg).

And Iran is viewed positively by even fewer respondents in most countries; only in Lebanon and Iraq where Iran is viewed as playing a positive role by many Shia respondents (47% in both countries) do more than three in 10 respondents overall say Iran's role in Iraq is positive. Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia are also more positive about Iran's role (42% vs. 51% neg), but Sunni respondents are so overwhelmingly negative toward Iran that only 7% of Saudis have a positive view of Iran's role in Iraq.

Which is the best outcome for the future of Iraq?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
It is best that the Iraqi government in Baghdad be reformed so that it represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation in order to keep the country unified.	75	50	38	36	76	74	44	43	42
It is best for Iraq to recognize that national unity can best be maintained if the country becomes a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the government in Baghdad.	17	28	41	33	12	20	49	35	41
It is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible.	9	22	21	30	12	6	7	23	17

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Three-quarters of respondents in Saudi Arabia (76%), Egypt (75%), and the UAE (74%) say that the best outcome for Iraq would be reform of the Iraqi government in Baghdad “so that it represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation in order to keep the country unified.” Pluralities in Lebanon (50%) and Turkey (43%) agree. Opinions are divided in Jordan, Palestine, Iran, and Iraq itself between this type of governmental reform leading to a unified country and the country becoming “a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the government in Baghdad” (Jordan: 38% reform vs. 41% federation, Palestine: 36% vs. 33%, Iran: 42% vs. 43%, Iraq: 44% vs. 49%).

Three in 10 Palestinian respondents say “it is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible,” a view shared by less than one-quarter of respondents in all other countries, including just 7% of Iraqis.

	Iraq			
	Shia	Sunni	Kurds	Arabs
It is best that the Iraqi government in Baghdad be reformed so that it represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation in order to keep the country unified.	46	40	47	44
It is best for Iraq to recognize that national unity can best be maintained if the country becomes a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the government in Baghdad.	47	54	47	49
It is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible.	7	6	6	7

We find the same divide within each of the sects and ethnic groups in Iraq who are torn between a federation of autonomous regions and a reformed government in Baghdad, with only 6-7% saying unity is impossible. The only slight difference of opinion is that a majority of Sunni respondents prefer the federation of autonomous regions (54%) to a more representative government in Baghdad (40%), while Shia respondents are evenly split (46% reform vs. 47% federation).

What is the best outcome for the future of the Kurdistan Region?									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
That it become an independent Kurdish state.	42	36	39	35	9	17	36	10	42
That it continue to operate as an autonomous region as part of the Iraqi state.	58	64	61	65	91	83	64	90	58



	Iraq	
	Kurds	Arabs
Independent state	45	35
Autonomous region	55	65

Majorities in all countries surveyed think that the Kurdistan Region should “continue to operate as an autonomous region as part of the Iraqi state.” This view is strongest in Saudi Arabia (91%), Turkey (90%), and the UAE (83%), with about six in 10 respondents in all other countries in agreement. The highest rates of agreement with the alternative option, “an independent Kurdish state,” are in Egypt (42%) and Iran (42%) as well as among Kurds in Iraq (45% compared to 35% of Iraqi Arabs).

[Note: While the percentage of Iraqi Kurds seeking an independent state may seem quite low in comparison to the recent referendum, please note that this poll was conducted nationwide in Iraq, while the referendum was held only in the autonomous region and included all Kurds whether or not they voted. In addition, our survey was completed a week prior to the referendum, and therefore does not reflect campaigns to sway voters in the lead up to the vote.]

YEMEN

When you consider the conflict in Yemen, in your opinion, which of the following is the most important concern?									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
The presence of al Qaeda in the Arabian Gulf	22	29	23	17	44	21	27	35	33
The restoration of the legitimate government	14	25	27	31	10	29	21	15	30
The threat of Iranian interference	35	21	36	32	35	41	29	23	14
The humanitarian crisis	29	25	15	21	10	9	23	27	23

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Overall the most frequently cited concern with respect to the conflict in Yemen is “the threat of Iranian interference,” the top choice in the UAE (41%), Jordan (36%), Egypt (35%), Palestine (32%), and Iraq (29%), though it is of the least concern to Iranians (14%) and Lebanese (21%). “The presence of al Qaeda in the Arabian Gulf” is the top concern for Saudis (44%) and in Turkey (35%), Iran (33%), and Lebanon (29%). The other two concerns, “restoration of the legitimate government” and “the humanitarian crisis,” are the third and fourth ranked concerns, but are still cited by as many as one-quarter of respondents in many countries.

U.S. POLICIES UNDER TRUMP

With the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, with regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, do you see a positive or negative change in US policy or do you see it remaining the same or do you feel it is too early to tell?

The conflict in Syria

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
More positive	36	16	25	17	41	75	24	75	12
More negative	56	33	30	52	43	25	32	21	36
Remaining the same	4	29	26	25	16	<1	26	2	29
Too early to tell	4	23	19	6	<1	<1	19	3	23

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Three-quarters of respondents in the UAE and Turkey say the change in U.S. policy with respect to the Syrian conflict since the election of Donald Trump as president has been positive. On the other hand, majorities in Egypt (56%) and Palestine (52%) feel it has been a negative change. Respondents are split between considering changes in U.S. policy about Syria positive and negative in Saudi Arabia (41% vs. 43%), Jordan (25% vs. 30%), and Iraq (24% vs. 32%). Pluralities in Lebanon (33%) and Iran (36%) view U.S. policy in Syria under President Trump as a positive change, though majorities in both countries say either it has remained the same or it is too early to tell.

The conflict in Iraq

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
More positive	35	24	21	11	35	87	20	50	12
More negative	55	35	37	42	21	13	27	20	29
Remaining the same	6	29	26	39	43	0	29	23	32
Too early to tell	4	12	16	8	1	0	24	7	27

Eighty-seven percent (87%) of Emiratis view changes in U.S. policy under the Trump administration with respect to the conflict in Iraq as positive, as do half of all respondents in Turkey (50%). A majority in Egypt (55%), however, view these changes negatively, as do pluralities in Palestine (42%), Jordan (37%), and Lebanon (35%). Opinions in Saudi Arabia, in Iran, and particularly in Iraq itself are quite divided. Slight pluralities in all three countries say U.S. policy has remained the same (KSA: 43%, Iran: 32%, Iraq: 29%). In Saudi Arabia the remaining respondents lean toward a positive view of changes in U.S. policy in Iraq (35% vs. 21% negative), while the majority of Iraqis and Iranians are split between a negative view of U.S. policy under Trump toward Iraq (27% and 29%, respectively) and the view that it is too early to tell (24% and 27%, respectively).

US relations with your country									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
More positive	34	29	33	8	47	33	23	25	11
More negative	52	39	26	49	6	17	17	14	36
Remaining the same	7	15	21	32	34	46	33	50	35
Too early to tell	7	17	20	11	13	4	27	10	17
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.									

Almost half of Saudi respondents (47%) see changes in U.S.-Saudi relations since Trump's election as positive, with just 6% seeing the change as negative. On the other hand, about one-half of Egyptians (52%) and Palestinians (49%) view changes in U.S. relations with their countries since Trump's election as negative, as do a plurality in Lebanon (39%). Iranians are split between saying U.S.-Iran relations have become more negative (36%) or have stayed the same (35%). Majorities in Turkey (50%), the UAE (46%), and Iraq (33%) say their countries' relations with the United States have remained the same since the election of Donald Trump, though between one-quarter and one-third of respondents in each country see a positive change in relations (Turkey: 25%, UAE: 33%, Iraq: 23%). Finally, in Jordan, opinions are quite divided, with one-third saying the change in U.S. relations with Jordan have been positive, 26% saying the change is negative, 21% saying relations have remained the same, and 20% saying it is too early to tell.

US relations with the Muslim World									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
More positive	33	22	27	10	17	14	28	1	20
More negative	55	31	32	44	12	25	27	14	39
Remaining the same	6	31	23	32	36	23	21	27	30
Too early to tell	6	16	18	14	36	37	24	57	10
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.									

When asked about changes in U.S. policy since the election of Trump with respect to the Muslim World, a majority of respondents in Egypt (55%) and pluralities in Palestine (44%) and Iran (39%) say such changes are negative. Six in 10 Lebanese respondents are evenly split between those who view U.S. policy toward the Muslim World as negative (31%) and those who say they are the same as before Trump was elected (31%). A majority in Turkey (57%) and a plurality in the UAE (37%) maintain that it is too early to tell if changes in U.S. policy toward the Muslim World are positive or negative. And Saudis are split between those who say the policy has remained the same (36%) and those who think it is too early to tell (36%). Finally, majorities in Jordan and Iraq are split between viewing changes in U.S. policy toward the Muslim World as positive and negative (Jordan: 27% vs 32%, Iraq: 28% vs. 27%).

Dealing with Iran

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
More positive	2	27	28	12	48	55	28	8	
More negative	86	29	41	29	0	18	41	68	
Remaining the same	8	25	19	37	20	5	17	11	
Too early to tell	4	19	12	21	32	22	14	13	

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. This question was not asked in Iran.

More than two-thirds of respondents in Egypt (86%) and Turkey (68%) say U.S. policy changes with respect to Iran since the election of Trump are negative, as do pluralities in Jordan (41%) and Iraq (41%). On the other hand, about one-half of respondents in the UAE (55%) and Saudi Arabia (48%) view these changes as positive. Palestinians and Lebanese are split on this question, with Lebanese respondents evenly divided among those who see the changes as positive (27%), negative (29%), and the same (25%), while Palestinians lean toward viewing the policy as remaining the same (37%) with others saying it is negative (29%) or too early to tell (21%).

ISRAEL-PALESTINE

The Trump Administration has indicated that it hopes to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From what you have seen so far, how confident are you that they will be able to make progress in their efforts?									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Confident	7	40	35	34	18	1	39	52	39
Not confident	93	60	65	66	82	99	61	48	61

In eight of the nine countries surveyed majorities do not have confidence that the Trump Administration will make progress in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This lack of confidence is highest in the UAE (99%), Egypt (93%), and Saudi Arabia (82%), with at least six in 10 respondents saying they do not have confidence in Palestine (66%), Jordan (65%), Iraq (61%), Iran (61%), and Lebanon (60%). Only in Turkey does a slim majority (52%) say they are confident that the Trump Administration will be able to make progress in resolving the conflict.

With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which of the following options would you be more inclined to support?									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
That the Palestinians have an independent state as part of a two-state solution	67	36	30	21	74	83	20	45	26
That there be a one-state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis	13	23	25	38	5	2	61	38	42
I don't believe a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis is possible.	20	40	45	41	21	15	20	17	32

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

When asked if they support a two-state solution or a one-state solution, or do not believe settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis is possible, **strong majorities in the UAE (83%), Saudi Arabia (74%), and Egypt (67%) continue to support an independent state of Palestine as part of a two-state solution;** a plurality of respondents in Turkey (45%) agree. A majority in Iraq (61%) as well as a plurality in Iran (42%) would be more inclined to support a one-state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis; 38% of respondents in Turkey and in Palestine itself also prefer a one-state solution. **At least four in 10 respondents, representing pluralities, in Jordan (45%), Lebanon (40%), and Palestine itself (41%) do not believe that a settlement of the conflict is possible;** one-third of Iranian respondents (32%) and about two in 10 respondents in all other countries surveyed also hold this view that no settlement is possible.

It has been suggested that an alliance between Israel and Arab governments would be useful in fighting extremist groups and combating Iran’s regional interference. Which of the following best describes your opinion?

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Such a partnership would be desirable, but only if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative	59	40	35		48	48	51	54	
Such a partnership should not be pursued even if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative	34	43	52		50	50	43	21	
Such a partnership would be desirable and should be pursued whether or not Israel ends its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative	7	16	13		2	1	6	25	

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. This question was not asked in Palestine or Iran.

Majorities in Egypt (59%), Turkey (54%), and Iraq (51%), as well as just under one-half of respondents in the UAE (48%) and Saudi Arabia (48%), say that **an alliance between Israel and Arab governments would be desirable for combating extremism and Iran’s interference, but “only if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative.”** On the other hand, one-half of those in Jordan (52%), the UAE (50%), and Saudi Arabia (50%), as well as 43% of respondents in Lebanon and Iraq, say that even if Israel ends its occupation, such a partnership should not be a pursued. **There is minimal support for an alliance between Israel and Arab governments for combating extremism without a resolution in Palestine;** one-quarter in Turkey (25%) hold this view, with a scant number of respondents in other countries agreeing – 7% or less in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq.

PALESTINIAN ATTITUDES

In 2002 the Arab League unanimously endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative in which they agreed to establish normalized ties with Israel if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories and resolve the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?		Palestine
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, and more effort should be made to achieve this goal.		41
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, but I don't believe that the Israelis will give up the territories.		27
Even if the Israelis agree to return all of the territories and agree to resolve the refugee issue, I am not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel.		32

Palestinians are quite divided in their views of the Arab Peace Initiative and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Overall, **two-thirds (68%) say they are “prepared for a just and comprehensive peace” if Israel meets the terms of the API, but while 41% think this is a goal worth pursuing, 27% “do not believe that the Israelis will give up the territories.”** The remaining one-third of Palestinian respondents (32%) are “not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel” even if the Israelis return all the territories and resolve the refugee issue.

Those respondents who support Fatah are more likely than those who support Hamas to say that more effort should be made to achieve a comprehensive peace with Israel through the API framework (Fatah: 43% vs. Hamas: 30%). On the other hand, Hamas supporters are twice as likely as Fatah supporters to say they are “not ready” for peace (Fatah: 28% vs. Hamas: 54%).

How do you rate your satisfaction with the overall performance of...?		Palestine					
		Overall	Fatah	Hamas	West Bank	Gaza	Jerusalem
The Palestinian Authority	Satisfied	46	45	31	46	47	46
	Not satisfied	54	55	69	54	53	54
Hamas	Satisfied	31	16	81	30	30	43
	Not satisfied	69	84	19	70	70	57

Majorities of Palestinians are not satisfied with both the Palestinian Authority (54%) and Hamas (69%), with significantly less satisfaction with Hamas. Those who support Hamas are less likely than those who support Fatah to express satisfaction with the Palestinian Authority (Fatah: 45% vs. Hamas: 31%), but are far more likely to express satisfaction with Hamas (Fatah: 16% vs. Hamas: 81%). There is little difference in satisfaction ratings based on residence in the West Bank, Gaza, or Jerusalem, though those who live in Jerusalem are a bit more likely to say they are satisfied with Hamas (43%) than their compatriots in the West Bank (30%) or Gaza (30%).

How important is it that the major Palestinian parties achieve unity? How confident are you that the major Palestinian parties will achieve unity in the next few years?

		Palestine					
		Overall	Fatah	Hamas	West Bank	Gaza	Jerusalem
Importance of unity	Important	70	63	79	63	74	94
	Not important	30	37	21	37	26	6
Confidence in unity	Confident	37	36	41	34	41	39
	Not confident	63	64	59	66	59	61

Seven in 10 Palestinian respondents (70%) say that it is important that the major Palestinian parties achieve unity, but only half as many (37%) are confident that such unity will be achieved in the next few years. Hamas supporters and those who live in Jerusalem are most likely to feel that unity is important (Hamas: 79%; Jerusalem: 94%), but the low confidence in achieving unity is basically the same across political parties and areas of residence.

Which of the following, in your opinion, is the best course of action for the Palestinian Authority?

		Palestine					
		Overall	Fatah	Hamas	West Bank	Gaza	Jerusalem
To remain as it is		12	13	8	14	9	13
To make a determined effort to press for unity		65	70	56	62	70	59
To dissolve		23	18	36	24	20	28

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

About two-thirds of Palestinian respondents (65%) say the Palestinian Authority should “make a determined effort to press for unity,” while one-quarter say it should “dissolve” (23%) and just 12% want it “to remain as it is.”

Have you or any members of your immediate family suffered violence at the hand of...?

		Palestine					
		Overall	Fatah	Hamas	West Bank	Gaza	Jerusalem
Israeli military, police or border patrols, or Shin Bet	Yes	35	32	54	37	28	54
	No	65	68	46	63	72	46
Israeli settlers	Yes	30	24	47	34	16	69
	No	70	76	53	66	84	31

One-third of Palestinian respondents (35%) say they (or their immediate family members) have suffered violence at the hand of Israeli military, police or border patrols, or Shin Bet. Three in 10 say they have suffered violence at the hands of Israeli settlers. Hamas supporters and Palestinians from Jerusalem are most likely to say they have suffered violence (Hamas: military/police: 54%, settlers: 47%; Jerusalem: military/police: 54%, settlers: 69%).

IRAN

With regard to Iran, of the following policy recommendations, in your opinion, which is the most important policy that the Great Powers should pursue?									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Continue to enforce the “Iran Deal” to limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions	20	33	26	19	34	22	18	62	
Scrap the “Iran Deal” and impose tough sanctions on Iran in response to its meddlesome role in the region’s conflicts	34	18	31	24	42	56	32	13	
Press Iran to participate in a regional security framework to help bring peace to the region	35	33	26	29	18	20	26	4	
Work more closely with and provide more assistance to the GCC countries to assist their efforts to contain Iran	10	16	17	28	6	2	24	21	
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. This question was not asked in Iran.									

Respondents were asked to consider four possible policies for the Great Powers with respect to Iran. Attitudes in most countries are quite mixed, with majorities in only two countries settling on one option: 62% in Turkey think there should be “continued enforcement of the ‘Iran Deal’ to limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions” and 56% in the UAE want to “scrap the ‘Iran Deal’ and impose tough sanctions on Iran in response to its meddlesome role in the region’s conflicts.” A plurality of Saudis (42%) agree with Emiratis, though another one-third of respondents in Saudi Arabia (34%) would prefer to continue with the current Iran Deal.

The more mixed responses can be summarized as follows:

One-third of Egyptians (34%) want to impose tough sanctions and set aside the current deal, while another third (35%) would prefer to “press Iran to participate in a regional security framework to help bring peace to the region.”

One-third of Lebanese respondents (33%) want to continue with the current deal, while another third (33%) want Iran to participate in a regional security framework.

Jordanians are split among continuing the current deal (26%), scrapping the current deal and replacing it with tough sanctions (31%), and the regional security framework including Iran (26%).

Finally, Palestinians and Iraqis are the most divided in their responses with varying levels of support for the three options presented thus far (i.e., current deal, new sanctions, security framework) and “working more closely with and providing more assistance to the GCC countries to assist their efforts to contain Iran.”

IRANIAN ATTITUDES

How satisfied are you with your government's performance with respect to each of the following?			
		Iran	
		2016	2017
Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Satisfied	51	62
	Not satisfied	49	38
Advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights	Satisfied	30	46
	Not satisfied	70	54
Giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen	Satisfied	47	60
	Not satisfied	53	40

We asked Iranian respondents to rate their satisfaction with their government's performance on several issues, repeating questions we asked them last year. About six in 10 respondents are satisfied with the government's investment "in improving the economy and creating employment" (62%) and "giving greater support to Iranian allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen" (60%). Just under one-half (46%) of Iranian respondents are satisfied with their government's work "advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights." In all cases, these rates of satisfaction are 10-16 points higher than last year's numbers.

How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in...?					
		Iran			
		2014	2015	2016	2017
Syria	Important	90	73	24	69
	Not important	7	27	76	31
Lebanon	Important	88	72	43	67
	Not important	10	28	57	33
Iraq	Important	87	64	47	75
	Not important	10	36	53	25
Yemen	Important	62	43	39	58
	Not important	36	57	61	42

Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included.

For the last three years we have asked Iranian respondents how important it is to them that their government continues to be involved in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. **Between 2014 and 2016, attitudes were in decline**, with fewer respondents suggesting that continued involvement was important. **However, in the current survey, we find that attitudes toward government involvement in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon are way up from last year and back to the higher levels of 2014 and 2015**—ending a two-year decline. Involvement in Iraq is deemed most important, with three-quarters of Iranian respondents saying it is important; at least two-thirds feel the same with respect to Iran's involvement in Lebanon (67%) and Syria (69%). Yemen, the conflict that has always ranked at the bottom

2017

for respondents, is considered important by 58% of Iranians in the current survey, close to the 62% who said it was important in 2014.

Which of the following best describes your opinion of the implementation of the nuclear deal?	
	Iran
I am satisfied with the implementation	24
Iran has met its obligations but the West has not yet met its obligations	46
Iran has met its obligations and the West will not do so because it is hostile to Iran	30

When asked about the implementation of the nuclear deal, 46% of Iranian respondents say that “Iran has met its obligations but the West has not yet met its obligations.” Three in 10 respondents (30%) go further, saying not only has Iran met its obligations, while the West has not, but also that “the West will not do so because it is hostile to Iran.” In other words, **more than three-quarters of Iranians fault Western countries for not meeting their obligations. Just one-quarter of Iranian respondents (24%) say they are “satisfied with the implementation.”**

TURKISH ATTITUDES

How satisfied are you with your government's performance with respect to each of the following?		
		Turkey
Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Satisfied	61
	Not satisfied	39
Advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights	Satisfied	44
	Not satisfied	56
Improving relations with the United States and the West	Satisfied	39
	Not satisfied	61

Respondents in Turkey were asked about their satisfaction with their government's performance on several issues. A majority (61%) is satisfied with this performance with respect to "investing in improving the economy and creating employment." On the other hand, only about four in 10 respondents are satisfied with their government's performance with respect to "advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights" (44%) and "improving relations with the United States and the West" (39%).

REFUGEES

Respondents in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey were asked about their attitudes toward the impact of Syrian refugees in their countries, questions we previously asked in 2014.

What is the impact of Syrian refugees coming into your country...							
		Lebanon		Jordan		Turkey	
		2014	2017	2014	2017	2014	2017
On your country's security?	Positive	14	30	16	29	4	7
	Negative	55	42	61	38	39	89
	No impact	24	28	18	34	56	4
On your country's economy?	Positive	32	25	16	31	9	14
	Negative	36	46	58	35	56	76
	No impact	26	30	22	35	30	10

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Pluralities in Lebanon view the impact of Syrian refugees in their countries as negative with respect to both security (42%) and the economy (46%). While these numbers indicate a more tempered view of the impact of refugees on Lebanese security since 2014, with the “positive impact” rating increasing from 14% to 30%, it is a more negative view of their impact on the Lebanese economy (with the positive number falling 7 points and the negative number rising 10 points).

In Jordan, attitudes are quite mixed, with almost equal numbers of respondents saying that refugees have a positive, a negative, or no impact on both security and the economy. **Since 2014, we find an increase in positive attitudes and a decrease in negative attitudes with respect to the impact of Syrian refugees on both Jordanian security** (positive increase of 13 points, negative decrease of 23 points) **and the Jordanian economy** (positive increase of 15 points, negative decrease of 23 points).

In Turkey, however, we see hardening negative views since 2014. More than three-quarters of respondents say Syrian refugees have a negative impact on Turkey's security (89%) and on the Turkish economy (76%).

POLITICAL ISLAM

Should religious movements restrict themselves to personal faith and spiritual guidance, or should they play a direct role in political life and governance?									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Restrict themselves to personal faith and spiritual guidance.	81	59	56	39	85	84	41	84	66
Play a direct role in political life and governance	19	41	44	61	15	16	59	16	34

Majorities in all countries surveyed except Palestine and Iraq think that religious movements should “restrict themselves to personal faith and spiritual guidance.” This belief is strongest in Saudi Arabia (85%), the UAE (84%), Turkey (84%), and Egypt (81%), followed by Iran (66%), Lebanon (59%), and Jordan (56%). About six in 10 Palestinian (61%) and Iraqi (59%) respondents say that religious movements should “play a direct role in political life and governance.”

When religious movements and their supporters have taken power, in general, have they made their countries stronger or weaker?									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
They have made their countries stronger.	19	52	47	26	16	16	29	4	58
They have made the countries weaker.	81	48	53	74	84	84	71	96	42

Respondents were asked about the effects that religious movements have had in countries where they have taken power. **Only in Lebanon and Iran do majorities say such movements make countries stronger** (Lebanon: 52%, Iran: 58%). The alternative view, that religious movements taking political power make countries weaker, is most prevalent in Turkey (96%), Saudi Arabia (84%), the UAE (84%), and Egypt (81%); more than seven in 10 respondents in Palestine (74%) and Iraq (71%) agree, as do 53% of Jordanians.

When religious movements do govern, have they in general improved the lives of citizens or made them worse?									
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
They have improved the lives of citizens.	17	50	49	30	16	16	23	4	62
They have worsened the lives of citizens.	83	50	51	70	84	84	77	96	38

Similarly, when asked if governing religious movements improve the lives of citizens in their countries or make them worse, more than seven in 10 respondents in Turkey (96%), Saudi Arabia (84%), the UAE (84%), Egypt (83%), Iraq (77%), and Palestine (70%) say they make the lives of their citizens worse. Opinion is evenly split in Lebanon (50% vs. 50%) and Jordan (49% vs. 51%). **Only in Iran does a majority feel that governing religious movements in general improve the lives of citizens (62%).**

In which of the following cases have religious movements been effective in making their countries stronger and improving the quality of life? [Responses are ranked for each surveyed country.]

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Overall Rank
Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood	4	2	3	5	2	3	5	4
Turkey under the AKP	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	1
Iran under the Ayatollah	2	1	5	3	4	2	3	3
Palestinian Authority under Hamas	5	5	4	4	5	5	4	5
Tunisia under Ennahda	3	3	2	2	3	4	1	2

Rankings are based on the percentage of respondents that deem each movement effective. These questions were not asked in Turkey or Iran.

Respondents were asked which governing religious movements have been effective in making countries stronger and improving citizens' quality of life. The table above shows rankings within each surveyed country based on the percentages of respondents who say the movement has been effective.

Despite mixed or negative feelings toward religious movements in government, respondents give higher grades to the AKP in Turkey and Tunisia's Ennahda for having been effective in governance. The AKP is deemed effective by 81% of respondents in Egypt, 70% of Emiratis, and 59% of Saudis. Ennahda in Tunisia is viewed as the next most effective religious movement that governed, with a top ranking by Iraqi respondents and second place rankings in Jordan and Palestine. Iran under the Ayatollah, ranked first by Lebanese respondents, follows as the next most effective religious movement that has governed. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in Palestine are deemed the least effective of these examples, with the lowest ranking among Egyptians, Lebanese, Saudis, and Emiratis.

While there is little variation in the attitudes of Sunni, Shia, and Christian respondents in Lebanon with respect to these governing religious movements, in Iraq there are some differences of opinion. Sunni Iraqis are most likely to view the AKP in Turkey (54%) and Ennahda in Tunisia (50%) as effective, with their lowest rating going to Iran under the Ayatollah (4%). On the other hand, among Shia Iraqis the most effective governing religious movements are deemed to be Ennahda (46%) and Iran under the Ayatollah (44%), with the lowest percentage going to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which is only viewed as effective by 15% of Shia respondents in Iraq.

Do you agree or disagree that it is appropriate for Arab governments to provide financial support to religious institutions and movements outside the Middle East? for Arab individuals and groups to provide financial support to religious institutions and movements outside the Middle East?

		Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Arab govern-ments	Agree	19	57	66	38	20	3	41		
	Disagree	81	43	34	62	80	97	59		
Arab individuals and groups	Agree	19	47	53	39	16	3	54		
	Disagree	81	53	47	61	84	97	46		

These questions were not asked in Turkey or Iran.

At least eight in 10 respondents in the UAE (97%), Egypt (81%), and Saudi Arabia (80%) as well as about six in 10 Palestinians (62%) and Iraqis (59%) say that they do not think it is appropriate for Arab governments to provide

financial support to religious institutions and movements outside the Middle East. On the other hand, majorities in Jordan (66%) and Lebanon (57%) do consider this appropriate.

With respect to Arab individuals and groups providing such support, again more than eight in 10 Emiratis (97%), Saudis (84%), and Egyptians (81%) as well as majorities in Palestine (61%) and Lebanon (53%) think this is inappropriate. Just over half of those in Iraq (53%) and Jordan (53%) say such financial support is appropriate.

APPENDIX A — METHODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

The approach used for conducting the poll involved face-to-face personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered in each country to cover a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative and was comprised of adult males and females who were 15+ years of age; in Palestine, adults ages 18 and up were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, only citizens and Arab expatriates were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where door-to-door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. However, adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was not skewed and was broadly representative. Since random, door-to-door sampling is possible in the remaining countries, a multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for selection of respondents in each country. In addition, 50 respondents were re-pollled in four countries to reconfirm responses and ascertain reasoning for particular responses.


Country	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Dates of Survey	Coverage
Lebanon	625	±3.9	9/5–9/16/17	Beirut (East & West Beirut), Baabda, El Maten, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, Saayda
Jordan	634	±3.9	9/5–9/15/17	Amman City, Balqa, Madaba, Irbid, Jarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba
Iraq	1028	±3.0	9/5–9/17/17	Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Karbala, Nassiriyah, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	1034	±3.0	9/5–9/17/17	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Haymana, Ceyhan
KSA	1039	±3.0	9/5–9/17/17	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Shammasyah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail and Hufuf
UAE	436	±4.7	9/5–9/15/17	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Egypt	1037	±3.0	9/4–9/15/17	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban & rural), Menia (urban & rural), Asyut (urban & rural), Tanta (urban & rural)
Iran	1025	±3.1	9/5–9/19/17	Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, Ahwaz
Palestine	1016	±3.1	8/24–9/15/17	Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Hebron, Jericho, Tulkarem, Tubas, Qalqilya, Salfit, Gaza City, North Gaza, Deir Al-Balah, Khan Yunis, Rafah

Demographics

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Male	51	50	53	50	56	49	50	50	51
Female	49	50	47	50	44	51	50	50	49
Under 30	42	35	44	47	39	56	45	32	33
30+	58	65	56	53	61	44	55	68	67
In city	57	88	78	70	83	86	66	73	78
Out of city	43	12	22	20 (village); 9 (refugee camp)	17	14	34	27	22
Sunni	89	25	96		85	91	35	85	6
Shia	1	29	2		15	9	65	15	94
Other religion	9 (Christian)	40 (Christian); 6 (Druze)	2 (Christian)						
Ethnicity							17 (Kurd); 75 (Arab); 8 (other)		

2018

Middle East Public Opinion



MIDDLE EAST PUBLIC OPINION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between August 22 and September 17, 2018, Zogby Research Services conducted face-to-face polls, surveying 8,628 adults in eight Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), Turkey, and Iran. We had been commissioned by the Sir Bani Yas Forum to explore attitudes toward a range of issues including their overall priorities; satisfaction with and confidence in their country's institutions; views of other countries; the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the Iran nuclear deal; and extremism. We also surveyed Palestinians and Iranians about developments within their countries. What follows is a summary of the most significant findings followed by a complete description of the results.

1. Priority Concerns

Expanding employment opportunities is still the top priority among respondents in eight of the 10 countries.

“Improving the educational system” and “political or governmental reform” are top-tier priorities in seven of the 10 countries.

“Political or governmental reform” has gained in importance in Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran, as has “ending corruption and nepotism” in Egypt and Tunisia.

2. Importance of Palestine, Syria, and Iranian Interference

All of these issues are seen as important, but **“ending the occupation of Palestinian lands” is rated the number one issue in most countries.**

3. & 4. Right/Wrong Track and Confidence in Institutions

There is a direct connection between whether respondents feel that their countries are moving in the right or wrong direction and their confidence in their institutions. **Tunisians, Egyptians, and Iraqis have very negative views about the direction of their countries and their institutions.**

Emirati and Turkish respondents, on the other hand, are very positive about both direction and their institutions. While Saudi right/wrong track numbers are mid-range positive, the confidence Saudis have in their institutions are among the highest across the region.

5. Sources of Information About the World

While “talking with family and friends” and television (both satellite and local) are still major sources of news and trusted sources, the media landscape has also changed, with a significant percentage of respondents now getting their information from the Internet and social media. These sources are also trusted for the information they convey.

6. Views of Other Countries

The European Union and China consistently receive the highest favorability ratings across the region. Turkey and Saudi Arabia also score well in most countries.

The United States only receives positive scores in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where the U.S. ratings have climbed dramatically. It is important to note that the United States only receives single digit favorable ratings in Iraq and Egypt.

Iran is only viewed favorably by a slight majority in Lebanon and Iraq. Elsewhere, its ratings are extremely low.

It is worth noting that in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq there is a sectarian divide with regard to attitudes toward Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. This same divide can also be observed in attitudes toward the roles these same countries are seen to play in Syria and Iraq.

7. Syria

The roles played by Iran and Russia in Syria are viewed negatively by respondents in most countries. Turkey's role in Syria is viewed positively by respondents in more than half of the countries surveyed.

A majority of respondents are only somewhat hopeful that the conflict in Syria is moving toward a resolution, but majorities or pluralities in most countries desire an outcome without Assad in power. These anti-Assad views have softened somewhat in most countries—most significantly in Jordan, the UAE, and Turkey.

8. Iraq

With few exceptions, respondents say that most countries have played a negative role in Iraq, with the lion's share of fault going to the United States and Iran.

Iraqis, while only slightly favorable to the role of the Popular Mobilization Units, are evenly divided on the roles played by Iran and their own military.

Iraqis, who in last year's poll were evenly divided on the U.S. role in their country, now overwhelmingly express the view that the U.S. involvement has been negative.

In the vast majority of countries, respondents favor a reformed and representative government in Baghdad that can keep the country unified.

It is noteworthy that a majority of Iraqis now support a reformed government that can keep the county unified. This view is shared by Iraqi Shia and Kurds. Only Iraqi Sunni Arabs now support a federation of autonomous regions.

This support for a unified Iraq represents a significant shift since last year when Iraqis were divided between this option and one that called for a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the government in Baghdad.

9. Palestine

In most countries a majority of respondents are opposed to Arab states partnering with Israel to combat extremism and Iran's interference. Even if Israel were to fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative most respondents would still be opposed to such a partnership.

In 2017, Palestinian respondents were almost evenly divided in their opinion as to whether there should be a one-state solution with equal rights for both Israelis and Palestinians and the contrary view that no solution was possible to resolve the conflict. Now in 2018, **fully one half of all Palestinians feel no solution is possible**, with the remaining half evenly divided between support for two states and one state as the way to end the conflict.

10. Yemen

In every country, a plurality of respondents say that their most important concern with regard to the conflict in Yemen is the humanitarian crisis. In 2017, that issue did not rise to the top of the list of the concerns in any country.

In five of the nine countries surveyed, either a decisive majority or a plurality of respondents favor “negotiations leading to compromise among warring parties and establishment of a central government representing all factions” as the best way to end the conflict. In the other four countries, respondents favor “the restoration of the legitimate government.” In no country do respondents favor a partition of the country.

11A. Iran’s Nuclear Program

While opinion in all 10 countries is nearly evenly divided on initial support for the P5+1 agreement, only in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey do a majority feel that the agreement has been successful in limiting Iran’s capacity to produce a weapon.

In every country, other than Egypt, majorities are supportive of the Trump Administration’s decision to pull out of the nuclear deal with Iran.

With the U.S. pull-out from the P5+1 agreement, opinion is divided as to what the remaining members of the agreement should do. **There is consensus, however, on one issue: that in any new agreement there must be “a verifiable Iranian commitment to end support for and withdraw its troops and allies from conflicts in Arab countries.”**

In every country but Tunisia and the UAE majorities support calling on Iran to “participate in a regional security arrangement with Arab countries to help bring peace to the region.”

Opinion is divided as to whether it possible for Iran and the Arab World to live in peace. In no case does a majority say it is “very possible” with a decisive majority of Tunisians and Egyptians saying “it is not possible at all.”

On the other side, only 8% of Iranians hold the view that “it is not possible” to live in peace with the Arab World, with one-half claiming that it is “very possible.”

11B. Iranian Views

A slight majority of Iranians supported the P5+1 agreement and express the belief that it was in their country’s interests. Nevertheless, **a substantial 84% of Iranians still hold the view that their country should have the right to a nuclear weapon.**

In almost every area (improving the economy, advancing democracy and protecting rights, giving support to allies in conflicts in Arab countries, and improving relations with the West and Arab governments) there is about a 10-point drop in Iranians’ satisfaction with their government’s performance.

Similarly, there is a **decline in Iranians' views of the importance of their government's continued involvement in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.**

12. Extremism

Majorities in every country except Tunisia and Palestine believe that radicalized individuals can be successfully de-radicalized, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE expressing the greatest confidence that this can be done. Less than one-quarter of Tunisians think de-radicalization is possible and only slightly more than one quarter believe that their country is prepared to deal with the return of radicalized individuals. In every other country polled, opinion is nearly evenly divided as to whether their country is prepared to handle the return of radicalized individuals.

PRIORITIES

We asked respondents to select and rank the three issues they see as most important from the following list:

Expanding employment opportunities
 Advancing democracy
 Protecting personal and civil rights
 Ending corruption and nepotism
 Political or governmental reform

Improving the health care system
 Improving the educational system
 Combating the threat posed by extremist groups and terrorism
 Increasing rights for women
 Protecting the country from foreign enemies

Table 1. Of the following list of issues facing your country, which are the three most important issues that need to be addressed? Rank them from 1 (being the most important issue) through 3.

RANK	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
1	Employment (1)	End corruption (4)	Employment (1)	Employment	Employment (1)	Employment (1)	Employment (1)	Personal rights (1)	Employment	Employment (1)
2	Education (8)	Education (2)	Health care (7)	Political reform	Women's rights (9)	Political reform (6)	Education (8)	Education (6)	Education	Women's rights (6)
3	Extremist groups (3)	Political reform (6)	Women's rights (9)	End corruption	Political reform (3)	Health care (5)	Extremist groups (7)	Foreign enemies*	Democracy	Political reform (4)
4	Political reform (5)	Employment (1)	Extremist groups (8)	Health care	Personal rights (7)	Personal rights (7)	Political reform (5)	Employment (3)	Women's rights	Health care (8)
5	End corruption (7)	Health care (3)	End corruption (2)	Education	Education (8)	End corruption (3)	End corruption (2)	Democracy (5)	Extremist groups	Personal rights (3)
6	Health care (6)	Personal rights (7)	Personal rights (4)	Personal rights	Health care (5)	Women's rights (9)	Personal rights (4)	Extremist groups (9)	Foreign enemies*	Democracy (2)
7	Personal rights (9)	Extremist groups (5)	Foreign enemies*	Women's rights	End corruption (2)	Education (4)	Foreign enemies*	Political reform (7)	Political reform	End corruption (5)
8	Women's rights (4)	Democracy (8)	Political reform (3)	Foreign enemies*	Democracy (6)	Extremist groups (2)	Democracy (3)	Health care (2)	Personal rights	Education (7)
9	Foreign enemies*	Foreign enemies*	Democracy (5)	Democracy	Extremist groups (4)	Democracy (8)	Health care (6)	End corruption (8)	End corruption	Extremist groups (9)
10	Democracy (2)	Women's rights (9)	Education (6)	Extremist groups	Foreign enemies*	Foreign enemies*	Women's rights (9)	Women's rights (4)	Health care	Foreign enemies*

For countries where we asked this same question in 2011 (all except Palestine and Turkey), the rank order of the issue in 2011 is included in parentheses.
 **Protecting the country from foreign enemies* is a new choice in the 2018 survey.

Overall, “expanding employment opportunities” is the number one issue on this list that respondents want their countries to prioritize. It is considered most important in eight of the 10 countries surveyed, all except Egypt, where respondents rank “ending corruption and nepotism” first, and the UAE, where “protecting personal and civil rights” tops the list. In both Egypt and the UAE, however, employment is still a top tier (4th) issue of importance.

“Improving the educational system” is the second most important issue overall, and is ranked second in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey. This issue is of the least concern in Iraq (7th), Iran (8th), and Lebanon (10th).

“Political and governmental reform” is the third most identified issue of importance overall and is a top-tier priority in Palestine (2nd), Iraq (2nd), Jordan (3rd), Iran (3rd), Egypt (3rd), Tunisia (4th), and Saudi Arabia (4th).

“Combating the threat posed by extremist groups and terrorism” and “ending corruption and nepotism” are the remaining two issues that are ranked in the top tier of priorities overall. Combating extremism and terrorism are of particular importance in Tunisia (3rd), Saudi Arabia (3rd), and Lebanon (4th), but of the least importance to respondents in Palestine (10th), Jordan (9th), Iraq (8th), and Iran (9th). In addition to Egypt where it is the number one issue of importance, ending corruption is also a top-tier priority in Palestine (3rd), Saudi Arabia (5th), Iraq (5th), Tunisia (5th), and Lebanon (5th).

“Protecting personal and civil rights” is considered important by respondents in the UAE (1st), Jordan (4th), and Iraq (4th). “Improving the health care system” is in the top tier of issues in Lebanon (2nd), Iraq (3rd), Palestine (4th), Iran (4th), and Egypt (5th). “Increasing rights for women” is second in Jordan and Iran, third in Lebanon, and fourth in Turkey. “Advancing democracy” and “protecting the country from foreign enemies” are each represented only once among the top tier of issues in the 10 countries: “democracy” is third in Turkey and “foreign enemies” is third in the UAE.

When comparing these results to the last time we asked this question in 2011, we find some aspects of stability and other issues of growing importance. Employment was also the number one ranked issue overall in 2011, and the concern with issues related to governance and rights that we noted as emerging in 2011 continues to be evident in this year’s survey. Political and governmental reform, ending corruption and nepotism, and protecting personal and civil rights are among the most important issues in many countries. Political reform has advanced as an issue of concern in Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Ending corruption has climbed the ranks in Tunisia as well as in Egypt (to first place). And the protection of civil rights has risen as an issue of importance in Jordan and Iraq.

Of particular note in the current survey is the growing importance of improving the educational systems in Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and the health care systems in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. In addition, we find a steep ascent in the importance of increasing rights for women among respondents in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iran, where this issue now ranks as the second or third most important issue, rising from the bottom tier of priorities in 2011.

IMPORTANCE OF PALESTINE, SYRIA, AND IRAN

Table 2. On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the least important and 10 being the most important, how important are each of the following issues facing your country?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Ending the occupation of Palestinian lands and resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict	9.45	9.15	6.36	8.82	5.81	6.37	8.82	8.65	8.81
Resolving the conflict in Syria	8.26	9.20	6.45	7.87	5.83	5.82	7.87	8.19	8.01
The danger posed by Iranian interference in the region	6.63	8.76	5.91	8.27	6.31	4.50	8.27	8.44	7.89

Values shown are the mean of all ratings given by respondents in each country.

Table 3. Rank of Importance: Ending occupation in Palestine | Resolving conflict in Syria | Danger of Iranian interference

RANK	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
1	Palestine	Syria	Syria	Palestine	Iran	Palestine	Palestine	Palestine	Palestine
2	Syria	Palestine	Palestine	Iran	Syria	Syria	Iran	Iran	Syria
3	Iran	Iran	Iran	Syria	Palestine	Iran	Syria	Syria	Iran

“Ending the occupation of Palestinian lands and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” is viewed as the most important issue of the three provided in six of the nine countries surveyed, including Tunisia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Palestine itself. In each of these countries the issue’s mean score tops 8.6 on a scale of 1 to 10; overall, it is the highest rated concern, with an average score of 8.03.

“Resolving the conflict in Syria” edges out the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Egypt and Lebanon as the most important issue. And the Syrian conflict is ranked second in importance by respondents in Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey. Its average importance rating out of 10 is 7.5.

Finally, “the danger posed by Iranian interference in the region” is considered the most important issue by respondents in Jordan, and has the second highest mean score in Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Overall, its average rating of importance is 7.22 out of 10.

RIGHT OR WRONG TRACK

Table 4. Do you feel that your country is on the right track or the wrong track?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Right track	20	19	47	14	34	22	49	80	84	40
Wrong track	69	55	30	65	38	52	36	10	0	28
Not sure	11	26	24	21	28	27	15	10	16	32

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

In two of the 10 surveyed countries, the UAE and Turkey, at least eight in 10 respondents are quite optimistic, saying that their country is “on the right track” (80% and 84%, respectively). Pluralities in Saudi Arabia (49%), Lebanon (47%), and Iran (40%) also view their countries as on the right track, while Jordanians are split on whether their country is on the right track or moving in the wrong direction (34% vs. 38%). In the remaining four countries, majorities say their countries are on the wrong track, including 69% in Tunisia, 65% in Palestine, 55% in Egypt, and 52% in Iraq.

Table 5. Overall, do you think you are better off or worse off than you were five years ago?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Better off	21	20	32	17	31	20	36	68	72	34
Worse off	59	64	39	49	39	55	29	6	2	33
About the same	20	16	28	33	30	25	36	25	27	33

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

To measure satisfaction, we ask respondents if they feel they are better off, worse off, or about the same now as compared to five years ago. Only in the UAE (68%) and Turkey (72%) do majorities say they are better off; in each of these two countries, about one-quarter say their situation is about the same and very small numbers say they are worse off (6% and 2%, respectively).

On the other hand, majorities in Egypt (64%), Tunisia (59%), and Iraq (55%), and almost one-half in Palestine (49%) say they are worse off now than they were five years ago, with about two in 10 respondents in each country saying they are better off. In Iraq we find that Sunni respondents are three times more likely than their Shia compatriots to say they are worse off (96% vs. 33%). Of the remaining Iraqi Sunnis, 3% say they are better off and 1% say they are about the same, while 29% of Iraqi Shia say they are better off and 38% say they are about the same. In Palestine, those who live in Gaza are most likely to say they are worse off (79% vs. 36% in the West Bank and 13% in Jerusalem), while Jerusalemites are the group most likely to say they are better off (42% vs. 7% in Gaza and 19% in the West Bank).

In the remaining four countries, respondents are quite divided, with about one-third in each saying they are better off (Lebanon: 32%, Jordan: 31%, Saudi Arabia: 36%, and Iran: 34%), while about one-third say they are worse off (Lebanon: 39%, Jordan: 39%, Saudi Arabia: 29%, and Iran: 33%) and one-third say they are about the same.

In most countries we find a significant overlap between those who say their country is on the right track and those who say they are personally better off now than they were five years ago, and likewise between those who think their country is on the wrong track and who say they are worse off now than five years ago. This pattern is particularly evident in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, where among those who say their country is on the wrong track, fewer than one in 10 respondents identify themselves as better off than five years ago and vice versa. The same basic pattern is found in Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran. While perhaps somewhat obvious, this serves as a reminder that the personal well-being of individuals (however they choose to define that) translates quite directly to their overall sense of satisfaction with their country's direction.

Table 6. Overall, do you think you are better off or worse off than you were five years ago? (by right track/wrong track response)

	TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		PALESTINE		JORDAN	
	Right Track	Wrong Track								
Better off	88	4	70	5	37	32	61	9	62	0
Worse off	0	81	9	83	35	42	25	63	20	60
About the same	12	15	21	12	28	26	14	28	18	40

	IRAQ		KSA		UAE		TURKEY		IRAN	
	Right Track	Wrong Track								
Better off	26	18	57	8	84	0	80	26	53	19
Worse off	39	60	0	58	2	45	1	6	17	42
About the same	35	22	43	34	14	55	19	68	31	38


Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

Table 7. How much confidence do you have in the performance of each of the following institutions operating in your country?

		TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Military	Confident	33	41	60	68	64	20	90	97	98	64
	Not confident	67	59	40	32	36	80	10	3	2	36
Police	Confident	26	37	64	72	63	19	87	96	81	58
	Not confident	74	63	36	28	37	81	13	3	19	42
Judiciary	Confident	41	39	66	69	62	20	89	96	93	66
	Not confident	59	61	34	31	38	80	11	4	7	34
Religious Establishment	Confident	15	50	69	73	64	28	94	96	99	63
	Not confident	85	50	31	27	36	72	6	4	1	37
Media	Confident	10	28	54	64	37	23	80	80	54	57
	Not confident	90	72	46	36	63	77	20	20	46	43
Parliament	Confident	25	27	48	53	47	6	79	89	45	56
	Not confident	75	73	52	47	53	94	21	11	55	44

Confident is the aggregation of responses of “a lot of confidence” and “some confidence.” Not confident is the aggregation of responses of “little confidence” and “no confidence.”



Overall, in seven of the 10 countries surveyed (all except Tunisia, Egypt, and Iraq) there is considerable confidence in most of the institutions operating in their countries, with the highest levels of confidence expressed with respect to the religious establishment, as well as the military, police, and judiciary, and lower levels of confidence in the media and parliament.

Respondents in Saudi Arabia and the UAE have the highest levels of confidence in their institutions, with at least eight in 10 respondents expressing confidence in every institution. In Iran and Palestine, majorities also express confidence in all institutions, albeit at a lower level than in Saudi Arabia and the UAE; closer to six in 10 respondents in these countries are confident in their institutions. In both Iran and Palestine confidence is slightly lower with respect to their parliaments (56% and 53%, respectively) and the media (57% and 64%, respectively) than other institutions. In Lebanon, again we find majorities confident in all institutions except parliament, about which opinion is split (48% vs. 52%). Jordanian respondents hold similar views to their Lebanese neighbors, though they have significantly less confidence in the media (37% vs. 63%).

In Turkey there are very high levels of confidence in the religious establishment (99%), military (98%), judiciary (93%), and police (81%), but respondents are somewhat split with respect to confidence in the media (54% vs. 46%) and parliament (45% vs. 55%).

Majorities of respondents in Egypt, Tunisia, and Iraq say they do not have confidence in any of the institutions operating in their countries. In Iraq only about one in five respondents express confidence in the military, police, judiciary, and the media. They have the highest level of confidence, still just 28%, in their religious establishment and the lowest level of confidence in the parliament (only 6%). Tunisian respondents express the highest levels of confidence in the judiciary (41%) and the military (33%), followed by one-quarter who are confident in parliament and the police; very few express confidence in the religious establishment (15%) or the media (10%).

In Egypt, the numbers are somewhat higher, with opinion evenly split with respect to the religious establishment (50% vs. 50%), and about four in 10 respondents saying they have confidence in the military (41%), the judiciary (39%), and the police (37%); just one-quarter express confidence in the media (28%) and their parliament (27%). It is worth noting that Egyptian respondents' confidence in the military has plummeted by more than 50 points since 2013. In the immediate aftermath of the deposing of President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, our polling found the level of confidence among Egyptians for their army was 93% and was consistent among secularists and Islamists alike. The current low level of confidence (41%) demonstrates a decline in this broad public support over the intervening five years.

In addition, Egyptians who say their country is on the right track are far more likely to express confidence in their country's institutions. This general trend is evident in a number of countries but nowhere is it as pronounced as it is in Egypt.

Table 8. Egypt: Confidence in Institutions (by right track/wrong track)

	Right track	Wrong track
Military	68	29
Police	66	22
Judiciary	69	27
Religious establishment	75	38
Media	66	19
Parliament	75	10

SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE WORLD

Table 9. What are the two main sources to which you turn for news about the world?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE
Satellite television networks from the Arab World	30	50	48	32	20	33	35	23
Satellite television networks from the West	11	5	35	15	8	6	19	16
National or local television networks	23	33	34	29	18	37	15	12
Newspapers	1	2	10	10	8	8	28	44
Internet news sites	31	25	10	33	35	20	31	38
Facebook, Twitter, other social media sites	69	39	14	48	29	24	35	31
WhatsApp	0	2	17	14	27	29	5	6
Talking with family and friends	35	43	32	18	55	43	33	30

Respondents in eight of the surveyed countries were asked about the two main sources that they turn to for news about the world. The top two choices overall are “talking with family and friends” and “Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites,” closely followed by “satellite television networks from the Arab World.”

Social media is ranked first among respondents in Tunisia (69%), Palestine (48%), and Saudi Arabia (35%). Family and friends are the top choice in Jordan (55%) and Iraq (43%), and the second-place choice in Egypt (43%) and Tunisia (35%). Satellite television is ranked first by respondents in Egypt (50%), Lebanon (48%), and Saudi Arabia (35%).

Internet news sites and national and local television networks are each identified as main sources for world news by an average of one-quarter of respondents.

Satellite television networks from the West, newspapers, and WhatsApp are the least identified world news sources in the poll, though there are a few exceptions. One-third of Lebanese respondents (35%) say they watch satellite news from the West and 44% of respondents in the UAE turn to newspapers as a source of world news (their top choice). More than one-quarter of respondents in Jordan and Iraq say WhatsApp is a significant source of world news for them.

It is interesting to compare these numbers to responses in 2011 when we first asked respondents across the region about the most important ways that they follow news and information—in that case, about the events in their own country and the Arab Spring. Considered in aggregate, satellite and local/national television were the top two choices in 2011 for following news about their countries, while satellite television networks and Internet news sites were the top choices for following events in the Arab World. Social media was near the bottom of the list for both domestic and regional news. Talking to friends and family was also far less significant in 2011. In some ways, these changes could be seen as a democratization of information – with peer-to-peer communication being increasingly privileged over more traditional news media.

One additional note of interest here is that unlike in our earlier polling, we no longer find differences based on age or any other demographic variable on choice of news source.

Table 10. Using the same list, which are the two sources for news you trust to provide the most honest information about the world?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE
Satellite television networks from the Arab World	34	51	25	32	20	32	33	21
Satellite television networks from the West	15	5	22	16	8	7	26	13
National or local television networks	6	33	31	29	19	36	15	12
Newspapers	13	1	21	19	7	8	32	43
Internet news sites	49	26	18	34	33	20	31	38
Facebook, Twitter, other social media sites	51	38	22	40	29	23	29	24
WhatsApp	0	2	22	14	26	29	3	4
Talking with family and friends	31	43	38	15	58	44	31	45

When asked to identify the most trustworthy news sources, overall respondents are most likely to say “talking with family and friends,” followed by satellite television networks from the Arab World, Internet news sites, and Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites. National or local television networks and newspapers represent the next tier of reliably honest news sources. At the bottom of the list overall, we find satellite television networks from the West and WhatsApp.

Family and friends are viewed as the top choice for honest information about the world in Jordan (58%), the UAE (45%), Iraq (44%), and Lebanon (38%). Arab satellite television is the top choice for respondents in Egypt (51%) and Saudi Arabia (33%) and social media is the top choice in Tunisia (51%) and Palestine (40%).

ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES

Table 11. For each of the following countries, please tell us if your attitudes are favorable or unfavorable.

		TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		PALESTINE		JORDAN		IRAQ		KSA		UAE		TURKEY		IRAN	
		2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018
US	Favorable		30	38	8	52	48		16	35	37	6	8	28	86	28	78	21	15	12	32
	Unfavorable		70	62	92	48	52		84	65	63	94	92	72	14	69	22	79	85	87	68
Turkey	Favorable		81	33	57	56	61		81	79	58	30	60	35	26	41	38			35	61
	Unfavorable		19	67	43	44	39		19	21	42	70	40	65	74	59	62			64	39
KSA	Favorable		6	84	61	57	57		57	85	54	68	58			76	100	83	26	36	34
	Unfavorable		94	16	39	41	43		43	15	46	31	42			23	0	17	74	62	66
Iran	Favorable		5	6	3	49	58		42	18	20	39	58	9	15	29	11	9	45		
	Unfavorable		95	94	97	51	42		58	82	80	61	42	90	85	71	89	90	55		
Russia	Favorable		18	49	19	33	54		40	35	38	28	48	24	54	40	20	10	85	57	67
	Unfavorable		82	51	81	67	46		60	65	62	71	52	76	46	59	80	87	15	43	33
China	Favorable		49		40		58		51		55		50		76		65		73		58
	Unfavorable		51		60		42		49		45		50		24		35		27		42
EU	Favorable		72		26		58		55		56		42		88		76		67		55
	Unfavorable		28		74		42		45		44		58		12		24		33		45

Percentages may not add up to 100% because responses of “not sure” (an option ONLY in 2016) are not included. Tunisia and Palestine were not included in the 2016 survey.

The European Union and China earn the highest favorability ratings of the seven countries about which we polled. The EU is viewed favorably by majorities in eight of the 10 countries surveyed, all except Egypt (26%) and Iraq (42%); its highest ratings are from respondents in Saudi Arabia (88%), the UAE (76%), and Tunisia (72%). Majorities in six of the surveyed countries hold favorable opinions of China, including 76% in Saudi Arabia and 73% in Turkey; opinion is evenly divided in Tunisia, Palestine, and Iraq, while China’s lowest favorable rating is found in Egypt (40%).

Majorities in seven of the nine surveyed countries hold favorable opinions of Turkey, with its highest ratings coming from Tunisia (81%) and Palestine (81%) and its lowest favorability in Saudi Arabia (26%) and the UAE (38%). Since 2016, overall ratings of Turkey have risen by eight points, with increases in Iraq (+30), Egypt (+24), and Iran (+26) and a significant decline in favorability among respondents in Jordan (-21).

Saudi Arabia is viewed favorably by majorities in six countries, but while opinion is now universally positive in the UAE (up 24 points since 2016), ratings have fallen sharply in Turkey (-57), Jordan (-31), Egypt (-23), and Iraq (-10), adding up to a 14-point drop overall in average ratings since 2016.

Russia has seen a significant rise in its favorability since 2016, with an average favorability 13 points higher than the previous survey. Majorities in four countries hold positive views of the country including Turkey (85%, up 75 points), Iran (67%, up 10 points), Saudi Arabia (54%, up 30 points), and Lebanon (54%, up 21 points), as do almost one-half of respondents in Iraq (48%, up 20 points). On the other hand, we find significant declines in Russia’s favorability ratings given by those in Egypt (-30) and the UAE (-20).

The United States and Iran remain at the bottom of the list, though the average favorability of both countries has risen since 2016, the United States by 13 points and Iran by seven. The United States receives favorable ratings by majorities only in Saudi Arabia (86%) and the UAE (78%), both of which have jumped by 50 points or more since 2016. There is also a significant increase in favorable opinions expressed by respondents in Iran (32%, up 20 points). Opinions have largely remained constant in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, while there have been significant declines in favorability among respondents in Egypt (-30 to 8%) and Turkey (-6 to 15%).

Only majorities in Lebanon (58%) and Iraq (58%) now view Iran favorably, with increases of nine and 19 points, respectively, since 2016. We also find a significant increase in Turkey, up 36 points to a favorable rating of 45%. Palestinians also have a relatively positive view of Iran, with 42% saying they view the country favorably. The biggest decline in ratings of Iran comes from the UAE, where favorability dropped 18 points since the previous survey.

Table 12. Favorability by Sect (2018)

	LEBANON		IRAQ		KSA		UAE	
	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia
Turkey	64	59	67	57	24	35	36	53
Saudi Arabia	60	52	70	52			100	100
Iran	52	67	15	81	5	76	6	56
Russia	44	67	41	52	51	71	21	16

There are some differences of opinion between Sunni and Shia populations in Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE with respect to their favorability ratings of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia. With only a couple of exceptions Shia respondents have more favorable views of Iran and Russia than their Sunni compatriots, while Sunni respondents are more favorable of Turkey and Saudi Arabia than their Shia compatriots. In Lebanon, the pattern is clear as Sunni respondents rate Turkey and Saudi Arabia 5-8 points higher than Shia respondents, and more significantly Lebanese Shia rate Iran and Russia more favorably by 15 and 23 points, respectively. Iraqi Sunnis rate Turkey and Saudi Arabia more favorably by 10–18 points, while the reverse is true with respect to Shia’s higher opinion of Russia. More pronounced is that Iraqi Shia view Iran very favorably (81%) compared to Iraqi Sunnis (15%).

We do not find a Sunni-Shia split in favorability with respect to Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the opinions of Saudi and Emirati respondents, perhaps due to the general disaffection for Turkey in Saudi Arabia and the UAE and the unanimity of favorability in the UAE for Saudi Arabia. However, the Sunni-Shia divide in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE regarding Iran is noteworthy. Among Shia, 76% in Saudi Arabia and 56% in the UAE hold favorable views of Iran, while just 5-6% of Sunni respondents in Saudi Arabia and the UAE agree.

SYRIA

Table 13. With regard to the conflict in Syria, of the list below, which countries do you believe are playing a positive role? a negative role?

	TUNISIA			EGYPT			LEBANON			PALESTINE		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
US	29	58	-29	4	91	-87	35	56	-21	7	53	-46
Russia	15	77	-62	9	76	-67	23	70	-47	18	45	-27
Iran	4	93	-89	2	96	-94	16	55	-39	16	30	-14
Turkey	67	18	+49	58	28	+30	71	20	+51	29	13	+16
KSA	10	84	-74	59	27	+32	38	43	-5	16	17	-1
None	19	1	+18	12	0	+12	11	0	+11	37	14	+23

	JORDAN			IRAQ			KSA			UAE		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
US	23	33	-10	8	47	-39	56	22	+34	58	29	+29
Russia	11	53	-42	20	42	-22	27	46	-19	24	76	-52
Iran	14	52	-38	28	35	-7	14	85	-71	12	82	-70
Turkey	49	19	+30	24	28	-4	44	47	-3	34	55	-21
KSA	40	23	+17	28	40	-12	64	28	+36	90	5	+85
None	9	0	+9	28	0	+28	13	0	+13	4	2	+2

	TURKEY			IRAN		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
US	11	82	-71	11	45	-34
Russia	51	31	+20	35	31	+4
Iran	26	58	-32	52	12	+40
Turkey	79	13	+66	32	27	+5
KSA	26	61	-35	11	52	-41
None	5	0	+5	10	0	+10

Respondents were asked if the United States, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia play positive or negative roles in the conflict in Syria.

Turkey is the country most likely to be seen as playing a positive role with regard to the conflict in Syria. Majorities in Turkey itself (79%), Lebanon (71%), Tunisia (67%), and Egypt (58%) view Turkey's role as positive, and more respondents say its role is positive than say it is negative in Jordan (49% vs. 19%), Palestine (29% vs. 13%), and Iran (32% vs. 27%). Opinion is split in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, while respondents in the UAE are more likely to view Turkey's role as negative (34% positive vs. 55% negative).

Saudi Arabia is seen as a positive force in the Syrian conflict by majorities in Saudi Arabia itself (64%), the UAE (90%), and Egypt (59%) and by a plurality of respondents in Jordan (40% positive vs. 23% negative). On the other hand, the Saudi role in Syria is seen as negative by majorities in Tunisia (84%), Turkey (61%), and Iran (52%), and on balance negatively in Lebanon (38% positive vs. 45% negative) and Iraq (28% positive vs. 40% negative).

The United States, Russia, and Iran are seen as playing a predominantly negative role in the Syrian conflict, with a few exceptions. The U.S. role is viewed positively only by respondents in Saudi Arabia (56%) and the UAE (58%), with majorities in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, and Turkey saying the United States plays a negative role in the Syrian conflict. There is similar sentiment with regard to Russia’s role in Syria, with respondents in Turkey (51%) saying it is positive, Iranians leaning toward the view that it is positive (35% vs. 31%), and respondents from the other eight surveyed countries clearly stating that Russia’s role in Syria is negative. Only Iranians themselves view their country’s role in Syria as positive (52%), while at least eight in 10 respondents in Tunisia (93%), Egypt (96%), Saudi Arabia (85%), and the UAE (82%), majorities in Turkey (58%), Lebanon (55%), and Jordan (52%), and on balance those in Palestine (16% positive vs. 30% negative) and Iraq (28% vs. 35%) view Iran’s role in Syria negatively.

We also find deep sectarian divides among respondents in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE with respect to which countries play positive and negative roles in Syria.

Table 14. With regard to the conflict in Syria, of the list below, which countries do you believe are playing a positive role? A negative role? (by Sunni/Shia)

	IRAQ						KSA						UAE					
	Sunni			Shia			Sunni			Shia			Sunni			Shia		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
US	12	52	-40	6	44	-38	53	22	+31	73	24	+49	57	30	+27	60	22	+38
Russia	1	54	-53	29	36	-7	18	53	-35	78	5	+73	24	76	-52	27	73	-46
Iran	2	57	-55	41	23	+18	<1	99	-98	91	3	+88	7	87	-80	56	44	+12
Turkey	65	20	+45	3	32	-29	51	39	+12	3	94	-91	34	55	-21	31	56	-25
KSA	67	11	+56	8	55	-47	69	21	+48	33	67	-34	90	5	+85	87	4	+83

While opinions about the United States are notably consistent between Sunni and Shia, with Iraqis viewing the U.S. role in Syria as negative and Saudis and Emiratis viewing the U.S. role on balance as positive, we find particularly significant differences by sect regarding the role of Iran in Syria. In Saudi Arabia, Sunni respondents are overwhelmingly negative about Iran’s role in Syria (-98), while their Shia compatriots are overwhelmingly positive (+88). Sunni respondents in Iraq and the UAE are also quite negative about Iran (-55 and -80, respectively), and Shia respondents are on balance positive (+18 and +12, respectively). **These positive ratings are somewhat tempered by the stable contingent of Shia respondents in Iraq and the UAE who hold negative views of Iran (in evidence elsewhere in this poll) – totaling about one-quarter of Shia in Iraq and about four in 10 Shia in the UAE.**

In the UAE, opinions about the roles of Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are not divided by sect. However, in Iraq and Saudi Arabia Sunni respondents are more likely to view Turkey and Saudi Arabia as playing positive roles and Russia as playing a negative role.

Table 15. How hopeful are you that developments in Syria are moving toward an end of that conflict?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Very hopeful	6	4	28	10	22	34	32	45	26	36
Somewhat hopeful	37	45	45	45	45	44	45	41	34	37
Not hopeful at all	57	51	27	45	33	22	23	13	40	27

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Majorities in Tunisia (57%) and Egypt (51%) are “not hopeful at all” that developments in Syria are moving toward an end to that conflict. But in all of the other surveyed countries, majorities are “very” or “somewhat hopeful.” About four in 10 respondents in all of the countries say they are somewhat hopeful. One-third or more respondents in Saudi Arabia (32%), Iraq (34%), Iran (36%), and the UAE (45%) are “very hopeful” about the prospects for an end to the Syrian conflict.

Table 16. Which of the following outcomes do you feel represents the best future for Syria?

	TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		PALESTINE		JORDAN		IRAQ		KSA		UAE		TURKEY		IRAN	
	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018
Negotiations leading to a national unity government without the participation of Bashar al Assad		73	88	78	36	33		38	58	29		26	74	64	97	54	90	24	15	15
Negotiations leading to a national unity government with the participation of Bashar al Assad		5	2	18	14	18		23	12	10		22	2	24	0	29	4	61	35	42
The establishment of a loose federation of regions		16	8	1	38	25		18	24	34		23	23	0	4	0	6	0	37	24
The partition of the country		1	2	0	12	12		7	6	20		21	1	0	0	0	0	0	13	6
A return to full power of the Assad Government*		5		3		13		14		7		8		12		16		15		14

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Tunisia and Palestine were not included in the 2015 survey. Iraqis were not asked this question in 2015.

* This option was not provided in 2015

When asked which outcome represents the best future for Syria, majorities in four of the surveyed countries (Tunisia: 73%, Egypt: 78%, Saudi Arabia: 64%, and the UAE: 54%) as well as pluralities in Lebanon (33%) and Palestine (38%) choose “negotiations leading to a national unity government without the participation of Bashar all Assad.” For a majority of respondents in Turkey (61%) and a plurality in Iran (42%) negotiations that include Assad would lead to the best future for Syria. A plurality of respondents in Jordan (34%) lean toward “the establishment of a loose federation of regions.” And Iraqis are split on what outcome would represent the best future for Syria.

It is important to note a few changes since 2015:

- In several of the surveyed countries we find a drop in the percentages of respondents who think negotiations without Assad (e.g., UAE: -43 points, Turkey: -66 points) are the best way forward and significant jumps in the percentages of those who opt for negotiations that include Assad (e.g., UAE: +29 points, Turkey: +57 points).
- While one in five respondents in Jordan and Iraq still view partition as the best outcome, few respondents elsewhere agree.
- Between 12-16% of respondents in Lebanon, Palestine, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE think “a return to full power of the Assad government” (a new option provided in the 2018 survey) represents the best future for Syria.

IRAQ

Table 17. Fifteen years after the US-led invasion of Iraq, who in your opinion benefited most from the war? (Choose up to two.)

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Iraqi people	6	1	9	4	9	1	26	36	27	9
US	87	87	33	53	28	35	50	37	42	44
Iran	54	26	28	15	33	50	23	19	22	15
Israel	24	60	44	30	49	26	29	22	46	41
Extremist movements	27	21	34	14	24	38	29	26	11	23
Iraqi elites	3	5	24	10	18	16	43	60	52	25
Saudi Arabia	0	0	16	6	24	27	0	0	0	25
Turkey	0	0	11	1	14	7	0	0	0	18
No one	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0

When asked who has benefited the most from the war in Iraq, overall the top choice is the United States, with respondents in Tunisia (87%), Egypt (87%), Palestine (53%), Saudi Arabia (50%), and Iran (44%) identifying the United States most frequently as a beneficiary of the war. More than one-third of respondents in Turkey, the UAE, Iraq, and Lebanon agree.

Israel is the second most frequently noted beneficiary and is the top choice among respondents in Jordan (49%) and Lebanon (44%), as well as a majority in Egypt (60%) and by more than four in 10 respondents in Turkey (46%) and Iran (41%).

According to one-half of Iraqi (50%) and Tunisian (54%) respondents, Iran has benefited the most from the war in Iraq, while for 60% of respondents in the UAE, 52% in Turkey and 43% in Saudi Arabia, Iraqi elites are the biggest beneficiaries of the war.

About one-quarter to one-third of respondents in seven of the 10 surveyed countries point to extremist movements as having benefited the most, including 38% of Iraqi respondents and 34% of Lebanese respondents as well as in Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran.

Significant percentages of respondents in the UAE (36%), Turkey (27%), and Saudi Arabia (26%) say that the Iraqi people have benefited from the war in their country, but fewer than one in 10 in the remaining surveyed countries agree. About one-quarter of respondents in Iraq (27%), Iran (25%), and Jordan (24%) view Saudi Arabia as a beneficiary of the war, while few elsewhere agree. And Turkey is least likely to be seen as having benefited from the war in Iraq.

Table 18. Of the countries and entities listed below, which are playing a positive role in Iraq? A negative role?

	TUNISIA			EGYPT			LEBANON			PALESTINE			JORDAN		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
Iran	5	91	-86	1	97	-96	20	48	-28	7	29	-22	11	40	-29
US	27	59	-32	3	93	-90	9	63	-54	9	62	-53	16	34	-18
Turkey	66	19	+47	54	28	+26	44	27	+17	19	10	+9	35	21	+14
Saudi Arabia	10	83	-73	55	29	+26	34	37	-3	12	16	-4	30	23	+7
Russia	14	76	-62	11	78	-67	15	50	-35	7	25	-18	25	37	-12
Iraqi military	30	49	-19	20	57	-37	34	32	+2	25	13	+12	26	27	-1
PMU*	20	64	-44	47	31	+16	26	43	-17	17	19	-2	15	37	-22
None of them	11	2	+9	11	0	+11	8	0	+8	35	11	+24	13	0	+13

	IRAQ			KSA			UAE			Turkey			IRAN		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
Iran	42	42	0	13	82	-69	14	80	-66	27	58	-31	56	11	+45
US	0	86	-86	24	67	-43	54	34	+20	10	84	-74	0	83	-83
Turkey	34	34	0	30	62	-32	32	57	-25	72	18	+54	29	26	+3
Saudi Arabia	20	37	-17	70	17	+53	89	6	+83	25	67	-42	24	33	-9
Russia	22	29	-7	21	55	-34	22	68	-46	56	28	+28	27	23	+4
Iraqi military	28	25	+3	48	35	+13	54	34	+20	38	49	-11	34	25	+9
PMU*	33	26	+7	21	68	-47	0	95	-95	20	72	-52	37	19	+18
None of them	5	0	+5	6	0	+6	2	0	+2	4	0	+4	12	0	+12

* Popular Mobilization Units

Overall, when asked to consider whether Iran, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the Iraqi military, and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) are playing either positive or negative roles in Iraq, Turkey is the country or entity most likely to be viewed as playing a positive role in Iraq, with majorities in Turkey itself (72%), Tunisia (66%), and Egypt (54%) as well as significant percentages in Lebanon (44%) and Jordan (35%) saying its role is positive. Majorities in Saudi Arabia (62%) and the UAE (57%) hold the opposite view of Turkey with respect to its role in Iraq.

On the other hand, **the United States is overwhelmingly seen as the most negative player in the country.** More than eight in 10 respondents in Egypt (93%), Iraq itself (86%), Turkey (84%), and Iran (83%), as well as majorities in Saudi Arabia (67%), Lebanon (63%), Palestine (62%), and Tunisia (59%) view the U.S. role as negative; one-third of those in Jordan also say the United States' role is negative (18 points more than who say it plays a positive role). Only in the UAE do respondents view the U.S. role as positive (54% vs. 34% who say it is negative).

Iran is also widely considered to play a negative role, by more than eight in 10 respondents in Egypt (97%), Tunisia (91%), Saudi Arabia (82%), and the UAE (80%), as well as 58% in Turkey, 48% in Lebanon, and 40% in Jordan. Iraqis themselves are split on Iran's role with 42% saying it is positive and 42% saying it is negative.

On balance, respondents in eight of the 10 surveyed countries find Russia's role more negative than positive, including majorities in Egypt (78%), Tunisia (76%), the UAE (68%), Saudi Arabia (55%), and Lebanon (50%). On the other hand, a majority of respondents in Turkey (56%) say Russia is playing a positive role in Iraq.

Majorities in the UAE (95%), Turkey (72%), Saudi Arabia (68%), and Tunisia (64%) say the PMU play a negative role in Iraq, as do more than one-third of those in Lebanon (43%) and Jordan (37%). On the other hand, respondents in Egypt, Iran, and Iraq are more likely to say the PMU's role is positive rather than negative.

Opinion is quite divided overall with respect to the roles played by the Iraqi military and Saudi Arabia in Iraq. Respondents in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Iran are more likely to view the role of the Iraqi military as positive than negative, while those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey are more likely to view it as negative than positive. For Iraqis themselves, as well as among respondents in Lebanon and Jordan, opinion on the role of the Iraqi military is evenly split between positive and negative. With respect to the role played by Saudi Arabia in Iraq, majorities of respondents in the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia itself view the Saudi role as positive, while strong majorities in Tunisia and Turkey hold the opposite view. Iraqis also are more likely to view the Saudi role as negative (37%) rather than positive (20%).

Again, we find deep sectarian divides among respondents in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE regarding their perceptions of which countries play positive and negative roles in Iraq, particularly the major players – the United States and Iran.

Table 19. Of the countries and entities listed below, which are playing a positive role in Iraq? A negative role?

	IRAQ						KSA						UAE					
	Sunni			Shia			Sunni			Shia			Sunni			Shia		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
Iran	6	80	-74	61	23	+38	1	92	-91	77	23	+54	9	85	-76	56	40	+16
US	0	100	-100	0	78	-78	16	74	-58	68	32	+36	53	35	+18	62	27	+35
Turkey	63	9	+54	18	47	-29	32	59	-27	18	76	-58	30	58	-28	44	44	0
Russia	21	29	-8	22	29	-7	16	58	-42	50	38	+12	21	69	-48	33	62	-29

In Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, Shia respondents are far more likely to view Iran's role in Iraq as positive, while Sunni respondents are far more likely to view it as negative. It is worth noting, however, that one-quarter of Shia respondents in Iraq and Saudi Arabia and 40% of Shia in the UAE actually view Iran negatively in terms of its role in Iraq. The United States is viewed negatively by all respondents in Iraq, but somewhat positively by Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Russia appears to be viewed as a non-factor by Iraqi respondents, while the ratings for Russia by Saudi and Emirati respondents may reflect overall favorability rather than anything specific to the country's role in Iraq.


Table 20. What is the best outcome for Iraq?

	TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		PALESTINE		JORDAN		IRAQ		KSA		UAE		TURKEY		IRAN	
	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018
Iraqi government in Baghdad should be reformed to represent all Iraqis and pursue national reconciliation to unify the country		71	75	78	50	40	36	41	38	39	44	55	76	47	74	30	43	65	42	41
National unity can be maintained if Iraq is a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the Baghdad government		15	17	22	28	26	33	35	41	30	49	27	12	16	20	15	35	20	41	38
It is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible		14	9	0	22	34	30	24	21	31	7	18	12	38	6	55	23	15	17	22

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Tunisia was not included in the 2017 survey.

Majorities in four of the surveyed countries (Egypt: 78%, Tunisia: 71%, Turkey: 65%, Iraq: 55%) and pluralities in five others (Saudi Arabia: 47%, Palestine: 41%, Iran: 41%, Lebanon: 40%, Jordan: 39%) continue to believe that the best outcome for Iraq would be for the Iraqi government in Baghdad to “be reformed to represent all Iraqis and pursue national reconciliation to unify the country.”

In the UAE a majority, however, hold the view that “it is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible.” In Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia about one-third or more of respondents agree that Iraqi national unity is not possible.



2018

● Reform Iraqi government ● Federation of autonomous regions ● National unity not possible

About one-quarter to one-third of respondents in five countries (Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran) think that “national unity can be maintained if Iraq is a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the Baghdad government.”

Comparing these results to last year’s results, we find growing optimism in Turkey where the percentage of those who view the best outcome as a reformed government that represents all Iraqis and seeks national reconciliation has increased by 22 points, while the percentage of those who think national unity is not possible has declined by 8 points. However, there is a growing pessimism with declines in those who believe the best outcome is a reformed representative government seeking national reconciliation in the UAE (-44), Saudi Arabia (-29), and Lebanon (-10), with corresponding increases in those who say unity is not possible (UAE: +49, Saudi Arabia: +24, Lebanon: +12).

In Iraq itself we find significant shifts. In 2017, almost one-half of respondents (49%) said the best outcome for Iraq would be a federation of autonomous regions. In the current survey this number has dropped 22 points, while the numbers of those who believe a reformed representative government is the best outcome and those who do not believe unity is possible have both increased by 11 points.

Table 21. What is the best outcome for Iraq? (2018)

	IRAQ					
	Sunni Arabs	Shia Arabs	All Arabs	Kurds	Right track	Wrong track
Iraqi government in Baghdad should be reformed to represent all Iraqis and pursue national reconciliation to unify the country	35	66	55	55	70	50
National unity can be maintained if Iraq is a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the Baghdad government	48	15	27	24	13	31
It is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible	16	18	17	21	18	19

Arab and Kurd opinions on the future of Iraq are close to identical – with majorities of both groups viewing a reformed unified government as the best path forward. Iraqi Arab Shia are almost twice as likely as their Sunni compatriots to view this unified approach as the best future for their country (66% vs. 35%), while Iraqi Arab Sunni are three times as likely as their Shia compatriots to favor a federation of autonomous regions (48% vs. 15%). It is worth noting that this split between Sunni and Shia is also evident in the differences between those who think the country is on the right track (who are more likely to be Shia) and those who say Iraq is on the wrong track (who are more likely to be Sunni).

PALESTINE

Table 22. It has been suggested that a partnership between Israel and Arab governments would be useful in fighting extremist groups and combating Iran’s regional interference. Which of the following best describes your opinion?

	TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		JORDAN		IRAQ		KSA		UAE	
	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018
Such a partnership would be desirable but only if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative		11	59	40	40	38	35	29	51	36	48	37	48	42
Such a partnership should not be pursued even if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative		84	34	55	43	47	52	52	43	42	50	60	50	58
Such a partnership would be desirable and should be pursued whether or not Israel ends its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative		5	7	5	16	15	13	19	6	22	2	2	1	0

Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding. Tunisia was not included in the 2017 survey.

Of the seven countries polled regarding their opinion on pursuing a partnership between Israel and Arab governments for fighting extremist groups and combating Iran’s regional interference, majorities in four and pluralities in the remaining three agree that “such a partnership should not be pursued even if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinians lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative.” This opinion is strongest in Tunisia (84%), followed by Saudi Arabia (60%), the UAE (58%), Egypt (55%), and Jordan (52%). More than one-third of respondents in the UAE (42%), Egypt (40%), Lebanon (38%), Saudi Arabia (37%), and Iraq (36%) think that should Israel end the occupation and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative (API), such a partnership would be desirable. About two in 10 respondents in Lebanon (15%), Jordan (19%), and Iraq (22%) think such a partnership should be pursued regardless of Israel’s actions on the occupation and the API.

In comparing this year’s survey to last year’s results, while the overall shape of the results is similar, we find a slight hardening of attitudes in some countries, with increases in the percentages of respondents who say that a partnership between Israel and the Arab governments should not be pursued no matter what in Egypt (+21), Saudi Arabia (+10), and the UAE (+8). On the other hand, there is a slight shift in Jordan and Iraq in the other direction, with increases in the percentages of respondents who say such a partnership is desirable regardless of Israeli actions (up 6 and 16 points, respectively).

Table 23. In 2002 the Arab League unanimously endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative in which they agreed to establish normalized ties with Israel if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories and resolve the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?

	PALESTINE	
	2017	2018
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, and more effort should be made to achieve this goal.	41	37
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, but I don't believe that the Israelis will give up the territories.	27	31
Even if the Israelis agree to return all of the territories and agree to resolve the refugee issue, I am not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel.	32	32

When asked about their opinions on the Arab Peace Initiative and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Palestinians remain quite divided, with two-thirds agreeing to the API evenly divided between those who think more effort should be made to achieve peace (37%) and those who want peace but don't think the Israelis will give up territory to achieve it (31%). The remaining third (32%) say they are "not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel." These numbers closely track those in last year's survey.

Table 24. With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which of the following options would you be more inclined to support?

	PALESTINE	
	2017	2018
That the Palestinians have an independent state as part of a two-state solution	21	25
That there be a one-state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis	38	25
I don't believe a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis is possible	41	50

Fully one-half of Palestinian respondents now "don't believe a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis is possible." The other half are evenly split on whether they would be inclined to support a two-state (25%) or one-state (25%) solution. These results represent an increase in pessimism since last year with an increase of 9 points in those who do not think a settlement is possible.

YEMEN

Table 25. What is your most important concern when you think of the continuing conflict in Yemen?

	TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		PALESTINE		JORDAN		IRAQ		KSA		UAE		TURKEY	
	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018
The presence of al Qaeda		2	22	23	29	24	17	16	23	22	27	23	44	22	21	21	35	39
The restoration of the legitimate government		3	14	3	25	26	31	23	27	24	21	29	10	14	29	21	15	10
The threat of Iranian interference		7	35	31	21	13	32	30	36	19	29	19	35	25	41	15	23	0
The humanitarian crisis in Yemen		88	29	44	25	37	21	32	15	36	23	30	10	39	9	43	27	50

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Tunisia was not included in the 2017 survey.

In all nine countries surveyed about the continuing conflict in Yemen, at least a plurality think the most important concern is the humanitarian crisis. This view is strongest in Tunisia (88%), followed by Turkey (50%). The presence of al Qaeda is the second most frequently cited concern overall, with more than two in 10 respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE and 39% of respondents in Turkey saying it is their most important concern. The restoration of the legitimate government and the threat of Iranian interference are also significant concerns in some countries, with more than one-quarter of respondents in Lebanon (26%) and Iraq (29%) choosing restoration of the legitimate government and more than one-quarter of those in Egypt (31%), Palestine (30%), and Saudi Arabia (25%) expressing concern about Iran’s interference in Yemen.

This year’s results are markedly different than last year’s responses. In 2017 pluralities in five of the eight surveyed countries, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and the UAE, were most concerned with the threat of Iranian interference, while in the remaining three, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Lebanon, pluralities were most concerned about the presence of al Qaeda. The humanitarian crisis, though of concern to about one-quarter of respondents in four of the eight countries, was still the least cited concern overall in the 2017 results.

Table 26. What, in your opinion, is the best solution to end the conflict in Yemen?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
The restoration of the legitimate government	22	30	47	33	47	38	36	54	61
Negotiations leading to compromise among the warring parties and the establishment of a central government representing all factions in the country	75	68	36	58	32	47	63	46	39
The partition of the country	3	2	17	9	22	15	1	0	0
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.									

Majorities in Tunisia (75%), Egypt (68%), Saudi Arabia (63%), and Palestine (58%), as well as a plurality in Iraq (47%), think the best solution to end the conflict in Yemen is “negotiations leading to compromise among the warring parties and the establishment of a central government representing all factions in the country.” On the other hand, majorities in Turkey (61%) and the UAE (54%) and pluralities in Lebanon (47%) and Jordan (47%) think the best solution would be “the restoration of the legitimate government.” The least preferred solution overall is “partition of the country,” though significant percentages of respondents in Jordan (22%), Lebanon (17%), and Iraq (15%) favor this option.

IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Table 27. How supportive were you of the nuclear agreement concluded between the P5+1 and Iran?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Supported	54	54	47	50	56	55	55	54	61	56
Opposed	46	46	53	50	44	45	45	46	39	44

Supported is the aggregation of responses of “fully supported” and “somewhat supported.” Opposed is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat opposed” and “completely opposed.”

Slight majorities in eight of the 10 surveyed countries say they either fully or somewhat supported the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran, with support hovering between 54% and 61%. Opinion is evenly split between support and opposition in Palestine. Respondents in Lebanon lean toward opposition, with 47% saying they supported the agreement while 53% opposed it.

Table 28. In your opinion, how successful has that agreement been in limiting Iran’s capacity to develop a nuclear program?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Successful	19	47	62	30	54	50	37	44	61
Unsuccessful	81	53	38	70	47	50	63	56	39

Successful is the aggregation of responses of “very successful” and “somewhat successful.” Unsuccessful is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat unsuccessful” and “very unsuccessful.”

Majorities in Tunisia (81%), Palestine (70%), Saudi Arabia (63%), the UAE (56%), and Egypt (53%) say the agreement with Iran has been somewhat or very unsuccessful in limiting Iran’s capacity to develop a nuclear program. On the other hand, only majorities in Lebanon (62%), Turkey (61%), and Jordan (54%) believe that the P5+1 agreement has been successful in limiting Iran. Opinion is evenly split in Iraq on this question.

Table 29. How supportive are you of the Trump Administration’s decision to pull out of the P5+1 agreement?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Support	57	38	55	50	56	66	82	92	76
Oppose	43	62	45	50	44	34	18	8	24

Support is the aggregation of responses of “fully support” and “somewhat support.” Oppose is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat oppose” and “completely oppose.”

Majorities in seven of the nine countries surveyed say they support the Trump Administration’s decision to pull out of the P5+1 agreement, with particularly strong support in the UAE (92%), Saudi Arabia (82%), and Turkey (76%), as well as 66% in Iraq and between 55-57% in Lebanon, Jordan, and Tunisia. Opinion is evenly split in Palestine (50% vs. 50%). A majority in Egypt (62%) say they oppose the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the P5+1 agreement.

Table 30. Now that the United States has withdrawn from the agreement, what in your opinion should the remaining P4+1 countries do?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Continue to enforce the Iran deal agreement to limit Iran's nuclear ambitions	21	27	28	18	24	32	15	12	26
Completely scrap the Iran deal and impose tough sanctions on Iran in response to its meddlesome role in the region's conflicts	61	23	21	31	30	16	31	37	1
Press Iran to participate in a regional security framework to help bring peace to the region	6	34	29	27	24	30	20	11	35
Work more closely with and provide more assistance to the Arab Bloc to assist their efforts to contain Iran	12	16	22	23	22	22	33	40	38

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Attitudes on what the remaining P4+1 countries should do now that the United States has withdrawn from the agreement are quite mixed. Only in Tunisia does a majority view exist; 61% of Tunisian respondents say they should “completely scrap the Iran deal and impose tough sanctions on Iran in response to its meddlesome role in the region’s conflicts.” Elsewhere, opinions are very divided.

In Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq, about six in 10 respondents are divided between “continuing to enforce the Iran deal” (Egypt: 27%, Lebanon: 28%, Iraq: 32%) and “pressing Iran to participate in a regional security framework” (Egypt: 34%, Lebanon: 29%, Iraq: 30%). In Saudi Arabia and the UAE respondents are divided between “scrapping the Iran deal” (KSA: 31%, UAE: 37%) and “working to contain Iran” through the Arab Bloc (KSA: 33%, UAE: 40%). Turkish respondents are divided between working with the Arab Bloc to contain Iran (38%) and pressing Iran to participate in a regional security framework (35%). In Jordan and Palestine very slim pluralities want to scrap the Iran deal (30% and 31%, respectively) while the remaining respondents are somewhat evenly divided among the other three options.

In short, there is no consensus on the way forward.

Table 31. Is it possible for Iran and the Arab World to live in peace?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN*
Very possible	2	10	40	12	33	24	14	8	40	49
Somewhat possible	24	20	34	53	33	60	51	50	20	44
Not possible at all	74	70	26	34	34	16	36	43	40	8

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.
* In Iran, the question was: Is it possible for your country and the Arab World to live in peace?

For at least seven in 10 respondents in Tunisia (74%) and Egypt (70%) it is “not possible at all” for Iran and the Arab World to live in peace. One-third or more of respondents in the UAE (43%), Turkey (40%), Saudi Arabia (36%), Jordan (34%), and Palestine (34%) agree that peaceful co-existence is not possible.

However, for respondents in seven surveyed countries, it is possible for Iran and the Arab World to live in peace. For majorities in Iraq (60%), Palestine (53%), Saudi Arabia (51%), and the UAE (50%) it is only “somewhat possible.” But four in 10 respondents in Turkey and Lebanon, as well as one-third of those in Jordan, say it is “very possible.”

On the other hand, more than nine in 10 Iranian respondents (93%) say it is possible for their country and the Arab World to live in peace, including almost one-half (49%) who say it is “very possible.” Only 8% say it is not possible.

Table 32. If a new international agreement is to be negotiated with Iran, in addition to a verifiable end to Iran’s nuclear program, how important is it that each of the following terms be included?

		TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN*
A verifiable Iranian commitment to end its ballistic missile program	Important	84	93	46	60	43	47	83	81	40	41
	Not important	16	7	54	40	57	53	17	19	60	59
A verifiable Iranian commitment to end its support for and withdraw its troops and allies from conflicts in Arab countries	Important	92	94	60	58	65	51	94	100	99	47
	Not important	8	6	40	42	35	49	6	0	1	53
Iranian participation in a regional security arrangement with Arab countries to help bring peace to the region	Important	40	98	81	58	62	80	58	41	78	72
	Not important	60	2	19	42	38	20	42	59	22	28

Important is the aggregation of responses of “very important” and “somewhat important.” Not important is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat unimportant” and “not important at all.”

* In Iran, the question was “If a new international agreement is to be negotiated between your country and the United States, in addition to a verifiable end to your country’s nuclear program, how supportive would you be of such an agreement including any of the following terms?”

Overall, the most important term to be included in any new international agreement with Iran is “a verifiable Iranian commitment to end its support for and withdraw its troops and allies from conflicts in Arab countries.” More than nine in 10 respondents in the UAE (100%), Turkey (99%), Saudi Arabia (94%), Egypt (94%) and Tunisia (92%) hold this view; majorities in Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq agree. Less than one-half of Iranian respondents (47%), however, think this term is important for inclusion in a new international agreement.

“Iranian participation in a regional security arrangement with Arab countries to help bring peace to the region” is important to majorities in eight of the ten countries, including 98% of respondents in Egypt, 81% in Lebanon, 80% in Iraq, and 78% in Turkey, as well as about six in 10 respondents in Jordan, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia. Seventy-two percent (72%) of Iranian respondents also agree that this term is important for any new agreement. For those in the UAE and Tunisia only about four in 10 say Iran’s participation in a regional security arrangement is important, while six in 10 say this term is not important for inclusion in a new international agreement.

Finally, “a verifiable Iranian commitment to end its ballistic missile program” is considered important by majorities in five of the 10 countries, including 93% in Egypt, 84% in Tunisia, 83% in Saudi Arabia, 81% in the UAE, and 60% in Palestine. On the other hand, majorities in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey do not consider this an important term to be included in a new agreement. Iranian respondents also do not view this term as important, with 41% calling this “very” or “somewhat important” and 59% saying it is either “somewhat unimportant” or “not important at all.”

IRANIAN VIEWS

Table 33. In your opinion, were your country's interests served by this [P5+1 nuclear] agreement?

	IRAN	
	2015	2018
Agree	81	57
Disagree	19	43

Agree is the aggregation of responses of "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree." Disagree is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat disagree" and "strongly disagree."

A majority of Iranian respondents (57%) say their country's interests were served by the P5+1 nuclear agreement, while 43% say Iran was not well-served by the agreement. This represents a significant decline in positivity since 2015 when 81% of Iranians thought the agreement served Iran's interests.

Table 34. Was it a good or bad idea for your government to have accepted limits on its nuclear program?

	IRAN	
	2015	2018
A good idea	32	45
A bad idea	68	55

When asked if it was a good or bad idea for their government to have accepted limits on its nuclear program, 45% of Iranian respondents say it was a good idea while 55% maintain that it was a bad idea. This is actually an increase in the sentiment that it was a good idea since 2015 when just one-third of Iranians (32%) thought acceptance of these limits was a good idea.

Table 35. How do you rate your satisfaction with your government's performance in each of the following areas?

		IRAN	
		2017	2018
Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Satisfied	62	46
	Dissatisfied	38	54
Advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights	Satisfied	46	37
	Dissatisfied	54	63
Improving relations with Arab governments*	Satisfied		51
	Dissatisfied		49
Improving relations with the United States and the West*	Satisfied		43
	Dissatisfied		57
Giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen	Satisfied	60	51
	Dissatisfied	40	49

Satisfied is the aggregation of responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied." Dissatisfied is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat dissatisfied" and "very dissatisfied."
* Did not ask in 2017.

Satisfaction in their government’s performance has declined for Iranian respondents by about 10 points in each area about which we asked in both 2017 and 2018. The lowest satisfaction rating goes to “advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights,” with only 37% of respondents saying they are satisfied with their government in this area, down 9 points from 2017. The biggest drop is found with respect to “investing in improving the economy and creating employment” – from 62% in 2017 to 46% in 2018. And just one-half of respondents (51%) express satisfaction with the support given by their government to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, down from 60% in last year’s survey.

About one-half of Iranians surveyed this year (51%) are also satisfied with their government’s performance with respect to “improving relations with Arab governments,” while 43% express satisfaction with performance regarding “improving relations with the United States and the West.”

Table 36. Which best reflects your opinion on your country having nuclear weapons?

	IRAN
My country should have nuclear weapons because it is a major nation	41
As long as other countries have nuclear weapons, we need them also	43
Nuclear weapons are always wrong and so no country, including my own, should have them	16


A substantial 84% of Iranians believe that their country should have nuclear weapons, half (41%) because Iran is a “major nation” and half (43%) because “as long as other countries have nuclear weapons” they should too. Just 16% express the view that “nuclear weapons are always wrong” and no country should have them.

Table 37. How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in each of the following countries?

		IRAN				
		2014*	2015	2016	2017	2018
Syria	Important	90	73	24	69	54
	Not important	7	27	76	31	46
Lebanon	Important	88	72-	43	67	64
	Not important	10	28	57	33	36
Iraq	Important	87	64	47	75	65
	Not important	10	36	53	25	35
Yemen	Important	62	43	39	58	54
	Not important	36	57	61	42	46

Important is the aggregation of responses of “very important” and “somewhat important.” Not important is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat unimportant” and “not important at all.”

* In 2014, percentages may not add up to 100% because responses of “not sure” are not included. This option was not provided in other survey years.



Since last year's survey, we find declines across the board with respect to the importance that Iranian respondents ascribe to their government's involvement in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. The most significant declines are related to the importance of Iran's involvement in Syria (-15 from 69% in 2017 to 54% in 2018) and Iraq (-10 from 75% in 2017 to 65% in 2018). The importance of being involved in Lebanon is noted by 64% of respondents this year, while 54% say continuing to be involved in Yemen is important.

Looking back over the data collected on these issues since 2014, we find steep declines from 2014 to 2016 and then a sharp increase in support for Iran's involvement in all of these countries in 2017. This year's decline in support for Iran's involvement in all four countries is, therefore, noteworthy.

EXTREMISM

Table 38. Do you think it is possible for radicalized individuals to be successfully de-radicalized?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Possible	22	61	53	39	61	54	83	100	70
Not possible	78	39	47	61	39	47	17	0	30

Possible is the aggregation of responses of “very possible” and “somewhat possible.” Not possible is the aggregation of responses of “not very possible” and “not possible at all.”

Majorities in seven of the nine surveyed countries say they think “it is possible for radicalized individuals to be successfully de-radicalized,” including 100% of respondents in the UAE, 83% in Saudi Arabia, 70% in Turkey, and slimmer majorities in Egypt (61%), Jordan (61%), Iraq (54%), and Lebanon (53%). **Only in Tunisia and Palestine do majorities say that de-radicalization is not possible (78% and 61%, respectively).**

Table 39. To what extent do you agree that your country is equipped to deal with the return of citizens who have been radicalized and fought and/or contributed to the wars in Iraq and Syria?

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Agree	28	47	54	45	51	57	57	56	54
Disagree	72	53	46	55	49	42	43	44	46

Agree is the aggregation of responses of “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree.” Disagree is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree.”

When asked if their countries are equipped to deal with the return of citizens who have been radicalized and fought and/or contributed to the wars in Iraq and Syria, opinion is split in most countries. Slim majorities in Saudi Arabia (57%), Iraq (57%), the UAE (56%), Lebanon (54%), and Turkey (54%) say their countries are equipped for such returns. In Jordan, opinion is almost evenly split (51% vs. 49%). In Egypt and Palestine, slim majorities do not agree that their countries are equipped to deal with returning radicalized citizens (47% vs. 53% and 45% vs. 55%, respectively). Finally, in Tunisia a substantial 72% say their country is not ready to deal with citizens who have fought or contributed to the wars in Iraq and Syria to return to Tunisia, while just 28% say they are equipped for this challenge.

APPENDIX A—METHODODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

The approach used for conducting the poll involved face-to-face personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered in each country to cover a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative and was comprised of adult males and females who were 15+ years of age; in Palestine, adults ages 18 and up were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, only citizens were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where door to door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. However, adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was not skewed and was broadly representative. Since random, door to door sampling is possible in the remaining countries, a multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for selection of respondents in each country.

Country	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Dates of Survey	Coverage
Lebanon	629	±3.9	8/30–9/13/18	Beirut (East & West Beirut), Baabda, El Maten, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, Saayda
Jordan	523	±4.3	8/30–9/11/18	Amman City, Balqa, Madaba, Irbid, Jarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba
Iraq	1035	±3.0	8/29–9/17/18	Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Karbala, Nassiriyah, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	1040	±3.0	8/29–9/15/18	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Haymana, Ceyhan
KSA	1042	±3.0	8/28–9/13/18	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Jeddah, Shamasyah, Taif, Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail, Hufuf
UAE	425	±4.8	8/30–9/11/18	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Egypt	1036	±3.0	8/28–9/13/18	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban & rural), Menia (urban & rural), Asyut (urban & rural), Tanta (urban & rural)
Iran	1036	±3.0	8/29–9/16/18	Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, Ahwaz
Tunisia	841	±3.4	8/30–9/13/18	Tunis, Bizerte, Ariane, Carthage, Sidi Thabet, Megrine, Sousse, Sfax, Kairouan, Gaafsa, Belkhir
Palestine	1021	±3.1	8/22–9/12/18	Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Hebron, Jericho, Tulkarem, Tubas, Qalqilia, Salfit, Gaza City, North Gaza, Deir Al-Balah, Khan Yunis, Rafah

Demographics

	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Male	49	51	50	53	54	51	51	50	50	51
Female	51	49	50	47	46	49	49	50	50	49
Under 30	29	42	32	44	48	47	56	44	32	32
30+	71	58	68	56	52	53	44	56	68	68
In city	64	59	89	79	71	83	87	66	73	78
Out of city	36	41	11	21	20 (village); 9 (refugee camp)	17	13	34	27	22
Sunni	99	89	27	97		85	89	34	85	6
Shia	1	2	28	2		15	11	66	15	94
Other religion		9 (Christian)	38 (Christian); 7 (Druze)	2 (Christian)	98 (Muslim); 2 (Christian)					
Ethnicity								17 (Kurd); 75 (Arab); 7 (other)		

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Zogby Research Services**

2019

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between August 25 and September 26, 2019, Zogby Research Services conducted face-to-face polls, surveying 8,315 adults in eight Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), Turkey, and Iran. We were commissioned by the Sir Bani Yas Forum to explore attitudes toward a range of issues including: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the roles played by different forces in the “Arab Spring” uprisings; the conflict in Syria; the defeat of Daesh; attitudes toward Iran; U.S. policy in the region; and, looking forward to the next decade, their expectations for their most dependable partners and their priorities for their country and for the region. We also surveyed Iraqis, Palestinians, and Iranians about developments within their countries. What follows is a summary of the most significant findings followed by a complete description of the results.

1. Israeli-Palestinian conflict

There is no question that there is a change in Arab attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

When asked to rank priority concerns the Arab World must address going forward, **justice for the Palestinians comes in last place out of the nine issues covered in the survey.** We also find a **substantial number of respondents in all countries saying that normalization with Israel would be desirable even if there were no Israeli-Palestinian peace. But this desire to normalize should not be overstated as it masks some degree of resignation and even some resentment.** The poll suggests that the main contributing factors are frustration with the Palestinian leadership, weariness with war, and the possibility of giving Arabs greater leverage to help secure rights for the Palestinians.

2. Palestinian Attitudes

Palestinians appear to feel abandoned by the United States and the Arab World and depressed by their current situation.

More than three-quarters say things are moving in the wrong direction. And one-half say they are worse off today than they were five years ago.

Palestinians find fault with both the United States and Israel and see only the Palestinian Authority (PA) as having made positive contributions to peace. While the role of the PA is seen more positively than Hamas by respondents in every region of the occupied lands including Gaza, a significant majority of all Palestinians want the competing factions to unify.

3. Arab Spring Countries

When evaluating the roles played by the various forces in the “Arab Spring” uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Sudan, **the military and popular movements in all four countries are given the highest positive scores** by our respondents. In **Egypt** the military is rated as playing the most positive role in six of the seven countries surveyed, while in **Sudan** the popular movement is rated highest in four of the seven.

The attitudes of Egyptians and Tunisians about the entities that have played positive roles in their own countries are particularly noteworthy. **In Egypt almost one-third of respondents say no party has played a positive role,** and only

one in eight say the popular movement has been a positive player. **In Tunisia, the roles played by the military and the popular movements are seen positively by slightly more than one-third.** Only one in five Egyptians and one in four Tunisians say that the political Islamist parties in their countries have played a positive role.

Also note that **the satisfaction and optimism ratings Egyptians give to the situation in their country are quite low, while the Tunisians are more positive.**

4. Syria

Attitudes toward Syria remain conflicted. **There is a growing acceptance that the Assad government has survived.** But many respondents see Syria under Assad remaining divided, with Russia and Iran playing important roles in the country. Between one-quarter and one-third of respondents in almost all countries surveyed see future clashes between Assad and the opposition or between Russia and Iran for influence in the country.

Opinion is divided as to whether Syria will have peace in the next 10 years.

5. Daesh

A strong majority of respondents in most of the countries covered in this survey feel **confident that Daesh has been defeated.** Only in Lebanon, Turkey, and Palestine are respondents not confident.

6. Iraqi Attitudes

As we have seen in past surveys, **the majority of Iraqis continue to favor a unified country led by a reformed government that pursues national reconciliation.** This view is held by all of Iraq's component groups: Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds.

Despite continued hardships, Iraqis appear to want to believe that the country is turning a corner toward achieving national unity. In a follow-up survey, many say that **recent demonstrations, which they support, have shaken their confidence in government institutions.** And they place **blame for the violence on outside players, some parties seeking advantage, and some undisciplined government forces.**

With regard to Daesh, one-half of Iraqis blame "outside interests for trying to destabilize" their country. Majorities credit their military and the PMU for defeating them, and two-thirds have confidence that the government in Baghdad is taking the right steps to prevent Daesh's reemergence. Nevertheless, despite this display of confidence, **a majority of Iraqis say that they are worse off today than they were five years ago, with an even greater number saying they expect their situation will be worse five years from now.**

Many Iraqis have soured on both the United States and Iran. They see a negative change in U.S. policy toward their country, and a majority express concern with Iran's role in their country, including almost one-half of the Shia community.

7. Attitudes Toward Iran

Far and away, the **greatest concern most respondents across the region express about Iran is with that country's nuclear program.** This is followed by **Iran's role in the Arab Gulf,** and then its involvement in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen in that order.

It is important to note that **the number one concern of the Lebanese is with Iran's involvement in their country, and the top concern of Iraqis is with Iran's involvement in their country.** These are both significant and new developments since past polling showed Iran was viewed more favorably in both countries. It is also noteworthy that Turkey's top concern with Iran is its involvement in Syria.

The issue that is least cited by respondents is Iran's ballistic missile program.

Looking to the next decade, slight majorities everywhere but Saudi Arabia and Tunisia say they have at least some confidence that there will be peace between the Arabs and Iran. Iraqis are divided on this matter, with a slight majority not confident that such a peace will exist.

8. Iranian Attitudes

As we have seen in past polls, **when Iran is under attack, public opinion appears to rally in support of their government and its policies, even if those policies are not in their interests.** This is certainly the case now, with more than six in 10 Iranians saying that U.S. policy has turned negative toward their country in the last three years and **one-half saying that U.S.-imposed sanctions have had an impact on their families.** As a result of these hardships, **one-half say that they are worse off than before. And less than one in five say they expect to be better off five years from now.**

Despite these negative views, a majority of Iranians claim to be satisfied with their government's handling of the economy and protection of civil and personal rights, and a greater number of Iranians than in previous years now support their country's involvement in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. But there is a sharp decline in Iranian support for involvement in Lebanon, with almost two-thirds now saying that involvement there is unimportant.

9. U.S. Policy

While two years ago there was some initial optimism that Trump administration policies toward some regional issues would move in a positive direction, that is no longer the case. **There is a sharp decline in respondents' views of U.S. policies toward Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Muslims.**

Respondents in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who early in the Trump administration saw positive changes in U.S. policy, are now less positive. The steepest drops in positive ratings are in Palestine, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The only exceptions are Jordan, where respondents give the United States a more positive score only in its relation to their country, and Saudi Arabia, where respondents now see a positive change in U.S. policy toward Syria.

10. The Next Decade: Most Dependable Allies

Reflecting the United States' slide in importance across the region, only respondents in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan view it as being their most dependable ally in the next decade. In Iraq, the top choice is Iran followed by China. In Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey, it is the European Union. And in Egypt, it is Saudi Arabia followed by Russia, while the Palestinians rate Turkey and the EU as somewhat dependable—but with only moderately passing scores—and appear to see no one else in their corner.

Looking to the next decade, Syria's closest neighbors—Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq—are very confident that there will be peace and an end to that country's conflict. The issues Arabs are most confident will be resolved are the defeat of religious extremist movements and the resolution of the issues that destabilized Arab countries during the Arab Spring.

Opinion is divided as to whether or not the next decade will see peace between Iran and the Arab states. And substantial majorities in five of the seven countries surveyed have no confidence that the Israel-Palestinian conflict will be resolved.

11. The Next Decade: My Country's Priorities

Only in the UAE and Tunisia do respondents say that they are better off now than they were five years ago (satisfaction) and that they expect to be better off five years from now (optimism). While UAE numbers are consistently high, the upward tick in both satisfaction and optimism in Tunisia is significant.

Both the satisfaction and optimism numbers are at significantly low levels in Egypt, as are the optimism numbers for Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

When asked to rank priority concerns they have for their country, in all seven countries covered **the top concerns include: increased employment opportunities, modernizing education, improving health care services, and strengthening their military and police.**

When asked whether they are confident that their countries could address these challenges in the next decade, there is moderate confidence that they will, except in Iraq where there is less confidence that the military and police will be strengthened.

12. The Next Decade: Priorities for the Region

When respondents were asked to rank the importance of issues facing the Arab World, far and away **the top-rated priorities are: investing more of the region's wealth and expertise in creating a more prosperous and stable Arab World, and promoting greater political unity among Arab states.** Down the list, tied for third place are promoting greater unity among Islamic countries and improving relations with the West, including the United States and the European Union.

Of respondents who selected these four objectives, two-thirds indicate they are confident the Arab World will achieve them in the next decade.

It is important to note that **the two lowest-rated priorities are improving relations with the countries of the East and South (including China, Russia, and Africa) and securing justice and rights for Palestinians.**

Note: There was a number of significant events that roiled the Middle East in the midst of our polling, which may have impacted the results. Especially worth noting are the bombing of oil fields in Saudi Arabia and the elections in Israel and Tunisia. As we were writing our report, demonstrations erupted in Iraq and Lebanon. The Iraqi demonstrations caused us to resurvey opinion in Iraq.

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

As you consider each of the following governments or entities, tell me, in your opinion, those whom you feel are doing as much as they can to play a positive role in achieving an Israeli/Palestinian peace agreement. (Select all that apply.)

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
United States	7	23	36	13	24	34
Israeli government	5	<1	3	12	5	10
Palestinian Authority	47	65	33	66	47	24
Hamas	23	15	12	27	16	13
Arab countries	70	39	65	27	59	41
No response	10	13	9	0	7	9

Overall, Arab respondents in the six surveyed countries rank the Arab countries and the Palestinian Authority (PA) as their top two choices for governments or entities that are doing as much as they can to play a positive role in achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Respondents in Egypt (70%), Jordan (65%), Saudi Arabia (59%), and the UAE (41%) are most positive about the efforts of Arab countries, while those in Lebanon (65%) and Palestine (66%) are most certain about the positive role played by the PA.

The United States is viewed as playing a positive role by less than one-quarter of respondents in four of the six countries surveyed, though about one-third of Jordanians (36%) and Emiratis (34%) see the U.S. role as positive. Hamas is even less likely to be viewed as playing a positive role in achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, but about one-quarter of respondents in Palestine (27%) and Egypt (23%) do feel that Hamas' efforts are positive. **The role of the Israeli government is viewed least positively in all countries.**

Among Palestinian respondents, unsurprisingly, there is a divide between Fatah and Hamas supporters with respect to the roles played by the PA and Hamas in the peace process. Of Fatah supporters, 83% say the PA is playing a positive role (vs. 33% of Hamas supporters) and 15% say Hamas is doing so (vs. 59% of Hamas supporters). While there are differences in intensity of opinion among Palestinians based on their place of residence, majorities in all areas view the PA as playing a positive role (Jerusalem: 87%, Gaza: 61%, West Bank: 65%). Palestinians in all areas are far less likely to view Hamas (Jerusalem: 16%, Gaza: 25%, West Bank: 30%), Arab countries (Jerusalem: 9%, Gaza: 33%, West Bank: 26%), and the United States (Jerusalem: 0%, Gaza: 19%, West Bank: 12%) as playing positive roles in the peace process.

Now using the same group of governments and entities, tell me in your opinion, those whom you feel have played a negative role in efforts to achieve an Israeli/Palestinian peace agreement. (Select all that apply.)

	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
United States	81	46	43	58	58	42
Israeli government	92	98	89	60	93	80
Palestinian Authority	22	0	8	15	21	20
Hamas	35	6	22	16	34	9
Arab countries	18	6	5	21	24	6
No response	1	1	<1	0	1	<1

When asked to identify governments and entities that have played a **negative role** in efforts to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, **respondents overwhelmingly select the Israeli government**, including more than nine in 10 Lebanese (98%), Saudis (93%), and Egyptians (92%), as well as 89% of Jordanians and 80% of Emiratis. In Palestine, 60% say the Israeli government has played a negative role in the pursuit of peace; an almost equal percentage (58%) say the role of the United States has also been negative. **The U.S. role is also widely cited as negative** in Egypt (81%) and Saudi Arabia (58%), with significant percentages of respondents in Lebanon (46%), Jordan (43%), and the UAE (42%) in agreement.

Hamas is viewed as playing a negative role in the achievement of an Israeli-Palestinian peace by about one-third of respondents in Egypt (35%) and Saudi Arabia (34%). Fewer than one-quarter of respondents in all surveyed countries view the Palestinian Authority and Arab countries as playing negative roles.

How confident are you that the Palestinians will have an independent state?						
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
Confident	48	40	55	58	48	44
Not confident	52	60	45	42	52	56

Confident is the aggregation of responses of “very confident” and “somewhat confident.” Not confident is the aggregation of responses of “not very confident” and “not confident at all.”

Majorities in Palestine (58%) and Jordan (55%) express confidence that the Palestinians will have an independent state. Saudis and Egyptians are split but lean slightly negative (48% confident vs. 52% not confident). Majorities in Lebanon (60%) and the UAE (56%) are not confident that Palestinians will have an independent state.

Among Palestinians, confidence is highest among those in Jerusalem (78% vs. 48% in the West Bank and 66% in Gaza).

In 2002 the Arab League unanimously endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative in which they agreed to establish normalized ties with Israel if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories and resolve the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?													
	Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		KSA		UAE		Palestine		
	2015	2019	2015	2019	2015	2019	2015	2019	2015	2019	2017	2018	2019
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, and more effort should be made to achieve this goal.	8	15	26	8	37	43 ↑	19	45 ↑	23	37 ↑	41	37	44
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugee, but I don't believe that the Israelis will give up the territories.	26	31	45	52	40	23	45	21	58	46	27	31	31
Even if the Israelis agree to return all of the territories and agree to resolve the refugee issue, I am not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel.	66	54	30	40	24	34	36	34	19	17	32	32	24

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change since the 2015 survey.

Pluralities in Saudi Arabia (45%), Palestine (44%), and Jordan (43%) say they are prepared for peace with Israel if Israel returns the occupied territories and solves the refugee issue, and they want more effort made to achieve this goal.

Among Palestinians, 61% of Jerusalem residents are prepared for peace and want more efforts made to achieve this goal, compared to 43% of West Bank residents and Gazans.

In Palestine, the percentage who are prepared for peace is consistent with our 2017 and 2018 polling (41% and 37%). In Saudi Arabia, these results represent a significant shift from our previous polling there in 2015, when just 19% said they were prepared for peace and wanted more effort made to achieve this goal.

There is also an increase in the percentage of Emiratis who are prepared for peace and want more effort put forth to achieve it, from 23% in 2015 to 37% in the current survey. Only 15% of Egyptians and 8% of Lebanese are prepared for peace if Israel returns the occupied territories and resolves the refugee issue.

A majority in Lebanon (52%) and a plurality in the UAE (46%) feel prepared for a comprehensive and just peace but do not believe Israel will give up territory; this is generally consistent with the 2015 survey. Between 21% and 31% in the other four countries surveyed are prepared for peace but do not think Israel will return any territory.

While only **in Egypt does a majority (54%) say they are not ready for peace**, more than one-third of respondents in Lebanon (40%), Jordan (34%), and Saudi Arabia (34%) are also not prepared for peace even if Israelis agree to return all the occupied territories and resolve the refugee issue. Among Palestinians, one-quarter of respondents (24%) are also not ready for peace; Hamas supporters are twice as likely as Fatah supporters to say they are not ready for peace (32% vs. 16%).

How likely is it that some Arab states will develop normalized relations with Israel even without peace between Israel and the Palestinians?						
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
Likely	59	37	52	72	53	64
Unlikely	41	63	48	28	47	36

Likely is the aggregation of responses of “very likely” and “somewhat likely.” Unlikely is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat unlikely” and “very unlikely.”

Majorities in five of the six surveyed countries say it is likely that some Arab states will develop normalized relations with Israel even without peace between Israel and the Palestinians, including 72% of Palestinians, 64% of Emiratis, 59% of Egyptians, 53% of Saudis, and 52% of Jordanians. Only in Lebanon do we find a majority (63%) saying this is unlikely.

How desirable is it that some Arab states will develop normalized relations with Israel even without peace between Israel and the Palestinians?						
	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
Desirable	73	49	72	39	79	84
Undesirable	27	51	28	61	21	16

Desirable is the aggregation of responses of “very desirable” and “somewhat desirable.” Undesirable is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat undesirable” and “very undesirable.”

More than seven in 10 respondents in the UAE (84%), Saudi Arabia (79%), Egypt (73%), and Jordan (72%) also feel it is desirable that some Arab states will develop normalized relations with Israel even without peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Opinion is split in Lebanon (49% vs. 51%). Only among Palestinians does a majority (61%) say that normalization is undesirable; this opinion is strongest among respondents in the West Bank (71% vs. 56% in Gaza and 34% in Jerusalem).

Normalization

Because the results reported here regarding the likelihood and desirability of normalization were somewhat unexpected and seem to indicate a significant change in attitudes, we went back into the field to re-interview respondents in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in an effort to better understand the situation. We wanted them to put into their own words why they thought normalization without peace would be desirable. **What we found was that this desire to normalize should not be overstated since it masks frustration, some degree of resignation, and even some resentment.**

The most common themes that emerge in favor of Arab normalization are the economic benefits that may accrue and the fact that this will win favor from the United States. Almost one-half of the responses indicate a begrudging acceptance of normalization with the dominant themes being Arab weakness (e.g., “we do not have the power to say no” or “we should do this until we get our power back”) and the fact that the Arab World is distracted by so many other conflicts. **Notably, none of responses mention Iran.** This is important because in past polling when we have asked questions about whether or not normalization with Israel should be pursued, it was always asked in terms of developing ties with Israel in order to confront Iran. This, it appears, is not a factor. Economic benefits and ties with the United States are more significant reasons.

“If benefit means that we have to deal with Israel, then why not? It will be in the interests of my people and my country.”

“Admitting is a painful truth but we have to do this because there is no alternative...but there should be clear and separate borders, with each party seen as an independent country.”

“All Arab countries are working on this, even if they do not declare it publicly ... I am forced to this position, even if I am not completely satisfied with it.”

“I do not want normalization, but our children and mothers die every day. Safety is better.”

“Reaching good relations with Israel and therefore with the United States is important and positive for most countries nowadays.”

“All evidence is that most Arabs have hidden ties...with Israel. It is better for them to declare such ties in front of the Palestinians. Better than hiding it... [But then goes on to add] This normalization should have clear and strict conditions that ensures the return of Palestinian lands, return of refugees and a Palestinian state”

“Going to normalization...gives a chance for Palestine because the whole world is now busy with what is happening in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. I believe that if there is a convincing normalization process, there will be a good chance to establish a Palestinian state.”

“Arab countries will develop relations with Israel because they are under pressure from the USA.”

“We have serious economic concerns... We are looking for a better life.”

“I agree with this for a period of time, in order for us to regain our power and gradually get back our lands.”

After collecting these open-ended responses, we re-contacted a different subset of 229 of the original respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to ask a series of follow-up questions. We asked if each of the following is a major factor, a minor factor, or not a factor at all in their responses regarding the desirability of normalization:

- If more Arab states had normal ties with Israel, they would have greater leverage to apply pressure to help secure rights for Palestinians.
- I recognize that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict isn't going to be solved any time soon, but the killing has to stop so we should choose peace.
- Because Israel is an advanced economy and because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict isn't going to be solved any time soon, it's important that Arab states consider their own needs and take advantage of trade and investment opportunities in Israel.
- Because Iran threatens the region and Arab states and Israel share a concern with Iranian interference in the Arab World, relations with Israel would be in our interests.
- The Palestinians need to get their house in order. They aren't helping themselves.

In all five countries, the top reason given for desiring normalization is that the Palestinians are not helping themselves and need to get their own house in order. About two-thirds of the respondents say this is a major factor in pointing to the desirability of normalization. **About four in 10 respondents overall say a major factor in favor of normalization is that it would give Arab states more leverage to help secure rights for Palestinians.** The third most cited factor in favor of normalization is that the conflict is not going to be solved soon but the killing needs to stop; about one-quarter say this is a major factor. The two factors considered more minor by the follow-up respondents are the trade and investment opportunities in Israel that could aid the economies of the Arab states and threats of Iranian interference; about four in 10 say that economic advantages are not a factor and about one-half overall say concerns about Iran are a non-factor in considering normalization.

PALESTINIAN ATTITUDES

On the whole, are things in our country generally going in the right direction, or in the wrong direction?	
	Palestinians
Right direction	15
Wrong direction	78
Don't know/Refuse	7

Overall, Palestinian attitudes are quite negative, with more than three-quarters saying things are going in the wrong direction, while just 15% say things are generally going in the right direction.

How do you rate your satisfaction with the overall performance of ... ?			
		2017	2019
Palestinian Authority	Satisfied	46	72 ↑
	Dissatisfied	54	28
Hamas	Satisfied	31	51 ↑
	Dissatisfied	69	49

Satisfied is the aggregation of responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied." Dissatisfied is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat dissatisfied" and "not satisfied at all." Arrows indicate a significant change since the 2017 survey.

Palestinians were asked to rate their satisfaction with the overall performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas. More than seven in 10 respondents say they are satisfied with the PA's performance, an increase of 26 points

since 2017. And a majority (51%) now say they are satisfied with the performance of Hamas, an increase of 20 points since 2017.

The divide between Fatah and Hamas supporters is very clear here. Ninety-one percent (91%) of Fatah supporters are satisfied with the PA (vs. just 35% of Hamas supporters), while 87% of Hamas supporters are satisfied with the overall performance of Hamas (vs. 42% of Fatah supporters). It is worth noting that residents of Jerusalem are more satisfied with Hamas' performance (65%) than Gazans (47%) or residents of the West Bank (52%).

How important is it that the major Palestinian parties achieve unity? How confident are you that the major Palestinian parties will achieve unity in the next few years?			
		2017	2019
Importance of unity	Important	70	82↑
	Not important	30	18
Confidence in unity	Confident	37	58↑
	Not confident	63	42
<small>Important is the aggregation of responses of "very important" and "somewhat important." Not important is the aggregation of responses of "not very important" and "not important at all." Confident is the aggregation of responses of "very confident" and "somewhat confident." Not confident is the aggregation of responses of "not very confident" and "not confident at all." Arrows indicate a significant change since the 2017 survey.</small>			

In the current survey, 82% of Palestinian respondents say it is important for the major Palestinian parties to achieve unity, and 58% have confidence that they will achieve unity in the next few years. These percentages represent increases in both the importance Palestinians place on political unity (up 12 points from 2017) and their confidence that it can be achieved (up 21 points since 2017).

The importance of unity is strongly asserted by both respondents who support Fatah (87%) and those who support Hamas (82%); in fact, majorities of both groups say unity is "very important" (Fatah: 52%, Hamas: 59%). And supporters of both major parties are equally confident that unity will be achieved (Fatah 61% vs. Hamas 59%). Residents of Jerusalem are more likely to be confident about the prospects for unity than residents of the West Bank or Gaza (84% vs. 58%).

Which of the following, in your opinion, is the best course of action for the Palestinian Authority?		
	2017	2019
To remain as it is	12	20
To make a determined effort to press for unity	65	65
To dissolve	23	16
<small>Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.</small>		

Despite the increased interest and confidence in political unity, there is no change in the percentage of Palestinian respondents (65%) who want the Palestinian Authority to make a determined effort to press for unity. There is, however, a slight decline in those who want the PA to dissolve (from 23% in 2017 to 16% in 2019) and a corresponding uptick in those who want the PA to remain as it is (from 12% to 20%).

Fatah supporters are more likely to want the PA to make a determined effort to press for unity (73%) than Hamas supporters (55%), while Hamas supporters are more likely to think the PA should dissolve (31%) than Fatah supporters (8%).

ARAB SPRING COUNTRIES

Which of the following have played or are playing a positive role in ... ? (Select all that apply.)								
		Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE
Egypt	Popular movement	17	13	38	26	29	26	19
	Military	40	48	61	60	39	67	60
	Political Islamist parties	18	20	18	17	28	14	16
	Secular political elites	3	3	6	2	18	5	9
	None	40	31	11	17	22	10	13
Tunisia	Popular movement	34	28	57	35	31	30	27
	Military	37	42	41	57	29	57	34
	Political Islamist parties	24	23	26	38	30	13	28
	Secular political elites	28	29	37	21	18	8	10
	None	22	18	12	11	20	12	18
Algeria	Popular movement	36	32	40	47	38	21	26
	Military	49	63	26	45	29	46	51
	Political Islamist parties	8	8	20	12	31	25	18
	Secular political elites	9	7	18	18	22	6	5
	None	23	17	26	19	17	8	17
Sudan	Popular movement	51	46	52	50	26	30	43
	Military	30	42	52	35	30	57	47
	Political Islamist parties	2	11	10	19	27	24	11
	Secular political elites	8	15	12	20	19	9	5
	None	23	19	4	15	27	8	12

Respondents in seven countries were asked whether the popular movement, the military, political Islamist parties, and secular political elites have played or are playing a positive role in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Sudan, or if none of these has played a positive role. Looking at the results overall, the military and the popular movements in these countries are most likely to be viewed as having played positive roles.

With respect to Egypt, overall the military is viewed most positively, with at least six in 10 Saudis (67%), Lebanese (61%), Jordanians (60%), and Emiratis (60%) saying the military has played a positive role in Egypt. **The military is also the top choice among Tunisians (40%) and among respondents in Egypt itself (48%); it is noteworthy that this positive view of the military in Egypt is held by less than one-half of Egyptian respondents.** Almost four in 10 respondents in Lebanon (38%) and about one-quarter of those in Palestine (29%), Saudi Arabia (26%), and Jordan (26%) view the popular movement in Egypt as having played a positive role; just 13% of Egyptians surveyed agree. Only in Palestine are political Islamist parties viewed positively by at least one-quarter of the respondents (28%). And the secular political elites in Egypt are seen as playing a positive role in Egypt by less than 10% in six of the seven countries surveyed. **Significant percentages of Egyptians (31%) and Tunisians (40%) say none of these groups have played or is playing a positive role in Egypt.**

The military is also viewed as having played (or playing) a positive role in Tunisia by majorities of respondents in Jordan (57%) and Saudi Arabia (57%); it is also the group most frequently cited for playing a positive role by those in Egypt (42%), the UAE (34%), and Tunisia itself (37%). A majority in Lebanon (57%) view the Tunisian popular movement as positive, as do about one-third of respondents in Jordan, Tunisia, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia. In six of the seven surveyed countries (all except Saudi Arabia) between 23% and 38% of respondents say political Islamist parties have played a positive role in Tunisia. Similar percentages of respondents in Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon also view secular political elites as playing a positive role.

In Algeria, the military is thought of as having played a positive role by majorities in Egypt (63%) and the UAE (51%), as well as by almost half of the respondents in Tunisia (49%), Saudi Arabia (46%), and Jordan (45%). One-third or more in Jordan (47%), Lebanon (40%), Palestine (38%), Tunisia (36%), and Egypt (32%) say the Algerian popular movement has played a positive role in that country. More than one-quarter of Palestinians (31%) and one-quarter of Saudis (25%) see the political Islamist parties in Algeria playing a positive role, while Algeria’s secular political elites are not viewed as a positive force by at least one-quarter of respondents in any surveyed country.

Finally, with respect to Sudan, about one-half of respondents in Lebanon (52%), Tunisia (51%), Jordan (50%), and Egypt (46%) say the popular movement has played a positive role there, while similar percentages in Saudi Arabia (57%), Lebanon (52%), and the UAE (47%) view the military’s role in Sudan positively. Again, political Islamist parties are only viewed as playing a positive role in Sudan by about one-quarter of Palestinians (27%) and Saudis (24%), and this threshold is not met by secular political elites in any surveyed country.

SYRIA

Which of the following do you feel is the most likely outcome for Syria?									
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
The Assad government will return to full power over all of Syria.	19	35	20	49	28	31	22	35	53
The Assad government will hold power over parts of Syria with the rest of the country remaining under the control of opposition groups.	47	38	58	43	40	39	56	39	28
After a period of quiet, the opposition will reassert itself and clash again with the Assad government.	34	27	22	8	33	30	21	26	19

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

When asked to consider the most likely outcome in Syria, there is no clear consensus overall among respondents. However, about half of those in Lebanon (58%), the UAE (56%), and Tunisia (47%) say the most likely outcome is control of the country geographically divided between the Assad government and opposition groups. Alternatively, about one-half of those in Iran (53%) and Jordan (49%) think it is more likely that the Assad government will return to full power over all of Syria. Opinion is quite divided in Egypt, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The third possible option—that after a period of quiet, the opposition will reassert itself and clash again with the Assad government—was selected by at most one-third of respondents in Tunisia (34%), Palestine (33%), and Saudi Arabia (30%).

What in your opinion will be the future of Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria?

	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Russia and Iran will remain in Syria and together exert influence over the Assad government.	32	39	57	34	31	28	6	26	50
Russia and Iran will remain in Syria, but the Assad government will be in control over decisions that affect the future of the country.	36	41	19	44	43	50	61	23	33
Russia and Iran will clash over the role they will each play with respect to the Assad government.	32	20	24	22	26	22	33	51	17

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Overall, **opinion is quite divided with respect to the future of Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria**. One-half or more of respondents in the UAE (61%) and Saudi Arabia (50%) as well as clear pluralities in Jordan (44%) and Palestine (43%) believe that Russia and Iran will remain in Syria, but the Assad government will be in control over decisions that affect the country's future. Alternatively, **one-half or more of respondents in Lebanon (57%) and Iran (50%) think that Russia and Iran will remain in Syria and together exert influence over the Assad government**. Finally, **one-half of Turkish respondents (51%) say Russia and Iran will clash** over the role they will each play with respect to the Assad government. In addition to these differing views country to country, within Tunisia and Egypt opinion is very divided among the three options for the future of Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria.

DAESH

How confident are you that Daesh has been defeated?

	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Confident	65	55	33	79	42	82	62	73	29	72
Not confident	35	45	67	21	58	18	38	27	71	28

Confident is the aggregation of responses of "very confident" and "somewhat confident." Not confident is the aggregation of responses of "not very confident" and "not confident at all."

Majorities in seven of the 10 countries surveyed express confidence that Daesh has been defeated, with the highest rates of confidence in Iraq (82%), Jordan (79%), the UAE (73%), and Iran (72%), followed by Tunisia (65%), Saudi Arabia (62%), and Egypt (55%). On the other hand, majorities are not confident that Daesh has been defeated in Turkey (71%), Lebanon (67%), and Palestine (58%).

IRAQI ATTITUDES

What is the best outcome for the future of Iraq?

	2015	2018	2019
It is best that the Iraqi government in Baghdad be reformed so that it represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation in order to keep the country unified.	59	55	57
It is best for Iraq to recognize that national unity can best be maintained if the country becomes a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the government in Baghdad.	19	27	30
It is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible.	22	18	13

A solid majority of Iraqi respondents (57%) continues to believe that the best outcome for the future of their country is a reformed government that represents all Iraqis and can pursue national reconciliation to keep the country unified. This percentage is consistent with previous surveys (59% in 2015 and 55% in 2018). And this view is shared by majorities of all of Iraq's component groups: Sunnis (55%), Shia (62%), and Kurds (50%).

A downward trend continues with respect to those who believe that national unity is not possible; 13% hold that view in the current survey, down 5 points from 2018 and 9 points from 2015. Finally, there is a corresponding uptick among those who think national unity in Iraq should be achieved by making Iraq a federation of autonomous regions, from 19% in 2015 to 30% in the current survey.

At present, the Parliament in Iraq is apportioned on a sectarian basis to reflect the population of the country. In your opinion...	
	Iraqis
This a good thing for Iraq	65
This creates a situation which fosters division in the country	23
It makes no difference	13
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.	

Two-thirds of Iraqi respondents (65%) think that the sectarian basis for apportionment of parliamentary seats is a good thing. About one-quarter (23%) believe that this system fosters division in the country. The remaining 13% say it makes no difference.

How confident are you in the performance of each of the following institutions/entities in promoting national unity in your country?		
	Confident	Not confident
Central government in Baghdad	72	28
Police	69	31
Military	76	24
Judiciary	42	58
Parliament	70	30
The Kurdish Regional Government	63	37
PMU	49	51

Iraqis express considerable confidence in the performance of many of their institutions in promoting national unity. More than two-thirds of respondents say they are confident that the military (76%), central government in Baghdad (72%), the parliament (70%), and the police (69%) promote national unity in the country. There is slightly less but still significant confidence in the performance of the Kurdish Regional Government (63%) in promoting national unity. Opinion is split with respect to confidence in the performance of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) (49% confident vs. 51% not confident). And a majority of Iraqi respondents (58%) are not confident that the performance of the judiciary promotes national unity.

There is basic agreement between Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds on confidence in many of their country's institutions, though Sunni Arabs are slightly more confident in the promotion of national unity due to the performance of the central government (85% vs. 66%/73%), the police (79% vs. 65%/67%), and the military (86% vs.

74%/76%). **Sunni Arabs are, however, significantly less confident about the performance of the PMU in promoting national unity (31% vs. 60%/53%).**

Iraqi Confidence in Their Institutions Promoting National Unity

These high levels of confidence are somewhat unexpected based on the results of last year’s survey when about 20% of Iraqi respondents expressed confidence in the performance of military and police and just 6% in the parliament. We re-interviewed 43 Iraqi respondents to help clarify these responses. **What we found is that the addition of “promoting national unity” seems to have greatly impacted the responses. Efforts toward achieving national unity including the defeat of Daesh, attempts to bring the PMU under the command of the national military, and national elections appear to have strengthened the confidence of Iraqis in their institutions.**

However, it is worth noting that **two-thirds of those we re-interviewed say they have less confidence following the recent protests and the performance of the government in handling them. About three-quarters say they think the demands of the demonstrators are just**, though some do not agree with their tactics. Again, about two-thirds blame the recent violence on political parties using the situation for their own advantage, agents of foreign powers trying to weaken Iraq, and undisciplined government forces.

What, in your view, was the main cause of the emergence of Daesh?	
	Iraqis
Failure of the Iraqi military	22
Sectarian policies pursued by the government that bred resentment	20
Outside interests trying to destabilize Iraq	48
Radical remnants of the Ba’ath regime	2
Social and economic conditions in the country	8

Almost one-half of Iraqi respondents (48%) say the main cause of the emergence of Daesh was outside interests trying to destabilize Iraq. One in five blame the failure of the Iraqi military (22%) and sectarian policies pursued by the government that bred resentment (20%). Very few respondents think Daesh emerged because of social and economic conditions in the country (8%) or because of radical remnants of the Ba’ath regime (2%).

Of the forces listed below, which two are most responsible for the defeat of Daesh?	
	Iraqis
Iraqi military	63
Pesh Merga	34
PMU	56
Support from Iran	23
Support from the United States	24

When asked to select the two entities most responsible for the defeat of Daesh, majorities of Iraqi respondents point to the Iraqi military (63%) and the PMU (56%). One-third (34%) say the Pesh Merga was most responsible for defeating Daesh, and about one-quarter each credit support from Iran (23%) and support from the United States (24%).

Is the government in Baghdad taking the right steps to prevent the reemergence of Daesh?

	Iraqis
Yes	64
No	30
Not sure	5

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

About **two-thirds of Iraqi respondents (64%)** say the government in Baghdad is taking the right steps to prevent the reemergence of Daesh, while 30% say it is not and 5% are not sure. Sunni Arab respondents are even more confident, with 76% saying the government is taking the right steps (vs. 60% of Shia Arabs and Kurds), while 37% of Shia Arabs and 35% of Kurds say the government is not taking the right steps to prevent the reemergence of Daesh (vs. 15% of Sunni Arabs).

ATTITUDES TOWARD IRAN

With regard to Iran, which of the following areas are of great concern to you? (Select all that apply.)

Rank	Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Iraq	
1	Nuclear program	49	Involvement in Lebanon	57	Nuclear program	58	Involvement in Iraq	70
2	Involvement in Syria	30	Nuclear program	43	Involvement in Syria	42	Involvement in Arab Gulf	63
3	Involvement in Arab Gulf	29	Involvement in Arab Gulf	35	Involvement in Arab Gulf	38	Nuclear program	63
4	Involvement in Iraq	26	Involvement in Syria	28	Involvement in Lebanon	31	Involvement in Syria	54
5	Iran doesn't concern me	21	Involvement in Iraq	24	Involvement in Iraq	27	Involvement in Yemen	53
6	Involvement in Lebanon	19	Involvement in Yemen	17	Sectarian agenda	19	Sectarian agenda	47
7	Involvement in Yemen	13	Ballistic missile program	13	Involvement in Yemen	17	Involvement in Lebanon	45
8	Sectarian agenda	12	Sectarian agenda	8	Ballistic missile program	13	Ballistic missile program	12
9	Ballistic missile program	6	Iran doesn't concern me	8	Iran doesn't concern me at	9	Iran doesn't concern me	5

Rank	KSA		UAE		Turkey	
1	Involvement in the Arab Gulf	80	Nuclear program	83	Involvement in Syria	53
2	Nuclear program	76	Involvement in the Arab Gulf	50	Nuclear program	44
3	Involvement in Yemen	62	Involvement in Yemen	39	Involvement in Iraq	39
4	Involvement in Syria	30	Involvement in Syria	28	Involvement in Yemen	37
5	Sectarian agenda	28	Involvement in Iraq	22	Sectarian agenda	37
6	Involvement in Iraq	27	Sectarian agenda	22	Ballistic missile program	31
7	Ballistic missile program	16	Involvement in Lebanon	9	Involvement in Lebanon	30
8	Involvement in Lebanon	8	Ballistic missile program	9	Involvement in the Arab Gulf	23
9	Iran doesn't concern me at all	0	Iran doesn't concern me at all	8	Iran doesn't concern me at all	9

Respondents in six Arab countries and Turkey were asked about their greatest concerns with respect to Iran. **Overall, the issue of the most concern is Iran's nuclear program**, which is the top concern in Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE, and the second most cited concern in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Iran’s various regional involvements are also of great concern, particularly to those countries most affected by these entanglements. Most worrisome overall are Iran’s involvement in Syria, which is the top concern in Turkey, ranks second in Egypt and Jordan, and is in the top tier of concerns in all countries surveyed, and its involvement in the Arab Gulf, which is the top concern in Saudi Arabia, ranks second in the UAE and Iraq, and ranks third in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan.

Iran’s involvements in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon are also of significant concern. Not surprisingly, for Iraqis, Iran’s involvement in their country is their greatest concern; this issue is also a top-tier concern in Egypt and Turkey. Iran’s involvement in Yemen is a top-tier issue of concern for Saudis, Emiratis, and Turks. For the Lebanese, Iran’s involvement in their concern is the issue of greatest concern; this is also a top-tier concern for Jordanians.

Iran’s sectarian agenda is not a top-tier concern in any surveyed country, but it ranks highest in Saudi Arabia (5th) and Turkey (5th).

Of the least concern to surveyed respondents overall is Iran’s ballistic missile program.

In six of the seven countries the percentages of those who say “Iran does not concern me at all” are in single digits; only in Egypt (21%) is there a significant percentage of respondents who are not concerned about Iran.

	Lebanon			Iraq		
	Sunni	Shia	Christian	Sunni Arabs	Shia Arabs	Kurds
Nuclear program	43	48	40	71	64	57
Involvement in Syria	23	31	31	93	27	69
Involvement in Iraq	20	24	27	100	46	88
Involvement in Lebanon	68	34	64	88	12	69
Involvement in Yemen	10	26	15	99	19	78
Involvement in the Arab Gulf	38	27	37	94	40	82
Ballistic missile program	13	13	12	13	10	11
Sectarian agenda	13	4	9	100	6	79
Iran doesn’t concern me at all	4	17	5	0	9	1

In Lebanon and Iraq, there are significant differences between Sunni and Shia attitudes on their areas of greatest concern with respect to Iran.

Among Iraqis, concern regarding Iran’s nuclear program is high for both Sunni and Shia Arabs and for Kurds, while concern regarding Iran’s ballistic missile program is quite low across the board. However, there are major differences when it comes to Iran’s sectarian agenda and Iran’s involvement in other countries. While almost all Sunni Arabs and strong majorities of Kurds express concern about Iran’s involvement in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Arab Gulf, among Shia Arabs concern about these engagements is much lower. It is worth noting that almost half of Iraqi Shia (46%) are concerned about Iranian involvement in their country.

In Lebanon, Sunni and Christian respondents are twice as concerned as their Shia counterparts about Iranian involvement in Lebanon.

It is also of interest that only 17% of Lebanese Shia and 9% of Iraqi Shia say that “Iran does not concern me at all.”

IRANIAN ATTITUDES

Have the U.S. sanctions had an impact on you and your family's economic status?		Iranians
A great impact		28
Some impact		27
	Impact	55
Little impact		21
No impact at all		24
	No impact	45

A majority of Iranian respondents (55%) say the U.S. sanctions have had an impact on their economic status and that of their family, while 45% say the sanctions have had little or no impact on them.

How do you rate your satisfaction with your government's performance in each of the following areas?					
		2016	2017	2018	2019
Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Satisfied	51	62	46	53↑
	Dissatisfied	49	38	54	47
Advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights	Satisfied	30	46	37	51↑
	Dissatisfied	70	54	63	49
Giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen	Satisfied	47	60	51	64↑
	Dissatisfied	53	40	49	36

Satisfied is the aggregation of responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied." Dissatisfied is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat dissatisfied" and "very dissatisfied." Arrows indicate significant change since earlier surveys.

After dips last year in satisfaction with their government's performance, Iranian attitudes have rebounded in the current survey. More than one-half of respondents (53%) are satisfied with their government's investment in improving the economy and creating employment, up 7 points from last year, though still below 2017's 62%. One-half (51%) are also satisfied with the advancement of democracy and protection of personal and civil rights by their government, the highest level we have seen to date. Finally, almost two-thirds of Iranians (64%) say they are satisfied with their government's support for their allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, up 13 points from last year.

How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in each of the following countries?							
		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Syria	Important	90	73	24	69	54	73↑
	Not important	7	27	76	31	46	27
Lebanon	Important	88	72	43	67	64	37↓
	Not important	10	28	57	33	36	63
Iraq	Important	87	64	47	75	65	83↑
	Not important	10	36	53	25	35	17
Yemen	Important	62	43	39	58	54	54
	Not important	36	57	61	42	46	46

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding and because responses of "not sure" are not included. Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since earlier surveys.

As we have for the last five years, we asked Iranian respondents how important it is for their government to continue to be involved in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Only with respect to Yemen are Iranian attitudes stable from previous years' surveys; 54% in the current survey say it is important for Iran to continue to be involved in Yemen, a number consistent with 2017 and 2018. On the other hand, **respondents ascribe greater importance to Iranian involvement in Iraq and Syria than in recent surveys and significantly less importance to their government's involvement in Lebanon.**

Involvement in Syria is viewed as important by 73% of Iranian respondents, returning to the level last expressed in 2015. Similarly, the importance of Iranian involvement in Iraq is noted by 83% of respondents, a level last seen in the 2014 survey when 87% said it was important for Iran to be involved in Iraq. Finally, just 37% of respondents say their government's involvement in Lebanon is important, a precipitous drop since last year (64%) and a new low for Iran's engagement in Lebanon.

If given the choice between "investing in improving the economy" and "giving greater support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen," which should be the priority or are both equally important?	
	Iranians
Investing in improving the economy is a higher priority.	52
Giving greater support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen is a higher priority.	16
Both are equally important.	31
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.	

When asked which should be a higher priority, improving the economy or giving support to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, a majority of Iranian respondents (52%) say investing in improving the economy is a higher priority. About one-third (31%) say both are equally important. Only 16% believe that giving greater support to their allies in other countries where Iran is involved should be a higher priority.

U.S. POLICY

Respondents in all 10 surveyed countries were asked about U.S. policy over the last three years with respect to regional issues. Specifically, they were asked to consider if the policy in each area has changed positively or negatively, has remained the same, or if it is not clear. Overall, the perception is that U.S. policy has changed negatively in all areas, particularly with respect to dealing with Iran. There is, however, some variability in opinion among the surveyed countries.

With regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, has there been a positive or negative change in U.S. policy in the past 3 years, or has it remained the same?: U.S. policy toward Syria										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Positive change	1	8	15	43↑	11	6	48	34↓	21↓	8
Negative change	31	19	18	32	60	47	12↓	21	42	45
Policy has remained the same	43	54	58	17	18	22	29	28	15	24
It is not clear	25	19	9	8	11	24	12	17	21	23
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.										

In terms of U.S. policy toward Syria, pluralities in three countries say there has been positive change over the last three years (Jordan: 43%, Saudi Arabia: 48%, UAE: 34%), while a majority of Palestinians (60%) and pluralities in Iraq (47%), Iran (45%), and Turkey (42%) say the change has been negative. Among Iraqis, a majority of Shia Arabs view

U.S. policy toward Syria as undergoing a negative change in the last three years (56%), while Sunni Arabs and Kurds less likely to agree (38% and 39%, respectively). Majorities in Egypt (54%) and Lebanon (58%) as well as a plurality in Tunisia (43%) feel that U.S. policy toward Syria has remained the same over the last three years.

Comparing these results to 2017 when we asked the same question, we find some slight shifting of opinion. Jordanians are more positive (from 25% positive in 2017 to 43% in 2019), while Turks and Emiratis are significantly less likely to view U.S. policy toward Syria positively (from 75% in 2017 to 34% in the UAE and 21% in Turkey in 2019).

With regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, has there been a positive or negative change in U.S. policy in the past 3 years, or has it remained the same?: U.S. policy toward Iraq										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Positive change	3	5↓	3↓	3↓	13	10↓	6↓	26↓	20↓	8
Negative change	35	28	75	40	52	50	29	21	34	41
Policy has remained the same	35	42	13	42	24	31	29	30	26	29
It is not clear	27	25	9	14	11	9	35	24	21	22

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Rows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.

With respect to U.S. policy toward Iraq, there is even less enthusiasm by respondents overall. In seven of the 10 countries surveyed (Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq itself) no more than one in 10 respondents view U.S. policy toward Iraq as having changed in a positive way in the last three years. Only in the UAE is more than one-quarter of respondents (26%) inclined to see a positive change in U.S. policy in Iraq. Majorities in Lebanon (75%), among Palestinians (52%), and in Iraq itself (50%) say the U.S. policy in that country has changed negatively. In Saudi Arabia, more than one-third of respondents (35%) say it is not clear.

While there was a generally negative view of U.S. policy toward Iraq in our 2017 survey as well, when comparing the results to the current survey, we find significant declines in almost every country in those who think there has been a positive policy change over the last three years. The greatest drops in positive opinions are among respondents in the UAE (-61), Egypt (-32), Turkey (-30), and Saudi Arabia (-30).

With regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, has there been a positive or negative change in U.S. policy in the past 3 years, or has it remained the same?: U.S. relations with your country										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Positive change	23	19	21	45↑	9	10	18	21	12	1
Negative change	21	10	6	7	67	50↑	30↑	33	47↑	61↑
Policy has remained the same	30	32	42	18	16	31	33	9	20	27
It is not clear	25	39	31	30	8	9	19	37↑	22	11

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.

When asked about how U.S. relations with their own country may have changed in the past three years, more than six in 10 Palestinians (67%) and Iranians (61%), as well as about one-half of Iraqis (50%) and Turks (47%), say there has been a negative change. In the UAE, opinion is quite divided with about one-third (37%) saying it is not clear, one-fifth (21%) saying there has been a positive change, and another third (33%) thinking the relationship has changed negatively. In four of the 10 countries there is significant ambivalence about U.S. relations with their countries; in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, majorities say either U.S. policy has remained the same or it is not clear.

Only in Jordan is there a positive slant to opinion; 45% of Jordanian respondents say there has been a positive change in U.S. relations with their country, though 30% say it is not clear.

Again, we see a negative turn in many countries since 2017. While Iraqis, Turks, and Iranians were quite ambivalent in 2017 with majorities saying relations had stayed the same or any change was not yet clear, in the current survey majorities of these respondents now say U.S. policy has produced a negative change in relations with their countries.

With regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, has there been a positive or negative change in U.S. policy in the past 3 years, or has it remained the same?: U.S. relations with the Muslim World										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Positive change	5	7	0	16	8	6	16	31	9	12
Negative change	39	29	55↑	25	64↑	63↑	45↑	32	56↑	46↑
Policy has remained the same	35	43	23	49	19	28	18	28	22	30
It is not clear	22	21	22	10	9	3	21	8	14	11

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.

Considering U.S. relations with the Muslim World as a whole, respondents tend to hold generally negative views, except in the UAE where opinion is split between those who see a positive change (31%), those who see a negative change (32%), and those who feel U.S. policy has remained the same (28%). Majorities in Palestine (64%), Iraq (63%), Turkey (56%), and Lebanon (55%), as well as clear pluralities in Saudi Arabia (45%) and Iran (46%) say they see a negative change in U.S. relations with the Muslim World. Pluralities in Egypt (43%) and Jordan (49%) see no change in this relationship based on U.S. policy over the last three years. Finally, in Tunisia opinions are divided, with 39% saying they see a negative change while 35% say there has been no change.

Since 2017 views have either become more ambivalent or remained mixed in Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. In Lebanon, there has been a significant shift toward seeing positive change in U.S. relations with the Muslim World. But the most notable comparison between the 2017 and 2019 data is the increase in the percentages of respondents in Palestine, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran who see U.S. relations with the Muslim World as having undergone a negative change over the last three years.

With regard to each of the areas mentioned below, from what you have seen so far, has there been a positive or negative change in U.S. policy in the past 3 years, or has it remained the same?: Dealing with Iran										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Positive change	3	5	7	14	8	3	11	31	2	1
Negative change	40	33	61↑	62↑	59↑	28	49↑	45↑	77	64
Policy has remained the same	21	39	15	15	21	30	27	9	6	25
It is not clear	36	22↑	17	10	12	39↑	13	15	15	11

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.

Overall, the U.S. policy regarding dealing with Iran is the area most likely to be viewed as having a negative change in the last three years. Majorities in Turkey (77%), Jordan (62%), Lebanon (61%), Palestine (59%), and Iran itself (64%), as well as pluralities in Saudi Arabia (49%), the UAE (45%), and Tunisia (40%) say they see a negative change in this area. Opinion is quite mixed in Egypt and Iraq with similar percentages in each country saying there has

been a negative change (33% and 28%, respectively), the policy has remained the same (39% and 30%), and it is not clear (22% and 39%). In seven of the 10 surveyed countries fewer than one in 10 respondents view U.S. policy dealing with Iran as moving in a more positive direction. The UAE is the only country where a significant percentage (31%) say they see positive change in U.S. policy dealing with Iran.

Looking back to the 2017 data, we find that opinions have become noticeably more negative on U.S. policy regarding Iran in Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and increasingly ambivalent in Egypt and Iraq. Only in Turkey has opinion remained stable, and quite negative.

Saudi and Emirati Attitudes: U.S. Policy Toward Iran

In an effort to better understand the change in Saudi and Emirati attitudes toward U.S. policy toward Iran, we resurveyed 102 Saudi and Emirati respondents. We asked them why they now view U.S. policy more negatively. **In Saudi Arabia, 15% said U.S. policy toward Iran was “too hard,” 43% said the United States was now “too soft on Iran,” while 42% said U.S. policy was “confused.” Among Emirati respondents, 29% said U.S. policy toward Iran was “too hard,” and equal percentage said it was “too soft,” and 43% said it was now a “confused” policy.**

The Trump administration has indicated that it hopes to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From what you have seen so far, how confident are you that they will be able to make progress in their efforts?

	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Turkey	Iran
Confident	20	23↑	17↓	63↑	35	54↑	20	42↑	17↓	8↓
Not confident	80	77	83	37	65	46	80	58	83	92

Confident is the aggregation of responses of “very confident” and “somewhat confident.” Not confident is the aggregation of responses of “not very confident” and “not confident at all.” Arrows indicate significant change, either up or down, since the 2017 survey.

In eight of the 10 countries surveyed, majorities of respondents do not have confidence that the Trump administration will be able to make progress in their efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; more than three-quarters of respondents in Egypt (77%), Tunisia (80%), Saudi Arabia (80%), Turkey (83%), Lebanon (83%), and Iran (92%) lack confidence in this regard. Only in Jordan (63%) and Iraq (54%) do majorities have confidence that the Trump administration will make progress. **Comparing these results to the 2017 survey, we find increased levels of confidence in Jordan (+28), Iraq (+15), the UAE (+41), and Egypt (+16), and decreased levels of confidence in Lebanon (-23), Turkey (-35), and Iran (-31). Among Palestinians and Saudis, attitudes are stable.**

THE NEXT DECADE: MOST DEPENDABLE ALLIES

As you look to the next decade, which of the following countries do you believe would be the most dependable partners for your country? (Select all that apply.)

	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Palestine		Iraq		KSA		UAE		Turkey	
1	EU	73	KSA	56	EU	84	US	59	Turkey	42	Iran	45	US	80	US	60	EU	64
2	Turkey	42	Russia	49	US	40	China	45	EU	35	China	43	Russia	29	KSA	32	China	42
3	China	36	US	44	Turkey	36	EU	30	KSA	20	US	40	China	27	India	25	India	39
4	US	24	China	33	China	34	KSA	29	Russia	19	Russia	27	India	23	China	23	Russia	37
5	KSA	19	Japan	22	Japan	25	India	25	China	16	EU	24	Japan	17	Russia	21	Japan	32
6	Japan	18	EU	20	Russia	18	Turkey	25	Iran	16	India	21	EU	14	EU	21	US	20
7	Russia	15	India	16	KSA	17	Russia	23	US	15	Japan	18	Turkey	2	Japan	13	KSA	17
8	Iran	9	Iran	6	Iran	14	Japan	23	Japan	9	Turkey	5	Iran	0	Turkey	8	Iran	14
9	India	2	Turkey	0	India	5	Iran	2	India	6	KSA	3			Iran	3		

In eight Arab countries and Turkey, respondents were asked to consider the next decade and identify the countries they believe will be the most dependable partners for their country. **Overall, the three top choices are the United States, China, and the European Union, followed by Russia and Saudi Arabia. The least cited partners for dependability over the next decade are Turkey, Japan, India, and finally Iran.** In many countries, it is notable that the top choice for a dependable partner is cited by a majority of respondents while the subsequent choices are cited by fewer than one-third of the respondents.

The United States is the top choice for a dependable partner over the next 10 years by respondents in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Eight in 10 Saudis cite the United States as a partner they can count on, while about six in 10 Emiratis and Jordanians do the same. The United States is also a top-tier choice in Lebanon (2nd place, 40%), Egypt (3rd, 44%), and Iraq (3rd, 40%). It is one of the least favored partners by Palestinians (7th, 15%) and Turks (6th, 20%).

The European Union is considered the most dependable partner by respondents in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey. Among the Lebanese, 84% believe their country can count on the EU over the next decade, as do 73% of Tunisians and 64% of Turks. The EU is also a top-tier, though significantly less popular, choice in Palestine (2nd, 35%) and Jordan (3rd, 30%).

China is ranked second by respondents in Jordan (45%), Iraq (43%), and Turkey (42%), and third in Tunisia (36%) and Saudi Arabia (27%).

Looking at the next tier of choices for dependable partners over the next 10 years, **Russia** is the second-ranked choice in Egypt (49%) and Saudi Arabia (29%), and **Saudi Arabia** is the top choice for Egyptians (56%), the second most frequently cited partner in the UAE (32%), and the third place choice for Palestinians (20%). Saudi Arabia is the seventh choice in Turkey (17%) and last in Iraq, where just 3% of respondents think the Kingdom will be a dependable partner over the next decade.

Despite being a less popular choice overall, **Turkey** is the preferred partner by the Palestinians, with 42% saying they believe Turkey will be a dependable partner for them in the next decade. Similar percentages in Tunisia (42%) and Lebanon (36%) think Turkey will be a reliable partner for their countries, making it a second and third ranked choice,

respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, however, Turkey is viewed as a partner by very few respondents in the UAE (8%), Iraq (5%), and Saudi Arabia (2%), and is not noted as a dependable partner by any respondents in Egypt.

Only in Turkey are **India** and **Japan** regarded as reliable partners for the next decade; 39% of Turks cite India and 32% cite Japan as dependable partners. Neither India nor Japan is mentioned by more than one-quarter of respondents in any of the Arab countries surveyed.

Iran is the top choice for a dependable partner over the next decade by Iraqi respondents; 45% in Iraq select Iran, though there is a significant sectarian divide (28% of Sunni Arabs vs. 53% of Shia Arabs). Elsewhere, Iran is almost always near the bottom of the rankings, with single-digit percentages in five of the nine countries surveyed.

As you look to the next decade, how confident are you that ...?								
		Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Iraq	KSA	UAE
there will be peace and an end to conflict in Syria	Confident	20	45	80	66	75	53	22
	Not confident	80	55	20	34	25	47	78
religious extremist movements will be defeated	Confident	60	65	44	85	58	61	63
	Not confident	40	35	56	15	42	39	37
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be resolved	Confident	27	29	3	58	59	27	30
	Not confident	73	71	97	42	41	73	70
the issues that caused several Arab countries to become destabilized by popular uprisings will be resolved	Confident	61	65	23	55	48	71	52
	Not confident	39	35	77	45	52	29	48
there will be peace between Iran and Arab countries	Confident	31	52	55	50	45	26	58
	Not confident	69	48	45	50	55	74	42

Confident is the aggregation of responses of “very confident” and “somewhat confident.” Not confident is the aggregation of responses of “not very confident” and “not confident at all.”

Respondents were asked about their confidence in a number of possible positive outcomes to regional challenges.

With respect to the conflict in Syria, its closest neighbors, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, express the most confidence that there will be peace and an end to the conflict. Three-quarters of respondents in Lebanon (80%) and Iraq (75%) have confidence in this outcome, as well as two-thirds of Jordanians. A slim majority (53%) in Saudi Arabia agrees. On the other hand, more than three-quarters of respondents in Tunisia (80%) and the UAE (78%), as well as a majority in Egypt (55%), do not have confidence that the Syrian conflict will find a peaceful resolution in the next decade.

There is greater agreement about the defeat of religious extremist movements, with about six in 10 respondents in Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, expressing confidence in this outcome. Jordanians are the most confident that religious extremism will be defeated; 85% hold this view. In Lebanon, however, only 44% are confident, while 56% are not confident that such movements will be defeated in the next 10 years.

With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, only in Jordan and Iraq are majorities confident that the conflict will be resolved in the next decade (58% and 59%, respectively). At least seven in 10 respondents in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE express a lack of confidence in this outcome. And an overwhelming 97% of Lebanese respondents say are not confident that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be resolved.

When asked about the issues that caused several Arab countries to become destabilized by popular uprisings, majorities in Saudi Arabia (71%), Egypt (65%), Tunisia (61%), and Jordan (55%) are confident there will be resolution in the

next decade. Opinion in Iraq and the UAE is divided. In Lebanon fewer than one-quarter of respondents (23%) are confident that the issues that led to destabilization of several Arab countries by popular uprisings will be resolved in the next decade.

With respect to the possibility of peace between Iran and Arab countries, opinions are quite divided in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Respondents in the UAE lean slightly toward having confidence that peace will be achieved (58%), while in Saudi Arabia and Tunisia majorities (74% and 69%, respectively) express a lack of confidence that Iran and Arab countries will achieve peace in the next decade.

THE NEXT DECADE: MY COUNTRY'S PRIORITIES

Are you "better off" or "worse off" than you were five years ago, or is your situation "about the same"?																		
	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Palestine		Iraq		KSA		UAE		Iran	
	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019	2018	2019
Better off	21	49↑	20	18	32	29	31	42↑	17	25	20	29	36	37	68	73	34	33
Worse off	59	35	64	44	39	44	39	35	49	50	55	53	29	50↑	6	16	33	50↑
About the same	20	15	16	38	28	27	30	23	33	25	25	18	36	14	25	11	33	17

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Arrows indicate significant change since last year's survey.

Respondents in nine countries were asked if they are better off or worse off now than they were five years ago, or if their situation is about the same—a measure of satisfaction. **In six of the nine countries, pluralities say they are worse off now than they were five years ago;** at least one-half of respondents express dissatisfaction in Iraq (53%), Palestine (50%), Saudi Arabia (50%), and Iran (50%). In the remaining three countries we find at least a plurality saying they are better off: the UAE (73%), Tunisia (49%), and Jordan (42%).

Among Iraqis, it is worth noting that Sunni Arabs are almost unanimous (97%) in feeling that they are worse off now than they were five years ago, while only 21% of their Shia counterparts agree; Kurds in Iraq are also deeply dissatisfied with their current situation (75% say they are worse off). On the other hand, 48% of Shia Arabs in Iraq say they are better off now than five years ago compared to 18% of Kurds and no Sunni Arabs.

In comparing these results to last year's survey, **we find a uptick in satisfaction in Jordan** (from 31% saying better off in 2018 to 42% in 2019) and **a significant increase in satisfaction levels in Tunisia** (from 21% to 49%). On the other hand, **there is a significant increase in dissatisfaction among respondents in Saudi Arabia** (from 29% saying worse off in 2018 to 50% in 2019). It is worth noting that in Iran the level of dissatisfaction (50%) is the highest we have found in our polling from 2013 to the present.

Do you feel that you will be better off or worse off five years from now, or do you think your situation will be about the same?										
	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	Iraq	KSA	UAE	Iran	
Better off	42	22	11	16	27	20	21	53	19	
Worse off	30	46	67	55	40	57	50	21	52	
About the same	27	32	22	29	33	23	29	26	30	

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

We also asked respondents in the same nine countries if they feel that five years from now they will be better or worse off, or if they think their situation will be about the same—a measure of optimism. **The only bright spots of optimism appear to be in the UAE, where 53% feel they will be better off in five years, and in Tunisia, where a plurality (42%) agree.**

Majorities in Lebanon (67%), Iraq (57%), Jordan (55%), and Iran (52%) feel they will be worse off in five years, as do pluralities in Saudi Arabia (50%), Egypt (46%), and Palestine (40%). One-quarter to one-third of respondents in every country feel their situation will be about the same five years from now.

In 2014, we asked the same question in Egypt and Iraq. While the Iraqi response in the current poll closely mirrors those 2014 results (better off: 20%, worse off: 48%, same: 27%), Egyptians have grown increasingly pessimistic. In 2014, 47% of Egyptian respondents said they would be better off in five years compared to just 22% in the current survey; and the 35% in 2014 who said they would be worse off has grown to 46% in 2019.

As you look to the future, which of the following issues are the most important for your country to address? (Select three.)

- creating more jobs for our expanding youth population
- modernizing our educational system so that our country can compete in the world
- improving our health care system
- doing more to protect civil rights and personal freedom
- doing more to advance equal rights for women
- maintaining our traditional culture and religious values
- doing more to combat religious extremism
- strengthening our military and police to ensure our peace and security
- doing more to promote unity among all the diverse communities in my country
- ending corruption and nepotism
- advancing democracy
- political and governmental reform

	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Iraq		KSA		UAE	
1	education	60	education	47	jobs	62	jobs	54	democracy	46	military/police	46	military/police	50
2	jobs	58	jobs	41	military/police	43	military/police	50	military/police	45	jobs	43	education	48
3	health care	41	health care	32	civil rights	41	education	45	health care	31	democracy	40	jobs	39
4	military/police	26	military/police	30	education	35	health care	24	education	31	health care	37	health care	30
5	corruption	23	extremism	25	health care	26	extremism	23	jobs	29	education	36	extremism	28
6	extremism	22	corruption	24	extremism	25	democracy	22	unity/diversity	29	extremism	36	civil rights	27
7	democracy	19	political reform	24	trad. culture	24	civil rights	17	political reform	23	civil rights	19	women's rights	26
8	political reform	18	democracy	22	corruption	17	women's rights	16	trad. culture	20	corruption	13	democracy	22
9	trad. culture	16	civil rights	19	democracy	10	corruption	15	extremism	15	trad. culture	10	political reform	11
10	civil rights	10	trad. culture	17	political reform	9	political reform	14	corruption	11	political reform	10	unity/diversity	7
11	women's rights	3	unity/diversity	11	women's rights	7	trad. culture	12	civil rights	10	unity/diversity	6	corruption	7
12	unity/diversity	3	women's rights	10	unity/diversity	2	unity/diversity	9	women's rights	10	women's rights	5	trad. culture	5

Respondents in seven Arab countries were asked to identify the issues they feel are most important for their country to address. **Overall, the top issues are creating more jobs for youth and strengthening the military and police to ensure peace and security;** each of these issues is ranked either first or second in five of the seven countries surveyed. **Modernizing the educational system to make their country more competitive and improving the health care system are the other two most frequently selected issues of importance across the board.** This primacy of fundamental bread-and-butter issues like jobs, education, and health care is noteworthy.

The next tier of issues of importance includes several concerns about individual rights and the underpinnings of democratic societies: advancing democracy, combating religious extremism, protecting civil rights and personal freedom, ending corruption and nepotism, and political and governmental reform. The three issues of least concern to

respondents this year are maintaining traditional culture and religious values, advancing equal rights for women, and promoting unity among diverse communities in their country.

In Tunisia and Egypt, education has risen to the top spot, followed by jobs, health care, and strengthening the military and police. The 2018 Tunisian concern with combating extremism and Egyptians’ concern with ending corruption and political and governmental reform have taken a back seat to these issues of everyday life.

In Lebanon and Jordan, creating employment opportunities for youth is still the number one issue, followed by increasing peace and security by strengthening the military and police. Concern with modernizing the education system has risen significantly in both countries, and health care remains a top-tier issue. For the Lebanese, doing more to protect civil rights and personal freedom is of increased importance this year, up to the third spot.

In Iraq, advancing democracy has greatly increased in importance in the current survey, to the number one spot from ninth place in 2018, closely followed by ensuring peace and stability through a stronger military and police force. Education has also grown in importance, moving into the top tier of concerns in the current survey, along with improving the health care system.

For Saudis and Emiratis strengthening the military and police to ensure peace and security is the top-ranked issue of importance for their countries. Education remains important for respondents in the UAE, as is expanding employment opportunities for youth. In Saudi Arabia, employment is ranked second, followed by an ascendant concern with advancing democracy. In both countries, improving the health care system has moved into the top tier of concerns.

Now from the list of issues you consider most important for your country to address (responses to previous question), identify those issues you feel confident your country will be able to address in the next 10 years. (Select all that apply.)

	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Iraq		KSA		UAE	
1	education	60	education	55	jobs	53	jobs	54	democracy	54	military/ police	76	military/ police	54
2	jobs	72	jobs	73	military/ police	67	military/ police	60	military/ police	49	jobs	70	education	65
3	health care	59	health care	50	civil rights	63	education	62	health care	65	democracy	65	jobs	62
4	military/ police	73	military/ police	87	education	57	health care	71	education	65	health care	68	health care	63

After selecting the three issues of most importance to their countries, respondents were asked how confident they are that their country will be able to address these issues in the next 10 years. The table above shows just the top four issues of importance in each country and the percentage of the respondents who selected these as important who also think their country will be able to address these issues in the next 10 years.

Across the board about 50-75% of respondents think the issues they identified as priorities will be addressed by their countries in the next decade, with a couple of exceptions. Fewer than one-half of Iraqis who say strengthening the military and police is important believe their country will address this, while 87% of Egyptians who point to the same priority are confident that their country will address it.

THE NEXT DECADE: PRIORITIES FOR THE REGION

As you look to the future, which of the following issues are the most important for the Arab World to address? (Select three.)

- promoting greater political unity among Arab states
- investing more of the region's wealth and expertise in creating a more prosperous and stable Arab World
- promoting greater unity among Islamic countries
- securing justice and rights for the Palestinian people
- working together to see the establishment of stable representative governments capable of achieving national unity in countries like: Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen
- confronting Iran's ambitions in the Arab World
- confronting groups that preach religious extremism
- improving relations with the West, including the United States and the European Union
- improving relations with countries in the East and South, including China, Russia and Africa

	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Iraq		KSA		UAE	
1	prosperity	61	prosperity	61	prosperity	52	political unity	56	prosperity	51	prosperity	46	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	47
2	unity/Islamic	47	political unity	55	relations w/ East/South	44	confront Iran	41	political unity	42	political unity	46	prosperity	43
3	political unity	44	unity/Islamic	44	relations w/ West	42	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	32	extremism	41	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	39	unity/Islamic	41
4	relations w/ West	34	Palestine	29	political unity	40	unity/Islamic	31	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	37	relations w/ West	36	confront Iran	41
5	extremism	32	extremism	29	extremism	34	Palestine	30	confront Iran	35	confront Iran	35	political unity	38
6	relations w/ East/South	30	relations w/ West	26	confront Iran	29	relations w/ West	30	relations w/ West	30	relations w/ East/South	32	relations w/ West	34
7	Palestine	28	confront Iran	22	unity/Islamic	22	prosperity	29	unity/Islamic	29	unity/Islamic	23	extremism	28
8	confront Iran	13	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	18	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	21	extremism	28	Palestine	20	extremism	22	relations w/ East/South	15
9	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	10	relations w/ East/South	16	Palestine	16	relations w/ East/South	24	relations w/ East/South	16	Palestine	20	Palestine	12

Respondents were also asked to select the three most important issues for the Arab World to address. **Overall, the top two issues are investing more of the region's wealth and expertise in creating a more prosperous and stable Arab World and promoting greater political unity among Arab states.** Creating a more prosperous and stable region is the most important issue in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and ranks second in the UAE. Political Arab unity is the number one issue in Jordan, and ranks second in Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and third in Tunisia.

The next tier of issues of importance includes the following: promoting greater unity among Islamic countries; improving relations with the West; supporting establishment of stable representative governments in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen; confronting Iran; and confronting groups that preach religious extremism. Islamic unity is a top-tier priority in Tunisia, Egypt, and the UAE. Improving relations with the West including the United States and the European Union is only among the top three most important issues in Lebanon. For respondents in the UAE, the most important issue for the Arab World to address is working together to help establish stable representative governments in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen; this is the third most important issue in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Confronting Iran is the second most important issue for the Arab World in Jordan, and confronting extremist groups is the third most important issue for the region in Iraq.

Overall, the least important priorities for the Arab World are improving relations with countries in the East and South, including China, Russia, and Africa, and securing justice and rights for the Palestinian people.

Now from the list of issues you consider most important for the region to address (responses to previous question), identify those issues you feel confident the Arab World will be able to address in the next 10 years. (Select all that apply.)

	Tunisia		Egypt		Lebanon		Jordan		Iraq		KSA		UAE	
1	prosperity	62	prosperity	72	prosperity	50	political unity	59	prosperity	65	political unity	67	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	68
2	unity/Islamic	68	political unity	73	relations w/ East/South	48	confront Iran	59	political unity	69	prosperity	78	prosperity	65
3	political unity	46	unity/Islamic	70	relations w/ West	55	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	69	extremism	54	Iraq/Syria/ Libya/Yemen	69	unity/Islamic	63

After selecting the three issues of most importance to the Arab World, respondents were asked how confident they are that the region will be able to address these issues in the next 10 years. The table above shows just the top three issues of importance in each country and the percentage of the respondents who selected these as important who also think the Arab World will be able to address these issues in the next 10 years.

Generally speaking, about two-thirds of the respondents who select each priority are confident that the Arab World will address the issue, with a few exceptions. In Lebanon, only about one-half think their priorities will be addressed by the region as a whole. And in Tunisia, less than half of the respondents who think political Arab unity is important are confident that the region will address it in the next decade. Similarly, only about half of the Iraqis who identify confronting religious extremism as a regional priority think the Arab World will address this in the coming years.

APPENDIX A—METHODODOLOGY & DEMOGRAPHICS

The approach used for conducting the poll involved face-to-face personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered in each country to cover a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative and was comprised of adult males and females who were 15+ years of age; in Palestine, adults ages 18 and up were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, only citizens and Arab expatriates were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where door to door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. However, adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was not skewed and was broadly representative. Since random, door to door sampling is possible in the remaining countries, a multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for selection of respondents in each country.

Country	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Dates of Survey	Coverage
Lebanon	519	±4.3	9/5–9/21/19	Beirut (East & West Beirut), Tripoli, Nabatiyeh, Baalbek, Sayda (Sidon), Baabda, Zahlah
Jordan	520	±4.3	9/5–9/21/19	Amman City, Madaba, Irbid, Jarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba, As-Salt
Iraq	1035	±3.0	9/4–9/26/19	Baghdad, Ramadi, Baqubah, Arbil, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Najaf, Karbala, Nas-siriyah, Sulaimaniyah, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	1016	±3.1	9/3–9/24/19	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Erzurum, Samsun, Trabzon
KSA	838	±3.4	9/3–9/25/19	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dereya, Najran, Sakaka, Onayzah, Jeddah, Taif, Makkah, Tabuk, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail and Hufuf
UAE	429	±4.7	9/4–9/20/19	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Egypt	1050	±3.0	9/3–9/23/19	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban & rural), Menia (urban & rural), Asyut (urban & rural), Tanta (urban & rural), Aswan, Qina, Port Said
Iran	1030	±3.1	9/4–9/26/19	Tehran, Mashhad, Esfahan, Tabriz, Shiraz, Rasht, Yazd, Kerman, Ahvaz
Tunisia	833	±3.4	9/3–9/23/19	Tunis, Bizerte, Sousse, Sfax, Kairouan, Gaafsa, Douz, Tataouine, Jendouba, Tozeur, Qabis (Gabes)
Palestine	1045	±3.0	8/25–9/10/19	Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Al-Bireh, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Hebron, Jericho, Tulkarem, Tubas, Qalqilya, Salfit, Gaza City, North Gaza, Deir Al-Balah, Khan Yunis, Rafah

Demographics

	Tunisia	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Palestine	KSA	UAE	Iraq	Turkey	Iran
Male	50	50	50	54	51	51	50	50	50	51
Female	50	50	50	46	49	49	50	50	50	49
Under 30	29	41	32	43	45	47	56	44	31	31
30+	71	59	68	57	55	53	44	56	69	69
In city	69	43	88	90	72 (town)	83	85	69	75	75
Out of city	31	57	12	10	18 (village); 10 (refugee camp)	17	15	31	25	25
Sunni	99	89	27	95		85	90	42	80	8
Shia	1	2	28	3		15	10	58	20	92
Other religion		9 (Christian)	39 (Christian); 6 (Druze)	3 (Christian)	99 (Muslim); 1 (Christian)					
Ethnicity								17 (Kurd); 73 (Arab); 7 (Turk); 2 (Assyrian); 1 (other)	76 (Turk); 18 (Kurd); 7 (other)	

APPENDIX*

Question	Year	Page	Book Page	Book Figure
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IRAQ

Iraqi Attitudes Toward Other Countries

Indicate your attitude [favorable/unfavorable] toward the following countries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United States • Iran • Saudi Arabia • Turkey • China • The UAE 	2011 2016 2018	18, 241–243, 314–315	17, 23–24	1.6, 1.13
Do you agree or disagree that each of the following countries contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United States • Iran • Turkey • Saudi Arabia • Russia • Israel 	2016	243–244	24	
Of the countries and entities listed below, which are playing a positive role in Iraq? A negative role? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran • United States • Turkey • Saudi Arabia • Russia • Iraqi military • PMU • None of them 	2018	321	24–25	1.14

Better Off/Worse Off

Do you think that the Iraqi people are better off/worse off than they were before the American forces entered their country?	2011	9	14, 18, 21	1.2; 1.7
Do you think that the Iraqi people are better off/worse off than they were five years ago?	2018	307	18	1.7

Confidence in Institutions

How much confidence do you have in each of the following? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iraqi military • Popular Mobilization Units • The leadership of the central government in Baghdad • My local/tribal leadership • The effort being made by the international coalition fighting Daesh • The leadership of the Kurdish Regional Government • Daesh 	2015	225–226	19, 22–23	1.12
How much confidence do you have in the performance of each of the following institutions operating in your country? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military • Police • Judiciary • Religious establishment • Media • Parliament 	2018	309–310	19–20	1.9

* The appendix can be used to find these questions in the contexts of the original surveys (2011–2018), as well as in the figures and pages of *The Tumultuous Decade*.

<i>Question</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Page</i>	<i>Book Page</i>	<i>Book Figure</i>
Conflict in Iraq				
Since U.S. forces entered Iraq, how do you feel the following areas of life have been impacted? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political freedom • Economic development and employment • Education • Health care • Personal safety and security of Iraqis • Relations with neighboring countries • Administration of government services • Women's rights • Religious freedom 	2011	10–11	14, 21	
American forces are scheduled to leave your country at the end of this year. In your opinion is this withdrawal a positive or negative thing for your country?	2011	13	15, 21	1.3
How great is your concern with each of the following once the United States leaves Iraq? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renewed fighting or civil war • The country will split into several parts • Terrorist groups will gain a foothold in the country • Iraq's economic situation will deteriorate • Iraqis will lose newfound political or religious freedoms • Iraq will become dominated by a neighboring country 	2011	14	15	1.4
Who benefited the most from the war in Iraq?	2011	12	16, 24	1.5
How significant is the role played by ... in causing conflict in Iraq? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A government in Baghdad that does not represent all Iraqis • Iranian involvement • Sunni extremist groups like al Qaeda and Daesh 	2015	204–205	21–22	1.11
Identify the two most important factors that, in your opinion, have contributed to destabilization and conflict in Iraq.	2016	250–252	22	
Fifteen years after the US-led invasion of Iraq, who in your opinion benefited most from the war?	2018	320	23–24	
Extremism				
Does ISIS (now calling itself “Islamic State”) pose a threat to your country?	2014	182	22	
Do you support direct Western-led military intervention to combat ISIS?	2014	182	22	
How effective have each of the following actors been in the conflict against Daesh? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi military • PMUs • Forces of Kurdish Regional Government • Iran • US-led international coalition 	2015	226–227	19, 22–23	1.12
How serious a problem is each of the following groups? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Daesh • Muslim Brotherhood • al Qaeda • militias and groups supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 	2015	221–222	22	
How do you evaluate the role played by each of the following countries in combating extremist sectarian violence? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United States • The UAE • Turkey • Iran • Saudi Arabia 	2015	224	22	

<i>Question</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Page</i>	<i>Book Page</i>	<i>Book Figure</i>
How confident are you with the work being done by the following institutions in your country to deal with the threat of violent extremist groups? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police and intelligence agencies • Religious leaders • Political leadership • Non-governmental leaders in business, media, and education 	2016	260–261	19	

Priority Concerns

How important are the following issues facing your country today? (2011) Of the following list of issues facing your country, which are the three most important issues that need to be addressed? (2018) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanding employment opportunities • Improving the education system • Protecting personal and civil rights • Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict • Ending corruption and nepotism • Lack of political debate on important issues • Combating extremism and terrorism • Advancing democracy • Improving the health care system • Political and governmental reform • Increasing rights for women 	2011 2018	22, 304–305	17, 25	
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The Future

Which of the following outcomes do you feel represents the best future for Iraq?	2014 2015	183, 206	19	1.8
What is the best outcome for Iraq?	2018	323–324	19; 21	1.8; 1.10

ARAB SPRING

Overview

Is the Arab World better off or worse off following the Arab Spring or is it too early to tell?	2014	172	35	2.1
Will each of the following countries be better off or worse off in five years? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Egypt • Tunisia • Libya • Syria • Yemen 	2014	174	36	2.2
As a result of the Arab uprisings that began in Tunisia and Egypt, the situation in my country has gotten better/worse/no impact.	2014	172	37	2.3
How important are the following issues facing your country today? (2011) Of the following list of issues facing your country, which are the three most important issues that need to be addressed? (2018) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanding employment opportunities • Improving the education system • Protecting personal and civil rights • Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict • Ending corruption and nepotism • Lack of political debate on important issues • Combating extremism and terrorism • Advancing democracy • Improving the health care system • Political and governmental reform • Increasing rights for women 	2011 2018	27–28, 304–305	38	2.4, 2.5

<i>Question</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Page</i>	<i>Book Page</i>	<i>Book Figure</i>
Tunisia				
Do you feel that your country is on the right track or the wrong track?	2018	307	41	2.11
Overall, do you think you are better off or worse off than you were five years ago?	2018	307	42	2.12
How much confidence do you have in the performance of each of the following institutions operating in your country? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military • Police • Judiciary • Religious establishment • Media • Parliament 	2018	309–310	42	2.13
Of the following list of issues facing your country, which are the three most important issues that need to be addressed? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanding employment opportunities • Improving the educational system • Protecting personal and civil rights • Protecting the country from foreign enemies • Ending corruption and nepotism • Combating the threat posed by extremist groups and terrorism • Advancing democracy • Improving the health care system • Political and governmental reform • Increasing rights for women 	2018	304–305	42	
To what extent do you agree that your country is equipped to deal with the return of citizens who have been radicalized and fought and/or contributed to the wars in Iraq and Syria?	2018	335	43	2.14
Egypt				
Is Egypt better off or worse off as a result of the June 30th Tamarrud and July 3rd military action?	2013	132	46	
What is your level of confidence in the Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood)?	2013	130	46	
What is your level of confidence you have in each of the following institutions? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The army • The judiciary • Police 	2013	133	46	
Will Egypt be better off or worse off in five years?	2014	174	46	
Has the role of the Muslim Brotherhood been positive or negative in Egypt?	2014	175	46	
How much confidence do you have in the performance of the military operating in your country?	2018	309–310	46–47	
Of the following list of issues facing your country, which are the three most important issues that need to be addressed? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanding employment opportunities • Improving the educational system • Protecting personal and civil rights • Protecting the country from foreign enemies • Ending corruption and nepotism • Combating the threat posed by extremist groups and terrorism • Advancing democracy • Improving the health care system • Political and governmental reform • Increasing rights for women 	2018	304–305	47	
Syria				
Is it still possible to find a negotiated solution to the conflict in Syria which includes the participation of both the Assad government and the Syrian Opposition?	2014	178	49–50	
Which of the following would be the worst outcome in Syria?	2014	177	50	2.23

<i>Question</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Page</i>	<i>Book Page</i>	<i>Book Figure</i>
What impact has each of the following had on Syria? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turkey • Iran • Saudi Arabia • United States • Russia 	2014	178–179	51	2.24
With regard to the conflict in Syria, of the list below, which countries do you believe are playing a positive role? a negative role? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turkey • Iran • Saudi Arabia • United States • Russia 	2018	316–317	53	2.26
How hopeful are you that developments in Syria are moving toward an end of that conflict?	2018	318	54	2.27
Which of the following outcomes do you feel represents the best future for Syria?	2015 2018	208; 318–319	55	2.28
What is the impact of Syrian refugees coming into your country on your country's security? Economy?	2014 2017	180–181; 293	56	2.29

Yemen

Is Yemen better off or worse off than it was before the Arab Spring, or is it too early to tell?	2014	173	58	2.31
Will Yemen be better off or worse off in five years?	2014	174	58	2.32
How significant is the role played by ... in causing the conflict in Yemen? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the Houthis and former President Saleh to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hadi • the failure of the Hadi government to represent all segments of Yemeni society • tribal rivalries • Iranian involvement • GCC involvement 	2015	210–211	59	2.33
What is the best solution to the conflict in Yemen?	2015	212	60	2.34
Identify the two most important factors that, in your opinion, have contributed to destabilization and conflict in Yemen.	2016	252–253	60	
What is your most important concern when you think of the continuing conflict in Yemen?	2017 2018	281; 327	61	2.35
What is the best solution to end the conflict in Yemen?	2018	328	61	

ISRAEL-PALESTINE

As you recall your feelings in 1993 at the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords, how hopeful were you back then that there would be a resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict?	2013	154	74	3.1
In your opinion in evaluating the past two decades, should the Oslo Agreement be seen as a positive or negative development in the history of the Israeli/Palestinian relationship?	2013	161	74	3.2
How desirable/feasible is it to have a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?	2013	163	75	3.3
Looking back at the 20 years since the Oslo Accords were signed, did each of the following groups do everything required of them to make the Accords work, or could they have done more to make them work? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Israelis • Palestinians • United States 	2013	156	75	3.4
Given the following events that occurred during the past 20 years, how significant an impact has each of them had on your outlook toward the prospects for peace?	2013	157–159	76	3.5

<i>Question</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Page</i>	<i>Book Page</i>	<i>Book Figure</i>
Support/Oppose: Jerusalem will remain the undivided capital of Israel.	2012	115	77	3.6
Support/Oppose: All Palestinian refugees should be granted the full right to return to their original homes in Israel [pre-1948 Palestine]. All Palestinian refugees, including those who choose not to return, are entitled to compensation.	2012	116	77	3.7
On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the least important and 10 being the most important, how important are each of the following issues facing your country? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ending the occupation of Palestinian lands and resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict Resolving the conflict in Syria The danger posed by Iranian interference in the region 	2018	306	78	3.8
In 2002 the Arab League unanimously endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative in which they agreed to establish normalized ties with Israel if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories and resolve the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?	2015	213–214	80	3.9
How confident are you the Trump administration can make progress in their efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?	2017	285	81	3.11
It has been suggested that an alliance between Israel and Arab governments would be useful in fighting extremist groups and combating Iran's regional interference. Which of the following best describes your opinion?	2017 2018	286; 325	82	3.12
With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which of the following options would you be more inclined to support? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two-state solution One-state solution No settlement is possible 	2017 2018	285; 326	83	3.13

IRAN

Attitudes Toward Iran

For each of the following countries [Iran], please tell us if your attitudes are favorable or unfavorable.	2018	314–315	95	4.1; 4.2
Of the following two statements, please tell me which one you agree with the most. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran is pursuing its nuclear program for peaceful purposes only. Iran has ambitions to produce nuclear weapons. 	2014	186	96	4.3
How supportive are/were you of the nuclear agreement concluded between the P5+1 and Iran?	2015 2018	219; 329	97	4.4
How supportive are you of the Trump Administration's decision to pull out of the P5+1 agreement?	2018	329	98	4.5
Now that the United States has withdrawn from the agreement, what in your opinion should the remaining P4+1 countries do?	2018	330	99	4.6
If a new international agreement is to be negotiated with Iran, in addition to a verifiable end to Iran's nuclear program, how important is it that each of the following terms be included?	2018	331	100	4.7

Iranian Attitudes

Are you better off or worse off than you were five years ago?	2013 2014 2016 2018	141; 187; 262; 307	101	4.8
Do you feel that you will be better off or worse off in the next three years?	2013 2014 2015	141; 187; 231	101	4.9

<i>Question</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Page</i>	<i>Book Page</i>	<i>Book Figure</i>
How important are the following issues facing your country today? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expanding employment opportunities • Improving the education system • Protecting personal and civil rights • Resolving the Israeli Palestinian conflict • Ending corruption and nepotism • Lack of political debate on important issues • Combating extremism and terrorism • Advancing democracy • Improving the health care system • Political and governmental reform • Increasing rights for women 	2011 2013 2018	27–28; 141–142; 304–305	102	4.10
How do you rate your satisfaction with your government’s performance in each of the following areas?	2016 2017 2018	262; 290; 332	101	
How much confidence do you have in the performance of each of the following institutions operating in your country? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military • Police • Judiciary • Religious establishment • Media • Parliament 	2018	309–310	103	4.11
How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in each of the following countries? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Syria • Lebanon • Iraq • Yemen 	2014 2015 2016 2017 2018	188; 232–233; 264–265; 290; 333–334	103	4.12
How supportive are/were you of the nuclear agreement concluded between your country and the P5+1?	2015 2018	229; 329	104	4.13
Were Iran’s interests served by P5+1 agreement?	2015 2018	229; 332	104	4.14
What is your opinion on nuclear weapons? My country should have nuclear weapons because it is a major nation. As long as other countries have nuclear weapons, we need them also. Nuclear weapons are always wrong and so no country, including my own, should have them.	2013 2014 2015 2018	147; 189; 230–231; 333	105	4.15
Was it a good or bad idea for your government to have accepted limits on its nuclear program?	2015 2018	229; 332	105	

EXTREMISM

Should religious movements restrict themselves to personal faith and spiritual guidance, or should they play a direct role in political life and governance?	2017	294	115	5.1
Has the role of the Muslim Brotherhood been positive or negative in your country?	2014	175	115	5.2
When religious movements and their supporters have taken power, in general have they made their countries stronger or weaker?	2017	294	116	5.3
Does ISIS—now calling itself “Islamic State”—pose a threat to the region? to your country?	2014	182	118	5.5
On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “a serious problem” and 5 being “no problem at all”), how serious a problem is each of the following groups? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Daesh • Muslim Brotherhood • al Qaeda • militias and groups supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 	2015	221–222	118	

<i>Question</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Page</i>	<i>Book Page</i>	<i>Book Figure</i>
<p>On a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “a very important factor” and 5 being “not an important factor at all”), how important a role do each of the following play in driving religious extremism?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corrupt, repressive, and unrepresentative governments • Foreign occupations/interventions • Religious figures and groups promoting extremist ideas and/or incorrect religious interpretations • Foreign countries providing funding and training • Anger at the United States • The alienation and frustration of young people • Poverty/lack of opportunity • Lack of education 	2015	222–223	120	5.7
<p>Which, in your opinion, are the two most important factors that would cause a Muslim to join Daesh or Jabhat al Nusra in Syria?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outrage at the Assad regime • The suffering of fellow Muslims • These groups are attractive because of their fighting skills and the victories they have won • Being inspired by extremist preachers or websites to believe that the way of these groups is a true path for Muslims • Anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogates • Frustration with the life they are living in their own country and the desire for adventure 	2016	253–254	120	
<p>Which, in your opinion, are the two most important factors that would cause a Muslim to join Daesh in Iraq?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outrage at sectarian policies of the government in Baghdad • The suffering of fellow Muslims • The attraction of Daesh because of their fighting skills and the victories they have won • Being inspired by extremist preachers or websites to believe that the way of Daesh is a true path for Muslims • Anger at the sectarian policies pursued by Iran and its surrogates • Failure of other governments to be more responsive and effective in changing the policies of the government in Baghdad • Frustration with the life they are living in their own country and the desire for adventure 	2016	256–257	120	
<p>In order to stop the spread of extremism and the recruitment of young people from joining extremist groups, in your opinion, how important are each of the following?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of intelligence agencies and police to crack down on the groups and individuals spreading extremist ideas • Cracking down on or discouraging young people from joining religion-based political parties since they can be ‘gateways’ to extremist political ideas • Countering the messages and ideas promoted by extremist groups and individuals and re-educating youth who have been attracted to their ideas • Changing the political and social circumstances in different countries that lead some young people to become attracted to extremist ideas 	2016	259–260	121	5.8
<p>Do you think it is possible for radicalized individuals to be successfully de-radicalized?</p>	2018	335	122	5.9
<p>To what extent do you agree that your country is equipped to deal with the return of citizens who have been radicalized and fought and/or contributed to the wars in Iraq and Syria?</p>	2018	335	122	5.10

<i>Question</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Page</i>	<i>Book Page</i>	<i>Book Figure</i>
ARABS' VIEWS OF OTHER COUNTRIES				
Attitudes Toward the United States				
For each of the following countries [the United States], please tell us if your attitudes are favorable or unfavorable.	2018	314–315	132	6.1
Of the countries and entities listed below [the United States], which are playing a positive role in Syria/Iraq? Of the countries and entities listed below [the United States], which are playing a negative role in Syria/Iraq?	2018	316–317; 321–322	133	
Agree/Disagree: The United States contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	2014 2016	190–191; 243–244	133	6.2
How important is it for your country to have good relations with the United States?	2016 2017	244–245; 272–273	132–133	
Attitudes Toward Russia				
Agree/Disagree: Russia contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	2014 2016	190–191; 243–244	133	
How important is it for your country to have good relations with Russia?	2016 2017	244–245; 272–273	133	
For each of the following countries [Russia], please tell us if your attitudes are favorable or unfavorable.	2018	314–315	134	6.3
Of the countries and entities listed below [Russia], which are playing a positive role in Syria/Iraq? Of the countries and entities listed below [Russia], which are playing a negative role in Syria/Iraq?	2018	316–317; 321–322	134	
Attitudes Toward Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran				
For each of the following countries [Saudi Arabia], please tell us if your attitudes are favorable or unfavorable.	2018	314–315	135	6.4
For each of the following countries [Turkey], please tell us if your attitudes are favorable or unfavorable.	2016 2018	241; 314–315	135	6.5
For each of the following countries [Iran], please tell us if your attitudes are favorable or unfavorable.	2018	314–315	136	6.6
For each of the following countries [Saudi Arabia; Iran; Turkey], please tell us if your attitudes are favorable or unfavorable. [Responses by sect]	2018	315	138	6.8
Agree/Disagree: Saudi Arabia contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	2014 2016	190–191; 243–244	134	
Agree/Disagree: Turkey contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	2014 2016	190–191; 243–244	134	
Agree/Disagree: Iran contributes to peace and stability in the Arab World.	2014 2016	190–191; 243–244	134	
How important is it for your country to have good relations with [Saudi Arabia; Iran; Turkey]?	2016 2017	244–245; 272–273	136	
Of the countries and entities listed below [Saudi Arabia; Iran; Turkey], which are playing a positive role in Syria/Iraq? Of the countries and entities listed below [Saudi Arabia; Iran; Turkey], which are playing a negative role in Syria/Iraq?	2018	316–317; 321–322	136	
Attitudes Toward China and the EU				
For each of the following countries [China; the EU], please tell us if your attitudes are favorable or unfavorable.	2018	314–315	137	6.7

