Jung and the 'Other' Encounters in Depth Psychology
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Introduction

This collection of chapters written by Andrew Samuels, Christopher Hauke, Renos Papadopoulos, Roger Brooke, Fanny Brewster and John Beebe elucidates and reflects upon the depth psychological positioning of the ‘other’ in current Jungian and post-Jungian discourse. The IAJS conference in July 2017, in South Africa, highlights alterity as the theme ‘The Spectre of the Other in Jungian Psychology.’ We have included the above authors in this special FreeBook by invitation of Routledge to address certain facets of the conference theme within these chosen chapters. The selection offers a wide spectrum of interest in alterity and how the ‘other’ is rendered through social, gendered, racial and typological perspectives, as transference and countertransference phenomenology, in both interior and exterior landscapes.

Featured chapters include:

The Mirror and the Hammer: The Politics of Resacrilization by Andrew Samuels

Samuels points out that the political tasks of modern democracy are similar to the psychological tasks of modern therapy and analysis in that they both fight between consciousness, liberation and alterity on the one hand, and suppression, repression and omnipotent beliefs as final truths on the other. From the beginning, both Freud and Jung were interested in the world of cultural evolution and collective psychology just as much as much as working day to day with their patients. Modern social theory is concerned with similar questions as depth psychology, such as self, identity, and difference. How am I part of the mass and still wholly unmistakably myself? Samuels argues that depth psychology, better than social theory alone, supplies a vehicle for exploring ‘not knowing’ and the ‘unknowing of interpretation and reinterpretation.’ Samuels takes the anxiety-making ideas of cultural fragmentation, fracture and complexity, as healing as well as wounding manifestations of a language that sees through its own fiction of homogeneity. He argues that the process of resacrilisation should not, however, rest on a return to spirituality out of disgust for how present politics are enacted, but to engender a process of new psychological valuing of the potential of political engagement itself. Samuels points out that attempts to link depth psychology to social and political issues have dried-out into an over-systemised, hyper-rational mechanical discourse. Depth psychology could be revitalised as an innovative tool for analysing political dimensions through using irrationality, imagination, subjectivity, and intuition as the ‘other’ approach. He suggests that we need more generosity towards what we consider ‘serious’ and ‘scholarly’ in academia by allowing more imaginative approaches into politics, including the efficacy of political symbolic imagery to evoke social change.
Introduction

Postmodern Gender: Masculine, Feminine and the Other by Christopher Hauke

Hauke depicts how women have been placed by the discourse of patriarchy as biologically, intellectually, and morally inferior beings. Referencing feminist sources such as Daly, O’Hara, Zabriskie, Irigaray, and Kristeva, Hauke argues that the feminist challenge is not only enlightening, but contains implications for pluralism and the motor for further critical discourse that transcends gender into question about the ‘otherness’ as the lack which is marginalised, dislocated, despised and abandoned in both sexes. Jung locates this ‘lack’ in the unconscious, that discarded stone or lapis as the contra-sexual shadow ‘other’ in ourselves which consciousness tends to reject. Hauke states that there is a detectable shift in postmodern feminism and postmodern Jungian psychology away from biology and from the opposites: contra-sexuality becomes contra-psychological in that the unconscious ‘other’ is embraced as personifying the richness and potential of becoming oneself, rather than the ‘other’ discarded as ‘abject.’

Therapeutic Encounters and Interventions outside the Consulting Room: Challenges in Theory and Practice by Renos K Papadopoulos

In this chapter, Papadopoulos reminds us that Jung is usually known for his conservative outlook towards social activism having lived through the negative effects of fascism in Germany and Italy as mass movements, as well as the authoritarian collectivism of Soviet communism. Jung places more trust in the individual rather than in the collective to work through and integrate ‘shadow’ projections of the ‘other.’ However, Jung emphasises the collective unconscious as a complementary function expressed through archetypes, which when experienced authentically, facilitates healing and nourishment. Papadopoulos argues that Jungian therapeutic tools, even without conscious intention, helps adversary survivors because it depathologizes psychological difficulties and appreciates the complexity of individual responses to painful experiences, for example, by helping to develop and strengthen positive traits, such as courage and resilience, through the adverse experience. Jung’s contribution to the implications of polarization in mass catastrophic contexts is particularly useful because it contests all regimes of authority including therapeutic ones.

A Critical Discussion of Jung’s Experience in Africa: The place of Psychological Life by Roger Brooke

Jung’s travels to Africa radically challenged his European identity and exposed an existential tension concerning human existence, personhood, the world, and the
relationship between them. While travelling eastwards on a train from Mombasa, Jung was deeply affected by the appearance of a dark skinned hunter standing motionless leaning on a long spear looking down at the train (Jung, 1961, p. 283). He felt that this man had been waiting for him for five thousand years, signalling a return for Jung to that primordial matrix as the individuating self. Such experiences in Africa led Jung to the ontological vision of the world as a temple in keeping with the theme of dawn. Jung witnessed his own personal myth in which the drama of the ancient sun god Horus-Ra is enacted only by the Elgonyi people who spit into their hands to welcome the warmth of the rising sun, but also by chattering African baboons which remain motionless and silent at dawn. For Jung, consciousness is neither a human invention nor a divine gift, but has evolved as witness to the endlessly repetitive drama since the dawn of time as a primordial reality, without which there would be no reflective consciousness. This experience, however, threatened Jung’s sense of his European identity. Brooke suggests that Jung took the psyche out of the world by evaporating that power into a symbolic ‘inner’ reality. But this movement into the imaginative realm also encourages the modern person to recover her/his humble heritage and find renewed meaning by embracing an ecological, primordial sensibility that transcends a scientific and technological ‘heroic’ ego.

African Archetypal Primordial: A Map for Jungian Psychology by Fanny Brewster

Brewster points out that one of the main problems presenting African Americans as a viable ‘other’ is a sense of a lack of African history derived from a systematic attempt to malign or eradicate African culture; the justification for slavery was based on Africans having smaller brain size and other physical limitations. In this chapter, Brewster takes examples of indigenous African practices which paralleled and influenced Jung’s methods of healing symptoms as a manifestation of an internal and external imbalance. She suggests that one significant aspect points to the Jungian archetypal perspective that the gods cause our psychological ‘illnesses’ but also hold their remedy. This is related to the Xhosa beliefs that the ancestors are an important part of the patient’s ability to heal through communicating with them in dreams. Ngoma cults communicate through drums and dance with the ancestors in ritualistic ceremonies to find the cause of the imbalance. Brewster draws on Ngubane’s work with Zulu cosmology which uses colour to identify illness and its remedy. For example, the colours black, red, and white are used in strict sequence signifying night, dawn/dusk and daytime. Black (night-time) and red (dawn and dusk) medicine as powerful intermediary agents are used in treatment to restore health by building strength and
resilience. The process of neutrally aligning the colour black with ‘shadow’ aspects in the unconscious as potential rather than disassociating it as ‘inferior’ or ‘evil’ is reminiscent of Hillman’s and Jung’s insistence on darkness and the journey to the underworld of dreams. The umuthi (medicine) is both a poison and a curative. This chapter has vital information about African indigenous practices which align the individual with his/her ancestors to facilitate healing and wholeness.

Identifying the American Shadow: Typological Reflections on the 1992 Los Angeles Riots by John Beebe

In this chapter, Beebe examines psychological part types through the image of African American, Rodney King, when he was brutally arrested and beaten by the police in order to differentiate underlying racial concepts about the value of the ‘other.’ When King was arrested, he was forced to lie face down with his body flat on the ground. Resistance led to further police beatings to keep him flattened. When King complained of such brutal treatment, the law sided with the police not with King. When compared to a televised scenario of the image of a white man pulled from his truck and beaten by African Americans, sympathy was withheld from the black perpetrators seeing them as antisocial hooligans. Beebe argues that introverted feeling operates on an impersonal, archetypal level taking the deepest soundings of a situation to ascertain its rightness or wrongness and to decide what is appropriate or not. Beebe suggests that introverted feeling was traditionally expressed in American African culture against racism but has been suppressed by extraverted feeling which tends to support the values of white collective norms. However, when King spoke in defence of African American perpetrators, his well-chosen words had the power to exonerate him. Beebe notes that the two feeling reactions, introverted and extraverted, came together, and human integrity triumphed over psychological part functioning. Beebe speculates that America’s superior function is extraverted thinking personified by Police Chief Gates in its demonic aspect, and African Americans personify introverted feeling (King) which is kept repressed and flattened as an ‘inferior’ position in the shadows. Beebe intriguingly asks which of these two men, Gates or King, personifies part of the American ‘shadow’ which is the most unconscious.

—Elizabeth Brodersen, PhD and Michael Glock PhD, IAJS Co-Chairs, July 2017

NB: As you read through this FreeBook, you will notice references to other chapters within the text. Please note that these are references to the original book in which the chapters appeared, and not the FreeBook.
Depth psychology and political transformation

This book is about the depth psychology of political processes, focusing on processes of non-violent political change. It is a contribution to the longstanding ambition of depth psychology to develop a form of political and cultural analysis that would, in Freud's words, 'understand the riddles of the world'. I will be trying to bring depth psychology as a whole, and the particular experience of clinical analysis, to bear on politics. An engagement of depth psychology with politics makes a contribution to social science, social theory and the other human sciences. But the book is also orientated in the opposite direction. Bringing an understanding of the political world to bear on the theories of depth psychology and the practices of clinical analysis, leading to a concern for humankind as well as an absorption in one's personal problems.

By 'politics' I mean the concerted arrangements and struggles within an institution, or in a single society, or between the countries of the world for the organization and distribution of resources and power, especially economic power. Politics concerns the way in which power is held or deployed by the state, by institutions, and by sectional interests to maintain survival, determine behavior, gain control over others and, more positively perhaps, enhance the quality of human life. Politics implies efforts to change or transform these arrangements and efforts to maintain them. Economic and political power includes control of processes of information and representation to serve the interests of the powerful as well as the use of physical force and possession of vital resources such as land, food, water or oil.

On a more personal level, there is a second kind of politics. Here, political power reflects struggles over agency, meaning the ability to choose freely whether to act and what action to take in a given situation. This is a feeling-level politics. But politics also refers to a crucial interplay between these two dimensions, between the private and public dimensions of power. There are connections between economic power and power as expressed on an intimate, domestic, level. Power is a process or network as much as a stable factor. This version of political power is demonstrated experientially: In family organization, gender and race relations, and in religious and artistic assumptions as they affect the life of individuals.

Where the public and the private, the political and the personal, intersect or even meld there is a special role for depth psychology in relation to political change and transformation. The tragicomic crisis of our fin de siècle civilization incites us
to challenge the boundaries that are conventionally accepted as existing between the external world and the internal world, between life and reflection, between extraversion and introversion, between doing and being, between politics and psychology, between the political development of the person and the psychological development of the person, between the fantasies of the political world and the politics of the fantasy world. Subjectivity and intersubjectivity have political roots; they are not as ‘internal’ as they seem.

The political tasks of modern democracy are similar to the psychological tasks of modern therapy and analysis. In both areas, there is a fight between consciousness, liberation and alterity on the one hand and suppression, repression and omnipotent beliefs in final truths on the other. Psychological and political processes share an uncertain outcome. Hence, the demarcation between the inner world of psychology and the outer world of politics has no permanent existence. The Umwelt is both inside and outside. This congruency of politics and depth psychology is demonstrated by the ubiquity of political metaphors that can depict personality: The ‘government’ signifies the ego, the ‘citizens’ signify constellations of object relations, social problems signify psychopathology. In this book, I do not in fact make use of notions such as ‘the class system inside one’s head,’ but I do draw conclusions from the existence of such notions about public referents of private matters.

From its beginnings, depth psychology has been interested in the world of politics. In his paper entitled ‘The claims of psycho-analysis to the interest of the non-psychological sciences,’ written in 1913, Freud staked a claim for the proactive capacity of psychoanalysis

   to throw light on the origins of our great cultural institutions – on religion, morality, justice, and philosophy. . . . Our knowledge of the neurotic illnesses of individuals has been of much assistance to our understanding of the great social institutions.

Jung made a similar point about the relationship of depth psychology and politics in a more reactive vein in 1946 in his preface to a collection of his essays on Nazi Germany:

   We are living in times of great disruption: political passions are aflame, internal upheavals have brought nations to the brink of chaos. . . . This critical state of things has such a tremendous influence on the psychic life of the individual that the analyst . . . feels the violence of its impact even in the quiet
of his consulting room. . . The psychologist cannot avoid coming to grips with contemporary history, even if his very soul shrinks from the political uproar, the lying propaganda, and the jarring speeches of the demagogues. We need not mention his duties as a citizen, which confront him with a similar task.

At times, it seems that Freud and Jung were as interested in the broad sweep of cultural evolution and in an engagement with collective psychology as they were in their day-to-day work with patients. Certainly, there is a tension between their cultural and clinical projects and this is a tension that is still with their descendants today. In the last twenty-five years, we have witnessed the growth of psychoanalysis as an academic discipline, whether as a human, social or emancipatory science. The same is now beginning to happen in analytical psychology (inevitably, twenty-five years later). Of course, the origins of this intellectual movement go much further back to ‘Freudian’ writers like Harold Lasswell, Jürgen Habermas, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, and Norman O. Brown, or to ‘Jungians’ like Mircea Eliade and Herbert Read.

The gulf between depth psychology in the academy and depth psychology in the clinic is at its widest in Britain and in the United States, but even in Europe we can see signs of a similar rift. Academic depth psychology might involve a close textual study of Freud’s writings or comparative work that sets Freud alongside Heidegger or other important thinkers. Literary and film criticism, cultural and gender studies, psychobiography and psychobiography, sectors within anthropology, sociology and political studies – all may quite fairly be reckoned as aligned with academic depth psychology. Research into the outcome of psychotherapeutic treatment and diagnostic studies may also be understood as academic. Though academic depth psychology often seems more at home with an insertion into the political field than clinical depth psychology does, it lacks a vehicle for engaging with political issues in a pragmatic form while retaining a psychological orientation.

However, something new is rumbling within the clinical world. In 1991, just before the Gulf War, a protest meeting was called in London by the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons and the Study Group on Psychosocial Issues in the Nuclear Age. It was held at the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, a highly significant fact in itself, and psychoanalysts were prominent on the platform. What is more, over a quarter of the members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society have joined a group called Psychoanalysts for the Prevention of Nuclear War. In Britain, and all over the world, clinicians and some who have voluntarily given up clinical practice
are arguing and writing about politics in a way that they did not just a few years ago.

It seems that the existence of a rupture between depth psychology in the consulting room and depth psychology in the political world is being challenged, if not exactly closed. One can tell that something significant is going on by the existence of fierce opposition to it from those who regard the clinical as an untouchable, privileged category, on the basis of its contribution to the alleviation of human suffering.

Although I abhor that kind of clinical triumphalism, I do not suggest in this book that we should close all the consulting rooms. This is because I can see that clinical practice may be something other than a bastion of possessive individualism and narcissistic introspection. It is right to criticize myopic (and greedy) clinicians who cannot apperceive that their work has a political and cultural location and implication. But it is not right to indulge in simplistic thinking that would do away with the entire clinical project of depth psychology. Without their connection to a clinical core, why should anyone listen to analysts at all? The rejection of the clinical forecloses what is, for me, the central issue: The relations between the private and the public spheres of life. This foreclosure mimics the attitude of the most conservative, dyed-in-the-wool clinicians and mental health professionals. The high-profile apostates of therapy are as terrified of exploring the relations between the personal and the political as are the fanatical professional adherents of therapy.

The patients who come to see analysts and therapists are playing a part in these debates. In Chapter 10, I give the results of a questionnaire that was sent to analysts and psychotherapists in several countries. The questionnaire concerned political material brought to the consulting room, its prevalence, and how it is handled by the practitioner. From the survey, it seems clear that such material is being brought more frequently than before to the clinical setting, that the range of themes and problems covered is immense, that these do not invariably reflect the social situation or obvious preoccupations of the particular patient, and that practitioners are a bit puzzled as to how to interpret such material. Through this survey, I have found that practitioners are more reluctant than I thought they would be to interpret political material in terms of the internal world of the patient. I can confirm this puzzlement from my own experience. During the Gulf crisis of 1990–1, I was struck, not only by how some patients employed war imagery to express their
internal states (predicted by theory), but also by how some patients communicated what looked like inner world material when actually they had a deep desire to talk about the Gulf crisis (not predicted by theory).

Depth psychology’s area of inquiry is moving on to make a new connection with the world of politics. However, I do not agree with the conceit that the unconscious itself has moved on and now resides outside the individual in the external world. The unconscious cannot be reified like that – and in any case who could doubt that the unconscious has always already been in the world as well as in the individual. The very idea of unconscious influence on action suggests that the unconscious itself influences the relations between the individual and the world. What has changed is our perception of what depth psychology can, and should do. (I return to the theme of the relations between the unconscious and the social world in Chapter 3.) Maybe it is now the turn of the external world to receive the ministrations of the depth psychologists. Maybe it is the external world that now clamors for our attention, for there is certainly much political pain and dis-ease ‘out there’ (as we say). But first we have to find out whether the political world does want something from depth psychology. (In the next chapter, I will unpack the word ‘world’.)

In spite of these developments, it has to be admitted that there is an intense reluctance in the non-psychological community to accept the many and varied ideas and suggestions concerning political matters that have been or are being offered by analysts of every persuasion. I do not believe this reluctance can all be put down to resistance. There is something quite offensive about reductive interpretations of complex sociopolitical problems in exclusively psychological terms. The tendency to pan-psychism on the part of some depth psychologists has led me to wonder if any adequate methodology and ethos actually exist to make an engagement of depth psychology with the public sphere possible.

Depth psychology concerns a person’s subjective experience of social and cultural structures, and that is valuable in itself. But in this book I want to ask: Is there a special psychology of and for politics and culture? If so, what does the clinical practice of analysis and therapy with individuals or small groups contribute to the forming of such a psychology? And, conversely, I ask: What does a perspective taken from cultural or political analysis contribute to a clinical analysis of an individual or small therapy group? In what way is the personal political – and in what way is the political personal? Can these questions be answered without
THE MIRROR AND THE HAMMER
THE POLITICS OF RESACRALIZATION

Excerpted from *The Political Psyche*

recourse to a totalizing politics, in a way that preserves and celebrates difference and diversity? A depth psychological approach to politics needs to be a humble one.

Depth psychology can help with these queries. In spite of claims that the age of psychology is over, we may be entering a period of cultural evolution in which it will become easier to work out the possible contribution of depth psychology to social science and politics. Modern social theory is concerned with identity, with difference, and with the relations between identity and difference. How am I wholly and unmistakably myself? How am I part of the mass, similar to or the same as others? These questions, which constitute the *cri de cœur* of what Anthony Giddens calls ‘late modernity’, shove us in the direction of psychology. These are the pressing questions that the analytic patient brings to the consulting room – even in group therapy. And these are the crucial questions about that patient that the analyst has to contend with – to what extent can I encounter this person as a unique human being, to what extent must I react to him or her as a typical patient, to what extent as a combination of these? The political dimension of these psychological questions was summarized by Aristotle: ‘Similars do not constitute a state.’ Nor, we may add, do people with nothing at all in common.

The characteristic of late modernity to try to make use of knowledge about itself can be recast as a struggle within our culture to become self-conscious; *our culture struggles to become psychological*. Moreover, the pervasive presence of *doubt*, even ‘radical doubt’, as a ‘feature of modern critical reason’ and as a ‘general existential dimension of the contemporary social world’, suggests that the psychology that is already being embraced by late modernity is depth psychology, the psychology of not knowing, of unknowing, of interpretation and reinterpretation.

The late modern (and, if you like, the post-modern) age has reorganized the categories of time, space and place, using technology to deliteralize and overcome them, permitting the exercise of power-at-a-distance. In its overturning of the laws of nature, the age itself more and more resembles the unconscious. The speedy and multilevelled tone of life at the close of the twentieth century means that we often do not know what it is that has hurt or disturbed us though we do know we have been hurt or disturbed. We may only know what it was after the event. Such ‘deferred action’, to use the standard mistranslation of Freud’s *Nachträglichkeit*, means that we are condemned to afterwardness and retrospection, required to fashion our response to hurtful and disturbing social changes out of a backward-looking stance. No wonder there has been an explosion of nostalgias.
**Psychological reductionism**

Here is an example of the difficulty with psychological reductionism to which I referred earlier. At a conference, a distinguished psychoanalyst referred to the revolutionary students in Paris in 1968 as ‘functioning as a regressive group.’ Now, for a large group of students to be said to regress, there must be, in the speaker’s mind, some sort of normative developmental starting point for them to regress to. The social group is supposed to have a babyhood, as it were. Similarly, the speaker must have had in mind the possibility of a healthier, progressive group process – what a more mature group of revolutionary students would have looked like. This ‘regressive group of students’ stunned nearly every intellectual in France and also fatally wounded Marxism. The regressive group was so effective that it forced an intelligentsia already intimately concerned with political issues to throw up its hands and realize the urgent need to rettheorize politics. Not bad for a psychologically immature group. (I return to the topic of group and institutional dynamics in Chapter 11.) Be this as it may, my main point here is to emphasize that complex social and political phenomena do not conform to the individualistic, chronological, moralistic, pathologising framework that is often applied in a mechanical way by depth psychological commentators.

The problem of reductionism does not stem from having a therapeutic attitude to the pathologies of culture as these are expressed in political issues. Rather, the problem stems from approaching an entire culture, or large chunks of it, as if it were an individual or even as if it were a baby. In this infantilization of culture, depth psychology deploys a version of personality development couched in judgmental terms to understand a collective cultural and political process. If we look in this manner for pathology in the culture, we will surely find it. If we are looking with a particular psychological theory in mind, then, lo and behold, the theory will explain the pathology. But this is a retrospective prophecy (to use a phrase of Freud’s), twenty-twenty hindsight. In this psychological tautologizing there is really nothing much to get excited about. Too much depth psychological writing on the culture, my own included, has suffered from this kind of smug correctness when the ‘material’ proves the theoretical point. Of course it does! If we are interested in envy or greed, then we will find envy or greed in capitalistic organization. If we set out to demonstrate the presence of archetypal patterns, such as projection of the shadow, in the geopolitical relations of the superpowers, then, without a doubt, they will seem to leap out at us. But so often this is just more of the maddening rectitude of the analyst who has forgotten that we
influence what we analyze. Psychological reflection on culture and politics needs to be muted; there is not as much 'aha!' as pioneers, such as the Frankfurt School, hoped for.

I am sure that the book cannot solve all the problems or answer all the questions I have mentioned. In the 1920s the Russian Futurist poet Vladimir Mayakovsky wrote that 'Art is not a mirror to reflect the world, but a hammer with which to shape it.' I think depth psychology might try to reflect and shape the world, doing it as part of a multidisciplinary project, and in a mixture of styles ranging from exegetical sobriety to playfulness to something quite frankly irrational. In these diverse ways, we may find out more about the interplays between (a) personality development and social structure, (b) the private, intrapsychic world of an individual and the public, political system in which he or she is embedded, and (c) psychic reality and sociopolitical reality. The political world is today's uncanny (Unheimlich); something that was familiar (heimisch) has slipped out of the grasp of consciousness.

**Psyche, culture and resacralization**

It has never been more difficult to make a psychological analysis of politics for, in our day, every institution and element in culture is undergoing fragmentation and Balkanization. It has become harder and harder to see what political arrangements can hold societies together. Moments at which one apprehends a social unity have become as precious and vulnerable as those revelatory and mystical moments when one experiences a personal unity.

Increasingly, the fragility and disunity of our culture provokes a reaction arising out of a sense of the underlying oneness of the world – a holistic response. But, for me, the problem with the re-emergence in our day of cosmic visions of a unified world is that a sense of oneness tends to generate only one particular kind of truth. Moreover, proclaiming the indissoluble unity of a world soul may be little more than a defensive reaction to atomization. Advancing holism as if it were the solution is not an adequate critical response to the drama of cultural diversity. Holism founders on the sea of the discontinuities of life, for holism is secretly highly rational and ordered and cannot abide irrationality or a messiness in which its Truth has to coexist with lots of truths. A unified viewpoint has to find some kind of articulation with a diversity of viewpoints; this, holism finds difficult.
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My approach here is not holistic. I want to take those anxiety-provoking ideas of cultural fragmentation, fracture and complexity, and re-imagine them as the very tools of the trade of psychological analysis of cultural political processes. Let us take our sense of fragmentation, fracture and complexity as *healing* as well as wounding to a sense of political and social empowerment. It follows that we have to try to engage with a diverse and fragmented culture by means of an analysis that sees through its own fantasy of homogeneity, is already itself diverse and fragmented, and seeks out complexity. Rousseau referred to ‘the language of the heart’ and I suppose that, in our day, we have to begin to speak the languages of the hearts.

Amidst the tragic anomic and baffling atomization, amidst the dreadful conformism of ‘international’ architecture, telecommunications and cui-sine, amidst the sense of oppression and fear of a horrific future, amidst war itself, there is an equally fragmented, fractured and complex attempt at a *resacralization of the culture* going on. People have risen to the challenge and there are many diverse surface signs of resacralization: New Age or New Times thought, expressions of concern for the quality of life, green politics, feminism, demands for the rights of ethnic minorities, the human potential movement, liberation theology, gay activism, finding God in the new physics. I would even including trying to engage depth psychology with politics on this deliberately diverse list; I certainly do not want to leave myself out! It is suspicious that depth psychologists concerned with the public sphere have not paid much attention to *themselves* as a cultural phenomenon. I would go so far as to say that depth psychology itself may be regarded as one of the precursors of late twentieth-century resacralization. A depth psychologist has as a credo that he or she is ‘in’ whatever is being analyzed, whether patient, political problematic, or art work. I can readily understand objections to resacralization that find the linkage of depth psychology and fundamentalist religion difficult to stomach. It was hard for me, at first. But if one’s goal is to track and speak up about such connections, then there is little alternative to leaving such shocking linkages out in the open. Perhaps the objections also have something to do with the differences between depth psychology and philosophy. While some philosophers might pay lip service to the impossibility of maintaining the observer/observed boundary, this often is not reflected in their experience-distant texts.

The groups and movements I have listed vary in the degree to which they seek fundamental changes in society as a whole; some of them have quite particular,
sectional interests to pursue. Nevertheless, I see this heterogeneous phenomenon – resacralization – as held together by aspirational rather than by socioeconomic ties. In fairness, I do not assume that only left-leaning, so-called progressive political and religious movements partake in resacralization. Born-again Christians, Islamic fundamentalists and the Lubavitch Jews are part of the same trend. In different forms, of course, resacralization is also a way to describe what has been happening in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Across the world, people have risen to the challenge of resacralization. It is the spiritual longings of ordinary people that have fuelled these movements – and perhaps all the more progressive political and cultural projects of the twentieth century. The resacralizing perspective recovers a sense of the religious verities but these are played through a changing world view less dependent on religious organization. The resacralizing ethic may be plebeian in its roots, but it is sublime in its aspirations.

Clearly I think that all these developments are extremely important. They may contain elements of a successful resolution of some of our most vexing dilemmas. But I also think that, in their present form, they are at risk of failing and the consequences of failure will be serious even for those who feel out of sympathy with many or all of the facets of resacralization.

As I said, I think these spontaneous movements are surface signs that there is something politically transformative going on. I want to suggest that resacralization is our contemporary attempt to shift a sense of holiness into the secular and material world. Let us look at holiness. The roots of holiness do not only lie in God or in a transpersonal realm. They also lie in humanity’s making of holiness. We make holiness by the designation and construction of sacred spaces (which we call temples). We make holiness by the performance of sacred acts (such as sacrifice and repentance). I doubt that contemporary resacralization will ultimately glorify God or lead to a new religion. But, along the way, most aspects of human culture will be touched by this attempt to connect to a feeling level that we sense once existed but we find has vanished from the modern world (hence resacralization). I think that, at the very least, this involves a search for a new ethical basis for society. In its preoccupation with the discovery of meaning, depth psychology has vectored in on the same search.

The notion that holiness is located in the material, social world is not a new one. For many, religious and non-religious alike, the world has long held a Chassidic
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gleam. Since my childhood, I have been fascinated by God’s detailed instructions to the Children of Israel about how to build the Ark of the Covenant (not to mention the Tabernacle, or, earlier, Noah’s Ark). In the divine detail of the construction, we see how ineffable holiness depends on every single joint, bevel, dimension, and the material used:

And Bezaleel made the ark of shittim wood: two cubits and a half was the length of it, and a cubit and a half the breadth of it, and a cubit and a half the height of it. And he overlaid it with pure gold within and without, and made a crown of gold to it round about. And he cast for it four rings of gold, to be set by the four corners of it; even two rings upon the one side of it, and two rings upon the other side of it. And he made staves of shittim wood, and overlaid them with gold. And he put the staves into the rings by the side of the ark, to bear the ark.

Bezaleel’s name is hardly ever mentioned, not even in the film Raiders of the Lost Ark! Yet he is the collective image and cultural personification of resacralization, the contemporary drive to render the secular holy as a creative response to the fate of God.

This is why, for many, resacralization has indeed taken the form of a return to religion. Sometimes this is established religion, sometimes archaic (or apparently archaic) religion. However, as a depth psychologist, I have to engage with resacralization in a different way. To do so, it is not essential to support or to believe in resacralization, and many do not. What is essential is to try to pick up on the psychology of what is happening in this particular piece of cultural process. I want to make something psychological, but not exclusively or excessively psychological, out of a host of social and political impressions. The idea is to bring something up and out that is already there – so these words of mine about resacralization are intended to be description, chronicle and interpretation, not sermon or advocacy, nor anything beyond an indirect contribution to resacralization itself. The parallel is with clinical analysis, in which the analyst can do no more than foster a process in which potentials within the patient are brought into consciousness.

One specific impression is of a growing, collective sense of disgust, in both Western culture and the once-communist states, with the political world in whose making we have participated. Disgust is lurking alongside the shallowness and cruelty of much of modern life; our subjectivity is full of it. As Thomas Mann put it, ‘Our
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capacity for disgust is in proportion to the intensity of our attachment to the things of this world: Disgust with our present politics leads us to aspire to a resacralized and reformed politics in which political openness and unpredictability lead to faith and hope rather than to fear and disgust. To achieve this, we need a new psychological valuing of the potential of political engagement itself. Involvement in the mess and confusion of the external world and passionate political commitment to that world are as psychologically valuable as an interior perspective or an intimate I–thou relationship. Political involvement can certainly be a means of avoiding personal conflicts or acting out such conflicts, leaving others to do the changing. But political involvement can surely also be a means of expressing what is best in humans, acknowledging the fact of our social being, that we are not the isolated, solipsistic monads that some psychological theories might lead us to believe we are.

A more evolved and realistic attitude to politics is something to work on in the consulting room, just as we work on more evolved and realistic attitudes to sexuality, spirituality and aggression. In the course of this book, I will propose that analysts (and patients, too) begin to work out models that enable us to refer to a person’s innate political potential, to his or her state of political development, and to a political level of the psyche. In clinical practice, such a model would enable us to generate new readings of personal and collective political imagery. We may even find that there is a politics of imagery and that countertransference and politics are linked. Political imagery will be as fluid and unpredictable in its display of what is (or claims to be) positive and what is (or seems to be) negative as any other kind of imagery. Not all political imagery presents the worst case for humanity. For example, in Chapter 4 I attempt a psychological analysis of the imagery in Machiavelli’s political thought, to find out how an engagement with the political level of the psyche affects depth psychology and how depth psychology affects political theorizing. Here, I want once more to emphasize that the core of my project is to move toward an end of the isolation of the consulting room, though not toward the end of clinical analysis itself, and to work out the detail of a serious relationship between depth psychology and politics rather than huff and puff at the absence of such a relationship. (I will discuss the role of the clinical project throughout the book.)

Our culture (and not just our culture) is longing to atone for its social injustices and the sense of disgust it feels for them, longing to be able to think good thoughts about itself and rid itself of depressive preoccupation with its own
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destructiveness, longing for a resacralized politics. When depression infects a political system, the first victim is any capacity to find imaginative solutions to political problems. This is because depression leads to an awful literalism in which fantasy and actuality are hopelessly muddled. Collective fantasies of hate and aggression are taken literally, leading to depressive guilt (for example, over the possession of nuclear weapons) and mass delusional self-reproach. The problem is how to contain and integrate disgust on this scale without either repressing it or acting it out.

On the political level, many are full of guilty contempt for capitalism (and for what passed for socialism in the East). But there is a lack of any cultural ritual by which reparation and repentance can be made. Lacking ritual and a symbolic language with which to express this unease and disgust, and the desire to atone, many resacralizers tend to make a split between the constructive and the cheating sides of capitalism and the market economy, preferring to see only the negative side. Perhaps in response, a group with a totally opposite ideology of support for capitalism and the market has emerged. If we do not do something about this split in our political culture, then, hard though it is to face, resacralization, so ardently sought by so many, will not take place; it will not work. To be specific: Resacralization seems to be characterized by an attempt to construct a shadow-free politics in which the dark side is located somewhere else – in men, in whites, in the market, and so forth. Even when resacralizers do get involved with politics, it is a half-hearted involvement, distinguished, psychologically speaking, by a fear of getting dirty hands. I want to explore the damaging contents of this split.

On the negative side, there are fantasies of an apocalyptic end, whether by nuclear conflagration, AIDS pandemic, or the greenhouse effect. All these are blamed on capitalism and the market economy. Certainly, these anxieties are rooted in reality and resacralizers are right to point this out. But taken as fantasies, they are the deepest signs of a self-punishing contempt for ourselves. Perhaps many people think we deserve to perish like this. On the positive side, there are other voices, not at all persuaded by the arguments of resacralizers, claiming to be 'realistic', extolling the virtues of capitalism and the workings of the market as the source of the material benefits that 'we' enjoy today and as the only economic system that seems to work.

Sometimes it seems that those involved in resacralization try to manage their disgust and guilt at the excesses of capitalism and the market economy by
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attempting to make reparation and repentance over-literally – by making it up to the entire planet. There will be many good things to come out of the environmental movement but a prudish and facile environmentalism may not have enough psychological depth, enough connection to the dirt it seeks to cleanse, to ease the unease and even the disease in the culture. In Chapter 5, I consider whether there is a way to transform the dreams of environmentalists into pragmatic politics and hence make social realities out of them.

The market

This form of negative/positive split can be very clearly seen in relation to the market economy. Is the market economy a socially divisive rich man’s charter, as even erstwhile supporters of it are beginning to say in Britain or the United States? Or is the market economy the road to freedom and dignity as many now seem to think in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? Or is it the best available synthesis, a good compromise? Or – and this is the line I intend to take – is it both a negative and a positive phenomenon at the same time, with the negative and positive verdicts each having a distinct psychology of its own that resists synthesis and compromise? In this way of looking at the market economy, our negative and positive images of it are not split off from each other; indeed, they each guarantee the existence of the other for there will be no chance of realizing the positive features of the market economy without accepting the simultaneous presence of the negative features of the market economy. It is relatively easy for a cultural critic to reject the Manichean, crude, psychologically primitive, split approach in which the market must be good or bad. But the approach that attempts a balanced view of the market is almost as problematic, psychologically speaking. In the so-called ‘balanced’ approach, which is supposed to ‘heal’ the split, there is a difficulty in integrating the undoubtedly unfair and ruthless features of free market economics, seeing how they have to be present for the benefits of the market to be available. Resacralizers need to come to terms with this. We are not talking of unfortunate byproducts of the market; according to this psychological analysis, they are its *sine qua non* and cannot be ameliorated. We need to know more about the psychology of the market as a negative phenomenon and about the psychology of the market as a positive phenomenon. Both psychologies are relevant for resacralization. Resacralizers cannot stay pure, above, or outside the economic world. Disgust cannot be transcended to order; there is no shadow-free politics. Resacralization will
have defeated itself as much as having been defeated by patriarchal exploitation and other reactionary forces.

Many sensitive and intelligent commentators have pointed out that the apparent triumph of capitalism is a moment for self-reflection. This is because market forces have already invaded or colonized most aspects of life. There is a need now to work on the development of a sense of community: Caring, compassionate, reaching-out to the less well-off. But a sense of community that does not address the shadow of community – the totalitarian shadow of community – will be thin, dessicated, morally elevated classroom civics, and socially useless. We will not be able to limit or tame market forces unless we comprehend their psychological nature and the powerful imagery involved in such forces. To understand the market requires political imagination and imagination about politics. There is no either/or about politics; nor is there an average. Politics is certainly the art of speculating, calculating, secret agreements and pragmatic maneuvering. But politics is also the art of making the world and the people in it better. There are some connections between these two distinct and separate images of politics that we should not ignore.

Our inability to stay in emotional contact with the psychologically distinct and separate images of the market makes it difficult to concentrate on the psychological issues of resacralization that are central to notions of economic and political change. Here, I am sure that economics can be a psychological focus. Later, in Chapter 4, in order to concentrate on splits within the image of the market economy, I will enlist the aid of the myth of Hermes to help us to hold onto both sides, positive and negative, enthusiasm and disgust, of our evaluation of the market economy. A political reworking of the myth of Hermes can provide a base for an approach that avoids the dangers of splitting and of trying to reach a supposedly balanced view. To the extent that there are opposite feelings in the air about the market, it is very hard, emotionally, to hold on to these as necessarily existing opposites without having recourse to either a schizoid, judgmental retreat or to glib sloganizing about accepting the bad with the good. As I said, we do need to know more about the psychology of the market as a positive phenomenon and about the psychology of the market as a negative phenomenon. Then, perhaps, we could move on to try to work out the psychology of the market without the introduction of the categories ‘positive’ and ‘negative’.

For the moment, we do have to let ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ structure our
psychological response to market economics. But there is a hidden gain in this. For maintaining an attitude of evaluation and judgment enables us to see to what extent the preceding ideas about attitudes to and images of the market are relevant outside Western, capitalistic culture.

It sometimes seems that the Zeitgeist in what was the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe is quite different from that of the West. In the West, criticisms of the excesses of free market economics are beginning to surface in circles that had, hitherto, been gung ho for the market. For example, it seems that the long sentence passed on Michael Milken, the ‘junk bond king’, was ‘widely seen as public retribution for the excesses of the ’80s, resulting from public anger over the ethics of the age’. Kevin Phillips, a one-time senior aide of President Reagan, published a bestselling book in 1990 entitled The Politics of Rich and Poor in which he prophesied the end of an ethical and political climate that permitted ‘the triumph of upper America – an ostentatious celebration of wealth, the political ascendance of the richest third of the population and a glorification of capitalism, free markets and finance’.

In the East (and in many parts of the Third World), things seem to be going the other way. In progressive circles, the free market is hailed, not only as the sole means to revive moribund economies, but also as a means to political and spiritual revival. However, I wonder if the two completely different political situations do not share some psychological features in common. Both kinds of society are fascinated, even obsessed by the market; the one eager now to condemn it, the other to praise and implement it. Both have the same difficulty in getting beyond a verdict that is either good or bad. Both seem to sense the limitations of the ‘balanced’ view. We see this in the former Soviet Union in the popular rejection of Gorbachev’s idea of a ‘third way’ incorporating what was best in communism and capitalism. We see it in the United States in the almost total disagreement about what can be done to ease the plight of the so-called underclass (including intense argument over whether such a grouping actually exists). Crucially, in both West and East, modes of economic and political organization are seen nowadays as inseparable from psychological, ethical and spiritual themes. One Russian commentator had this to say: ‘The main thing is for people to learn to be human. If we have bread and still become beasts, there will be no reason for us to live.’20 Surface differences between Western and Eastern attitudes to the market mask a deeper, psychological similarity.
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Excerpted from The Political Psyche

Of course, we shall have to wait to see what, if anything, the psychosocial impact of a new Russian middle class will be. But the psychological dimension is demonstrated in a comment made by a Russian political commentator in 1991: ‘Our people are fed up with the free market without having lived in it for a single day.’

I have not merely been proposing that our epoch needs resacralizing and encouraging people to do it. I am arguing that resacralization is already going on, and has a life of its own running underneath the development of technology and a hyper-rational way of life. As I said, I am trying to bring something to consciousness – to cultural consciousness – that is already there in culture. It is an analyst’s way of making politics. And it is as an analyst that I have found myself thinking that, from a psychological point of view in which depth common denominators are given more weight than surface discrepancies, everything I have written about ‘our’ culture (meaning Western culture) is, paradoxically, exemplified by what has been happening in Eastern Europe since the late 1980s. The imagery from two differing contexts is not disconnected.

Numinous experience and sociopolitical criticism

I feel that split-inducing collective disgust would be moderated by a sense that culture can be transformed through a resacralized politics. The psychic energy locked up in disgust and cultural depression would be employed in a less masochistic way – in a more practical way, like Bezaleel’s, with his sacred box. When considering such a political commitment, it is unavoidable that religious language and imagery, if not religion itself, will have a part to play. Here, the role played by the churches in the political changes of Eastern Europe should be borne in mind. One cannot imagine an expression of the more caring and compassionate side of liberal democracy without religious terms. We need to look again, more psychologically and more generously, at what we regard as sacred. Beneath and within the fractured surface of contemporary Western culture lies a protoreligious culture (and this is also shown clearly by events in Eastern Europe and in the emergence of liberation theology in Latin America). We can see the culture’s attempts to resacralize itself in its extreme openness to numinous experience – not always along decorous lines, and including the ritually pagan: Sexual experimentation, rock music, sports, food, fashion, money, collectible things. Maybe the best way to find the sacred today would be to submit and surrender to the apparently pagan.
However, political resacralization is not identical with religion or religious revival. In the latter case, there is usually or often a program to be followed, a prescription, a recipe. What I perceive in resacralization is the marking out and making of a place – a social temple – in which something politically transformative can be born. The resacralizing place is also designed for self-reflection and the recovery of personal dignity.

In religious, mystical or holistic experiences, the individual is seized and controlled by something outside himself or herself that is possessed of a fascinating and awe-inspiring power. Such a power, in Jung’s words, makes one feel ‘its victim rather than its creator’. This kind of experience was described by Rudolf Otto in *The Idea of the Holy* in 1917 as numinous experience. Otto was at pains to stress the paradox that, though the numinous experience was irrational, it could be analyzed rationally; an important point to remember concerning depth psychological analysis of politics. We can be rational about the irrational and honor both dimensions while so doing; we can be secular and social about the holy and the sacred. Nevertheless, the irrational is irrational. Otto, in fine German academic style, lists his criteria for the irrational:

- Pure fact in contrast to law, the empirical in contrast to reason, the contingent in contrast to the necessary, the psychological in contrast to transcendental fact, that which is known *a posteriori* in contrast to that which is determinable *a priori*; power, will, and arbitrary choice in contrast to reason, knowledge, and determination by value; impulse, instinct, and the obscure forces of the subconscious in contrast to insight, reflection, and intelligible plan; mystical depths and stirrings in the soul, surmise, presentiment, intuition, prophecy and finally the ‘occult’ powers also; or, in general, the uneasy stress and universal fermentation of the time, with its groping after the thing never yet heard or seen in poetry or the plastic arts – all these and many more may claim the names ‘non-rational’, ‘irrational’.

It is remarkable that Otto, the author of one of the most influential works on religious psychology and the psychology of religion, publishing in the revolutionary year of 1917, should perceive in the ‘uneasy stress and universal fermentation of the time’ a groping, not for a rational system as a form of panacea (such as Marxism) but for the nub of the irrational itself – the *numen*. I want to take this statement of Otto’s as an account, not only of the raw material of a psychological analysis of political process, but also of the orientation of the political analyst. It is
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a kind of clarion call to pay attention to what seems absurd and trivial, as well as to what seems dignified and profound. What is ‘deep’ (as in ‘depth’ psychology) may be on the surface.

Reacting to Otto has led me to muse on the styles or, perhaps more accurately, the tropes of depth psychology in its attempt to do cultural and political analysis. We need to introduce the irrational into our discourse on politics: Measures of exaggeration, grotesquerie, vulgarity and broad comedy, making a social critique out of these just as the unconscious itself sometimes manages to. For example, the wild and compelling imagery of aggressive fantasy eventually promotes concern for other people. The hidden social telos of aggressive fantasy, the covert function it serves, the thing that it is secretly for, is the fostering of an emergence of concern. Without my base and sordid aggressive fantasies in the direction of another, there would be less need for concern about him or her on my part.

Similarly, the seductive and shifting fantasies of sexual selfhood that I call ‘gender confusions’ respond to a political and prospective reading, leading to a far more positive and welcoming evaluation than the one usually given by analysts. In the future, we will all become even more confused about gender. Provided we stay close to the confusion and the confused experience, and do not try for an instant escape by ‘androgyny’ or flee into ‘gender certainty’, and provided we keep our judgmental tendencies under control, then the earthy challenge to the established order represented by gender confusions may move onto an ever-more practical, collective, political level. (See Chapter 7 for a further discussion of gender confusion.)

As I see it, the tasks of depth psychologists who seek to engage with the political are to locate the enormous psychic energy that is presently locked up in collective and subjective self-disgust, and to try to release the energy so that it becomes available for political renewal. If depth psychology is to make a contribution on a political level to the processes of resacralization of which it is already an unconscious part, it must surely continue to engage with the irrational and numinous aspects of life. Depth psychology can attempt to work these into a social and political analysis of culture. But this fantastic and original project cannot always be carried on within a rational or moral framework. A politics of transformation can hardly be totally rational. However, working with the irrational and the amoral is the forte of depth psychology. In Donald Williams’s words: ‘The greatest possibilities for wisdom in the psyche come from its immediate aliveness
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To new, current and contemporary sources that take advantage of its innate adaptability and resourcefulness.

To be sure, as I mentioned, this brings up matters of style and, at the same time, something more than style is involved. For what looks like a matter of style is also relevant to the concrete contribution depth psychology can make to the social sciences, especially politics. It may be that it is the general areas of interest that depth psychology covers that earn it the right to be taken seriously by social scientists, as Ian Craib has suggested. He saw the central features of depth psychology as (a) its concern with the irrational, (b) its focus on emotions, (c) its apprehension of the complexity of personality, and (d) its concern for creativity (including, in Craib's listing, religion and artistic production) and for morality. Depth psychology reaches the parts of human nature other disciplines, such as sociology, do not reach: 'The complexity and conflict of people's emotional lives, . . . the profound ambiguities of motivation and meaning, . . . the strange and often difficult relationships we have with our bodies.'

I want to take this clarion call of Ian Craib's and rotate it through 180 degrees. The central features of depth psychology, meaning the areas it has staked a claim for in the knowledge-battle, may also be the ways and styles in which it should make its contribution to social science. Not only saying something about irrationality, emotion, personality, creativity, morality – but saying something with and through these thematics, and with and through dream, fantasy and passion. The style of a depth psychological contribution to an understanding of political process should be congruent with what depth psychology has habitually done, while not reducing one field to the other. We should focus on a particular political problem in terms of its irrational aspects, the emotions (and hence the images) it engenders in our subjective experience of the problem, the complexity of the issue as it impacts on people's evolving personal lives, and the ways in which what is going on speak of the fostering or negating of human creativity and moral sensibility.

This idea is strengthened by noting that many of the criticisms of attempts to link depth psychology to social and political issues have settled on the oversystematized, hyper-rational, mechanical nature of these 'applications.' In particular, the project of combining Freud and Marx to create a politics of the subject(ive) has degenerated into an obsession with Freud – the man and his texts – and a preoccupation with the work of Jacques Lacan that, for many, has cut psychoanalysis off from those very features of itself that could make a distinctive
contribution to social science (as listed, for example, by Craib, above). While these failings are not going to be totally absent from my book, I have tried to be aware of them. Hopefully, this enables me to ask: Can social theory truly respond to the challenge of telling us who we are as subjects and what our place in cultural process might be without its taking account of a realm of interiority? This, in turn, leads to exploration of the various criticisms of depth psychological accounts of subjectivity that have been mounted.

Before concluding the chapter, I want briefly to make some distinctions about the ways I am using the overlapping terms 'subjectivity' and 'the personal' and how these relate to 'the irrational'. Subjectivity is a perspective on things that tends toward direct experience of them and an evaluative response fashioned out of direct experience, however illusory that might be from a philosophical standpoint. (I return to the philosophical problems with the idea of subjectivity in the next chapter.) The sensation of direct experience remains even when the intellect is aware that one experiences things through ideological filters and that subjective experience is itself culturally and politically constructed. In addition, I see the body as a prime source (and recipient) of subjective experience and of subjectivity.

I regard the personal as being implicated in the identity/difference theme that I referred to earlier in the chapter. This implies a sense of boundary, however permeable ('skin-ego'), and hence a potential for relationship. The narrative and mythology of people's lives contribute to their sense of what is personal of and for them.

The irrational can scarcely be comprehended without reference to its spouse: rationality. Moreover, what is and is not considered irrational is highly variable according to personal, historical and cultural features. However, when attempting to factor subjectivity and the personal into political discourse, there is little doubt that a sense of irrationality will (and ought to be) generated from time to time.

These distinctions are the background to the 180-degree turn I proposed earlier in which the central concerns of depth psychology are revisioned as the tools with which to make an analysis of a political problem: Irrationality, subjectivity, the personal dimension, and a focus on creativity and morality.

As I said, the way in which depth psychology engages with political themes is both a matter of style and, at the same time, something more. On the stylistic and on other levels, I will return to the topic at many moments throughout the book – a sign that I find myself unable to reach a conclusion about the balance between
rational and irrational elements in my text. Perhaps what is needed at the present time is a more generous conception of what is 'serious' and 'scholarly' in writing. Maybe we are on the verge of a revolution in our understanding of what constitutes scholarly, academic and intellectual writing, based on the realization that many apparently discursive texts in the human sciences are full of rhetoric. An antithesis between scholarly and imaginative writing can itself be an obstacle to the success of a text in either mode. (The question of how literally I intend to be taken is addressed in Chapter 7.)

Sometimes depth psychologists will seek to accomplish their political tasks irrationally, making use of the least rational psychological function: intuition. Intuition provides a person with a subjective sense of where something is going, of what the possibilities are, without depending on conscious knowledge or empirical proof (though, hopefully, without downgrading these). Hence, intuition moderates the vicissitudes of Nachträglichkeit, the deferring of action that, in social terms, condemns us to study the impact of political change only retrospectively, only when it is too late. Though intuition may tend toward prophetic or oracular pronouncement, intuition also has the capacity to weave empathy, compassion and imagination into social theorizing. Crucially, intuition is required for the conversion of subjective response into sociopolitical criticism – and this is the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 2

POSTMODERN GENDER

MASculine, Feminine AND THE OTHER

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Jung and the Postmodern

by Christopher Hauke

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DEALING WITH THE ESSENTIAL

Having spent many pages up till now arguing for the postmodern qualities in Jung's psychology, it is now time to consider where Jung appears far more essentialist, conformist, and, to the contemporary reader, reactionary. In a way that is quite in contrast to his radical critique of modernity and modern consciousness and rationality, Jung's perspective on the feminine, and on the psychological attributes of, and differences between, men and women strikes many as old-fashioned, irrelevant and often offensive. In Jung's psychology, women and men appear to be tied to the abstract principles of *eros* and *logos* with a rigidity that compares with Freud's more physiological emphases on the presence or absence of a penis as formative of psychological difference. Granted, there is an emphasis on the contra- sexual element to be found in the unconscious of a man or a woman which Jung formulates as the archetype of the *anima* in the first case and the *animus* in the latter. But this only serves to deepen the tendency towards essentialisms in Jung- a universalising trend that finds its ultimate expression in his theory of the archetypes of the collective unconscious, itself.

It strikes me that there are a number of ways to approach this issue: in the first place, we need to examine some of the received wisdom that says that the postmodern condition is characterised by the end of grand narratives, the demise of all essentialist concepts, and the rise in an acceptance and legitimisation of small-scale ‘truths’ that comprise local narratives and discourses and so promote a valuation of plurality and difference. Apart from the obvious contradiction that such a view forms a grand narrative of itself and contains its own essentialism, it has also been pointed out how the whole business of the universal and the local forms a tense contradiction within late capitalism that does not resolve itself in either direction. For example, while, on the one hand, multinational enterprise and the global economy tends to result in a flattening of differences on the grand scale so we may travel thousands of miles to encounter identical products – like Coca-Cola and McDonald’s – chain stores and services, on the other hand, the high street has never before witnessed such an ethnic diversity of foods, artefacts, materials and images drawn from every quarter of the globe. Before the 1970s in the UK it was difficult to find a provincial greengrocer who had heard of sweet peppers or avocado pears let alone stocked them. The same trend in world-shrinking trade results in very contrasting effects when experienced either at the global level or at the local level. One level assumes we wish to drink Coca-Cola or Heineken (I get nothing for this product placement, by the way) or
watch Disney’s *The Lion King* wherever our plane touches down, while the local level assumes the very opposite: that we *don’t* wish to eat the same thing every night but want to vary our diet between Indian, Chinese, Thai, Italian, Jamaican, Japanese, Ghanaian cuisine every night – or at least appreciate the opportunity to do so. This is one example of the argument from the world-economy, but the end of grand narratives and universalising, essentialist beliefs refers more usually to the shift between a modern and a postmodern position on knowledge, or, to put this more accurately, *the legitimation of knowledge*. For many commentators, the postmodern is characterised by what Lyotard calls the end of master narratives, but Fredric Jameson in his foreword to *Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1984), points out how:

paradoxically ...the vitality of small narrative units at work every-where locally in the present social system, are accompanied by ... a more global or totalising ‘crisis’ in the narrative function in general, since ...the older master-narratives of legitimation no longer function in the service of scientific research – nor, by implication, anywhere else (e.g. we no longer believe in political or historical teleologies, or in the great ‘actors’ and ‘subjects’ of history- the nation-state, the proletariat, the party, the West, etc.).

(Jameson, in Lyotard, 1984: xi-xii)

In other words, ‘local’, sometimes marginal, narrative truths persist throughout the postmodern scene as ‘sub-narratives’, if you like, which Jameson explains by positing,

not the disappearance of the great master-narratives, but their passage underground as it were, their continuing but now unconscious effectivity as a way of ‘thinking about’ and acting in our current situation. This persistence of buried master-narratives in what I have elsewhere called our ‘political unconscious’...

(ibid.: xii)

Contemporary culture has thrown into us into a great uncertainty about unitary ‘truths’: moral values, the purpose of human life, the belief in human progress and, perhaps above all, the inviolable trust in scientific investigation and its ability to reveal the world’s and nature’s secrets. This loss of master discourses and the shift from certainty to uncertainty has produced the necessity for a greater and greater tolerance of difference and of incommensurability. Expressed in forms of ‘local’
narratives which do not make claim to being whole ‘truths’, such ‘local’ forms of knowledge are always in tension with the opposing tendency to cling to unitary truths. It seems that this distinction between ‘local’ forms and master narratives is useful when discussing gender issues under postmodern conditions. In the discussion of masculine and feminine attributes and gender roles and differences, attempts to produce definitive truths consistently keep emerging. More often than not such attempts to pin down gender differences and essentials rely on biological, evolutionary and anthropological ‘evidence’ as if the scientism of such investigations contains a privileged ‘truth’. However, when the power of scientific rationality itself is seriously challenged in postmodern times, the establishing of questionable facts on the basis of other questionable facts proves a fruitless exercise. There arises a plurality of views and a plurality of ‘truths’ which are seen to be contextually dependent in the extreme. When it comes to the position of women themselves, it hardly needs pointing out how the master narratives of modernity have been literally just that - the discourse of the masters, or rather, of patriarchy. As Maureen O’Hara writes: ‘When every “system of truth” …has concluded that women are biologically, intellectually and morally inferior, that we are at once dangerous and naturally nurturing, that we are unsuitable for public office and should be protected and subdued - then you bet feminists have a stake in conversations about “truth” and “reality”!’ (O’Hara, 1996: 147).

Any examination of the tension between the universal and the local, and between essentialist beliefs and diverse, local forms of knowledge obviously throws up problems of how we are to regard Jung’s theory of archetypes and his views on feminine and masculine psychology, both of which appear highly universalising and essentialist in the grand narrative style. It is due to this that these concepts have been subjected to a good deal of criticism - not least from Jungian scholars and analysts themselves. It is with these post-Jungian writers who are the focus of the present chapter that we are most likely to come across a re-reading of Jung’s psychology within the postmodern frame; this is not to excuse Jung for the essentialist aspects of his views, but, having admitted these, to then note how post-Jungians take up such important themes such as male and female psychology and the concepts of anima/animus in an effort to examine them for their relevance in the present. This project is no less legitimate then, and compares to, the feminist re-examination of Freud’s ‘dark continent’ of women through Lacanian lenses, only to discover the limits of this and develop further, more individual, psychoanalytic feminist theories as have Julia Kristeva and others who I mention later. What this
argument amounts to is, similar to Jameson quoted above, the recognition of a state where the grand-narratives do not disappear, but where their authority no longer holds so fast and thus renders them more malleable, more plastic in the hands of the user. To return to the metaphor of postmodern economy, the grand theories are required to become more consumer friendly or ‘consumer responsive’ if you like; knowledge, like everything else, becomes more consumer driven. The negative aspect of this results in a ‘pick-and-mix’ knowledge which tends to lose any persuasive power or weight, but on the positive side there emerges a democratisation of knowledge which retains the value of the earlier narratives or discourses while also asserting the validity of criticising these from ‘local’ positions that may be novel to the discourse but have the effect of expanding its frame and its ‘truth’.

THE GENDER PARADIGM
In addition to the end of grand-narratives, a further defining quality of the postmodern condition is the end of a unitary, single self. It is no longer enough to be - the tendency towards hyper self-reflection in contemporary culture constantly prompts questions about this being or that being, questions that are ultimately about the subjective identity, or identities, of each man and woman. Psychology as a way of self-reflection is typical of postmodern times: given the degree of uncertainty around the dominant forms of rationality which have been scientific, instrumental and extra- verted, it seems inevitable that psychology should have arisen as a new perspective. Once established in culture, psychology has then fed back into self-consciousness its doubts about that very rationality and influenced its assumptions - thus changing the idea of ‘knowing’ and taking human culture to a different plane of self-experience. The rediscovery of the unconscious at the end of the last century arose at the height of the success of Enlightenment rationality to deliver material benefits through the achievement of industrial technology - just at the moment when such successes were beginning to be doubted. The role of psychology since then has been to help us live with the consequences - but only if it is recognised for what it is, a critical practice, and not mistaken for a further ‘scientific truth’. This is why Jung insisted we paid the greatest attention both to consciousness and to what influences it - the rest of the psyche in the form of the personal and the collective unconscious. It need not matter so much here whether these elements, consciousness, personal unconscious, collective unconscious, are
described in the language of previous sciences like biology, ecology or even evolutionary theory - what matters, and what Jung saw, was that the self-reflective attention of human consciousness to itself could no longer be ignored as if it was somehow less relevant to the world of truth and matter. Jung saw that psychology was less about an objective analysis of the human mind and more about the recognition that consciousness *constructs reality*. For some time now, post-Jungians have paid close attention to this facet of analytical psychology which Michael Vannoy Adams refers to as the 'psychical construction of reality' (Adams, 1991). These writers -more of whom we will encounter in Chapter 8 -take Jung's psychology as the starting point for addressing and deconstructing our contemporary construction of reality which is addressed elsewhere by postmodern thinkers, and along the way they do not shirk at the task of deconstructing Jung's psychology itself. This is especially so in the field of gender and the psychological theories attached to it. The post-Jungian analyst Andrew Samuels, whose work on gender will be discussed later, is explicit about where he is coming from:

You will gather from these remarks that post-Jungian analytical psychology is part of a post-structural intellectual matrix - or, rather, that when I employ the term 'post-Jungian', I am deconstructing analytical psychology. The key terms are now interaction - of psychic themes, patterns, images, behaviour, emotions, instincts - and relativity - archetypes in the eye of the beholder, a dethroned self, and democratic individuation.

(Samuels, 1990: 295)

For many years, challenges to long-held assumptions about masculine and feminine 'nature', 'identity', 'behaviour' and so on have persisted but it is perhaps more recently, over the last twenty years, that feminist discourse has formed part of postmodern critique. Some have felt that the first wave of feminist critique during the 1960s and 1970s was more typically modernist in its aims and its tone. Following Lyotard's identification of two types of 'legitimation narrative' typical of Enlightenment modernism, the feminist movement seemed to qualify as a continuation of this in two ways. On the one hand, its emphasis on women's liberation forms part of an 'emancipation narrative', while on the other, the focus on 'consciousness raising' which aimed to provide greater insight into male power forms part of the second legitimation narrative of speculative knowledge generated for its own sake. Stuck within the patriarchal discourses of Enlightenment 'women could occupy only a range of pre-given positions: they
could write only as surrogate men’ (Thornham, 1998: 43). Given the Western, bourgeois, white, heterosexual origins of Enlightenment discourses, the essential woman of feminist theory would then be ‘as partial, as historically contingent and as exclusionary as her male counterpart’ (ibid.). There has needed to be a shift away from the universalised ‘woman’ to an emphasis on differences between women and on the partial nature of ‘knowledge(s)’ around the feminine. As Sue Thornham puts it: ‘once it occupies this position, feminist thought would seem to move away from its Enlightenment beginnings, and to have much in common with postmodernist theory’ (ibid.: 43-44).

The feminist challenge these days, then, is not only enlightening and emancipatory, but, like postmodernism itself, it also contains implications for pluralism, for the acknowledgement of difference without hierarchy and for the questioning of a unitary self - a self that has been consistently based on a fixed gender identity. But, above all, these challenges to assumptions about gender are not only a visible result of postmodern change but they are also the motor of further critical discourses that extend beyond questions about gender itself. This is because gender difference, the symbolic opposition of the male and the female, has been employed as a paradigm throughout human history. On the one hand, it has been the far from neutral way of understanding human qualities within a hierarchy that privileges those qualities attributed to the male, but, on the other hand, it has also served as a way of retaining the very idea of oppositional thinking itself. As is well known, Jung uses gender differences in both these ways so it will be interesting to see where, and how, post-Jungians have begun to deconstruct gender and its applications within the postmodern frame.

The Jungian analyst Beverley Zabriskie points out how gender has been a constant throughout the ages in the way it has been used by human beings to grasp their world and to make psychological and emotional sense of it.

The receptive and the penetrating, the near and the distant, the cyclic and the linear, the containing and the moving were manifest pairs, complements, opposites, in both the elements and creatures of nature. They were assigned gender, the most apparent carrier of difference. Gender was thus projected onto, and seen in correspondence with, humankind’s external surroundings: ... Gender informed and shaped the understanding of the universe ... and was then extended into mythology, theology, philosophy, history, sociology, and psychology.

(Zabriskie, 1990: 267)
According to Zabriskie, there now seems good evidence to suppose that, in previous eras, female attributes and feminine energies were valued and celebrated far more than they have been over the last two thousand years. The growth of civilisations in size and complexity saw a consequent change in the valuing of the feminine and the demoting of a culture and cosmology of Great Goddesses:

As male rulers and conquerors of ascendant civilisations sought to have their agendas and appetites reinforced by male gods, goddesses in many cultures lost primary status to increasingly patriarchal and domineering father gods ... The ascendant masculine values rigidified into patriarchal orthodoxies, self-consciously superior toward all that seemed to belong to women’s contextual and emotional sensibilities.

(ibid.: 269)

Zabriskie gives the example of how a general experiential quality, the principle of the receptive - once positively assigned to the feminine - has suffered under patriarchy. Women are valued for their supportive connections to others but they also tend to be placed in the position of living up to characteristics projected onto them by patriarchy and for these to be viewed as innate. Thus, Zabriskie summarises,

womanly relatedness may be merely submission to an outer mandate or an internal compulsion - at the cost of authentic relation to the actual and potential in oneself and in another. Sadly, the fundamental, universal principle of the receptive, with its powerful and active generative energy, is then domesticated, as if transmuted and tamed within the constricting notion of availability.

(ibid.: 271)

Zabriskie claims that depth psychology ‘implicitly challenges patriarchal authority’ by the way it suggests individuals and groups are shaped by the unconscious, but then, of course, has to admit how its late nineteenth-century founders, Freud and Jung, were steeped in the patriarchal assumptions of their times. Here we come once again upon the problem of how can a challenge to the dominant rationality emerge with any radical force from that very rationality itself? I think the way to look at this is that the radical challenge does not emerge fully formed to any degree at all. It will always carry the language and assumptions of the previous perspective and it is only over time and through frequent reworking.
in different cultural spaces that a robust enough shift will become more or less established. Even then, the new thinking will drag behind it much of the old and critics of the new departure will find it tempting to dismiss real change on the grounds of the assumptions still left over from the beginnings. I think this is the problem we have with psychoanalysis and analytical psychology and 'the unconscious.' Not only is there a problem with Freud's and Jung's views about women and the feminine, but further difficulties lie with the tendency to genderise aspects of the psyche - and then assume sexist hierarchies between these aspects - which, nowadays, strikes many analysts as quite unnecessary.

There is something powerful in the concepts of depth psychology that goes beyond the patriarchal tone of the original texts. This is why it is so important to pay more attention to the reworking of Freud and Jung by post-Freudians and post-Jungians, and why a number of feminists have turned to post-Freudian writers like Lacan. Having said this, we are still able to detect important deconstructing elements in Jung's own writing that, despite his patriarchal essentialism elsewhere, support a radical challenge to modernity when it comes to feminist concerns. As Zabriskie points out: 'Jung noted that the conscious values that had informed 'civilised' Western women and men in the last two millennia were masculine: authority and dominance within hierarchical structures, penetrating and focused assertion and aggression, superiority of linear cognition and detached rationality' (ibid.: 272). And, within a way of thinking about the psyche that regarded it in tension and balanced between pairs of opposites, the unconscious became characterised as feminine: 'Insofar as he believed the unconscious to have a compensatory function in relation to the cultural dominants and the established ego, it followed that the intuitive, elliptical, contextual and emotionally charged mythopoetic language and imagery of the unconscious shared qualities and associations with those outside the prevailing order: the poets, mystics, dreamers, lunatics, lovers and women' (ibid.). Jung's personal experience was key to this understanding of the psyche of contemporary men: it was a female voice he encountered in his own imaginal self-analysis:

I was greatly intrigued by the fact that a woman should interfere (sic) with me from within. My conclusion was that she must be the 'soul' in the primitive sense, and I began to speculate on the reasons why the name 'anima' was given to the soul. Why was it thought of as feminine? Later I came to see that this inner feminine figure plays a typical, or archetypal, role in the unconscious of a man, and I called her the 'anima'. The corresponding figure in the unconscious
of a woman I called the ‘animus’. It is she who communicates the images of the unconscious to the conscious mind, and that is what I chiefly valued her for.


The idea of the unconscious and the feminine coinciding and becoming linked due to their shared position as being Other to cultural dominants which are of a masculinist, patriarchal mode of being is central to the post-Jungian view of analytical psychology as a radical response to modernity. But I wish to leave this theme at an introductory stage at the moment to go on to examine some postmodern views of sex and gender and then return to compare the Jungian position with these.

POSTMODERN SEX, POSTMODERN GENDER

Several feminist thinkers critically address a range of sexist assumptions about women and gender difference which then come to form a discourse of women’s nature, essential qualities and attributes which are used to explain the position women find themselves allocated within culture. This is the critique of Mary Daly in Gyn/Ecology for whom there is an essential female nature which is determined by and is manifested through the female body. This view then notes how the uniquely female is denigrated and repressed in patriarchal culture so that women are prevented from knowing and appreciating themselves and their sister human beings. A separatist solution is recommended - one in which women should create their own institutions, symbols, religions, and so on that would reflect an ‘essential feminine consciousness’. With such regressive urges, promoting some idea of a golden age of the feminine that needs to be re-found, and the retention of female essentialism, this is hardly a postmodern view. It is, however, one which has appealed to readers of Jung, who find in it a revaluation of the feminine and literalise this to mean women themselves. As I said above, it is as the Other that women are aligned with a variety of Others, via the feminine, but it is a mistake to find in this anything about what is essential in women themselves.

Carol Gilligan, like Nancy Chodorow, produces a different critique which focuses on the asymmetry in child-rearing that tends to reproduce gender asymmetries. The idea is that girls develop a connectedness to the world and others while boys must separate to individuate. Emancipation for women will only arrive once it is acknowledged that ‘woman’s ways of knowing are not second-rate versions of “real (read patriarchal) knowledge” but in fact speak to crucial aspects of human
existence totally ignored by 'male-stream' thinking’ (O'Hara, 1996: 148). These ideas are more useful, especially in positing undervalued human qualities that get allocated to women, but I feel the theorising relies too much on the power of familial experiences early in life without addressing other wider and deeper sources of cultural influence. When it comes to a postmodern feminist critique, it is the French feminist writers Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous who have the most to offer in the way they argue that the deepest layers of women's and men's psyches are in fact constructed within - and so form part of - patriarchal discourse. The feminist analyses above, in their emancipatory and enlightening forms, suffer from being limited by a reliance on the language of the very discourse they seek to address.

Although these three feminist writers are distinctively individual - a point they all regard as central to countering the homogenisation of women in patriarchal culture - they are frequently grouped together because of the way they understand the position of women from a postmodern perspective. Their analysis of women, culture, language and psychoanalysis forms a challenge to the dominant rationality that, on the one hand, provides a critique of modern culture that extends beyond feminist concerns, but, on the other hand, also locates the position of women as a central and emblematic field illustrative of a range of postmodern critical thinking. All of this plus their use of the concept of the unconscious in their discourse, makes a comparison with analytical psychology, despite its patriarchal roots, a real possibility, and one which I will use to shed light on the postmodern concerns common to both.

What are Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva saying in their postmodern critique that is also feminist discourse? And what are post-Jungian writers and feminists saying that compares with this? First, similar to the Jungian view, Cixous and Irigaray emphasise how Western culture is characterised by a certain form of rationality, a product of the Enlightenment, that assumes superiority and is unconscious of its one-sided, repressive and repressed, assumptions. This form of rationality, Irigaray maintains, is male and structured by a form of identity - that is, A is A because it is not B. It is a rationality characterised by binary, either/or thinking which minimises ambiguity and ambivalence by maintaining oppositional categories like culture/nature, head/heart and so on. Jung's thinking displays such an oppositional style, it must be said, and this has been criticised by post-Jungians such as Zabriskie (1990) and Samuels (1989) - not least when Jung opposes the 'masculine' and the 'feminine'. Cixous relates this style of rationality to the
creation of an opposition between 'man' and 'woman' and she also notes that such pairs always involve a hierarchy which privileges one side of the pair and represses the other. These dialectical structures powerfully influence the formation of subjectivity and thus of sexual difference. Cixous uses Hegel's Master/Slave relation to illustrate how woman becomes represented as the Other, which is necessary to the creation of identity but which then persists as a threat. This is a view of sexual difference as a power structure where one side, the female, otherness and difference, has to be repressed. Questioning the inevitability of structural hierarchies, Cixous, like all three writers, focuses on the space where women are placed by culture. Irigaray points out how this is a monosexual culture where women are marginalised and dislocated as 'defective men'. The form of reason we live with is not neutral but gendered, and its great discourses such as science are in fact discourses of the male subject. The master narratives the postmodern abandons really are of the master who is both male and in charge. In proposing rationality as male there is a danger in classing women as irrational or as the unconscious of culture, but as one commentator puts it: 'What is important is that rationality is categorised by Irigaray as male, not in order to oppose it, but in order to suggest a more adequate conceptualisation in which the male does not repress or split off the female/unconscious, but acknowledges and integrates it' (Sarup, 1993: 117).

In one way, this is what Jung recommends in his own writing, but, as Demaris Wehr (1988) points out, when Jung declares he is going to discuss the anima, an aspect of male psychology, what he in fact does is to launch into a description of the psychology of women. His views are fudged between the unconscious Other of male ego-consciousness, which is characterised as 'feminine', and the way this is described in terms of and as if it were identical to - the psychology of women. In Jung, the feminine Other to 'male' Enlightenment rationality - a useful critical analysis - becomes compounded with a sexist attempt at describing the psychology of women which is full of all the errors that the first critique would wish to address. It is no wonder that Jungians have been in two minds about analytical psychology on the feminine. While it is valid to link the anima and female psychology in terms of how the projection of a male anima onto women contours women's self-image, to do so without a recognition of the bias of patriarchal culture results in an essentialist view just at the point at which Jung could be really revaluing the 'feminine'.
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Thus the downside of Jung’s valuing of the ‘feminine’ as part of a general critique of the one-sidedness of modernity, becomes a confirmation of women as the repressed, and inferior. Other which, for Jungian feminists, plays into women’s actual experience of themselves as alienated and inferior. Wehr cites this passage from Jung for its subliminal message that women can find their identity through the service of a man:

Woman, with her very dissimilar psychology, is and always has been a source of information about things for which a man has no eyes. She can be his inspiration; her intuitive capacity, often superior to man’s, can give him timely warning, and her feeling, always directed towards the personal, can show him ways which his own less personally accented feeling would never have discovered.

(Jung, 1917, CW 7: 186)

Polly Young-Eisendrath notes how all her women patients suffer from an evaluation of themselves as somehow deficient or inadequate, and Demaris Wehr following Mary Daly’s ideas of the internal self-hater or ‘internalised oppressor’, notes how Jungian psychology may help by offering a form of dialogue with such an internal figure - complex or sub-personality - and thus restore a woman’s autonomy and identity as an individual. But she is more critical of Jungian methods whereby ego-consciousness needs to reduce its dominance to allow in the influence of other aspects of the psyche and the self. It is pointed out that under patriarchy, it cannot be assumed that the state of the ego is similar for women and men. When the dominant consciousness is ‘male’, women’s ego is compromised. The rebirth of the personality contingent upon a ‘death’ of the ego needs to proceed differently for men and for women, Wehr claims. ‘For example, perhaps men need to undergo the annihilation of an ego experienced as separate and distinct from others and to be reborn into relationality’ (Wehr, 1988: 103). On the other hand, women need not so much the annihilation of the ego but a ‘need to die to the false self system that patriarchy has imposed upon them, whatever form it has taken’ (ibid.).

Beverley Zabriskie points out how we owe much to Jung for his resurrection and revaluing of the mythopoeic and inner figures of the unconscious and of history which contribute to a restoration of a ‘feminine’ otherwise undervalued and ignored in modernity. At the level of the individual - in Jungian analytic work - attention to inner images that are either threatening to a woman’s identity - from a
conventional point of view - or are idealising of the male, can, through integration with the woman's consciousness, offer a sense of self and a more complete personality less subject to the influence and pressure of patriarchal society. But Zabriskie agrees that Jung was at fault in projecting his own anima and personal associations onto women and their psychology, 'It is as if the archetypes fell into matter and reemerged as stereotypes' (Zabriskie, 1990: 276). One result of this confusion of the unconscious feminine in himself, and other men, with women themselves lead to the intimation that women are more unconscious than men. (Something very similar could be said here about Jung's attitude to the psyche of non-Caucasians which appears as racist as his views on women are sexist. We find here a parallel confusion and projection, this time on to black people, of an unconscious 'primitivity' in Jung himself, his own 'missing layer of consciousness' he found hard to acknowledge (Adams, 1996a).)

So, to summarise the comparison I am making between postmodern feminist theory, Jungian psychology, and its post-Jungian critique: For Jung, the modern psyche manifests as a partial, fragmented version of its potential, dominated by an overly rational consciousness, and with the tendency to project onto others and the world unconscious contents that are denied by the dominant culture. As mentioned above, this dominant style of consciousness was recognised by Jung as being distinctly masculine and coterminous with the rise of patriarchal culture over the last two millennia, an idea which led, in complementary fashion, to conceiving of the neglected aspects as feminine. What Jung saw as necessary for modern culture, the integration of the unconscious and ignored, despised aspects of psyche, was never expressed directly in terms of the position of women. For better or for worse, Jung did not see the need to address women's position as a separate concern. For Jung, we are all, men and women alike, suffering from the same loss - the loss of contact with the unconscious. In a similar way, the French feminists do not restrict their view to women alone, but note that men too suffer from a diminishment in their potential humanity. Both men and women suffer from a lack.

**JULIA KRISTEVA, THE ABJECT AND THE LAPI**

In my view, Julia Kristeva theorises the psyche of men and women in such a way that closely approaches the Jungian concern for modern culture and modern consciousness, and proves useful for its amplification. Kristeva and Irigaray both affirm the archaic force of the pre-Oedipal which remains preserved but repressed
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...in - or excluded from - the human subject. Following Lacan’s position that ‘masculinity’ and ‘truth’ are bogus cultural constructions - maintained by the privileging of the phallus within patriarchal culture - for Irigaray and Kristeva the pre-Symbolic, pre-Oedipal realm of the semiotic is pre-patriarchal and therefore offers the potential for psychical experience that is free of the cultural restrictions that patriarchy imposes. (For an explanation of Kristeva’s use of the terms ‘semiotic’ and ‘Symbolic’ which differ radically from the Jungian usage see Chapter 8, pp. 193-194). Together with Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva focus on the place or position from which women can speak. In a way that helps us link these ideas with analytical psychology, Rosalind Minsky summarises how these thinkers not only see,

women’s position as the lack as marginal, dislocated, excluded, despised, abandoned and rejected but also a position which, because it lies in the unconscious, allows a way of speaking to women and men beyond the reach of phallic control, in a domain which potentially offers meanings based on openness, plurality, diversity and genuine difference. In other words, this position may offer women and men the opportunity to become themselves.

(Minsky, 1996: 180, italics added)

In seeking to extend the feminist agenda, these theorists are keen to say something about the condition of women and men which amounts to a critique of culture and consciousness - a critique that I find comparable to Jung’s position. Jung’s psychology emphasises how, in contemporary western culture, attention to the unconscious is minimised, ignored and despised. Jung’s concern is the lack and the strength to be found in the marginalisation of the unconscious, while the French feminists are concerned with the lack and the strength to be found in the marginalisation of women and the ‘feminine’. The latter express themselves in psycho-analytic and Lacanian terms: the pre-Oedipal and pre-Symbolic; in contrast to Jung who, among several forms of expression, found the language and symbols of alchemy imagistically and emotionally resonant as ways of conveying the unconscious outside the dominant rationality - or outside the Symbolic Order, to use Lacan’s term- which constructs a particular cultural ‘reality’. When Jung is expressing himself in the metaphor or language game of alchemy, he notes how words like excluded, discarded, rejected, abandoned and despised are used to refer to the lapis philosophorum or philosopher’s stone. The lapis refers to the concept of the humble stone, which is, on the one hand, rejected by the builders - perhaps
the ‘builders’ of mainstream culture and rationality - but, on the other hand, is valued by those who are paying attention to the neglected and marginalised aspects of their psyche and their humanity. The lapis, in other words, the rejected, marginalised and discarded, may then be used in achieving the goal of integrating conscious and unconscious parts of psyche. Viewed within such a frame, the passage I highlighted above - ‘this position may offer women and men the opportunity to become themselves’ - appears to refer to the Jungian concept of individuation - Jung’s version of know thyself, or rather, become thyself - which is the process of such an integration. Jung tells the story of how, when he was building the Tower at Bollingen, among the stones specially cut and delivered from a quarry there was a cornerstone which had been wrongly cut: ‘The mason was furious and told the barge men to take it right back with them.’ But, Jung tells us, rather than get rid of the stone, he knew he wanted to keep it but did not know why. He began to work on the stone, chiselling into its faces over the years, images and words as they sprang from his unconscious. The first was a verse by the alchemist de Villanova:

Here stands the mean uncomely stone,
Tis very cheap in price!
The more it is despised by fools,
The more loved by the wise.

This verse refers to the alchemist’s stone, the lapis, which is despised and rejected.

(Jung, 1983/1963: 253)

The researcher Johannes Fabricius, in a broad-ranging psychological analysis of alchemical texts that extends beyond Jung to both Freudian and Kleinian ideas, writes about the repulsiveness of the stone - and how this primal matter is compared to the shadow (Fabricius, 1994). An encounter with the shadow is expressed by the alchemists as ‘burrowing into the dung-hill’, an image that compares closely with Kristeva’s concept of the ‘abject’. The abject is disgusting and vomit-inducing, but, in Kristeva’s view, it is not a ‘lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order’ (Kristeva, 1980: 4). ‘The abject is what is on the border, what doesn’t respect borders ...It is neither one or the other. It is undecidable. The abject is not a ‘quality in itself’. Rather it is a relationship to a boundary and represents what has been ‘jettisoned out of that boundary, its other side, a margin’ (Kristeva, 1980: 69)’ (Oliver, 1993: 56). Like Jung’s
stone, it not only falls outside structure but it also stands for and reminds us of the very existence of the structure. It reveals the possibility of marginality by its refusal to be included or excluded and yet is still excluded.

The alchemical imagery and associations to the *lapis philosophicorum* reveal further connections to Kristeva’s ‘abject’ that root this as a concept which goes deeper than the feminist and psychoanalytic agendas from one point of view, but, from another angle, may also reveal how these have their source in the concepts that alchemy was also expressing. Fabricius points out how certain alchemical imagery depicts the perennial mystery of the birth of the human subject - which has its source in two (the male and female parents) then develops as one (the fetus in the mother) to become two (individual and mother) upon the separation at birth. He finds that the umbilical cord symbolises - and on the biological level is the embodiment of - what we call *primary identification*: the state of the subject before the existence of subjecthood, before its separation from the body of the mother. The alchemical image of the *body-phallus-cord* - which Fabricius regards as an ‘equation of the unconscious at its vaginal-uterine level of organization’ (Fabricius, 1994: 75) - also appears as the archetypal image of the serpent in dreams and in myths such as the Book of Genesis where it is explicitly connected to the primal act. Fabricius quotes Otto Rank’s psychoanalytic finding that castration anxiety derives its affective force from an actual, earlier, and more profound event: the cutting of the umbilical cord at birth, the aggressive separation of ‘one body’ (the mother-baby unit pre-birth) into two. In other words, the Oedipal crisis and resolution that thrusts the infant into the world of individual subjecthood and ‘separation’ from mother through the threat of paternal intervention (in Freud’s formulation) is a replay or reminder of the more profoundly significant separation from the mother’s body upon birth. Fabricius points out how Melanie Klein’s theorising of the pre-Oedipal infant in the months after birth with its fantasies and projections of aggression and retaliation, attacking and devouring, links closely to the significance of the umbilical ‘castration’. The difference is that in Freud it is the Father - or patriarchy - that performs the aggressive intervention, while in Klein, it is the more Jungian and alchemical image of the ‘phallic mother’, the Terrible Mother pole of the Great Mother archetype, who is fantasised as responsible for the separation. As we see shortly, Kristeva’s ideas bring these two ‘castrations’ together, the Oedipal-Symbolic both requiring but repressing the earlier maternal authority-body.

In alchemy, the potential ego or subject is conveyed by the image of the
hero-knight who, like St George in the myth, encounters and battles with the dragon’s fire. In this battle for birth - or rebirth - there is a secret identity between the dragon-fighting knight and his ‘fetal’ animal symbol the salamander; both enter the fire (of the womb and of rebirth) without being consumed by the fire. ‘By “feeding” on it and so partaking of it, reveals the salamander as a symbol of primary identification’ (ibid.: 77). The link with the stone or lapis is quite direct in the alchemical texts: ‘The philosophers have called this stone our salamander, because, like a salamander, it is fed exclusively by the fire; it lives in it, that is to say, it is perfected by it, and so it is with our stone.’ In other words, the lapis too refers to primary identification - also known as primary narcissism, the primary self or the original non-dual state. What then, you may ask, has all this medieval gobbledegook got to do with our present subject of Kristeva’s ‘abject’ and its connection with what she calls a maternal realm of the ‘semiotic’. Kristeva is theorising a place which precedes the Symbolic order of patriarchal culture from which women (and, ultimately, men) might both speak and experience without the restrictions and distortions imposed by patriarchy. If, as Kelly Oliver explains, the abject is a relationship to a boundary and represents what has been jettisoned, the other side of the boundary, its margin, it remains threatening to the social or Symbolic order.

The Symbolic is the order of boundaries, discrimination and difference. Reality is parcelled into words and categories. Society is parcelled into classes, castes, professional and family roles, etc. The abject threat comes from what has been prohibited by the Symbolic order, what has been prohibited so the Symbolic order can be. The prohibition that founds, and yet undermines, society is the prohibition against the maternal body.

(Oliver, 1993: 56)

And this not only refers to the separation from the mother expressed as Freud's Oedipal incest prohibition or Lacan's formulation of a prohibition against the mother's jouissance. Kristeva's emphasis is similar to Otto Rank's in that the abject has its source in the earliest, profound separation: the separation of birth itself. Fabricius notes how 90 per cent of all fetal distress is caused by the death-like choking and suffocation experienced as the umbilical cord is cut and ‘200 to 300 million uninflated air sacs are expanded for the first time while blood circulates to the lungs to pick up the oxygen earlier supplied by the mother’s placenta’ (Fabricius, 1994: 79). In this way, human birth is a death and rebirth experience.
Beyond the biological fact, Kristeva is indicating how both human life and human society are initiated by this prototypical abject experience. The identity of the subject starts here for, ‘Before the umbilical cord is cut, who can decide whether there is one or two?’ (Oliver, 1993: 57).

Like the lapis of the alchemists, primary identification, the abject is pre-subject and pre-object and thus ‘Abjection is therefore a kind of narcissistic crisis’ (Kristeva, 1980: 14). The phallic mother re-emerges in Kristeva’s formulation as the maternal authority which regulates the boundaries of the clean and unclean self and not-self through the regulation of the food the body takes in and the regulation of the faeces the body expels. In this way the abject, and boundaries and ‘order’, are founded on maternal authority; it is this maternal authority that the Symbolic order represses while at the same time it relies on its foundational boundary-laying. The abject persists as a threat to the Symbolic order that has to be excluded not repressed. Thus the abject and the lapis refer to many linked themes at the personal, social, epistemological, biological, alchemical and sexual levels of human experience. They refer to the emergence of ‘twness’ from ‘oneness’ that is human birth- the beginning of self and other; they refer to the rejected ‘unclean’ and marginal that is excluded from the order of (patriarchal) rationality and is associated, because of birth from a mother, with the female; they refer to the ‘problem’ of the tension between avoiding separation from the mother and avoiding identification with the mother, which has to be ‘discarded’ for the entry into subjechthood and society to be possible. The abject, and the lapis, represents what is left out of patriarchal order, for the feminists, excluded from the rationality of modern consciousness for Jungians, and that which forms the symbolic (in a Jungian not a Kristevan/Lacanian sense) ground for the transformation of rebirth for the alchemists. Similarly, for the contemporary feminist and Jungian alike, the abject and the lapis both represent a conceptual space from which both modernity and patriarchy may be critically addressed.

Jung’s narrative of the discarded stone literalises for us the abstraction of the abject, or the metaphor of the lapis. He writes of how he felt compelled to carve the discarded stone; the language that came to him was Latin sayings - ‘more or less quotations from alchemy’:

I am an orphan, alone; nevertheless I am found everywhere. I am one but opposed to myself. I am youth and old man at one and the same time. I have known neither father nor mother, because I have had to be fetched out of the
deep like a fish, or fell like a white stone from heaven. In woods and mountains
I roam, but I am hidden in the innermost soul of man. I am mortal for everyone,
yet I am not touched by the cycle of aeons.

(Jung, 1983/1963: 254)

Linking back to what I have been saying in the previous chapter, Jung notes how
the carved stone stands outside his Tower and is both ‘an explanation of it’ and ‘a
manifestation of the occupant’ but one which remains impossible for others to
understand. Jung’s language is alchemical and medieval- and also Taoist in tone,
something to be explored in Chapter 8 - but I feel it directs us to the pre-objectal,
pre-Symbolic of Kristeva’s abject and what she refers to as the ‘semiotic’. Jung tells
us how he wanted to carve ‘Le cri de Merlin’ into the back face, the ‘cry that no one
could understand’ which, according to the twelfth-century legend, sounded from
the forest after Merlin’s death. Again I am reminded of the pre-Symbolic, the abject
outside the boundary of ‘meaning’ which, although excluded, persists in the
unconscious. Jung reckons that the secret of Merlin was taken up by the alchemists
and, later, by his own psychology of the unconscious and ‘remains uncomprehended
to this day! That is because most people find it quite beyond them to live on close
terms with the unconscious. Again and again I have had to learn how hard this is
for people’ (Jung, 1983/1963: 255). And although she theorises within a quite
different discourse, when Kristeva speaks of the semiotic she too refers to ‘the use
of a specifically poetic language which, because of its close involvement with the
unconscious, must always challenge the arbitrary, male-defined categories
through which we experience the world’ (Minsky, 1996: 179).

Kristeva, however, is not so one-sided to think that women, or any of us, can speak
purely from the pre-Symbolic position. Any position, once represented, will be
absorbed into language and assimilated into the Symbolic; this is why
‘Kristeva does not place her hopes for women in the body and the pre-oedipal,
phallic mother beyond the authority of the phallus’ (ibid.: 180). Instead, she
regards the meaning of the pre-oedipal mother as encompassing both ‘masculinity’
and ‘femininity’: ‘masculine’ because of the way the baby experiences the mother
as all-powerful and phallic, and also ‘feminine’ because the mother in the semiotic
‘lies outside the phallic imposition of meaning which asserts itself during the
Oedipal crisis’ (ibid.: 181). This is why Kristeva recommends that women ‘should
employ a double discourse which reflects the real state of identity which must
always be fluid - at the same time both “masculine” and “feminine” - both inside
and outside the boundaries of the symbolic’ (ibid.). This double discourse brings to mind the double coding of the postmodern we came across in Charles Jencks’s architectural analysis in the last chapter. In that case it referred to the way the postmodern is defined by a double-coding, not only in its combination of modern techniques with traditional wisdom, but also through the pluralistic inclusion of elite/popular, accommodating/subversive and new/old. In that section I compared this pluralism to elements in Jung’s psychology, but in the present case of Kristeva and post-modern feminism the double is that of the ‘masculine’ and the ‘feminine’. Making such a comparison helps us to see how masculine and feminine are not only metaphors for a gendered, and also hierarchised, conceptualising of the ‘real world’, but they also embody such a dichotomising, in this culture and era, in the actual bodies of men and of women. Where the postmodern perspective helps us, whether it is speaking from the point of view of architecture, depth psychology or feminism, is how it admits and celebrates a pluralism - the fluid real state of identity in Kristeva - that addresses the limits of a skewed, modernist, ‘masculinist’, rationality as the only approach to the ‘real world’ and to ‘truth’.

THE SHADOW, THE OTHER, PROJECTION AND THE SEMIOTIC

In her essay Women’s Time (1981), Kristeva highlights a number of concerns that are to be found in Jung’s work as well as that of post-Jungians such as Andrew Samuels who is discussed in the next section. Not only does Kristeva note that modernity is considered to be the first historical epoch in which humans have attempted to live without religion, but she also notes that the feminism of the 1980s seems to have gone beyond a social-political level and is situated in the very framework of the religious crisis of modernity. This leads her to question the usefulness of the dichotomy ‘men’ versus ‘women’ as being another thought-trap based on the original cutting, castrating imagery of patriarchy. She recommends, ‘an introduction of its cutting edge into the very interior of every identity whether subjective, sexual, ideological, or so forth’ (Kristeva, 1981, in Minsky, 1996: 286). Kristeva views women as part of a group of cultural scapegoats that includes others like the Jews under the Third Reich, thus her statement recommends that instead of scapegoating the external Other in a social-political field, contemporary feminism offers an opportunity for women to address the interiorised, rejected and oppressive Other within. This alternative amounts to nothing less than ‘the
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Excerpted from Jung and the Postmodern

analysis of the potentialities of victim/executioner which characterize each identity, each subject, each sex’ (ibid.).

Apart from sounding similar to Beverley Zabriskie’s analysis of what Jungian psychology can offer to women, Kristeva’s position is generally similar to a Jungian emphasis on a need for the integration of the unconscious shadow - Jung’s term for the ‘other’ in ourselves which ego-consciousness tends to reject. In the feminist discourse, each gender has the other as just one part of each individual’s shadow, but the genderised other, and its rejection, is seen as a critical confrontation with which men and women should struggle in present times. The Jungian analyst Warren Colman, in his paper ‘Contrasexuality and the Unknown Soul’ (1998), emphasises how the gendered Other within each man or woman, the anima or animus image, represents lost parts of the personality felt to be foreign and other to the ego but which are calling for inclusion and to be in dialogue with ego. In this, Colman is one of several post-Jungians who have tackled Jung’s tendency to identify the unconscious feminine other of the anima with an inferiorised woman’s psychology; Colman does this by emphasising the disparaged Other without the need to anthropomorphise it into a woman. In line with postmodern feminist thinking, this post-Jungian perspective emphasises how what is kept for ego and what is abandoned or despised as other, is not neutral or accidental but arises as a result of what the culture will or will not support. This is why the critique of mainstream patriarchal, masculine dominated culture as discussed in feminist discourse is central not only to the improvement of women’s position but for addressing much of the failure of modernity that postmodern thinking and Jung’s psychology is also directing us toward. The concept of projection is as important in Kristeva as it is in Jung’s and post-Jungian theorising of the Other and the shadow. What is projected differs across these views but the mechanism of projection itself is central to both their arguments. Kristeva’s emphasis is on acknowledging the difference in ourselves - the ‘stranger in ourselves’ as she calls it - rather than denying this and projecting it onto others in an effort to establish our own identities.

As we have seen, Kristeva uses the concepts of the abject and the semiotic to track the tension between the pre-Oedipal and Oedipal construction of the human subject. Her concept of the semiotic refers to the pre-Oedipal position, the relationship with the mother and thus the ‘repressed feminine’. The semiotic is always in interplay with, but repressed within, the Symbolic, the social order, but in times of greater cultural disruption, the semiotic can be seen to burst through.
Kristeva sees this in the art of the avant-garde with their extreme challenges to the Symbolic and the world of the taken-for-granted. The semiotic also bursts through as holiness, madness or poetry, or often all three, although there is the risk that this is reconverted back into the Symbolic, its energy dissipated through the conserving, ordering power of the Symbolic. But the opposite extreme may arise: the social phenomenon of fascism, where disruptive semiotic processes energise not only a narcissistic adoration of the charismatic leader, but through this, a rigidified, hierarchical organisation that presents a dangerous parody of the previously dominant Symbolic while nevertheless succeeding to replace it.

Jung and post-Jungians write about the shadow in a way that suggests it functions like Kristeva’s semiotic. The shadow not only has an individual function which manifests in the sphere of personal psychology and neurosis, but it is also emphasised how the shadow functions collectively, sometimes with devastating effects on cultural and political life. Dealing with the shadow on a purely personal level, Jung writes: ‘Everyone carries a shadow, and the less it is embodied in the individual’s conscious life, the blacker and denser it is’ (Jung, 1940, CW 11: para. 131). Isolated from consciousness it cannot be modified or influenced and so it can burst forth suddenly or it may thwart the subject’s well-meant intentions. Jung suggests we all need to find a way for the conscious personality and the shadow to live together (ibid.: para. 132). Among the shadow’s tendencies, Jung includes the ‘statistical criminal’ in us all which is suppressed more or less consciously; the ‘unconventional, socially awkward’ tendencies repressed by ‘looking the other way so as not to become conscious of one’s desires’ (ibid.: para. 129); and the ‘inferior qualities and primitive tendencies ... of the man who is less ideal and more primitive than we should like to be’ (ibid.: para. 130). The shadow is also ‘unadapted and awkward’ (ibid.: para. 134) - a description that conveys further shades of Kristeva’s semiotic: ‘it contains childish or primitive qualities which would ...vitalize and embellish human existence, but convention forbids!’ (ibid.).

Beginning with her focus on the position of women, which depicts how the semiotic is subsumed under the symbolic, Kristeva ends up with a text about the repression of unconscious elements in the psyche - a focus very much shared with Jung. Jung seems to ignore any direct recognition of patriarchy in the feminist sense but there is a connection with the ‘feminine’ and the mother, too, quite detectable in Jung’s concept of the shadow. He makes a link not only between the shadow and the anima - the ‘feminine’ in men - but also between the shadow and the ‘earth’ which Jung consistently associates with the Great Mother as in Mother
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Earth. As the source of our ambivalent relationship to an all-powerful but
containing mother in the personal and the mythological sense something very
similar to Kristeva’s analysis of the repressed maternal body and maternal
authority of the phallic mother is implied here in Jung’s writing. He quite
specifically states that the anima is resisted ‘because she represents ...the
unconscious and all those tendencies and contents hitherto excluded from
conscious life. They were excluded for a number of reasons, both real and apparent.
Some are suppressed and some are repressed’ (ibid.: para. 129).

Jung’s understanding of the personal shadow is never far from his understanding
of the shadow and its effects in the collective sense. In fact, this theme illustrates
well the way in which Jung’s thinking frequently slips between the personal and
the collective, between the individual and the social and cultural. Critics often miss
this vital element in Jung’s work, reading him along too personalistic a line in a
way that is more true of Freud’s than of Jung’s perspective. Jung’s expression is
often awkward, class-conscious and sexist to contemporary postmodern readers,
but this should not distract us from noticing the importance of his cultural
analysis. Writing in 1937, Jung makes an explicit connection between the shadow,
the earth and the current situation of Nazism in Europe that predates a Kristevan
understanding of the effect of the semiotic when it bursts through the collective:

The educated public, flower of our present situation, has detached itself from
its roots, and is about to lose connection with the earth as well. There is no
civilized country nowadays where the lowest strata of the population are not in
a state of unrest and dissent. In a number of European nations such a condition
is overtaking the upper strata too. This state of affairs demonstrates our
psychological problem on a gigantic scale. Inasmuch as collectivities are mere
accumulations of individuals, their problems are accumulations of individual
problems.

(ibid.: para. 134)

By asserting that what is required is a ‘general change of attitude’ by individuals
themselves, Jung is not being a psychological reductionist but is pointing out
something similar to what we find in Kristeva’s writing in the 1980s. That is, that
when a culture or social formation cannot contain its Symbolic, its dominant
conscious ordering of the world, to any degree - due to loss of faith in, and
effectiveness of, symbols such as leadership, religious belief, economic power,
national identity, political conventions or whatever - then the unconscious shadow
will burst through, like the semiotic, and find in a charismatic leader a new form of order that may have devastating effects. Due to his interest in grand cultural myths, Jung analysed the rise of Hitler and the Third Reich, with its mythology and symbolism of an omniscient Germanic nation, in terms of this historical moment of European culture not being able to supply any other symbols for the projection of shadow contents which resulted in them being projected onto the State and its leader. The energy behind this projection comes from the personal shadow with its despised, childish, excluded contents - unintegrated, urgently seeking expression and bursting forth.

Certain post-Jungians, like Loren Pederson in his book *Dark Hearts: Unconscious Forces That Shape Men’s Lives* (1991), connect the collective shadow with masculinity and the repression of the feminine, again in line with the postmodern feminists. Pederson produces a post-Jungian development of ideas about the shadow that links it specifically with the negative aspects of men and masculinity in contemporary culture:

Rather than being able to rest with a conscious sense of superiority, he [the contemporary man] is saddled with an unconscious sense of inferiority - a sense of inadequacy vis-a-vis the creative maternal and the feminine. In this way he becomes impaired in his ability to promote life, to nurture, and to relate effectively and empathically with either men or women. The anima, then, even though it is projected, is best understood in this context as an incomplete, damaged sense of self.

(Pederson, 1991: 164-165)

He goes on to note how men need women to carry the deprecated image of femininity as a projection of what is split off and denied in men, with the result that women may be said to be carriers of an anima image that is contaminated by the masculine shadow. This analysis pushes us a step further in our understanding and criticism of Jung’s projection of his own anima onto women’s psychology.

Pederson is keen to analyse Freud’s idea of the death instinct and its connection with aggression and the way that this is culturally emphasised by men’s behaviour, ‘as if aggression and the drive for power and control were simply attributes of their sex’ (ibid.). Pederson connects the death instinct with men’s need for power, which itself is a function of men’s predominantly extroverted approach to the world, women and themselves - ‘or, stated another way, a result of their failure to incorporate the feminine in themselves. We can surmise that men then need women
as a group to carry this deprecated image of femininity’ (ibid., italics added).

Although Pederson makes no broad links with modernity, rationality and its values, these are implied in his analysis of the masculine, but this then causes his citing of the unincorporated ‘feminine’ to suffer from a degree of unfashionable essentialism. Despite this, his ideas provide another approach that goes some way towards bringing Jungian concepts in line with postmodern concerns as expressed in contemporary European feminist discourse.

THE FAILURE OF THE GODDESSES

More successful anti-essentialist views are to be found in the critique of the ‘feminine principle’ and of the ‘goddess’ movement which, at one time, appeared central to several feminist and Jungian positions on women. Maureen O’Hara puts the difficulty succinctly:

The idea of ourselves as ‘goddesses’ or ‘priestesses’ is a deeply comforting antidote to the usual sense of insignificance most women experience in their daily lives. Nonetheless, I think ‘goddess’-type language and affirmations of some inborn, biologically based ‘femininity’ in fact only perpetuate ways of thinking about human realities that themselves justify attitudes and social practices that have disenfranchised women for millennia.

(O’Hara, 1996: 150)

The post-Jungian critique is led by Andrew Samuels who writes in his paper Beyond the Feminine Principle (Samuels, 1990 and 1989) ‘The problem is that the more all-encompassing, the more utopian, the “bigger” the image, the more it devours other images, other people’s images. The “feminine principle” can be such a megaimage’ (Samuels, 1990: 298). Samuels is criticising Jungian feminism for the way it assumes there is something eternal about femininity; that women therefore display essential transcultural and ahistorical characteristics; and that these can be described in psychological terms …(while secondly) …much Jungian discourse on the ”feminine” seems directed away from political and social action. Dwelling upon interiority and feeling becomes an end in itself (ibid.: 296). Here he is hitting upon two major concerns for the postmodern Jungian: first is the tendency towards essentialism in Jung’s theorising, specifically the theory of archetypes common to all humanity; second is the way that hierarchical thinking still remains in Jungian feminism in the way that celebrating the feminine has taken on an oppressive,
privileged tone - in the manner of patriarchy and the phallus - ‘leading to a simple and pointless reversal of power positions’ (ibid.: 297). This second point seems very much in line with Kristeva's and O'Hara's anti-essentialism, and Samuels moves Jungian thinking on from the 'burdensome part of the legacy from Jung' (ibid.: 300)- the essentialism of the eternal and archetypes - to direct our thinking to the phenomenon of difference. Specifically, he refers to the way

Each woman lives her life in interplay with such difference. This may lead to questions of gender role (for example, how a woman can best assert herself in our culture), but these questions need not be couched in terms of innate femininity or innate masculinity, or ...some feminine-masculine spectrum. Rather, they may be expressed in terms of difference ... The psychological processes by which a man becomes an aggressive business executive and a woman a nurturing homemaker are the same, and one should not be deceived by the dissimilarity in the end product ...In the example, the difference between assertion and compliance needs to be seen as different from the difference between men and women. Or, put another way, what ever differences there might be between men and women are not illuminated or signified by the difference between compliance and assertion.

(ibid.: 299)

I have already mentioned Cixous’ criticism of oppositional thinking as typical of the patriarchal, masculine style of rationality we have inherited from the Enlightenment. It is problematic therefore, when I am on a path of discovering the postmodern views critical of modernity in Jung, to have to acknowledge how central to his overall theory is this very principle of opposites. It is the frame, inherited from his late nineteenth century background, that remains with Jung and is used to structure a good deal of what he says about the psyche. Samuels helps us with this, challenging Jungian ideas of wholeness as well:

The notion of difference, I suggest, can help us in the discussion about gender - not innate opposites that lead us to create an unjustified psychological division expressed in lists of antithetical qualities, each list yearning for the other so as to become whole. Not what differences between women and men there are, or have always been ...But rather the fact, image and social reality of difference itself - what difference itself is like, what the experience of difference is like. Not what being a woman is but what being a woman is like. Not the archetypal structuring of woman's world but woman's personal
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experience in today's world.

(ibid.: 300)

As Zabriskie points out above, for Jung, the marginalised unconscious psyche gets expressed as 'female' in a metaphorical sense but this 'metaphor' then comes to have a 'literal' meaning. The 'literalness' of the comparison stems from the way that both the dominant rationality, and dominant cultural mores, define themselves as 'masculine'. They achieve this by privileging a one-sided 'male' culture and a certain style of consciousness which benefits anatomically-defined men and marginalises actual women (anatomically-defined) as well as other aspects of human psychology then labelled 'feminine'. As Andrew Samuels puts it,

Sometimes it is claimed that 'masculine' and 'feminine' are metaphors for two distinct weltanschauung en ...When we bring in either masculinity and femininity or maleness and femaleness, we are projecting a dichotomy that certainly exists in human ideation and functioning onto convenient receptors for the projections. Arguing that masculinity and femininity should be understood nonliterally, as having nothing to do with bodily men and bodily women in a social context, may be taken as an effort to come to terms with what is lost by the projection; but this has not led to a recollection of it.

(ibid.: 301-302)

In this post-Jungian thinking we are also leaving behind the literal/metaphorical issue of 'biology'. That is, we are leaving behind one of the dominant paradigms that influenced Jung's - and, of course, Freud's - psychological thinking; and one we now see as the manifestation of a particularly masculine rationality. As O'Hara says, compared to the essentialist feminism of 'goddess' talk, 'The constructivist position is a harder pill to swallow. Its arguments leave the question of biological contribution to consciousness veiled in mystery. It is not that our biology is irrelevant but that it serves as a lower boundary condition through which and upon which we must construct symbolic reality, both internal and social' (O'Hara, 1996: 151). Samuels makes a similar point from the post-Jungian position: 'each person remains a man or a woman, but what that means to each becomes immediate and relative, and hence capable of generational expansion and cultural challenge. All the time, the question of "masculine" and "feminine" remains in suspension-the bliss of not knowing ... ' (Samuels, 1990: 300). In his phrase 'immediate and relative' Samuels returns us to the tension between the global, grand-narrative and the local, the postmodern problematic, which was introduced as an initial
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approach to essentialism at the start of the chapter.

The shift detectable in postmodern feminism and postmodern Jungian psychology is one away from biology, away from opposites and also away from simplistic metaphorical assumptions that, as I have been emphasising, keep not only men and women in their opposed places, but also keep one style of rationality empowered over any other version of the 'truth'. In his example of the pitfalls inherent in both literal and metaphorical relations between anatomy and psychology, Samuels points out, 'The fact that a penis penetrates and a womb contains tells us absolutely nothing about the psychological qualities of those who possess such organs. One does not have to be a clinician to recognise penetrative women and receptive men or to conclude that psychology has projected its fantasies onto the body' (ibid.: 301). What becomes clear in Samuels' deconstruction of Jungian ideas is that:

Animus and anima images are not of men and women because animus and anima qualities are masculine and feminine. Rather, for the individual woman or man, anatomy is a metaphor for the richness and potential of the 'other'. A man will imagine what is other to him in the symbolic form of a woman - a being with another anatomy. A woman will symbolise what is foreign to her in terms of the kind of body she does not herself have. The so-called contrasexuality is more something 'contrapsychological'; anatomy is a metaphor for that.

(ibid.)

Samuels is making the point that metaphors - especially when referred to as 'just a metaphor' - are seductively misleading. They direct us towards positions and beliefs as one-sided as any 'literalisms'. (The predominance of the 'child' and 'infancy' in contemporary psychotherapy is similarly 'just a metaphor' which has extensive consequences in leading our thinking. I address this topic in Chapter 2.) They are the consequence of the human tendency to project a dichotomy of maleness and femaleness onto convenient receptors for the projections - such as rational/irrational, Apollonian/Dionysian, classical/romantic - which are not possible to genderise without this 'bifurcated projection' (ibid.: 302). Why do we do this? Samuels gives the psychological answer that, 'It could be because we find difficulty in living with both sides of our murky human natures. We import a degree of certainty and clarity, and hence reduce anxiety, by making the projection' (ibid.).
think this answer does not go far enough. For instance, why are we in the position of requiring 'certainty and clarity' to reduce our anxiety? Why is the murkiness, the ambiguity, plurality and ambivalence of our natures anxiety-inducing in the first place? What tells us, or, if you will, who says this is something to be anxious about and that this can be helped by importing 'a degree of certainty and clarity'? A broader socio-cultural and political view would suggest that we are once again encountering the hegemony of a dominant rationality, as the French feminists describe, characterised by its intolerance for ambiguity and by its single-minded, phallic assertion of Truth. In other words, we are encountering the Symbolic of Lacan which produces anxiety in anyone who cannot subscribe to its certainties and who, thereby, risks remaining disempowered in the margin. Once again, the lesson to be learnt is how, when we are employing the double perspectives of individual psychology and collective culture to deconstruct the human condition in postmodern times, it is important to be explicit about the historical and cultural contexts in which our depth psychological insights operate.

THE USE OF MYTHS: FRENCH FEMINISTS, JUNG AND CLINICAL WORK

I should like to end this chapter with a note about the use of material derived from Greek myths. Both Cixous and Irigaray use such mythology to extend their analyses of women’s position and the roots of patriarchy but nowhere is it mentioned, as far as I have found, how this is comparable to the Jungian use of mythological themes. Jung places a great deal of importance on myths in his psychology having noticed that the ‘psychic development of the individual produces something that looks very much like the archaic world of fable’ (Jung, 1935, CW 16: para. 18). Many agree with Jung that both clinical and social analysis can benefit from such an approach because, ‘Mythological ideas reach deep and touch us where reason, will and good intentions do not penetrate’ (ibid.: para. 19). After sketching some French postmodern and post-Jungian feminist applications, I will conclude with a clinical vignette from an analysis with a woman client of my own which sheds light on feminist concerns through a re-examination of the Ariadne myth.

Cixous interprets the Oresteia myth and reads it as a narrative of the origins of patriarchy. Apollo’s ruling that the woman is merely nurse to the seed while the man is the source of life is used to diminish the relative seriousness of matricide compared to the murder of a husband, a view that legitimates the development of patriarchal social relations. Irigaray has interpreted many classical myths where she has been particularly concerned with the unsymbolised mother-daughter
POSTMODERN GENDER
MASCULINE, FEMININE AND THE OTHER

Excerpted from Jung and the Postmodern

relationship which has been bypassed, since the Greeks, in favour of the mother-son relationship. For Irigaray this results in women failing to achieve an identity in the symbolic order that is distinct from their role as mothers. Irigaray accepts the view that women have difficulty in separating from their mothers and tend towards relationships where identity is merged. Irigaray extends Cixous’ analysis of the Orestes/Clytemnestra myth by pointing out how it is Athena, the father’s daughter, who advises Apollo, against the chorus of women, that Orestes’s matricide was justifiable. As Madan Sarup succinctly puts it, ‘In Irigaray’s account of the myth, patriarchy covers its tracks by attributing the justification of matricide to a woman. Athena, the father’s daughter, was an alibi for patriarchy’ (Sarup, 1993: 120).

Jungian psychotherapists are known for using myths and folk stories, in varying degrees, not only to resonate with and amplify the psychological material and imagery their clients bring but also to examine women’s position. The British Jungian analyst Coline Covington has produced an analysis of the folk tale ‘The Handless Maiden’ which she entitles ‘In Search of the Heroine’ (Covington, 1989: 243-254). In this she contrasts the path taken by the eponymous heroine which differs from the path of the hero in this tale and in others. She argues for an equal valuation of the ‘steady state’, stillness and waiting rather than these being regarded as negative and thus negating women who enact these modes. She regards these ‘feminine’ attributes as being modes that belong to men and women alike so that both genders share the potential for the waiting of the heroine or the activity of the hero:

The concept of hero and heroine - and their different struggles - cannot be applied exclusively and respectively to men and women. Men can be under the influence of the heroine just as women can follow the path of the hero. The anatomical difference between hero and heroine does not indicate a basic difference in the psychology of men and women; it is a metaphor of otherness.

(ibid.: 252)

A woman client who I have called Elizabeth when I wrote about her in a previous paper (Hauke, 1997) frequently related to me in a way that called for a variety of mythological comparisons. The fact that I was a man and she a woman was an important aspect of the analysis which, apart from her individual need for healing, shed light on contemporary man-woman relationships in general for which the myths were very useful. In her analysis, the struggle with time boundaries were
difficult for Elizabeth because each occasion I needed to remind her of these was experienced as a painful withholding, or refusal, of her by me which evoked childhood emotions experienced originally in response to her mother’s unavailability. Elizabeth either always arrived on time or slightly early, and when I asked her to wait in the waiting room she felt hurt and rejected. For a period, she was consistently coming early because she had no watch and was taking the time by the church clock around the corner. I felt irritated by her urgent neediness and felt my own time was being squeezed. When I brought up the boundaries of the times of starting and finishing, again in an effort to firm up the analytic nature, and reality of our relationship - from a masculinist, symbolic position, I now recognize - she replied: ‘But your boundary is like a sword’. She was expressing how cut off she felt by the boundary but at the same time she seemed to be valuing its phallic security. She went on to describe an image which seems to convey the possibility of her own phallic empowerment - possession of her animus or addressing her experience of ‘lack’ - which could become facilitated through my sword-like boundary keeping. The image was one of me as St George who, with his sword, was protecting the Dragon - who was ‘like a negative, wicked mother’ - from Elizabeth herself - no longer the ‘vulnerable maiden’ but one transformed into a woman with power. While this image carried a sense of her experience of the Oedipal triangle (and resonance of the rebirth expressed in the alchemical imagery I refer to above), it also felt positive in the casting of herself as a challenger and not a victim. And as if to confirm this, and the rightness of the boundaries, she forged a small, but sharp and heavy sword for me out of beaten metal and gave it as a gift between us.

The importance of this material symbol lies in it being her creation but given to me to be in my possession. I detect in this a particular form of female individuation that we find in the myth of the Minotaur, Ariadne and Theseus. Although it is the hero Theseus who finally slays the monster, his triumph is as much that of Ariadne’s. It is she who advises Theseus the best time to attack the monster, she who supplies him with a sword as well as the vital thread by which he can find his way back out of the labyrinth. Through this, Ariadne enables her own escape from her oppressive father, King Minos, by sailing away with Theseus - only to be abandoned by Theseus on the island of Naxos.

Elizabeth herself felt very strongly that she needed my phallic maleness inside her to empower her and ground her in her work as an artist and in her life in general. She told me how she would imagine my presence as a phallic power within her when she had to accomplish some strenuous task in her studio, for example. This
was a relationship with me that extended beyond the erotic bond often found in analytic work to one that seemed to point directly towards her experience of ‘lack’. The myth, arising it seems from a period when patriarchy was well established, suggests a complicated dynamic that involves the effort of the woman to free herself from the oppressive Father, not directly under her own steam, but through empowering another male— the hero Theseus— who is there to ‘correct’ the father’s errors. In this we should remember how it is through the hubris of King Minos that he keeps the bull lent him by Neptune, and it is through the copulation of Minos’s wife, Ariadne’s mother, and the bull that the Minotaur is born. Like the father in Beauty and the Beast or ‘The Handless Maiden’, Minos features as the foolish father who makes mistakes that usher in the events that lead to his daughter’s path of individuation and fate. Beauty and Ariadne, while pursuing their individuation, do so in reference to, and within the context of, the Father whose order remains. These stories confirm a state where woman, despite her own efforts in empowering the man, is trapped within the Law of the Father.

But, in addition, as I wrote at the end of Chapter 3, the Ariadne myth is rich in a greater imagery that is relevant for the affirmation of life, the development of consciousness, and, coterminously, the integration of the ‘feminine’ or anima. This is the Nietzschean position which, although there is not the space to go into it here, the French feminists also endorse. While still linked to her lover Theseus, Ariadne, ‘is only the feminine image of man: the feminine power remains fettered in man’ (Deleuze, 1986: 187). But when the god Dionysus finds Ariadne abandoned on Naxos and places a non-earthly crown of nine bright stars on her head, the feminine power is emancipated in the form of the beneficial and affirmative Anima.

Although Ariadne’s, and my client’s, individuation, such as it is, is accomplished within conditions that are dominated pervasively by the masculine, initially, there is a spark of hope in the activity displayed by the feminine in Ariadne’s empowerment of Theseus. That this leads once more to Ariadne’s abandonment, and not marriage to Theseus, may be viewed ambiguously as, on the one hand, a loss, or, on the other, a blessing achieved through the ‘divine’ marriage with Dionysus. Going beyond primary affirmation and the initial integration of heroic, phallic aspects, this second affirmation and integration of the unconscious feminine which Ariadne achieves goes further than women—and men—are able to achieve under present cultural conditions. In contrast to Ariadne, in the case of the incomplete project of gender and postmodernity—the integration of the unconscious Other—we still have some way to travel.
CHAPTER 3

THERAPEUTIC ENCOUNTERS AND INTERVENTIONS OUTSIDE THE CONSULTING ROOM

CHALLENGES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

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Analysis and Activism

Edited by Emilija Kiehl, Mark Saban, and Andrew Samuels

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Jung + activism = oxymoron?

This chapter attempts to address the conference theme, 'Jung and Activism', from one specific perspective based on my own endeavours, over many years, in working in contexts outside the analytical consulting room. At the outset, it is important to address the obvious question as to whether Jungian psychology and ‘activism’ are at all compatible. The question is appropriate because, prima facie, any connection between the two appears to be incongruous; if anything, ‘Jungian activism’ is an oxymoron because nothing about Jung could be construed as connected with activism, as it is commonly understood.

Without elaborating over the various definitions and forms of activism, I propose that we understand activism as the questioning of existing power relations and the contesting ‘of regimes of authority that seek to govern us’ (Rose, 1999, p. 60). Both the terms ‘regimes of authority’ and ‘govern’ should be understood in the widest possible way, to cover not only governmental politics but also societal discourses and professional ideologies with reference to theory and practice (Norris, 2002 and 2007).

Jung is known for his notorious conservative outlook with regard to his political and social views and, therefore, he can hardly be considered as an activist. During the cold war, he identified totally with the polarised view that everything that did not conform with the outlook of the ‘free western world’ was a product of ‘communism’, which he condemned outright (cf. Papadopoulos, 2002a). Uncharacteristically to the complexity of his thinking and cultural sophistication, he seemed to be incapable of affording any critique of his own political position. There is no evidence that he was involved in any movement for any consideration for social justice at any level – certainly, not in terms of any form of activism but not even at any theoretical or speculative level. Moreover, he used his own theories to support his conservatism. Characteristically, he argued that ‘only those individuals can attain to a higher degree of consciousness who are destined to it and called to it from the beginning, i.e. who have a capacity and an urge for higher differentiation… Nature is aristocratic’ (Jung, 1917/1943, para 198).

It should not be forgotten that the concept and very process of individuation, the cornerstone of his theory of personal development, is focused exclusively on the individual, despite his attempts to claim that (being) an individuated person does not exclude social awareness.1 Jung's emphasis was almost entirely on the intrapsychic realm, arguing firmly for the simplistic formula that ‘society is the sum
total of individuals' (Jung, 1956, para 536). Moreover, he repeatedly maintained that ‘every man is, in a certain sense, unconsciously a worse man when he is in society than when acting alone; for he is carried by society and to that extent relieved of his individual responsibility’ (Jung, 1928/1953, para 240). This illustrates Jung’s privileging the individual over any issues of social consideration.

I have long argued for the importance ofrealising and taking seriously the fact that Jung’s view of the social realm was purely negative, and to consider studiously the multiple implications of this (Papadopoulos, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1999a, 2000a, 2006a, 2009, 2011). Jung equated the societal dimension with the ‘collective’ that he simply considered negatively. The ‘collective’ he had in mind was identified with the amorphous masses that ‘relieve’ man ‘of his individual responsibility’. This view represents the prevailing understanding of the time, propagated by the French writer Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931), who put forward the idea that in the crowd the individual loses his/her identity and becomes a small particle of the herd, which is led by unscrupulous demagogues. In the crowd, the individual becomes an anonymous entity, is prone to suggestibility and contagious negative influences (Le Bon, 1895). Jung was aware of the destructive effects of the masses not only in the context of the abhorrent fascist movements he experienced during his lifetime in Germany and Italy, but also in the ‘collectivism’ of the Soviet communism that he equally opposed, most vehemently.

No wonder that within this unfavourable perspective, Jung found it difficult to form any positive inclination towards anything associated with the social realm and one’s involvement within it. Yet, it is important to remember that his actual theory of the collective unconscious clearly has a potentially positive and, indeed, rejuvenating role for the collective, when the individual integrates the archetypal elements in an appropriate way. Even on the seemingly destructive occasions when the collective unconscious ‘floods’ the individual psyche, Jung still saw its positive and renewing function, likening it to the ‘flooding of the Nile’ that ‘increases the fertility of the land’ (Jung, 1946, para 479).

At this point, it is instructive to pause and reflect on the significant confusion in distinguishing between Jung’s attitudes towards the collective unconscious and towards the actual social collective. For Jung, the collective unconscious along with its archetypal elements has an unmistakably compensatory function, refreshing the withered psyche of the individual. Repeatedly, Jung lamented the current state of modern living that did not provide the vital connection with collective/archetypal
forms that could nourish the modern person’s psyche. In dramatic terms, he continually warned of the dangerous effects of this lack. At the same time, he expressed serious concern at people’s attempt at resorting to fake substitutes for these positive archetypal forms. He drew a sharp distinction between appropriate and inappropriate expressions of these revitalising collective forms and it is telling of his mistrust for the social collective that he clarified this distinction as follows:

Anyone who has lost . . . [the nurturing contact with these positive collective forms] and cannot be satisfied with substitutes is certainly in a very difficult position today: before him there yawns the void, and he turns away from it in horror. What is worse, the vacuum gets filled with absurd political and social ideas, which one and all are distinguished by their spiritual bleakness.

(Jung, 1934/1954, para 28)

This typical quotation testifies to Jung’s detesting of ‘political and social ideas’ that he considers ‘absurd’ and as characterised by ‘spiritual bleakness’, contrasting them to appropriate archetypal forms that are genuinely spiritual. This distinction is deeply rooted in Jung’s own specific context, i.e. the historical times he lived in, the intellectual tradition within which he was educated, the sociopolitical realities of his time and his geographical location, and his own personal and family experience.

Accordingly, Jung seemed to idealise an intangible form of archetypal spirituality and demonise anything connected with the actual societal dimension. This sharp division was reflected in the way he conducted his psychotherapeutic/analytical practice: he worked exclusively with individuals in professionally delineated and defined settings (i.e. state mental health services and private practice) and did not engage with any group or family therapeutic activities, or even with individuals outside these settings. Admittedly, no models of such practices were available at the time and, therefore, one may argue that this is the sole reason why Jung did not extend his practice to those domains. Conversely, the claim of this chapter is that the main reason is not the lack of existing models of such practices but Jung’s own firm prejudice against anything that he (mistakenly) considered was violating the sanctity of the individual. Jung was fairly iconoclastic in many respects and pushed many boundaries and applied his creativity in many spheres, so he could have done the same in relation to extending the range of his therapeutic practices. He was not able to do so, due to his own limiting specific context, but not due to any inherent limitations of his theory.
Therefore, my argument is that Jung’s theories can be expanded to accommodate such extensions in practice, and I consider my own modest work with adversity survivors outside the consulting room as examples of such attempts. This would be in line with Jung’s own dictum that the pupil serves the master better if he takes the master’s work further and does not just keep imitating it.

In order to undertake this task, it is imperative to differentiate between what Jung himself thought and did and what one can develop on the basis of his theoretical premises and entire approach. Often this distinction is not made and, instead, analytical psychology tends to identify entirely with Jung the person, with what he said and what he did not say, and with what he did and what he did not do. Once this distinction is made (as well as some additional ones), it would be possible to illustrate that a connection between Jung and ‘Activism’ is not only feasible but also of considerable heuristic value.

**Important differentiations**

Traditionally, in contexts where so-called ‘mental health’ assistance is required, appropriately trained practitioners (analysts, psychotherapists, counsellors, et al.) provide their services in structured settings. However, in contexts where people experience various forms of human distress, disorientation, psychic ache, etc., due to being exposed to various forms of collective adversity (political/military conflict, involuntary dislocation, natural disasters, etc.), offering services that are conceptualised and developed for ordinary settings is inappropriate. Experience shows that even offering various forms of ‘trauma counselling’ is inappropriate as, inadvertently, they tend to fix a ‘victim identity’ on the persons they intend to assist; moreover, the epistemological basis of these types of ‘counselling’ is not culturally sensitive and it is not fitting for emergency situations or for unusual settings (e.g. refugee camps etc.). In these contexts, what is required is apposite response to the plight of the people who experience what is usually referred to as ‘normal responses to abnormal circumstances’.

My own experiences in these contexts and settings has shown that what is required is not to offer psychotherapy or analysis or counselling but to provide contact with the adversity survivors that is essentially *therapeutic* (e.g. Papadopoulos, 1998b, 1999b, 2011). Thus, it is imperative to make a distinction between ‘doing psychotherapy’ and ‘being therapeutic’. Whereas the former needs to be delivered by suitably trained analysts, psychotherapists, counsellors, the latter
can be offered by anybody who has any type of contact with adversity survivors, as long as she or he is sensitised to the psychological complexities of the overall phenomena involved, and this is one of the main activities that I am engaged in: designing projects that enable workers to introduce a therapeutic dimension to whatever contact they have with adversity survivors.

An additional differentiation that needs to be made is between therapeutic ideologies, therapeutic techniques and therapeutic frameworks.

**Therapeutic ideologies**

Each school of psychotherapy or analysis is based on a set of theoretical presuppositions not only about their methods of intervention but also about the way they conceptualise the very phenomena they observe (in particular, the way they identify what is ‘the problem’) as well as, directly or indirectly, shaping the stance of the therapist. For example, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy focuses on the interactions between behaviour, thinking and feeling, and, therefore, the way they would conceptualise both their identification of the problem, as well as the methods of treatment and stance of the therapist, would be in line with this theoretical schema. Comparably, a psychodynamically oriented therapist would consider the unconscious as central to any understanding of the problem and the method of treatment as well as the way the therapist would relate in order to access and address unconscious material.

Inevitably, these therapeutic ideologies are present, explicitly or implicitly, in all forms of interventions with adversity survivors, thus imposing their assumptions onto every situation, especially when they are applied to ‘trauma’ intervention contexts.

**Therapeutic techniques**

By and large, these techniques are specific applications of therapeutic ideologies, e.g. free association (psychoanalysis), active imagination (analytical psychology), empty chair (Gestalt), writing self-statements to counteract negative thoughts (CBT), etc. However, what is of great significance is that, almost imperceptibly, the landscape of psychotherapy has been changing, and whereas before the profession was dominated by established schools of psychotherapy or analysis, now there is
an endless plethora of specific therapeutic techniques, seemingly independent of therapeutic ideologies. Propagators of these techniques (some of them are even called ‘therapies’) claim that it is not necessary for one to embark on a long, arduous and expensive form of training, but, instead, a few weekend trainings would suffice to enable one to apply these techniques. Examples of these techniques include Mindfulness, Narrative Expressive Therapy, Tree of Life, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Coherence Therapy, Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR), Mode Deactivation Therapy, Nonviolent Communication, etc.

Often, the most successful and most enduring of these techniques, eventually, develop theoretical perspectives to support them and, consequently, they extend and formalise the training they offer to the prospective of these techniques. Thus, gradually, these techniques begin to resemble the traditional schools of psychotherapy.

When applied to working with adversity survivors, these forms of therapeutic interventions tend to be more rigid insofar as they apply the set technique to any given situation, regardless of the setting and complexity.

**Therapeutic frameworks**

Different from the above, a therapeutic framework consists of a set of basic principles, not at a theoretical or applied/practice level but, instead, aimed at providing an epistemological perspective that can then be used with, almost, any theoretical ideology and/or theoretical technique. It is this that emerged from my experience in working with adversity survivors, in unusual settings outside the consulting room and away from traditional mental health services, as the most useful set of guidelines for this work. The advantages of therapeutic frameworks are that, free from therapeutic ideologies and fixed techniques, they are adaptable to any situation and they can be used by persons of any cultural, educational or work background.

*The present therapeutic framework*

The basic elements of the therapeutic framework that emerged during my work with adversity survivors in non-traditional settings and outside the consulting room include the following:
(a) Conceptualisation of ‘the problem’

The predominant way of perceiving human distress in the face of any forms of adversity has been in terms of trauma. My investigations into this field revealed that trauma is an inaccurate and crude term to capture the fine shades and uniqueness that each individual, family or community respond in, in each given adverse situation (Papadopoulos 2000b, 2002b, 2006b, 2007, 2010, 2013). There is a persistent but erroneous assumption that all phenomena of human distress involve psychological trauma and, moreover, most traumatic experiences are equivalent to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

It should not be forgotten that the prevalence of PTSD following exposure to most forms of adversity is not much more than 10% (Arnberg et al., 2013; Berger et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2012). This means that the overwhelming majority of people respond in non-pathological ways. Yet, this fact is hardly addressed in the literature. This does not mean that they do not suffer or do not experience forms of distress and disorientation; certainly, they do and it is our responsibility to develop ways of grasping the specificities of these phenomena without confusing them with psychopathological or psychiatric conditions.

It is within this perspective that my experiences led me to develop the concepts of ‘nostalgic disorientation’ and ‘onto-ecological settledness’ (Papadopoulos, 2012, 2015) to account for non-pathological ways of responding to adversity. Under ordinary circumstances, people experience a state of relative stability where life is fairly predictable. I call this state ‘onto-ecological settledness’, referring to the familiar arrangement and relationship ‘between the totality of one’s being and the totality of one’s environment’ (Papadopoulos, 2015, p. 40). This is not an ideal state but it is predictable and creates a sense of settledness that is disrupted once adversity strikes. Then, people experience a sense of disorientation that includes a strong nostalgic element in it, insofar as it creates a yearning for returning to the disrupted state of settledness, and this is what I call ‘nostalgic disorientation’. Although ‘nostalgic disorientation’ is not a psychiatric disorder, the felt discomfort and distress are real and should not be underestimated.

(b) Conceptualisation of the intervention

Consequently, it is inappropriate to offer psychotherapy to the overwhelming majority of adversity survivors because of the nature of their suffering, and the cultural and situational contexts. Therefore, what is required is to provide ‘therapeutic input’ via suitable ‘therapeutic encounters’ within the existing settings.
Short and focused trainings can equip all who work with adversity survivors to add a ‘therapeutic dimension’ to the work they already do, by becoming sagaciously aware of the psychological complexities of

1. the relevant phenomena (definition of ‘the problem’)
2. the beneficiaries (clients) and their contexts
3. the workers themselves and their contexts
4. the interaction between them
5. the organisational/systemic and sociopolitical contexts within which the encounters between them take place
6. the epistemological assumptions and methodology that are used in these encounters, and
7. the interaction of all the above.

(Papadopoulos, 2013)

Finally, instead of focusing exclusively on the negative responses to being exposed to adversity, this therapeutic framework is drawing from the obvious reality that, in addition to (not instead of!) their pain and suffering, persons do retain some of the positive functions, characteristics, abilities, relationships, qualities they had before their exposure to adversity, as well as developing new positives as a direct result of the fact that they were exposed to adversity. The existing positives I call ‘resilience’, and the new positives that are activated by the very exposure to adversity, I call ‘adversity-activated development’ (AAD). The three groups of responses to adversity (i.e. negative, resilience and AAD) are accounted for in the ‘Adversity/Trauma Grid’ that represents a formalisation of my experiences and it is now used widely (Papadopoulos, 2002b, 2006b, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013).

These are the key ingredients of the framework that I use to design consultancies and interventions at both macro and micro levels in various contexts with adversity survivors. The framework is, essentially, an explicit epistemological perspective to conceptualising all the relevant phenomena (including the ‘identification of the problem’) in situations of societal adversity and all the required interventions.

**Jungian reflections**

This framework was not intended to apply Jungian theories, instead, it evolved from my experiences in the field; however, some key Jungian themes are easily

Jung encouraged creative ways of conducting therapy beyond the traditional frame of verbal exchange. Known for his attempts at depathologising psychological difficulties, he ‘emphasised the transformative function of suffering and its renewing effect. In this way, he appreciated the complexity of individuals having more than one response to painful events and experiences’ (Papadopoulos, 2013).

Finally, this framework includes a not-so-obvious but still extremely significant contribution by Jung to these situations – the multiple implications of polarisation. Situations of adversity in mass catastrophic contexts create polarised phenomena at all levels, where Jungian reflections can be most fruitful.

Under ordinary conditions, with our ‘onto-ecological settledness’ relatively stable, we experience archetypes in their bi-polarity, in a balanced and ‘human’ way, i.e. ‘in forms that combine not only the two polarities (positive and negative) but also both collective and personal dimensions’. However, under polarised conditions, archetypes tend ‘to lose their flexibility and nourishing abilities’ and, instead, ‘pure archetypal dazzling energy’ is released that ‘can exert an irresistible fascination, often of a numinous nature’ resulting in individuals and groups becoming ‘totally gripped by their power’, losing their ability to bear complexity and resorting to crude and destructive oversimplification at all levels (Papadopoulos, 2013).

This framework illustrates an approach that includes ‘activism’ not only in terms of engaging within the social realm, but also in terms of contesting the ‘regimes of authority’ that ‘govern’ conceptualisations and work in this field. Moreover, it illustrates how Jungian theories, once extended, can be used fruitfully in ‘activism’ endeavours.

**Note**

1 ‘As man is not only an individual but also a member of society, these two tendencies inherent in human nature can never be separated, or the one subordinated to the other, without doing him serious injury’ (Jung, 1912/1955, para. 441).

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THERAPEUTIC ENCOUNTERS AND INTERVENTIONS OUTSIDE THE CONSULTING ROOM
CHALLENGES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE


Journa, Inc., pp. 25–49.
A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF JUNG'S EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA

THE PLACE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFE

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Jung and Phenomenology

by Roger Brooke

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In this chapter I want to describe and discuss Jung's confrontation with that fundamental world-openness phenomenologists call intentionality. It forms a bridge between considerations of Jung's method and his theories, between his way of seeing and what he saw and thought. Primarily descriptive, it is an enquiry into the place and significance of psychological life as Jung experienced it, for our task here is to discover an experiential and descriptive base from which to address Jung's thought.

Jung's experience in Africa provides such a base. It is relatively unspoiled by theoretical and philosophical reflection, and it is Jung's only concrete description of the goal of individuation and a consciousness that has attained that goal. Described most extensively in his autobiography, it thus makes excellent 'data' for phenomenological analysis.

It will be seen that Jung's experience in Africa radically challenged his European identity, and it exposed an existential tension that his conceptual thought was unable adequately to heal, except perhaps near the end of his life. Thus an enquiry into Jung's trip to East Africa is also an exposition of a fundamental tension in his thought concerning human existence, the felt sense of personhood, the world, and the structure of their relation. Therefore a descriptive account of Jung's African experience is effectively a critical analysis of some of the foundations of his thought.

In the summer of 1925–6 Jung spent a few months in East Africa, and it affected him more deeply, it seems, than even his visit to India (Van der Post 1976, p. 51). As he travelled into the interior of East Africa he felt as though he was returning home, but this sense was paradoxical for he was both returning to his origins and yet somehow fulfilling his destiny, the purpose of his life. Moreover, he had an uncanny feeling that Africa had been waiting for him, and that his destiny, therefore, was intimately bound with the destiny of the world. Travelling west on the train from Mombasa, Jung awoke at dawn and looked outside. He recalled:

On a jagged rock above us a slim brownish-black figure stood motionless, leaning on a long spear, looking down at the train. Beside him towered a gigantic candelabrum cactus . . . I had the feeling that I had already experienced this moment and had always known this world which was separated from me only by distance in time. It was as if I were this moment returning to the land of my youth, and as if I knew that dark-skinned man who had been waiting for me for five thousand years. I could not guess what string
within myself was plucked at the sight of that solitary dark hunter. I only knew that his world had been mine for countless millennia.

(Jung 1961, p. 283)

This sense of returning to a source that was also a goal remained with him throughout his journey. It had the effect, therefore, of enacting in the concrete terms of actual life one of the essential themes of the individuation process: that the realisation of the self as the goal of psychological development is also a return to that self which forms the original matrix of one’s life.

Therefore, it is tempting to regard this journey as ‘symbolic’ of the individuation process, where individuation is a process of unfolding and differentiation ‘within the psyche’. Analytical psychology generally takes this view, as Jung himself does. For example, he reflects that:

In reality a darkness altogether different from natural night broods over the land. It is the psychic primal night which is the same today as it has been for countless millions of years.

(Jung 1961, pp. 298–9, italics added)

From this perspective, in which light and darkness are understood ‘symbolically’, the ‘real’ meaning of development is internal to Jung’s (or anyone else’s) psyche. If individuation means becoming ‘a separate, indivisible unity, or “whole”,’ (Jung 1939a, p. 275), then it demands that projections be withdrawn, ‘in order to restore them to the individual who has involuntarily lost them by projecting them outside himself’ (Jung 1938/54, p. 84).

This temptation to interiorise the meaning and place of individuation is profoundly mistaken. If the significance of Jung’s experience in Africa is to be understood, then those central terms of analytical psychology which define human existence need to be recovered as descriptions of relationships with the world, for that is the inescapable place of experience and setting within which the drama and meaning of human life unfolds. In other words, the task here is to recover the essential structure and meaning of Jung’s experience in Africa. On one hand, it is an experience of the realisation of the self, perhaps the central theme of analytical psychology; on the other hand, it is an experience the existential meaning of which tended to be forgotten in Jung’s reflections when he returned to Europe. Europe and Africa are ‘states of mind’ as much as geographical locations, and it is difficult to think through an African experience in European terms. The separation
of the world from the place of experience (i.e. Cartesianism) is the single biggest obstacle for the technological European to overcome if it is to be understood that the essence of psychological life is its world-relatedness. But this essential world-relatedness is what needs to be recovered here if Jung's experience in Africa is to be understood on its own terms, and if analytical psychology is to be rescued from its tendencies towards a headbound interiority.

The recovery of the world

Jung's sense that the motionless hunter had been waiting for him became clearer as his westward journey continued. That patient waiting strengthened into an appeal, and it came from the African world itself. From a low hill on Kenya's Athai plains Jung watched the vast herds of silent animals.

Grazing heads nodding, the herds moved forward like slow rivers. There was scarcely any sound save the melancholy cry of a bird of prey. This was the stillness of the eternal beginning, the world as it always had been, in the state of non-being; for until then no-one had been present to know that it was this world.

(Jung 1961, p. 284)

Writing about the same scene elsewhere Jung continues:

I felt then as if I were the first man, the first creature, to know that all this is. The entire world around me was still in its primeval state; it did not know that it was. And in that moment in which I came to know the world sprang into being; without that moment it would never have been. All nature seeks this goal and finds it fulfilled in man, but only in the most highly developed and fully conscious man. Every advance, even the smallest, along this path of conscious realisation adds that much to the world.

(Jung 1938/54, pp. 95–6)

Thus the appeal to which Jung responded was the call of the light of consciousness, which he saw as the goal of human life. As such, therefore, it is intimately connected with the individuation process and the realisation of the self (Brooke 1985).

Before going further, it is important to grasp the irreducible link between the call of consciousness and the call of the world. Jung was not 'projecting an 'inner need'
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Excerpted from Jung and Phenomenology

on to 'outer reality'. After all, whereas projection implies a lack of insight, this moment was one of heightened consciousness and self-awareness. The longing for consciousness is a longing of the world itself: 'All nature seeks this goal' (op. cit.). Thus the development of consciousness does not refer to a process outside of the world, but to a process in which the world itself comes into being in that human light called consciousness.

Jung's awareness of this ontological connection between the being of the world and the being of human being remained with him and was profoundly liberating. No longer did his psychic life need to be contained within his European head as an embalmed inner world, like the res cogitans of Descartes. As Jung (1961) put it: 'My liberated psychic forces poured blissfully back to the primeval expanses.' In other words, with the emergence of the world into the light of consciousness, Jung's psychological life returned to its original place in the world. Thus he experienced a 'divine peace' and a sense of kinship and harmony with all things.

If Jung's psychological life came home, then home was transformed in the process. It emerged as a world radically different from that imagined by the modern European mind. That world, which is taken for granted as real, immutable, and inescapable, is nevertheless contingent upon its own peculiar history (see Romanyshyn 1982, 1984; Roszak 1972). It is ontologically disconnected from human existence and therefore alien. It is the world of the technocrat, there to be set upon and harnessed, the world of Faust, who could not tolerate the uselessness of land left under the sea and before whom the gods fled and wandered homeless (Giegerich 1984). It is a disenchanted world bereft of purpose, where even life is dissolved into the meaningless movements of energy and matter according to the brute inevitabilities of natural law. It is the world Jung identified as reflecting the sickness of modern life, and against which he set his life's work. As Jung says in the very passages we are considering, 'In such a cheerless clockwork fantasy there is no drama of man, world, and God . . . but only the dreariness of calculated processes' (Jung 1961, p. 284). And it was this world that was radically and permanently transformed. It became a temple.

Before looking at Jung's description of the particular physiognomy of experience after this ontological transformation, it is necessary to pause for a moment. The above reflections might make one ask whether Jung is not describing a form of regression. There seems to be some evidence for this. For example, he describes the journey as a return to the land of his youth. More importantly, as will be seen,
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he later took fright at the prospect of falling back into the participation mystique of a 'primitive' existence, in which, he believed, the boundaries between self and world were collapsed. Further still, if psychological development involves the 'withdrawal of projections', i.e. the separation of subject and object such that the subject is the source and vehicle of meaning and the object is 'uncontaminated' by the subject's psychological life, then there certainly seems to be a problem here. But there are several ways to address this.

First, it can be pointed out that it was a continual conceptual problem for Jung. Throughout his work there are remarks about the importance of withdrawing projections from the world, together with a discussion of the fateful significance of doing so. For example, in Psychology and Religion he writes:

The hypothesis of invisible gods or daemons would be, psychologically, a far more appropriate formulation [of the unconscious], even though it would be an anthropomorphic projection. But since the development of consciousness requires the withdrawal of all the projections we can lay our hands on, it is not possible to maintain any non-psychological doctrine about the gods. If the historical process of world despiritualisation continues as hitherto, then everything of a divine or daemonic character outside us must return to the psyche, to the inside of the unknown man, whence it apparently originated.

(Jung 1938/40, p. 85)

This is a telling piece from a much longer discussion in which the development of consciousness is correlated with the despiritualisation of the world. As James Hillman (1973) put it in his inimitable way, it amounts to 'stuffing the person with subjective soulfulness and leaving the world a slagheap from which all projections, personifications, and psyche have been extracted' (p. 123). However, not only is the world abandoned as a disinfected and godless slagheap, but 'the withdrawal of all the projections we can lay our hands on' amounts to a heroic inflation. In the same passage referred to above, Jung writes:

Why did the gods of antiquity lose their prestige and their effect on the human soul? Because the Olympians had served their time and a new mystery began: God became man.

(Jung 1938/40, p. 81)

The two figures who epitomise this, and to whom Jung repeatedly refers, are Faust and Nietzsche. It was he who announced the death of God and the corning of the
Superman, and who even went so far as to say that if God were not dead then man, as Superman, should kill him in order to be his own master (Nietzsche 1883, pp. 109–10). But Nietzsche broke under the strain of his philosophy and collapsed into insanity. Therefore, by no stretch of the imagination can these figures be regarded as examples of individuated people. In fact, Jung’s prime interest in Nietzsche seems to have been as a case study (Moreno 1970). In any event, to be swallowed up in an archetypal motif, in this case heroically inflated, is to lose precisely that differentiation that defines an individuated consciousness. The heroic ‘withdrawal of projections’ has a manic edge which leads to blindness, not insight.

It seems, therefore, that Jung’s appeal to the development of consciousness sometimes reflects the very heroic mentality against which he had set himself as a doctor of the soul, so that he ends up at cross-purposes with himself. He insists on the importance of withdrawing projections, yet he describes those who, like Nietzsche, do as ‘clever specimens of homo occidentalis who lived yesterday or the day before . . . tin gods with thick skulls and cold hearts’ (Jung 1917/43, p. 71).

On the other hand, there is clearly an important insight in the notion of ‘withdrawing projections’ that needs to be retained. Somehow, and I think this is crucial, a way needs to be found to understand our vital engagements within the life-world symbolically without spatialising that understanding and hauling psyche out of the world. As Jung (1931a, p. 65) himself notes, the question is whether or not metaphors are taken concretely, but, as we can insist, there is nothing inherently spatial in this. The shift then is not from ‘out there’ to ‘in here’, but from blind literalism to metaphor. In this case there is no reason to believe that Jung’s recovery of the world as the home of psychological life necessarily implies a regression.

A second way to meet the idea that Jung’s experience in Africa was regressive is to recall the numerous occasions in which he showed an understanding of psychological life very different from the anthropocentric terms described above. He then writes that, for example, the psyche is not in us but rather that we are in the psyche (e.g. Jung 1957, p. 271), or that the psyche is not originally ‘projected’ but is formed through acts of introjection (Jung 1934/54, p. 25). When Jung writes like this he manages to avoid an error he noted in his critics, but into which he himself sometimes fell: confusing psyche and ego, or in other words the place of experience with the boundaries of the individual person (Jung 1947/54, p. 226). These difficult issues lie at the heart of a phenomenological critique and
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interpretation of Jung's thought, and will be addressed at some length after Jung's experience in Africa has been described further (and they will be returned to in chapter 5).

Finally, if Jung's experience was at all regressive, or if the meaning of returning his psychological life to its original home in the world was to abandon his sense of personal boundary, then he could not have had that ontological sense of our unique place in the scheme of things. Nor, within his sense of connection with the world, could he have also understood the human being's unique difference.3 For Jung, the revelation of the African world was equally the birth of ego identity, not its dissolution (Jung 1955–6, p. 107). Thus he saw that it was the human being

who alone has given to the world its objective existence – without which, unheard, unseen, silently eating, giving birth, dying, heads nodding through hundreds of millions of years, it would have gone on in the profoundest night of non-being down to its unknown end. Human consciousness created objective existence and meaning, and man found his indispensable place in the great process of being.

(Jung 1961, p. 285)

The world as temple

Washed in this ontological vision Jung continued westward. He travelled by train, truck, and finally on foot to Mt. Elgon, the slopes of which he and his party climbed to over 6,000 feet. By the time he arrived there the world had not only been recovered as a world; the recovery revealed the world to be a temple. It was a pagan temple rather than a Christian church (or at least the church that Jung knew), for the divine had not retreated skywards, beyond the stars, leaving the world forsaken. Rather, the divine was given within the pregnant immediacy of the phenomena of the world itself. As Jung said, 'we found a dawning significance in things' (Jung 1931a, p. 62).

Presumably Jung could have chosen any number of places or events on which to found his meditations, but, in keeping with the theme of consciousness as the illuminating realm within which the being of the world can shine forth, it is not surprising that he found himself most compellingly drawn to the dawn. Although Jung writes of this time some thirty-five years later, the vivid impressions still shine through. He says:
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The sunshine in these latitudes was a phenomenon that overwhelmed me anew every day. The drama of it lay less in the splendour of the sun's shooting up over the horizon than in what happened afterwards. I formed the habit of taking my camp stool and sitting under an umbrella Acacia just before dawn. Before me, at the bottom of the little valley, lay a dark, almost black-green strip of jungle, with the rim of the plateau on the opposite side of the valley towering above it. At first, the contrasts between light and darkness would be extremely sharp. Then objects would assume contour and emerge into the light which seemed to fill the valley with a compact brightness. The horizon above became radiantly white. Gradually the swelling light seemed to penetrate into the very structure of objects, which became illuminated from within until at last they shone translucently, like bits of coloured glass. Everything turned to flaming crystal. The cry of the bell bird rang round the horizon. At such moments I felt as if I were inside a temple. It was the most sacred hour of the day. I drank in this glory with insatiable delight, or rather, in a timeless ecstasy.

(Jung 1961, pp. 297–8)

At these moments Jung was present to 'the great god who redeems the world by rising out of the darkness as a radiant light in the heavens', and was thus bearing witness to the most primordial metaphor through which the meaning of human consciousness is given. In terms of this primordial metaphorical reality, therefore, the European Jung discovered his own personal myth (ibid., pp. 284–303), and at the same time participated in a process that was older than history and possibly even humanity. The Elgonyi left their huts each morning, and in short, individual ceremonies they spat into their hands and held them up to the sun (ibid., pp. 295–6). But Jung further recalls that at the moment of dawn the baboons too would sit motionless, facing east, like carved baboons in an Egyptian temple performing 'the gesture of adoration'; and this was in stark contrast to their noisy ranging through the rest of the day (ibid., p. 298).

In other words, the world's revelation as a temple in which the drama of the ancient Egyptian sun-god, Horus, is daily enacted is older than human consciousness. For Jung, human consciousness is neither a human invention nor a gift that arrived out of the blue. Rather, consciousness has evolved as witness to the endlessly repetitive drama given through the moment of dawn. The psyche, insists Jung (1938/40, p. 84; 1957, p. 271; 1976a, p. 410), is antecedent to and the precondition for that phenomenon now called mankind. Thus the world as a
temple is the primordial reality, and without it there would be no reflective consciousness. Its significance as a metaphor for the shape and meaning of human life is therefore a later development, but the existential density of that place at which the metaphor is grounded remains. The dawn is still a glorious divine moment of ‘insatiable delight’ (op. cit).

As has already been argued, one way to forget this primordial reality is to spatialise the metaphor by locating its meaning as an experience within one’s head. On one hand, this allows the world to slip into darkness, and in our time, as both Jung and Heidegger agree, while the scientific light glares upon the world, that world which is essentially a temple disappears under the profane darkness of natural law. On the other hand, the Cartesian interiorisation of psychological life loses an essential quality of metaphor, namely its capacity to intensify reality. As Philip Wheelwright expressed it in his classic study on metaphor: ‘What really matters in a metaphor is the psychic depth at which the things of the world, whether actual or fancied, are transmuted by the cool heat of the imagination’ (Wheelwright 1962, p. 71).

Thus a metaphor opens up the world and at the same time situates the imagination. It is important to understand that what might seem like two processes here is in actuality one. Intentionality, it may be recalled, is fantasy. Thus the opening up of the world, as a temple, for example, is imaginative; and to imagine the world as a temple is to open up the very temple-like being of the world. In other words, the structural unity between the world and human consciousness is given as metaphorical reality. Metaphors are not abstractions from reality, in which two distinct entities, world and temple, are cognitively linked together. Rather, metaphors are the primordial means within which our shy and ambiguous world comes into being in the imaginative light of human consciousness. The same can be said of symbols, for they have the same essential structure.

Now the point of these reflections is that, when Jung refers to the ‘symbolic life’ or the ‘symbolic attitude’ as a measure of psychological maturity, he is not intending to evaporate the metaphor into an intellectual abstraction. He is rather trying to encourage the modern person to recover his or her existential heritage and find meaning as it is given through the metaphors within which the world speaks. Jung’s overwhelming experience of the dawn on the slopes of Mt. Elgon needs to be understood in these terms.
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Jung's retreat
Throughout his life Jung was concerned with the question of the self. In a deeply personal way it was the central problematic that held his life and work together (Papadopoulos 1984), and it seems that Jung, more than most people, was threatened with the terror of its disintegration and loss (Winnicott 1964). If this was so – and the arguments of Papadopoulos and Winnicott (and others) are sensitive and convincing – then perhaps one can understand something of Jung's emergent fears, and the relief he felt at turning northwards towards Europe. The purpose is not to embark upon a mini-analysis of Jung. However, Jung's frightened retreat from Africa needs to be dealt with, as it seems to contradict the significance of his African experience as understood here, and the above comments about Jung's relation to this self offer a clue to resolving this. Gerhard Adler has pointed out that the path of individuation is 'from an unconscious anonymity to a conscious anonymity' (Adler 1949/69, p. 152), with the establishment of a personal identity as a middle stage. Although somewhat overstated, anonymity is thus the theme common to both source and goal, regression and progression (Jung 1930/31, p. 403).

The question can be put as follows: if Jung's experience in Africa touched the goal of individuation, and therefore reflected a developed and integrated consciousness, then how is it that Jung feared losing the degree of conscious development that he felt he had achieved?

Jung returned to Europe by travelling northwards to the Nile, then downriver to Cairo and the Mediterranean. Although it was 'with heavy hearts' that he and his companions left Mt. Elgon, as they travelled northwards Jung came to realise that the intensely personal nature of his journey into Africa 'touched every possible sore spot in [his] own psychology' (Jung 1961, p. 303). He realised that he had been trying to avoid his dreams, which had been reminding him of his indebtedness to his European identity. In one dream Jung's American Negro barber was using a red-hot curling iron to give him Negro hair, and Jung woke in terror. He recalled:

I took this dream as a warning from the unconscious; it was saying that the primitive was a danger to me . . . The only thing I could conclude from this was that my European personality must under all circumstances be preserved intact.

(ibid., p. 302)
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It would seem that the 'European personality' that was so threatened has to do with the specifically European constitution of identity. Jung felt that his dreams were advising him to think of the African journey not as something real, but rather as a symptomatic or symbolic act (ibid., pp. 30 1–2). Given the European's Cartesian heritage, this could only mean retracting all those 'liberated psychic forces [that had] poured blissfully back to the primeval expanses'; and enclosing psyche, individuation, and his self inside him. The existential liberation that had revealed to Jung the goal of individuation, the spiritual realisation of the world as a temple, is now seen through the defensive eyes of the psychiatrist.

In Africa Jung had realised the self as a non-substantial openness within which the world could come into being, first as a world, then as a temple. But to realise the self as a non-substantial openness is to discover that the self is not an entity but a capacity that emerges through the revelation of the world. The spirituality of the self, for example, is a capacity that emerges through the world's revelation as a temple; what is actually found is not one's spirituality but a temple. Thus, the self is recovered as a world in which the meaning of one's life is given. This means that the European understanding of the self, with its Cartesian and humanistic roots, is called radically into question. For the European, or, to be more precise, for those like Jung who have inherited the Cartesian separation of subject and world, the self is contained as a private place within one, a place of consciousness, and an inner domain on which one's identity is founded (Heidegger 1927, pp. 366–8). Thus when Jung recovered the ontological unity between the self and the world it would have called into question the very foundations of his self-understanding and the direction of his life's central problematic.

When Jung felt threatened by the possibility of losing his identity he reasserted himself in the only way that he, as a European, knew: by taking psyche out of the world. Jung felt the need to hold on to his ego (personality identity), but he did so by encapsulating psyche, 'withdrawing projections', and evaporating the power of the world into a symbolic 'inner' reality. Psyche and world became truncated in the service of his vulnerable ego boundaries, and at that point his insight into the material place of experience (or psyche) was largely undone.

It might be objected at this point that Jung's distinction between the ego and the self is being confused here. For Jung the ego is the seat of identity and an individual's consciousness, and the self is the totality of the psyche and the place of experience (all experience being psychic reality). In a sense self and psyche are
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synonymous for the totality (Jung 1921, p. 460n.) of which the ego is that part concerned with personal boundaries. But in the European Cartesian heritage, however, the place of these is virtually indistinguishable, and, significantly perhaps, it was only after Jung's return from Africa that the terms became clearly distinguished in his writings (Jung 1928b). (The distinction between ego and self had emerged to some extent by 1921, but the self was added as a separate entry to the 'Definitions' in Psychological Types only much later.) Louis Zinkin (1985) has made the point that the shift from Freud to Jung is a shift from the body to the self as the focus of psychological life, and that the inner–outer distinction, therefore, does not refer to the skin unless the self identifies with the body. But it seems that Jung's fear reflected his Cartesian heritage and his fragile ego boundaries, and he did not yet have the insight or strength to make these distinctions.

One place where Jung does seem to resolve these issues is in the beautifully written epilogue to Psychology and Alchemy (1944/52). Here Jung distinguishes between 'withdrawing projections' and 'making psychological contents personal'. The latter, he says, leads precisely to the Faustian inflation described earlier, and Jung (following Goethe, in fact) contrasts this attitude with that of Philemon and Baucis. These two humble tramps gave hospitality to whatever was revealed in their world, and in that act of reverence allowed the world to reveal its divinity (pp. 4 79–81; cf. Giegerich 1984). The attitudinal stance of these two figures would seem to describe Jung's experience in Africa more adequately than terms which set psychological life loose from its moorings. Moreover, a shift from heroic conquest to reverent hospitality as a metaphor for an individuated consciousness is clearly more appropriate to Jung's overall therapeutic sensibilities. At the heart of psychological life is an ecological sensibility which Jung does not want violated by the heroic ego, one expression of which is natural-scientific and technological iconoclasm.

Interestingly enough, in the closing pages of his autobiography Jung once again captures that ontological vision he had had in Africa. He writes:

The older I have become, the less I have understood or had insight into or known about myself . . . I exist on the foundation of something I do not know. In spite of all uncertainties, I feel a solidity underlying all existence and a continuity in my mode of being. The more uncertain I have felt about myself, the more there has grown up in me a feeling of kinship with all things.

(Jung 1961, pp. 391–2)
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Chapter 4

The uncertainty of the ego is no longer a threat, for the integrity of its functions is assumed, and it rests upon the realisation of the greater self, even though this too is not an entity but a fundamental connectedness with things.

Before leaving this description of Jung's experience in Africa, it should perhaps be repeated that it has been used only as a point of access for our ontological questions. However, as Jung points out, access to archaic existence is given equally well through Zurich’s Mr Muller at Easter time, ‘running about the garden, hiding coloured eggs and setting up peculiar rabbit idols’ (Jung 1931a, p. 72), for we all live from the archaic levels of psychological life. Jung's studies of 'archaic man' make no sense at all unless it is understood that he is not primarily studying how 'modern man' might have been 'a long time ago', but is trying to reveal those primordial structures that found psychological life now (Giegerich 1975).

Conclusion

It seems that our task as psychologists is to sustain our thinking in terms which authenticate Jung's experience in Africa, despite whatever neurotic 'European' anxieties we might have. For Jung's experience in Africa has a meaning for analytical psychology that transcends the fundamental ontological and epistemo-logical assumptions on which it has tended to rest. It may be added that, in terms of our personal response to Jung, it invites us to incarnate our psychological lives and recover that vital ecological sensibility that is the foundation of a meaningful existence.

Notes

1 When I wrote the original edition of this book, I was aware of Jung's colonialist and European prejudices, evident here in his apparent assumption that no black African had had the experience of consciousness that he is describing. I had not wanted to get sidetracked away from the ontological issues that are the focus of this chapter. My further thinking (Brooke 2008) leads me to realise that I underestimated the extent to which Jung's colonialism affected not only his experience in Africa and his view of black Africans but also his understanding of the psyche. There is a colonialist thread that runs through his descriptions of psyche, its conscious and unconscious dimensions, and individuation that, I now think, needs to be seen through as part of our epoché if his work is to be taken further. See also Adams (1996).
2 The ‘modern European’ is oriented to a post-renaissance and post-Enlightenment world. The knower is radically separated from the known, and there is a continual attempt, despite the protestations of our senses, to establish the world as a universe of natural laws and psychological life and meaning in interior, subjectivistic terms. The ontological and epistemological roots of this mentality called modernism find their clearest expression in Descartes; the clearest ethical and theological expression of modernism is humanism. The twentieth century, particularly under the impact of the two world wars, has seen the erosion of modernism, and the expression ‘modern European mind’ could be misunderstood. The term modern as used in this chapter does not mean ‘contemporary’, for the erosion of modernism introduces the post-modern era. Thus the term ‘modern’ highlights the cultural and cultural–historical Jung brought to his experience in Africa.

3 Zinkin (1987) makes the same point as he reflects on a similar experience of his own, while watching windsurfers from the beach. Wholeness, he discovers, does not mean fusion, yet it includes a sense of being a part of a more embracing whole.
AFRICAN ARCHETYPAL PRIMORDIAL
A MAP FOR JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY

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Excerpted from *African Americans and Jungian Psychology*

*Cape Coast Castle*

A man stumbles
into the dark hole of this space several more follow
they too fall,
feces dust rise to their mouths to their eyes,
they are bound close
unable to see beyond the march from forest to ocean

In this room the air bends back folding into itself
their fever-coughs
bounce from sweating stones
and collapse on over-burdened ears

The river water flows free under their dungeon mindful of them
but unable to stop its motion the men listen,
to wave after wave beating stone,
their voices cry to be heard

but being free
smelling their forest scent
without memory of them as children only the river speaks,
and their voices fall silent

*Fanny Brewster*

*Journey: The Middle Passage*

One of the most psychologically difficult aspects of African American contemporary life continues to be the "sense" of a lack of history due to the systematic attempts to eradicate or malign African history, inclusive of every aspect of its culture. Ironically enough, Jungian psychology holds several elements of what I consider as deriving from African psychological and archetypal maps. This intention to discredit and, in many cases, to destroy this history (while making use of African cultural models) has occurred across every aspect of American society, including within the field of psychology. The period of time within the field of American psychology that epitomizes the most racist view of African Americans was most vehemently expressed through *eugenics*.

In *Even the Rat Was White: A Historical View of Psychology*, author Robert Guthrie gives the reader a look at the beginning of the use of "science" to establish the "facts" regarding the lesser intelligence of African Americans:

The earliest recorded attempt by American researchers to measure psychological capacities in different races was made in 1881 when C.S. Meyers tested Japanese
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Excerpted from African Americans and Jungian Psychology

subjects and proved that the Asians were slower in reaction time than Europeans. Shortly afterwards, utilizing a popular reaction time device, Bache (1895) tested American Indians and Blacks and concluded that these “primitive peoples” were highly developed in physiological tests and attributes while “higher” human forms “tended less to quickness of response in the automatic sphere; the reflective man is the slower being.”

(Chirie, 2004, p. 47, italics added)

Guthrie states, “As late as 1973, Henry Garrett, a past president of the American Psychological Association, supported this theory (of skull size designating intellectual capacity) when he wrote that the Black man’s brain ‘on the average is smaller ... less fissured and less complex than the white brain.’

These “scholarly” ideas regarding African Americans initially began through the anthropological work of men “exploring” Africa. The justification for slavery and later religious conversion of Africans was partially substantiated by discrediting Africans by skull size and other physical limitations.

When we look to African culture, developed from a variety of African countries, we see areas of richness including art, dance, philosophy, religion, and psychology.

Oftentimes, the art of psychology was based on traditional healing practices.

M. Vera Bührman, a Jungian analyst and author of Living in Two Worlds: Communication between a White Healer and Her Black Counterparts (1986), became a practitioner of Xhosa medicine through her training with Mongezi Tiso.

The Tiso School, where Bührmann studied for nine years, is useful in giving us an understanding of African medicine specific to psychological healing. This is especially important due to its close connectedness, philosophically, to the underpinnings of belief that support Jungian psychological theories. Bührmann expresses a belief that Xhosa medicine was based on Jungian concepts of psychology.

I would differ with her in this, suggesting rather that depth psychology, as developed by Jung, was oftentimes based in part on the social and spiritual concepts of indigenous people, including Africans.

Bührmann states:

In my work the world-view of the Nguni people is relevant, especially as it pertains to mental health and ill-health, i.e. the psychological aspect in its widest sense. It is important to make the latter point, because Western medicine divides illness into the different categories of somatic, psychological and psychosomatic; the Black
people do not: they say that "when part of me is ill, the whole of me is ill", irrespective of what the illness is.

(Buhrmann, 1986, p. 26)

Due to the fact that we are considering the art of psychology, other areas of African culture will not be discussed in great detail in this chapter. The focus is on the lineage of healing within the scope of psychology that shows lines of connection between the cultural aspects of traditional African healing practices and their potentiality for African American psychological healing.

Another important source of information regarding African healing practices, comes from John Janzen, who, like Buhrman—but unlike Jung and Freud—spent time actually researching African healing communities. His text, *Ngoma: Discourses in Healing in Central and Southern Africa* (1992), provides detailed descriptions of medicine as practiced among these communities.

These communities, given the English name “cults of affliction” by Victor Turner, provided not only psychological support for individuals but also a social and cultural context within which healing could occur. The word *ngoma*, which means drum, is relevant as drumming and dance were vital components of the healing rituals for community members requiring medicinal support.

Of significance is the emphasis on the involvement of family and community in a healing ritual that was led by a traditional healer.

Janzen gives the reader a detailed description of his experiences of meeting with healers, including the following:

In the city of Kinshasa, he met with a healer who was of the *nkita* lineage. Nkita defined not only the lineage, but also the name of the illness, the spirit behind the illness, and the therapeutic rite to be performed for healing. Janzen spoke of the signs of affliction particular to the patients seeing this healer: psychological distress, disturbing dreams, fever, childhood disease, and female infertility. The patient’s illnesses became areas of specialty for the healer. The initial healing ceremony took place at a river.

(Brewster, 2011, p. 123)

This experience as described by Janzen reminds me of how in archetypal psychology, the god that appears has a particular “affliction” as well as the remedy for healing. It is important to note that Jung did make a trip to Central Africa in 1925, which he describes in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. However, he did not stay for any extensive studies with African individuals or communities. In fact, his visit, as he himself
described it, was one of fear. He had left Europe concerned about his psychological state, hoping to visit Africa and get relief. While in Africa, he describes his fear of “going black” and losing his European consciousness. His anxiety was about falling into a more “primitive,” lower state of consciousness. This appears to have been an immense anxiety for Jung at different times in his life, not only in relationship to becoming victim to an African consciousness.

An important aspect of the ngoma is that those who become healers of this tradition experience a sickness or illness suggestive of a psycho-spiritual calling.

This is suggestive of the same way in which Jungian analysts are brought into their profession, as handmaidens of the soul. Sometimes, an illness appearing within a dream, or in the body, is indicative of ngoma, a spiritual calling to become a healer.

It would appear that many Jungian analysts consider their work to be a call by spirit—Jung might say, a spirit of the depths, to enter into the spiritual work of psychoanalysis. Jung, at one point in expressing his own calling in The Red Book, says, “the spirit of the depths was silent in me, since I swayed between fear, defiance, and nausea, and was wholly the prey of my passion. I could not and did not want to listen to the depths. But on the seventh night, the spirit of the depths spoke to me: ‘Look into your depths, pray to your depths, waken the dead’” (2009, p. 140).

Until very recent times, within the past two decades, African Americans have been extremely reluctant to engage in formal psychotherapeutic practice as patients.

Practitioners have given varying reasons for this lack of engagement by people of color. One reason that seems apparent is the lack of trust, dating from the early days of psychoanalysis, between the founding members of psychoanalysis and African Americans.

In their book *Psychotherapy with African American Women: Innovations in Psychodynamic Perspectives and Practice*, practicing therapists Leslie Jackson and Beverly Greene list nine basic reasons why African American women might be reluctant to engage in psychodynamic therapy.

The focus of early psychoanalysis was on needing patients who were “crazy.”

There was a very large stigma placed on anyone who required being seen by a medical doctor for psychological or emotional treatment. The authors list this as one of the major reasons the women with whom they worked would not want psychotherapy.

It was not unusual for African Americans in those early days of the twentieth century, as is often the case now, to receive a lesser standard of healthcare as compared to Whites. Economics and race were generally significant in whether or not an individual could be taken care of by the medical profession.
AFRICAN ARCHETYPAL PRIMORDIAL
A MAP FOR JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY

Excerpted from African Americans and Jungian Psychology

In American society from the early days of slavery, Africans were not initially allowed to be taught how to read English; then, later, schools could not be built for them and finally, when these schools were built, African Americans were segregated into the worst schools possible based on Jim Crow laws. Colleges did not readily accept African American men or women as doctoral students. Francis Cecil Sumner was the first such graduate in 1920 under the mentoring of Stanley Hall. He completed a doctoral thesis on Freud and Adler. The first African American woman to complete her doctoral degree was Inez Beverly Prosser in 1933. It was in Educational Psychology.

The number of applicants for graduate programs was extremely limited and enrollment was discouraged. Under these conditions, it was unlikely that a formally trained psychoanalyst would be available for African Americans, in cities or particularly in rural areas. Dr. Sumner attempted to remedy this situation as one of the founders of Howard University's Psychology Department.

Africanist cultural tradition indicates medicine was a communal experience that was heavily dependent not only on one individual in a private setting but also on family and extended family members. It was vital to know what was considered “sickness” and what was “normal” for the culture. Psychoanalysis, particularly in its early years, would not have been positively responsive to African Americans, except in the most extreme cases where hospitalization was a factor, such as in Jung’s case with St. Elizabeth Hospital. Even then, the treatment may have taken the form of a physiological experiment, though William Alanson White was working at changing the American model of psychology from one of laboratory-focused research experiments to psychoanalysis. Meanwhile, the families of mentally ill patients strove to take care of them at home without the intervention of “outsiders”—psychiatric medical doctors.

The medical establishment that African Americans encountered from their very earliest days in America, including psychiatric care, was in many ways reminiscent of those European doctors who gradually over time began to replace the traditional African healers. However, along with this newer relationship, perhaps, came the mistrust of removing the process of healing patients away from cultural norms with its focus on body–mind connection, dreams, family involvement, and respect for ancestors as a part of understanding mental sickness and its remedy. Is the contemporary mistrust of African Americans a continued underlying effect of early psychoanalysis, which even today can negatively impact patient–doctor relations? How do the long-standing cultural aspects of African traditional healing practices, discounted by European civilized medical principles and practice, remain stifled in African Americans many generations later?
One significant aspect of African healing points to the Jungian archetypal idea that the
gods cause our psychological "illness" and that this selective god who has brought the
sickness also holds the remedy for our psychological healing. In this view, a healing at
the deepest level—soulfulness—is expected.

This appears strongly related to Xhosa beliefs that the ancestors were an important
part of a patient's ability to heal. Dreams represented the way in which a patient could
understand her illness and also the manner in which the sickness could be treated or
cured. In Xhosa culture, the ancestors were believed to have communicated through
dreams. Jung's idea was that the archetypal gods communicated to us through our
dreams. Asclepius and others in working with dreams invited the dreamer into a space
where dream and healing took place almost simultaneously.

A supportive environment was essential and this included a great deal of trust.

Perhaps, this level of trust cannot yet be established in patients of color as regards
psychoanalysis due to the African experience of colonialism and the African American
experience of slavery, psychoanalysis's medical treatment of African Americans, and its
accompanying racism toward patients as well as those training to become medical
doctors. In Living with Racism: The Black Middle-Class Experience, authors Feagin and
Sikes provide the following insight taken from an African American: "Black medical
professionals with whom we talked often reported having a difficult time in school or
in the early years of practice, in that they were tested in unfair ways or were expected
to fail" (1994, p.116).

John Janzen stated that his text Ngoma: Discourses in Healing in Central and Southern
Africa (1992) was an attempt to create a more popularly acceptable concept and view of
the healing communities, or ngoma cults, that existed in southern and central Africa.
These communities, named "culs of affliction" by anthropologist Victor Turner, were
distinguished in African communities not only for their therapeutic effect but also as
socializing elements.

They provided support and emotional comfort in times of physical and psychological
difficulty. Ngoma, defined as "drum," signified the presence of drumming and dancing in
the ritualistic ceremonies conducted under the direction of a traditional healer. Janzen
provided a detailed and rich written report of the nuances of the ngoma. In doing so, he
pointed to the historical and contemporary nature of the ngoma.

Reviewing the current status of medicine in Africa, he strongly suggested that the
ngoma be recognized as an established institution. He believed this would greatly
support the development of social agencies for the care of sick individuals. He noted
that ngomas thrive in African communities and should be supported in a broad manner
for the social, psychological, and physical well-being of Africans.
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In his opening chapter, Janzen took the reader to the four geographical areas he selected for his research on the ngoma communities. These comprised Kinshasa (Zaire), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Mbabane-Manzini (Swaziland), and Cape Town, South Africa. These areas were chosen because they differ from each other in language and in general social custom.

Janzen detailed his meetings with healers. He described their work with patients and his own personal experience of ngoma work with several of these healers. For example, in the city of Kinshasa, he met with a healer who was of the nkita lineage.

Nkita defined not only the lineage, but also the name of the illness, the spirit behind the illness, and the therapeutic rite to be performed for healing. Janzen spoke of the signs of affliction particular to the patients seeing this healer: psychological distress, disturbing dreams, fever, childhood disease, and female infertility. The patients’ illnesses became areas of specialty for the healer. The initial healing ceremony took place at a river.

An important element of the ngoma is that, in many respects, it serves as an initiation to become novices and eventually healers within a healing community. The sickness or illness experienced by individuals is often considered to be a spiritual calling to become a healer. However, it can also be a sickness brought on by magic or due to disrespect for the ancestors. The nature of the illness and its origin is determined by the healer, who provides guidance about the healing solution.

Another important feature of ngoma is that this tradition, which began in rural areas of Africa, is now common in urban life. Janzen noted that the negative side of this is the dominance of charlatans preying on lonely, sick people who have moved to urban areas due to poverty and stressful circumstances in their homelands. However, he said that the more positive side is the considerable exchange of healing therapies and remedies from a variety of communities whose members have met in urban areas.

In reviewing ngoma on the Swahili coast, Janzen recalled the work of Hans Cory, an ethnologist from the early twentieth century, who recorded the ngoma communities and their makeup.

Cory observed that they were communities not only for ancestor reverence and divination, but also served as guilds for professional and artistic development.

Janzen interviewed Botoli Laie, a healer from this area. Laie noted the spirits that afflict and describe the accompanying sicknesses. Omari, the second healer interviewed, stated that he learned ngoma from his father and was not himself a “sufferer-novice.”

Omari was viewed by the author as more of a medical doctor with a clinical practice.
However, Omari did work with patients who had *sheitani* (spirit) sickness, and he stated that he referred patients with "ordinary sickness" to the hospital.

In South Africa, Janzen described a different ngoma that he believed was influenced by the hostile and potentially volatile atmosphere of the townships. Within this atmosphere, the ngoma offered a much-needed place of solace and support. The author noted that one of every four households belonged to a ngoma. He described in a case study the initiation of Ntete, a Cape Town man. Janzen compared the differences and similarities in ceremonies between Cape Town and other ngoma locations.

The basic nature of the rituals remained the same as those conducted in the rural countryside: calling the ancestors, smearing medicine on the initiate's body, the sacrifice of a goat, and dancing and singing.

All activities were completed over a three-day period. Janzen observed that this ngoma of Cape Town had several of the main features of the broader ngoma institution. These included the entry of a sick person into ngoma training under the supervision of a healer, novices working together to learn and study dreams, and songs and divination practices. Individuals celebrated rites of passages through sacrifice and the sharing of meals.

Janzen stressed the importance of lexicon in determining the nature of ngoma. He described in detail the origin of ngoma and how this aspect of African life spread from one location to another. He determined that by tracing the linguistic features of the Bantu languages through selected African regions, he could observe the history and development of ngoma. He discussed ngoma musical instruments and how they promoted development of ngoma as an institution. Janzen stated that the methodology of genetic classification has been the key factor in determining the historical development of ngoma through shared features. He provided a list of cognate terms that "reveals symptoms, etiologies, healer roles, medicines and ritual activities with end-goal of health of cognate reconstructions based on a comparison of modern semantic variations" (1992, p. 63). For example, the Bantu proto- cognate word for *dog* suggests that that which causes sickness also heals. Janzen described the core features of ngoma therapy, from the initial sickness and identification by an established healer through the ceremonial rituals of whitening the body, purification ceremonies, and dream and divination training.

Again referring to Turner, Janzen noted the rites of passage in the separation of sacred and profane space and time in the healing rituals.

Divination, a diagnostic tool, is always a part of the work of the ngoma. It assists the healer in determining the cause of the sickness and the direction of the healing.
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Spirits are a major feature of ngoma therapy and must be communicated with, either through channeling or through requests for assistance in healing. Often, spirits are identified as the source of the sickness. Someone following this sign, indicated by sickness or dreams, will become a healer in the spiritual community or ngoma of this identified spirit. It is believed that a society should remain stable and without misfortune. The sacrifices made by the ngoma assure its members of good fortune.

Janzen stated that the animal sacrifice “purifies the universe in that it restores or regenerates the human community to its ideals” (1992, p. 104).

In my opinion, Janzen’s recommendation of the ngoma as a recognized institution would be most beneficial to Africans. A social institution that has remained as consistent as this one should be supported. Additionally, the ngoma is a purely African institution that has survived and provided much for the spiritual and financial well-being of Africans. Its ability to withstand the pressures and influences of colonialism proves its viability. Based on Janzen’s research, it appears that there are correlations between ngoma healing practices and those of modern medicine.

Bantu Folklore by Matthew Hewat (1970) was originally published in 1906. It has been chosen for inclusion because of the author’s apparent familiarity with the social customs of the Bantu people.

According to Hewat, when death came suddenly, it was believed to be caused by family members, and they were the first to be held under suspicion. Within Bantu cosmological belief, a spirit world existed. Sacrifices by “medicine men” were offered to appease the “offended spirits” and were also made when someone dreamed of the ancestors. Hewat described in detail the specific rituals for offering sacrifices. He also reported that amulets were worn by most Bantus as a form of protection against sickness and evil.

Hewat noted that there were several different kinds of amagqira (doctors), including herbalists, witch doctors, and surgeons. They could be either men or women. The doctors could attain this position through lineage or choose the path of medicine on their own. Individuals who became doctors or healers went through a training period.

This training began after the initiate was identified as having a calling through a dream, a spirit river calling, and visions. Once these events occurred, then training with a teacher began. Hewat stated, “Taking a herb doctor all-round he is often a clever fellow, good at the cure of some diseases, and his methods and principles compare favourably with those ascribed to Aesculapius and Galen in the early history of medicine” (1970, p. 28).

In Chapter 4, Hewat provided the reader with a list of diseases, causes, and prescribed traditional cures. Chapter 5 continued in the same manner but also included instances
where surgery was performed and stated the medicines for diseases where surgery was necessary.

Hewat also wrote about the Bantu rituals related to midwifery and children. Of particular note was the rite carried out 10 days following birth: placing children in a hole in the earth to protect them and keep them healthy. Related and of equal significance was the burial of small children in the earth when they appeared to be getting sick. In his summary, Hewat allowed that native healers or doctors were knowledgeable and adequately prepared to provide healthcare services to their patients.

Harriet Ngubane lived among the Zulu people, conducting anthropological fieldwork. The text Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine: Ethnography of Health and Disease in Nyuswa-Zulu Thought and Practice (1977) was a result of her investigative studies. In opening, she said that her book grew out of “a desire to look into social behaviour that was considered traditional” (p. 2). In this introductory section, Ngubane discussed the advantages and disadvantages of being Zulu to completing her research study. Chapter 1 began with a historical review of the Nyuswa people. The Nyuswa, according to Ngubane, had resided on their land for 130 years. They were a clan people with strong lineage lines. She said of them, “I would argue that in spite of Christianity the permeating influence in the Nyuswa reserve is based more on Zulu culture than any foreign culture” (Ngubane, 1977, p. 20).

In Chapter 2, Ngubane discussed the causes of sickness and related facts and defined various terms. Umuthi (medicine) is a tree or shrub that is both poisonous and curative. Isifo is defined as somatic symptoms, misfortune, or disease. In Zulu culture, illness has two major causes. One is biological (natural forces), which occur as part of the life process—that is, aging, childhood illnesses, seasonal sickness, and family genealogical sickness. This type of illness is termed umkhuhlane. Medicines used for umkhuhlane are not part of a ritual but are considered sufficiently potent to help with sickness. Africans believe that non-Africans are capable of understanding these kinds of illnesses but not those “based on Zulu cosmology” (p. 2). Ukufa kwaban was defined as a disease of the African peoples. “This name is used mainly because the philosophy of causality is based on African culture” (p. 24).

The second major cause of illness was directly related to an imbalance in the psychic and physical environment of an individual. “Pollution” existed through sorcery or the negative actions of one person or animal upon another. This “pollution” could be reversed by a balancing between order and disorder. “For a Zulu conceives good health not only as consisting of a healthy body, but as a healthy situation of everything that concerns him…. Good health means the harmonious working and coordination of his
universe” (Ngubane, 1977, p. 27). There were some who were considered more vulnerable to environmental pollution; those included infants, strangers, and individuals who had been sick for long periods of time without treatment. In the chapter discussing sorcery, Ngubane said that it resulted from intentional pollution of the environment that left something behind that caused illness. According to the author, everyone had the right and was expected to protect himself or herself against sorcery. She listed three types of sorcerers: night sorcerers, day sorcerers, and lineage sorcerers.

Another chapter of Ngubane’s text (1977) was devoted to a discussion of ancestors and sickness. Zulu belief is that ancestors are a major factor in health and sickness; the living have a responsibility to respect and acknowledge their ancestors.

When this does not occur, it is more likely that an individual or close family member with “Pollution” was considered to have mystical powers. There were two situations in which it usually dominated. The first was the birth of a child, and the second was death.

Other circumstances considered to be polluted (but less so) were menstruation and the day after sexual intercourse. Someone who murdered another was considered to be in a polluted state. In order to rid oneself of pollution, it was necessary to seek treatment.

This treatment was typically sought from three different sources. Classified by group, these included the diviner, the bone thrower, and whistling great ancestors. Herbal medicine was considered a part of treatment and was classified according to the colors red, black, and white. “Colour plays an important and dominant role in symbolism related to therapy of mystical illness,” reported Ngubane (1977, p. 113).

The colors black, red, and white were always used in strict observance of sequence. Black and red were considered equal, both good and bad. White was held to be good. Black and red medicine was always followed by white medicine. The former two were used in treatment to rid the body of what was considered to be bad: the sickness. White was then given in order to restore the individual to good health. The colors were related to the “cosmic order of day and night.” It was believed that danger existed at night in the form of night sorcerers, sick people, and ancestral spirits. Black medicine was necessary to help restore health and provide a time for resting. “Herein lies the relevance of the equivocal power of black medicines. While they are dangerous, they are nevertheless necessary to make a person strong and powerful” (Ngubane, 1977, p. 115).

Sunrise and sunset that had a reddish color represented the state between something dark and something light. In discussing red medicines, Ngubane said, “Red compared with black represents less danger and more good” (1977, p. 116). Going further, she
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Excerpted from African Americans and Jungian Psychology

added, “Daylight represents life and good health. To be (mystically) ill is likened to moving away from the daylight into the dimness of the sunset and on into the night.” In sorcery, it is black medicine that is used, which signifies the darkness, the night. In order for one to become healthy, one must move from night to day. Ngubane also stated that “illness is associated with heat.” Black and red medicines were always heated before application. In contrast, white medicines were usually not heated before application. Although the author refers to the theory of color evolution by Berlin and Kay, where colors evolve from stage one (black and white) to stage seven (purple, pink, orange, or gray), she stated that she did not find it relevant in her study of Zulu society.

Once the illness was removed, it was usually placed in one of two locations: either cast onto an animal (a goat or black bull) or at crossroads and on highways. It was hoped that in this secondary way, a passing stranger would absorb and carry the evil away with him. Ngubane wrote that “The symbolic therapy is fixed and standardized for each mystical illness. It is not abandoned if good results are not realized, but is repeated all over again, because such rites are rites of transformation, rites of process, of passage from a mystical state of darkness to one of mystical light. Treatment in this sense is a religious act” (1977, p. 132).

Ngubane carefully outlined in the succeeding chapters the Zulu view of the nature of spirit possession. In the summary conclusion, she discussed spirit possession, anthropology, and its relationship to Zulu beliefs. Referencing Gluckman, Levi-Strauss, and Turner, Ngubane concluded that women were not witches and that sorcery was masculine, pollution feminine. She referenced Turner’s symbology of colors: red for transition, white for life, and black as an indication of death. She applied Levi-Strauss’s raw-cooked symbology to the Zulu concepts of good and evil opposites.

Ngubane’s research and discussion of Zulu healing practices touched on several topics by other authors. The fact that black medicine was found to be so necessary to the healing process is reminiscent of Hillman’s insistence on darkness and the journey to the underworld. The umuthi (medicine) is both a poison and a curative. Meier (1967) noted the Greek acceptance of this healing concept in his text. Like Ngubane, Meier said it was someone from another world—a god (or ancestor)—who brought sickness. I note the strong similarities between Ngubane’s findings related to healing practices and those of others. The longevity of African healing practices suggests a capacity for healing that goes beyond the body-only orientation of modern medicine. It inherently relates directly to that which is spiritual.

In his text Working with the Dreaming Body (1985), Arnold Mindell presented 50 case studies. He discussed the relationship between dreams and physical illness. His belief was that body symptoms are mirrored in dreams and vice versa, and that these
symptoms intensify as the body seeks health. Mindell related his story of becoming sick and the effect this had on his perspective as he viewed his body's attempts to heal itself. In an example from a patient's life, he tells of a patient dying from a tumor.

The author worked on increasing the level of psychic pain in the stomach, pushing for something to "break through." The patient had never been able to communicate with others in a manner he found satisfactory. Mindell believed that because of their work together, the patient reached a point where he was able to successfully express himself.

The patient was relieved of his painful stomach symptoms and survived longer than expected.

I believe that Mindell's approach to dreamwork, with its emphasis on body healing, mirrors the African system of healing's inclusiveness of body and mind in the process. In Jung's theory, there is recognition of the place of consciousness working with the unconscious. I interpret his use of the word "conscious" within this context as an awareness that is inclusive of the body as part of ego functioning.

Amplification is the process Mindell used in his work with patients to discover the "channel" through which the body was attempting to manifest symptoms. He amplified both the dream experience and the body or proprioceptive experience.

Mindell (1985, p. 9) described his work as process work, stating that it is a "natural science.... I simply look to see what exactly is happening in the other person and what happens to me while he is reacting." He did not credit himself or the therapist with any special skill but rather stated, "The therapist's only tool is his ability to observe processes. He has no pre-established tricks or routines." It is through this process that the next actions can be predicted.

Mindell proceeded further to define process. He noted that the term is not viewed from a psychological perspective but rather from that of a physicist. He said of process that the primary feature is being close to awareness of all that is transpiring.

Additional features include identifying "unconscious" body symptoms, working without judgment, and the use of neutral language in exchanges with patients.

Mindell said (1985, p. 13), "I don't believe the person actually creates disease, but that his soul is expressing an important message to him through the disease." He supported this statement by relating how many of his patients—most of whom were dying—moved from just being sick to a life-affirming process of inner development. He stated that often these patients were initially not interested in analysis, only in physical healing. An example he provided was of a woman, Frau Herman, who had cancer. In what Mindell considered a dream related to her physical condition, she took a trip to the gym. Later,
she dreamed of a woman with milk in her breast. Mindell believed this dream opened her consciousness to being cured of cancer. Through the dream series of this patient, Mindell was able to follow the path of physical healing from beginning to end. “The body has many centers and points of awareness. Your body uses projections and psychological problems to stimulate discovery of its different parts” (Mindell, 1985, p. 31).

Mindell said that shamans knew and understood about projection as a cause of illness by the placing of “black magic” on another. He believed that projections could make one sick.

He told of a man with goiter, a throat problem, who had a very difficult and controlling father. As the patient was able to become physical, punching and hitting and screaming his hate for his father, he was physically and mentally released from negative father projections. Mindell maintained that the withdrawing of the negative projection from the father and the acceptance of his feelings of hatred enabled the patient to heal. He stated that successful bodywork depends entirely on the patient.

Mindell believed that the dreambody is a multichanneled personality. He noted the process of healing changes “channels” and goes from hearing to feeling, feeling to visualizing, and from seeing to moving. He indicated that it is through the experience of feeling pain that one is awakened to consciousness. When the pain becomes too intense, one changes channels and moves toward health. Mindell said the dreambody signals to the physical body, identifying a symptom. The ability to switch from one channel to another in the process, Mindell believed, is often a matter of life and death. If one cannot move in the direction of healing, then one dies, remaining, in effect, stuck in one channel.

Mindell reviewed the dreambody in fairy tales and couple relationships and as a part of the world collective. He believed that understanding oneself makes for a better understanding of the world collective dreambody. Mindell stated that at an early age, one might discover illnesses that would be chronic because they usually appeared in childhood dreams. He outlined a plan for working alone, without an analyst, with the dreambody, using increased awareness, amplification, and channel-changing as phases in the process.

Mindell concluded his text by indicating that dying individuals beginning dreambody work often feel that they are getting better and report feeling less sick. Mindell summarized that this is because the dreambody is containing and healing the physical body even as it approaches death.
References


CHAPTER 6

IDENTIFYING THE AMERICAN SHADOW

TYPOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE 1992 LOS ANGELES RIOTS

This chapter is excerpted from

Energies and Patterns in Psychological Type

by John Beebe

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IDENTIFYING THE AMERICAN SHADOW

TYPOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE 1992 LOS ANGELES RIOTS

Excerpted from Energies and Patterns in Psychological Type

It was not hard to see the image of America that triggered the conflagration sweeping over Los Angeles after the acquittal of police charged with using excessive force during their arrest of Rodney King. Anyone with a television set had access to the sequence of events. A black man was supposed to lie face down, his entire body flat against the ground. Should he attempt in any way to rise, peace officers with clubs would beat him until he was again knocked flat, and when he later complained about such treatment, the law would side with the police, not him. This was a trial for all Americans, and it seems faintly obscene to draw understanding from typology in the face of such pain, but psychological questions come at such collective moments, along with the nerve to answer them.

What part of us responds to such an image? At one level it depends upon with whom we identify and what our racial and personal experiences with authority have been. As an analytical psychologist, a specialist in the part-functions of mental and emotional consciousness in their relation to deep unconscious realities, I believe that the peculiar force of Rodney King's beating sent its alarming message to blacks and whites alike, not so much through the empathetic sympathy it evoked as through its deeper shock to introverted feeling. Introverted feeling, as Jung was the first to get us to see, is a valuation function that works at the archetypal (not the personal) level, taking the deepest possible sounding of a situation. It not only enables but compels us to feel the rightness and wrongness of images, arrogating from its very closeness to the archetypal a bench of judgment that grants it the power to decide what is appropriate and what is not.

One of the first African Americans to have her own business as an MBTI consultant and type practitioner, Pat Clark Battle (1991, pp. 6–9) has offered observations which suggest that introverted feeling, though traditionally prevalent in American black culture, is sometimes suppressed in favor of extraverted thinking by African Americans who want to adapt to the prevailing values of economically empowered whites. It is not hard to imagine that there may be also a contrary emphasis on introverted feeling in African Americans who have not succeeded when attempting an adaptation to extraverted thinking. When a strongly emphasized introverted feeling is paired with the mode of response Jung called extraverted sensation, what appears is a style of emotional realism that prefers action to reflection and can produce an explosive rather than thought-out reaction when confronted with a deeply felt injustice. Spike Lee beautifully detailed this sort of reaction in white and black characters in his 1989 film, Do the Right Thing (see Beebe, 1989). In the case of an event like the Rodney King verdict, in contradistinction to the Rodney
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King beating, the injustice is done not only to a man, but to the principle of what a man can legitimately aspire to. I believe it is this latter injustice to which introverted feeling responds so deeply and so violently when, monitoring power, it identifies abuse.

INTROVERTED FEELING

The introverted feeling function concerns itself with the values expressed in the archetypal aspect of situations, often relating to the actual situation by measuring it against an ideal. When the actual is found wanting, introverted feeling can become intensely disappointed. Although it often finds it hard to articulate its judgments, or simply prefers to keep them to itself, introverted feeling also tends to ignore social limits regarding the communication of critical responses, to the point of appearing to depreciate others. It may withhold positive feeling as insincere and fail to offer healing gestures to smooth over difficult situations. In its shadow aspect, introverted feeling becomes rageful, anxious, and sullen. It may withdraw all support for attitudes it has decided are simply wrong, even at the risk of rupturing relationship and agreed-upon standards of fellow-feeling.

Others who watched their television sets at a safe distance from all that was going on saw another image, perhaps easier for them to witness, and certainly more compelling for middle-class whites. This was the image of the white man being pulled from his truck and beaten senseless by a group of rageful blacks. Psychologically, this image pulled for the other sort of feeling: empathic, righteous, and subtly snobbish in the name of the human compact—a shadow aspect of the extraverted feeling that is so prevalent in the white collective. Viewers with that perspective simply put themselves in the young truck driver's place and withheld any sympathy from those who beat him, especially resenting their many black apologists. Pictures of the truck driver released by the papers showed a sweet, engaging open-hearted face—the kind that typically graces a California campground on summer weekends. In sharp contrast, the men who beat him were Boys 'N the Hood, fatally without charm.

And so, the opposites of feeling were joined along racial lines: From the standpoint of introverted feeling, the verdict was shockingly unjust, but from the standpoint of extraverted feeling, the reaction to the verdict was stupid and
unfair—even, as one white drugstore clerk airily declared to me in the first hours of the riot, before it was clear that this was the worst civil disturbance in America in over a hundred years, “silly.”

**EXTRAVERTED FEELING**

The extraverted feeling function concerns itself with other people’s emotions—especially those that lie on or near the surface and are easy to sympathize with. Placing a value on people’s feelings, extraverted feeling relates to them with discrimination, empathy, and tact. At its best, it tends to appreciate the strengths of people, but it also seeks concrete gratitude and validation. In its shadow aspect, extraverted feeling tends to discriminate against feelings that are less easy to identify with, and therefore less socially acceptable. The result is that extraverted feeling tends to ignore or harshly judge emotional needs that do not validate collective norms. This kind of response can lead to forms of bullying and prejudice, as majority values are emphasized at the expense of other, more individual values.

Then Rodney King unexpectedly spoke, reversing and perhaps atoning for the unwise decision of the prosecution to keep him off the stand, and also relieving us of the anxiety that he was too brain-damaged to speak. When he spoke, the two feeling reactions, introverted and extraverted, suddenly came together in one of those triumphs of being human that seem peculiarly American. His words, which had the poetic appropriateness of speeches that find their way into grammar school texts of composition, seemed to erase our knowledge of his criminal record, exonerating him almost as fully in the popular imagination as those inspired sentences Bartolomeo Vanzetti spoke before his execution in 1927. It became obvious that it was still possible in this country to bring not only the races together, but also the two kinds of feeling that blacks and whites had come to personify through the demeaning oversimplification that is a race riot.

The next day, people of all ethnic groups were joining in the cleanup. There was recognition that the big losers, at least where everyone’s feeling was concerned, might after all be Asians, the people who had trusted this country to be better than the lands they had left. Some looters even returned what they had stolen, and many individuals acted with courage and generosity, human integrity triumphing over psychological part-functioning.
I was paying a house call to an AIDS patient when I watched Rodney King speak: swallowed in the collective, my patient and I were finding it hard to summon the energy to meet. We seemed to merge in a sort of shared fantasy, a television set dreaming that it could be a human perspective. From that unrealistically heightened perspective, it felt easy to see the larger drama playing behind the scenes of the riots and to know what one thought about it. One could imagine one knew the fault line in the American character that the earthquake had revealed.

I think about typology often and have often relied on the ruthless simplicity of Jung’s model of types to unmask the strengths and weaknesses of any personality. Revived by the image and words of Rodney King on my patient’s television, I commenced again to think, and a mini-lecture began to form in my mind, with America, this time, as the personality to be typed. America, I told myself, with the breathtaking oversimplification that characterizes such moments, is an extraverted thinking type. Our collective inferior function, as a country, is introverted feeling, and we (even when we are black) let blacks carry this, keeping ‘them’ wherever possible, in an ‘inferior’ position where ‘their’ feeling can be despised or at least selectively honored. Yet this, I reasoned, is not our darkest shadow: that shadow is carried by the smiling, sinister white man at the base of the American character, the man with demonic extraverted feeling.

This demonic extraverted feeling function is what some blacks call ‘the man.’ It was not hard to see ‘the man’ in the series of undermining moves that finally provoked the conflagration: in Police Chief Gates’s denial that anything was amiss in his leadership and his refusal, on the grounds of morale, to step down; in the change of venue of the police officers’ trial to overwhelmingly white Simi Valley for a ‘fairer’ hearing by peers; and, finally, in the under-reaction of Gates (still, incredibly, in charge) to the early rioting, now out of a belated gratuitous empathy for the feelings of those who might not take well to more police intervention. This chain of perverse reactions in the name of feeling for others had, in fact, been a chain of evil, and it was clear the Chief had been making mischief all along. In his stubborn wrongheadedness as the tragic drama unfolded, Gates was the true opposite of Rodney King.

Just as television sets are not people, psychology turns demagogic when it pretends it can use its tools with any accuracy or competence to analyze what is, after all, only televised images. I did not know Rodney King or Daryl Gates, and I am not competent to evaluate their worth as persons. But as an American analytical
psychologist, I can see that the fate of the happiness of our country, the way we feel about ourselves, probably still depends upon a collective judgment, a projected moral decision. The question that all Americans must answer, with whatever feeling for such things is honestly at their disposal, is this one: Which of these two unfortunate men represented the part of the American shadow of which we are most unconscious?

References

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