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Poor choices: de-alignment, development and Dalit/Adivasi voting patterns in Indian states

TARIQ THACHIL AND RONALD HERRING

ABSTRACT    The surprising loss of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led national government in India’s 2004 general elections has been generally understood as a rejection of the National Democratic Alliance’s campaign that celebrated a ‘Shining India’ among voters who had not shared in the wealth produced by India’s recent growth boom—especially Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe electorates. A close look at the empirical evidence demonstrates that Dalit and Adivasi communities were by no means the homogeneous voting block portrayed in many post-election analyses. Nor did the BJP consistently lose in these constituencies. Both findings undermine the currently popular conceptualization of Indian electoral and party behavior as identity-based or ethnic. Instead, the 2004 results confirmed a growing trend for these disadvantaged populations to vote for radically dissimilar parties across different states—from the Communist Party of India (Marxist), to the Congress, to the Bahujan Samaj Party, or indeed to the BJP itself—driven by plausible calculation of interests. Using national election data from the 1999 and 2004 elections, this paper examines the theoretical puzzle this divergent electoral behavior presents to both the comparative literature on cleavage-based party systems and the scholarship on caste and identity politics in India. We argue that at least some of this variance can be explained by the fact that differences in state-level conditions influence which of the array of strategies used by Indian parties to recruit Dalit and Adivasi voters is likely to be successful. We then analyze the specific puzzle of differential BJP success among Adivasi/Dalit communities. We conclude that the embedded nature of the BJP as a party with social movement characteristics, combined with the poor developmental performance of many Indian states for their most disadvantaged populations, opens a spatially and politically differentiated niche for a social-provisioning electoral strategy. Developing this strategy has aided the BJP in overcoming at least partially its legacy as a Brahmin-Bania party.

Introduction: the myth of a Dalit/Adivasi electorate

Results of the 2004 parliamentary elections in India largely came as a shock not only to observers of the country’s political system, but more rudely to the ousted...
governing coalition in New Delhi. The ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) headed by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), buoyed by positive public opinion poll results, had called early elections in the hope of lengthening their tenure in office. If we assume politicians to be skilled in their game, this tactic suggested significant popular strength for the Government. Indeed, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was held to be especially popular. Surprisingly, the NDA instead lost to a coalition headed by the Indian National Congress (Congress). Analysts hailed the results as ‘a vote for secular politics’¹ and argued that it signaled a ‘radical shift in the social basis for power’.² The NDA’s ‘India Shining’ campaign—built around celebration of anomalously high economic growth rates—seemed not to have resonated with poorer sections of the Indian electorate.³

Empirics contradict the notion of a ‘radical shift’ from the BJP to the Congress. The BJP as a party lost only 1.5% of the vote between its successful 2000 campaign and the 2004 election, and was still the second-largest party in 2004 in terms of percentage of votes by some margin.⁴ Further, only seven seats separated the Congress and the BJP (out of 543 total seats contested) in the Lok Sabha. If anything, the 2004 elections confirmed that the BJP has successfully cemented its status as one of India’s two main national parties. Both major parties retained similar shares of the national vote, with neither garnering more than one-quarter of all votes. Since coalition partners did change, it is reasonable to look to coalitional shifts as a more plausible explanation for the change in government. But aggregate vote shares tell us nothing about where the parties gained and lost strength. Were there significant defections by particular electorates that determined the surprising 2004 results?

It is well known that the India Shining electoral theme did not capture the reality for all Indian voters. Indeed, by 2006 there seemed to be evidence of renewed agrarian radicalism in the resurgence of Naxalism and widespread perceptions of rural crisis, as evidenced by reports of increasing numbers of farmer suicides.⁵ It is thus plausible that, as many analyses of the elections supposed, poorer voters ousted the NDA from power; the celebration of ‘shining’ was insulting to those suffering from poverty or deprivation in the economic turmoil entailed in more rapid growth. Is there evidence for this pattern?

Our paper begins by arguing that while the increasing salience of coalition-building in determining national election results has been widely recognized, many post-election analyses tended to commit the primordialist ecological fallacy of depicting Scheduled Caste (SC, Dalit) and Scheduled Tribe (ST, Adivasi) voters as a cohesive electorate acting collectively at the national level.⁶ However, disaggregating the national data reveals wide disparities in the electoral behavior of each community. For example, the Congress’ support from Dalit voters varied from a high of 70% in some states to a low of under 5% of the vote in others, while that of the BJP ranged between a high of nearly 40% to a low of 0%. Similar oscillations are observable with ‘tribal’ populations; each party’s support ranges from 0% to approximately 50% of the total Adivasi vote share. These variations indicate that attribution of a national ‘swing’ or tide among either of these disadvantaged communities is unsupportable.

Moreover, the two main national parties are not the only major players with Dalit and Adivasi electorates. Indeed in the 2004 election, the national parties capturing
the largest proportion of votes from either community at the state level ranged from the leftist Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM), to the more centrist Congress, to the Hindu nationalist BJP. In other states, ‘lower’-caste parties like the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh, regional parties like the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra or All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu were most successful with both communities. What is interesting and puzzling about this result is that these parties both span a wide ideological spectrum and take divergent stances on issues ranging from economic liberalization to public spending priorities. It is therefore not useful to think of Dalit and Adivasi electorates as anything like a national vote bank, much less one with anti-incumbency consensus sufficient to oust the BJP Government. These populations display very different political preferences at the state level, and it is here that a great analytical puzzle lies: what choices do relatively poor voters confront, and what choices do they make?

Given the still strong correlation between class and Dalit and Adivasi identities, and conventional understandings of the ways in which caste has been politicized in Indian politics, it is a reasonable assumption that these marginalized populations would act as a relatively cohesive electorate at the national level. Both broader comparative scholarship on cleavage-based party systems and India-specific literatures have theoretical reasons to expect similar behavior from communities with shared social profiles. For much of India’s postcolonial political era, single-party dominance of the Congress Party was buttressed by its manipulation of persistent social cleavages; Congress constructed itself as the party of affirmative action and uplift of ‘weaker sectors.’

Dealignment from the Congress was a long process, beginning in some states as early as 1967 but evident virtually everywhere in India by the late 1980s. In the second section of the paper, we outline how political parties utilized a wide array of recruiting tactics to wean away Dalit and Adivasi voters from the Congress, ranging from the same clientalist networks utilized by the Congress, to pro-poor reforms implemented by the CPM, to populist subnationalism of such parties as the Telugu Desham, to community-based patronage networks employed by the BSP and regional parties. These patterns gave rise to something like a new matrix of options for disadvantaged communities, although they may well remain poor choices.

To anticipate our argument, we will work through the ways in which party systems are theorized by political scientists, then discuss actual strategies of Indian parties, and, in the final section, conclude with the structural dilemma of the BJP. The party has historically attracted wealthy upper-caste voters, and is best known for advocating Hindutva, a socio-political configuration with roots in Brahminical intellectual traditions. Such a political profile would seem antithetical to social aspirations of those outside the top echelons of the Hindu social order—especially Adivasi/Dalit communities. However, knowing that its electoral base had to be expanded to become a serious player at the national level, the BJP has made recent efforts to attract the votes of marginalized communities. This strategy has yielded some success, although it is a mixed record. As Figures 1 and 2 highlight, the party’s success varies widely across Indian states with both electorates. How can this variance be explained?
Clearly, electoral trends are not explained by any single factor, especially in a polity as complex as India’s. However, complexity should not prevent attempts to discern underlying patterns. Consider these different outcomes in some key states:

**Figure 1. BJP performance with SC voters.**

*Source: Center for the Study of Developing Societies 1999 and 2004 National Election Studies,*

<www.lokniti.org>.

**Figure 2. BJP performance with ST voters.**

*Source: Center for the Study of Developing Societies 1999 and 2004 National Election Studies,*

<www.lokniti.org>.
the BJP has done well among voters at the bottom of the social pyramid in Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, but not at all in Kerala, West Bengal or Tamil Nadu. These latter states are ones that have been comparatively effective in either redistributive policies or distributive populism; there is not a yawning niche for a new entrant promising to treat the poor better.8

States that have been relatively efficient in implementing leftist or populist policies, including the provision of basic social services, have proved much harder arenas for the BJP to make inroads with Dalit and Adivasi voters. This finding suggests that the BJP may have better luck in those states in which there are marked inadequacies in performance of state governments, inadequacies that provide niches for its Sangh affiliates to fill. There seems to be initial evidence that BJP electoral success with the poor is enhanced by prior failure of incumbent state governments in providing basic social services. What theory might account for this hypothetical outcome? How robust is it?

In the three sections that follow, we first look at how the variance in voting patterns of Dalits and Adivasis defies expectations in both the comparative literature on cleavage-based party systems, and depictions of these communities as unified electorates within Indian political studies. In the second section we argue that this variance is due to the differing success of the particular strategies utilized by Indian parties in recruiting these communities. In the final section we analyze the specific puzzle presented by the success of the BJP, commonly understood as the party of Brahmins and Banias, in wooing Hinduism’s oppressed through the provisional services of the grassroots networks of the Sangh Parivar.

Theorizing social morphologies of voting blocs and party systems

The comparative literature on party systems would find the variation in Dalit and Adivasi voter behavior across India counter-intuitive. Much of this scholarship would expect these communities to vote for the same or similar parties nationwide. One influential set of explanations understood the development of party constituencies as stemming from the institutionalization of the significant social cleavages within a given polity.9 Studies of Western European political systems outlined how class or religious differences were determinative of the political axes along which parties organized. Voters accordingly were thought to affiliate with the party that best represented the interests of the members of their religious or class community, a phenomenon most clearly witnessed in the strong ties between social democratic parties and working-class electorates.10

Initially, India did not seem to fit the description of a cleavage-based party system. For several decades following independence, the Indian National Congress typified a ‘catch-all’ party in successfully consolidating support from all caste communities.11 Even when the Congress began losing support from increasingly fragmented upper-caste constituencies, Dalit and Adivasi populations were seen as relatively unified electorates. This view was in large part held because both were the last demographics to de-align en masse from the Congress’ once-dominant coalition. Indeed analysts have noted that from the 1970s onwards the Congress
increasingly showed signs of becoming a cleavage party based on support from these poorer electorates. The BJP’s emergence as the party of choice for upper-caste Hindus, coupled with the desertion and re-alignment of the ‘other backward castes’ communities, rendered the Congress increasingly reliant on Dalit and Adivasi voters. Between 1970 and 1980, the Congress began to lose significant support among the upper castes; its vote share dropped from 45.6% to 35.8%. Yet the party’s share of Dalit and Adivasi votes actually increased from 47.8% to 50.5% and from 41.2% to 48.6%, respectively, during the same time span.

This fracturing of the Indian electorate in many ways typifies a cleavage-based system. The voter profile of the two parties was clearly differentiated along social divisions, with the Congress becoming the party of the socially marginalized: Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims; the BJP, the party of the upper castes. This new polarization of the electorate was attributed to the BJP’s religious ideology, which appealed to elite Hindus while alienating marginalized castes and religious minorities. However, the inadequacy of a dichotomous understanding of caste–party affiliations in India became clear with the significant de-alignment of Dalit and Adivasi electorates from the Congress in the late 1980s. Between 1980 and 1996 the vote share of the Congress dropped among Dalit populations from 50.5% to under 30%, and among Adivasi populations from 49% to under 40%.

De-alignment of Dalit and Adivasi voters made these electorates increasingly available for electoral competition; the response was a continuous and unstable proliferation of parties courting their votes. Success of these new contenders rendered less and less accurate the model of the two major national parties as inverted caste hierarchies, even as the political salience of caste in electoral behavior was arguably reinforced—but in new configurations. In response to the crumbling of the Congress ‘system,’ even with respect to its most loyal Dalit and Adivasi vote banks, the scholarship on Indian parties began to focus on how the political arena was transformed from one of Congress dominance, to one of bipolar competition between the Congress and BJP, to a fragmented system predicated on caste differences. Explanations of the emergence of a new form of caste politics, particularly concerning the electoral behavior of ‘lower’ castes and Adivasis in India, fall into two categories. The first argued that growing socio-economic tensions polarized and politicized caste (and religious) communities; as a result, opportunistic political parties centered on these cleavages proliferated. Dalits and Adivasis were understood to ‘no longer accept their position in the social hierarchy,’ and accordingly began forming their own political organizations, including political parties, mirroring the practice of the upper castes. As a consequence, India witnessed the emergence of a party system organized primarily on the axis of caste identities.

A second strand of scholarship focused on the institutional features of the Indian political system in explaining the transformation of the political arena into one rooted in caste differences. This scholarship argued that caste-based associational activity was relatively weak. Therefore, the aggregation of distinct jatis (local
caste communities) into large-scale clusters such as ‘forward,’ ‘backward,’ and SCs required the active intervention of political parties. Parties thus became indispensable linkages between caste groups and the state. Rather than parties emanating deterministically from social divisions and structures as the literature on cleavage-based systems suggested, political parties strategically activated caste identities by centering their campaigns on deliberately divisive issues, in their competition to construct core constituencies for themselves.

Both sets of explanations for how caste party systems have emerged have proved useful in making sense of fundamental changes in the political terrain of Indian elections. However, neither approach explains what happens once a caste-based system of political competition is institutionalized. In particular, how can we explain divergent patterns of support among similar caste groups across different states? The literature emphasizing caste-based parties emerging to represent communities engaged in social conflict implicitly assumes that each caste constituency would then support the parties emerging to ‘represent’ ‘their’ social interests. This expectation has largely gone unfulfilled, with the exception of long-term historical evolution in some states with significant horizontal solidarities and class conflict—such as Kerala. Most national parties experience differential success in trying to broaden their appeal across different states. The BJP’s mixed record with Dalits and Adivasis is mirrored by the BSP, which has not been able to replicate its model for building a cross-caste support base outside its Uttar Pradesh stronghold.

The alternative account of the emergence of caste-based politics, which stresses the agency of parties in activating caste identities, has provided compelling explanations of how caste becomes a salient political identity. However, this approach also fails to provide an adequate theoretical basis for understanding a particular caste community’s electoral behavior once it has been mobilized. Indeed, we often see situations in which one party has been particularly active in activating a given caste community, but has not received electoral support from that constituency. For example, the BSP played an active role in politicizing caste in Madhya Pradesh, but the party has not attained much success there with Dalit communities. Similarly, in the 2004 elections Adivasis in Jharkhand supported the BJP as much as they supported regional parties such as the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, which historically initiated the movement for independent statehood, and played a major role in socially constructing an Adivasi electorate in the state.

Thus neither set of arguments analyzing the development of a caste-based Indian party system explicitly tackles the fundamental issue of how this system plays out once it has been institutionalized. The fact that caste communities across India have voted for parties that vary widely in ideological and policy orientations provides a particularly compelling puzzle. The theoretical expectations of both old-fashioned modernization theory and Marxist theories of economic change converge on one possible account for this fracturing of the vote within social strata—and by extension within a caste community. This explanation is that the erosion of cleavage-based party systems may result from differentiation of the underlying social divisions that have historically structured the political arena. In Europe, the decline of class-based voting has been understood as a product of the
blurring of class boundaries themselves. With the universalization of education, growing social mobility, and the concomitant shrinking of the European proletariat, scholars argue that class is of diminishing electoral salience.

Similarly, the growing secularization of European populations explains why religion has played a much smaller role in determining electoral behavior. In theory, ethnic attachments also wane with cross-cutting identifications and mobility. Thus, as the underlying fissures on which parties take positions become less sharply defined, voters are less likely to align with parties on the basis of such cleavages.

Yet scholars of democratic-party systems would not expect the erosion of cleavage-based electorates where socio-economic distinctions remain sharp. In India, class divisions remain extreme and caste identities are highly correlated with these divisions. Poverty rates among Dalits (36.2%) and Adivasis (43.8%) are much higher than among the rest of the population (14.3%). Despite being under 18% of the population, 45% of India’s poor come from these two groups. In such a system, political scientists would fully expect evidence of some voting along underlying social divisions, whether of caste or religion, and concomitantly would expect Dalit and Adivasi populations to continue to vote along caste lines and support similar parties. Thus European social cleavage theories do not generalize well to explaining trends of divergence in the Dalit and Adivasi support patterns.

Some analysts of Indian politics have argued that, despite the continuing correlation between caste and class, caste is of declining political salience. This formulation is plausible, but is, like ours, largely dependent on survey data; in interaction with investigators, it is entirely possible that individuals downplayed the role of caste in determining their vote, from an understandable desire of respondents to assert their individual autonomy. Moreover, the salience of caste in political behavior is context dependent and is variable over issue areas and time. When parties take divergent positions on caste-based reservations in educational institutions (e.g. linking material incentives of individuals with members of similar caste backgrounds), the salience of caste rises with the level of public contention. Moreover, Dalits and Adivasis do vote in large numbers for a particular party within most Indian states. In every case in the sample, over 30% of voters in both categories voted for the same party, and over 40% voted for the same party in a majority of cases, a high number given the degree of party fragmentation in each state.

Much attention has been paid to trends at the national level, such as the proliferation of ‘lower’-caste parties across India, the increased salience of Dalit and Adivasi politicians, or the increased electoral participation of Dalit and Adivasi voters. However, less attention has been paid to how the variance in Dalit and Adivasi voter preferences across states highlights the fact that caste is politicized differently in various state contexts. In attempting to redress this neglect, we focus in the next section on two related questions; one concerning party strategies, and the other regarding voter decisions based on these strategies. First, we outline the different strategies these ideologically and organizationally dissimilar political parties are using to woo Dalit and Adivasi communities. We then move to analyzing the conditions under which voters are more susceptible to any one of the tactics from this menu. Specifically, we focus on state-level factors conducive to the
success of the BJP, which, as the party of the Hindu upper castes, faces the greatest political and ideological hurdles in appealing to Dalit and Adivasi voters.

Comparative party strategies
Indian political parties demonstrate a wide array of the strategies identified above in the broader comparative literature on parties as possible means to recruit voters from socio-economically disadvantaged communities. We outline three of the tactics used by significant players in domestic party politics to capture Dalit and Adivasi votes: implementing policies that tangibly benefit poor communities, utilizing patron–client networks with local elites to mobilize support among poor vote banks, and relying on the appeal of shared caste identities.

Policy platforms
Perhaps the most obvious way for parties to recruit new constituencies is by advocating and implementing policies that serve their material interests. European party analyses have repeatedly noted the central importance of political platforms that are explicitly oriented towards protecting the class interests of poorer voters in order to gain their electoral support. The historical success of social democratic parties with working-class communities in continental Europe was understood to be predicated on their pursuing policies beneficial to these populations, whether in the sphere of labor laws or in the wider provision of social services. Only with declines in the magnitude of class differences has the efficacy of this strategy been weakened.

In India, a variant of this tactic has been successfully deployed by the CPM in their stronghold states of Kerala and West Bengal. The strategies and results have differed somewhat, but in both cases poor voters typically had few doubts about who is on their side. In Kerala, early communist electoral victories centered on promises of education reform and land reform—two spheres of special importance to the socially marginalized. The polarization that resulted from this strategy pitted coalitions of redistributive forces against forces defending the status quo, led by the communists and Congress, respectively. Indeed the Congress in Kerala remained a political force with these communities only because competition with the left moved its policies to the left of other state Congress units. Alterations between these two coalitions came to characterize the party system of the state.

The communists in West Bengal may well have the longest running electoral streak in the world, certainly the longest in India: 30 years of rule. In Bengal, unlike Kerala, the party historically faced no unified opposition; in power, it has held the allegiance of the poor because of its early commitment to land reform and its organizational prowess in rural Bengal. The party’s strategy was described as one of ‘directing efforts towards the consolidation of electoral power by channeling some public resources to the lower agrarian classes.’ However the case of West Bengal also highlights that policy-based allegiances may prove precarious when the policies themselves change, as happened when the Buddhadeb Bhattacharya regime decided to encourage foreign capital investment, and to forcibly remove poor
farmers from areas demarcated for Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The subsequent protests and brutal repression by the CPM Government created a growing strain between the party and its traditional supporters, as evidenced by the nervousness of the CPM concerning local body elections in Nandigram, the epicenter of the violence around SEZs. However, this shift only serves to highlight the fact that once the policy mechanism pursued by the party for ensuring poor support was abandoned, evidence of de-alignment surfaced as expected.

What is clear in these states is that certain conditions necessary for rational party voting at the state level are lacking at the all-India level. When leftist commitment to the poor is credible, and the voters know where they stand, left parties have garnered interest-based support because of their early and long-standing commitment to alleviation of the problems of the poor, and in part due to their relative efficacy in pursuing pro-poor policies. The left’s entrenched support among poor voters in these stronghold states, coupled with their impressive performance in the 2004 elections, points to the potential efficacy of this approach. However, this mechanism seems predicated on early success: government tenure is a prerequisite for a strategy based on policy performance. Consequently, outside their stronghold states, the left has not been able to expand its following significantly enough for this particular cleavage-type to be dominant.

Patron–client networks

Another possible mechanism for parties to connect with poor voters is through the workings of patron–client networks, which studies of Eastern European and Latin American parties have repeatedly outlined. In these cases, parties expand their base by establishing patronage links with key elites, who then ensure the support of the constituencies they control. In India, the dominance of the Congress Party was once characterized as a top-down network sustained by transfers of resources. Indeed, internal divisions between the predominantly upper-caste leaders of the Congress fueled the development of vertical networks to Dalit and Adivasi constituencies; competition between rival factions prompted elite Congress politicians to form alliances with local caste leaders to ensure the support of specific vote banks as they jockeyed for power in New Delhi.

These networks functioned largely to serve the interests of the elites running them, and provided minimal substantive gains for poorer constituents. The problem with patronage-based systems is one of aggregation: there is never enough to go around, or there is serious fiscal crisis if attempts are made to ensure patronage trickles down. Instead, the loyalty of Dalit and Adivasi communities was maintained through a mixture of coercive capability of local elites and the deployment of various rhetorical frames, ranging from Nehruvian socialism’s promise of inclusion to Indira Gandhi’s populist slogans of garibi hatao (remove poverty).

There is of course a fundamental tension in these divergent Congress strategies: strong patron-client systems as mobilizational vehicles presuppose the very dependency and inequality that Nehruvian promises of democracy and leveling promise to eliminate. Garibi hatao as a slogan in fact ran contrary to the material
base of clientelism, as programs such as the abolition of debt bondage or the extension of rural credit through nationalized banks would loosen the grip of local elites and compromise their ability to deliver votes to the party. Not surprisingly the Congress under Indira Gandhi did little to actually implement its populist policies, and focused more on centralizing the vertical chains of command within the party.37

Strategies of community-based patronage and identity politics

Studies of post-communist party strategies in Eastern Europe have demonstrated that parties relying on ideological appeals to identity or on the personal popularity of particular individuals are often successful with poor voters despite the fact that their policies are little better for these communities than those of clientelist regimes.38 In India, a variant of this strategy has been evident in the efforts of parties specifically formed by Dalit politicians, most notably the BSP. The BSP has quickly risen to become the fourth largest party in India (behind the Congress, BJP, and CPM), due to electoral backing of Dalit voters, who constitute over two-thirds of its supporters.39

Identity-based politics is especially appealing to constituencies that have been historically denigrated in dominant culture. As denigration and material deprivation often go hand in hand, identity politics at the bottom of society is not easily separable from material interests, but does have a distinct electoral appeal.40 The charismatic appeal of a Laloo Prasad Yadav (Rashtriya Janata Dal) in Bihar is not entirely separable from symbolic appeal of the fact that a Yadav could be Chief Minister of a state in which Yadavs were traditionally denigrated by ‘higher’ castes. Other charismatic party leaders, such as Mayawati (the BSP Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh) and Phool Singh Baraiyya (the party leader in Madhya Pradesh until 2003) have utilized similar appeals to garner support for their party.

This support has been predicated on promises of economic and political rewards to their constituents.41 However, the retention of such support has not been the result of concrete policies catering to marginalized communities. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, lower-caste parties continued and even exacerbated inadequate expenditure on social services during their reign.42 Instead, lower caste parties have created their own patronage structures. Part of the continuing appeal of the Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar with Dalit voters stems from the fact that a Yadav in charge means patronage is likely to flow through more accessible channels for lower-class voters than patronage flowing through Bhumiar channels. Thus, identity politics of this kind mirrors patron-clientalism: it seeks to circumvent the need to enact actual pro-poor policies, but adds symbolic rewards and expectations that community membership will matter when fellow-ethnics rule, even if material payoffs are small.

However there are differences between the two forms of linkages. Under patron-clientalism, parties utilize private or (where they are successful) state resources to recruit powerful elites who deploy these resources to consolidate vote banks. Patronage works through existing social hierarchies: there are consensual ‘big men’ whose support political parties seek. Parties like the BSP instead rely on the identity they share with low-income voters, rather than on actually delivering
materially to their core constituencies. In both cases, one can imagine a penumbra effect based on ecological fallacy among voters; benefits may not be available to individuals, but to spatial or social aggregates that trickle across. Normatively, the position of identity-based parties promoting and benefiting from democratic deepening is that patronage has always been confined to circulation within dominant communities; now it is our turn. ‘Identity politics’ is thus not inconsistent with a continuation of selective appropriation of public monies, positions and discretionary authority; it is simply a matter of changing the social circuit within which privilege is shared out.

Puzzling out the electoral success of the BJP among Dalit and Adivasi voters

Having outlined the main tactics deployed by Indian parties to attract Dalit and Adivasi support, we turn to the case of the BJP. Historically understood as a Brahmin-Bania party, the BJP has had perhaps the most difficult task in forging support among these constituents. It has often oriented itself programmatically to appeal to upper-class and middle-class voters, including a relatively pro-neoliberal platform for economic liberalization. While liberalization was supported by these elite voters, opinion polls showed it was largely unpopular with poor electorates. The party faces a structural dilemma: it cannot emulate the leftist strategy by dramatically changing its policy positions to cater to poor communities, without risking alienation of its core constituencies. Other explanations for the rise of the BJP have focused on its ability to polarize the electorate along communal lines, but this strategy seems unhelpful in explaining Dalit and Adivasi support. The Sangh Parivar made consistent efforts to draw attention to what it saw as a variety of ‘aggressions’ on the part of Muslim and Christian minorities—ranging from attempted conversions of Hindus, to demands for preferential governmental treatment and participation in anti-state insurgencies. Scholars argued that the party was able to translate the anxiety generated by such allegations into support from a threatened Hindu majority through the ingenious use of symbolic tactics ranging from rath yatra [chariot marches] to mosque demolitions and pogroms directed against Muslims.

These analyses have focused on variables such as the proportion of Muslims residing in the state, or a history of Hindu–Muslim conflict as essential conditions for the success of the Hindu nationalist movement. However, such tactics are unlikely to appeal to Dalit and Adivasi populations who view Hindu nationalist discourses as defending hierarchies that have historically marginalized them. Indeed, these communities often had a greater socio-political affinity with Muslim populations; for example, in Gujarat, the two communities shared a common placement at the bottom of the class ladder, similar non-vegetarian eating habits, adjoining neighborhoods, and common occupations in manufacturing centers. The ideological appeal of ‘threats’ to Hinduism cannot explain Dalit and Adivasi support for the BJP.

Thus neither the BJP’s programmatic orientation, nor its ideological appeals, seemed to resonate with Dalit and Adivasi electorates, leading scholars to conclude that the party had reached a saturation point in terms of its vote share nationally. Paul Brass notes:
Many backward castes, like other caste Hindus, have no doubt been moved by the new political cult of Ram, but there has been no consolidation of these castes in a self-conscious and prideful Hindu identity which is integral to the upper caste Hindu identification with this cult. Even less has there been a Hindu consolidation among the lower castes... The BJP cannot integrate upper castes and backward castes into a consolidated Hindu party. It cannot... become the regional party of north Indian Hindu nationalism, let alone a ruling all-India party of the Hindus.49

Brass was correct in noting that the political cult of Ram largely did not catch on among Dalits and Adivasis. However, the prediction that the BJP would as a result be unable to make inroads among Dalits and Adivasis has not proved uniformly true; indeed, in some states the BJP has actually emerged as the leading party with each electorate. Looking at election results since the 1990s, we see that the BJP overtook the Congress as the largest single seat-holder in both SC and ST-reserved constituencies (see Figures 3 and 4). Note that even in the 2004 election, which was understood as a mandate by the poor against the NDA, the BJP retained its lead over the Congress in both types of constituencies.

Yet BJP support is clearly uneven across India. Looking at Figures 1 and 2 again we see the range of success the party has had with both Dalit and Adivasi voters, from less than 3% of the Dalit vote in Tamil Nadu to over 48% of the Adivasi vote in Jharkhand. Clearly, certain states offer better opportunities for the BJP’s recruitment; the critical question then concerns the conditions under which the party is most likely to succeed. To gain analytical traction on this question, we need first to analyze the BJP’s strategy for courting Dalit and Adivasis.

Tactics of provision

It thus seems evident that the BJP’s success with Dalits and Adivasis cannot be predicated simply on an extension of the ‘cult of Ram’ tactics it deployed so successfully with upper castes.50 The BJP has employed a different array of strategies in order to expand its support base; these include recruiting an increasing percentage of Dalit and Adivasi leaders into its fold, and often supporting (rhetorically at least) the demands of regionalist movements, as in Jharkhand.51 But the most important recruitment tactic has been the grassroots efforts of its organizational affiliates—most notably under the auspices of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).52 The RSS established specific wings devoted to social programming aimed at Dalit and Adivasi voters, including a network of Vidya Bharati schools, and medical services operating through both Sewa Bharati and chapters of the Vanvysi Kalyan Parishad in tribal strongholds. These service-providing affiliates have provided the BJP with a massive organizational base from which to launch its recruitment of lower-caste voters.

A recent report documents the proliferation of the Sangh’s centers in thousands of slums, villages and tribal localities, operating under the slogan of ‘catch them young’.53 A recent survey of Sewa Bharati schools by the National Council for Education Research and Training, the major public educational body in India,
estimated the number of schools run by the organization at about 6000 in the late 1980s. By 1998 this number had gone up to 13,000 and in 2003 had reached 19,741. The aggregate enrolment of these schools has now crossed 2.4 million students, and the organization employs over 80,000 teachers.\textsuperscript{54} In addition to education targeting
the young, health services ranging from mobile dispensaries providing cholera medication to blood banks in remote areas have been provided.55

These organizations have also re-intensified their efforts to deliver services in the wake of natural disasters, an old Sangh strategy where state response had been inefficient, corrupt and inadequate. Recent examples include the aftermath of a major earthquake in Gujarat, cyclones in Orissa, and the tsunami in southern India. Such disasters exacerbated already intolerable conditions of destitution and starvation, making particularly fertile ground for Sangh activities. Their efforts have been extensive.56 For example, estimates of the activities following the Gujarat earthquake included the setting up of 53 mobile dispensaries, the feeding of over 50,000 people, and the rescue of more than 1000 survivors.57 Providing health, food, and schooling proves an effective strategy with groups that might otherwise not be disposed to joining nationalist organizations.58

Sewa Bharati insists on framing itself as an apolitical ‘social welfare’ organization, and this conceivably explains its ability to establish bonds with communities historically alienated from the Hindu nationalist movement. The group describes how its initial interactions with poor communities revolve around the provision of services:

The karyakartas [activists] saw that patients from far-away places come to the district hospitals. They often have no contacts … and none they can turn to for suggestion or help in time of need. Sewa Bharati came forward to fill this need and deputed karyakartas to keep the patients company, identify the patients’ special needs and offer help to the extent possible.59

Once the bond is established through service, however, the Sewa International organization is quite clear that its ultimate goal is to promote a pan-Hindu identity. The organization’s description of its activities with tribal populations in Orissa nicely highlights the shift in emphasis from welfare:

To win the hearts of people through service, we started activities in the chronically famine-stricken region of Kalahandi in Orissa. Grains were given to people in the absence of work; children were fed free; Samskar Kendras [schooling centers] and mobile dispensaries were started in many villages; medicines were distributed free to the needy.

to Hindutva:

The karyakartas [activists] have thus found a place in the hearts of the people. Because of isolation, some distortions had set in, in the lives of the Vanvasis [tribals]. These are now gradually disappearing. Hardly any one now eats beef. Four full-time karyakartas have now emerged from among the past students of our hostel, to carry on the work of social transformation … People of all castes throng to temple now … Religious fervor pervades the whole village [Orissa in 2005].

The shift in discourse from welfare to religion is done through a variety of mechanisms. Sometimes the giving of aid itself catalyzes the politicization
process. For example, at a recent training camp for poor new student recruits, Vidya Bharati began connecting the scholarships pupils were receiving to attend the school with ‘Vedic concepts of justice and equality’. With the disaster relief aid, Sangh workers help instill communal divisions through their selective disbursement of relief exclusively to Hindu victims and not their Muslim or Christian neighbors.

This strategy has proved beneficial for the Hindu nationalist movement in multiple ways. First, it provides a mechanism for expansion that minimizes the chances for defection from the BJP’s upper-caste base. By relying on the RSS and other affiliates to recruit Dalit and Adivasi communities, the BJP itself is free to continue the policy platform it has historically favored, which benefits its elite supporters. In short, tactics of provision greatly facilitate the efforts of the BJP to replace the Congress as the ‘catch-all’ party, rather than remain as merely a middle-class and upper-caste organization.

At the same time, this strategy has helped temper certain tensions within the Sangh, between the BJP and RSS. Commentators have increasingly conceptualized their relationship in terms of the conflicting interests of a more pragmatic BJP stressing the need for a more ‘moderate’ stance to win votes, with a more rigid RSS resistant to dilute its ideological stance and activities. However, as we have outlined, the provision of social services has provided a strategy by which a trade-off between votes and ideology, or even ‘votes and violence’ is not necessary. Sewa Bharati’s services have served, if anything, to radicalize poorer electorates into not simply voting for the BJP, but serving as foot soldiers in the Sangh’s communal activities. Evidence of this growing mobilization has been noted by several scholars of Indian politics who have openly admitted they ‘are now so surprised’ at the ‘baffling and unprecedented’ participation by Dalits and Adivasis in violent activities directed against Muslim and Christian communities.

**Social provisioning and support for the BJP**

As sketched above, an important special characteristic of the BJP as a political formation is its straddling of elements of social movement and electoral party. In this sense, the BJP resembles the early Indian National Congress, in which the social-movement aims of the Gandhians were in tension with, but ultimately supportive of, the electoral and broader political aims of Congress politicians: independence and office. The BJP is the electoral element of the Sangh Parivar, but it is critical that there is a family of associations, not simply a stand-alone electoral organization.

In theory, the BJP’s ‘welfarist’ strategy to expand its base downwards in the social hierarchy has two great merits: it does not alienate the party’s core constituents, and it maintains harmony of complementarity between the party and other arms of the movement. In practice, this strategy has been successful only in certain states. Under what conditions does the BJP succeed in winning over Dalit and Adivasi voters? Congress de-alignment was one period of shifting political opportunity structures in Indian politics, opening opportunities for other parties to
compete for lower-order electorates. Another dimension of political opportunity is constituted by the extent of prior social provisioning through state-level policy. The great variance in provision of social services cross-sectionally has had an important influence on the BJP’s differential success with Dalit and Adivasi constituencies.\textsuperscript{66}

We have previously suggested that one prominent condition for the direct translation of social position to electoral support was the existence of a party with credible commitments to serving material interests of constituents. For poor voters, these interests begin with education and economic opportunity.\textsuperscript{67} State governments vary greatly in which policies they prioritize and how well they implement them; these variations are of great consequence for the welfare of populations incapable of provisioning social services from the market. Despite the obvious importance of governmental policy and administrative performance, social policies have been relatively neglected in the literature on determinants of voting behavior.\textsuperscript{68}

Yet the interest engagement model of party success suggests that social policy performance would especially affect electoral patterns within Dalit and Adivasi communities, since these services are most important to low-income populations (of which Dalits and Adivasis are a disproportionate percentage). It would follow deductively that those parties that have done the best job of providing social services when in government are likely to be popular with the electorates most likely to benefit from such services. Alternatively, those incumbent regimes that have consistently underprovided minimum basic social goods such as healthcare and primary education would leave poor populations dissatisfied and open to appeals to switch allegiances to alternative electoral parties.\textsuperscript{69}

Specifically, we would expect the BJP’s strategy of social provision to be particularly effective in cases in which the social policies of incumbent state-level regimes have been incomplete or ineffectual. Hindu nationalist groups tied to the BJP have been extremely proficient in filling the void left by ineffective state governments.\textsuperscript{70} If this hypothesis is robust, one implication is that our distinction between political parties and social movements may need rethinking. The Sangh Parivar as a movement has developed specific organizations to perform a variety of functions—consciousness-raising, education, women’s support, and so on—only one of which is electoral canvassing and governing. One clear implication is that when there is a consonance between the goals of the movement and the party, the party should do better than those lacking the social movement penumbra. The trade-off is that a party embedded in a differentiated social movement is constrained by the ideological strictures of the broader family, thus limited in electoral tactics to a greater extent than is the case for purely electoral parties. Certainly communist parties have struggled with their more radical mass bases when pleading for electoral constraints on militancy.\textsuperscript{71}

If poorer voters are sufficiently concerned with basic services that party ideology drops in salience, state-level failures in provisioning social services should predict BJP success. The Sangh’s tactics take on heightened meaning in Indian state politics precisely because the positions of most parties on matters concerning division of public goods or policy positions are not well known.
As parties constantly shift their platforms within and between states, poor voters are hard-pressed to find reliable signals on which to base their electoral decisions. This ignorance is particularly salient in places where state governments have been consistently negligent, and therefore the Sangh Parivar’s services are often the most dependable cues Dalit and Adivasi voters have from any political front that the party will look out for their material well-being.

Success of the Sangh has been particularly dramatic among Adivasis in the east and northeast region of the country, an area that has historically been neglected by...
the central government and as a result has extremely poor infrastructure even by Indian standards. Wherever we find similar conditions, similar dynamics are likely to be potentially important electorally, although the extent will vary with particular electoral alignments and coalitions. For example, in the state of Rajasthan alone, the Vanvasi Kalyan Parishad is present in at least 3000 of the 5096 tribal villages in the state; it runs an assortment of hostels, schools and health centers. In Uttarakhand, the party’s leadership explicitly noted the importance of ‘coordinating with the Sangh’ in establishing a rural base in the state as central to the party’s electoral success in recent elections. By contrast, in states with better basic-human needs performance, such as Kerala, voters can make more nuanced decisions. High levels of social development in these states lessen the efficacy of Sangh service work, thereby bringing into focus the BJP’s ideological platform, its major liability in attracting lower-status voters.

Conclusion

This paper has presented three connected arguments regarding the voting behavior of Dalit and Adivasi populations. The first point was that attempts to refer to either community as a cohesive electorate at the national level is a fallacy belied by significant variations in their electoral behavior across different states. We moved on to argue that this fracturing of the Dalit and Adivasi vote is caused in large part by the effect of disparate conditions across Indian states influencing which specific party tactics will prove successful. After outlining the array of strategies used by parties, ranging from the CPM to the BJP, we focused on the particular puzzle of variation in support for the latter party from Dalit and Adivasi voters across India. We find the BJP’s case particularly interesting given its history as an upper-caste party, making Dalit and Adivasi recruitment an especially anomalous outcome. We argued that the BJP has used the grassroots activities of Sewa Bharati and other organizational affiliates within the Parivar to recruit voters through the provision of health and educational services. We hypothesized that this strategy was more likely to succeed in states where such provisioning has been most neglected.

Some basic empirical evidence supports the arguments presented here; the numbers support conventional wisdom about state-level politics in India. Tables 1 and 2 cross-tabulate the Human Development Index (HDI) measured by the United Nations Development Programme for several states in India with the BJP’s vote share among Dalit and Adivasi communities. These tables show that Dalit populations in 10 out of 15 major Indian states for which we were able to obtain survey data fall into the category expected by the theory: the categories of ‘high HDI (low BJP vote share’, ‘medium HDI—medium BJP vote share’, and ‘low HDI—high BJP vote share’, respectively. Similarly, seven out of the 11 Adivasi cases fall into predicted configurations of human development and BJP electoral success. The theory proves particularly robust at each end of the sample spectrum: the BJP receives high levels of support from both populations in seven out of the 10 cases of low HDI, whereas it receives a low vote share in all of the high HDI cases. Given the
vagaries of coalitions and random emergence of political issues specific to various states, there cannot be any deterministic relationship between social development and BJP vote share. Nevertheless, there is enough in the state-level data to suggest support for the basic thesis.

This tabular classification suggests a method for further case-study tests of the propositions presented in this paper. Looking at states that stand out in the data as ends of the spectrum could help flesh out the contextual workings behind the theory posited here. For example, in Kerala, long noted for its achievement on basic social development indicators, there would seem to be less opportunity for a new party to contest on grounds of social provisioning. Not only is the political space thoroughly inhabited by effective coalitions of the left and center, but social services work reasonably well—as evidenced by historically remarkable human development outcomes and poverty reduction. In this state the BJP has made few inroads; its vote share in Dalit and Adivasi communities is quite low. At the other extreme stand states like Jharkhand or Madhya Pradesh, which have been marked failures in terms of providing basic services in health and education; there the BJP does well in obtaining Dalit/Adivasi votes. We suggest these variations in state efficacy have constructed radically different opportunities for the BJP to recruit Dalit and Adivasi voters, and we have illustrated their means of doing so.

Although many of the observations we have made concern both Dalit and Adivasi communities, there is no sense in which we seek to homogenize or essentialize the two populations. Indeed, we would argue for greater contextual disaggregation of each community to see how these variables are interpreted and given meaning in politics. There are important differences between the political options available to each community, not to mention strata within each community. Most obviously, Dalits are a much larger demographic presence in most states; as parties have increasingly competed to win over their votes, Dalit voters seem to have understood the importance of their collective strength in electoral bargaining. In the states where they are larger in number, their votes have acquired increasing significance in deciding electoral outcomes. Only in the left-ruled states of Kerala and West Bengal (the small sample size of Tripura did not permit statistically valid analysis) has a party remained well entrenched among the Dalits. Moreover, in states where they have a large presence, Dalits have organized and supported their own political option. The experience of the BSP in Uttar Pradesh suggests that in these states no party can take their vote for granted. By contrast, given their smaller and often geographically isolated populations, Adivasis are much more constrained in their ability to form their effective, autonomous political. As a result, their political options are limited; these communities must inevitably choose from existing alternatives, weakening their electoral leverage. Even among poor choices, their choices are especially poor.

Even for Dalit communities with an increasing range of choices, the BJP’s strategy of social provisioning in the weakest sectors of Indian society—a strategy mostly abandoned by the Congress long ago, and much diluted by the communists in power—has proved relatively successful. This strategy is hardly unique to the BJP; it resonates with the experience of other politicized religious movements.
such as Hamas in Palestine and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Where incumbent parties have been more attentive to the needs of disadvantaged constituencies, there is less political space for the strategy to succeed. The success of the BJP strategy in some states runs counter to one major phenomenon noted in Western European and Latin American party systems: the replacement of ‘mass parties’ fulfilling a variety of social functions by ‘electoral professional parties’ narrowly focused on the techniques and technologies of campaigning at election time.

This phenomenon is not without Indic roots and parallels; in 1938, Nehru wrote to Gandhi a prescient observation on the Congress ministries in power:

They are trying to adapt themselves far too much to the old order and trying to justify it . . . What is far worse is that we are losing the high position that we have built up, with so much labor, in the hearts of the people. We are sinking to the level of ordinary politicians.

Social movement characteristics were losing out to electoral imperatives, sacrificing the social-transformational nature of the Congress. For the Congress, Nehru was prophetic; it was precisely failure on the transformational front that fed de-alignment and the structural opening for alternative appeals to the lower orders in Indic society. For the BJP, only time will tell. For recent elections, however, the BJP’s reliance on its grassroots affiliates to provide both social services and organizational energy in communities lacking self-organization demonstrates the importance of organizational networks around parties in explaining narrow electoral success. However, as the BJP builds records as the incumbent at both the national and state levels, the pressure to perform through policies and not simply via outsourcing to its organizational affiliates may still prove to make its provisioning strategy a short-term success. It remains to be seen whether this strategy will continue to prove successful, even if in limited pockets, or indeed even viable as both the BJP and the Sangh Parivar face competition in the constantly shifting terrain of poor choices.

Notes and references
6. We employ the terms ‘Dalit’ and ‘Adivasi’ because these are the monikers with which these communities have largely self-identified in India, eschewing the more administrative labels of ‘Scheduled Caste’ and ‘Scheduled Tribe’. These latter labels referred to these populations being identified not by themselves, but by...
government lists or ‘schedules’ of caste communities. However, we still use SC and ST terminology when discussing concepts associated with formal governance, such as the demarcation of reserved constituencies.

7. The text does not imply that ST/SC formal status corresponds to economic disadvantage; there is significant elongation and class differentiation among both categories. Nevertheless, the poverty continues to be disproportionately among ST/SC populations, as we outline later in this paper.


20. Indeed, recent work on post-Communist Eastern Europe has noticed that increasing levels of inequality and rising class differences have facilitated the emergence of class-based voting even in these new democracies; see G. Evans and S. Whitefield, ‘The emergence of class politics and class voting in post-Communist Russia’, in G. Evans (ed.), The End of Class Politics? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp 254–280.

21. The assumption in this line of argument is that parties have credibility, are meaningfully distinguishable on major policies affecting interests of voters, and that voters know of these differences and believe the parties will act as their agents once in power. All of these conditions are undermined by the common perception of politicians in mass publics one hears in India: ‘sab chor heh’ (‘they are all thieves’).


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35. R. Ray and M. Katzenstein (eds), Social Movements in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).
38. Kitschelt et al., op cit, Ref 32.
41. Chandra, op cit, Ref 24.
42. Weiner, op. cit, Ref 34.
43. Poor voters seem to understand this reality. One farmer laborer who supported the communists told Herring that the party did not do too much for her when in power, but in any event ‘the most the government can help is Rs. 1000 (about $20 US)’; see R. Herring, ‘Contesting the “great transformation”: local struggles with the market in south India’, in J. Scott & N. Bhatt (eds) Agrarian Studies: Synthetic Work at the Cutting Edge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
45. 47.5% of voters earning Rs. 20,000 a month or more reported their financial situation as improving, whereas only 18.5% of those earning Rs. 1000 or less said the same. Source: National Election Study, 2004, Question 31.
49. Brass, op cit, Ref 47, p 258.
52. The number of schools run by such organizations has multiplied 500% in the past 20 years, and their influence with low-income voters has grown commensurably. For details, see <www.vidyabharati.org>, accessed 5 November 2007.


58. Indeed, many Dalits and Dalit movements have been in tension not simply with notions of caste hierarchy within Hindu nationalism, but have even had a fractious relationship with Indian nationalism more generally. Evidence of the disagreements between Gandhi and Dr B.R. Ambedkar (one of the first leaders of early Dalit movements) are evident in Ambedkar’s own writings. See B.R. Ambedkar, *What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables* (Bombay: Thancher, 1946). For an example of recent Dalit scholarship’s critique of Hinduism more generally, see K. Illiah, *Why I am Not a Hindu* (Calcutta: Samya, 1996).


60. *The Hindu*, *op cit*, Ref 55.

61. A recent survey found that even though Congress governments initiated neoliberal reforms, the BJP’s politicians were more vociferous supporters of pro-market policies; see Chibber, *op cit*, Ref 44.


64. Ahmad, *op cit*, Ref 50.

65. Kumar, *op cit*, Ref 50.


67. See Dreze and Gazdar on Uttar Pradesh for an argument that, at comparable levels of poverty, some states reproduce ‘inertia’ that leaves bottom sections of the population untouched, even as equally poor states serve to redistribute opportunity to the bottom of society (e.g. Kerala); J. Dreze, J. and H. Gazdar, ‘Uttar Pradesh: the burden of inertia’, in J. Dreze and A. Sen (eds), *Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp 33–128.

68. For an exception, see Krishna, *op cit*, Ref 22.

69. The literature on the variation in social policy performance across India is well developed, but has not specifically linked this performance to party politics; see J. Dreze and A. Sen, *India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

70. Since educational and health policies are largely the purview of individual state governments, using this subnational level for the unit of analysis seems most appropriate.

71. Heller’s take on Kerala is that class compromise was difficult for the CPM, but necessary to provide the basic conditions for economic growth by reining in union demands; see Heller, *op cit*, Ref 26. Also see R. Mallick, *Development Policy of a Communist Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).


73. Quote from Ravi Shankar Prasad, the party’s election-in-charge of Uttarakhand; see ‘Uttarakhand assembly 2007 results’, *Indian Express*, 4 March 2007.

74. Dreze and Sen, *op cit*, Ref 69.


77. R. Herring, *op cit*, Ref 18, p 405.