APPENDIX A: THE REASON FOR GOD

THE REASON FOR GOD

By Tim Keller
(excerpted from Chapter 8 of the book)

THE CLUES OF GOD

How can we believe in Christianity if we don’t even know whether God exists? Though there cannot be irrefutable proof for the existence of God, many people have found strong clues for his reality—divine fingerprints—in many places.

“If one puts aside the existence of God and the survival after life as too doubtful...one has to make up one’s mind as to the use of life. If death ends all, if I have neither to hope for good nor to fear evil, I must ask myself what I am here for, and how in these circumstances I must conduct myself. Now the answer is plain, but so unpalatable that most will not face it. There is no meaning for life, and [thus] life has no meaning.”

[Somerset Maugham, The Summing Up]

“It was true, I have always realized it—I hadn’t any “right” to exist at all. I had appeared by chance, I existed like a stone, a plant, a microbe. I could feel nothing to myself but an inconsequential buzzing. I was thinking...that here we are eating and drinking, to preserve our precious existence, and that there’s nothing, nothing, absolutely no reason for existing.”

[Jean-Paul Sartre]

I once met regularly with a brilliant young scientist who was haunted by a general sense that God existed. Much of what I am writing in this chapter and the next I discovered during my conversations with him. He looked at one argument for God after another, and though many of them had a great deal of merit, he found that ultimately every one of them was rationally avoidable at some point. This troubled him greatly. “I can’t believe unless I find at least one absolutely airtight proof for God,” he said to me. I pointed out to him that he was assuming “strong rationalism” and he got some relief when together we realized that he had no airtight proof for that. Then we began to go back and review the lines of reasoning that he had been calling “proofs” and began to look at them instead as clues. When we went about it with that perspective he began to see that, cumulatively, the clues of God had a lot of force to them.

The philosopher Alvin Plantinga believes that there are no proofs of God that will convince all rational persons. However, he believes that there are at least two to three dozen very good arguments for the existence of God. Most readers who take the time to think through Plantinga’s list will find some items compelling and others not. However, the accumulated weight of the ones you find appealing can be very formidable. I will trace out just a handful of them.
THE MYSTERIOUS BANG

Those of a more rational mind-set have always been fascinated by the question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” This question has become even more interesting to people in the wake of the Big Bang theory. There’s evidence that the universe is expanding explosively and outwardly from a single point. Stephen Hawking wrote: “Almost everyone now believes that the universe, and time itself, had a beginning at the Big Bang.” Scientist Francis Collins puts this clue in layman’s language in his book The Language of God:

We have this very solid conclusion that the universe had an origin, the Big Bang. Fifteen billion years ago, the universe began with an unimaginable bright flash of energy from an infinitesimally small point. That implies that before that, there was nothing. I can’t imagine how nature, in this case the universe, could have created itself. And the very fact that the universe had a beginning implies that someone was able to begin it. And it seems to me that had to be outside of nature.

Everything we know in this world is “contingent,” had a cause outside of itself. Therefore the universe, which is just a huge pile of such contingent entities, would itself have to be dependent on some cause outside of itself. Something had to make the Big Bang happen—but what? What could that be but something outside of nature, a supernatural, non-contingent being that exists by itself?

Sam Harris, in his review of Francis Collins’ book, makes the classic objection to this line of reasoning. “In any case,” he writes, “even if we accepted that our universe simply had to be created by an intelligent being, this would not suggest that this being is the God of the Bible.” This is perfectly right. If we are looking at this as an argument proving the existence of a personal God, it doesn’t get us all the way there. However, if we are looking for a clue—a clue that there is something besides the natural world—it is very provocative for many people.

THE COSMIC WELCOME MAT

For organic life to exist, the fundamental regularities and constants of physics—the speed of light, the gravitational constant, the strength of the weak and strong nuclear forces—must all have values that together fall into an extremely narrow range. The probability of this perfect calibration happening by chance is so tiny as to be statistically negligible.

Again, Collins puts it well:

When you look from the perspective of a scientist at the universe, it looks as if it knew we were coming. There are 15 constants—the gravitational constant, various constants about the strong and weak nuclear force, etc.—that have precise values. If any one of those constants was off by even one part of a million, or in some cases, by one part in a million million, the universe could not have actually come to the point where we see it. Matter would not have been able to coalesce, there would have been no galaxy, stars, planets or people.

Some have said that it is as if there were a large number of dials that all had to be tuned to within extremely narrow limits—and they were. It seems extremely unlikely that this would happen by chance. Stephen Hawking concludes: “The odds against a universe like ours emerging out of something like the Big Bang are enormous. I think there are clearly
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religious implications.”  
Elsewhere he says, “It would be very difficult to explain why the universe would have begun in just this way except as the act of a God who intended to create beings like us.”

This has been called the “Fine-Tuning Argument” or the “Anthropic Principle,” namely that the universe was prepared for human beings. As an argument it must be a pretty powerful one, because there are a lot of fierce rebuttals being published about it.

The most common rejoinder, which Richard Dawkins makes in his book The God Delusion, is that there may be trillions of universes. Given the enormous number of universes existing over enormous amounts of time and space, it is inevitable that some of them are fine-tuned to sustain our kind of life. The one we are in is one, so here we are.

“The odds against a universe like ours emerging out of something like the Big Bang are enormous. I think there are clearly religious implications.”

Again, as a “proof,” the Fine-Tuning Argument is rationally avoidable. Though there’s not a shred of proof that there are many universes, there’s also no way to prove that there aren’t.

However, as a clue, this line of thinking has force. Alvin Plantinga gives this illustration. He imagines a man dealing himself twenty straight hands of four aces in the same game of poker. As his companions reach for their six-shooters the poker player says, “I know it looks suspicious! But what if there is an infinite succession of universes, so that for any possible distribution of poker hands, there is one universe in which the possibility is realized? We just happen to find ourselves in one where I always deal myself four aces without cheating!” This argument will have no effect on the other poker players. It is technically possible that the man just happened to deal himself twenty straight hands of four aces. Though you could not prove he had cheated, it would be unreasonable to conclude that he hadn’t.

The philosopher John Leslie poses a similar illustration. He imagines a man who is sentenced to be executed by a firing squad consisting of fifty expert marksmen. They all fire from six feet away and not one bullet hits him. Since it is possible that even expert marksmen could miss from close range it is technically possible that all fifty just happened to miss at the same moment. Though you could not prove they had conspired to miss, it would be unreasonable to draw the conclusion that they hadn’t.

It is technically possible that we just happened to be in the one universe in which organic life occurred. Though you could not prove that the fine-tuning of the universe was due to some sort of design, it would be unreasonable to draw the conclusion that it wasn’t. Although organic life could have just happened without a Creator, does it make sense to live as if that infinitely remote chance is true?

THE REGULARITY OF NATURE

There is something about nature that is much more striking and inexplicable than its design. All scientific, inductive reasoning is based on the assumption of the regularity (the "laws") of nature, that water will boil tomorrow under the identical conditions of today. The method of induction requires generalizing from observed cases to all cases of the same kind. Without inductive reasoning we couldn’t learn from experience, we couldn’t use language, we couldn’t
rely on our memories.

Most people find that normal and untroubling. But not philosophers! David Hume and Bertrand Russell, as good secular men, were troubled by the fact that we haven’t got the slightest idea of why nature-regularity is happening now, and moreover we haven’t the slightest rational justification for assuming it will continue tomorrow. If someone would say, “Well the future has always been like the past in the past,” Hume and Russell reply that you are assuming the very thing you are trying to establish. To put it another way, science cannot prove the continued regularity of nature, it can only take it on faith.

There have been many scholars in the last decades who have argued that modern science arose in its most sustained form out of Christian civilization because of its belief in an all-powerful, personal God who created and sustains an orderly universe. As a proof for the existence of God, the regularity of nature is escapable. You can always say, “We don’t know why things are as they are.” As a clue for God, however, it is helpful.

THE CLUE OF BEAUTY

Arthur C. Danto, the art critic at the Nation, once described a work of art that gave him a sense of “obscure but inescapable meaning.” In other words, while great art does not “hit you over the head” with a simple message, it always gives you a sense that life is not a “tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” It fills you with hope and gives you the strength to carry on, though you cannot define what it is that moves you.

Leonard Bernstein once rhapsodized about the effect of Beethoven on him:

Beethoven...turned out pieces of breath-taking rightness. Rightness—that’s the word! When you get the feeling that whatever note succeeds the last is the only possible note that can rightly happen at that instant, in that context, then chances are you’re listening to Beethoven. Melodies, fugues, rhythms—leave them to the Tchaikovskys and Hindemiths and Ravels. Our boy has the real goods, the stuff from Heaven, the power to make you feel at the finish: Something is right in the world. There is something that checks throughout, that follows its own law consistently: something we can trust, that will never let us down.

If there is no God, and everything in this world is the product of (as Bertrand Russell famously put it) “an accidental collocation of atoms,” then there is no actual purpose for which we were made—we are accidents. If we are the product of accidental natural forces then what we call “beauty” is nothing but a neurological hardwired response to particular data. You only find certain scenery to be beautiful because you had ancestors who knew you would find food there and they survived because of that neurological feature and now we have it too. In the same way, though music feels significant, that significance is an illusion. Love too must be seen in this light. If we are the result of blind natural forces, then what we call “love” is simply a biochemical response, inherited from ancestors who survived because this trait helped them survive.
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Regardless of the beliefs of our mind about the random meaninglessness of life, before the face of beauty we know better.

Bernstein and Danto are testifying to the fact that even though we as secular people believe that beauty and love are just biochemical responses, in the presence of great art and beauty we inescapably feel that there is real meaning in life, there is truth and justice that will never let us down, and love means everything. Notice that Bernstein, though by no means an orthodox religious person, can’t refrain from even using the term “Heaven” when talking about Beethoven. We may, therefore, be secular materialists who believe truth and justice, good and evil, are complete illusions. But in the presence of art or even great natural beauty, our hearts tell us another story.

Another prominent artist who is apparently telling us the same thing is John Updike. In his short story “Pigeon Feathers” a young teenager says to his mother, “Don’t you see, if when we die there’s nothing, all your sun and fields and what not are all, ah, horror? It’s just an ocean of horror.” Later, in the presence of the beauty of pigeon feathers, of their texture and color, he is overwhelmed by a certainty that there is a God behind the world who will allow him to live for eternity. Updike seems to be saying that regardless of the beliefs of our mind about the random meaninglessness of life, before the face of beauty we know better.

“So what?” someone might object. “Just because we feel something is true doesn’t make it so!” Are we, however, only talking about feeling here? What is evoked in these experiences is, more accurately, appetite or desire. Goethe refers to this as selige sehnsucht—blessed longing. We not only feel the reality but also the absence of what we long for.

St. Augustine in his Confessions reasoned that these unfulfillable desires are clues to the reality of God. How so? Indeed (as it was just objected) just because we feel the desire for a steak dinner doesn’t mean we will get it. However, while hunger doesn’t prove that the particular meal desired will be procured, doesn’t the appetite for food in us mean that food exists? Isn’t it true that innate desires correspond to real objects that can satisfy them, such as sexual desire (corresponding to sex), physical appetite (corresponding to food), tiredness (corresponding to sleep) and relational desires (corresponding to friendship)?

Doesn’t the unfulfillable longing evoked by beauty qualify as an innate desire? We have a longing for joy, love, and beauty that no amount or quality of food, sex, friendship, or success can satisfy. We want something that nothing in this world can fulfill. Isn’t that at least a clue that this “something” that we want exists? This unfulfillable longing, then, qualifies as a deep, innate human desire, and that makes it a major clue that God is there.

THE CLUE-KILLER

In our culture there is a very influential school of thought that claims to have the answers to all of these so-called clues. This is the school of evolutionary biology that claims everything about us can be explained as a function of natural selection. A book that seeks to explain all clues about God in this way is Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon by Daniel Dennett. Dennett claims that if we have religious feelings it is only because those traits once helped certain people survive their environment in greater numbers and
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Therefore passed that genetic code on to us. He sums up his view when he writes:

   Everything we value—from sugar and sex and money to music and love and religion—we value for reasons. Lying behind, and distinct from, our reasons are evolutionary reasons, free-floating rationales that have been endorsed by natural selection.

Belief in God is an accidental by-product of other traits that did give adaptive advantage.


We know that “the idea of an infallible God is comfortable and familiar, something children readily accept.” Why? Some evolutionists such as David Sloan Wilson think belief in God made people happier and more unselfish, which meant their families and tribes survived and they got better mates. Others such as Scott Atran and Richard Dawkins posit that belief in God is an accidental by-product of other traits that did give adaptive advantage. Our ancestors who survived were most prone to detect agents in the brush even when they weren’t there, and were most likely to impose narratives, causal reasoning, on everything that happened around them. However, these same traits make us more likely to believe in God—to see agents and narratives and intelligences where they don’t actually exist.

Despite fierce debates within the field, evolutionary theorists all agree that our capacity to believe in God is hardwired into our physiology because it was directly or indirectly associated with traits that helped our ancestors adapt to their environment. That’s why arguments for God appeal to so many of us. That’s all there is to it. The clues are clues to nothing.

However, there are many who believe not only that the clue-killer argument has a fatal contradiction in it, but that it actually points to another clue for God.

If our cognitive faculties only tell us what we need to survive, not what is true, why trust them about anything at all?

In the last part of Dawkins’s The God Delusion he admits that since we are the product of natural selection, we can’t completely trust our own senses. After all, evolution is interested only in preserving adaptive behavior, not true belief.

In a New York Times Magazine article, another scientist says, “in some circumstances a symbolic belief that departs from factual reality fares better.” In other words, paranoid false beliefs are often more effective at helping you survive than accurate ones.

I don’t believe Dawkins or other evolutionary theorists realize the full implications of this cruel insight. Evolution can only be trusted to give us cognitive faculties that help us live on, not to provide ones that give us an accurate and true picture of the world around us. Patricia Churchland puts it like this:

The principle chore of [brains] is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a
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fancier style of representing [the world] is advantageous so long as it...enhances the organism’s chances for survival. Truth, whatever that is, takes the hindmost.\textsuperscript{xxiv}

Thomas Nagel, the prominent philosopher and atheist, agrees in the last chapter of his book The Last Word. He writes that to be sure my mind is telling me what is really, truly out there in the world, I must “follow the rules of logic because they are correct—not merely because I am biologically programmed to do so.” However, according to evolutionary biology laws of reason would have to make sense to us only because they help us survive, not because they necessarily tell us truth. So, Nagel asks:

[Can we have any] continued confidence in reason as a source of knowledge about the nonapparent character of the world? In itself, I believe an evolutionary story [of the human race] tells against such confidence.\textsuperscript{xxv}

Evolutionists say that if God makes sense to us, it is not because he is really there, it’s only because that belief helped us survive and so we are hardwired for it. However, if we can’t trust our belief-forming faculties to tell us the truth about God, why should we trust them to tell us the truth about anything, including evolutionary science? If our cognitive faculties only tell us what we need to survive, not what is true, why trust them about anything at all?

It seems that evolutionary theorists have to do one of two things. They could backtrack and admit that we can trust what our minds tell us about things, including God. If we find arguments or clues to God’s existence that seem compelling to us, well, maybe he’s really there. Or else they could go forward and admit that we can’t trust our minds about anything. What is not fair is to do what so many evolutionary scientists are doing now. They are applying the scalpel of their skepticism to what our minds tell us about God but not to what our minds are telling us about evolutionary science itself.

This is a huge Achilles’ heel in the whole enterprise of evolutionary biology and theory. Alvin Plantinga points out that Charles Darwin himself saw this major vulnerability. To a friend, Darwin wrote that:

The horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy.\textsuperscript{xxvi}

Plantinga then proceeds to argue that it is ultimately irrational to accept evolutionary “naturalism,” the theory that everything in us is caused only by natural selection. If it were true, we couldn’t trust the methods by which we arrived at it or any scientific theory at all.\textsuperscript{xxvii}

People like Dawkins hold that there is a conflict between science and religion...the truth of the matter, however, is that the conflict is between science and naturalism, not between science and belief in God... It’s as likely, given unguided evolution, that we live in a sort of dream world as that we actually know something about ourselves and our world.\textsuperscript{xxviii}

Despite popular books like those of Dennett, Dawkins, and Harris, which try to use the evolutionary clue-killer on religion, more and more thinkers are seeing through it, and not just orthodox believers, but those like Thomas Nagel. Leon Wieseltier, the literary editor of The New Republic, points out the flaw in the clue-killer argument in his review of Dennett’s book Breaking the Spell.
[Dennett] portrays reason in service to natural selection, and as a product of natural selection. But if reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? The power of reason is owed to the independence of reason, and to nothing else... Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it.\textsuperscript{xxix}

It comes down to this: If, as the evolutionary scientists say, what our brains tells us about morality, love, and beauty is not real—if it is merely a set of chemical reactions designed to pass on our genetic code—then so is what their brains tell them about the world. Then why should they trust them?

**THE CLUE-KILLER IS REALLY A CLUE**

I think that ultimately the supposed clue-killer ends up showing us one more clue for God to put beside the others.

The first clue is the very existence of the world, the Big Bang. The secular person rightly responds, “But that doesn’t prove God exists. Maybe the Big Bang just caused itself.” The second clue is the fine-tuning of the universe, the one-in-a-trillion-trillion chance that our universe supports organic and human life. Again the secular person can very fairly respond: “But that doesn’t prove God. It could be through sheer random circumstance that this universe is the one that was formed.” Another clue is the regularity of nature. All scientific, inductive reasoning is based on the assumption of this, though we haven’t the slightest rational justification for assuming it will continue. When believers have responded that this is a clue to God’s existence, nonbelievers retort, rightly, “We don’t know why nature is regular, it just is. That doesn’t prove God.”

Another clue is the clue of beauty and meaning. If we are the product of the meaningless, accidental forces of nature, believers ask, how do you account for the sense we have that beauty matters, that love and life are significant? The secular person responds: “This doesn’t prove God. We can explain all such ‘senses’ and convictions through evolutionary biology. Our religious, aesthetic, and moral intuitions are there only because they helped our ancestors survive.” However, as many thinkers point out, if this argument proves anything at all it proves too much. If we can’t trust our belief-forming faculties in one area, we should not trust them in any area. If there is no God, we could not trust our cognitive faculties at all.

Oh, but we do, and that’s the final clue. If we believe God exists, then our view of the universe gives us a basis for believing that cognitive faculties work, since God could make us able to form true beliefs and knowledge. If we believe in God, then the Big Bang is not mysterious, nor the fine-tuning of the universe, nor the regularities of nature. All the things that we see make perfect sense. Also, if God exists our intuitions about the meaningfulness of beauty and love are to be expected.

If you don’t believe in God, not only are all these things profoundly inexplicable, but your view—that there is no God—would lead you not to expect them. Though you have little reason to believe your rational faculties work, you go on using them. You have no basis for believing that nature will go on regularly, but you continue to use inductive reasoning and language. You have no good reason to trust your senses that love and beauty matter, but you keep on doing it. C.S. Lewis puts this vividly:

> You can’t, except in the lowest animal sense, be in love with a girl if you know (and keep on remembering) that all the beauties both of her person and of her character are a momentary and
accidental pattern produced by the collision of atoms, and that your own response to them is only a sort of psychic phosphorescence arising from the behavior of your genes. You can’t go on getting very serious pleasure from music if you know and remember that its air of significance is a pure illusion, that you like it only because your nervous system is irrationally conditioned to like it."

Of course none of the clues we have been looking for actually proves God. Every one of them is rationally avoidable. However, their cumulative effect is, I think, provocative and potent. Though the secular view of the world is rationally possible, it doesn’t make as much sense of all these things as the view that God exists. That’s why we call them clues. The theory that there is a God who made the world accounts for the evidence we see better than the theory that there is no God. Those who argue against the existence of God go right on using induction, language, and their cognitive faculties, all of which make far more sense in a universe in which a God has created and supports them all by his power.

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i A survey can be found in Alvin Plantinga’s lecture notes, “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments,” available at http://www.homestead.com/philoreligion/files/Thieticarguments.html and many other places on the Internet. See also the summary of William C. Davis, “Theistic Arguments,” in Murray, Reason for the Hope Within.


xvi The classic statement of this argument is found in the chapter on “Hope” in C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (Macmillan).


xix Henig, “Why Do We Believe?” p.43.

xx Ibid., p.58.

xxi Dawkins, The God Delusion, p.367ff, “Our brains themselves are evolved organs… evolved to help us survive.”

xxii Henig, p.7.

xxiii In his foreword to Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene, Robert Trivers noted Dawkins’s emphasis on the role of deception in animal life, and added if indeed “deceit is fundamental to animal communication, then there must be strong selection to spot deception and this ought, in turn, to select for a degree of self-deception, rendering some facts and motives unconscious so as not to betray – by the subtle signs of self-knowledge – the deception being practiced.” Therefore, “the conventional view that natural selection favors nervous systems which produce ever more accurate images of the world must be a very naive view of mental evolution.” Quote from Robert Wright, The Moral Animal (Pantheon, 1994), pp.263-64. Cognitive psychologist Justin Barrett writes: “Some cognitive scientists assume that because our
brains and their functions have been “designed” by natural selection we can trust them to tell us the truth; such an assumption is epistemologically dubious. Just because we can successfully survive and reproduce in no way ensures that our minds as a whole tell us the truth about anything – especially when it comes to sophisticated thinking … what a completely naturalistic view of the human mind can safely embrace is that our minds were good for survival in the past.” Justin L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (AltaMira Press, 2004), p.19.


xxxi For the full argument, see A. Plantinga, Chapters 11 and 12 in Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford University Press, 2000)

