Ancillary benefits of reduced air pollution in the US from moderate greenhouse gas mitigation policies in the electricity sector

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Abstract

Actions to slow atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases also would reduce conventional air pollutants yielding “ancillary” benefits that tend to accrue locally and in the near-term. Using a detailed electricity model linked to an integrated assessment framework to value changes in human health, we find a tax of $25 per metric ton of carbon emissions would yield NO\textsubscript{x}-related health benefits of about $8 per metric ton of carbon reduced in the year 2010 (1997 dollars). Additional savings of $4–$7 accrue from reduced investment in NO\textsubscript{x} and SO\textsubscript{2} abatement in order to comply with emission caps. Total ancillary benefits of a $25 carbon tax are $12–$14, which appear to justify the costs of a $25 tax, although marginal benefits are less than marginal costs. At a tax of $75, greater total benefits are achieved but the value per ton of carbon reductions remains roughly constant at about $12.

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1. Introduction

A number of actions to slow atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) accumulation from fossil fuel use would also tend to reduce various “criteria” air pollutants (as defined in the Clean Air Act). The benefits that result would be “ancillary” to GHG abatement. Moreover, these benefits would tend to accrue in the near-term as does the cost of abatement, while any benefits from reduced climate change mostly accrue over a time frame of several decades or longer. In addition, ancillary benefits accrue largely to those countries undertaking mitigation action, in contrast to the benefits of reduced climate change risks that accrue at a global level.

A failure to adequately consider ancillary benefits could lead to an incorrect assessment of the “net costs” of mitigation policies—that is, the direct cost of climate policy less ancillary benefits that accrue from those policies—and an incorrect identification of “no regrets” levels of GHG mitigation. It also could lead to the choice of a policy that was unnecessarily expensive because of its failure to fully exploit potential ancillary benefits.

This paper presents results from a model of the electricity sector called Haiku. The model calculates market equilibrium by season and time of day for three customer classes at the regional level, with power trading between regions. We simulate the effects of moderate carbon taxes on investment, retirement and system dispatch for the year 2010, and on changes in emissions of nitrogen oxides (NO\textsubscript{x}) that result from these carbon taxes. We model alternative baselines in the absence the GHG policy, all of which go beyond requirements of the 1990 Clean Air Act. In one case, full implementation of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act in the electricity sector is coupled with Phase II of NO\textsubscript{x} reductions in the northeastern 11 state Ozone Transport Commission region. In another case, further reductions in the baseline include application of NO\textsubscript{x} emission rates in an eastern 19 state region to comply with standards expected to take effect in 2004, affecting the so-called “SIP Call” region associated the requirement that states revise their State Implementation Plans. In a sensitivity analysis, we vary the representation of the regulatory structure in the electricity industry.

We find health-related ancillary benefits from further reductions in NO\textsubscript{x} emissions under a $25 carbon tax to be about $8 per metric ton of carbon reduced (1997 dollars). Aggregate reductions in sulfur dioxide (SO\textsubscript{2}) are not affected by the moderate carbon policies we model, but additional savings accrue from reduced investment in NO\textsubscript{x} and SO\textsubscript{2} abatement in order to comply with emission caps. These savings sum to $4–$7 per ton of carbon reduced. Total ancillary benefits of a $25 carbon tax are estimated to be $12–$14. These compare to expected average cost of carbon reductions of about $12 for a $25 tax. Hence ancillary benefits contribute significantly to a justification for the moderate carbon tax of this magnitude, though the marginal ancillary benefits are less than marginal costs of a $25 tax.

At a tax of $75 per ton carbon, greater health benefits and abatement cost savings are achieved but the value of ancillary benefits per ton of carbon reductions remains at about $12. These compare to expected average cost of carbon reductions of less than $37.5 for a $75 tax. In this case ancillary benefits are expected to be about one-third of the average cost per ton. These findings compare favorably with the most detailed models that have been used in the previous literature, reviewed in Section 5, after accounting for the omissions in those models that have been explicitly captured in this analysis.
Numerous uncertainties surround the estimates and the choice of assumptions in the parameterization of the models. Some of the previous literature has obtained relatively large estimates of ancillary benefits under assumptions that have been criticized. Therefore in this study we have tried to buttress the conclusions with assumptions that are well within the mainstream but may be likely to achieve smaller estimates than would defensible alternative assumptions. The main result survives this cautious approach. We find that ancillary benefits weigh importantly in the consideration of climate policy and provide near-term and local benefits that offset an important portion of the costs of the policies.

2. Background

Three types of methodological issues are important to the consideration of how GHG mitigation could yield ancillary benefits [1]. These include the characterization of changes in emissions, the characterization of health benefits, and the baseline against which these changes are measured.

2.1. Emissions

A review of recent comprehensive studies of electricity fuel cycles [2–4] finds that 82–93 percent of all quantifiable environmental and public health damages from electricity generation (e.g. excluding climate change and species biodiversity) stem from the air-health environmental pathway [5]. The dominant component of this is attributable to the changes in particulate concentrations.

Previous studies that address only the electricity sector identify potentially significant reductions in NO\textsubscript{x} that may result from policies aimed primarily at reducing CO\textsubscript{2} emissions. The studies vary in their predictions about reductions in SO\textsubscript{2} depending on their treatment of the emission cap under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, an important baseline issue we discuss below. Secondary pollutants (sulfates, nitrates and ozone) are treated in an inconsistent manner across previous studies, and often are not mentioned at all.

In this study we focus on the reduction in emissions of NO\textsubscript{x} that are ancillary to CO\textsubscript{2} emission reductions achieved in the electricity sector. We focus on the effect of NO\textsubscript{x} directly and through particulate (nitrate) formation (but excluding ozone formation) on health effects. These limitations mean our estimates are a lower bound of the estimates that would be achieved if a complete analysis was possible. However, we feel the focus on the electricity sector is not especially limiting. The sector is responsible for one-third of CO\textsubscript{2} emissions presently, and the EIA projects that this sector will be responsible for about three-quarters of CO\textsubscript{2} emission reductions in the US under a economy wide, cost-effective climate policy [6]. The electricity sector will be especially important as the least expensive and likely first source of reductions under moderate reduction scenarios.

2.2. Health effects

Many previous studies have attempted to calculate health benefits based on aggregated “unit values,” i.e., uniform estimates of benefits expressed as “dollars per ton of pollutant reduced,”
which do not incorporate information about geography and demography in valuing benefits. We use a damage function approach that involves an atmospheric transport model linking changes in emissions at a specific geographic location with changes in exposure at another location. Concentration-response functions are used to predict changes in mortality and morbidity. The model accounts for expected changes in population, and for expected changes in income that affect estimates of willingness to pay for improvements in health status.

Although the damage function approach is more complex, the results may be general. Krupnick and Burtraw [5] survey a set of damage function studies and largely reconcile the differences in quantified damages from conventional pollutants among based on measurable differences in technical parameters at the power plants and in the size of exposed populations, although atmospheric modeling remains an important source of unpredictable variation.

It also is important to account for changes in population, especially since population trends have greatly outstripped energy prices over the last century. Population growth will lead to greater exposure to a given level of pollution and, along with income growth, one can expect greater benefits from reducing that pollution [7]. Demographic considerations suggest the reported values for conventional pollutants in previous studies underestimate damage in future years. Although we solve only for the year 2010, the model does incorporate important demographic shifts among regions, and in the income and age of the population. Of course, greater demand for electricity also suggests that the opportunity cost of reducing carbon emissions will rise absent technological change.

2.3. The baseline

An analysis of benefits requires a clear definition of a baseline against which the prospective scenario can be measured. In a static analysis the baseline can be treated as the status quo, but since climate policy inherently is a longer-term effort, questions arise about projecting energy use, energy regulation, technology investments, and emissions of GHGs and criteria pollutants with and without the GHG policy [8].

One potentially important aspect of the baseline is the regulation of the electricity sector. In this analysis we adopt a cautious assumption regarding the future regulation of the industry by assuming that traditional average cost pricing continues in effect for most of the nation over the study period. Seven subregions of the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) located in the northeast (New England and New York State), the west (California and the mountain states) and Texas, are modeled to have marginal cost pricing. The year in which restructuring is assumed to occur is reported in Table 1. In sensitivity analysis we explore an alternative scenario and describe the effect of electricity restructuring and marginal cost pricing at the national level.

The baseline is confounded further because of ongoing changes in the standards for criteria air pollutants. If one ignores expected changes in the standards, one would fail to anticipate that there may be less NOx emitted per ton of CO2 than there is today and the ancillary benefit estimate

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1In real terms, energy prices have been about constant for the last century. The price of oil in the US has fluctuated between $15 and $20/bbl for about a 100 years, except for the period 1974–1985. The mean jumped slightly for the period after 1986 as compared to that before 1973.
will overstate environmental savings. Historical emission rates may be 10 times the rates that apply for new facilities. The recent tightening of standards for ozone and particulates and associated improvements in environmental performance over time imply that benefits from reductions in criteria air pollutants resulting from climate policies will be smaller in the future than in the present. The benefits of NO\textsubscript{x} reductions from current levels already would have been achieved, and the credit for the improvement could not be given to the climate policies. This underscores the general point that focusing on the ancillary benefits of climate policies is a partial view.

Furthermore, the nature of the ancillary benefits varies directly with the structure of the environmental policy [9]. For example, regulation that establishes uniform emission rates such as a performance standard for new or all sources would enable reductions in conventional pollutants at those sources as a facility is utilized less. On the other hand, a cap and trade program will prevent aggregate emissions from changing as long as the cap continues to bind under the carbon policy. A climate policy is likely to yield savings in avoided investments in abatement under each type of policy, though the magnitude of those savings will differ greatly. Hence, absent the promulgation of a specific policy or identification of a specific proposal for implementing future emission reductions, one cannot estimate the ancillary benefits of concomitant climate change policy. In this study we look as far as possible into the future with respect to regulation of conventional pollutants given how specific proposals regarding the shape of the regulation have taken shape.

It also is challenging to establish a baseline for technological change.\textsuperscript{2} The rapid introduction of new technologies such as fuel cells could change both the overall efficiency of energy use and the

\textsuperscript{2}For example, SO\textsubscript{2} emissions in 2020 that were forecast in 1990 varied by a factor of two on the basis of expectations of clean coal technology and plant life [10, p. 222].
fuel type, but the rate of penetration is difficult to anticipate. Since the end point of this study is 2010, the technology baseline uncertainties should be small.

In this paper, baseline controls include restrictions on NO\textsubscript{x} emissions beyond Phase II of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. These controls are modeled as cap and trade programs set to achieve an average emission rate of 0.15 lb per million Btu of heat input at all fossil-fired and wood-fired generation facilities. In one baseline, we model further reductions beyond Title IV in the Ozone Transport Region (OTR), which comprises 11 northeastern and mid-Atlantic states stretching from Maryland to Maine, plus the District of Columbia and the northern counties of Virginia, as indicated in Table 1. The OTR established NO\textsubscript{x} emission “budgets” for each state for the 5-month summer season, when ground-level ozone is commonly a problem, and enabled emissions trading among sources and states, beginning in summer 1999. The total NO\textsubscript{x} budget for the region is 219,000 tons per summer \cite{11}, a substantial reduction from the 490,000 tons of emissions in the region in the baseline year, 1990.

In a second baseline, indicated in the last column of Table 1, we model an expanded NO\textsubscript{x} cap and trade program encompassing 19 states and the District of Columbia, resembling the EPAs proposed regional program to achieve NO\textsubscript{x} emissions that initiated a redrafting of State Implementation Plans (SIPs) in the region. The EPA has promoted a trading program under an emission cap for the 5-month summer ozone season affecting primarily fossil and wood-fired electricity generators. At the national level, the program would lead to reductions of 22 percent from an annual baseline level of 5.4 million tons in 2007 to a new annual level of 4.25 million tons, according to EPA estimates. Summer-season emissions in 2007 would fall by 40 percent from 2.4 million tons to 1.45 million tons.\footnote{USEPA \cite{11}, Table 2; USEPA \cite{12}, Table 2-1.} In the affected region, the program is expected to reduce summer-season emissions by 62 percent, from 1.5 million tons to 0.56 million tons.\footnote{USEPA \cite{12}, Table 2-1. The reductions pertain to EPAs original program that targeted 22 states and the District of Columbia.}

Another important example of a regulatory baseline is the cap on SO\textsubscript{2} emissions from electricity generation in the US. A consequence of the current emissions cap is that aggregate SO\textsubscript{2} emissions from electric utilities (the major source category in the US) are not likely to change much as a result of moderate GHG emissions reductions such as those described in this paper. Only if climate policies are sufficiently stringent that utilities substitute significantly away from coal and the long-run annual level of SO\textsubscript{2} emissions is below the annual emissions cap, would further reductions in SO\textsubscript{2} be achieved.\footnote{Direct emissions of PM are likely to be affected to only a small degree because current control technology already removes over 98 percent of PM at the stack.}

Many previous studies use historical emission rates and do not incorporate the SO\textsubscript{2} emission cap, and therefore they do not recognize that aggregate SO\textsubscript{2} emissions will remain roughly constant. Hence they overstate the ancillary benefits that may be achieved, at least by moderate climate policies. By the same token, however, historically based carbon abatement cost estimates that do not incorporate the effects of the SO\textsubscript{2} cap overstate the opportunity cost of carbon reductions. For instance, the imposition of controls on a conventional pollutant such as SO\textsubscript{2} may reduce the cost advantage that coal has over gas for electricity generation. Layered on top of a
control on SO₂, the reduction of carbon emissions (achieved by substitution from coal to gas) would be less expensive than it would appear were the model to ignore the SO₂ controls.

Further, there is an ancillary economic saving associated with CO₂ reductions, even with a binding SO₂ emissions cap. Under the cap, a facility that reduces its SO₂ emissions makes emission allowances available for another facility, displacing the need for abatement investment at that facility. In this paper we find the SO₂ cap remains binding under the moderate policies we model, and hence we do not anticipate ancillary health-related benefits from changes in SO₂ emissions. However, we do anticipate reduced costs of compliance with the SO₂ cap to result as a consequence of climate policies.

We also model existing and anticipated new standards concerning NOₓ emissions from power plants that take the form of a cap and trade program analogous to the SO₂ program. In this framework, changes in NOₓ emissions in response to carbon policies are not expected in the region of the country covered by the NOₓ cap during the summer season, except for the subtle effects of changes in the location of emissions, which are captured in the model. However, potentially important ancillary economic savings can result from the avoided abatement investment for NOₓ controls, analogous to the avoided abatement investment for SO₂ controls under the SO₂ cap. In the event that the EPAs proposed cap is implemented but the trading program is not implemented, because the EPA lacks the authority to compel states to participate in trading, the level of emissions would be approximately the same as we model in our baselines but the cost of compliance with the NOₓ rules would be greater. Therefore, our estimate of the compliance cost savings resulting from a carbon tax would be likely to underestimate the savings in this case.

3. The models

This study employs an electricity market equilibrium model called Haiku to simulate electricity generation and consumption between 2000 and 2010. Changes in emissions that result from policy experiments are fed into an integrated assessment model of atmospheric transport and environmental effects called the Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF).

Haiku models market equilibrium in regional electricity markets and inter-regional electricity trade with a fully integrated algorithm for NOₓ emission control technology choice. Haiku is constructed with the Analytica modeling software. The model simulates electricity demand, electricity prices, the composition of electricity supply, inter-regional electricity trading activity among NERC regions, and emissions of key pollutants such as NOₓ, SO₂ and CO₂ from electricity generation. Investment in new generation capacity and retirement of existing facilities are determined endogenously in the model, based on capacity-related “going forward costs.” Generator dispatch in the model is based on minimization of short-run variable costs of generation.

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6Changes in the location of SO₂ emissions under the aggregate emissions cap are not reflected in the estimates. Burtraw and Mansur [13] examine the health effects of changes in the location of SO₂ emissions under the aggregate emission cap under the SO₂ emission trading program.
Haiku employs a convergence algorithm to search for equilibria in multiple linked markets. The Intra-regional Electricity Market Component solves for a market equilibrium identified by the intersection of electricity demand for three customer classes (residential, industrial and commercial) and supply curves for each of four time periods (super-peak, peak, shoulder and baseload hours) in each of three seasons (summer, winter and spring/fall) within each of 13 NERC subregions. The Inter-regional Power Trading Component solves for the level of inter-regional power trading necessary to equilibrate regional electricity prices (accounting for transmission costs and power losses). These inter-regional transactions are constrained by the assumed level of available inter-regional transmission capability as reported by NERC. Factor prices such as the cost of capital and labor are held constant. Fuel price forecasts are calibrated to match EIA price forecasts for 2000 [14]. The model includes fuel market modules for coal and natural gas that calculate prices that are responsive to factor demand. Coal is differentiated along several dimensions including fuel quality and location of supply, and both are differentiated with respect to point of delivery. All other fuel prices are specified exogenously, with most changing over time.

The model can be used to simulate changes in electricity markets stemming from public policy associated with increased competition or environmental regulation. Technical parameters are set to reflect midpoint assumptions by the EIA and other organizations regarding technological change, growth in transmission capacity, and a number of other factors. The economic and technical parameters in the model yield relatively modest forecasts regarding increases in renewable electricity technologies over this time frame. Most new investment in the baseline and in the policy cases we examine is in conventional technologies including integrated combined cycle natural gas units and gas turbines.

To estimate the potential for carbon emission reductions, we impose a tax on all emissions in the industry. This tax is collected through the price of electricity and affects dispatch and investment decisions. We explore three levels for the tax, all of which are far below the EIAs estimated tax of $348 per metric ton carbon required to achieve Kyoto budgets in 2010 in the absence of international trading. In the experiments the tax is set at $0, $25 and $75 per metric ton of carbon. All values are reported in real (inflation adjusted) 1997 dollars. There are minor reductions in carbon emissions that are achieved through fuel switching from coal to natural gas. In practice, there is a parasitic loss from running post-combustion controls at the power plant that may amount to 2 percent of power at the plant, and thereby lead to increased carbon emissions, but this is not represented in the model. There are slight reductions in carbon achieved in switching from less efficient to more efficient coal-fired generation, and due to reductions in consumption, that are represented.

The changes in emissions of NO\textsubscript{x} are fed into the Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF). TAF is a nonproprietary and peer-reviewed integrated assessment model constructed with the Analytica modeling software [15]. TAF integrates pollutant transport and deposition (including

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7In this analysis we do not allow for cofiring of biomass with coal as a means of carbon reduction.
8TAF was developed in support of the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP). Each module of TAF was constructed and refined by a group of experts in that field, and draws primarily on peer reviewed literature to construct the integrated model. TAF is the work of a team of over 30 modelers and scientists from institutions around the country. As the framework integrating these literatures, TAF itself was subject to an extensive peer review in December 1995, which concluded that “TAF represent(s) a major advancement in our ability to perform integrated assessments” and that the model was ready for use by NAPAP [16]. The entire model is available at www.lumina.com/taflist.
formation of secondary particulates but excluding ozone), visibility effects, effects on recreational lake fishing through changes in soil and aquatic chemistry, human health effects, and valuation of benefits. All effects are evaluated at the state level and changes outside the US are not evaluated. We report only health-related impacts, which are the lion’s share of impacts according to previous papers [5,13].

Health effects are characterized as changes in health status predicted to result from changes in air pollution concentrations. Effects are expressed as the number of days of acute morbidity effects of various types, the number of chronic disease cases and of statistical lives lost to premature death. The health module is based on concentration–response (C–R) functions found in the peer-reviewed literature. The C–R functions are taken, for the most part, from epidemiological articles reviewed in EPA’s Criteria Documents that, in turn appear in key EPA cost–benefit analyses, such as the EPA Section 812 prospective and retrospective studies [10,13]. The health effects module contains C-R functions for particulate matter smaller than 10 μm in diameter (PM10), total suspended particulates (TSP), sulfur dioxide (SO2), sulfates (SO4), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and nitrates (NO3).

Our analysis here focuses on health effects related to NOx. Source–receptor coefficient matrices in TAF are drawn from a reduced-form version of the Advanced Source Trajectory Regional Air Pollution model, which uses 11 years of wind and precipitation data to estimate the variability of model results on the basis of climatological variability. The model converts convert NOx emissions in source areas to nitrate concentrations in receptor areas. Mortality reductions are estimated using the PM10 mortality concentration–response function from the daily time series study by Schwartz and Dockery [17]. This function links PM10 concentrations to mortality risks. While a number of studies (e.g., [18,19]) have documented the effects of PM10, PM2.5 and sulfates, a constituent of PM2.5, on mortality, none have documented an effect of nitrates specifically. We assume that nitrates have the potency of the average PM10 particle. This assumption is conservative on two fronts. First, the long-term studies (e.g., [18]) show higher relative risks from particulates than the daily time series studies and, second, nitrates could have been assumed to be of equal potency to PM2.5, which is greater than that for PM10. Relaxing either assumption could significantly increase benefits of NOx control, even to the vicinity of the marginal cost of a $25 carbon tax. As noted, we do not find changes in aggregate SO2 emissions (or sulfates) due to the cap, and we assume that geographic changes in SO2 emissions are negligible.

For morbidity, changes in NO2 and NO3 are modeled according to a scheme designed to avoid double counting of effects such as symptom days and restricted activity days, using a variety of studies from the literature. NOx is included for respiratory symptom days, eye irritation days, and phlegm days. There is little if any evidence of a threshold in the concentration–response functions for any of the pollutants treated in this study so improvement in health status is assumed to result from reductions at any level of concentration. The change in the annual number of impacts of each health endpoint is the output that is valued.
The health valuation submodule of TAF assigns monetary values taken from the environmental economics literature to the health effects estimates produced by the health effects module. The benefits are totaled to obtain annual health benefits for each year modeled. The numbers used to value these effects are similar to those used in recent regulatory impact analysis by USEPA [12] and the EPA Retrospective and Prospective studies [11,20]. However, compared with EPAs preferred estimate ($5.9 million in 1997 dollars), the value of a statistical life (VSL) in our model is adjusted downward ($3.8 mil in 1997$). The EPA choice is based on a curve-fitting analysis of 26 mostly labor market studies. The lower estimate that we use is more consistent with the VSL ($3.35 million in 1997 dollars) used by the Canadian government [21]. In contrast, a new analysis by Mrozek and Taylor [22] has performed a more sophisticated meta-analysis of 38 studies contributing 203 VSL estimates. They find that EPAs best estimate is three times too large (i.e., the best estimate of Mrozek and Taylor is $2 million), owing to a number of factors. The most important is a false attribution of wage rate differentials to mortality rate differences, when in fact, much of this variation is due to inter-industry differences in wage rates that occur for other reasons.

It has become increasingly recognized that the labor market approach relies on preferences of prime-age, healthy working males facing immediate and accidental risks of workplace mortality. In contrast, particulate pollution primarily affects seniors and people with impaired health status and may occur years after initial exposure. This recognition has led to attempts to estimate VSL through stated preference approaches in contexts more appropriate to that of mortality risks from particulate exposure. First results [23,24] show lower estimates of the VSL than being used by EPA, although the reasons for this may have more to do with futurity of the effect and better understanding of probability than health and age differences. Also, effects of dread and lack of controllability have not yet been factored into these new analyses. The sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the assumed VSL and other assumptions are explored in Section 6.

4. Results

The first scenario reported in Table 2 is identified as OTC Baseline indicating that in this baseline a NO\textsubscript{X} cap and trade program is in place in the northeast Ozone Transport Commission region. We find that a carbon tax of $25 per metric ton of carbon would yield ancillary benefits from reductions in NO\textsubscript{X} of approximately $8 for each ton of carbon reduced in the year 2010 (1997 dollars). The primary category of these benefits is mortality, though morbidity benefits are also significant. In the OTC Baseline case, the ancillary benefits for a $75 tax increase in the aggregate, and when measured per ton of carbon basis they increase to nearly $10.

The quantity of carbon emission reductions that are achieved by a $75 tax is less than proportional to that achieved by a $25 tax, which illustrates that the marginal abatement cost curve for carbon reductions is convex over this range. In the reference case, we find that the cost of new scrubbed coal and of new combined cycle natural gas generation are about equal, with a slight advantage to gas in most parts of the nation. The $25 tax serves to make new combined cycle natural gas plants more competitive with both new and existing coal plants. A $75 tax improves the situation for natural gas combined cycle plants further, making their operating costs less expensive than existing coal in almost the entire nation. However, the cost of capital
additions, and constraints on how quickly investment and retirement can occur, constrain the role of combined cycle facilities. The carbon tax also improves the situation for gas turbines. The national average delivered cost of natural gas in the OTC Baseline rose by about 9 percent from $3.25/mmBtu under the baseline to $3.55 under the $75 tax. The national average delivered price of coal fell by almost the same percentage from $0.96/mmBtu to $0.88 over this range of policies. In the scenarios with NO\textsubscript{x} controls in the SIP region, gas prices start out slightly higher and coal prices slightly lower than in the OTC Baseline, and the relative changes from the baselines are slightly less than in the OTC case. When the SIP region NO\textsubscript{x} controls are overlain with marginal cost pricing, the baseline fuel prices and the change from baseline under the carbon taxes are very similar to the OTC scenarios.

In the OTC Baseline scenario with a zero carbon tax, the OTC region has about 15 percent of national generation in 2010 while the larger SIP Call region includes over 55 percent of national generation. In addition, the OTC region has less than 7 percent of national NO\textsubscript{x} emissions while the larger SIP region has nearly 65 percent. In the second baseline, we model the NO\textsubscript{x} cap and trade program in effect within the larger SIP region. In this baseline, NO\textsubscript{x} emissions are reduced by over 16 percent at the national level and by 32 percent within the SIP region, compared to the OTC Baseline. The extension of NO\textsubscript{x} controls to the SIP region could dramatically reduce the opportunity for ancillary benefits, especially since the form of regulation in the baseline is an emission cap, which implies that aggregate NO\textsubscript{x} emissions are likely to remain unchanged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of carbon tax ($/metric ton)</th>
<th>OTC Baseline</th>
<th>SIP Call Baseline</th>
<th>SIP Call—MC Pricing Baseline</th>
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<tr>
<td>Carbon (million metric tons)</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>687</td>
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<td>NO\textsubscript{x} (thousand short tons)</td>
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<td>4543</td>
<td>4785</td>
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<td>Emission reductions under carbon policies</td>
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<td>NO\textsubscript{x} (thousand short tons)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NO\textsubscript{x}-related health benefits per ton carbon (dollars)</td>
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Table 2
Ancillary health benefits from reductions in NO\textsubscript{x} emissions resulting for various carbon taxes in the electricity sector in 2010 using Haiku/TAF (1997 $)
However, since the NO$_x$ cap applies only during the five summer months, there remains an opportunity for reductions in the spring, fall and winter that would have health effects.

Table 2 reports that, measured against a SIP Baseline, a carbon tax of $25 per metric ton of carbon would yield ancillary health-related benefits from reductions in NO$_x$ of almost $8 for each ton of carbon reduced in the year 2010 (1997 dollars). In the SIP Baseline case, the ancillary health benefits for a $75 tax are significantly greater in the aggregate, but they are nearly equivalent to those under the $25 tax when measured per ton of carbon reduction.

The third scenario reported in Table 2, labeled SIP Call with Marginal Cost Pricing, represents the possibility that restructuring of the electricity industry is implemented nationwide. We place somewhat less stock in this scenario because it is more speculative than the characterization of changes in NO$_x$ policies that distinguish the first two scenarios. Consequently, we consider it a sensitivity analysis, in contrast to the first two scenarios that represent our preferred assumptions.

In the sensitivity analysis—SIP Call with Marginal Cost Pricing—we find ancillary health benefits of a $25 carbon tax are $8 per ton carbon reduced, about midpoint between the first two scenarios. However, for a $75 carbon tax the ancillary health benefits rise up to nearly $13 per ton carbon reduced, the highest value we observe in the cases we examine.

The benefit estimates in Table 2 indicate that benefits are not strictly linear with respect to NO$_x$ reductions. This reflects the geographic differences in the national electricity industry, the geographically specific sources of emissions, atmospheric transport of pollutants and the different population densities exposed to those pollutant concentrations in the air.

We can examine how much of the increase in NO$_x$ benefits is related to locational differences in generation by comparing the benefits per ton of NO$_x$ reduction. The following numbers are derived from Table 2. The benefits from a reduction in NO$_x$ emissions vary from $793 per ton of NO$_x$ under a $25 tax in the SIP Baseline to $800 per ton at a $25 tax in the OTC Baseline. A $75 tax produces a similar pattern ranging from $798 to $822 in benefits per ton of NO$_x$ reduced, with a greater measure in the case of the OTC Baseline scenario. In the sensitivity analysis labeled SIP Call with MC Pricing, the value per ton of NO$_x$ reduced ranges up to $881. When viewed on a per ton basis in this way, the differences among the benefit per ton estimates are entirely due to differences in the location where emission reductions occur. In essence, lower values result when the additional sources reacting to the higher carbon tax are located in areas where the conversion of NO$_x$ to nitrates is less efficient, or where fewer people are being exposed to the nitrate concentrations, or both. Taken together, the nonlinearity in emission reductions and in the benefits of those reductions provides an indication of the importance of using a regionally disaggregated model to investigate this issue, unlike some of the previous studies that are discussed below.

The electricity generation in each baseline and the change from the relevant baseline under each carbon policy is reported in Table 3. In the OTC Baseline scenario, coal generation represents about 45 percent of total generation, and gas generation represents just over one-quarter in 2010. Under a $25 carbon tax, coal generation falls by over 11 percent and gas increases by about 10 percent relative to their levels in the baseline. Total generation falls by about 2.5 percent in response to the increase in price, which increases by almost 5 percent on a national average basis. Nonhydroelectric renewables also decrease by a small amount in absolute terms, but by almost a quarter relative to the level in the baseline. This decrease may appear counter-intuitive, because the price of renewables does not increase under a carbon tax. However, the result is consistent in
Haiku and some other models absent a policy that specifically promotes renewables. The reason is that the dispatch of technologies is scheduled according to short-run variable cost. When new gas units are built in response to a policy, they have relatively low variable cost and very high potential utilization rates. Their relatively low cost allows them to crowd out some opportunity for renewable generation. The prospect for gas-fired generation is linked to the price path of natural gas, which has been volatile in recent years and is uncertain in the long run, but is expected to be relatively favorable toward the addition new gas-fired capacity over the next decade.

When expanding the carbon policy to a $75 tax, the decrease in coal generation is nearly proportional to the $25 case. Again, this decrease is made up primarily by an increase in gas-fired generation and also, to a lesser extent, by further decreases in generation in total. Under the $75 tax, total generation falls by over 4 percent from the baseline, in response to an average electricity price increase of over 19 percent.

The change in generation under a SIP Baseline is similar to the OTC Baseline scenario. Perhaps the biggest difference between these scenarios is evident in the initial baselines, in the absence of a carbon tax. In the OTC Baseline total generation is greater, coal generation is greater and electricity price is lower than in the SIP Baseline because the SIP Call NO\textsubscript{x} program initiates a switch from coal to gas within the region. Consequently, as indicated in Table 2, NO\textsubscript{x} emissions are substantially less under the SIP Baseline. Also, carbon emissions are lowest in the SIP Call Baseline both inside and outside the SIP Call region.

The sensitivity analysis with marginal cost pricing also indicates the greatest difference in generation among the scenarios in the absence of a carbon tax. The introduction of marginal cost pricing leads to a significant decrease in new capacity and a greater reliance on existing capacity, including use of existing coal facilities. However, under marginal cost pricing, the choice of generation is more responsive to the carbon tax. The difference between the marginal cost pricing sensitivity case and the other scenarios is largely erased with a $25 carbon tax and it is reversed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline/Policy Scenario</th>
<th>Generation (million MWh)</th>
<th>Price (1997$/MWh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTC Baseline</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>1174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25 Carbon Tax</td>
<td>-213</td>
<td>+122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75 Carbon Tax</td>
<td>-536</td>
<td>+379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIP Call Baseline</td>
<td>1809</td>
<td>1182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25 Carbon Tax</td>
<td>-203</td>
<td>+159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75 Carbon Tax</td>
<td>-589</td>
<td>+408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIP Call Baseline with MC Pricing</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25 Carbon Tax</td>
<td>-184</td>
<td>+126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75 Carbon Tax</td>
<td>-681</td>
<td>+507</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3
National generation by fuel and electricity price in baseline, and change from baseline, under alternative scenarios, for 2010
with a $75 carbon tax. In the absence of a carbon tax, the marginal cost pricing scenario has the
most coal and the least gas generation of the scenarios we modeled. However, under the $75
carbon tax this is reversed; the marginal cost pricing scenario has the least coal and the most gas
generation. The reversal is evident as well in the reduction in NO\textsubscript{x} emissions and the calculation of
ancillary benefits per ton of carbon reduction reported in Table 2.

Heretofore we have focused only on emission changes and their health effects. We noted the
emission changes under an emission cap are zero as long as the cap is binding; however, the cost of
achieving the cap on a conventional pollutant is affected by the carbon policy. There exist
potential ancillary cost savings from the regulation of NO\textsubscript{x} and SO\textsubscript{2} emissions under their
respective caps.

To estimate the cost savings from avoided abatement of NO\textsubscript{x} we rely on a direct estimate of
compliance cost associated with post-combustion controls that are obtained in the model. The
compliance cost estimates include annual capital and operating costs. These estimates are divided
by the projected carbon emission reductions reported in Table 3 to obtain an estimate of NO\textsubscript{x}-
related compliance cost savings per ton of carbon reduced. Table 4 indicates that these estimates
range from around $1–$2 per ton carbon, in the OTC Baseline scenario where NO\textsubscript{x} regulation is
the least stringent, to around $3 in the SIP Call Baseline scenarios. In the sensitivity analysis that
simulates marginal cost pricing, the compliance cost savings reach as high as $6 per ton carbon
reduced.

We cannot rely on investments in post-combustion controls for SO\textsubscript{2} abatement because no
additional investments of this nature are expected in the baseline, so none could be avoided under
a carbon tax. Marginal compliance in the baseline is expected to occur through substitution
among types of coal that vary by sulfur content. Fuel cost savings associated with avoiding the
expense of using low-sulfur coal is commingled with the additional cost of switching from coal to
gas to comply with the carbon tax. Consequently, to evaluate the cost savings associated with SO\textsubscript{2}
abatement we calculate the reduction in SO\textsubscript{2} emissions from each baseline that would result from
reduced coal-fired generation under each carbon tax, where the average SO\textsubscript{2} emission rate to
remain unchanged. The allowance price in any year represents the present discounted value of
marginal compliance costs in 2010 [25]. The implied reduction in demand for SO\textsubscript{2} emission
allowances is valued at the average allowance price in 2000, which is equal to $138 in 1997 dollars.
This approach is used to estimate compliance cost savings in 2010 under a $25 tax for each
scenario as reported in Table 4.

Using the average allowance price as a proxy for the savings from avoided SO\textsubscript{2} abatement may
yield an estimate that is too great in the case of a $75 carbon tax because the greater the reduction
in demand for SO\textsubscript{2} allowances, the lower will be the allowance price. Under a large carbon tax the
scarcity value of SO\textsubscript{2} allowances may trend toward zero. However, as long as the SO\textsubscript{2} cap is
binding the allowance price has a floor at about $70 per ton of SO\textsubscript{2}, which is roughly the operating
cost of installed post-combustion control (flue gas desulfurization) for SO\textsubscript{2} removal. Therefore,
for the $75 carbon tax we base our calculations on $70 as the value of an SO\textsubscript{2} allowance.

The estimated compliance cost savings for SO\textsubscript{2} are divided by the carbon reduction under each
policy to obtain an estimate of the ancillary compliance cost savings per ton carbon reduced. We
have relatively more confidence in the OTC Baseline scenario estimates, because current
allowance prices reflect this baseline, though to some degree current allowance prices may reflect
the expectation of a SIP Call NO\textsubscript{x} policy. The difference across scenarios is not great in any case
and is centered at about $3 per ton of carbon reduction for a $25 carbon tax, and about $1.5 per ton of carbon for a $75 carbon tax.

The last row of Table 4 provides the sum of compliance cost savings for NO$_x$ and SO$_2$ control. This information is reproduced in Table 5, along with the estimate of health-related ancillary benefits reported in Table 2. In every case health benefits are greater than compliance cost savings, but the latter matter importantly to the total measure of ancillary benefits reported in the bottom row of the table. These benefits range from $12 to $14 per ton of carbon for our preferred scenarios, and increase to $20 in the sensitivity analysis with marginal cost pricing.

5. Previous estimates

Most previous efforts have relied on average estimates of the benefits of reduced emissions without consideration of atmospheric transport of emissions or representation of the exposed population. Table 6 compares our results with those of previous studies.\(^{13}\) In every case there is a

\(^{13}\)These are described in greater detail in Burtraw and Toman [26]. Cifuentes et al. [27] provide additional comparison and analysis of these studies.
One pattern that emerges from the array of estimates in the table and others we discuss is that greater level of detail in the modeling and in the characterization of the baseline has led to lower (and to many eyes more credible) estimates of ancillary benefits from reduced air pollution. However, there also emerges a category of savings associated with avoided investments in abatement of conventional pollutants that contributes importantly to total benefits.

Three previous modeling efforts, McCubbin et al. [28], Holmes et al. [29] and Dowlatabadi et al. [30], are based on frameworks that include considerable detail about the electricity industry. McCubbin et al. [28] is the most comparable to our study, with a regional focus on changes in energy consumption and changes in emissions, and these are mapped into changes in concentrations of particulates, and mapped into changes in health status and valued in monetary terms. The authors paid careful attention to revisions in the US air quality standards in constructing their baselines. The study accounted for reductions in compliance costs for achieving ambient air quality standards in regions of the country that are in attainment of air quality standards, as well as improvements in air quality and health status in regions that are in nonattainment. Unfortunately, total carbon reductions that are achieved are not reported. The range of estimates for ancillary benefits per ton include high-end estimates that result when the carbon policy causes SO$_2$ reductions to fall below the cap established in the 1990 Clean Air Act. In our model, a comparable carbon policy does not cause SO$_2$ emissions to fall by this much for a moderate tax. Holmes et al. [29] and Dowlatabadi et al. [30] report only emissions changes, which are linked to PREMIERE, a model that employs a reduced-form atmospheric transport model linked to monetary valuation of health impacts at a NERC region level. The results of these combined analyses are reported in the table.15

The next two studies include an estimate using a model developed for New York State called EXMOD [3] and an analysis of the effects of a one percent reduction in utilization of coal-fired electricity generation using the PREMIERE [31] model. Both look at uniform decreases in coal utilization without accounting for how the shortfall in supply is replaced. Hence, both estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of carbon tax ($/metric ton)</th>
<th>OTC Baseline</th>
<th>SIP Call Baseline</th>
<th>SIP Call—MC Pricing Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health benefits</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of compliance</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

Sum of ancillary benefits by scenario for 2010 (1997 $)

14PREMIERE is a derivative of the TAF model, described previously. See Palmer and Burtraw [31].
15We ignore the Dowlatabadi et al. [30] estimates for SO$_2$ because they do not model the allowance trading program.
## Table 6
Estimates of air pollution reduction benefits in the US from greenhouse gas limitations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Model type</th>
<th>Baseline assumptions</th>
<th>Targeted sectors, pollutants and policy</th>
<th>Average ancillary benefit per ton carbon reduction (1997 dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiku/TAF</td>
<td>Regional electricity sector; atmospheric transport and valuation</td>
<td>Beyond 1990 CAAA</td>
<td>Moderate electricity sector carbon tax in 2010 with population adjustment; NO\textsubscript{x} health benefit valuation. No ozone or visibility benefits. Includes compliance cost savings for NO\textsubscript{x} and SO\textsubscript{2}</td>
<td>$7–$10 (health) $2–$7 (compliance cost) $12–$14 (total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Previous studies of electricity sector with regional detail</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCubbin et al. (Abt/Pechan)</td>
<td>Regional multi-sector model, atmospheric transport and valuation</td>
<td>Beyond 1990 CAAA</td>
<td>Carbon taxes of $30 and $68; modeled changes in particulates (no ozone) and health, visibility and materials. Only health monetized. Includes avoided abatement costs for NO\textsubscript{x} and SO\textsubscript{2}. High tax leads to net SO\textsubscript{2} reductions</td>
<td>$8–$69*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmes et al. (DEGREES)/PREMIERE</td>
<td>Regional electricity sector; atmospheric transport and valuation</td>
<td>1990 CAAA</td>
<td>Nationwide Motor Challenge voluntary program (industry), analyzed at regional level; health effects from NO\textsubscript{x} changes valued using PREMIERE, including secondary nitrates, excluding ozone effects</td>
<td>$3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowlatabadi et al./PREMIERE</td>
<td>Regional electricity sector; atmospheric transport and valuation</td>
<td>1990 CAAA not modeled</td>
<td>Nationwide seasonal gas burn in place of coal, analyzed at regional level; health effects from NO\textsubscript{x} changes valued using PREMIERE, including secondary nitrates, excluding ozone effects</td>
<td>$3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXMOD (Rowe et al. [3])</td>
<td>NY State electricity sector; atmospheric transport and valuation</td>
<td>1990 CAAA</td>
<td>Reduced utilization of existing (1992) coal steam plant at suburban location in NY; only PM, NO\textsubscript{x} and SO\textsubscript{2} (under emission cap) changes valued, secondary particulates and ozone effects; health, visibility and other effects included</td>
<td>$24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
are greater than the two preceding studies because they do not account for the bounceback effect that may result from increased utilization of another technology such as natural gas.

The sensitivity of conclusions to the health effects and valuation of damages is illustrated by comparing the EXMOD and Coal/PREMIERE estimates to the seventh estimate in Table 6, Coal/PREMIERE/RIA, which uses assumptions drawn from the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for new particulate and ozone standards [12]. On net the EPA’s approach yields an estimate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Model type</th>
<th>Baseline assumptions</th>
<th>Targeted sectors, pollutants and policy</th>
<th>Average ancillary benefit per ton carbon reduction (1997 dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal/PREMIERE (Palmer and Burtraw [30])</td>
<td>Regional electricity sector, atmospheric transport and valuation</td>
<td>1990 CAAA</td>
<td>Equal percentage reduction in utilization of existing (1994) coal plants analyzed at state level; only health effects from NOx changes valued using PREMIERE, including secondary particulates and excluding ozone</td>
<td>$5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal/PREMIERE/RIA (USEPA [12])</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>1990 CAAA</td>
<td>Same, except only NOx-related mortality changes valued using PREMIERE, and using 1997 EPA RIA estimates of impacts and valuations</td>
<td>$24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viscusi et al.</td>
<td>Valuation only, average for nation</td>
<td>1990 CAAA</td>
<td>Equal percentage reduction in utilization of existing (1980 average) coal steam plants; human health and visibility effects from reduced total emissions of all criteria pollutants</td>
<td>$90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General equilibrium studies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goulder/Scheraga and Leary</td>
<td>Dynamic general equilibrium; unit valuation</td>
<td>1990 CAAA</td>
<td>Economy-wide carbon tax with stabilization at 1990 levels in 2000; human health effects from all criteria pollutants, no secondary particulates or ozone</td>
<td>$34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyd et al.</td>
<td>Static general equilibrium; unit valuation</td>
<td>1990 CAAA</td>
<td>Economy-wide carbon tax; human health and visibility effects calculated from reduced total emissions of all criteria pollutants</td>
<td>$41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of mortality impacts from NO\textsubscript{x} changes (excluding ozone impacts) of three times that from PREMIERE.\textsuperscript{16}

Lutter and Shogren \cite{9} provide estimates specific to California that we do not include in the table because the modeling is less detailed. A significant portion of benefits is due to savings in complying with strict new ambient standards for particulates specified in the EPAs 1997 air quality standards, with health benefits based on Pope et al. \cite{19}. Total ancillary benefits of $320 per ton are estimated.

The last three results show how measuring benefits of emissions reduction using broad unit valuations appears to lead to higher values of ancillary benefits than found with a more detailed model that allows for greater opportunity for substitution of fuels and changes in demand behavior. Viscusi et al. \cite{33} applied an equal percentage reduction of coal steam plants at the national level with vintage 1980 without accounting for changes in other types of generation and without regional variation.

Two previous studies employed general equilibrium analyses of economic activity and associated emission rates, coupled with estimates of monetary values of avoided health damages from reduced emissions of criteria pollutants, a process we referred to as unit valuation, to estimate the ancillary benefits of different carbon policies. Goulder \cite{34} exercises a dynamic and detailed model, although the reported estimate do not account for the cap on SO\textsubscript{2} emissions. Scheraga and Leary \cite{35} extend the Goulder model and provide the estimates that indicate that about one quarter of the cost of the policy aimed at returning to 1990 level emissions is offset by the value of criteria air pollutant reductions.\textsuperscript{17} Boyd et al. \cite{37} use a simpler general equilibrium model, with land treated as a separate factor of production, to consider an ad valorem tax on fuels. Environmental benefit estimates that reflect a reduction in secondary pollutants absent geographic resolution are drawn directly from Viscusi et al. \cite{33}. The authors report the optimal ad valorem tax on coal is about 45 percent, which is comparable to a $9/ton carbon charge (1997 dollars).\textsuperscript{18}

Not reported in the table, Ekins \cite{38} reviews the European literature and suggests a benchmark of $278 in ancillary benefits per ton carbon reduction (1997 dollars), about half of which is from reduced sulfur emissions, and does not reflect the 1994 European Second Sulfur Protocol. Taking this and other issues into account adjusts the estimate to $192. This relatively high value reflect the aggregate level of modeling in these studies, assumptions about health epidemiology, greater

\textsuperscript{16}The RIA places greater weight on one epidemiological study, Pope et al. \cite{19}, leading to greater estimates of long-term mortality from changes in particulate concentrations than does PREMIERE, which treats this as a high estimates in a distribution of possible estimates. Finally, the valuation of mortality effects in the RIA is about 1.5 times that in PREMIERE. One can also ask how the use of a reduced-form version of the Advanced Statistical Trajectory Regional Air Pollution for modeling atmospheric transport in PREMIERE compares with the use of Regional Acid Deposition Model (RADM), which is the model used in the Draft RIA. Burtraw et al. \cite{32} compared the two directly and find RADM yields valuation numbers about 50 percent less than ASTRAP when considering sulfates, but no comparison of nitrates was made.

\textsuperscript{17}Jorgenson et al. \cite{36} provides another dynamic general equilibrium model that includes adjustments for projected technical change on an industry basis. The Jorgenson et al. estimate is expressed as a percentage of carbon tax revenue, and GHG reductions are not reported, so it is not shown in Table 6.

\textsuperscript{18}We have difficulty replicating their calculations regarding the carbon charges.
population density in Europe, and the ecological effects resulting from on-shore atmospheric transport of sulfur, in contrast to off-shore transport in the eastern US.

6. Uncertainty

A central purpose of this analysis is to show that a detailed characterization of many of the assumptions embodied in the previous literature leads to a revision in estimates. The estimates that we obtain are in many cases smaller, but we feel they inspire a greater level of confidence in the main finding that ancillary benefits should weigh importantly in the consideration of climate policy.

Nonetheless, there are numerous uncertainties that surround the calculation of ancillary benefits. The nature of uncertainty in this analysis might be categorized as two types: model uncertainty and parameter uncertainty. Section 5 highlights model uncertainty and also identifies a number of uncertain parameters. In this analysis we identify six questions that appear most important to the main finding.

One of these is the characterization of market structure in the electricity industry. This is fundamentally an uncertainty about the model because significantly different institutions are relevant to simulating behavior in the electricity sector under different scenarios. Our preferred case is one that limits restructuring to certain regions, but we examine the alternative of nationwide restructuring. Under restructuring, the movement to marginal cost pricing at the wholesale or retail level is expected to lead to a reduction in the cost of generation and the price faced by consumers. This should lead to an increase in electricity generation, much of which is expected to come from existing coal-fired power plants. It will lead to higher emissions of carbon and NO\(_x\) in the baseline, even when combined with a NO\(_x\) policy in the SIP Call region, and it leads to greater quantities of emission reductions of both pollutants in general as a result of a carbon policy. The value of ancillary benefits per ton of carbon reduction is the greatest under this market structure among those we considered.

A related source of uncertainty about parameters is the assumption about future fuel prices. In the months since publication of the estimates that we use in this analysis, natural gas prices have risen and then fallen precipitously. Most analyses view these changes as short-run variability in price and they continue to adhere to long-run forecasts similar to those we use. However, if natural gas supplies become limited, either due to natural availability or regulatory decisions, then we would expect to see more coal-fired generation in both the baseline and in the policy cases we model. The result would be somewhat closer to the scenario involving the effects of marginal cost pricing in the electricity sector.

A third issue is the form of the institution for environmental regulations in the future. We assume the cap on SO\(_2\) emissions precludes changes in emissions from modest carbon mitigation policies, but that NO\(_x\) is not capped on a national or annual basis. If future reauthorization of the Clean Air Act was to retain a strong flavor of performance standards, which many advocate, then emissions of NO\(_x\) would vary with carbon policies. If both pollutants are capped in the aggregate, as proposed in President Bush’s Clear Skies Initiative, then ancillary benefits from health effects under a carbon policy would tend toward zero although benefits from avoided investment in abatement may be significant.
A fourth parametric uncertainty is the level of control and the timing of regulations governing conventional pollutants in the future. Currently, implementation plans for achieving new fine particulate matter standards are due in 2007 and compliance with the new standards is scheduled for a decade later. It would be unprecedented if this schedule was close to being achieved. Nonetheless, implementation of tighter standards would reduce emissions in the baseline, but the effect on ancillary benefits of carbon policy would depend on the institution used to achieve the lower emissions, as mentioned previously.

A fifth important question stems from the health epidemiology, that in our integrated assessment model boils down to the value of one parameter. We characterize the potency of nitrates as comparable to other components of PM$_{10}$ and not as potent as sulfates in affecting human health. If instead we characterized nitrates as comparable to sulfates as measured by Pope [19], their potency would increase three-fold, and the mortality benefits of emission reductions would increase commensurately.

The valuation of economic benefits of improvement in human health is affected most strongly by the choice of an estimate of the value of a statistical life. The estimates that can be found in recent reviews of the economics literature range from about $2$ million to about $6$ million, with the EPAs preferred choice at the high end of this range. The value we use of $3.8$ million is about midpoint in this range.

7. Conclusion

Early analyses of ancillary benefits of carbon policies yielded unrealistically high estimates of ancillary benefits because of incomplete modeling of emissions, health effect valuation, and policy baselines. More recent analysis has suggested potential benefits are still significant, but of a lower magnitude.

This study adds to the previous literature by offering results from a more detailed examination of changes in NO$_x$ emissions in the electricity sector. We exercise an electricity market model to calculate ancillary benefits for modest carbon taxes. We consider changes that would occur in addition to those resulting from NO$_x$ controls that go beyond the requirements of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.

With the goal in mind to identify the ancillary benefits per ton of carbon reductions for a modest carbon abatement program, we find that a $25$ per metric ton carbon tax would yield ancillary health-related benefits from NO$_x$ reductions of about $8$ per metric ton of carbon (1997 dollars). Avoided abatement costs for NO$_x$ and SO$_2$ controls under existing or anticipated emission caps are estimated to yield another $4$–$7$ in benefits. The total benefits are estimated to sum to $13$–$14$ per ton carbon reduced in the scenarios we think most likely.

We expect the average cost to be less than the marginal cost, which would equal the carbon tax. By varying the size of the carbon tax in this and other exercises [32], we find the schedule of opportunities for carbon reduction to begin at a marginal cost of about zero and to be slightly convex, so that the average cost per ton of carbon reduced would be less than or equal to one-half of the marginal cost. Hence, we expect, the average cost of carbon reductions under a $25$ carbon tax would be around $12$ per ton reduced. Thus, total costs would be about equal to the estimated ancillary benefits of the policy, though marginal costs would exceed marginal ancillary benefits.
For a carbon tax of this magnitude, ancillary benefits from reductions in NO\textsubscript{x} emissions contribute significantly to justifying the cost of carbon emission reductions.

With a larger carbon tax, aggregate ancillary benefits increase, but the value per ton of carbon reduced is roughly unchanged. We find that a $75 carbon tax would yield ancillary benefits of health and compliance cost savings combined of about $12 per ton of carbon reduced. The average cost of a $75 carbon tax would be considerably less than its marginal cost. At a value one-half of the marginal value, the average cost would be around $37 per ton reduced. In this case ancillary benefits per ton are expected to be about one-third of the average cost per ton. Finally, we find in a sensitivity analysis that restructuring of the electricity industry on a nationwide basis would set the stage for ancillary benefits that could rise to over $20 per ton of carbon reduced under a $75 carbon tax.

The economic problem of how to control carbon emissions in the presence of ancillary benefits may invite a broader policy measure than a uniform policy such as a carbon tax spread across all the United States. Regional differences in ancillary benefits, stemming from geography, meteorology and population density, may suggest that the efficient carbon tax should vary by region of the country. This question is reserved for future research.

Several biases may affect these results and will be the subject of further analysis. One of the most important is the considerable weight in these estimates placed on the value of changes in health status. This literature remains controversial, and changes in these values will directly affect our results. For example, considering two prominent alternatives to the choices we have made, if the Pope et al. [19] study was used to estimate health effects the estimated benefits would be over three times greater; while, if the Mrozek and Taylor [22] study was used to value mortality, the estimates would be cut almost by half. In addition, we have not modeled all potential health effects of changes in conventional pollutants, and health effects do not exhaust all the environmental benefits of emission reductions. Nonetheless, our analysis indicates that ancillary benefits from modest reductions in greenhouse gases appear significant relative to the costs of those reductions and should play an important role in the debate regarding near-term policies to address the threat of climate change.

References


[29] R. Holmes, D. Keinath, F. Sussman, Ancillary benefits of mitigating climate change: selected actions from the climate change action plan, Final Report prepared for Adaptation Branch, Climate Change Division, Office of
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