Foreign *clientelae* in the Roman Empire

A Reconsideration

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BEYOND ‘FOREIGN CLIENTELES’ AND ‘FOREIGN CLANS’
SOME REMARKS ON THE INTERMARRIAGE BETWEEN ROMAN AND ITALIAN ELITES

Hans Beck

This contribution explores how intermarriage between the ruling elites at Rome and other communities in Italy exerted a significant impact on their mutual relations. It argues that inter-aristocratic family connections, in the specific cultural setting of early- and mid-Republican Rome, were semantically associated with a foedus. The resulting loyalties governed the affairs between Rome and the Italians just as much as treaties and alliances, especially during times of nonviolent exchange. The complementary nature of both concepts – political alliance and family allegiance – was reinforced by the ties established by women in particular, who, far from being passive tokens, were active agents in a mutual exchange between Rome and the Italians. With a very limited body of sources at hand, the following reflections draw strongly on the advancement of scholarly concepts that are at the heart of the debate.¹

BADIAN, MÜNZER, AND THEIR CRITICS

As indicated in the title, two prominent scholarly views stand out in particular. The first of the two, that of so-called “foreign clienteles”, relates to the works of Ernst Badian (1925–2011), especially to his monograph of the same title, published by Clarendon Press in 1958 (Foreign Clientelae, 264–70 B. C.). The conceptual roadmap behind the idea of foreign clienteles is charted in various contributions to this volume. In brief, Badian argued that the Roman institution of clientela, with its in-built sentiments of reciprocity (officium-beneficium) and a corresponding sense of interstate hierarchy, was at the core of Rome’s relations with other states in Italy and beyond. As Roman power grew, the ties of clientela merged with ideas of hospitium and amicitia which, too, had both a private and public dimension; unlike the

¹ The conference was made possible through financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad and the German Fritz Thyssen Foundation. I am grateful to the organizers Francisco Pina Polo and Martin Jehne for their generous invitation to participate in the event. A related version of this paper was delivered at a colloquium in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of Friedrich Münzer’s death in the Nazi camp of Theresienstadt in 1942. The Friedrich Münzer colloquium was held at Münster University in October 2012, on the initiative and under the aegis of Matthias Haake and Ann-Cathrin Harders, to whom I would like to extend my warmest thanks. At McGill, Mike Fronda, Bill Gladhill, and Alex McAuley have once again been invaluable resources of knowledge and insight.
officium-beneficium pairing, however, hospitium and amicitia implied a relation between partners that were equal rather than asymmetrically or hierarchically unequal. The gradual amalgamation of the two sets fostered a sense of reciprocity that allowed both sides to engage in political relations that were conceived as being governed by the mutual obligations between equals, even though they were de facto relations between unequal partners. With an ever increasing volume of clienteles in Italy and the provinces, the senate’s exercise of power abroad was supported by perceptions of moral obligation; effectively, the system of foreign clienteles became a powerful engine that drove the vehicle of Roman imperialism.

Badian’s views have become extremely influential. The enduring contribution of his book manifested itself in the successful replacement of more traditional, legalistic readings of Rome’s external relations. In this sense, Foreign Clientelae marked the ultimate departure from the concept of Staatsrecht and its application in the foreign arena. In lieu of formal, legalistic ties between Rome and its client states, Badian highlighted the extra-legal underpinnings of these relations – their interpersonal, moral, and genuinely political character – that superseded the realm of law. The second tier of scholarly advancement came with the congenial re-alignment of external relations and the political life in the city of Rome. By demonstrating that the foreign clienteles of individual members of the senatorial elite played an increasingly important role in domestic affairs, particularly in the second and first centuries BCE, Badian’s model succeeded in solving not only one scholarly conundrum but two: he helped to explain the dazzling degree of triumphant expansion, and he added to the understanding of the convoluted state of themes and affairs that are commonly associated with the fall of the Roman republic.

Despite occasional voices of discomfort and dissent, Badian’s findings are by and large intact; that is, until today. In his contribution to this book, Francisco Pina Polo engages in a forceful discussion with some of the most basic methodologies behind the clientelae axiom. Embarking from an in-depth account of provincial prosopographies and onomastics, Pina Polo targets the link that turns patron-client relations into a lasting power configuration. His analysis leaves no doubt that, if and when such relations were in place, there is no reason to conjecture that they were gentilician and hereditary in nature. In other words, Pina Polo, while generally conceding that some Roman aristocrats maintained personal ties with families from local or provincial elites, views those relations as volatile, coincidental, and often ephemeral. Most eminently, however, he demonstrates that they did not transform into an intergenerational network of loyalties that governed the exchange between Roman and provincial aristocrats and, by implication, the exercise of Roman power. The idea of large-scale units of clienteles that associated themselves with specific patron families over the course of generations builds on a highly suggestive, yet over-simplified interpretation of their adopted Roman names. As coherent, inter-


generational participants in an ongoing negotiation of power between the Roman center and provincial peripheries, the foreign clientelae are a phantom.4

Another systematic challenge came by means of Paul Burton’s book on Friendship and Empire, published in 2011.5 Although less concerned with an actual devitalizing of Badian’s paradigms, Burton’s attempt to shift the discussion to new discursive ground effectively alters the terrain. Challenging the somewhat under-theorized views of Realist interpretations of Roman imperialism, he charts the impact of gesture and language on the efforts of empire building. Burton argues that the discursive vocabulary that was employed in the mutual relations between Rome and its foreign partners governed their exchange as much as military muscle. In their diplomatic ties with others, Romans drew on a distinct semantics of amicitia, or friendship, which was both hardwired in Roman ideology and which corresponded with the broader language of international relations in the Mediterranean world. Effectively, Burton proposes to replace a “constraining clientela paradigm … with the more flexible amicitia model” (2011: 6).

Turning to the second paradigm referenced in the title of this chapter, that of “foreign clans” and their impact on Roman politics, the history of criticism is much longer than that of foreign clienteles; indeed, it runs through much of the second half of the twentieth century, when it was dismantled by many and with much – sometimes too much – academic passion. The notion of foreign clans was stamped by Friedrich Münzer (1868–1942) and derives from his seminal book Römische Adelsparteien, published in 1920; an English translation of the book appeared in 1999.6 In Münzer’s interpretation, the politics of the senatorial elite, and with it that of the republic in general, was governed by what he famously called the arcana imperii (a label borrowed from Tacitus): the arcane, secretive assumptions of power that, according to Münzer, allowed the families of the Roman nobility to exercise power and perpetuate their social and, ultimately, political distinction. In this view, politics at Rome was steered by the great and at times sinister factions of the senate that manipulated the consular elections by pre-selection of candidates or by shifting around large blocks of voters that would guarantee a faction’s success or failure in the elections. This view has been challenged so often that recalling of Münzer’s views again in detail, or the engaging in the scholarly debate that is directed against them, would seem like flogging a dead horse. It should not go without notice, however, that the views that were so often attributed to Münzer by subsequent scholars were not quite what he had written; on a more balanced note, Römische Adelspar-

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4 Pina Polo in this volume; cf. also Pina Polo 2008 and 2011a.
5 Although published only in 2011, the book draws strongly on a PhD thesis that was written in the course of the 1990s. Cf. Burton’s comments (2011: IX–X) on the relation between the two manuscripts and the impact of language and ideas as significant autonomous quantities on the construction of global realities, as experienced by Burton in the aftermath of the events from September 2001.
6 Münzer 1920 and 1999. See also Hölkeskamp 2012 on Münzer’s life and oeuvre, including a full appreciation (XIV–XVI) of Münzer’s very high volume of contributions to Pauly-Wissowa’s Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft in the field of Roman republican prosopography.
teien is a much more ingenious, subtle, and nuanced account than many have come to think. We will return to this issue shortly.

For Münzer, the forging of factions was at the heart of the nobility’s political and social power, and the apparatus that brought everything together were the so-called marriage alliances between the great families at Rome. Münzer detected this thrust towards familial alliance building in all eras of the history of the republic. In the early Republic, marriage alliances allowed the Roman clans to integrate aristocratic noble families from outside of Rome into their social stratum and, effectively, enhance their status distinction vis-à-vis the common people in Rome – hence the label of foreign clans. In the mid-Republic, marriage alliances (and adoptions) preserved some of the most esteemed senatorial families from extinction: the Corneli and Fabii are only the most prominent examples of this (1920: 188–281). And in the late-Republic, it was again by means of marriage alliances that the main protagonists to a great extent and for the longest time governed their charged relations. In this sense, as in so many others, Augustus appears as the last of the republicans who drew fully on a societal practice that had been time-honored for roughly four centuries before him.

Interestingly enough, this one piece in the puzzle of Münzer’s factional politics remains largely intact. Despite the overwhelming criticism the factions have earned, in particular over the course of the last few decades, Münzer’s starting observation that the members of the senatorial elite were interrelated by wedding alliances has never been questioned or challenged, let alone rejected. Not even the most vocal and most esteemed critics of Münzer’s work – Peter Brunt, Peter Wiseman, and Karl-J. Höllkeskamp, to name but three – dismiss the observation of marriage strategies that served a certain goal and held a certain meaning at different times in republican histories. In fact, in his groundbreaking work on the rise of the nobility, Karl-J. Höllkeskamp sketches the development of the Roman elite in part through the vectors of marriage arrangements that were made between some segments of the Patricio-plebeian elite and the many local aristocracies throughout Italy.

7 See the forthcoming publication of the papers delivered at the colloquium in commemoration of the anniversary of Münzer’s death, edited by Ann-Cathrin Harders and Matthias Haake (above note 1).
8 Cf. Chapter Two of the English translation: “The Naturalization of Foreign Princely Clans”.
9 Münzer touches on Augustus of course only in the final chapter and Appendix (1920: 328–375, 376–408). The topic was developed further in time in Ronald Syme’s masterly analysis. In the Preface to the first edition from 1939, Syme writes: “It will at once be evident how much the conception of Roman politics here expounded owes to the supreme example and guidance of Münzer: but for his work on Republican family-history, this book could hardly have existed.”
THE ROLE OF WOMEN AND THE SEMANTIC ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FOEDERA AND MARRIAGE ALLIANCES

Interr marriage between Roman and Italian elites is widely attested for the earlier periods of Republican history. Indeed, the evidence for this pattern is coherent. In the literary tradition, it can be traced back to the ‘big-bang’ moment of Roman history when Aeneas and Latinus first met after the arrival of the Trojans in Latium. Livy (1.1.5–11) records two traditions of the encounter: a battle in which, after the defeat of Latinus, both men concluded a peace and marriage alliance (affinitatem iunxisse tradunt: 1.1.6); and a less violent exchange in which the battle is skipped in lieu of a peaceful dialogue and diplomatic gestures that pave the way to a treaty (foedus). The agreement is sealed by a marriage alliance between Aeneas and Latinus, the daughter of Latinus, which complements their foedus (1.1.9):

“inde foedus ictum inter duces, inter exercitus salutationem factam; Aeneam apud Latinum fuisse in hospitio; ibi Latinum apud penates deos domesticum publico adiunxisse foedus filia Aeneae in matrimonium data.”

“The commanders then made a treaty, and the armies saluted each other. Aeneas became a guest in the house of Latinus; there the latter, in the presence of his household gods, added a domestic treaty to the public one, by giving his daughter in marriage to Aeneas.”

Both strands of this tradition (fama: 1.1.5) culminate in the marriage agreement between Aeneas and Latinus. Their action, protected by the gods, clearly established an exemplum that created a new social norm. Validating the alliance between equal partners and instilling their relations with reciprocal bonds of trust and loyalty, the agreement between Latinus and Aeneas amounted to a formative force. In this tradition, the strengthening of interfamilial ties through the deliberate act of intermarriage soon became an accepted societal protocol that governed the relations of the Roman aristocracy.

In modern studies on the political culture of the Republic, the connection between aristocratic families through intermarriage plays at best a subordinate role, if any. In part, this might have to do with the inherent risk that the subject raises suspicions of parties and factions; in a nutshell, it might be too closely aligned with a “Münzer script”. Be that as it may. Wedding arrangements within or between ruling elites are in any case entrenched in a variety of connotations that differ from society to society. Their political and cultural connotations vary through time and space. For instance, although the Roman nobility, Hellenistic dynasties, the Venetian aristocracy, and the nineteenth century British House of Lords all employed wedding strategies in their attempts to secure power and preserve their social status, it does not mean that this was always done with the same mindset, or filled with similar societal meaning. Economic factors further complicate the question, as issues such as legal prescriptions for, e.g., dowries or the ownership of property change over time. Also, at the family level, there are vastly different ways to define what constitutes a family, and hence as to how to conceive what the value of a marriage might

12 Cf. Hölkeskamp 2000: 228–9, with regards to the notion of fides.
be (Lévi-Strauss 1949 and 1956). Finally, family-bonds, affection, and love, all are expressed in socially encoded modes and measured against norms and traditions that differ from society to society.

In a recent study on the role of royal women in the Hellenistic world, Elizabeth Carney concluded (2011: 208) that we “should not underestimate the agency of women in marriage alliances: the presumption that they were always or usually genetic tokens needs to be questioned. We need to recognize them as dynastic go-betweens with enduring ties to the oikos of their birth. Similarly, we have underestimated the role of royal women in diplomacy via euergetism. Here we have not only underestimated female agency but we also need more focus on why rulers felt it necessary to encourage euergetism by their wives and daughters.” Although Carney’s observations cluster around a specific society with distinct institutions, protocols, and practices (the Hellenistic court, the Greek oikos, euergetism), the call for a more nuanced conceptualization of marriage alliances applies to other societies as well. In particular, it targets the inherent belief that women merely served as passive ‘objects’ in the active affairs of men. Once an alliance is concluded, the male agents are satisfied with the outcome of the negotiation and, in their future engagements they follow the trajectory from a fixed spot, as defined at the moment of the alliance. Such readings are not automatically impossible, but Carney’s assessment makes it clear that they are not universal either. As landmark in the creation and perpetuation of marriage alliances, both the role of women and the type of family that emanates from the alliance require cultural contextualization.

Ann-Cathrin Harders combines both threads, the role of women and the concept of family, in a groundbreaking study from 2008. Based on anthropological family models, Harders argues that Roman aristocratic families were not only vertically layered units that were governed by the authority of age, but were rather more complicated. In her analysis, she fleshes out the horizontal intersection between families, their adfinitas, and demonstrates how the idea of horizontal interconnectivity was a defining feature that constituted a noble family. It has often been argued that the families of the Roman nobility entertained all sorts of marriage alliances to maintain their social status and enhance their prestige. But in Harders’ account, the utilitarian aspect a marriage strategy secures in any given constellation is complemented by a more permanent force of familial relations. The resulting horizontal bond between families is established not by men, but rather by women, who

14 Harders 2008: 31–44, with a discussion of the locus classicus on adfinitas in Cic. off. 1.53–54: “Artior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum; ab illa enim immensa societate humani generis inexiguum angustumque conclusitum. Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeat libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia omnia; id autem est principium urbi set quasi seminarium rei publicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos tamquam in colonias exuunt. Sequuntur conubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinquui; quae propagatio et subolesorigo est rerum publicarum. Sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines et caritate.”
were true agents in the shaping of families. Consequently, they were far from passive objects exchanged between men; they were much more than genetic tokens or trophy women.

The nature of the evidence and the scope of her investigation forces Harders to confine her study to the family relations between brothers and sisters in the nobility, within and between the members of the senatorial class of the city. The net of the nobility’s family-bonds via intermarriage was of course cast wider than this. As noted above, in the fourth and early third centuries BCE, the traces of this practice shines through in frequent marriage arrangements between Roman aristocrats and local Italian elites. In turn, this attests to a more lively family exchange between both groups than is commonly believed. But how are those marriage alliances to be understood, and how did they impact the relations between Rome and other communities in Italy?

In the earliest attested case of this kind, to return to the marriage alliance between Latinus and Aeneas, Livy labels the arrangement a foedus (see above). Incidentally, the alliance between Caesar and Pompey from 60 BCE is equally called a foedus, on the grounds that it was cemented by the marriage of Pompey to Caesar’s daughter Iulia: “Crassi morte apud Parthos, morte Iuliae Caesaris filiae, quae nupta Pompeo generi socerique concordiam matrimonii foedere continebat, statim aemulatio erupit” (Florus 2.13.2: “When Crassus had fallen fighting against the Parthians, and Julia, who, as Caesar’s daughter and the wife of Pompeius, by this bond of marriage maintained friendly relations between father-in-law and son-in-law, had died, rivalry immediately broke out.”). In Varro (r.r. 2.4), the marriage bond between members of the nobility is also freely associated with a foedus.

The passage begins with an etymology that derives the word “pig” from “sacrifice” because the first rite of sacrificing originated from the slaughter of the pig. The enim then announces that what follows are proofs for this claim. The last two items in the list of evidence are that the striking of a foedus is performed by the immolation of a piglet; and, that the kings and noble men in Etruria sacrificed a pig at the beginning of a marriage ceremony. The logic of Varro’s narrative is somewhat associative, as he discusses the connection between ὄς and θυς, he chooses various sacrificial rituals that are all connected through the piglet. Yet, as is now pointed out by

Bill Gladhill, the connection is also temporal, since Varro seems to be suggesting that the piglet sacrifice in Greece, Rome, and Etruria stands as the primordial instance of animal sacrifice in each community. At Rome, the practice was sanctioned by the foedus between Latinus and Aeneas. In Livy’s archetypical depiction of the conclusion of a foedus (1.24.3–9), the smiting of the pig is included in the prayer that sanctions the governance of the foedus before the gods. So to be in conjunction with Livy’s explicit statement that “the same protocol is always employed” (1.24.3: “eodem modo omnia [foedera] fiunt”) more or less necessitates that the concluding ceremony between Aeneas and Latinus was conceived of as including the sacrifice of a piglet.

So based on the terminology, semantics, and broader associative frame of reference, early Roman marriage alliances with the ruling elites of Italy were conceived of as something that was comparable to a foedus. The ways in which they were forged followed the same ritual dynamic as the creation of a foedus between communities; it might be even conjectured that the perceived obligations that came with both were similar. In the case of Aeneas and Latinus, the two were complementary; in Livy’s words the two went hand in hand (1.1.9): Latinus completed the political alliance (foedus publicum) by a domestic one, and gave his daughter in marriage to Aeneas, which constituted a foedus domesticum. The strict distinction between public state action and private affairs is of course a narrative trope, but the message is clear: Romans and Latins were tied together not only by political treaties and military alliances, but also by the bonds of a marriage alliance that laid the foundations of their common history.

It is difficult to determine whether foedera with other communities in Italy followed a similar ritual semantic. The senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus from the early second century BCE might point in this direction; the foederati there are addressed as communities whose social and religious equilibrium is closely intertwined with that of Rome. The mutual obligations, agreements, or pledges made amongst the Bacchantians were in any case contrary to the spirit and sanctioned nature of the agreements that existed between Rome and the foederati. In this sense, their mutual relations were most likely initiated by a series of rites and sanctioned in ceremonies as they are evoked by Varro. On the other hand, it might be somewhat hazardous to stake so much on Varro’s piece of evidence, as so little seems to be known about the specific context that surrounded the conclusion of foedera.

16 Cf. Gladhill (forthcoming). It might be added to these connections that the myth of Ceres and Persephone, Roman foedera, and Etruscan marriage all overlapped in the semantics of matrimony.
17 Cf. G. Kantor, EAH s. v. Treaties, Roman, who offers an insightful survey over the relevant readings and interpretations of foedera; cf. also Gladhill (forthcoming).
Beyond ‘Foreign Clientele’ and ‘Foreign Clans’

THE EVIDENCE FROM CAMPANIA

Some glimpses shine through from the literary tradition, however. The Campanian nobility, for instance, was notorious for its manifold connections with the Roman elite. In 340 BCE, Livy attests that Romans and Campanians were already connected “by private ties of hospitality and kinship” for some time (8.3.3: “quosdam privatis hospitii necessitudinibusque coniunctos”). The greater part of Campania was first conquered in 335 under the consul M. Atilius Regulus Calenus, who led a campaign against Cales, one of the main urban centers of the region. Yet the affairs between Rome and Cales were more entangled than the superficial narrative of campaign and conquest suggests. The Roman Atilii themselves stemmed from the ruling elites of Campania. Their roots can be traced to Cales, Calatia, and Capua itself; the names Numerius and Kaeso Atilius are epigraphically attested on local pottery, and bits and pieces in the literary tradition and onomastic evidence betray that they held an elevated position in the region in the fourth century BCE.

There are, of course, many inconsistencies and indeed red flags in Livy’s account that make it difficult to take the details of his narrative of Rome’s conquest of the region at face value. But two structural observations can be made: the Roman Atilii were from the region, and they played a crucial role in the process that led to an association with Rome.

It is tempting to conjecture that the Atilii were among those Campanian noble families who, according to Livy, were related to the Roman elite “by private ties of hospitality and kinship” (8.3.3). Valerius Maximus explains (8.1.9, for the year 306) that a certain A. Atilius Caiatinus was married to Fabia, the daughter of Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus (cos. I 322, V 295). The term that Valerius Maximus uses here to label the family relation between both parties is adfinitas. Interestingly enough, the Atilius who was married to Rullianus’ daughter appears to have been a ‘local guy’, i.e., he had not held any offices at Rome: either Rullianus married off one of his daughters to a local aristocrat, or, more likely Atilius was among the ruling Campanian equestrians who had received citizenship around 340 BCE, in return for the concession of lands north of the Volturnus river to Rome. The marriage between him and Fabia was but one arrangement that related to a much broader context; effectively, it might have been instrumental to streamlining the relations be-

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21 Cf. Hölkeskamp 1987 (2011): 180, n. 84. Frederiksen 1984: 231 is skeptical about the Capuan origins but later on (308) views it as part of the family’s political motivations.
22 Val.Max. 8.1.9: “A. Atilium Calatinum Soranorum oppidi proditione reum admodum infamem imminentis damnationis periculo paucu uerba Q. Maximis socier subtraxerunt, quibus adfirmauit, si in eo crime sometem illumipse conperisset, dirempturum se fuisse adfinitatem:continuo enim populus paene iam exploratam sententiam suam unius iudicio concessit, indignum ratus eius testimonio non credere, cui difficillimis reipublicae temporibus bene se exercitus credidisse meninerat.” On Fabia, RE s. v. Fabius 170 (Münzer).
23 Cf. Liv. 8.11.16.
tween Rome and Campania and pave the way towards a foedus.24 At a critical juncture in their mutual relations, the ruling elites of both sides apparently resorted to the practice of a private marriage arrangement that complemented, and cemented, the relations between their communities. Keeping in mind that the more rigid distinction between public and private actions of ruling elites is largely anachronistic in the late fourth century BCE, the cross-stimulation between both avenues of interaction, the conclusion of a foedus and the establishment of inter-aristocratic family ties, is even more obvious. There is at any rate enough evidence here to challenge the traditional narrative of interstate relations and sketch out a picture that is more complex. What is usually viewed as a dichotomous affair between “the Romans” and “the Campanians” was an affair with mutually entangled protagonists on both sides of the fence: the link that cut across the division lines was established by various means, most eminently the practice of a marriage alliance that established an adfinitas between the ruling elites in Rome and Campania.

The first scholar to comment on the marriage alliance between the gens Fabia and the Campanian Atilii was no other than Münzer. In his high volume of entries on the Fabii in the corresponding volume of the RE, published in 1909, the connection is already disclosed.25 Over a decade later, in Römische Adelsparteien, the marriage between Rullianus’ daughter and A. Atilius is presented as a founding moment in the great family alliance between the Fabii and the plebeian Atilii, who were considered clients of their great patrician patrons. In the Adelsparteien, this of course sets the stage for Münzer’s masterly and highly suggestive reconstruction of the Fabian party: complementing the pool of potential candidates for the consulate from their own family, which was in any case limited, the family alliance with the Atilii allowed the Fabii to wield substantial influence over the elections for higher magistrates from the Samnite War to the First Punic War.26

Before the marriage alliance between Roman and Campanian elites is further contextualized, it is worthwhile to pause and see how Badian conceived of this. Badian was intimately familiar with Münzer’s work, both through personal study of the Adelsparteien and from conversations with, and works by, his teacher, Ronald Syme, who was deeply inspired by Münzer’s work.27 The Adelsparteien are cited on several occasions in Foreign Clientelae; indeed, Münzer is mentioned in the Preface, along with Matthias Gelzer, as a “pre-eminent scholar” (1958: vii). But, on the whole, Badian is tellingly cold about the arcana imperii as they were disclosed

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24 According to Livy (7.30–31), the Campanian request for a foedus was denied by the senate in 345–343 BCE, because the senate felt that this would be in conflict with its existing foedus with the Samnites. The Campanians then surrendered themselves to the Romans in fidem (7.31.4). See Burton 2011: 122–127, and the discussion of Frederiksen 1984: 180–198.
25 RE s. v. Fabius (114) column 1805.
26 Münzer 1920: 56–60; see also 63–78 passim on the ties between the Fabii and the plebeian Otacilii who were of Samnite origins (Hölkeskamp 2011: 180). The Otacilii reached the consulate in 263 and 261 (Beck 2005: 125, 222). According to Münzer, they owed their nobility to the family connection with the Fabii (as indicated by the author on first names, de praenom. 6 and Festus 174 L.). Fabia (RE s. v. Fabius 171), sister of Fabius Maximus ‘Cunctator’, had a daughter that was married to T. Otacilius Crassus (pr. 215).
27 See above, note 10.
by Münzer. *Foreign Clientelae* is faithful to the method of prosopography, yet Badian’s clientelae work differently than Münzer’s clans. The case of A. Attilius Caiati
nus and his marriage with Fabius Rullianus’ daughter Fabia is arguably too early for Badian; hardly anywhere in the book does he elaborate on fourth century BCE af-
fairs. The relations between Rome and non-Latin communities are however ana-
lyzed in the opening chapter, and the conflict between Rome and Campania is di-
rectly addressed. Badian views the relations with the Campanian cities as being
similar to those with Caere. The Caerites, he argues, were led into a subordinate
status of a *civitas sine suffragio*, i.e., their city remained in existence and their in-
habitants were made Roman citizens, with the exception of two main privileges that
were associated with that status: voting and holding office. Their status was “as-
similated to that of resident aliens waiting for enfranchisement” (1958: 18). In re-
turn for their inferiority, the Caerites were “probably granted a certain degree of
local autonomy” (ibid.). So in his examination of Roman relations with non-Latin
communities, Badian decidedly positions himself as a ‘state-historian’: the way in
which he conceptualizes the relations between Rome and Italy is to project a legal-
istic scenario in which the Italians are either *cives Romani*, members of a *civitas
sine suffragio* (such as the Caerites or Campanians), or *socii*. When explaining how
those categories came into being, and what facilitated their implementation, Badian
points to a mixture of power politics and constitutional politics: the state-institution
of *hospitium* (1958: 11–12), *foedera aequa* and *iniqua* (16–20 and *passim*), and of
course early forms of clientele relations.

To be sure, all of these institutions played a vital role in Rome’s overall design
of its relations with communities in Italy and beyond. In light of a notorious lack of
a grand architecture to govern those relations, the various mechanisms discussed by
Badian were the true instruments of Roman foreign policy. As mentioned above,
Burton has now reignited the discussion of each one of these, pointing to the lan-
guage of *amicitia* as an all-embracing empire-building device. All the while,
Münzer has miraculously disappeared from Burton’s bibliography. The Romans
had forged all sorts of power relations with their Italian neighbors which were
clothed in the language of *amicitia* and which governed the political or state-inter-
action between them, if such a concept of interstate affairs in Italy from the fourth
to the late third century is indeed applicable. However, there was a more vibrant
human factor to those official relations than is commonly believed, they were more
entangled. This was mostly due to inter-aristocratic family ties that united many of
the Italian and Roman elites. From the Roman point of view, these family relations
were situated in the very mental space that was occupied by *foedera*; i.e., marriage
alliances were in close proximity to the political sphere, and they steered both the
expectations and actions of their participants just as much as state treaties did. In the
period prior to the Hannibalic War, when the power gradient in Italy was less steep

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skeptical on the grounds of more minute interpretations but does not engage in a discussion
with Burton’s constructivist views.
than in later periods, elite relations through marriage ties were in all likelihood more impactful than the sources indicate.

The advanced understanding of the role of women in inter-aristocratic affairs complements this picture. As noted earlier, with Harders’ analysis it becomes obvious that the horizontal relation of *adfinitas* came into being, and was perpetuated, through aristocratic women who integrated elite groups that were previously unrelated into a new family branch. This does not imply that the nobility married off its daughters to Italian elites en masse, or on a regular basis. The marriage strategies of an aristocratic elite differ, in general, from that of a monarchy in the sense that republican elites were pressed even harder to maintain their social status in a climate of open competition. As far as the perception of states from the outside is concerned, there is a marked difference in the marriage alliance between, for instance, a Bactrian client-kingdom and the Seleucid royal family on the one hand and the marriage alliance between an aristocratic family from Praeneste and a noble Roman family. By default, the intermarriage between aristocracies from different local backgrounds manifests itself in a multitude of connections that spread through all segments of the ruling elite; in turn, these multiple ties garner a broad and ramified network of family loyalties that draw through all circles of the elite.

In the Hannibalic War, the fraudulent affairs of the tax farmer M. Postumius Pyrgensis caused some commotion in the city of Rome, as his agitations triggered a minor insurrection. What made the case even more complicated was that Postumius was related with the aristocratic family of the Servilii. According to Livy, he was the “propinquus cognatusque” (“the blood-relative” 25.3.15) of the tribune C. Servilius Casca, who tried to hold his hand over his family for as long as he could. Postumius was evidently the son of a marriage between a Roman aristocrat and a woman from a prestigious family in Pyrgi (or vice versa), who exploited his local ties at Pyrgi to maximize the profits from his tax commission. The name of another, equally querulous tax farmer, T. Pompeius Veientanus, speaks most likely to a similar family background.

More conclusive evidence for the prevalence of private ties once again derives from Campania. A major section in Livy’s account on affairs in Southern Italy after the battle of Cannae is dedicated to Capua and the events that led up to its revolt from Rome. Livy introduces a certain Pacuvius Calavius who was the highest executive magistrate of Capua at the time, the *meddix tuticus*, most likely in 217. When Hannibal appeared before the city gates after Cannae, Pacuvius suspected that the “common people” (the *plebs*) were inclined to kill the senators of Capua and hand their city over to the Carthaginians (Liv. 23.2.3–4). Livy then reports a cleverly designed ruse devised by Pacuvius in order to reconcile the people and the senate of Capua so that they would remain in the Roman camp for the time being.

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30 Hölkeskamp 1987 (2011): 178. Badian discusses his case, along with that of T. Pompeius Veientanus (see the following note) in his study on the *publicani*, 1997: 11–12.
All the while, he established himself as leader of the common people and soon spearheaded the party that invited Hannibal into the city. The details of Pacuvius’ machinations are difficult to discern. Apparently he became the leader of the pro-Carthaginian party in subsequent years. When Capua fell in 211, more than 70 senators were arrested or killed themselves, among them in all likelihood also Pacuvius.33

One of the main factors that prevented many Campanian communities, and Capua in particular, after Cannae, Livy says, was “that the long-established right of intermarriage had united many distinguished and powerful families [in Capua] with the Romans” (23.4.7: “conubium vetustum multas familias claras ac potentis Romanis miscuerat”). Indeed, Pacuvius himself “had children by a daughter of Appius Claudius and had given a daughter in marriage to Marcus Livius” (23.2.5–6). It has been argued that the men in question were no other than Ap. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 212 or maybe his father, P. Claudius Pulcher, cos. 249) and M. Livius Salinator (cos. 219), which would imply a twofold marriage relation between Pacuvius’ family and two of the most esteemed families of the Roman nobility (through both his own and one of his daughters’ marriage) as well as blood ties to one of them (by means of his children with a Claudia).34 Such high esteem was no doubt in accordance with Pacuvius’ status in his native community; the attainment of Capua’s top public office suggests as much.

Pacuvius’ case otherwise appears to be representative of a general trend, rather than an exception. According to Livy, the conubium between both communities was “long-established”; in his own narrative, the topic related back to the 340s BCE when both sides were already united by private ties of hospitality and kinship for some time (8.3.3, see above). In 26.33.3, turning to the punishment of Capua after the recapture by Rome in 211 BCE, he reiterates that many Capuans were linked to Rome “through relations by marriage and now by close blood relations in consequence of their long-established right of intermarriage” (“cives Romanos adfinitatis plerosque et propinquos etiam cognationibus ex conubio vetusto iunctos”). Finally, when many Capuan aristocrats were sold into slavery, Livy says that the daughters who had married into other communities were exempt from this punishment; presumably, this referred to young women who had either married into other loyalist Capuan families or into elite families elsewhere, including Rome.35 It might be argued that Livy overemphasizes the extent to which those relations where in place in order to raise the narrative tension of his account.36 On the other hand, there is no reason to reject the general observation that the ruling elites between

33 The most comprehensive treatment is now provided by Fronda 2010: 103–126 (see below), who discusses all sources and relevant scholarly views; on the executions of 211, cf. Liv. 26.15.5–6, with Fronda 2010: 251–3; cf. also Ungern-Sternberg 1975.
36 In 23.4.8, Livy says that the strongest bond staving off Capua’s revolt were 300 young equites, whom the Romans selected to garrison some frontier cities on Sicily. The two motivations, hostages and intermarriage, were of course not mutually exclusive. Rather, they appear to have worked complementary.
Capua and Rome were once again closely connected by marriage ties. Incidentally, the presence of Pacuvius Calavius’ family at Rome is well attested in 210 BCE in an incident that was not immediately related to the Capuan revolt (Liv. 26.27.7–10).

The Calavii offer a good example not only of the assets that came with marriage ties with the Roman nobility, and hence the value that came with conubium for those aristocratic families that were entitled to it, but also the pressures this generated in times of crisis. No matter what Pacuvius’ actual role was in the coup that led to the defection from Rome, the complicated family ties no doubt weighed heavily on everyone. Pacuvius’ son decidedly turned his back on his father’s decision to side with Carthage. On the night of a banquet with Hannibal, he was determined to kill Hannibal in an attempt to safeguard the foedus with Rome. Livy casts the encounter between both Calavii in a moralizing if not cheesy father-and-son talk (23.8.2–13), the outcome of which is as unconvincing as the previous exchange of words. Be that as it may, the stereotypical presentation of conflicting loyalties is not impossible; on the contrary, family affiliation with Rome was difficult to ignore. In times of crisis, during the distress of the Second Punic War in particular, marriage ties between Italian elites and the Roman nobility were exposed to severe, strenuous tension. Michael Fronda recently offered an in-depth analysis of the convoluted affairs in southern Italy as they emerged from Hannibal’s sudden appearance in the region. Torn between Roman loyalties, Carthaginian promises, and their local histories of rivalry and violent exchange, each of the communities in Apulia, Campania, Bruttium, and Lucania were asked to position themselves in a war of unprecedented magnitude; the outcome of the war was totally unpredictable. For Campania, Fronda diagnoses a “complex struggle of interests among the Capuan elite, which was fractured by deep political divisions, competing interests and shifting loyalties” (2010: 106). The issue of communal loyalty was further complicated by the fact that the members of the local elite were related to Roman families. For these aristocrats, allegiance to Rome was reinforced mostly on private grounds; they were “motivated more by personal concerns and family connections than by ideological attachment to either the Roman or Carthaginian cause” (Fronda 2010: 108). Fronda further makes it clear that the Capuan elite was by no means exceptional in this dilemma. In fact, the same constellation can be traced in other communities too. Fronda’s work covers the multiplicity of motivations behind the decision-making process in the southern Italian communities at a particular moment of crisis. The circumstances of the Second Punic War should not, however, obfuscate the prevailing picture in times of nonviolent exchange. Prior to the Hannibalic War, the relations between Rome and its southern allies were governed by an ever expanding web of family ties that united the ruling elites from both regions. In other words, the foedera between Rome and many Italian cities were complemented by intensive ties of adfinitas that had led to a gradual amalgamation of both elites.

Calavius’ son first has his mind set ardently to honor the foedus with Rome by killing Hannibal (“iam ego sanguine Hannibalis sanciam Romanum foedus”: 23.8.11) but then drops the idea after a lengthy speech by his father.

CONCLUSION

Among the ideologically potent self-beliefs at Rome was the notion that the Romans themselves originated from peoples of different local backgrounds, and that they were able to integrate those peoples and the distinct cultural advances and achievements they brought to their new home into their community with great success. The tradition of Romulus’ asylum and the legend of the Sabines are but two of the most prominent expressions of this belief; in the works of the earliest Roman historians, from the late third and early second century BCE, the idea is equally present.\(^{39}\) In the cultivation of their family histories, some of the most esteemed members of the nobility fostered the idea of their non-Roman roots. The Claudii were a notorious case in the patrician segment of the aristocracy, as were the Mamili, Fulvii, Otacilii, and several other families from the plebeian nobility.\(^{40}\) The axiomatic view in scholarship is that, once the nobility was ‘closed’ and the circle of its members more or less defined, however permeably, by the early third century BCE, the marriage strategies of the nobility applied to the confined pool of potential marriage partners from within the nobility itself. By the second century BCE, this confinement, along with a low number of male offspring to maintain patrilineal lines of descent, soon resulted in another strategy of creating familial continuity: adoption.\(^{41}\)

Interruption with families from non-Roman elites is solidly attested in the sources, but the topic has received little attention after Münzer’s initial work. Whenever the sources do in fact relate inter-aristocratic ties between Roman and Italian elites, the orthodox view is to subsume those relations to the power configuration in Italy: the rise of Rome soon privileged family alliances with the nobility over relations with other Italian aristocracies; Rome used the grant of conubium as a vehicle to territorial expansion, while the local elites sought to earn distinction and increase their social prestige within their own communities; after the Hannibalic War, those personal ties quickly merged into clientele relations; after the Social War, when all Italians received the right of intermarriage, conubium finally lost its distinction and, effectively, its attraction to non-Roman elites.\(^{42}\)

Beyond legal prescriptions and trajectories of power, this paper argued for a more nuanced, subtle picture of exchange between Roman and Italian elites. Complementing the conclusion of foedera, marriage ties between both status groups were most likely common rather than occasional; in Campania, for instance, they

\(^{39}\) See the Ineditum Vaticanum BNJ 839 F 3 with commentary H. Beck.

\(^{40}\) The degree to which the plebeian elite drew on Italian aristocracies continues to be contested. Münzer (1920: 46–50, 59, 412–413) naturally argued for broad Italian origins, a view that was subsequently rejected by many. See, however, Toynbee 1965: 336–9; Galsterer 1978: 144; Meier 1980: 28 with note 22; and Hölkenskamp 1987 (2011): 180 who all call for a more balanced picture than the one evoked by Münzer’s critics. The point here is that, no matter what the actual extent was (the notion itself is beyond doubt), the nobility’s Italian background remained more impactful for Rome’s foreign policy than commonly assumed.


governed the political exchange with Rome for the longest time in the fourth and third century BCE. The nature of the literary evidence allows for this type of interaction to shine through mostly in moments of crisis and hostile exchange; the longue durée of peaceful exchange and female agency within it are silenced by the sources. Friedrich Münzer’s focus on the nobility disclosed how the “foreign clans” were absorbed into the various “parties” of Roman society. In that perspective, the foreign dimension of many families of the nobility was subordinated to the view of an emerging, homogenous elite at Rome; while Ernst Badian, preoccupied with the systematic disclosure of the power relations, reduced family ties mostly to their functionalistic force of demarcating foreign clienteles. Along the way, the mutual relations between Rome and its allies were impacted much more by the human factor than both scholarly paradigms imply. They were shaped by family ties between husbands, wives, and children, by bonds of personal loyalties, and all the power – and disempowerment – that comes with them.