Security Strategies Today: Trends and Perspectives

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This conference report provides a summary of the discussions that took place during the seminar. The opinions and views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the position of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

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Introduction

There have been considerable developments in security-policy thinking since the end of the Cold War, and a complex set of transnational threats and challenges necessitates new security policies and strategies. Not only the attacks of 11 September 2001, but also the dark side of globalisation such as climate change, the global spread of dangerous technologies and international organised crime have changed the security perspective and policy procedures in recent years. Consequently, new national-security strategies, white papers and security-policy documents have been drafted in order to take into account the changing security landscape.

On 6 April 2009, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) welcomed a group of leading security experts for a seminar entitled “Security Strategies Today: Trends and Perspectives”. The goal of the seminar was to provide a forum for experts from different European states, major international powers and regional and international organisations to take stock of current security polices in the European region and beyond. The participants had an opportunity to assess the direction of security-policy thinking by analysing a number of key security-policy documents such as national-security strategies, defence concepts and
white papers, among others. Assumptions regarding future threats were considered, as were a variety of drafting processes and methodologies.

More than 30 participants attended the seminar, including representatives of the Defence Ministries of Finland, Germany and Sweden, as well as representatives of the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition to faculty members from the GCSP, regional and international experts from a range of academic and policy institutions participated, including speakers from PricewaterhouseCoopers, the International Affairs Institute (Rome), the Institute for International Strategic Studies (Beijing), the Royal Institute of International Relations (Brussels) and the Foundation for Strategic Studies (Paris).

During the seminar, a wide range of views were expressed on the process of formulating strategy, with both states and regional organisations represented. The main areas of focus were the realities of building consensus at the different levels of governance, the methodologies that states have used to produce their strategic documents, and an examination of the motivations and uses of these documents in a globalised security environment. This Geneva Paper provides a synthesis of the ideas presented at the seminar in an attempt to outline a set of best practices that will be of use to other experts within the strategic community.
European Security Policies

European Security Strategies Today

Europe provides examples of a greater variety of approaches to reconciling latent tensions across the multiple fault lines of security-strategy formulation than perhaps any other region today. When examining the security strategies of European nation-states, one sees the articulation of a number of different strategies in response to the challenging questions that states now face with regard to their defensive strategic posturing. The following are just some of the many difficult questions that the security strategies of European states have answered in different ways:

1. What threats pose the greatest risk to state security?
2. What is the overarching paradigm for organising a state’s defensive resources: ensuring territorial defence or constructing an expeditionary force that can be projected over a certain strategic distance?
3. How congruent are the security strategies of a nation-state and those of the international organisations it is a member of?

Indeed, a topical overview of security-strategy content and formulation within European states displays a wealth of diversity in the perspectives through which each state observes its own security context, as well as the methodologies used by states to articulate their strategies.
While they share similar perspectives on the actual global threats to their security, their strategies on how to counter these threats are invariably rooted in their unique geopolitical situation.

Given the long processes of European integration, it is interesting to see these differences in security-strategy formulation amongst European states. The articulation of common strategic concepts at the EU level in 2003\(^1\) demonstrated that EU member states do have a shared overall vision for European security. However, because of the complexities of achieving consensus at the international level, a European security strategy necessarily remains a more abstract vision. As a result, one can view the security strategies of European states as fulfilling a role that thus far the EU has been unable to play.

Reasserting the State in the European Context

A series of events have shifted the focus of international politics from the aggregate level to, once again, that of the state. As a result, the importance of the state in formulating security strategy has re-emerged. Compromises made at the international level in attempts to achieve consensus have certainly played a role in the return to the emphasis on state security. Yet more specific events of the past few years have exacerbated the general difficulties of formulating international strategies, and have forced a move away from the trend of strengthening international architecture in the 1990s. Indeed, some have seen in recent years a distinct paradigm shift away from the globalisation processes of the 1990s and towards a new paradigm of globalisation and geopolitics.

Specific events such as the 2008 war in South Ossetia, the international financial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, the Irish referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, and longer-term processes such as what

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has been termed the “decline of the West” have led to the refocus of strategic security considerations back onto the state.

The conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008 gave a considerable shock to the West. This was evident in the disjointed response from Western countries towards the actions taken by both Russia and Georgia. The lack of factual information regarding the belligerents served all too well to delineate the tangible limits of Western knowledge and influence in the world, and in particular the limited ability of NATO to act as a guarantor of security on the eastern fringe of Europe. With NATO’s deficiencies sharply exposed, the war produced a distinct ideational shift towards focussing on state security.

Furthermore, the reality of the international financial and economic crisis has meant that European states face constraints in what they can provide in terms of global security. European states have been reassessing their security priorities in the wake of the crisis, and while the long-term implications of the crisis cannot be surmised at the present moment, it is certainly possible that European states will emerge less unified and more narrowly focussed than before.

The failures of both the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the Irish referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon have presented a great challenge for European integration. In a rapidly changing security environment, the European Union must still work with the structures of the 2003 Treaty of Nice. The confusion about how the EU is to move forward from the failed Irish referendum has added to the emphasis on state action and has been a key element in terms of pressing forward with the formulation of national-security strategies in light of the fact that the notion of a more integrated Europe has been placed on hold for the present.

The events in South Ossetia and the recent downturn in international financial markets have served as tangible proof of the “decline of the West” that has emerged in the forefront of the global imagination over
the past decade. The euphoria of the end of the Cold War has given way to a sense of cynicism regarding the ability of the West to prevent crimes against humanity (such as in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia) or to win the “war on terror” (as evidenced by the continued instability in Afghanistan). In the face of such a re-examination of the power and future prospects of the West, many countries have returned to more regional perspectives, and the idea of spheres of influence.

Therefore, the security strategies of European states reflect current trends in emphasising the role of the state to various degrees. The following analyses of the individual security strategies of European states will attempt to discern how much emphasis these strategies place upon the state, as well as regional and international bodies. The paper will also discuss the different methodologies used by each state to build and articulate their own particular security strategy.

France

Background to the 2008 French White Paper

In August 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy commissioned the drafting of a white paper, which was to be the first iteration of France’s national-security strategy since 1994. The publication of the latter paper led France, in 1996, to transform its army into a fully professional force, to eliminate its arsenal of surface-to-surface nuclear weapons, and to increase its force-projection capability.

The gap of 13 years between the publication of white papers in France was substantial, and much had changed during that time that necessitated a reworking of France’s national-security strategy. The 1994 white paper formulated French security in the paradigm of the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, but it was unprepared to deal with the effects

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3 Ibid., p. 1.
of globalisation that would occur in the second half of the 1990s and beyond. Thus, last year’s white paper provided a thorough overview of France’s national-security strategy, with the intention of formulating a new defence and national-security paradigm that would be relevant for the next 15 years.

Methodology of the 2008 White Paper

In order to provide the process of drafting the 2008 white paper with the greatest chance of success, the French brought together a large and diverse group of bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic organisations, and provided a lengthy time frame in order to ensure that the exercise was a thorough one. Furthermore, the process included a number of checks to ensure that the recommendations that came from the paper would be properly followed up afterwards.

First, the French took a comprehensive approach to producing the paper by tasking a number of ministries across the spectrum of national security and defence to work together to find a global perspective on French security. Participants included representatives of relevant government agencies and the armed forces, parliamentarians and qualified individuals from academia and strategic think tanks, as well as outside experts and personalities. As the process took into account the opinions of many different stakeholders in France’s national-security establishment, it can be considered a good example of proper utilisation of a comprehensive approach, the goal being to bring together different actors in order to create synergies and a more global understanding of the subject. To this end, France’s ability to find and use knowledge from representatives of different groups ensured that a holistic security-strategy document could be produced.

The follow-up process is vital to transforming a white paper from a simple strategic document into a modicum for changing public policy. France, in addition to using an exhaustive drafting process, has also
taken measures to ensure that the recommendations outlined in the paper are properly implemented. The most obvious first step after publication was to make sure that the points of legislation relevant to security matters were congruent with its strategic aim. To this end, France has ensured that its five-year military spending bill and its domestic-security spending bill both correspond to the stipulations of the white paper, as well as to one another. Both were drafted in parallel by the national-security council to ensure that their recommendations corresponded to one another and have now been passed to the French parliament for approval.

The next follow-up step envisioned by France is a planned meeting of experts in 2010 to assess the progress that has been made in implementation. Given that only two years will have passed since the publication of the white paper, this meeting will constitute quite an early assessment to make sure that there have not been any unjustifiable departures from the document and that there will be a political and bureaucratic price to pay if such departures are found. The assessment will certainly be just one of many status checks throughout the paper’s life, and such periodic updates will ensure that France’s security policy is firmly tied to its expressed strategic vision.

The White Paper’s Findings
As the 2008 paper was the first strategic white paper published by France since 1994, it was necessary to provide an updated analysis of the global situation prior to delineating the changes in France’s strategic vision. This analysis focussed heavily on the impact of globalisation in terms of national security. It accepted that, with the existing potential for systemic and global crises, one must expect substantial strategic discontinuities, or *ruptures stratégiques*. Since the current global system is characterised by a multitude of complex interconnections, one must accept that there is a great deal of information that cannot be ascer-
tained. As a result, there are a number of strategic requirements to make the best use out of what information is available. This places an enormous premium on improving the capability to pick up less noticeable and potentially harmful activities by small groups of people that are carried out in the midst of the general activity of the greater population. It also means that the collection of information in the guise of a “knowledge based-security entity” is now focused upon as a stand-alone function besides the more traditional areas of security, such as deterrence and force projection.

What the white paper recommended was the reorganisation of the French state so that it would be capable of dealing with any threat that might arise effectively and flexibly. This means that, at times, the state will have to have structures in place to deal with the unknown, which could be seen as a strange proposition. Nevertheless, it is possible to infer from the trends expounded upon in the analysis of the global situation possible areas from where threats could arise, and thus any lack of knowledge can be dealt with on a general level. For example, as health experts have warned that the threat of pandemics has increased in the globalised world, and that the threat of bioterrorism is also higher than ever before, it could be possible to create an organisation to deal with a marriage of both areas even if the specific context regarding viruses, pathogens or toxins is unknown. Thus, the white paper recommended organising the state in such a way so as to reinforce the resilience of society against these aforementioned strategic discontinuities and to pick them up as early as possible.

The white paper recommended significant changes in how France approaches its national-security policy, which has led to the creation of new positions such as the national intelligence coordinator and the functional equivalent of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to the President in the United States (US). This emphasis on intelligence has been mirrored by increasing
budgetary resources geared towards knowledge-based security structures. The corresponding resources for intelligence in general have been doubled, as have those for areas of a more technical nature, such as military uses of Outer Space, which in the French perspective also falls under intelligence.

The white paper also recommended changes in the decision-making machinery of France’s national-security establishment. France used to have a defence council (which handled military affairs) and a domestic security council of a similar nature, though the two bodies were separate and never met. In accordance with the white paper, these have been forged into a defence and national-security council. There has also been a complete reshaping of France’s crisis-planning and management machinery. Using the British system as a template, France has sought to implement a similar crisis-management structure that utilises the same multilevel effectiveness, imitating the United Kingdom’s Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBRA) top-level management structure down to its grass-roots machinery. Thus, the white paper has initiated an ambitious restructuring of France’s national-security apparatus.

Overall, the paper sought to codify and delineate France’s national-security strategy for the next 15 years after its publication in 2008. Its comprehensive approach has led to creation of structures that are more flexible and that communicate with one another. It has even led to the explicit definition of the main geographic space of France’s post-Cold War strategic interest: the area spanning the Eastern Atlantic through the Mediterranean, down to the Middle East and into parts of the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, it has sought to guarantee that its specific objectives will be backed up by funding commitments, the most important being the ability to project a corps-sized military force into any part of the main region of strategic interest. For the moment, those involved in the preparation of the white paper feel that they have put in place the necessary theoretical tools to ensure the transformation of France’s secu-
rity nexus, but what remains is the important element of follow-up to smooth out potential wrinkles that might arise in the implementation process.

Germany

Much like France, Germany also had a large gap between publications of white papers. Prior to the publication of its white paper in 2006, Germany’s last security-strategy document was released in 1994. Thus, the 2006 white paper also focused on updating Germany’s security strategies in the wake of the changes caused by globalisation. In drafting the paper, Germany’s aims included inter-agency cooperation and bringing together a variety of opinions into a cohesive overarching strategic position. At the national level, the paper recommends the congruent use of all national means – political, diplomatic, civilian, economic, developmental, intelligence, police and military – in a coordinated and orchestrated manner. It also recommends the application of hard and soft power in a flexible way as needed, which reflects its espousal of an effects-based policy with respect to security as a whole and operations in particular. Yet while the national level plays a large role in German security, the paper is especially prescient in its prioritisation of Germany’s international commitments and the necessity for the German state to coordinate with international organisations in an effective manner in order to guarantee its own security.

Multilateralism and the White Paper

The white paper emphasises international cooperation as a key element of Germany’s security strategy. According to the paper, the organisations that are most vital for Germany’s security policy are NATO, followed by the European Union and finally the United Nations. The paper states that: “The transatlantic partnership remains the foundation of Germany’s

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and Europe’s common security. The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to be the cornerstone of Germany’s future security and defence policy.”  

Much like the coordinated action envisioned at the national level, the white paper also calls for greater integration in the security policies at the international level. While it admits that it is more complicated to bring international institutions and national actors together, it encourages greater dialogue at the institutional level and expresses the hope that this can lead to more practical cooperation in the field. Through the use of what the paper describes as “networked security”, it is hoped that global security structures can be built to rival the complex and multifaceted threats that face all nations today.

Threats and Risks to German Security

The white paper places heavy emphasis on the impacts of globalisation with regard to the permeability of borders and information. The ease of sharing information makes it possible to coordinate complex attacks that challenge security systems; thus, the openness of the so-called global village is at the heart of the threats identified in the white paper: international terrorism, weapons proliferation and instability from regional conflicts, among others. The white paper thus recommends that given the transnational nature of these threats, Germany should engage deeper with the international community to combat them. As a result of recent changes in the global security environment, the threats identified by the white paper are already in need of updating. Added in 2009, for example, were the effects of climate change and the global financial and economic crisis. Both can be seen as negative multipliers that exacerbate the implications of the transnational threats outlined earlier. And both will be given much more attention in the future.

5 Ibid., p. 5.
Germany and NATO

The Atlantic alliance is the top strategic priority for German security. The white paper reaffirms Germany’s important strategic alliance with the United States and expresses the belief that “[m]aintaining a close and trusting relationship with the USA is paramount for Germany’s security in the 21st century.” The paper clearly delineates Germany’s strategic vision for the future of NATO: evolutionary expansion, enhanced dialogue and a strategic transformation of the alliance in order to meet the complex challenges of the new century.

The paper declares Germany’s support for NATO’s open-door policy so long as the key tenets of the Washington Treaty and the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept continue to apply, and as long as new members “recognise NATO’s goals and are able to contribute to common security.” In addition to its support of the open-door policy, the paper declares that NATO should engage in greater dialogue with other organisations and states. It recommends a deeper integration between NATO and the European Union and expresses the belief that both institutions need to harmonise and synchronise defence-planning processes to enhance their effectiveness. Germany has been a key advocate of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and it hopes to further exploit opportunities created through the Partnership for Peace. The paper also espouses greater dialogue and openness with Russia, as this relationship is vital for countering international terrorism and other transnational threats.

Finally, the white paper, and more recently the German Defence Ministry, outlined Germany’s position on the future of NATO’s strategic concept. Germany holds that the key points of the 1999 concept are still valid for today: security, consultation, deterrence, defence, crisis management and partnership have not lost their relevance in a rapidly changing world. However, a new conceptual framework is needed to

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6 Ibid., p. 25.
7 Ibid.
reapply the 1999 strategy to present realities, and thus Germany eagerly wishes to make a contribution to the formulation of the 2009 NATO strategic concept.

The Role of the Bundeswehr in Germany's National-Security Policy

The white paper reaffirmed the integral role of Germany’s unified armed forces, the Bundeswehr, in its national-security strategy. Officially, the Bundeswehr, as defined by its mission statement, “guarantees the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy, contributes towards European and global stability, maintains national security and defence, provides assistance in the defence of [Germany’s] allies, [and] fosters multinational cooperation and integration.” 8 In addition, the Bundeswehr is tasked with the responsibilities of preventing international conflict, crisis management, supporting Germany’s allies, providing for the protection of Germany and its population, assisting in rescue and cooperation missions, and providing subsidiary assistance and humanitarian relief. Thus, Germany envisions the role of its armed forces as an instrument of peace and multilateral cooperation.9

The white paper explicitly states the importance of the military to Germany’s civil society. In doing so, it promotes the advantages of providing for leadership development and civic education (Innere Führung) amongst members of the army, so that they may ably serve with distinction both in the Bundeswehr and in their local communities.10 Furthermore, despite the identified changes in Germany’s security environment, the white paper maintains that the Bundeswehr will continue to rely on universal male conscription.11 Universal conscription, the paper argues, has played a key role in the integration of German society and has provided many young men with a wide range

8 Ibid., p. 53.
9 Ibid., p. 56.
10 Ibid., p. 59.
11 Ibid., p. 61.
of vocational skills. Universal male conscription also guarantees that the German armed forces will remain adequately staffed.

Overall, the white paper advocates the creation of a Bundeswehr that is streamlined and armed with the most modern equipment. It recommends reducing operational expenses by cutting personnel and bureaucratic elements. The savings from these cuts would then be expected to be reinvested in modern equipment so as to transform the Bundeswehr into an expeditionary force. More investment in mobility solutions, armaments and other procurements are essential in order to successfully create a Bundeswehr with a projection capacity that can meet Germany’s international commitments to its allies.

Germany’s Security Concerns in the Twenty-First Century

The major theme of the white paper is the paramount importance of Germany’s international commitments and the need to upgrade and modernise its armed forces in order to meet these commitments. The paper envisions a complete strategic and structural transformation of the Bundeswehr, from a territorial-defence-based defensive posture to a more expeditionary-based approach. This requires a transformation of all aspects of the armed forces, affecting its capabilities, strengths, structures, stationing, personnel, materiel, equipment and training.\footnote{12 Ibid., p. 74.} At the same time, to make such a comprehensive transformation affordable, the paper envisions major changes in the German bureaucracy and advocates the use of an interministerial approach in order to determine how best to reorganise Germany’s bureaucracy. Overall, Germany believes that the formulation of its security strategy requires the coordinated efforts of all parties, working in conjunction with its allies, in order to meet the diverse challenges of the globalised world.
Sweden
Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has seen a tangible shift in its security strategy and its defence policy. While popular opinion in Sweden may still believe that the country remains neutral, the reality of the new security environment means that Sweden is now more than ever integrating its defence capabilities with those of its allies. Indeed, Sweden’s involvement in peace operations in the former Yugoslavia and currently in Afghanistan, and a move towards interoperability of defence materiel according to NATO standards, demonstrates the global strategic aim of Sweden’s new direction in its security policy. Furthermore, the adoption of a 2004 government bill called “Our Future Defence” initiated a comprehensive modernisation process of Sweden’s armed forces. Much like the armed forces of Germany and of France, Sweden expects to radically transform its own armed forces from a static, territorial posture into a highly mobile expeditionary force. Such a transformation would be the result of Sweden’s acceptance of the transnational nature of the threats to security in the 21st century.

Moving Away from a History of Neutrality
Sweden has been a neutral state since the time of the Napoleonic wars in the early 19th century. During the Cold War, Sweden’s defensive posture focussed primarily on strong territorial defence, coupled with universal male conscription. At the same time, as an act of solidarity with the international community, Sweden participated in UN peacekeeping missions.

In the post-Cold War period, Sweden has considerably shifted its approach towards a multilateral conception of its security. In addition to participating in missions in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, Sweden has become more active in its own region. It joined the European Union and the Partnership for Peace in 1995, and through these organisations has developed a cooperative framework with NATO. Currently, Sweden’s
objective in the international sphere is to achieve increased integration and cooperation with the EU. While still militarily non-aligned, Sweden is willing to cooperate with other nations in military operations.

As a result of this shift in strategic thinking, Sweden has reorganised its armed forces to reflect its objective of assisting in crisis-management operations across the globe. The number of active servicemen has been reduced, and the armed forces are now positioning themselves to deal more with international conflicts across the globe. Many units have been decommissioned in an effort to cut costs where needed. There has also been a push towards a network-based defence for the armed forces, which would have the proposed effect of “assembling units based on the specific requirements of each situation”, which would help to increase the level of precision and relevance of the armed forces in crisis-management situations. The expeditionary capabilities approved in the 2004 bill are already beginning to take shape, and the armed forces will continue to build their expeditionary capacity for the future.

Recent Changes in Sweden’s Defensive Posture
Sweden’s security strategy has been revised in the years since “Our Future Defence” was passed in 2004. In particular, the Defence Ministry has published updated reports that correspond to the changing security environment around the globe. In December 2007, the report “Global Outlook: Threats and Challenges” stated the importance of transnational threats to Swedish security at the expense of traditional “territorially conceived” threats, thus continuing a trend in strategic thinking that began with the 2004 bill. The report especially placed increased importance on the effects of climate change. The Defence Ministry followed this report with the publication of another document entitled “Neutrality of Swedish Defence”, which advocated even more sweeping changes to

the structure and objectives of the armed forces, especially with regard to personnel. Already in 2004, “Our Future Defence” suggested increasing the number of volunteers in the armed forces. This was followed up by “Neutrality of Swedish Defence”, which suggests transforming the armed forces into an all-professional volunteer force. It also suggests reorganising the forces into separate departments and forming a home guard, as well as professional and support units. The recent thinking in Swedish security policy is shifting even more radically towards a global perspective.

The Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, is scheduled to vote on a new bill in 2009 that is based on the recommendations of the two documents previously discussed. Entitled “A Functional Defence”, the focus of the new strategy is envisioned to extend from 2010 to 2014. Like the preceding documents, the main highlight of the bill is the dramatic proposal to shift to an all-volunteer force. Citing the requirement that the armed forces have troops ready on an immediate basis, the bill frames the change as a direct consequence of the expeditionary posture of Sweden’s new defence strategy. The bill calls for an organisation of defence forces that would be immediately deployable across the globe, consisting of permanent and contracted forces as well as a home guard.14 A total of 50,000 operational forces are proposed to be on active duty in the army, with 28,000 shared between the permanent and contracted forces, and the remaining 22,000 in the home guard.15 The bill also proposes adding support duties to both the navy and the air force. Thus, the Defence Ministry is planning sweeping changes for the armed forces that are currently unrivalled in their structural impact anywhere else in Europe. The broad and sweeping nature of these reforms is sure to generate much debate once they are put for a vote in the Riksdag.

15 Ibid.
but one must believe that it is only a matter of time before the demands of an expeditionary posture signal a massive restructuring of the armed forces either with the passage of “A Functional Defence” this year or another bill drafted upon similar lines in the future.

United Kingdom

Historically, the practice of producing white papers as formal declarations of government policy originated in Great Britain. They became a cornerstone of administrative practice, frequently being used as a vehicle for providing regular information to Parliament. In the case of defence, it was routinely the case that the Government’s “Annual Statement on the Defence Estimates” was promulgated in the form of (and was referred to as) the annual defence white paper. From year to year these did not routinely signal any particular shift in strategic emphasis. However, the annual statement also became the means by which more comprehensive reviews of defence (or ‘Defence Reviews’) were promulgated.

Such white papers also have a wider presentational purpose. Unfortunately the importance of presentation has arguably increased over substance in recent years. If one contrasts a typical defence ‘white paper’ from the 1960s with a more recent offering, the shift in the balance between substance and presentation is fairly obvious. In the 1960s, white papers were plain and substantial volumes combining official prose, figures and statistics (and certainly no pictures) that taken together represented a reasonably thorough explanation of what money was being spent, on what and for what strategic reason. Twenty-first century white papers are glossy, colourful and attractive ‘coffee table’ style publications illustrated with numerous photographs and with a prose style majoring on short pithy paragraphs, frequent bullet points and fairly brief analysis of the strategic backdrop. This is the way that government policy is ‘marketed’ in contemporary Britain and defence is merely reflective of the trend across government. White papers have
become essentially just that – a means of marketing the defence policy of the government of the day.

As such they are fundamentally political documents. Despite the extensive involvement of officials, both civilian and military, in the production of periodic white papers, ultimately they are signed off and launched by the political head of the Department of State. They will, of course, contain comments about the strategic environment and what decisions are being made in response to the threats and other challenges that the environment presents. They are not, however, the totality of what one would describe as British Strategy.

The Components of Strategy

Essentially, strategy can be broken down into two components – policy and doctrine. The former states what the armed forces will be called upon to do, while the latter says how they will go about doing it. The former is articulated by politicians and signed off by the Secretary of State; the latter by the Chief of Defence Staff and the other Service Chiefs and their military staffs. Strategy in the United Kingdom (UK) can thus be seen as a combination of defence policy and military strategic doctrine. There are essential links between the two. Policy cannot be shaped beyond the capacity of the military to act – doctrine, based as it is on a practical realisation of the military capacity of the armed forces, therefore serves as a brake on policy. If the military capacity to act is not considered adequate enough, policy will need to be shaped in a manner consistent with the development of additional military capacity. Unfortunately, it is something of a truism that for many years there has been little willingness on the part of successive governments to increase spending on defence. During Labour’s period in power (since 1997) there has been a substantial increase in the amount that the armed forces have been asked to deliver – mostly in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan - while at the same time there have been substantial reductions in defence spending.
The result is a profound crisis in the defence programme, which is itself the root cause of the need for a major review of defence in the round. Nevertheless, despite the increase in activity and the restrictions placed on defence spending, the publication of white papers has all but dried up. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, a follow-on to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review was developed. The resultant ‘New Chapter’ was published in 2002, but there has been no regular white paper, constituting an equivalent of the annual statement on defence, since then (there have been one or two but these have been about specific issues - the nuclear deterrent, for example – not about defence in general). The defence white paper process is stalled.

Over the last two years one might account for this by reference to an expressed intention on the part of the Government to publish a National Security Strategy, which should be viewed as an overarching strategy for the whole of government – and, therefore, an essential precursor for a review of defence.

The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom

The publication in 2008 of “Security in an Interdependent World”, the so-called National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, is an attempt to create an overarching strategic framework encompassing all identified threats. The results are reflective of the comprehensive approach developed under New Labour but which itself owes much to the “joined-up” government initiative developed under the previous Conservative administration in the early 1990s. The emergence of the comprehensive approach in the UK dates back well over a decade, therefore, emerging largely as a result of military experience in the Balkans which highlighted a need for much greater and far more effective inter-departmental cooperation and coordination at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical. Influential to the process that produced the comprehensive approach was the work carried out by the Army on
doctrine for Peace Support Operations (PSO). The author of the most influential edition of the UK’s PSO doctrine, Col. Philip Wilkinson, went on to conduct considerable work in that area and the UK’s comprehensive approach was eventually adopted within NATO and the US. So, this approach was a direct result of military doctrine development – not a policy initiative emanating from the political level.

The National Security Strategy has received mixed reviews since its publication. It is certainly wide ranging (reflective of the comprehensive approach) and clearly identifies the “core values” of the United Kingdom and the threats to them, listing the primary threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, organised crime and failed states, as well as the additional “negative multipliers” of climate change, scarce energy resources and poverty that increase the risk of these threats. However, at the same time, it lacks penetrating analysis to allow it to go beyond the relatively simple identification of threats and towards the more challenging articulation of an actual comprehensive strategy to deal with them. Of course, it is extremely difficult to imagine what strategy would be capable of dealing with security threats ranging from WMD in the hands of rogue states at one extreme, to bird-flu at the other. In many ways the desire for a comprehensive approach has delivered the dilemma of diversity and substantially undermined the development of an overarching strategy. Perhaps it would be far better to develop a series of strategies dealing with a threat or cohesive group of threats that lend themselves to that sort of treatment.

The Government has acknowledged the need for a defence review in coming months. There are two points to make about this. The first is that in theory at least, a defence review strictly ought to be conducted with the National Security Strategy as its backdrop. Since this arguably does not constitute an actual strategy it is difficult to know to what extent it is going to influence the upcoming defence review process. The second point to make about the future defence review, is that
while it is being contemplated by the current Labour Government, given their performance in opinion polls and the deep unpopularity of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, it seems very unlikely that it will actually be conducted by the current Government, which is likely to have lost an election before the summer of 2010.

Finland

The Methodology of Producing Finland’s White Papers

Finland has produced defence white papers in various forms since the early 1970s, the first of which was completed in Finland’s parliament, the *Eduskunta*. Recently, however, this has changed, as the last three white papers, published in 2001, 2004 and 2009, have been drafted by small groups of experts, and then had their contents debated by the government prior to approval by the parliament. Each white paper has a specific term of relevance and a set expiry date; most recently, they have been written to focus on the subsequent eight years. However, Finland drafts white papers at a rate of one every four to five years. This provides a sense of continuity to defence planning, as elements of expiring white papers are rolled into the new versions, as they are still relevant while the new white paper is being drafted. Thus, Finland’s expected 2012 white paper will incorporate many elements of the 2009 version, as the 2009 findings are supposed to be relevant up until 2017. The 2012 white paper will in turn plan ahead until 2020, providing a framework for the following white paper that succeeds it.

The most recent white paper, entitled “Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009”, was drafted in 10 months, beginning in August 2007, and it was passed by the parliament on 23 January 2009. In drafting this white paper, an attempt was made to utilise a comprehensive approach. In addition, diverse elements of the Finnish government, such as the
Prime Minister’s Office, the Foreign Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the President’s Office, and members of the military establishment all came together to participate in the drafting process. Furthermore, after preliminary drafts were completed, the paper was reviewed by all other ministries, partners and relevant authorities. Thus, all ministries had a role to play from a national-security point of view. From a military perspective, the comprehensive approach utilised in the drafting process was helpful in that it forced the Finnish armed forces to set priorities and to think hard about what projects were of top priority.

The White Paper of 2009

The current white paper begins by trying to answer important core questions. These include:

1. What sort of world are we living in?
2. What are the challenges and opportunities?
3. Who are the key actors in the world that impact Finnish security?
4. How do we go about formulating military security in the world that emerges from the other three questions?

This is a similar starting point to that of the French white paper. The threat assessment is also similar in its findings: the commonly accepted threats of climate change, pandemics, terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs all rank high on the list. Finland’s white paper is unique, however, in that its main focus remains on how to prevent the use or threat of military force against Finland as a geographic entity. Unlike the strategies of the other European states mentioned above, Finland remains firmly in the national paradigm and still maintains a territorial-defence perspective. Thus, Finland has not initiated a transformation similar to what is taking place in the armed forces of its neighbour, Sweden, towards the creation of a mainly expeditionary force. While Finland’s white paper acknowledges that the source of threats to Finnish security remain outside its borders, and it pledges active cooperation
with the EU, NATO and the UN, it has not witnessed as comprehensive a shift in its strategic defensive posture as Sweden. Unlike Sweden’s radically new proposal towards ending conscription, there is no sign that Finland will sacrifice its commitment to full conscription, and its territorial defence rests on its ability to mobilise 350,000 troops. Thus, given the widespread approval of the territorial paradigm in Finland, the largest part of the paper remains devoted to how Finland can survive militarily within its local environment.

The paper also calls on the government to provide the resources needed to carry out the paper’s suggestions. The current government is firm on maintaining a defence spending level of about 2.5 billion euros, or 1.4 percent of Finland’s GDP. This level is increased every year with a leading index cost of 3 percent added, and from 2011 onwards the government has pledged an additional 2 percent budgetary increase on top of the inflation adjustment. Given Finland’s comfort with a territorial-defence strategy, this stable amount should be adequate for providing for Finland’s defence forces.

Finland’s External Security Nexus

While the paramount concern of Finland’s territorial security has been established, external security concerns have begun to play a more important role in Finland’s overall defence strategy. Finland joined the EU in 1995 and was the first Scandinavian country to adopt the euro. As a non-member of NATO, it is of little surprise that Finland’s most important international partner is the EU. Finnish troops are active in EU battle groups, and the country is largely positive about the Lisbon Treaty, having already adapted its solidarity and mutual-assistance clauses into its domestic legislation. Finland’s white paper also recommends greater cooperation between the EU and NATO, and certain sections of Finland’s political spectrum advocate applying for NATO membership, perhaps not during the current government, but maybe in 2011 or 2012.
The white paper also calls for a greater engagement with Finland’s neighbours. It holds Nordic cooperation to be an important element of Finland’s greater security strategy, as it could produce savings and synergies in military cooperation. Enhanced Nordic cooperation is also politically viable, as it is an issue that has almost no detractors. Far more complex is Finland’s relationship with Russia, the most important actor in Finland’s geographic neighbourhood. While the border with Finland is probably the quietest of Russia’s land borders, Finland believes that Russia is a military factor to be reckoned with. In the near future, it is likely that the strategic environment of the Arctic areas between the two countries will become more important, as will the waterways near Finland used for transporting oil and gas. Russia, therefore, has been labelled by Finland not as a threat or an enemy, but rather as a challenge.

Finally, the white paper emphasises the importance of the United States to Finland’s defence strategy. As mentioned previously, the paper takes a positive stance towards NATO and calls for greater EU-NATO cooperation, largely due to its belief in the importance of the Atlantic alliance in maintaining a role for the United States in Europe. Furthermore, Finland and the United States have also engaged in a defensive materiel cooperation programme.

Thus, while the core of Finland’s security strategy remains territorial defence, it has demonstrated a willingness to participate in international operations. Currently, Finland contributes 700 to 800 troops to overseas missions at a cost of 120 million euros annually. However, its enthusiasm for a greater expeditionary force is tempered by its national-security constraints and its limited budgetary resources. In conclusion, it seems likely that Finland will continue in the near future to maintain its current strategic vision of great emphasis on territorial security while at the same time engaging with its international commitments on a secondary level.
Italy

The Organisational Challenges of the Italian Security Apparatus

Italian security doctrines are largely similar to those of other European states; in terms of Italy’s perception of security threats and in its international commitments, its centralised planning mechanisms function similarly to those of other European states that are members of the EU and NATO, such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Italian forces are currently on active international duty in Afghanistan and were involved in Iraq prior to 2006. Furthermore, Italian forces have participated in UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Mozambique, Darfur and Lebanon. Thus, at the international level, Italy is a major player in security operations around the globe and will remain so in the future.

Having established Italy’s significant contribution in worldwide military operations, challenges nevertheless exist internally within the Italian state with regard to formulating security strategies. Italy has never produced an official white paper on defence, and while policymakers themselves have produced many high-level strategic documents, these do not bear the stamp of authority of the Italian state. Due to their lack of widespread support, Italian documents are not very useful for defining an overarching security policy of the Italian state as a whole. Therefore, the reality is that security-policy debates in Italy involve low-level concerns, such as how to cope with the complexities that arise in specific missions, such as Italian involvement in the Balkans and in Somalia. Talks focus on how to put together resources, about financing, qualities and quantities.

The greatest challenge within the Italian government is that Italy’s security forces far outnumber its defence forces. As a result, they are better financed, but they are not centrally organised; rather, they are answerable primarily to the different ministries that they belong to. Not counting local and private police, Italy has about 450,000 policemen, the
largest number in Europe and perhaps the highest ratio of policemen to civilians. Furthermore, there exist a number of different branches of police:

1. The national police are controlled by the Interior Ministry;
2. The penitentiary police are controlled by the Justice Ministry;
3. The carabinieri, or military police, are controlled by both the Interior Ministry and the Defence Ministry;
4. The border guard is controlled by the Treasury Ministry; and
5. The forest guard is controlled by the Agriculture Ministry.

Such an overview gives an idea of the dysfunction inherent in the organisation of Italian security forces. Each branch is in practice autonomous and controls its own planes, boats and tanks.

There is, however, hope for synthesis in the future. The state of policing in Italy is currently being looked over by a high-level committee, the Supreme Defence Council, which makes decisions concerning Italian security. The Council does not answer to the Italian parliament, and it has decided to take a look at the current mix of defence and security forces in the country. However, figuring out the situation will take a lot of effort, and the complex picture does not lend itself to easy solutions.

Security Priorities for the Italian State

The Italian state's priorities in terms of security are related to its internal political perceptions. These include organised crime and micro-criminality, illegal immigration and human and drug trafficking. With respect to Italy's intelligence apparatus, there also exist many different outlets for intelligence-gathering, which, until now, have not been properly coordinated. However, reforms have been put in place by the Prime Minister's Office regarding high-level intelligence, with the hope of
increased reliance on the technical intelligence space created by these various services.

Italian crisis management suffers from internal legislation that blocks the use of private agents outside the country. This creates the need to identify public agents that can operate internationally, which has led to the emergence of a civilian structure. This is one area in which Italy has successfully implemented a comprehensive approach, as the civilian structure has created an efficient communication and command structure that can be projected internationally. The successful implementation of this structure should serve as an example of what can be achieved in creating workable structures. However, the organisational problems of the Italian state require a significant transformation in the bureaucratic structures of the government, and it is far from certain that these transitions will occur anytime in the near future.

Poland

Recurring Themes in Polish Security-Strategy Formulation

All national doctrines contain a certain unique congruence, and Poland’s are no exception. In the official documents outlining the security strategies of Poland since its independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, there are noticeable themes that have been reasserted time and again. Clearly visible in every iteration of Polish security strategy is an ambition for a renationalisation of strategy, which stems from Poland’s independence drive of the 1980s. As a result, Poland has tried to carve out certain margins for national freedom in its strategic documents. At the same time, there has existed an institutional inadequacy with regard to the correct approaches to the processes of strategy formulation. With the Polish Constitution not being formalised until 1997, there has been a constant fight among state institutions regarding which should take the lead in the formulation of Poland’s national interests. Perhaps this could
be most adequately done by members of the older generation. However, the politics of independent Poland have removed such an option.

Other themes of the Polish experience in drafting a national doctrine also reflect both universal problems found in the experiences of other states and unique elements of Poland’s own historical experience. On the one hand, Poland, like many other European states, suffers from internal factional politics when deciding who is best positioned to define national security strategies. This has led to a battle between political factions, as well as conflicts between the civil and military sectors of the Polish state, as each faction believes that it is in position to dictate policy. The different factions scrambling for discursive power has led to a divergence of opinions on how best to formulate Poland’s security policy; priorities range from focussing on increased defence spending for the protection of the country or investing in infrastructure so as to catch up in terms of economic development. Other diverging security concerns also fail to agree on where the main threat to Polish security lies within the region.

The failure to find consensus within the state apparatus, however, is a common theme in most other states. What is unique about the Polish case is the emphasis it places on the primary importance of its national security. The legacy of the failed international guarantees suffered by Poland in World War II has left a strong impression in the Polish psyche, and there are strong feelings within the Polish government that such guarantees from other countries are only as good as Poland’s own national strength. Thus, these debates – so common to the policy process in all states – take on a more heated tone in Poland given the importance it places on creating a strong and independent state.

An Overview of Poland’s Security-Strategy Documents
The problems discussed regarding the disagreements within the Polish state for identifying core actors and themes in its security policy have unfortunately led to the failure of Poland’s security documents to influ-
ence policy in a meaningful way. The first Polish document, produced in 1990, attempted to elaborate a defence doctrine if Poland were to become a completely independent state. As Poland was still within the Warsaw Pact at the time, this first document was limited in its scope and unsure in what the new paradigm would be in the near future. As a result, it was more of a training exercise than an attempt to clearly delineate a future path.

The next Polish strategy document, drafted in 1992, was significantly more progressive in its approach. Already in this relatively early moment following the end of the Cold War, it spoke about working towards Poland’s entry into NATO and the EU. It also sought to build stable, formal and practical relations with all of Poland’s neighbours. This was an important step, as at the time Poland had significant issues to discuss with all countries, such as the question of national minorities, borders and the uncertainty of cooperation with one another. In the end, the document elicited no clear response from the West; relations were friendly, but nothing concrete arose in the early part of the 1990s. As a result, Poland focussed mainly on building self-sufficiency within its own defence structures during the time.

The next cycle of developing security strategy was initiated in 2000 when Poland became a member of NATO. This important event called for a rethink of Poland’s security and defence strategy, but in the end the process was unsuccessful. This was primarily because it did not take into account all actors: the process was arranged by the Polish armed forces and the Ministry of Defence but without any involvement of the president or the parliament. As a result, it did not have the political backing necessary for it to have a significant influence on policy. Polish defence strategy was primarily organised around its membership in NATO and the acceptance of Article 5 regarding collective defence, as well as a territorially defensive strategy that emphasised Poland’s national capabilities with an additional focus on non-military aspects.
There was another strategic round in 2003 on the eve of Poland’s accession to the EU the following year. This round incorporated many of the non-traditional security risks that are found in the threat assessments of other states. Rather than attempting to create a single over-arching strategic document, discussions resulted in a series of more functional documents that served operational purposes. Poland’s security strategy was also positioned to include more expeditionary capabilities, and it called for the development of a crisis-response force as a preventive measure. Thus, by 2003, Poland’s strategic thinking had been broadened to include a more global picture due to its increased international commitments as a member of the EU and NATO.

The Strategic Defence Review (2006)

Poland initiated the creation of a comprehensive security-strategy document, its strategic defence review, in 2006. While Polish officials had learned valuable lessons from previous experiences of drafting documents since Poland’s independence, the production of the strategic defence review unfortunately repeated the deficiencies of earlier documents.

The aim of the strategic defence review was to build on the practical documents created in 2003 and to formulate a comprehensive document that would create a roadmap towards deeper integration within the NATO and EU security frameworks, as well as towards building Poland’s crisis-response and expeditionary capabilities. But the document suffered from a number of problems. While the formal process of creating the strategic defence review had presidential approval, it was not subject to public or parliamentary debate. Furthermore, though the elaboration of the military aspects of the review was delegated to different departments, there was no overarching formulation of a state security system.

These challenges in the formulation process were coupled with basic dilemmas concerning the future of Poland’s national-security strategy.
These dilemmas fell under seven categories: scope, method, political legitimacy, resolve, threat perception, national territorial defence and external engagement. Together, these dilemmas necessitated making tough choices, but consensus was not forthcoming within Poland’s security-strategy apparatus for reasons discussed above. As such, the inability to find solutions to these dilemmas and the political debate within the Polish government meant that the strategic defence review was never adopted.

Poland, like all European states, faces considerable challenges that will have to be confronted in the future. These include assisting with the construction of common international security mechanisms, paying special attention to harmonising the security strategies of NATO and the EU, and attempting to build consensus on the dilemmas articulated previously. For example, how will Poland view Russia in the future, as a dormant threat or an uncertain ally? The case of Poland therefore demonstrates the problems many Eastern European states face in redefining their security objectives after the tumultuous changes of the 1990s and in attempting to move away from a territorial positioning towards a more global outlook.

Spain

The Restructuring of Spanish Security Policy After Franco

Under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, Spain was an insular state with limited external relations with Europe and the rest of the world, though the general environment of the Cold War contributed to the survival of the regime. The bilateral agreement with the US that allowed important US military bases on Spanish soil was a major event in security terms. But security and defence remained mostly an internal affair under that regime. The restoration of democracy in Spain after Franco’s death in 1975 brought sweeping changes in Spanish foreign policy. Spain joined NATO in 1982. In 1986, Spain joined what is now the European
Union. That same year, Spain held a referendum on its NATO membership. The vote was favourable and resulted in Spain’s accession into the alliance, but under certain conditions. It called for no Spanish participation in NATO’s integrated military structure (a condition that was later changed in 1997), a reduction of US personnel in Spain (which took place after the Cold War anyway), a pledge to never place nuclear weapons on Spanish territory and a greater Europeanisation of security policy.

Spain’s security policy has seen significant changes in recent times. In 1991, Spain played a minor, but novel, role in the Gulf War, participating within the European framework and allowing extensive use of its bases by the United States. Its participation in international peacekeeping, peacemaking and security missions has been growing, with the biggest deployments at present in Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden. In 2000, Spain decided to establish a fully professional army. Spain initially participated in the US-led invasion of Iraq that followed the events of 11 September 2001. This changed, however, three days after the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004, when José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero fulfilled his electoral commitment and immediately recalled Spanish forces. Spain’s experience with terrorism by both domestic and international groups has had a significant influence on its strategic thinking on security, insisting always on fighting terrorism with the rule of law.

Creating a National Security Strategy for Spain

In 2008, Zapatero, committed to developing a national security strategy, though the formal drafting has still not begun. Like that of the United Kingdom, the purpose of this planned document is to delineate the core threats and security challenges, internal and external, facing Spain and the proposed solutions to combat them.

There have been previous texts published by the government relating to security. Since 2000, Spain has produced a defence white paper (2000), a strategic defence review (2003) and two national defence directives
(2004 and 2008). These texts all provide a substantial background to the strategic framework already in place, which will be used as the foundation of the national security strategy.

At the core of Spain’s defence strategy is the commitment to guarantee the security and defence of Spain and Spaniards, with emphasis being placed on citizenship. Spanish policymakers believe that an important step in achieving this aim is to continue developing a collective security partnership between Spain and its allies, synthesising its European, Mediterranean and Atlantic visions. They state that Spain further wishes to continue making contributions to crisis-management missions undertaken by organisations to which it belongs, and it maintains its commitment to international peace and security, as well as the respect for international law.

The Spanish strategic framework thus maintains a central role for Spain’s involvement in conflict resolution and multilateralism. It links Spanish security to that of Europe and encourages the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Spain believes in the importance of NATO and advocates using the ESDP in order to reinforce the transatlantic relationship. Indeed, Spain places great emphasis on its bilateral relationship with the United States. In addition to its traditional relationship with Europe and the Americas, the influence of globalisation means that areas formerly of limited interest to Spain are now appearing more prominently on its radar screen, such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Asia-Pacific region. In order to construct this global network of Spanish activity, Spain needs a multidisciplinary focus and a comprehensive approach that takes into account both its own internal necessities and those of its allies.

The drafting of Spain’s national security strategy should be similar in its structure to other documents from different states. The document should begin with a core analysis of the threats and opportunities facing Spain in the global security environment. This will be more or less the same in
its content as for other states in Europe but with a greater emphasis on a
multilateral framework, beginning with the EU and NATO. Again, much
like the documents of other nations, the aim will be to give the national
security strategy a relevant time frame of some twenty years, with revi-
sions scheduled to take place every few years. The drafting should be
under the direct authority of the prime minister.

Achieving political consensus will certainly be necessary if Spain is
to carry forth its ambitious plan of utilising a comprehensive approach
not only within the Spanish government but also at the local and inter-
national level. The current plan calls for the direct involvement at the
national level of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, and
the Economy, as well as the national parliament. Also to be consulted
are the various regional governments of Spain’s autonomous communi-
ties, as their input will be key in implementing the document, as the
regions are essential in terms of facing a variety of threats. Finally, Spain
also intends to seek out the opinions of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and to integrate in its security strategy the European Security
Strategy (ESS) and the NATO Strategic Concept, now under revision. The
eventual Spanish national security strategy should lead to some organi-
sational changes and not be merely limited to a document; instead, it
should be translated into actual planning and action.

Switzerland
The case of Switzerland, more often than not, presents a notable excep-
tion to most rules of modern state-building. A federation of diverse
and politically powerful localities, with four languages, with few natural
resources, Switzerland has enjoyed more than 150 years of uninter-
rupted neutrality and economic prosperity. With such a history, it could
be expected that Switzerland would present an exceptional case in its
security strategies when compared to those of other European states.
Switzerland recognises the same threats that are found in the assessments
of other European states, engages with NATO through the Partnership for Peace and takes part in NATO-led peace-support operations. While NATO’s original role was seen as providing common defence against military aggression in Europe, Switzerland believes that NATO membership would not significantly increase its security, given that the more likely risks are not of a military nature. Swiss membership in the European Union is not primarily a topic of security policy. Switzerland appreciates the EU’s efforts to create a more secure and stable environment, and it takes part on an ad hoc basis in EU-led peace-support missions, without acceding to membership.

The Swiss government intends to submit a new report on security policy to parliament by early 2010. In the past, such reports have been written or rewritten at irregular intervals: 1969, 1973, 1990, 1999. From now on, such reports will be updated, revised or rewritten every four years. These reports typically cover threats and dangers, the role of international organisations relevant to security policy – such as NATO, the EU, the UN, the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe – the interests and objectives of Swiss security policy, Switzerland’s basic strategy, the instruments for implementing its policy, as well as coordination and leadership. These are official government reports, which means that they are written within the executive branch and adopted by the government. It also means that parliament cannot amend them.

Swiss government reports are typically written by officials from within the administration. The lead is with the Department of Defence, and all departments are included among a number of working groups. In 1996-1998, a group of 42 people from outside the administration was established to come up with ideas on the basic thrust of Swiss security policy, which provided significant input for the official report. This time, Switzerland is conducting hearings among 45 organisations and individuals as a precursor to drafting a new report. Since the idea is to stimu-
late public debate, the hearings are being taped, transcribed and posted on the Internet for discussion. Before drafting begins, the government will approve the main thrust of the report and possibly also the structure. Once a consolidated draft exists, fairly broad consultations will be carried out for about a month. Then amendments will be made, and the report will be submitted to the government for adoption.

According to regular polls, some 80-90 percent of the population supports maintaining Switzerland's status of neutrality. Neutrality will thus continue to remain an integral aspect of Switzerland's security strategy for the foreseeable future, even if the law of neutrality – geared to conventional war between states – is no longer applicable in most armed conflicts. The same fact can, however, also be used to argue in favour of maintaining the status of neutrality, as it hardly ever constrains (at least legally) Switzerland's actions.

Like neutrality, Switzerland's army also derives legitimacy from its long history. As more than 200 years have passed since the last instance of military aggression against Switzerland, it can be argued that the Swiss armed forces have been successful in guaranteeing Switzerland's sovereignty. Compared to other European states, there is a greater emphasis on territorial defence. This does not reflect any apprehensions with regard to neighbours and other states in the region but rather a tradition that has – in contrast to most other European states – not been interrupted or broken by wars. Over recent years, however, the armed forces have been restructured to focus more on the protection of important infrastructure against non-conventional attacks. This line is likely to continue. Switzerland's armed forces are rooted in tradition, but there is also an awareness that they must make an effective contribution to security in today's world against existing threats and dangers.
Security Strategies at the Regional and International Levels

Articulating ‘Strategy’ at the International Level

As the previous chapter illustrated, security strategies have yet to be decoupled from the interests and priorities of individual states. Though progress has been made towards greater interstate understanding, any initiative aimed at convincing states to cede a portion of their power to an international body will be an innately fragile one. While the process may be smooth, if slow, during times of peace, progress made during tranquil times can easily be halted by unforeseen events that bring instability and fear back into the equation.

As a result, security strategies within international institutions are not necessarily strategies in the true sense of the word. The high degree of consensus required to get a multitude of sovereign states to agree to common aims necessitates the use of a broader canvas. As such, a focus on the methodology and documents that have been produced by the major global international institutions – the United Nations, the European Union and NATO – will highlight the many differences between the strategies of these institutions and those of the European states discussed in the previous chapter. However, while the policy statements that emerge from both processes may be very different in terms of their specificity and overall application, one surprising factor is that the interna-
tional organisations highlighted below do not necessarily demonstrate a scaling-up of the comprehensive approach seen in the security-strategy formulations of many European states. While it will be seen that NATO and the UN are more likely to express a greater variety of opinions in their documents, the EU’s first strategic document was written mainly by a small circle in the European Council led by Javier Solana.

This highlights two possible solutions when looking at the enormous complexity of an international organisation: documents are either drafted in committee, which expends time and resources, in order to engage constituent members on a deep level, or a small committee can be tasked with drafting a document and then presenting it to the relevant authorities. While the first option provides a better opportunity for input from stakeholders, it can be extremely costly, and the document can also end up being less readable and more ambiguous in its language. By contrast, the second option is more likely to produce a tight and well-structured document, while running the risk of alienating stakeholders and producing internal opposition. Neither choice is ideal, and this highlights a main point of debate when drafting security-strategy documents at the international level.

The United Nations

So far, the United Nations has not produced a single white paper. Therefore, when attempting to identify the security doctrine of the United Nations, one must look at other official documents, such as the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), reports of the secretary-general and reports by high-level panels. When taken together, such UN documents in the post-Cold War era reveal three elements that are important in expanding the concepts of peace and security: a shift in focus to look at internal conflicts and fragile states, an emphasis on the protection of the individual and the dynamic basket of global challenges. Together, these three elements have formed the
core of security conceptualisation within the United Nations, and the documents produced by the UN in the post-Cold War era have helped shape global norms and have given increased legitimacy to the trends that have taken place in the field of security strategy.

Internal Conflicts and Fragile States
Throughout the Cold War, the UN’s chief concern was to try to prevent the escalation of interstate conflicts. The main exception to this paradigm was the 1960 Congo crisis, which provided an example for developing the post-Cold War model for UN engagement in fragile states. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, there has been increasing recognition by the international community in general and the UN in particular that the dysfunctional internal dynamics of failed states pose a serious threat to international peace and security and that such internal conflicts can spill over and affect neighbouring countries and regions. This dynamic has been witnessed in conflicts all around the world, such as in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. In addition, the UN has initiated a transition from traditional peacekeeping to modern peace- and state-building. Today, UN peace operations incorporate many diverse categories, such as human-rights monitoring, security-sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, assisting in creating the basic building blocks of state institutions, helping to establish local governance structures, and repairing and setting up service delivery systems. Such a wide range of operations, engaging across all aspects of modern state security, demonstrate how far the UN has come in changing its contemporary security paradigm from its emphasis on interstate conflict during the Cold War period.

Many significant documents have charted the UN’s progression towards its emphasis on internal conflicts. In 1992, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali presented “An Agenda for Peace” in a report to the Security Council. The document acknowledged that the sources of conflicts had become more complex and that the cohesion of states was being threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural and linguistic strife. In response to this new environment, the report argued that the UN needed to strengthen the capacity of its preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building structures. It also acknowledged that the UN had a role in rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures in states torn by internal strife. Furthermore, in 1995, spurred by the perceived failures of the UN to address threats posed by conflicts in countries like Somalia and Bosnia, Boutros-Ghali wrote a supplement for “An Agenda for Peace”, which reasserted the principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. Together, these two documents laid the groundwork for greater engagement by the UN in internal conflicts.

The period from 1998 to 2006 saw a rise in UN-led peace operations from five to 18 and the establishment of a high-level panel on UN peace operations led by the Former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi. The so-called “Brahimi Report”, published in 2000, reaffirmed that the UN would have to continue to face the prospect of having to assist communities and nations in establishing peace after conflict. It again acknowledged the key role of peace-building in complex operations and expressed the belief that, to address conflicts, the UN would need to help states achieve national reconciliation through quick-impact programmes in areas related to state-building, such as the rule of law.

The continuing trend of recognising the primacy of peacekeeping in UN documents was seen again in 2004 with the publication of the report of Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-level Panel on Threats,

The report confirmed that the usual practice in UN peacekeeping operations was to give peacekeeping forces both peacekeeping and peace-enforcing mandates, as well as peace-building duties. It also called for the UN to develop civilian policing capabilities and to focus on establishing a more formal peace-building architecture. This call led to the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission and a support office to handle the long-term stability and reconstruction of fragile states. The High-level Panel’s proposals were later endorsed in Annan’s report “In Larger Freedom” in 2005 and were further codified in the Outcome Document of the World Summit the same year.

Just as the emphasis on peacekeeping has played an increased role in the security strategy of the United Nations over the past two decades, the challenges to peacekeeping operations have also increased. Today, UN peacekeepers are being deployed in harsher terrains in much more demanding conditions. In addition, within the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the number of civilian, military and police personnel in the field has grown from 56,000 to over 130,000 within the past five years, with 110,000 currently deployed. This increase in human capital has been matched by a growth in expenditures, with the DPKO’s budget increasing from $2.5 billion to $7.6 billion over the same period. Yet, even with this steep rise in resources, the UN is still not able to meet the growth in peace operations demanded by member states. The DPKO has been undertaking initiatives to grapple with these challenges, and it analysed its internal situation in a 2006 report called “New Horizons: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century”. Furthermore, in May 2009, the UN Security Council discussed a report on peace-building, continuing the trend towards greater UN involvement in internal conflicts.

The Responsibility to Protect

The second major trend in UN security-strategy conceptualisation has been the increased recognition of the security threat caused by the state’s failure to protect individuals. The protection of human rights has long been enshrined in the UN Charter and the UN Declaration on Human Rights, but it was the events of the late 20th century, namely the atrocities that occurred in the Cambodian Killing Fields, the Rwandan genocide and the fall of Srebrenica that served as the catalyst for recognising the link between protecting human rights and traditional concerns for securing peace and legitimacy. Indeed, if the UN was to retain credibility and legitimacy in the face of such tragedies, it could not focus exclusively on the security of the state without taking into account that of the population.

Thus, the natural conclusion was that the subject of the UN security umbrella had to be expanded. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and UN Security Council Resolution 1674 provided the normative and legal framework that codified the recognition that member states had a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic-cleansing and crimes against humanity. If a state was suspected of failing to protect its citizens from these crimes, the international community resolved to take collective action through the Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter.

The UN has yet to see how its future policies will be affected by what has now been termed the “responsibility to protect”, or R2P. Further clarification, however, may be seen in the upcoming meeting of the UN General Assembly in 2009, which will feature an updated report by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon regarding the progress of R2P implementation.
The UN and Global Challenges: The Case of Global Health

The UN has coordinated many of its institutions to counter the basket of global challenges spoken of in many national white papers. Taking the example of global health, one sees how the UN uses the strengths of its different institutional apparatuses, including the Office of the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the World Health Organization (WHO) to address the different facets of the issue. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan made the fight against global health problems, and more specifically HIV/AIDS, the central focus of his time in office. In his address “We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century”, Annan called on all states to take action to address global health threats and to reduce the damage caused by HIV/AIDS. This initiative was then taken up by the Security Council, which produced UNSC Resolution 1308, which highlighted the threat of HIV/AIDS to social stability. The initiative was then taken up by the General Assembly, which held a special session on HIV/AIDS and released a Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, which acknowledged the epidemic as a global emergency that posed a formidable challenge to human life and dignity.

The recent history of the UN has shown an even broader understanding of the threats posed to global security by pandemics. For example, the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change brought to light the devastating impact of other diseases, including the rapid spread of tuberculosis and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Furthermore, in 2005 the WHO completed a comprehensive revision of the 1969 International Health Regulations in order to strengthen cooperation between states to help prevent the outbreak of diseases. This commitment to controlling the spread of disease was then codified in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which stressed the need to invest in health-care infrastructure, to support health workers and to make contributions to researching vaccines. Recently, Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon convened members of the UN family to work on health-related programmes and to explore the possibility of partnerships with the private sector and NGOs.

While much progress has been made in identifying and bringing to the fore global threats to security, much work still must be done. These threats to security have multiplied and have taken on new dimensions, and this has forced the UN to develop new strategies and modes of engagement, as well as new partnerships. Thus, more voices are now participating in developing countermeasures to these threats. However, there is no indication that the global security environment will get any simpler within the next 10 to 20 years.

The European Union

In September 2008, the European Union finished reviewing its first strategic document, which was published in 2003. The original document and the review document were drafted using slightly different methodologies. While the former was drafted by a small circle around Javier Solana, the latter passed through a difficult and uncertain phase after the failed Irish referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as having to be elaborated together with the European Commission. It is important to underline the distinctively different nature of both documents: whereas the 2003 document represented a still valid strategy, the 2008 document was a implementation report that complemented the strategy. Both will thus be reviewed in depth in the following sections.

Drafting the European Security Strategy in 2003

With the outbreak of the Iraq war in 2003, the EU found itself divided. However, the start of the Intergovernmental Conference for the Constitutional Treaty and the adoption of the European Security Strategy provided a moment of hope. By June 2003, led by the efforts of Javier Solana, the then-High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, the EU was able to formulate a European security concept. The team was then tasked to formulate a strategy by the end of the year.

The ESS did not follow the typical EU drafting process. It was not drafted in committee but rather in a small circle around Javier Solana. Afterwards, at a later stage it went through informal discussions in the Political and Security Committee before being adopted by the European Council. This process was more flexible than normal EU drafts, which are usually produced in committee, and this made the document’s language much more readable. It was also accompanied by three seminars, organised by the European Union Institute for Security Studies, open to representatives of acceding and third states.

The ESS is a brief document of 13 pages, and provides the primary impetus for the main principles and guidelines for the EU to work on foreign and security policy. It reinforces the assertion that strategy at the regional level is more conceptual and less concrete than that formulated by states. The threat assessment that opens the document identifies the key negative multipliers and transnational threats to security, and the next section sets out strategic objectives at the European level for countering those threats. First, it advises strengthening the so-called European neighbourhood through concerted action at Europe’s frontiers, such as the South Caucasus and the Mediterranean, as well as resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Next, the document encourages what it calls “effective multilateralism” through the development of stronger international institutions and respect for the rule of law. It recommends that international organisations aim for universal membership amongst all states while maintaining high standards and that regional organisations develop greater ties in order to facilitate their work. Finally, the document encourages the EU to be more active in pursuing these objectives, as well as increasing its capacity and ability to develop unified policy.
The Report on the Implementation of the ESS

Calls for a review of the ESS in 2007 led to the initiation of a strategic-review process that focussed both on assessing the implementation process of the 2003 strategic document and on making recommendations on which areas of strategy should be improved and complemented. The resulting document, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy”, published in December 2008, looks at what the European Union had been able to achieve in the preceding five years, and it also discusses the challenges that lie ahead.

The new document faced considerably more methodological challenges than the ESS did. Two rounds of EU enlargement had added 12 new states to the EU, and the 27 member states had different expectations on what should be included in the report and where the emphasis should lie. More consensus-building was therefore necessary for the review, and formulation began with informal committee and bilateral discussions to see what member states thought should be highlighted. Unlike in 2003, where Javier Solana and a small team of advisers worked on the document’s major strategic issues, the review was mandated to involve the European Commission. Also, as each member state had its own agenda of what it wanted the review to reflect, the increased number of opinions meant that greater prioritisation was required. Overall, the structure of the review was envisioned to be similar to the ESS, i.e., a short, eminently readable statement that could also serve as a public-relations tool and that would be produced in one year following the initial discussions.

Regarding content, a slight reshuffling has been made within the threat assessment. Terrorism and organised crime were grouped together, as the instruments used to counter both threats are of a similar nature.

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Additionally, the threat of failed states was grouped with regional conflicts when assessing EU activities in this area over the past five years. Indeed, the increasing number of ESDP missions abroad means that the EU is more present in different areas of conflict and now has more experience in detailing the different aspects of the problems of failed states. There has also been growing recognition in the change of priority amongst threats since 2003. Higher up on the list in the 2008 document are climate change, energy security, piracy and cybersecurity.

Furthermore, the strategic concept for countering these threats has also been updated, introducing some elements that the 2003 strategy did not include. In the 2003 document, there was a great focus on the threat of terrorism but only a cursory sense of the threat stemming from violations of human rights. These two issues were included hand in hand in the 2008 document, as was respect for human rights and gender issues in crisis management. There is also increased space devoted to new concepts such as the responsibility to protect and responsible governance; the nexus between development in international security and respect for human rights has been made more explicit. The review also provides a more thorough explanation of the rationale for sending EU personnel to conflicts abroad so as to garner greater public support.

The priorities of the review are identical to the ESS, and here the document primarily focuses on updating what has transpired since 2003. Regarding capacity, the review recommends expanding the EU’s dialogue and mediation role, as well as strengthening the ESDP and prioritising commitments. On the EU’s engagement with its neighbourhood, the review commends the EU’s bilateral relations with other members in the region but calls for more regional integration as a whole. It also stresses the importance of engaging both Russia and Iran. Finally, returning to effective multilateralism, the review once again recalls the international engagement of the EU with partners across the globe, such as the UN, NATO, the African Union, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
other global players such as China and India. It also highlights the power shifts of the last years, away from the West to the East and calls for greater engagement of the emerging powers in international organisations. On all fronts, the review calls for deeper engagement, where applicable, and greater international understanding.

Having expanded from 15 nations to 27, the review is commendable in that the drafting exercise was able to build consensus from a substantially larger field and to create a document that is both representative of the main interests of EU member states and eminently clear and readable so as to effectively communicate the EU’s security vision for the future with the public both within and outside the EU.

NATO

In its 60 years of existence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has repeatedly reinvented itself in order to remain a relevant force in changing times. In the 1950s, the two “Three Wise Men” panels sought to devise new solutions for expanding member contributions and finding new modes of non-military cooperation. The widely hailed “Future Tasks of the Alliance”, or “Harmel Report”, of 1967 was a crucial breakthrough that allowed NATO to play a role in helping to bring forth détente in Europe in the 1970s. Now, with its latest strategic concept created in 1999, NATO is embarking once again on another exercise to update its priorities for the next decade.

The Declaration on Alliance Security

NATO’s new strategic concept was outlined at the April 2009 summit in Strasbourg, where the North Atlantic Council (NAS) adopted the Declaration on Alliance Security (DAS) that was proposed at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. The DAS is intended to be a building block to provide conceptual clarity for the strategic-concept discussion. However, it is relevant mainly due to its final point, which tasks “the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts, who in
close consultation with all Allies will lay the ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals for its implementation for approval at our next summit.” This point thus sets out the road map for the production of a new strategic concept envisioned for 2010.

The DAS is also useful from a public-diplomacy standpoint in that it provides the alliance with an opportunity to restate its relevance and value in the 21st century, and it thereby engages with public opinion on the question of the alliance’s importance today. However, most importantly, the DAS has innate objective value in that it has made advances on the conceptualisation of the new strategic concept by laying groundwork and providing initial ideas and markers. It has thereby given the creators of the new strategic concept something to shape in their future work.

The DAS also includes new elements that should assist in the production of the strategic concept. It places great emphasis on the expeditionary posture of NATO, and it mentions alliance operations within the context of collective defence. The document is also the first of its kind to refer to deterrence based on a mix of nuclear and conventional forces. It also aims at settling the “territorialisation” debate and avoiding artificial distinctions between security of NATO territory and security at a strategic distance. There is also a positive message towards Russia, as well as a commitment to improve relations with other international organisations by taking a comprehensive approach.

Finally, the DAS is significant due to the tough choices facing NATO today. The fault lines of Afghanistan and engagement with Russia spark constant debate within the alliance. In addition, questions abound regarding the alliance’s core functions, its expansion strategy, as well as the balancing of its military and political priorities. The new strategic

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concept will have to make tough choices in shaping NATO’s future direction. Will the alliance’s priorities hinge on collective defence or an expansion of expeditionary missions? Will it be a global management subcontractor or an institution that defends the interests of its members? Furthermore, how will the new strategic concept deal with the “solidarity crisis” within the alliance, where some countries participate more than others? Indeed, the strategic concept faces a tough task in responding to these key questions.

The Methodology of Producing the New Strategic Concept

The unique constellation of the new US administration, the reintegra-
tion of France within NATO’s integrated structures, advances in the
ESDP and an expected resolution on the Treaty of Lisbon all appear
to provide a favourable environment for producing the new strategic
concept. However, many questions regarding the content and process
of elaborating the concept are yet to be resolved.

There is no common perception amongst NATO members of the new
transnational threats to security or of what the priorities should be. With
the global financial and economic crisis currently tying up many govern-
ment resources, discussions on the level of ambition or capabilities will
be difficult. Indeed, the economic crisis is bound to have an effect on
defence budgets and may lead to the temptation to rely solely on territo-
rial capabilities, as they are cheaper than expeditionary forces and are
already in place.

With respect to the nature of the strategic concept, it needs to remain
a planning document and not simply a public statement of purpose. A
number of member states have expressed conservative feelings about
the concept. For many, NATO’s 1999 strategic concept still remains
valid; for others, a total strategic rethink could result in opening up a
host of controversial issues that the allies simply cannot afford at the
moment to discuss in much depth. Thus, how far the alliance wishes
to rethink its strategy is up for debate and will have consequences on the outcome document.

The process of drafting the new strategic concept has also not yet been determined. The first issue to be resolved is how to implement Paragraph 10 of the DAS, which outlines the next steps for producing the strategic concept. There is a great need for cooperation, with reference points and basic principles that will lead to an open environment. In order for the exercise to be successful, it must reinforce consensus and also utilise a simple process that does not absorb the political energies of the allies and distract from the main issues of Afghanistan and Russia. The timeline should also be reasonable in order to produce a comprehensive document that is supported by all member states.

NATO has several historic templates that could provide guidance for the new strategic concept. In 1999, the alliance opted for a bureaucratic approach, and the strategic concept was drafted by the Senior Political Committee in Brussels. NATO could also opt for a methodology along the lines of the French white paper and determine its strategic objectives by conducting an independent exercise. Finally, and most interestingly, NATO could resurrect the Harmel exercise of 1967, which brought together not only a group of experts but also involved all the member states in creating a strategic document that called for a balance between détente and deterrence. Indeed, the methodology used in the production of the “Harmel Report” could be a useful way of approaching the issues that are now on the agenda, many of which were similar to those faced by NATO in the 1960s, including arms control and greater rapprochement with NATO’s eastern frontier.

Thus, the new strategic concept needs to be supported by all member states if it is to have the unifying power needed to give new impetus to the alliance, which is currently facing a radical change in the global security environment.
Security Strategies of the Global Players: The United States, Russia and China

Great-Power Approaches to Security
With diverse global interests and large military capabilities, the security strategies of the United States, Russia and China are complex. With the option of projecting forces across the globe, and with interests on all continents, these three great powers take different approaches to defining their strategies from those of European states or regional organisations.

One key element shared by these three powers is that of realism: there is no evidence that any of the three is taking a strong ideological stance in its overall security strategy. While ideology may be seen in the politics of all three, it is not as prevalent within the cadres of their respective security structures. A realist outlook also ensures that national interest remains a key element of the critical security decisions that are taken by the leaders of these three states.

At the same time, one also sees a strong element of respect for international norms within their security documents. All three are active members of the UN Security Council, and they have cited the need for respect for international law and for providing humanitarian assistance to fragile states. While their perspectives may differ, and despite statements to the contrary in the political arena, in reality each state cares deeply about its international
image and will always try to justify its actions by arguing that they are in accordance with established international norms.

There is no argument that the United States, in spite of concerns about its decline, remains the foremost power in the world today. Still, it faces strong challenges that will have a great impact on its future capabilities. The war in Iraq and the conflict in Afghanistan have shown the limits of its power-projection capabilities, and the current global financial crisis has severely affected its economy. While the United States will remain a military superpower for the foreseeable future, the challenges of the past decade have shown the limits of its capabilities in bringing about real change in the international arena. It is clear that the Obama administration has grasped the advantages of dialogue and negotiation in providing security breakthroughs at a much lower political and financial cost. Yet it remains uncertain what the future holds for the United States as a global hegemon.

For Russia, the trend is more parabolic; mired in economic and political uncertainty after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has re-emerged under the leadership of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev as a strong force once again in international relations. Its views are straightforward: it opposes the expanding influence of the West within spheres that it deems to be of key interest, and its search for security must therefore start with a rapprochement with the West. Russia’s actions, while understandable from a realist perspective, are not well received in the West. Yet tensions can be smoothed over as long as both parties refrain from playing a zero-sum game. Both the West and Russia face common threats, and the search for common ground may lead to the opening of new avenues for brokering solutions that are mutually beneficial. It is therefore up to all parties to try to “press the reset button” and change the current climate into one that takes a more favourable view of negotiating.

Finally, China has grown at a rapid pace since its economic reforms in the 1970s and is now an economic powerhouse with global ambitions. Yet while China and the West have developed strong economic ties, political under-
standing has been less easy to forge. Like Russia, China also seeks peace and is eager for dialogue and cultural exchange – the recently concluded Beijing Olympics provide sufficient evidence of this. As a whole, China has no declared external interests: it does not participate in any military bloc and is inherently defensive in its military posture. China’s recent white paper declares that its security policy is apolitical and not directed towards any single external state or region. The paper adds that for China, priority is given to economic development, and its security interests will always be secondary, existing mainly to ensure continued economic growth.

The United States
As US security strategy is primarily operational in nature, strategy documents have a narrow window of relevance, sometimes having value for only short periods of time. US strategy is therefore adapted to different situations. The ability to find innovative solutions as problems arise will be necessary if the current administration is to succeed in navigating through the many challenges it faces. On the one hand, the election of President Obama has brought high expectations among the public for a resurgence of American leadership. On the other hand, the current administration faces difficult situations in Afghanistan and in Iraq, as well as a financial crisis that is redefining America’s security position in unpredictable ways. Each conflict region therefore merits different strategic initiatives, which will be discussed in detail below.

In Afghanistan, despite reports to the contrary, it is clear that the US is in a protracted campaign in the south and that military matters will take precedence over development, political change and state building. The resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda has led to increasing conflict. Coupled with this rise has been the issue of the exact role of NATO in the conflict and the challenges facing member states in terms of executing NATO’s existing procurement programme in order to increase the alliance’s capabilities in the region.
In Iraq, the United States has maintained a fragile structure that will be tested after the envisioned rapid reduction following the future presidential election in Iraq scheduled in 2010. The US will have to close 283 bases and move out 140,000 troops and over 100,000 contractors. How Iraqi forces will cope with the loss of US support remains to be seen.

The Iraqi conflict has clearly been redefined in the wake of a renewed US engagement with Iran. There is a clear intent on the part of the United States for dialogue, yet the benefits of any negotiations will be limited. There remains the probability that Iran will have nuclear weapons within the next three to five years, and the problem is more what to do about that development once it happens.

Regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Obama administration knows that quick action is needed. This was the reason for the appointment of George Mitchell as special envoy to the Middle East. Yet with the continued split of the Palestinian leadership between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank, as well as the still-undefined policies of the more right-wing Israeli coalition led by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, the question will remain more what sort of strategy can be worked out in the face of such massive obstacles.

The United States has also developed new strategies for engagement with the Islamic world as a whole. The phrase “the global war on terror” has quietly been dropped, as it became obvious that this rhetoric was seen as anti-Arab and anti-Islamic. While this rhetorical omission does not signal substantial strategic change, it does mean that the fight against terrorism has shifted to a focus on given movements, without mentioning the possibility of expanding operations in different states. This change has gone hand in hand with a host of speeches that President Obama has made to ease tensions between the US and the Islamic world.

While the Middle East may remain the area of greatest focus regarding American security, the US also engages with states and organisations all across the globe. In Asia, the US maintains a number of diverse
strategies. Regarding the nuclear question in North Korea, the US will continue to rely on the six-nation talks. With China, there will be greater initiative to understand what Chinese priorities are and to better communicate American interests; the emergence of China as a great power is also not considered as a necessarily negative development. With Russia, there is a recognition that the reduction of nuclear arsenals is a first step towards dealing with the issue of tactical and biological weapons, a more comprehensive test-ban treaty, non-proliferation and other issues. Finally, the emergence of the global financial crisis has greatly affected those at the margins of development, and the US has yet to devise a policy to respond to economic failure in Africa and the situation in Darfur, as well as the rise in drug trafficking in Mexico and organised crime in Latin America in general.

The Operational Levers of the US Security Structure

Given the realist nature of American approaches to security, white papers play little or no part in the day-to-day US security planning. The United States does, however, produce documents that outline its security posture. Documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Defense Strategy Review are produced every four to five years, but their relevance is largely limited to key areas of immediate interest. For example, the 2006 QDR focuses on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and though it attempts to reach general conclusions regarding these conflicts, its analysis is still limited to the specific context of fighting a war within these two unique states. Furthermore, as can be gathered from the title, the QDR is also a defence document, with its singular focus on how best to operationalise America’s armed forces in combat situations. The 2006 QDR is almost entirely devoted to how the US can effectively counter the threat of global terrorism through its military might. There is no mention of the risks of other transnational threats to security that are seen in the strategy documents of European states.
Therefore, American defence strategy documents also reflect the realist nature of the state’s security structure.

While the QDR does offer some insight into American security-strategy conceptions, its utility is limited in that it is not coupled to budgets or action plans that are necessary to implement its recommendations. Much like other white papers, the QDR posits strategy that is supposed to be relevant for the subsequent two decades. However, unlike in most European states, there is no review process to gauge how these strategies are being implemented. Indeed, the QDR is disconnected from the implementation phase, as it does not concern itself with resources or specific changes. Its general outlook also does not explicitly task certain people or offices to carry out its recommendations, and therefore there is no chain of accountability established for implementation. Therefore, the QDR remains a document with limited value for those who wish to find the core elements of American security strategy.

Instead, national-security strategy within the United States has traditionally been formulated by high-ranking members of the administration. Influential members of an administration who have the greatest influence on security can come from a number of different positions, be it the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defence, or the Secretary of State. Usually, more can be gathered on the strategic posture of an administration by looking at the personal profiles of these high-ranking officials than by reading defence documents. Within the Obama Administration, all signs point towards a pragmatic security structure. The appointment of Gen James L. Jones as National Security Advisor, Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, and Robert Gates as Secretary of Defence all suggest that the current administration is looking for leaders who have the necessary operational experience to build consensus and get policy passed in Washington. This realist security structure will be a significant change from the ideological leanings of the previous administration and will correct what could be seen as a neo-conservative
aberration in American history. Pragmatism has been the hallmark of American politics over the past two centuries, and it has reasserted itself within the Obama Administration.

Russia

The recent conflict in Georgia in August 2008 illustrated the large gaps in communication and trust that existed between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. For many weeks, insinuations were issued on both sides regarding the specific details of the conflict, many of which had to be embarrassingly altered once more details emerged. The fallout from the conflict demonstrated the necessity for a comprehensive rethink of the relationship between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.

Thankfully, such an opportunity presented itself with the election of President Obama. Only a few days after taking office, Vice President Joe Biden remarked at the Munich Security Conference on the need to “press the reset button” regarding the West’s relationship with Russia. Such a need was supported by other states such as Germany and France. Russia, too, believes that a new understanding is crucial in order to guarantee security for the entire region. Underlying the realism inherent in great-power security strategies, Russia is confident that the international community has the ability to put aside its ideological preferences in order to deal with harsh realities; this was witnessed in the aftermath of 9/11, as well as during the ongoing global financial crisis. Russia believes that international cooperation is vital in order to solve the world’s most pressing security concerns, such as the fight against terrorism, securing peace in the Middle East and Afghanistan, non-proliferation and dealing with the effects of climate change.

Within the Euro-Atlantic region, however, Russia has been less enthused by recent developments. While cooperation has been successful in times of crisis on a global scale, Russia has noted with disappointment the persistence of the “Cold War mentality” of dividing states. In Russia’s
view, the past two decades has seen the erosion of respect for international law, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Instead, Russia claims, international law has been applied selectively in accordance with political expediency. Russia also questions those who consider NATO the main pillar of Euro-Atlantic security, as a considerable number of countries, such as Russia itself, find themselves beyond its sphere and have no plans in the future to bid for membership. As such, if Euro-Atlantic security policy truly wishes to effectively combat transnational threats, it would be wise to utilise more inclusive structures in order to coordinate security action across all states.

Indeed, Russia sees Euro-Atlantic security as indivisible in its nature. No state or group of states should provide for their security at the expense of others; it is not a zero-sum arrangement. Rather, the question should be turned around to consider how to provide security for all 56 states within the Euro-Atlantic region. Here, President Medvedev has outlined his ideas for a new and inclusive European security treaty that would have at its heart the legally binding pledge of non-use of force amongst other nations within the region and would ensure a truly universal system of collective security. This proposed treaty is at the heart of Russia’s new overture to the West, and it has as its primary target the goal of making a universal security system within the Euro-Atlantic region a reality.

Hallmarks of the Proposed European Security Treaty
The “Russian Initiative Regarding a Treaty on European Security” was presented to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on 5 December 2008. The proposal is based on multilateralism and prioritising international norms, which would exclude arbitrary interpretation, as well as the impetus to unite the area under common rules that would provide a legally binding solution to security problems.
In preparation for a new treaty, it is necessary to start with a review of the relevance of institutional structures. Indeed, there is a need to amend or build new structures that would guarantee the inviolability of borders and take into account the realities of the 21st century. The multidisciplinary and integrated nature of security problems would call for an integrated approach. Indeed, it may not be feasible for all disciplines to be narrowed down into a single treaty, and it would therefore be necessary at the outset to set clear priorities and to be guided by mainly pragmatic considerations.

Russia states that this proposed treaty should create a new fabric of interaction that would eliminate the possibility of marginalisation or alienation of any country or international organisation. Indeed, Russia welcomes the participation of organisations that it is not a part of, such as NATO. The goal, therefore, would be to establish better communication and teamwork in the field of international security and to enable more efficient use of resources.

As alluded to earlier, one main obstacle the Russian proposal sees in creating such a treaty is the lack of trust that lies at the root of many difficulties today. Indeed, the existence of mutual trust and confidence is the key to substantive dialogue and can only come about with open and honest discussions amongst all parties. The proposal states that Russia is ready to engage in discussion on a number of ideas and ranging over a few key themes:

1. New collaboration in the field of security;
2. Implementation of old commitments prior to making new declarations;
3. A focus on prevention of crises within the Euro-Atlantic space;
4. New preparations in countering new challenges; and
5. A commitment to disarmament.

The initiative regards the OSCE as the guardian of basic principles that a new treaty would espouse, and it expresses the belief that the OSCE is the best forum for discussing the contents of the treaty. However, in its
present condition, the OSCE is unlikely to cope with such a large-scale task, Russia says. Still, Russia’s proposal suggests that certain parts of the treaty could be handled by the different areas of expertise within the OSCE umbrella, such as the Forum for Security Co-operation and the Annual Security Review Conference.

The end result of the initiative cannot be foreseen at present. By making this proposal, Russia has only declared its willingness to engage on a substantive level with its Euro-Atlantic neighbours in order to build a new relationship of understanding and mutual respect. It enters into the negotiations without trying to force its own agenda but rather by encouraging input from other states, think tanks, NGOs and academia. At the same time, Russia will be asked by European states and the US to respect existing security arrangements such as the OECD and NATO. The task will therefore not be easy, and the importance of these discussions cannot be overemphasised.

China
On 20 January 2009, the Chinese government issued its latest white paper entitled “China’s National Defence in 2008”. The most important points can be summarised as follows:

1. To assess the international and regional security situation and to expand China’s strategic judgment on external and internal threats;

2. To declare China’s national defence policy and to reaffirm the military strategy of active defence for a new period;

3. To declare that China remains committed to a policy of no first use for nuclear weapons, thus pursuing a nuclear strategy of self-defence, and to reiterate China’s refusal to enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country;

4. To make public the changes in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces in various respects over the last 30 years;
5. To give details about the four strategic services of the PLA and other components of the armed forces, including the science, technology, and industry of national defence;

6. To release data on China’s defence expenditures over the last 30 years; and

7. To announce China’s progress in international security cooperation, arms control and disarmament.

Compared with other major countries, China has a unique security policy that is independent, defensive, and subordinate to national politics. China wishes to build and consolidate its national defence independently through self-reliance, and it does not seek allies with any country or group of countries, nor does it participate in any military bloc. Furthermore the paper states that China opposes all acts of aggression or expansion, and “will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it becomes.” Rather, China follows a policy of active defence in which it pledges to engage in armed conflict only if attacked first. Finally, China’s defensive policy has been built to serve the nation’s politics, and the state “makes it a point to take into consideration the needs of economic and social development and insists on having military and civilian purposes compatible with and beneficial to each other, so as to achieve more social benefits in the use of national defense resources in peacetime.”

The Content of ‘China’s National Defense in 2008’

China’s new white paper begins, as most do, with a threat assessment of the new security environment. However, China’s environment differs significantly from that of European countries. Unlike in Europe, which has witnessed large-scale conflict in the past two decades in Georgia and

in the former Yugoslav states, the Asian security situation has remained stable for quite some time. Furthermore, the external security situation has improved substantially, although no external country is explicitly mentioned within the white paper, thus reaffirming China’s independent and defensive posture. It is further stated that China’s nuclear weapons are not aimed at any state during peacetime, proving that China is concerned with its own national security.

The paper also traces the three phases of strategic thinking in national security and defence in the past 60 years. The first period, lasting from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, was characterised by enmity with the United States, direct conflict in the Korean War between the two belligerent states, and interference in the Taiwan Strait. The United States posed a military and economic threat to the survival of the new, but poor, People’s Republic of China (PRC), which remained unchanged until the visit of President Richard Nixon to the PRC in 1972 and the US withdrawal from Vietnam, which led to normalised relations thereafter.

The second phase of China’s strategic thinking lasted from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, when the so-called Sino-Soviet split led to high tensions between the Soviet Union and China. This conflict led to the deployment of over one million troops along China’s borders with the Soviet Union and with Mongolia, with the climax coming in 1969 with the outbreak of tensions, as both the Soviets and the Chinese made preparations for large-scale nuclear war. Fortunately, tensions decreased, but it was not until the end of the 1980s with the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to the PRC that the relationship was normalised.

The current period of China’s security strategy began in the 1980s following major reforms and policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping to open up the country. In June of 1985, Deng made an important assessment of the international strategic situation in an enlarged meeting of the essential military commission, stating that “it is possible that a large-scale war will not occur in a fairly long time, and it is hopeful to maintain world
peace”. This declaration signalled a shift in China’s strategy from war preparations towards peacetime construction. China’s military strategy was thus changed over time to become subordinate to economic development, and moved away from the vigilant stance seen during the height of the Sino-Soviet split towards a more relaxed defensive posture.

The Methodology of Drafting ‘China’s National Defense in 2008’
The drafting process began with an examination of both basic and key issues regarding different aspects of China’s security environment, including China’s international and regional situation, as well as its internal security situation. China’s basic and core interests were also formally articulated, as was the progress of China’s domestic economy, science and technological development. Finally, the situation within China was compared with the revolution of military affairs across today’s globalised world.

After this examination, the white paper sought to answer the following questions:

1. What kind of threats is China faced with?
2. What are the core Chinese interests that must be protected?
3. What kind of wars does China envision fighting in the future?
4. What sort of armed forces should be built in peacetime, and what is China currently able to build?
5. What kind of military strategy should be carried out?

Once these questions were answered, the drafters then began to think about what kind of security and defence policy should be constructed.

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After the draft of the white paper was completed, it was given to various government and military departments for review. Once revisions were made, the final version was submitted for approval.

Thus, the launch of China’s new white paper was important for again reaffirming to the international public China’s limited ambitions regarding its security policy. The paper declares that China will continue to remain inherently defensive in its security posture and seeks no aggrandisement of territory. The new white paper will therefore serve as a key public-relations tool to soothe irrational fears of China’s growth as an economic power by categorically stating China’s limited military ambitions.
The presentations and rich discussions of the seminar have shown that in terms of substance, strategies are heavily influenced by the level at which they are produced, by core values that reflect the strategic history of a state or international actor, by geopolitics, and by considerations for the direction that the state or organisation wants to follow in the future. Strategies have also seen some levels of convergence: there is a growing acceptance of similar threat assessments at both the state and international levels, as well as a trend of securitising non-traditional threats and challenges.

Methodologically, there are a number of different ways that states and international organisations have gone about formulating their strategies. At the state level, one sees that most states have utilised a comprehensive approach when planning their strategic documents and have tried to bring together a number of different ministries and government agencies to have a wide spectrum of perspectives and a pool of resources to choose from. However, what the state level has shown is that even if a comprehensive process is taken, the security-strategy process still requires the presence of a large amount of political capital in order for it to proceed. The experiences of many countries have shown that interde-
partmental disagreements often arise during the process, and a powerful arbiter is needed to stabilise the process and keep the focus directed towards the completion of the overall final product.

At the international level, strategic formulation becomes much more difficult. Each international organisation is comprised of a number of member states with disparate interests, and therefore defining vital interests at the international level is more complicated. As a result, most international strategies remain vague and broad in order to accommodate the different positions within the organisation, and these can be thought of more as guidelines than fully elaborated strategies. With regard to methodology, the experiences of a number of different organisations have shown that there are two broad categories of strategic formulation at the international level: either to task a small core group with most of the responsibility of creating a strategic document or to open up the production to all members in order to enhance the collaborative process. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, a small core group can work more efficiently and produce a more concise and readable document while, on the other hand, this lacks the cohesion of a collaborative effort and is susceptible to the dissent of parties who feel marginalised within the organisation itself. A more collaborative effort, while including a greater wealth of opinion and nuance, is a considerably more unwieldy process that takes a lot of time and energy in order to gather all the parties together and to build consensus. Thus, organisations must decide which drafting style suits their needs best for each individual task.

Overall, experts have called for a greater focus on the strategic aggregate level, moving away from the state level and towards more development on an international scale. Strategies should be harmonised at both the state and international level in order to have a more unified general view of the interests and response mechanisms of particular regions. With the acceptance amongst most states that today’s threats and chal-
Challenges require a high level of coordination, it is now more important than ever to begin to develop regional and international security strategies towards as intricate a level as is seen in the strategies of different states. International norms should be defined and accepted by all states, and the current consultative machinery in international organisations should be strengthened and upgraded.

These tasks require a greater collaborative effort on the international level, but such is the nature of the present challenges faced by all states that the only option for guaranteeing the security for one is to work towards greater progress in the realm of global security. The road ahead is difficult, but sustainable security can only be created at the international level, going beyond the limited abilities of hard power. Indeed, some things are too good to be left to national interests, and thus states should continue to work towards strengthening the international security sphere.
Monday, 6 April 2009

09h00 - 09h10  Welcome Remarks
Ambassador Dr Fred TANNER, Director, GCSP
Dr Nayef AL-RODHAN, Senior Scholar in Geostrategy and
Director of the Programme on the Geopolitical Implications of
Globalisation and Transnational Security, GCSP

09h10 - 09h20  Introduction
Dr Gustav LINDSTROM, Course Co-Director, European Training
Course in Security Policy (ETC), GCSP

09h20 - 10h45  Panel One: “European Security Policies I”
(France, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom)
Chair: Dr Peter FOOT, Academic Dean, GCSP
Professor François HEISBOURG, Chairman of the Foundation
Council, GCSP; and Special Advisor, Foundation for Strategic
Studies, Paris (France)
Col (GS) Rainer MEYER ZUM FELDE, Branch Head, Transatlantic
Security and Strategic Issues, Policy Planning and Advisory
Staff, Ministry of Defence (Germany)
Mr Jan HYLLANDER, Secretary General, Secretariat of the Defence Commission, Ministry of Defence (Sweden)
Professor Steven HAINES, Head, Security and Rule of Law Programme, GCSP (United Kingdom)

11h00 - 12h30  Panel Two: “European Security Policies II”
(Finland, Italy, Poland, Spain, Switzerland)
Chair: Dr Thierry TARDY, Course Director, European Training Course in Security Policy (ETC), GCSP
Dr Pauli JÄRVENPÄÄ, Director-General, Defence Policy Department, Ministry of Defence (Finland)
Professor Stefano SILVESTRI, President, International Affairs Institute (Italy)
Dr Andrzej KARKOSZKA, Managing Director, Aerospace, Defence and Security Team, Central and Eastern Europe, PricewaterhouseCoopers (Poland)
Mr Andrés ORTEGA, Director, Policy Unit, President of the Government’s Office (Spain)
Dr Christian CATRINA, Director ad interim, Directorate for Security Policy, Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (Switzerland)

14h00 - 15h15  Panel Three: “Current Security Policy Thinking at the Regional and International Level”
(European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations)
Chair: Professor François HEISBOURG, Chairman of the Foundation Council, GCSP; and Special Advisor, Foundation for Strategic Studies, Paris
Mr Michael DÓCZY, Senior Advisor, Policy Unit of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Union)
Mr Antonio ORTIZ, Policy Adviser, Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary General (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
Dr Eva BUSZA, Principal Officer, Strategic Planning Unit, Executive Office of the Secretary-General (United Nations)
15h30 - 17h15  Panel Four: “Security Policies of the Global Players”
(China, Russia, United States)
Chair: Dr Graeme HERD, Faculty Member, GCSP
Rear Admiral (Retd.) Borong ZHOU, Senior Advisor, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (China)
Mr Pavel KNYAZEV, Head of NATO Section (Political Issues), Department of European Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Russia)
Professor Anthony CORDESMAN, Senior Fellow, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. (United States)

17h15 - 17h45  Concluding Discussion
Chairs: Ambassador Dr Fred TANNER, Director, GCSP; and Dr Nayef AL-RODHAN, Senior Scholar in Geostrategy and Director of the Programme on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalisation and Transnational Security, GCSP (All participants)

17h45 - 18h00  Closing Remarks
Professor Sven BISCOP, Director, Security and Global Governance Programme, Royal Institute of International Relations, Brussels
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