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The Making of Global Governance:
Not by States Alone

In 1985, international bureaucrats working at the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) set a goal: a new international institution to deal with climate change. The United States, the Soviet Union, and many other states opposed this idea. If climate change were to be considered at all, states wanted it to be done in-house, by domestic agencies.

Suddenly, the situation changed. By 1987, the Ronald Reagan administration in the United States hammered out a proposal for a new institution called the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Other states were excluded from the deliberations but swiftly rubber-stamped the plan. Thus, in a brief period, the institutions addressing climate change shifted markedly. From being under the sole purview of domestic agencies, the issue was taken up by a new international body.

This was an idea promoted by UNEP bureaucrats but rejected by the United States and other states just two years earlier. Moreover, despite the Reagan administration's insistence on tight control over climate change dialogue and the fact that it cut out other states from the preparation of the initial proposal, the IPCC is less under the United States' thumb than expected. For example, UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) provide part of its funding. This waters down one of the US government's favorite tactics: directly shaking up organizations by withholding American contributions.

1 The terms “international bureaucrats,” “IGO staff,” “IGO employees,” or “IGO personnel” will be used interchangeably.
2 Agrawala 1998a, 609, 613.
3 Meanwhile, important factors remained constant: Cold War tensions between the United States and Soviet Union, the US presidency of Ronald Reagan, and the tenure of Mostafa Tolba as UNEP Executive-Director.
4 Obasi 1988.
The mystery of the United States and the IPCC does not end there. In fact, the United States’ ongoing friction with the IPCC is as puzzling as the United States’ about-face in leading the organization’s creation. In early 2002, for instance, the United States was grappling with the aftermath of massive terrorist attacks on its own soil. Meanwhile, US President George W. Bush was initiating a series of astonishing moves to hamstring the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Facing a routine decision to nominate an American scientist for a second term as IPCC Chair, Bush refused. Fossil-fuel lobbyists and others with White House connections charged that the Chair had failed to pursue US interests, because he did not dilute the firm and accusatory tone of the Panel’s reports. This was a duty that the Chair, as head of an international organization rather than a domestic agency, did not agree was his.\(^5\)

The United States backed an Indian economist for the position, forcing something unprecedented: a run-off election for a post already occupied by an internationally popular American with eligibility for another term. Then, Bush deployed US State Department personnel on a startling mission—not to cultivate allies in the burgeoning war on terror, but to campaign overseas on behalf of the Indian IPCC candidate and against the American one.

Although the Indian candidate eventually won, US intervention failed. For one thing, it was costly. Time, money, and political capital that the Bush administration and State Department personnel spent challenging the reappointment of the American IPCC Chair could have been spent addressing other pressing international or domestic issues. Furthermore, the maneuver did not yield the desired result. Declaring himself no “toady” of the United States, the Panel’s Indian head immediately rebuked US environmental policies.\(^6\) The grim reports continue—with the latest report released in 2014. The Bush administration resorted to extraordinary measures, but this is merely one of several stymied attempts by the United States to dictate the IPCC’s activities.\(^7\) Ostensibly, the IPCC is a US creation. So why can’t the United States simply use levers that it institutionalized for itself when it crafted the IPCC?\(^8\)

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\(^7\) For example, IPCC staff successfully curbed the skeptical Reagan administration’s direct involvement at the working-group level. But its scientists later also deflected the proactive Clinton administration's attempts, in the working-group plenary, to exaggerate the danger of climate change by reporting only the upper half of the range of the predicted temperature rise (Skodvin 2000b, 116, 134).  
\(^8\) There are numerous plausible explanations for President George W. Bush’s dislike of the IPCC. The puzzle, however, is why his administration failed in derailing it even when they mustered extraordinary US resources to do so.
The Making of Global Governance

This book unravels why. And it demonstrates a phenomenon that goes far beyond environmental organizations—applying, instead, to global governance structures more generally.

The Puzzle

Contemporary global governance involves not only states, but also a variety of non-state actors—such as civil society networks, multinational corporations, or international bureaucrats employed in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).9

IGOs, in particular, are central structures in global governance. They are formal, continuous bodies established among governmental members from sovereign states.10 Moreover, they often serve as conduits between governments and non-state actors. Within the United Nations (UN) system, for instance, the UN Development Program (UNDP) partners with civil society networks to deliver development assistance from donor countries to local populations. Meanwhile, the UN Global Compact commits multinational corporations to the pursuit of shared principles—concerning environmental sustainability, human and labor rights, and anti-corruption—across the countries in which they operate. And of course, the UN Secretariat alone encompasses more than 40,000 international bureaucrats, who interact with approximately 200 member-governments and operate under formal civil service protections while pursuing longer-term careers within the UN system.11

Beyond linking states and non-state actors, IGOs are central global governance structures due to the sheer size and scope of their population. The population has mushroomed from a few dozen intergovernmental organizations in the 1940s, to many hundreds today.12 These hundreds of IGOs now operate across the world, with some functioning on a global scale but many others focusing on specific geographic regions. Moreover, today’s IGOs cover almost every issue imaginable: from the prevention of nuclear proliferation to the preservation of historic sites, from the protection of intellectual property to the eradication of communicable diseases.

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Among non-state actors involved in contemporary global governance, the international bureaucrats within IGOs probably are subject to the most explicit state control. After all, unlike most civil society networks or multinational corporations, IGOs are created by governments or their agents. What is more, that creation process generally institutionalizes the nature of states’ control mechanisms, such as the frequency with which government representatives convene for oversight meetings. Therefore, we would expect many civil society networks or multinational corporations to be relatively free of state control. But for the international bureaucrats working within IGOs, we would not anticipate much “insulation”: a dampening of the stringency of mechanisms by which states can try to steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities.

Insulation is a pivotal organizational characteristic. In practice, it means that states lack common levers of control, such as financial domination or veto power. Once it is in place, states face trouble limiting the tasks to which it can be applied. An organization that is shielded from state intervention for one task also acquires cover for pursuing other initiatives—initiatives for which states may find insulation unnecessary or even unwelcome. Because insulation increases the amount of resources that states would need to expend in order to intervene in an organization’s activities, we would expect insulation to be much greater in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) than in intergovernmental ones.

And yet, within the IGO population there is substantial variation in insulation from state control. For example, some IGOs have access to material resources from state sources only, while others obtain funding from fellow IGOs or even from non-state/non-IGO sources such as non-governmental organizations, business interests, or charitable foundations. In some, only high-level government officials serve as states’ representatives—in others, representatives hail from the private sector, research institutes, civil society, or other positions that are less readily influenced by states. Some IGOs are subject to a remarkable number of state oversight meetings, while others operate for many months without answering to states about their operations. In some, organizational activities are thwarted if even one member-state

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13 Although international bureaucrats operate alongside member-states within international intergovernmental organizations, they are by definition non-state entities. Operating together, the employees in IGOs are “actors,” organized in a hierarchical structure and equipped with collective resources (Bauer 2006, 28–29).

14 Shanks et al. 1996, 593.


16 One might suggest that states, if they deem this by-product objectionable, can simply roll back ways in which the intergovernmental organization is shielded from their intervention. Yet not so surprisingly, exerting control generally requires mechanisms of control. Even insulation flowing directly from purposive actions by states rather than IGO employees is difficult to roll back, for if it were easily reversible it would not have provided the credibility, etc., needed for the IGO’s mission in the first place.
casts a dissenting vote—in others, organizational activities proceed unless numerous states cohere as a blocking coalition.

Conventional wisdom offers two broad explanations for IGOs with dampened state control mechanisms. One is that states install insulation during the initial process of institutional design. That process entails “the devising and realization of rules, procedures, and organizational structures that will enable and constrain behavior so as to accord with held values, achieve desired objectives, or execute given tasks.”\textsuperscript{17} Thus, perhaps the degree of insulation in an IGO reflects states’ interests and/or distribution of power during the design stage. For instance, if a prospective IGO’s state-membership does not include any great-power states to be placated with special privileges, then states can aim for more expeditious decision-making rules built on simple-majority voting rather than a veto for individual members.

A contrasting explanation is that international bureaucrats cultivate insulation in their own IGO over time. Employees within an intergovernmental organization do not simply adapt to the institutional design presented by states. They also alter it.\textsuperscript{18} They erect barriers between their IGO and states, incrementally buffering themselves from states’ interference.\textsuperscript{19} For instance, states can design an IGO to be financed only by themselves, but over time the international bureaucrats within the IGO can decrease this vulnerability by diversifying their funding sources beyond states.

In short, the prevailing views are that an IGO’s insulation exists because states installed it during the initial design process, or because international bureaucrats cultivated it in their own IGO over time.

Both views have contributed to our understanding of global governance in the past. But neither dispels the puzzle of the IPCC, a relatively young organization that seemingly was proposed and crafted largely by a single great power that has been one of climate change’s most vocal skeptics. It is strange if the Republican administration of Ronald Reagan single-handedly designed the IPCC in 1987 but forgot to install mechanisms by which it could influence the organization’s activities in the future. And it also is strange if the Reagan administration did install stringent mechanisms, but the people working within the IPCC succeeded in buffering their new organization so rapidly that by 2002 the Republican administration of George W. Bush had to resort to truly unorthodox methods to intervene in the IPCC’s work. The question remains: why has the United States had such difficulty trying to control its ostensible brainchild?

\textsuperscript{17} Alexander 2005, 213.
\textsuperscript{18} Cox 1969; Barnett and Coleman 2005; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006.
\textsuperscript{19} Hawkins et al. 2006, 37.
Organizational Progeny

Addressing this requires wrestling with the odd behavior of the Reagan administration itself at the organization’s founding. US President Ronald Reagan was a forthright climate change skeptic who maimed the domestic Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and quipped that his record of environmental protection was “one of the best-kept secrets in Washington.” So why did he and his Republican administration reject UNEP employees’ 1985 request for a climate change body, but then suddenly U-turn in 1987 to spearhead the creation of an IGO dedicated to this environmental issue?

Climate change is one of today’s most prominent, costly, and provocative topics. Moreover, IPCC personnel are not pushovers, even vis-à-vis the immensely powerful state that spearheaded the creation of the organization. Hence, the open questions above are cause for concern. The situation is not well explained by either line of conventional wisdom.

But even more important, the puzzle surrounding the IPCC exposes a deeper obstacle to our understanding of institutional design and global governance: existing explanations overlook relevant actors.

The Problem: Existing Explanations Overlook International Bureaucrats

In particular, prevailing views neglect a third possibility, which is the argument of this book:

International bureaucrats working in pre-existing IGOs can—and do—advocate the creation of new institutions, participate in the institutional design process, and dampen the mechanisms by which states endeavor to control new institutions.\(^{21}\)

The result is a large and growing number of “IGO progeny”—organizations that are descendants of other IGOs and that interact in an increasingly complex family tree.\(^{22}\)

Few people recognize this phenomenon and its implications. Oft-cited institutional design examples such as Bretton Woods have molded the way


\(^{21}\) The argument shares the functionalist (Mitrany 1944, 1948) and neo-functionalist (Haas 1958, 1964; Sandholz and Sweet 1998) belief that IGOs gradually accumulate influence over more issue areas. However, it does not share their rationale that this accumulation occurs because states grow increasingly invested in the survival and growth of IGOs.

\(^{22}\) Shanks et al. 1996 use the term “emanations” to refer to intergovernmental organizations created with the participation of international bureaucrats working in pre-existing IGOs. The Yearbook of International Organizations also uses this term, but differently: to flag any offshoot of “persons, places, or bodies,” not only offshoots of IGOs. To avoid confusion, the term “emanation” is not used here.
that scholars and the public think about the IGO design process. For three weeks in July 1944, approximately 700 government representatives from forty-four countries negotiated at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. On the last day they signed an agreement that created the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This well-known example fuels prevailing views that states dictate an IGO’s initial design, with the result that international bureaucrats who will work in that IGO are able only to attempt to insulate it over time.

But prevailing views miss two key, connected points. States do not monopolize the process of designing new IGOs. Moreover, international bureaucrats’ ability to shape global governance structures is not limited to the post-design stage.

Instead, international bureaucrats facilitate the birth of new IGOs. This is not a phenomenon only of the twenty-first century, or even the post-Cold War period. Rather, it can be traced at least as far back as the 1940s, and it has grown since then.

To see this, consider data on 180 IGOs, randomly sampled from—and hence suitably representative of—the overall population of IGOs. The organizations in this new and original Dataset of IGO Creation can be divided according to the time period in which each was created: prior to 1945; during the post-World War II institution-building frenzy of 1945–1949; or in each subsequent decade from the 1950s to the 2000s. Then, the IGOs can be portrayed with percentages, as a way of standardizing across eras that may have produced different numbers of IGOs. For each era, Figure 1.1 displays the percentage of the IGOs created by states alone, versus the percentage that was IGO progeny, created with the involvement of international bureaucrats working in pre-existing IGOs.

The figure shows that states indeed monopolized institutional design processes prior to 1945. However, even in the vigorous institution-building of the early postwar period, states did not maintain the monopoly. True, states alone produced postwar IGOs such as the Council of Europe (CoE), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Food and Agriculture Organization.
(FAO). Nevertheless, international bureaucrats were involved in creating about 40 percent of the randomly sampled IGOs from this era. In fact, even nascent bureaucracies were involved: in 1948, for instance, the UN bureaucracy participated in establishing the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), while the FAO bureaucracy participated in establishing the Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC).

Even more striking: from the 1950s onward, IGO progeny account for the majority (between about 55 and 80 percent) of international intergovernmental organizations that were established. For a half-century, state monopolization of the design process has been the exception. IGO progeny have become the rule.

Intergovernmental organizations are central structures in global governance, and this phenomenon produces an important net result in the contemporary IGO population: overall, a remarkable 65 percent of today’s IGOs were crafted not by states alone, but with the participation of international bureaucrats.27

This amounts to hundreds of organizations, which function in every part of the world and deal with an array of issues. The personnel of pre-existing IGOs participated in various ways to make these organizations – in other words, international bureaucrats’ design roles vary. For example,

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international bureaucrats from six organizations within the UN family collectively launched the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) to quell a pandemic, and states were largely sidelined to a rubber-stamping role. In contrast, staff of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) negotiated with states—and at states’ invitation—in order to introduce the International Energy Agency (IEA) to alleviate threats to energy supplies. Occupying middle ground, proposals from the UN secretariat became the foundation on which the Economic and Social Council and the United Nations General Assembly established the UNDP to aid the world’s poor countries.

The point is that international bureaucrats make and shape additional international bureaucracy in various ways. Yet scholarship routinely ignores this.28 International bureaucrats may be consequential in the real world, but they rarely are consequential in theories about the creation and design of global governance structures. As a result, international bureaucrats “may be looked at as intervening factors that somehow affect regime outcomes—but more often than not, they are not really looked at.”29

Even without the phenomenon of IGO progeny, the international bureaucracy warrants attention. It consists of agencies that pursue policies in the international arena, have been set up by public actors, possess some degree of permanence and coherence, and are beyond formal direct control of individual national governments.30 Its reach extends into every corner of the world. Its numbers rival the size of the public sector in a medium-sized state. Its budget exceeds those of many countries.31

Thus, neglect of international bureaucrats is problematic for theory and policy. For one thing, international relations scholarship does not provide ready answers for some fundamental questions:

28 Realism has paid them little mind, for their impact on powerful states is taken to be theoretically unlikely (Morgenthau 1967; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994/1995). Liberal institutionalism’s lengthy scholarly excursion into regime analysis attached no great importance to IGO employees’ potential political roles and therefore dealt with them only perfunctorily (De Senarclens 2001, 510; Bauer 2009, 18). Constructivism has devoted quite a bit of attention to IGO employees’ role in transforming their own organizations but much less to their role in creating new organizations (Cox 1969; Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Hurd 1999; Wendt 2001; Barnett and Coleman 2005).


30 Bierman and Siebenhüner 2009a, 3; Bierman et al. 2009, 37–39. This definition distinguishes international bureaucracies from national ones, parses out bureaucrats from intergovernmental organizational structures as a whole, and does allow for multilateral mechanisms of control.

31 Mathiason 2007, 2–3. For instance, the UN’s biennial budget for 2006–2007 was US$3.6 billion, with an additional US$3.6 billion for the specialized agencies of the UN system, not including the Bretton Woods institutions (i.e., the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization).
Organizational Progeny

Why do international bureaucrats’ institutional design roles vary—and what impact do their design activities have on the institutions that result?\(^{32}\)

Furthermore, it offers little guidance to politicians and other practitioners interested in reforming institutional design processes and global governance structures. This is because international relations scholarship has not captured the ways in which international bureaucrats shape these things in the first place.\(^{33}\)

The Solution: Link Institutional Design, Principal–Agent Relationships, and Bureaucracy

This book overcomes these problems by establishing links among three core political topics: institutional design, principal–agent relationships, and bureaucracy.

The institutional design process is momentous, particularly due to institutions’ well-known tendency toward path dependence: institutionalized arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.\(^{34}\) Hence, the institutional design process entails a bargaining context in which participants contrive to turn their design visions into a reality that serves their objectives well into the future.\(^{35}\) In this context, agenda-setting—that is, an actor exerting its will by circumscribing the choice sets of other actors—looms large.\(^{36}\) Circumscribing other actors’ choice sets is as simple as shifting the prevailing state of affairs, the status quo, to which other actors refer in evaluating their options. The greater the extent to which a given design participant manipulates the status quo to which others refer, the more the resultant design tends to reflect the objectives of that participant.

Many observers equate “institutional design participants” with states. However, this presumption is difficult to justify in the face of principal–agent (P–A) notions, which characterize states as principals and international bureaucrats as their agents.\(^{37}\) The reality is that the inevitability of incomplete contracting affords agents with leeway,\(^{38}\) and international bureaucrats regularly enter the institutional design arena. And P–A notions imply that

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\(^{32}\) Hafner-Burton et al. 2008 note that an even more basic question remains unanswered: what impact the increasing number of IGOs has on the formation of new organizations (183). This book addresses that gap as well.

\(^{33}\) Bierman and Siebenhüner 2009a, 6.

\(^{34}\) Levi 1997, 28; North 1990.


\(^{36}\) Gruber 2000, 277.

\(^{37}\) Nielson and Tierney 2003; Cortell and Peterson 2006; Hawkins et al. 2006; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006; Lyne et al. 2006; Martin 2006; Pollack 2006; Thompson 2006.

\(^{38}\) Hart 1995.
they, like any agent in any arena, accumulate expertise and other resources that aid them in pursuing objectives of their own.

Ultimate objectives of international bureaucrats include material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement.\textsuperscript{39} Insulation from states’ interference is a facilitating objective that aids in attaining these ultimate objectives.\textsuperscript{40} But previous research has focused on international bureaucrats’ maneuvers to insulate their immediate organizations, without recognizing that international bureaucrats also stand to benefit from insulating new IGOs within the broader family tree.

Thus, by linking what we know about three core topics in political science—institutional design, principal–agent relationships, and bureaucracy—we gain crucial insights into a particular type of non-state actor: international bureaucrats employed in IGOs. But this focus does not suggest that other non-state actors are unimportant. Quite the contrary. Because traditional international relations theories have centered on states, personnel in IGOs ought to pose an easy case for state-centric notions to explain away and a \textit{hard} case for demonstrating how non-state actors matter in global governance. After all, other non-state actors—civil society networks, multinational corporations, and so on—are not under states’ thumbs to the extent that international bureaucrats are.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, these other actors are bracketed until Chapter 7. In the meantime, the general importance of non-state actors will be well established if it is shown that even state-constrained international bureaucrats matter.

And they do.

\textbf{The Argument in Brief: International Bureaucrats Insulate New Global Governance Structures}

This book presents an explanation of international bureaucrats’ role and impact in the important process of institutional design. It argues that \textit{during the initial design process, international bureaucrats working in pre-existing IGOs insulate new IGOs from states’ interference}. Personnel in pre-existing IGOs possess an interest in participating in the institutional design process and setting the design agenda, in order to shape design outcomes for new IGOs in their organizational family.\textsuperscript{42} Motive meets opportunities afforded by two factors revolving around international bureaucrats themselves.

\textsuperscript{39} These ultimate objectives, adopted from Barnett and Coleman 2005, can include many things—such as professional promotions (under material security) or the cultivation of policy communities (under policy advancement).

\textsuperscript{40} Barnett and Coleman 2005, 598.

\textsuperscript{41} Jonsson and Tallberg 2010.

\textsuperscript{42} See Gruber 2000 for a different, but related, take on the importance of agenda-setting. By creating international institutions themselves, powerful states may be able to shift the status
One is their own insulation. International bureaucrats are particularly well positioned if their own organization is only moderately buffered from state intervention. After all, personnel in a highly insulated IGO would have little motivation to seek additional buffers from state interference. Meanwhile, personnel in a stringently controlled IGO would have little space in which to do so.

The second factor is the availability of allies—personnel in fellow intergovernmental organizations, in NGOs, in the private sector, in epistemic communities, and so on—to aid international bureaucrats in pressuring or evading states.43 Allies empower IGO personnel in taking advantage of “two-level games,” the interactions between international and domestic politics. These interactions often offer multiple policies that could satisfy groups at both levels. It is well established that national leaders and domestic civil society groups can benefit from this multiplicity of viable policies, playing one level against the other in order to get closer to their own preferred policy within that choice-set. But national leaders and domestic civil society groups are not alone in being able to benefit from this strategic environment: international bureaucrats can, too. Partnering with staff in fellow IGOs can amplify pressure on states at the international level, and partnering with local civil society groups can amplify pressure on states at the domestic level. Partnering with transnational civil society groups holds the promise of amplifying pressure domestically as well as internationally.

International bureaucrats capitalize on their own insulation and their allies to set the institutional design agenda for states. And if IGO staff have an extensive agenda-setting role, they might even succeed in presenting states with a fait accompli that advances their own objectives by loosening mechanisms of state control in new bodies within their organizational family.44 Mechanisms of state control range from management of resources, to institutional oversight, to decision-making practices. Even in seemingly marginal ways such as supplying secretariat services for states’ own design negotiations, international bureaucrats affect the flow and content of information.

quo to which weaker states refer when choosing whether or not to participate in an international institution. That is, a weaker state may wish that the institution did not exist, but it cannot return to such a world. Instead, it can choose only between joining the institution or remaining outside of it. International bureaucrats can put weak and strong states in a similar bind.


44 Agenda-setting and insulation from state control are distinct concepts. Staff of extant IGOs do not merely replicate their own characteristics in new institutional designs. Consider, for example, the OECD and the offshoot that its staff helped to create: the IEA. While decision-making in the OECD requires unanimity among member states (i.e., stringent state control, with an effective veto wielded by every state), decision-making in the IEA follows majority voting rules and therefore is more insulated from state control than is its antecedent.
But there are other, more powerful, means by which they can agenda-set, shifting the status quo to which states refer. By organizing conferences, they can force an issue to the table for international discussion; by crafting their own design plans, they can compel states to counteroffer or acquiesce. In the aggregate, states’ control mechanisms are chipped away, and states literally “lose control” as global governance structures become more insulated against channels by which states otherwise could intervene.45

Two scope conditions limit this theory about IGO progeny and states’ loss of control. If a prospective organization would cover a matter whose salience for states is high, then the book’s argument about international bureaucrats’ design role and impact might not apply. Specifically, states tend to jealously guard the institutional design arena for issues of “high politics,” which directly pertain to state security or survival.46 When such salient matters are at stake, states permit relatively little institutionalization at the international level—and the institutionalization that does exist tends to be designed by states alone. Similarly, the book’s argument might not hold if design negotiations involve a highly capable group of states. When states are free of challenges such as technical uncertainty, a lack of resources, or collective action problems working as a cohesive group, then they can more easily keep international bureaucrats out of the institutional design arena. In short: losing control is less likely if institutional design negotiations deal with high-politics concerns or involve a cohesive group of technically adept and well-resourced states.

But these constraints apply to only a minority of institutional design scenarios. To see this, again consider the random sample of international intergovernmental organizations. As Figure 1.2 illustrates, less than 15 percent of today’s IGOs deal with high-politics matters such as defense, energy, or governance.47 An additional 10 percent or so are “general cooperation” IGOs—for example, the Organization of American States (OAS) or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Such IGOs are not pigeonholed in just one or two narrow issue areas but instead encompass cooperation in a variety of high-politics and non-high-politics matters simultaneously.

45 How this plays out over generations of IGO progeny is an interesting question, but theoretical and empirical considerations put this question beyond the book’s scope. From a theoretical standpoint: the first-order concern is whether IGO progeny are meaningfully different from IGOs created by states alone. From an empirical standpoint: because IGO progeny are a post-World War II phenomenon, their proliferation (while stark) remains concentrated in just one or two generations of offspring.
46 Cox and Jacobson 1974; Lipson 1984.
47 Examples include the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) or the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
However, the remaining 75 percent of the IGO population focus on non-high-politics matters: economic issues such as trade or monetary policy, social issues such as health or education, or a combination of economic and social issues. Even with the high-politics scope condition, the book’s theory applies to the vast majority of institutional design scenarios.

The same is true for the scope condition pertaining to states’ capabilities. In some circumstances, states truly are free of challenges pertaining to uncertainty, resources, or heterogeneity. The origins of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—described in greater detail in Chapter 7—is an example. International bureaucrats from the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the IMF, and other relevant pre-existing IGOs essentially had no role in the design negotiations that created the FATF in the late 1980s. Instead, states dominated the process, and unsurprisingly, the resulting institution exhibits very stringent mechanisms enabling formal state control.

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48 Examples include the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) or the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

49 Examples include the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) or the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).

50 Examples include the African Development Bank (AfDB) or European Forestry Commission (EFC).
But the circumstances in which the FATF was designed are uncommon. The Ronald Reagan administration in the United States led a small and closely knit group of wealthy democracies in standardizing international anti-money laundering practices in accordance with technical practices that the US Treasury Department already had developed domestically. Institutional design scenarios do not usually look like this. For instance, only about 5 percent of the randomly sampled IGOs share the FATF’s initial focus on developed states alone. Instead, lower-capacity developing states usually participate in IGO design negotiations, and that makes it more likely that the group of negotiating states suffers from technical uncertainty, a lack of resources, and/or collective action problems. Therefore the high-capabilities scope condition, too, leaves many institutional design scenarios subject to this book’s argument.

**The Research Approach**

In testing its argument, the book probes two fundamental but neglected questions: why international bureaucrats’ institutional design roles vary, and what impact their design activities have on the institutions that result. The answers are connected. In the majority of design scenarios, issues of high-politics are not at stake and there are some soft spots in states’ capabilities. Under such circumstances, the extent to which international bureaucrats from pre-existing IGOs set the institutional design agenda is shaped by two factors: international bureaucrats’ own buffers from states’ interference, and international bureaucrats’ alliances with personnel in fellow IGOs or in civil society groups. And in turn, the extent to which international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda affects the extent to which they are able to instill new IGOs with insulation from mechanisms of state control.

These theoretical predictions are tested with three complementary research methods, which are explained in greater detail below:

1) Generalizable “large-N” quantitative analyses of the new and original *Dataset of IGO Creation*, which is representative of the overall IGO population

2) Process-tracing within a detailed case study of a prominent IGO

3) Qualitative comparisons across the origins of three prominent IGOs.

Together, these methods provide breadth and depth.51 First, quantitative analyses demonstrate that the book’s argument about international

bureaucrats’ design role and impact holds in the IGO population generally. Then, a detailed case study works out the IPCC puzzle—a puzzle that remains unresolved by prevailing views that states monopolize institutional design activities and that international bureaucrats’ ability to shape global governance structures is limited to the post-design stage. And last, the qualitative comparisons establish that the book’s argument about IGO progeny explains other prominent intergovernmental organizations as well—across a variety of issue areas, time periods, and international bureaucracies.

Quantitative Analyses of Randomly Sampled Observations

Large-N quantitative analyses, which encompass numerous observations, are essential for discovering whether the book’s predictions hold across many IGOs. Statistical techniques can control for numerous other factors and even incorporate the possibility of selection or endogeneity—that is, the possibility that factors making stringent state control mechanisms less likely also make international bureaucrats’ participation in institutional design processes more likely. Meanwhile, more intuitive quantitative approaches—such as matching or correlations—can show how different factors relate to one another within subsets of similar observations.

Randomly selecting the sample from the *Yearbook of International Organizations* ensures that the *Dataset of IGO Creation* is representative of the IGO population as a whole. This alleviates “the limited amount of comparative research on international organizations and the small number of the total population of organizations that receive the attention of researchers.” The dataset captures the nature of international bureaucrats’ involvement in designing each randomly sampled IGO: none, supplying information, sponsoring conferences, negotiating at the invitation of states, crafting design proposals to be considered by states, or serving as predominant creators. In addition, the dataset includes other variables—such as the organization’s age—to control for alternative explanations of international bureaucrats’ institutional design roles or IGOs’ insulation from state interference.

52 Strictly speaking, the complication is more about selection than endogeneity. The intergenerational dynamics impede a chicken-and-egg problem in which the level of insulation of IGO progeny directly reverberates to increase the extent of the parent bureaucracy’s agenda-setting in subsequent negotiations that create other IGOs. However, because people sometimes use the term “endogeneity” in a more general way to refer to things that are influenced by factors within the same system, both endogeneity and selection are mentioned here.

53 For all IGOs in the sample, *Yearbook* entries were verified and augmented with supplementary sources such as the individual websites of the organizations, the Register of United Nations Bodies, the United Nations Bibliographic Information System, and the United Nations Treaty Series.

Unlike previous work, this book probes multiple mechanisms of state control: financial domination, oversight meetings, veto power, and monopolization of delegates. This mirrors theory and real-world observations, which indicate that states exert influence not only by blocking or reversing organizational activities, but also by steering or monitoring them in the first place.\(^{55}\) It requires no presumptions about one mechanism being more worthy of examination than others. And it facilitates a more comprehensive evaluation, by probing whether institutional design agenda-setting by international bureaucrats has an impact generally, or only on particular mechanisms of state control.

Considering formal state control mechanisms presents a tough test for the argument that international bureaucrats shape institutional design processes and outcomes.\(^{56}\) After all, designs with loosened formal mechanisms impose real costs on states, lie in plain view rather than being obscured, and tend to endure with their incorporation into official documents. If international bureaucrats matter only marginally or not at all, then one would not expect to find support for the argument by looking here.

**Process-Tracing within a Detailed Case Study**

Large-N quantitative analyses provide breadth, enabling us to verify whether the book’s theory is generalizable to the overall universe of IGOs that exist today. In contrast, small-n qualitative analyses provide depth. They allow us to investigate whether the book’s theory on IGO progeny applies to the subset of prominent intergovernmental organizations about which scholars or practitioners are most likely to care. They also enable us to probe counterfactuals by comparing existing IGOs to organizations that were proposed but not actually created, or to organizations that were created but did not survive. And they can resolve the book’s opening conundrum concerning the IPCC’s surprising existence and its notable insulation from states’ interference.

In particular, the method of process-tracing lays bare the causal mechanisms at work in important instances, while also uncovering actors’ motivations, tactics, and sequencing of interactions. This qualitative approach looks

\(^{55}\) Cox and Jacobson 1974. The four general channels emphasized by the authors (i.e., controlling resources, blocking actions, initiating actions, and brokering deals) are similar to the management of resources, institutional oversight, and decision-making practices discussed here.

\(^{56}\) For an overview of the formal and informal channels used by states and other actors to exert influence within intergovernmental organizations, see Cox and Jacobson 1974. Certainly, states may attempt to control IGOs by less formal means (Stone 2011), and IGO staff may seek insulation from these less-formal mechanisms as well. Because the received literature pays little attention to the role of IGO personnel in institutional design, however, this book begins by demonstrating that their involvement is having an impact even on states’ common, formal mechanisms of control. Less-formal mechanisms remain an avenue for further research.
at “the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes,” and this shows how agenda-setting and status quo-shifting alter actors’ assessments of how assorted design options serve their objectives. It also portrays the reality that neither states nor international bureaucracies always act cohesively as unitary actors.

In addition, the method uncovers sub-cases for a within-case probe. A few years before their involvement in crafting the IPCC, international bureaucrats from UNEP and the WMO participated in creating a different climate change institution. That institution, the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) permits fruitful comparisons with the IPCC itself: the two sub-cases keep many factors (such as issue area) unchanged while the theory’s main aspects (such as the extent of international bureaucrats’ design agenda-setting) vary. This boosts confidence that any differences in design outcomes stem from differences in international bureaucrats’ agenda-setting, not from other factors.

The within-case probe draws from secondary materials and also benefits from a variety of primary sources. For example, the extensive Public Papers of the Presidents offers the public messages, news conference remarks, speeches, and statements of US President Ronald Reagan. Writings, speeches, and press releases by the UNEP Executive-Director Mostafa Tolba, the WMO Secretary-General Patrick Obasi, the inaugural IPCC Chairman Bert Bolin, and US Environmental Protection Agency employees Alan Hecht and Dennis Tirpak provide first-hand accounts from various actors involved in the debate over whether to create an international climate change organization. Author interviews with people such as Michael Oppenheimer of the AGGG afford further insight.

This approach solves the puzzle of the IPCC. Cursory consideration only of the Reagan administration’s proposal could give the mistaken impression that the origin of the organization is handily explained by looking at states alone. A narrow focus on states assumes away important activities by other actors, and thus it finds none. But in fact, international bureaucrats from the WMO and UNEP played a central role—in determining whether the design process would be undertaken at all, whether employees from pre-existing

57 George and McKeown 1985, 35. 58 Reinalda and Verbeek 2004b, 239–240.
59 Theorizing is “a dynamic process between deduction and induction” (Kelley 2004, 24). This study began with the theoretical framework's prediction that more extensive involvement by international bureaucrats in institutional design results in designs that are more insulated from common mechanisms of state control—in terms of management of resources, institutional oversight, and decision-making practices—than designs created by states alone. The prediction then was tested using the case of the IPCC, which provided further insights into international bureaucrats’ proactiveness in shifting the status quo to which states refer. Then, the quantitative analyses and additional case studies were employed as further tests of the enriched theoretical framework.
IGOs would participate in that process, and how the new organization would look.60

After organizing conferences to promote the idea of an international institution dedicated to climate change, UNEP and WMO personnel directly lobbied the US government with design demands.61 Then they proceeded, without states, in launching a provocative and highly insulated climate change institution of their own.62 This shifted the status quo to which states referred and placed states in a reactive position.63 States could choose not to cooperate with the new body, and they could even maneuver to bring about a substitute more to their liking. However, they could not return to a world in which climate change was not discussed on the international stage, or one in which it was not addressed by an international institution. For the Reagan administration, this made the creation of the IPCC look attractive by comparison, even though it meant less control than if the issue could have remained corralled within the domestic realm.64

In the subsequent negotiations to design the IPCC, staff of UNEP and the WMO did not set the agenda alone. Instead, they bargained with officials from the US government.65 With international bureaucrats facing a single superpower in design negotiations, one might expect the resulting IPCC to exhibit extremely stringent mechanisms of state control, reflecting the Reagan administration's determination to keep the multilateralism of this topic in check. Yet, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, people working within the Panel are buffered from state intervention in a number of ways.66

This is unsurprising to people who worked closely with UNEP's forceful Executive-Director, Mostafa Tolba. After all, as one high-level UNEP employee put it: Tolba was “the kind of UN official who would lock [government officials] in a room and at four o'clock in the morning say, ‘You can't leave until you agree to something.’”67 In the end, the institutional design outcome was a compromise—between the United States' inclination toward stringent mechanisms of state control on the one hand, and international bureaucrats' inclination toward insulation from state control on the other.68

There are tangible effects. Since its creation, the IPCC's insulation has stymied intervention by states, including the United States itself. This is partly due to the insulation that UNEP and WMO bureaucrats managed to install during initial design negotiations—and also partly due to IPCC personnel

60 Tolba 1983; Boehmer-Christiansen 1994a, 1994b; Author interview June 2013.
64 Agrawala 1998a, 1998b; Author interview, September 2009.
parlaying that moderate initial insulation into further buffers vis-à-vis states. Five years into the existence of the IPCC, for instance, the organization’s first Chair successfully pushed to replace government officials with scientists in all IPCC working groups, even the US-led working group on policy responses to climate change. The added insulation from state control affects IGO efficacy: the organization’s legitimacy suffers less from states’ fickle interference but instead hinges on how favorably policymakers and the public view the scientific community. When that view sours—as it did among officials in the George W. Bush administration in the early 2000s—states may refuse to cooperate, or even launch an attack against the organization.

Certainly, the IPCC case is distinctive in some respects. After all, the push for a new IGO does not always come from international bureaucrats working in a pre-existing IGO, those international bureaucrats do not always undertake maneuvers as bold as launching a provocative advisory group of their own, and a powerful state does not always resort to such unorthodox means in attempting to undermine an organization that would seem to be its brainchild. Nevertheless, the IPCC provides an indispensible lesson about the danger of narrowly focusing on states. If the potential importance of non-state actors is assumed away a priori, it is never explored—and hence, never found. This self-fulfilling prophecy hinders our understanding of global governance. But without puzzles such as the ones probed here, the problem goes unnoticed. The IPCC puzzle disappears only after considering non-state actors too.

Qualitative Comparisons across Prominent Cases

The case of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change demonstrates that the book’s argument can apply to prominent IGOs, and a third approach takes this even farther. The book pursues qualitative comparisons of the origins of three prominent intergovernmental organizations: the World Food Program (WFP), the UNDP, and UNAIDS. These three cases encompass additional issue areas, time periods, and international bureaucracies. In addition, the first case also offers sub-cases for deeper comparisons: international bureaucrats tried and failed to establish a World Food Board in the late 1940s, but that proposal inspired the blueprint for the WFP launched fifteen years later.

With the focus on prominent IGOs rather than the general population, the cases are not selected at random from the overall universe of IGOs. After all, the first part of the analysis—which involves a large number of randomly

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69 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1992.
selected intergovernmental organizations—already provides evidence from a representative sample of the IGO population. That representative sample even includes organizations that were created by states alone, without any involvement by international bureaucrats in pre-existing IGOs. The comparative qualitative accounts, in contrast, consider only prominent organizations that are IGO progeny, created with some type of participation by international bureaucrats.

Specifically, “prominent” entails two requirements that shrink the pool of potential cases. First, an organization’s initial design negotiations must have involved at least one great-power state: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, or the United States. If a great-power state deemed the prospective IGO important enough to warrant participation in institutional design negotiations, this signals a prominent IGO. Second, an IGO must be global, rather than operating only in one geographic region or across a few regions. This ensures that the organization’s activities are relevant around the globe. In addition to saying something important about intergovernmental organizations as a whole, the theoretical argument ought to make sense of organizations that are among the foremost in the world.

From this constrained pool, the three IGOs were chosen in order to capture different issue areas, time periods, and international bureaucracies. The WFP, UNDP, and UNAIDS deal with a variety of important issues: agriculture, economic development, and health. In addition, they stem from a variety of time periods: the 1930s to 1960s for the WFP, the 1940s to 1960s for the UNDP, and the 1980s to 1990s for UNAIDS. Their origins also involve different international bureaucracies: staff of the FAO, the UN secretariat, employees from the WHO, and so on. As in the quantitative analyses, this variation is useful for verifying whether the predictions about IGO personnel hold in a variety of circumstances.

The approach reveals that the roots of the WFP extend much further back than the organization’s official creation in the 1960s. And it, too, owes its existence to the relentlessness of international bureaucrats. Over the course of more than a decade, personnel in the FAO sustained a bold institutional design vision, using information campaigns and concrete design proposals to alter states’ reference point. They also bolstered their bargaining position in two critical ways: 1) by successfully lobbying to relocate FAO headquarters from Washington DC to Rome, where they would be freer from interference by US government officials, and 2) by intensifying their alliances with international bureaucrats elsewhere in the UN system, as well as with civil society groups. In the end, states “requested” that FAO bureaucrats assemble a proposal for an organization to manage global agricultural supplies. For years, international bureaucrats had campaigned in favor of such an organization and had enunciated their design vision. Thus, what initially looks
like delegation from states was in fact post hoc authorization for status quo shifting that international bureaucrats had done on their own. The resulting IGO, moreover, exhibits distinctive forms of insulation from state control—for instance, the full state-membership never meets to oversee organizational activities, and instead the governing board consists of only a subset of the membership at any given time.

International bureaucrats’ agenda-setting was similarly significant in the origins of the UNDP, and the organization’s design reflects this. From the late 1940s into the 1950s, David Owen, Hans Singer, and other UN bureaucrats reached out to poor states, encouraging them to use their numbers in the UN General Assembly in order to demand the kind of development institution that Owen and his colleagues wished to construct. With this and a variety of other tactics, they successfully badgered powerful states into implementing their proposal for an Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA). Through EPTA, UN personnel would be able to guide poor countries in development projects. But this was only a portion of their overall design vision: they also desired a complementary financing arm for the projects. And they wanted to make sure that both the technical and the financial bodies were protected from the sorts of state intervention that had interrupted their own work in the past. By 1966, the efforts of Owen and others would result in the establishment of the UN Development Program. Not only is the UNDP more insulated from state control than if states had operated on their own—but what is more, it is a body that powerful states refused at first.

International bureaucrats exhibited an even greater role and impact in the origins of UNAIDS. As AIDS spread in the 1980s, the WHO was the first IGO to deal explicitly with the pandemic, with an in-house Global Program on AIDS (GPA). Strong and weak states alike quickly came to rely on the GPA for policy advice versus this frightening disease. International bureaucrats in five other intergovernmental organizations—the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); UNDP; the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); and the World Bank—later capitalized on their differing areas of expertise and launched AIDS initiatives of their own. In the early 1990s, the United States, Sweden, and the Netherlands tired of dealing with multiple in-house programs. These states demanded the creation of a single agency, dedicated to AIDS and placed under the UN umbrella. But they lacked the wherewithal to construct such a body themselves. After all, it was international bureaucrats who possessed comprehensive and global know-how about numerous aspects of the pandemic: health, children, social work, education, family planning, economic growth. In order to coax the six pre-existing agencies to hand their operations to a new body, states had to cede institutional design leadership to them. International bureaucrats would take advantage of this role,
implementing a design with innovative insulation from the state “meddling” that their own organizations had experienced.

The bottom line: IGOs vary in their insulation from states’ interference. The three-pronged research approach of quantitative analyses, a within-case probe, and a cross-case probe reveals that this is not merely because states sometimes install insulation during the initial design process, or because international bureaucrats sometimes buffer their own organizations over time. Rather, it is because in the initial design stage, international bureaucrats working in pre-existing IGOs set the design agenda and insulate new IGOs from states’ intervention.

Why This Matters

These findings yield practical, real-world implications. For one thing, they enhance our understanding of global governance by uncovering the role of international bureaucrats in the institutional design arena—a place long thought to be a bastion of state domination. Two-thirds of today’s international intergovernmental organizations are IGO progeny, crafted with the involvement of international bureaucrats employed in pre-existing IGOs. In making global governance structures, states contend not only with each other, but also with the international bureaucracy already in place. In fact, the case studies illustrate that international bureaucrats can even bring to fruition bodies that states initially opposed.

Furthermore, by parsing out the different roles that international bureaucrats play, we see their impact on specific design elements. A general pattern emerges: the more that international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda, the more the resulting institution will be insulated from interference by states. Encountering new IGOs with dampened formal mechanisms of state control—financial domination, oversight meetings, veto power, or monopolization of delegates—imposes tangible costs on states. As mentioned, this raises the amount of resources that states would have to expend to steer, monitor, or reverse the new organization’s activities. Insulation provides protection from states’ intervention. Moreover, once in place it is difficult to roll back: exerting control often relies on having levers of stringent control available in the first place.

As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8, the findings offer concrete lessons for international bureaucrats who wish to nurture this phenomenon. Appreciate the pivotal nature of agenda-setting. Strive to strengthen one’s own insulation or alliances prior to design negotiations. And seek favorable circumstances in which states either will not or cannot resist the design overtures of employees in existing IGOs.
The findings also offer concrete lessons for government officials who wish to stanch the design phenomenon. Start by addressing laxity in issues other than high-politics and reducing reliance on international bureaucrats’ expertise. Then, pay keen attention to organizational charters, ensuring that any new ones include clauses that limit international bureaucrats’ rights and responsibilities in future institutional design negotiations.

Of course, whether the phenomenon should be stanch is a complex question—and this book highlights new information for practitioners to consider. Observers already worry that democratic deficits and lack of accountability plague global governance, because IGOs are far removed from the attention and control of the general public. Uncovering international bureaucrats’ design role and impact compounds these concerns, because the phenomenon demonstrates that the delegation “chain” is even longer than previously realized. It not only extends from national publics, to national governments, to a web of IGOs. Instead, the chain lengthens within the organizational web, as international bureaucrats in pre-existing IGOs craft and delegate to progeny that are more insulated from states’ interference.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the phenomenon also has positive aspects for legitimacy and effectiveness. IGO personnel hail from around the world and are charged formally with operating in support of all member-states. Free from the constraints of a narrow electoral constituency, and generally possessing specialized expertise, they are well positioned to take actions on behalf of a wider public. Their policies often support weaker actors vis-à-vis strong ones, or collective aims vis-à-vis particularistic ones. This offers a healthy counterbalance to powerful states’ attempts to pursue their own objectives in the institutional design process and afterward. International bureaucrats’ inclination to insulate new institutions from mechanisms of political control enhances this desirable positioning.

Beyond these practical implications, this book yields theoretical contributions. Most fundamental: it exposes oversights in prevailing views that an IGO’s insulation exists only if states installed it during the initial design process, or if international bureaucrats cultivated it in their own IGO over time. Instead, institutional design is a process by which international bureaucrats pursue insulation in their wider organizational family.

This, in turn, challenges what we think we know about institutional design in general and intergovernmental organizations in particular. IGOs are thought to exist because states demanded them, and look as they do because states crafted them that way. However, this book demonstrates that

71 Mashaw 1985.
72 Bierman and Siebenhüner 2009a, 3.
73 Fearon and Wendt 2002.
actors other than states advocate the creation of new institutions and shape the mechanisms by which states endeavor to control new bodies. The challenge is not going away. In fact, it is likely to grow ever more pertinent. While traditional state-created IGOs remain a “relatively stable core” of the universe of active intergovernmental organizations, the number of IGO progeny has exploded in the past several decades.74

Reassessing what we think we know about intergovernmental organizations has further implications for two seemingly distinct lines of research: that on institutional design, and that on international bureaucracy. The theoretical framework draws on both literatures, demonstrating that scholars of design and bureaucracy actually have much to say to one another. What we know about the behavior of participants in institutional design applies not only to states (as commonly supposed) but also to the personnel of pre-existing IGOs. Furthermore, what we know about the impact of the international bureaucracy applies not only to arenas in which IGO staff are left largely to their own devices, but also to the institutional design arena, which generally has been presumed to be monopolized by states.75 Each body of work is enhanced by the insights of the other, suggesting even richer research agendas ahead.

Probing these links also deepens our understanding of agency relationships. International relations scholarship has begun characterizing state–IGO relationships in terms of delegation: states are principals, and IGOs are their agents. This growing line of research generates valuable insights. Nevertheless, it misses crucial points. Design of agency contracts takes place within organizational webs rather than in isolation, and delegation occurs in chains rather than in single links.76 Either directly or indirectly, international bureaucrats in IGOs are agents of states—but they also may be agents of other international bureaucrats, and sometimes they act as principals themselves. Thus, they are in central positions, with the potential to push “up” against state-principals as well as “down” against agents of their own.

Hence, the separate lines of work on delegation, institutional design, and bureaucracy are in fact intertwined: bureaucrats shape new institutions in ways that complicate the delegation challenges of governance.

74 Shanks et al. 1996, 600.
75 See, for example, Reinalda and Verbeek 1998, 2004; Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Barnett and Coleman 2005; Hawkins et al., 2006; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006; Bierman and Siebenhüner 2009; Grigorescu 2010. I characterize this body of work as examining “international bureaucracy,” for this is a common underlying theme in research done by people interested in principal–agent models, constructivism, organizational ecology, international civil service, IGO independence, and so on.
Even more broadly, this book shows how, when, and why non-state actors make a difference in politics. If even intergovernmental organizations are not reducible merely to their member-states, how much more so is this true for other non-state actors? Certainly states matter, and sometimes they matter most. Yet the theoretical parsimony achieved by overlooking non-state actors is problematic if it creates puzzles rather than solving them. Friction between IPCC personnel and the United States—the great-power state that proposed its creation and initially was the only state involved in designing it—is a case in point.

In short, the findings matter for both practical and theoretical reasons. Consequently, the central position of unelected IGO staff must be investigated and understood. To do so, the book proceeds in three parts: theory, empirics, and synthesis.

Chapter 2 develops a theory of why international bureaucrats’ design roles vary, while Chapter 3 develops a complementary theory of how their participation in the institutional design process has an impact on new institutions that emerge. After that, three chapters probe the theoretical predictions with a battery of quantitative and qualitative empirical approaches. Chapter 4 demonstrates the theory’s breadth and generalizability through large-N quantitative analyses of the new and original Dataset of IGO Creation. With detailed process-tracing of the origins and history of the IPCC, Chapter 5 demonstrates the theory’s depth and its ability to clear the opening puzzle of this book. Then, Chapter 6 wedds the breadth of datasets and the depth of case studies by qualitatively comparing the origins of three additional, prominent intergovernmental organizations: WFP, UNDP, and UNAIDS. Next, Chapter 7 provides a synthesis of the book’s argument and findings by fleshing out key theoretical contributions: refinement of our understanding of principal–agent relationships and delegation chains, identification of the conditions under which international bureaucrats can be considered “independent” of states, and the necessity of both states and non-state actors in accurate depictions of contemporary global governance. Chapter 8 concludes by examining practical implications for international policymaking and pinpointing questions that must be posed and answered for the future.

Readers are invited to absorb the entire book, but those who are interested primarily in policy repercussions may wish to focus on the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6, as well as the practical takeaways in Chapter 8.

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