

QTMUN 2023



United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

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Equity Disclaimers

Throughout this committee, delegates will be engaging in complex debates and discussions covering a wide array of topics. As UTMUN seeks to provide an enriching educational experience that facilitates understanding of the implications of real-world issues, the content of our committees may involve sensitive or controversial subject matter for the purposes of academia and accuracy. We ask that delegates be respectful, professional, tactful, and diplomatic when engaging with all committee content, representing their assigned country's or character's position in an equitable manner, communicating with staff and other delegates, and responding to opposing viewpoints.

This Background Guide presents topics that may be distressing to some Delegates, including but not limited to: the environment, illicit arms trade, corporate accountability, health, nuclear latency, and the rights of states. Great care will be taken by staff in handling any/all of these topics should they arise.

UTMUN recognizes the sensitivity associated with many of our topics, and we encourage you to be aware of and set healthy boundaries that work for you. This may include: refraining from reading certain parts of the background guide, preparing yourself before reading this background guide, doing some self-care or seeking support after reading the background guide, or anything that can help make you feel more comfortable. We ask that all Delegates remain considerate of the boundaries that other Delegates set.

UTMUN expects that all discussions amongst delegates will remain productive and respectful of one another. If you have any equity concerns or need assistance in setting boundaries or navigating sensitive subject matter, please do not hesitate to reach out to me or our Equity Director, Aidan Thompson, at equity@utmun.org. We want you to feel safe and comfortable at UTMUN!

If you wish to switch committees after having read the content warnings for this committee, please:

- Contact your Faculty Advisor/Head Delegate with your request if you are a part of a group delegation
- Email our Director of Academics, Elaine Wang, with a brief explanation of why you would like to switch committees if you are NOT a part of a group delegation.

Model United Nations at U of T Code of Conduct

The below code of conduct applies to the behaviour of all attendees of UTMUN for the entire duration of the conference, while engaging in any conference-related activities, including but not limited to committee sessions, conference socials, committee breaks, and the opening and closing ceremonies.

1. Harrassment and bullying in any form will not be tolerated, the nature of which includes, but is not limited to, discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, ethnicity, colour, religion, sex, age, mental and physical disabilities, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression,
 - a. Harassment and bullying include, but are not limited to, insulting and/or degrading language or remarks; threats and intimidation; and intentional (direct or indirect) discrimination and/or marginalization of a group and/or individual;
 - i. The above prohibition on harassment, bullying, and inappropriate behaviour extends to any and all behaviour as well as written and verbal communication during the conference, including notes, conversation both during and outside committees, and general demeanour at all conference events;
 - ii. UTMUN reserves the right to determine what constitutes bullying and/or inappropriate behaviour toward any individual and/or group;
 - b. Attendees must not engage in any behaviour that constitutes physical violence or the threat of violence against any groups and/or individuals, including sexual violence and harassment, such as, but not limited to,
 - i. Unwelcome suggestive or indecent comments about one's appearance;
 - ii. Nonconsensual sexual contact and/or behaviour between any individuals and/or groups of individuals;
 - iii. Sexual contact or behaviour between delegates and staff members is strictly forbidden;
2. UTMUN expects all attendees to conduct themselves in a professional and respectful manner at all times during the conference. Specific expectations, include, but are not limited to,
 - a. Attendees must, if able, contribute to the general provision of an inclusive conference and refrain from acting in a manner that restricts other attendees' capacity to learn and thrive in an intellectually stimulating environment;
 - b. Attendees must adhere to the dress code, which is Western business attire;
 - i. Exceptions may be made on a case-by-case basis depending on the attendees' ability to adhere to the previous sub-clause;
 - ii. Attendees are encouraged to contact Director of Equity, Aidan Thompson, with questions or concerns about the dress code or conference accessibility;
 - c. Attendees must refrain from the use of cultural appropriation to represent their character

- and/or country, including the use of cultural dress, false accent, and any behaviour that perpetuates a national or personal stereotype;
- d. Delegates must not use music, audio recordings, graphics, or any other media at any time unless approved and requested to be shared by the Dais and/or the Director of Equity, Aidan Thompson;
- e. Attendees must abide by instructions and/or orders given by conference staff members;
 - i. Attendees are exempt from this above sub-clause only if the instructions and/or orders given are unreasonable or inappropriate;
- 3. Delegates, staff, and all other conference participants are expected to abide by Ontario and Canadian laws and Toronto by-laws, as well as rules and regulations specific to the University of Toronto. This includes, but is not limited to,
 - a. Attendees, regardless of their age, are strictly prohibited from being under the influence and/or engaging in the consumption of illicit substances, such as alcohol or illicit substances for the duration of the conference;
 - b. Attendees are prohibited from smoking (cigarettes or e-cigarettes, including vapes) on University of Toronto property;
 - c. Attendees must refrain from engaging in vandalism and the intentional and/or reckless destruction of any public or private property, including conference spaces, venues, furniture, resources, equipment, and university buildings;
 - i. Neither UTMUN nor any representatives of UTMUN is responsible for damage inflicted by attendees to property on or off University of Toronto campus;
 - ii. Individuals will be held responsible for any damages.
- 4. The Secretariat reserves the right to discipline delegates and/or attendees for not adhering to/violating any of the above stipulations. Disciplinary measures include, but are not limited to,
 - a. Suspension from committee, in its entirety or for a specific period of time;
 - b. Removal from the conference and/or conference venue(s);
 - c. Disqualification from awards;
 - d. Disqualification from participation in future conference-related events.
- 5. If online, additional rules apply to delegate and staff conduct, including but not limited to Zoom background usage. Delegates must use either conference-provided Zoom backgrounds, the blurred background, solid colours, or no background.
- 6. UTMUN reserves the right to the final interpretation of this document.

For further clarification on University of Toronto Model United Nations' policies regarding equity, questions, concerns, or for any equity violations that attendees would like to raise, please contact equity@utmun.org, or fill out this [anonymous form](#).

Letter from Your Director:

Dear Distinguished Delegates,

Welcome to the 2023 University of Toronto Model UN Conference (UTMUN)! My name is Abdullah Sheikh, and I have the pleasure of serving as your chair for this conference. Joining me on the DAIS is Vismay Buch as our Vice Director and Rohan Jagpal as our Moderator. As a Logistics Officer last year for the Legal Committee and an avid MUNer since high school, I can't wait to see how you guys tackle the raging issues of Chemical Weapon Stockpiling and Nuclear Disarmament.

The United Nations (UN) depends on the cooperation and goodwill of its Member States. As each state has its own interests and concerns, it is challenging to come to a solution that pleases everyone. Diplomacy and Compromise are the keys to finding a solution that everyone is comfortable with.

I expect each delegate to come to the conference with an understanding of their country's positions and a willingness to forge agreements. To represent your country to the best of your ability, I recommend you go over the guide that follows and look up the topics in the context of your state. The background guide is intended to be a starting point for your research.

As your chair, I will ensure the community runs smoothly. I will also do my best to ensure that everyone understands the procedure and the committee is run in a memorable and enjoyable manner for all delegates. I envision a committee where all ideas are heard and everyone feels included.

Good luck,

Abdullah Sheikh

Director for United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

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Topic A: Chemical Weapons:

Introduction:

The world witnessed the horrors of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in WW1 and WW2.¹ With the ever-advancing developments in technology and the changing geopolitical landscape, we must be vigilant as ever to ensure that countries do not have access to Weapons of Mass Destruction. This committee will try to curtail the access to WMD's and related technologies by rogue states and/or non-state actors with the end goal being to eradicate all instances of WMDs whether they be chemical, biological and/or nuclear. This background document will give you a brief overview of UN actions to date and will put in context the economic, environmental and biological devastation caused by the use of WMDs through a variety of case studies. The UN conventions like the Geneva Protocol and Chemical Weapons Convention will also be important as they form the current treaty-based international legal order regarding the limitations on the use of WMDs.^{2 3}

Chemical and biological weapons were banned by the international community after World War I with the ban being enforced in 1972 and 1993 by prohibiting their development and stockpiling through the Chemical Weapons Convention and Geneva Protocol.^{4 5} The misuse of scientific achievements to create Weapons of Mass Destruction has been of concern to institutions responsible for regulating dangerous bioweapons. Despite the ban on chemical weapons, numerous states in the 21st century have implemented chemical weapons to achieve their goals of total disarmament. Bioweapons in modern history originated in World War 1 with the Germans using them against the French and British in the trenches. Many times in recent history they were heavily researched and used in World War 2 in regions such as China.⁶

The first large-scale use of a traditional WMD was during World War 1. In April 1915, the German army used 160 tons of chlorine gas over the French trenches.⁷ This allowed the Germans to rupture the French line along a 6 km front causing terror and forcing a panicked and chaotic retreat. The German High Command sanctioned the use of gas in the hope that this new weapon would bring a decisive victory. It helped units win battles they fought, but interestingly enough chemical weapons killed proportionally few soldiers but caused much

¹ "Chemical and Biological Weapons. ICRC, November 30, 2020. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/chemical-biological-weapons>.

² "Fact Sheets & Briefs." CWC | Arms Control Association, April 2020. [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20\(CWC\)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20(CWC)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.)

³ "Geneva Protocol ." United Nations. Accessed September 21, 2022. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/#:~:text=The%201925%20Geneva%20Protocol%20prohibits,force%20on%208%20February%201928.>

⁴ "UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) – UNODA." United Nations. 2004. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540/>.

⁵ "Fact Sheets & Briefs." Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association, May 2021. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>.

⁶ "1925 Geneva Protocol – UNODA," accessed October 2, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/>. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/> "1925 Geneva Protocol – UNODA."

⁷ "Chemical and Biological Weapons." International Committee of the Red Cross. ICRC, November 30, 2020. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/chemical-biological-weapons>.

more psychological damage from the “gas fight”. Psychological changes include: depression, long-term mood disorder, anxiety, PTSD and erectile dysfunction.⁸ Understanding the origins of chemical warfare during World War 1 can provide insight into why they are banned today and have a global consensus on eventual eradication.

Chemical nerve agents were investigated for bubonic plague, anthrax, typhus, smallpox, yellow fever, tularemia, hepatitis, cholera, gas gangrene, and glanders, among others. These weapons have caused psychological and physical damage to those exposed to it and, as such, they must be eradicated from the world.⁹

Destruction of Chemical Weapons and the Environmental Impact:

In the 21st century, various countries are in illegal possession of WMDs.¹⁰ The committee urges any existing WMDs to be purged from the stockpile possession of any state. Methods to destroy Weapons of Mass Destruction include incineration and neutralization. Incineration is the controlled ignition of materials that convert them to ash, water vapor, carbon dioxide, and other products formed by combustion.¹¹ Incineration is the Department of Defence's preferred method for destroying chemical warfare agents and munitions.¹² The United States has destroyed various chemical weapons agents at facilities across the country using incineration. The next method is neutralization where the US breaks down chemical agents with hot water and a caustic compound. However, waste from this process has to be treated further at another location making it less environmentally feasible than incineration.¹³ All delegates are encouraged to focus on the environmental aspect of chemical weapons.

Adverse environmental impacts aside from their impact on human health include the generation of debris and waste and the release of hazardous material such as asbestos, industrial chemicals, and fuels. Damage to industrial facilities can also result in chemical spills and land/

8 Fitzgerald, Gerard J. “Chemical Warfare and Medical Response during World War I.” American journal of public health. American Public Health Association, April 2008. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2376985/>.

9 Rasoul Roshan et al., “Long-Term Effects of Sulfur Mustard on Civilians’ Mental Health 20 Years after Exposure (The Sardasht-Iran Cohort Study),” Health and Quality of Life Outcomes 11, no. 1 (April 24, 2013): 69, <https://doi.org/10.1186/1477-7525-11-69> Roshan et al. <https://doi.org/10.1186/1477-7525-11-69>

10 Roshan et al. Gerard J. Fitzgerald, “Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War I,” American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 4 (April 2008): 611–25, <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.11930>; “CDC - Chemical Weapons Elimination - Methods Used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents,”

<https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/demil/methods.htm>. <https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.11930> Fitzgerald, “Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War I”; “CDC - Chemical Weapons Elimination - Methods Used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents.”

11 Fitzgerald, “Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War I”; “CDC - Chemical Weapons Elimination - Methods Used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents.” <https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/demil/methods.htm> Fitzgerald, “Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War I”; “CDC - Chemical Weapons Elimination - Methods Used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents.”

12 “Environmental Legacy of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.” UNEP. UNEP, November 5, 2021. <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/environmental-legacy-explosive-weapons-populated-areas#:~:text=Impacts%20of%20explosive%20weapons%20on%20the%20environment&text=Additionally%2C%20damage%20to%20industrial%20facilities,infrastructure%20can%20result%20in%20pollution>.

13 “CDC - Chemical Weapons Elimination - Methods Used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, May 31, 2013. <https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/demil/methods.htm#:~:text=its%20individual%20stockpile-,Incineration,chemical%20warfare%20agents%20and%20munitions>

water contamination.¹⁴ Damage to water supply and collapse of solid waste infrastructure due to the development of nerve agents can result in pollution levels skyrocketing as well. Cityscapes reduced to rubble are tough to rebuild to their fullest and in countries such as Syria, 1/3 of the housing stock has been damaged or destroyed with 15 million tons of debris generated in the country's major cities.¹⁵ Meanwhile, in neighbouring Iraq, over 63 cities and 1600 villages were destroyed during the ISIL conflict.¹⁶

Damage to industrial facilities results in the release of toxic chemicals causing air, water, and soil pollution. In the Ukrainian Donbas, 36 mines have flooded and released methane gases and toxic metals into local pools, damaging the water and making it unhealthy to drink.¹⁷ Damage to drinking water supply systems results in contamination and leads to waterborne diseases such as diarrhea. In 2017, due to chemical attacks from militants more than half of the Libyan schools did not have access to quality drinking water.¹⁸

Chemical Weapons and Illicit Arms Trade:

Reckless arms trading devastates lives. Illicit chemical weapons have been used in war zones such as Iraq, Syria, and Darfur. In 2016, Amnesty International uncovered evidence suggesting the Sudanese government which was led by President Kiir, who belonged to the Dinka ethnic group, was using chemical weapons against the rebels from the Nuer ethnic group supporting Sudanese Vice President Machar.¹⁹ Victims had suffered horrifying injuries including loss of vision, and respiratory problems, vomiting, blisters, and rashes. The Sudanese government's stockpile was illegally acquired and developed.²⁰

This committee hopes to find cracks in the system of arms manufacturers and ensure that all sales are legitimate and lawful. NGOs in the past have indulged in legal challenges to stop arms trades to regimes accused of committing war crimes and have made some progress. In some cases arms deals between different allies have been halted due to findings by NGOs showing the illegality of their nature. The chairs of this committee encourage delegates to focus on corporate accountability in the defense sector.

Corporate Accountability:

14 "CDC - Chemical Weapons Elimination - Methods Used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents"; Roshan et al., "Long-Term Effects of Sulfur Mustard" Mental Health 20 Years after Exposure (The Sardasht-Iran Cohort Study)"; "Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association." <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>

15 Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association," accessed October 2, 2022. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>

16 "Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association." <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>

17 "Arms Control," Amnesty International, accessed October 2, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/>

18 "Arms Control," Amnesty International, accessed October 2, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/>

19 "Arms Control," Amnesty International, accessed October 2, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/>

20 "Civil War in South Sudan | Global Conflict Tracker." Council on Foreign Relations. Center for Preventive Action, May 12, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan>.

Amnesty International has called for the ICC to investigate the role of European arms companies in aiding war crimes.²¹ Open source information and imagery must be used to uncover human rights abuses.²² While arms companies intent may not be to commit war crimes, awareness must be raised of the human cost of their products.²³ There have been various instances of certain non- state actors using weapons provided by governments coming from American and European arms manufacturers.²⁴

As tools used in warfare continue alongside the development of technology, it is important that regulation and disarmament are considered. Arms control efforts can take many forms such as: structural restrictions on the development, deployment or quantity of specific material (such as nerve agents), ;imitations on the targets, uses, and missions of specific weapons and other military activities, and export controls.²⁵ These techniques overlap and in looking at company regulation for arms manufacturers diplomatic relations in the context of certain wars, export control regulations, and availability of certain materials must be considered.²⁶

Delegates must also look at humanitarian imperatives such as the protection of civilians and combatants from the effects of WMDs. The end of the Cold War ushered in new forms of security control such as different recognitions of arms control which would be needed to address the risks to humans posed by war such as the effects of WMDs and small arms. Looking at it from a humanitarian perspective, we learn that civilians, not governments, are the main victims of armed conflict. The humanitarian perspective helps mitigate harm to civilians by regulating the use of certain weapons or banning them completely. A humanitarian approach to corporate accountability allows for peaceful applications of nuclear energy for energy production and medical purposes. Furthermore use of biological pathogens for developing the technology of vaccines, creating processes and mechanisms for transparency and confidence building. With the illicit arms trade for chemical weapons, we must consider both companies and governments to ensure that the wrong material doesn't end up in the hands of dangerous actors across the world.²⁷ Delegates must evaluate the possibility and environmental feasibility of certain methods to eradicate chemical weapons. They must also further explore how Chemical weapons are tied to the illicit arms trade. As it stands, 12 countries have declared chemical weapons production facilities and six countries have declared stockpiles of chemical weapons. These declared facilities have been destroyed or converted to civilian use after the implementation of the CWC. Many countries and figures may be at risk of arms trafficking. How can this be countered?

21 "Arms Control." Amnesty International, August 6, 2021. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/>.

22 "Arms Control." Amnesty International, August 6, 2021. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/>.

23 "Regulating new tools of warfare: Insights from humanitarian and disarmament and arms control efforts." Project Ploughshares, 2021. https://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/regulating-new-tools-of-warfare-insights-from-humanitarian-disarmament-and-arms-control-efforts/.

24 "Arms Control." Amnesty International, August 6, 2021. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/>.

25 "Chemical and Biological Weapons." International Committee of the Red Cross. ICRC, November 30, 2020. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/chemical-biological-weapons>.

26 "Regulating new tools of warfare: Insights from humanitarian and disarmament and arms control efforts." Project Ploughshares, 2021. https://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/regulating-new-tools-of-warfare-insights-from-humanitarian-disarmament-and-arms-control-efforts/.

27 West, Jessica, Branka Marijan, and Emily Standfield. "Regulating New Tools of Warfare: Insights from Humanitarian Disarmament and Arms Control Efforts." Project Ploughshares, March 24, 2022.

Case Study - Yemen:

“The people of Yemen are being killed and are at serious risk of famine because of the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition’s relentless bombing campaign that has been made possible by British arms and equipment,” said Lucy Claridge, Amnesty International’s Director of Strategic Litigation.²⁸

While the war in Yemen was ongoing, the British government was under immense pressure to halt sales to the GCC due to their alleged war crimes in Yemen.²⁹ “How many more people must die before the UK Government admits it is in the wrong? By selling billions of pounds worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, ministers are signing a death warrant for the people of Yemen.” Amnesty International, alongside different NGOs registered a case against the British government, asking them to investigate arms sales to Saudi Arabia.³⁰ The case was heard by the High Court in London in February 2017 where it was argued that arms transfers to Saudi Arabia should be halted because of “the clear risk that the weapons supplied would be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law in Yemen”.³¹ These weapons were classified as WMDs. While many argue that such sales to Saudi Arabia are unlawful, the UK court rules that the government is entitled to continue authorizing arms trade to Saudi Arabia³².

Case Study - Syria

The Syrian War has been going on since 2011 with the regime of Bashar al Assad with the backing of Russia and Iran fighting rebels sponsored by the west and its allies. There have been various instances of chemical weapons attacks on civilians. This case study focuses on the feasibility of chemical weapon disarmament in Syria. The study highlights that disarmament would be an enormous challenge and the timetables proposed by the US and Russia seem unrealistic.³³ As of July 2022, efforts to disarm Syria’s WMD stockpile have not made any progress.³⁴ The UNSC Resolution 2118 was implemented in 2013 regarding the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme.³⁵ The government has been rather uncooperative with the OPCW for inspections.³⁶ Without government cooperation, disarmament is near impossible.

28 “Court Ruling over UK Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia a ‘Deadly Blow’ to Yemeni Civilians.” Amnesty International, August 16, 2021. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/court-ruling-over-uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-a-deadly-blow-to-yemeni-civilians/>.

29 “Court Ruling over UK Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia a ‘Deadly Blow’ to Yemeni Civilians.” Amnesty International, August 16, 2021. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/court-ruling-over-uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-a-deadly-blow-to-yemeni-civilians/>.

30 “Court Ruling over UK Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia a ‘Deadly Blow’ to Yemeni Civilians.” Amnesty International, August 16, 2021. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/court-ruling-over-uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-a-deadly-blow-to-yemeni-civilians/>.

31 “Court Ruling over UK Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia a ‘Deadly Blow’ to Yemeni Civilians.” Amnesty International, August 16, 2021. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/court-ruling-over-uk-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-a-deadly-blow-to-yemeni-civilians/>.

32 “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association, May 2021. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>.

33 “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association, May 2021. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>.

34 “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association, May 2021. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>.

35 “UN Resolution 2118”. United Nations 2013 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2118.pdf

36 “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association, May 2021. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>.

Syria possesses a vast arsenal of chemical weapons with various state-of-the-art facilities.³⁷ The first step in locating these facilities is a challenge on its own.³⁸ The possibility that the weapons came as a side effect of the Iraq War in Syria is also a strong possibility. Syria is also likely to develop bioweapons as an alternative to chemical weapons, which is a loophole in the CWC and agreements for disarmament in Syria between the US and Russia.³⁹ While assessments related to Syria's chemical weapon arsenal are vast, the program's history is rather secretive.⁴⁰

Case Study - North Korea:

Kim Jong Nam, half-brother of North Korean President Kim Jong Un was assassinated in Malaysia with Agent VX.⁴¹ The VX is a toxic inhibitor that was first developed in the UK as a chemical warfare agent for a chemical weapon that is classified as a WMD.⁴² Kim Jong Nam was seen as the heir to the throne for North Korea after being replaced in favour of Kim Jong Un. The stockpile of VX is believed to have come from military stockpiles.⁴³ Only three countries are unknown to possess it: the US, Russia, and Syria.⁴⁴ If the VX used in Malaysia against Kim Jong Nam did not originate from either of these sources, it is possible that it was manufactured by North Korea itself.⁴⁵

Previous UN Involvement:

The 1925 Geneva Protocol: The protocol was a landmark for international humanitarian law and was followed by (most) states in the form of the convention by 1972 Biological Weapons convention. While it was a step to ban bioweapons, instances of use in WMDs have persisted in the 21st century. In 1966, UNGA resolution 216B called for all states to strictly observe the protocol⁴⁶.

Chemical Weapons Convention: The CWC is a nuclear treaty pushed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).⁴⁷ The convention prohibits the large-scale use,

37 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association, May 2021. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>.

38 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association, May 2021. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>.

39 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2022 | Arms Control Association, May 2021. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity>.

40 "Chemical Weapons Convention". OPCW, <https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention>

41 Patočka, Jiří. "What Killed Kim Jong-Nam? Was It the Agent VX?" Military Medical Science Letters 86, no. 2 (March 9, 2017): 86–89. <https://doi.org/10.31482/mmsl.2017.013>

42 Patočka, Jiří. "What Killed Kim Jong-Nam? Was It the Agent VX?" Military Medical Science Letters 86, no. 2 (March 9, 2017): 86–89. <https://doi.org/10.31482/mmsl.2017.013>

43 Patočka, Jiří. "What Killed Kim Jong-Nam? Was It the Agent VX?" Military Medical Science Letters 86, no. 2 (March 9, 2017): 86–89. <https://doi.org/10.31482/mmsl.2017.013>

44 Patočka, Jiří. "What Killed Kim Jong-Nam? Was It the Agent VX?" Military Medical Science Letters 86, no. 2 (March 9, 2017): 86–89. <https://doi.org/10.31482/mmsl.2017.013>

45 Patočka, Jiří. "What Killed Kim Jong-Nam? Was It the Agent VX?" Military Medical Science Letters 86, no. 2 (March 9, 2017): 86–89. <https://doi.org/10.31482/mmsl.2017.013>

46 "1925 Geneva Protocol – UNODA." United Nations. United Nations. Accessed September 21, 2022. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/#:~:text=The%201925%20Geneva%20Protocol%20prohibits,force%20on%20February%201928>.

47 "Chemical Weapons Convention". OPCW, <https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention>

development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons if used for warfare.⁴⁸ 193 states have become parties to the CWC.⁴⁹ This is an extension of the Geneva Protocol and the OPCW works closely with the UN on policy and practical issues.⁵⁰

UNSC Resolution 1540: Resolution 1540 states that nations shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop or use chemical weapons for terrorist purposes.⁵¹ The resolution requires all states to adopt and enforce appropriate laws to this effect as well as other measures to prevent proliferation.⁵² The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs provides support for the following goals set by the OPCW: First, the facilitation of national implementation activities including through regionally coordinated approaches.⁵³ Second, the cooperation between international, regional, and sub-regional organizations.⁵⁴ Third, the effective partnerships of key stakeholders including civil society, the private sector, and academia.⁵⁵

Next Step Forward:

First, Delegates can consider countering the use of chemical weapons in the 21st Century. Chemical Weapons have been banned by the global community but to discourage their use countries and nonstate actors must be sanctioned for their use of WMDs in armed conflicts.⁵⁶ Inspections by the OPCW must be allowed and action against non-cooperators must be taken. Easier said than done, corroborating nations must first grant physical access to the facilities to the OPCW inspectors. As we saw Iran refusing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from entering their uranium enrichment facilities.⁵⁷ Those using it on civilians who are enemy combatants will be put under further scrutiny by pressuring them through the means

48 "Chemical Weapons Convention". OPCW, <https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention>

49 "Chemical Weapons Convention". OPCW, <https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention>

50 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance | Arms Control Association, April 2020. [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20\(CWC\)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20(CWC)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.)

51 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance | Arms Control Association, April 2020. [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20\(CWC\)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20(CWC)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.)

52 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance | Arms Control Association, April 2020. [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20\(CWC\)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20(CWC)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.)

53 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance | Arms Control Association, April 2020. [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20\(CWC\)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20(CWC)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.)

54 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance | Arms Control Association, April 2020. [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20\(CWC\)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20(CWC)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.)

55 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance | Arms Control Association, April 2020. [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20\(CWC\)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20(CWC)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.)

56 "Fact Sheets & Briefs." The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance | Arms Control Association, April 2020. [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20\(CWC\)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance#:~:text=The%20Chemical%20Weapons%20Convention%20(CWC)%20is%20a%20multilateral%20treaty%20that,the%20possession%20of%20chemical%20weapons.)

57 "Chemical Weapons Convention". OPCW, <https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention>

of severe sanctions to allow thorough inspections by inspectors from regulatory agencies such as IAEA for nuclear facilities. The committee also urges all countries to allow OPCW inspections of their stockpile to ensure that no dangerous weapons are developed and that material is only used for peaceful purposes. Industries must regulate arms manufacturers to ensure no illicit production/transfer. For this to work, governments and companies must cooperate with the committee.

Second, Delegates can consider enforced checks and balances of stockpiling chemical weapons. Countries must consent to inspections of their stockpile, and if they are in possession of any WMDs they must dismantle them immediately.⁵⁸ Additionally, any individuals who may be at risk for trafficking such weapons must come under intense scrutiny. Failure to comply will result in penalties such as severe sanctions as well as a total trade embargo on the states. In some cases, countries may choose to restrict some inspections of their chemical weapons production facilities and/or stockpiling sites. The committee may recommend political, economic and/or military measures to try to force that state to abide by the international treaty based legal order. Some of these recommendations could be sanctions on government officials, international diplomatic isolation and/or a threat of military action.

Third, Delegates can consider sanctioning any and all individuals perpetuating the sale of WMDs. While nation states themselves may sanction chemical weapons, the actions of individuals in certain states with access to technology to create WMDs must be monitored. Individuals and governments or officials helping them must be sanctioned to ensure global safety. Such individuals must be tracked by organisations maintaining global terror watchlist and intelligence agencies across the globe should collaborate to keep a track of them. For instance, agencies such as, Interpol, and individual national intelligence agencies should keep track. If any signs of illicit trade of sensitive material is detected, all UN member states should cooperate to stop the illegal trade of WMDs and stop them from reaching into the hands of rogue states and/or non-state actors such as terror groups.

Fourth, Delegates can consider Declaration Timelines and Action Reports. As per the rules of the CWC, countries must submit declarations that include information on chemical weapons along with a general destruction plan.⁵⁹ A framework must be introduced with a general destruction plan the committee and OPCW must enforce these plans. The OPCW aims for the total elimination of chemical weapons in the world by prohibiting the production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, or use of chemical weapons by States Parties. States Parties, in turn, must take the steps necessary to enforce that prohibition in respect of persons (natural or legal) within their jurisdiction. All state parties have agreed to destroy any stockpiles and create a verification regime for certain chemicals and their precursors to ensure that they are only used for peaceful purposes. The convention also incorporates a “challenge inspection” where any state party can be asked for a surprise inspection when in doubt of their compliance.⁶⁰

⁵⁸“UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) – UNODA.” United Nations. United Nations, 2004. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540/>.

⁵⁹ “CDC - Chemical Weapons Elimination - Methods Used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, May 31, 2013. <https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/demil/methods.htm>.

⁶⁰ “Chemical Weapons Convention”. <https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention>

There is no right of refusal, taking this into account with transparency and methods in place to ensure that no new WMDs are developed, the OPCW must incorporate a framework giving a clear timeline and regular updates to the convention on their progress on disarmament and their latency to develop WMDs.



Topic B: Nuclear Disarmament

Introduction:

Nuclear Weapons were first developed in the 1940s and used in World War II. Since then, there have been nine countries in possession of nuclear weapons; five of which are signatories to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), promising not to develop more nuclear weapons in the future and eventually dismantle them. Four states: Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea have a (mostly) growing nuclear arsenal and are not signatories to the NPT.⁶¹ Nuclear weapons are largely a deterrent to a full-blown armed conflict. Many states hold no first use policies and a zero deterrence policy, essentially using nukes as a deterrent to avoid greater escalation in a warzone. Today, there are approximately 13,080 nuclear weapons in the world.⁶² Steps must be taken for disarmament in a transparent and smooth manner. There have been recent setbacks for nuclear disarmament recently and we hope to resolve that in this committee. We will go over topics such as the NPT, policies countries have over nuclear weapons, progress on disarmament, and how to solidify the use of nuclear energy for peaceful and not destructive purposes.

Nuclear Latency:

In 2018, Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal. One condition of the deal was Iran giving up its nuclear stockpile (even for peaceful purposes), essentially sacrificing their nuclear latency.⁶³ Nuclear latency is the possession of the technology, material, facilities, expertise, and resources needed to develop nuclear weapons. Four non-NPT signatories with nuclear latency have managed to develop nuclear weapons. Ever since nuclear weapons were first developed for the Manhattan Project, latency has been an issue. Concerns take place in the form of possible misuse of civilian nuclear power programs for military purposes. In this context, nuclear latency was seen to pose a technological threat. One such case was Iran till the JCPOA was achieved, after President Trump's withdrawal the revival of the nuclear program was a concern amongst the global community.⁶⁴ The NPT does not address latency and has not been explored over the topic of nuclear proliferation.⁶⁵

Nuclear latency will be described as the ability to develop nuclear weapons in a non

61 Ware, Alyn. "UN Human Rights Committee Concludes That the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Violates the Right to Life." UNFOLD ZERO, October 30, 2018. <https://www.unfoldzero.org/un-human-rights-committee-condemns-the-threat-or-use-of-nuclear-weapons-and-other-wmd/>.

62 "New START Treaty - United States Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, September 15, 2022. <https://www.state.gov/new-start/>.

63 Robinson, Kali. "What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?" Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, July 20, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal>.

64 "Regulating New Tools of Warfare: Insights from Humanitarian Disarmament and Arms Control Efforts." National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed September 21, 2022. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal>.

65 Pilat, Joseph "Exploring Nuclear Latency". October 2, 2014, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/exploring-nuclear-latency>

nuclear state that is a signatory of the NPT. If we look at recent history, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea recently withdrew from the NPT and developed its nuclear stockpile.⁶⁶ Must we be cautious of this going forward? Is raising concerns about nuclear latency a direct opposition to peaceful purposes of nuclear enrichment such as energy? While nuclear latency does not indicate a country's intention to develop nuclear weapons, the risk of proliferation and rogue elements that are further explored in case studies still exist. While it is recognized the NPT allowed latency, the latency question is not effectively addressed as the latency provision provides loophole for nations to enrich enough uranium that meets the latency allowance and conduct covert activities to produce the remaining amount to get enough uranium to produce a nuclear weapon as was done in the Manhattan project and other cases.⁶⁷ States also non cooperative with the IAEA with nuclear latency must be put under scrutiny. In certain cases, a latent state could use regional conflict as an excuse to develop nuclear weapons without security assurances.

Are Nuclear Weapons a Right?

From a humanitarian perspective, nuclear weapons are the most destructive of their kind as seen in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the vicinities of nuclear testing areas. The UNHCR concluded that the "threat or use of nuclear weapons violated the Right to Life"⁶⁸. However, from a state's perspective, are nuclear weapons a right for the security of a state? It can be argued that history shows us nuclear weapons have done nothing but prevent horrible conflicts since 1945. For example, Pakistan became capable of nuclear weapons in 1998, there has not been a major India-Pakistan conflict since 1971 (not counting the 1999 Kargil Skirmish). However, what about close calls to conflict which have taken place before? For nuclear deterrence to truly work, we must assume that humans can act rationally and predictably. There are also instances where a nuclear armed state is able to bully smaller states, such as Ukraine and Russia in recent times.⁶⁹ This was apparent as Russia being a nuclear armed state did not want NATO united under Article 5 which talks about an attack on one is an attack on all⁷⁰. Russia took advantage of it being a nuclear power and invading Ukraine and as they had predicted, the West avoided direct confrontation with a nuclear armed Russia.⁷¹ When advocating for disarmament, countries can argue that a bigger, nuclear armed neighbor could strongarm them in the name of their own

66 Bai, Su. "North Korea's Withdrawal from the NPT: Neorealism and Selectorate Theory." E-International Relations, January 28, 2022. <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/01/27/north-koreas-withdraw-from-the-npt-neorealism-and-selectorate-theory/>.

67 West, Jessica, Branka Marijan, and Emily Standfield. "Regulating New Tools of Warfare: Insights from Humanitarian Disarmament and Arms Control Efforts." Project Ploughshares, March 24, 2022. https://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/regulating-new-tools-of-warfare-insights-from-humanitarian-disarmament-and-arms-control-efforts/.

68Ware, Alyn. "UN Human Rights Committee Concludes That the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Violates the Right to Life." UNFOLD ZERO, October 30, 2018. <https://www.unfoldzero.org/un-human-rights-committee-condemns-the-threat-or-use-of-nuclear-weapons-and-other-wmd/>.

69 "Russia's nuclear arsenal is huge, but will Putin use it?". October 17, 2022. <https://www.npr.org/2022/10/17/1129443703/russias-nuclear-arsenal-is-huge-but-will-putin-use-it>

70 "What about 'Nuclear Deterrence' Theory? Do Nuclear Weapons Help Keep the Peace?" ICAN. Accessed September 21, 2022. https://www.icanw.org/what_about_nuclear_deterrence_theory#:~:text=History%20shows%20that%20the%20existence,be%20expectedhttps://www.icanw.org/what_about_nuclear_deterrence_theory#:~:text=History%20shows%20that%20the%20existence,be%20expected%20to%20last%20forever.%20to%20last%20forever.

71 "Russia's nuclear arsenal is huge, but will Putin use it?". October 17, 2022. <https://www.npr.org/2022/10/17/1129443703/russias-nuclear-arsenal-is-huge-but-will-putin-use-it>

interests. So are nuclear weapons a right? Do they stop global conflict?

Different Nuclear Policies:

There are two nuclear policies used by nuclear-armed states. The first is the “No first use” policy which is a commitment to never use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances or as a response to a nonnuclear attack. In other words, only use a nuclear weapon if you have been attacked with one.⁷² These countries will only use nuclear weapons if attacked with one first. These policies are used by India and China.⁷³⁷⁴ Meanwhile France, Pakistan, and Russia maintain policies that permit the first use of nuclear weapons in conflict; however, they can only use them when they are under extreme threats and are not to be used in minor circumstances.⁷⁵ North Korea, the UK, and the US incorporate similar policies. Israel does not acknowledge the existence of its nuclear weapons and thus does not have any official policy. Nuclear weapons are a core component of a country’s overall capabilities and influence their foreign policy and that of their neighbors militarily. They are a very sensitive topic that one must approach with caution. Policies such as the No-first use and zero deterrence are in place to ensure that there is no need to set off nuclear weapons.

Long Term Health Issues:

Health effects of a nuclear explosion include blindness, deafness, ruptured organs, fractured skulls, and penetrating wounds⁷⁶. Nuclear testing has caused these types of health problems in areas where they have been tested. Places such as Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Chernobyl also have had long-lasting effects on the people living there due to nuclear blasts which have taken place in these areas as a result of war or major accidents. In 1945, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the blast resulted in long-term harm to human health, the surrounding environment and the development of the area.⁷⁷ Modern modeling techniques show that even a small-scale use of nuclear weapons would lead to a cooling of the atmosphere, shorter growing seasons, food shortages, and a global famine. The effects of a nuclear weapon explosion destroy local infrastructure, trade, communication and schools. No current international body is adequately equipped to deal with a nuclear blast in urban areas. To prepare for an event of nuclear detonation (accidental or intentional) the Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Diamond would

72 Ware, Alyn. “UN Human Rights Committee Concludes That the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Violates the Right to Life.” UNFOLD ZERO, October 30, 2018. <https://www.unfoldzero.org/un-human-rights-committee-condemns-the-threat-or-use-of-nuclear-weapons-and-other-wmd/>.

73 “No First Use FAQs,” Global Zero, accessed October 14, 2022, <https://www.globalzero.org/no-first-use-faqs/>.

74 “No First Use FAQs,” Global Zero, accessed October 14, 2022, <https://www.globalzero.org/no-first-use-faqs/>.

75 “No First Use FAQs,” Global Zero, accessed October 14, 2022, <https://www.globalzero.org/no-first-use-faqs/>.

76 “Long-Term Health Effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic Bombs Not as Dire as Perceived.” ScienceDaily. Genetic Society of America, August 11, 2016. <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/08/160811120353.htm#:~:text=No%20health%20effects%20of%20any,and%20from%20acute%20radiation%20poisoning.>

77 “Environmental Legacy of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.” UNEP. UNEP, November 5, 2021. <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/environmental-legacy-explosive-weapons-populated-areas#:~:text=Impacts%20of%20explosive%20weapons%20on%20the%20environment&text=Additionally%2C%20damage%20to%20industrial%20facilities,infrastructure%20can%20result%20in%20pollution.>

need contingency effective contingency plans in order to effectively treat and aid the affected.⁷⁸ Women and children are the largest victims with an effect on reproductive health, puberty, and the structure of the brain. To combat the aforementioned point, the WHO would need to form an international focus group that can have various institutions under a single global command to help countries cope with the tragedy as well as to educate people on correct courses of action during and after a nuclear detonation.

Case Study - Iran:

The Iran nuclear deal or “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) is an accord reached by Iran and world powers where they agreed to dismantle their nuclear program and open facilities to IAEA inspections in exchange for sanctions relief.⁷⁹ This deal was seen as a landmark for nuclear disarmament and prevented another country from possibly acquiring nuclear weapons. This also was believed to heavily reduce the risk of further conflict in the Middle East, especially between Iran and its regional rivals. However, after President Trump withdrew in 2018, Iran started to breach the limits of uranium enrichment agreed upon in the JCPOA. As per the European diplomats, if Iran continued enriching uranium at that rate, it would have enough weapons grade uranium in 12 to 18 months. The Iranian government claimed that it can quickly restart its nuclear program after the US withdrew from the deal. It is largely dependent on how aggressively Iran challenges its terms.⁸⁰ These terms include IAEA inspections and further monitoring of its capabilities. However, as of 2021, President Joe Biden said the US would return to the deal if Iran also upholds its end.⁸¹

The JCPOA's goals wanted to unwind Iran's nuclear program to a point where the development of a nuclear weapon is impossible. It was believed Iran could develop weapons-grade uranium just months before the deal was reached. While Iran is an NPT signatory, it was signed by the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1970, nine years before the Islamic Republic of Iran was established, deposing a dynasty in the revolution. While still being party to the treaty, the Islamic Republic was covertly developing nuclear technology. Prior to the agreement, negotiations were in place to reduce their nuclear program. The deal sets back Iran's capability to develop a nuclear weapon while easing the sanctions. Iran agreed not to produce either the highly enriched uranium or the plutonium that could be used in a nuclear weapon. It also took steps to ensure that its nuclear facilities pursued only civilian work, including medical and industrial research. The other signatories agreed to lift nuclear-related sanctions and a weapons embargo. The UNSC was to vote on sanctions relief and Iran largely cooperated. Reinstating the deal may continue the

78 Roshan, Rasoul, Parvin Rahnama, Zeinab Ghazanfari, Ali Montazeri, Mohammad Reza Soroush, Mohammad Mehdi Naghizadeh, Mahdiyeh Melyani, Azadeh Tavoli, and Tooba Ghazanfari. “Long-Term Effects of Sulfur Mustard on Civilians” <https://hqlo.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1477-7525-11-69#:~:text=Exposure%20to%20chemical%20warfare%20is,and%20sexhttps://hqlo.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1477-7525-11-69#:~:text=Exposure%20to%20chemical%20warfare%20is,and%20sexual%20dysfunction%20%5B15%5Dual%20dysfunction%20%5B15%5D>.

79 Robinson, Kali. “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, July 20, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/background/what-iran-nuclear-deal>.

80 Robinson, Kali. “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, July 20, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/background/what-iran-nuclear-deal>.

81 Robinson, Kali. “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, July 20, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/background/what-iran-nuclear-deal>.

milestone to a nuclear zero achieved by the Obama Administration.⁸²

Case Study - Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan:

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was a Pakistani nuclear scientist who confessed to the illicit transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea.⁸³ He is reported to have made a personal fortune from the transfer. Khan was later pardoned by Pakistani authorities but remained under house arrest while under questioning by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). His activities revealed the transfer of nuclear weapons-related technology and blueprints to Libya, Iran, and North Korea through a middleman. Khan was running a nuclear smuggling network amassing millions of dollars. To counter such actions, the Pakistani government released export control regulations banning the export of nuclear material unless a “No Objection Certificate” is issued by the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission. Previous regulations allowed Khan to take advantage by smuggling material. He also used his status as a national hero in Pakistan to conduct black market sales. While they initially intended to develop weapons for Pakistan, his old channels allowed him to profit off states also interested in nuclear technology of their own. In the aftermath of these channels being exposed, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry established new export control regulations to address the scrutiny they were put under by the IAEA. The country had to introduce laws punishing those who smuggle nuclear equipment with 14 years imprisonment, forfeiture of assets, and a fine of \$90,000. Individuals who are capable of such activity are a hindrance to the UN’s goal of a nuclear zero. Moreover, individuals like Mr Khan can be considered the cause of nuclear proliferation as such people get involved in illicit arms trade that can increase the access of rogue states such as Libya, North Korea as well as non state actors such as various terror organizations.⁸⁴

Case Study - Hiroshima and Nagasaki:

Within the first few months after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, up to 166,000 people died a few months after the bombing. While the nuclear blast on its own caused a huge toll on the cities, people later died because the fallout from the weapons caused the body to expose itself to extreme heat and the force of the aftermath of the explosions. Radiation exposure also causes deaths. Exposure to radiation can cause fatal effects on the body. Mutations can occur spontaneously and they could also lead to diseases such as cancer. Among the long-term effects of survivors of nuclear blasts, leukemia is common and children are more prone to developing the disease.⁸⁵ Other cancers took longer to develop. It also causes problems in the fetus, leading to new health problems developing in families. Nuclear weapons have long-term

82 Robinson, Kali. “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, July 20, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal>.

83 Norris, R. S.. “Abdul Qadeer Khan.” Encyclopedia Britannica, March 28, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdul-Qadeer-Khan>.

84 Norris, R. S.. “Abdul Qadeer Khan.” Encyclopedia Britannica, March 28, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdul-Qadeer-Khan>.

85 “Long-Term Health Effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic Bombs Not as Dire as Perceived.” ScienceDaily. Genetic Society of America, August 11, 2016. <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/08/160811120353.htm#:~:text=No%20health%20effects%20of%20any,and%20from%20acute%20radiation%20poisoning>.

effects on the inhabitants of affected areas.⁸⁶

Previous UN involvement:

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The NPT is a treaty whose objective is to prevent the expansion of nuclear weapons and promote peaceful use of nuclear weapons. It also aims to achieve a nuclear zero, a world with no nuclear weapons. The treaty was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament which is sponsored by the UN. It has more consensus on it than any other arms treaty with only five nonparties to the treaty. The treaty defines nuclear weapons as “those that have built and tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967. The treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings called Review Conferences. Criticism of the NPT includes that it does not stop nuclear proliferation or motivate states to dismantle them. They point to the fact that there are 13,400 warheads in their combined stockpile and state that non-party to the treaty are free to develop nuclear weapons.

Previous UN Involvement - UN Resolution L.41:

In December 2016, the UNGA adopted resolution L.41 which is a “legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons leading to their total eliminations.” Two-thirds of the world’s nation-states support the resolution, showing a collective desire for a nuclear-weapon-free world. This is a huge step to prohibit nuclear weapons and all member states were encouraged to participate. The decision followed the recommendation of multilateral disarmament negotiations which have successfully taken place in the past.

Next Steps Forward:

Expansion on Current Nuclear Disarmament Agreements: Treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty protocol as well as the NPT are largely agreed upon by the countries of the world. There have been countries in the past such as South Africa, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine who have willingly given up their nuclear weapons. If all the permanent members of the UNSC take initiative, they could also help lead non-NPT signatory states to join. Cooperation of states to ensure an end to WMD possession is also important. Countries such as Iran have allowed inspection of their nuclear facilities under the Iran Nuclear Deal to encourage transparency in exchange for sanctions. States considered “rogue” should be offered concessions if they are willing to cooperate with a body to ensure no dangerous weapons are being produced. A collective framework that is satisfactory to the demands of all nation states could lead to a nuclear zero, establishing a peaceful world.⁸⁷

Countries and their Capability to Develop a Nuclear Arsenal: In the past, countries with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons have been a concern for the UN. Countries in the

⁸⁶ “Environmental Legacy of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.” UNEP. UNEP, November 5, 2021. <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/environmental-legacy-explosive-weapons-populated-areas#:~:text=Impacts%20of%20explosive%20weapons%20on%20the%20environment&text=Additionally%2C%20damage%20to%20industrial%20facilities,infrastructure%20can%20result%20in%20pollution>

⁸⁷ “UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) – UNODA.” United Nations. United Nations, 2004. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540/>.

past have attempted to develop nuclear weapons and have been close to being able to test new weapons. However, incentivizing states to allow further IAEA inspections of the nuclear program to ensure no proliferation will take place could help reach the goal of a nuclear zero⁸⁸. While disarmament is heavily focused on, preventing more states from developing nukes is also a part of the equation. Countries are free to leave the NPT and develop an arsenal of their own. This is also something delegates should look into when coming up with a resolution. There must be incentives for states to stay in the NPT, especially those prone to conflict.

Expansion on Resolution 4.31: How are we to further enforce a ban on nuclear weapons? How are we to speed up disarmament? How do we convince non-NPT signatories to join the treaty? What do they get out of disarmament? For starters, countries that join NPT can be given Most Favoured Nation status by all the countries across the globe. This is one and only effective economic incentive to keep them from developing nuclear weapons. Many countries developed nuclear weapons for the sake of their country's survival. Terms agreeable to all parties to achieve a safer world is necessary. There have been various close calls in history for a Nuclear Holocaust and the issue of a nuclear zero is paramount to peace.

Incorporating New States into the NPT: There are four nuclear-armed countries that are not signatories to the NPT: Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and India. They are not bound by the disarmament clauses in the treaty and all four countries are involved in major global conflicts which can escalate at any time. They also have growing nuclear stockpiles.⁸⁹ Encouraging them to join the NPT could accelerate the process of a world free of nuclear weapons. There must also be an incentive for these countries to join. The dais urges delegates to be creative with solutions to incentivizing nuclear-armed non-NPT signatories to join.

⁸⁸ "Arms Control." Amnesty International, August 6, 2021. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/>.

⁸⁹ West, Jessica, Branka Marijan, and Emily Standfield. "Regulating New Tools of Warfare: Insights from Humanitarian Disarmament and Arms Control Efforts." Project Ploughshares, March 24, 2022. https://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/regulating-new-tools-of-warfare-insights-from-humanitarian-disarmament-and-arms-control-efforts/.

General Tips for Writing Position Papers and the Conference:

Read the Background Guide! While we unanimously agree it can be an intimidating document, it is ultimately a resource that helps you and gets you started. The more you relate your work to the background guide, the more on track you will be to making productive working papers and speeches!

Research credible sources - We will be checking! These include scholarly articles, peer-reviewed papers, anecdotal work, UN documents and resolutions, legal frameworks and legislations, etc. Do not feel limited by what you can and cannot research, but ensure that they are trustworthy and accurate! If you're not sure, email us and ask!

Position papers should be no more than one page. While I am aware that UTMUN's policy is maximum two pages, mine is one. Be super concise and straight to your point.

Be as specific as you can with your position paper. What legal policy, legislation or framework do you support and why? Why does it advantage your state?

Adhere to your country's foreign policy. You are a unique nation with your own sets of values, beliefs, and political ideologies. The more you stay true to your character, the more productive and healthy debate will follow. As such, be careful who you form blocs with - they might disagree and that is okay!

Equity matters, always. We are dealing with incredibly sensitive topics, so please be mindful about how you approach your country's political stance, even if it is relatively controversial. UTMUN strives to ensure the comfort of all Delegates, and you play a large part in that!

Engage in every way that you can! Model UN is only exciting when you talk, pass notes, form blocs, participate in writing working papers, debate, etc. We rely on you to make the conference lively, don't let us down!

Trust your dais. We are experienced and heavily-trained Model UN staff. If there is anything we can do, during the conference or otherwise, please let us know! If you are new to Model UN, please reach out to us and let us know how we can improve your UTMUN experience!

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