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The Trinity of Buen Vivir in Ecuador | La trinidad del buen vivir en Ecuador – Antonio Luis Hidalgo-Capitan & Ana Patricia Cubillo-Guevara

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Housing Movements and Participation in Institutional Spaces – Valesca Lima

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Alternautas is a peer-reviewed academic blog that publishes content related to Latin American Critical Development thinking.

It intends to serve as a platform for testing, circulating, and debating new ideas and reflections on these topics, expanding beyond the geographical, cultural and linguistic boundaries of Latin America - Abya Yala. We hope to contribute to connecting ideas, and to provide a space for intellectual exchange and discussion for a nascent academic community of scholars, devoted to counter-balancing mainstream understandings of development.

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Welcome to the fifth volume of Alternautas!

2018 is witnessing two major processes affecting Latin-American politics in very different ways. On the one hand, the political crisis in Brazil has developed in alarming and dramatic events with the politically motivated murder of Marielle Franco, a socialist and black feminist city councillor in Rio de Janeiro, and the escalating interference of the Army and the Judiciary in the presidential elections, resulting in the arbitrary arrest of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The combined reading of these events indicates that Brazilian institutions are failing to act impartially and are having a significant impact on the country’s democracy.

On the other hand, in the past months Nicaragua has witnessed a wave of protests from different sectors of society, which have been met with violent repression by the Ortega/Murillo government. During this time, access to cities has been blocked, protesters have been arrested and disappeared, and some accounts report more than 300 deaths in 75 days of demonstrations. The role of the state in these events is linked to the deployment of the riot-squad police and of pro-government youth groups who have been accused of acting as paramilitary agents. Sparked by student protests, the movement has been joined by labour unions, business groups, academics and intellectuals in an uproar that goes beyond opposition to the state’s negligence and oppressive policies. The demonstrations are also fueled by the discomfort caused by the malfunctioning of the democratic systems and by alliances of the government with segments of society that a large part of the population interprets as a betrayal of the Sandinista ideals.

In the face of these political processes, academia is progressively taking position to clarify the empirical facts and produce rigorous analysis. Alternautas reproduced an
article\textsuperscript{1} by Professor José Luis Rocha where he explains the events leading up to the demonstrations. Alternautas is committed to supporting these kinds of initiatives, by analysing these events through the framework of critical development studies.

We are an academic blog focused on discussing development through critical lenses with a particular Latin-American perspective. During the last five years, we have published original and translated articles from young and prominent scholars from Latin America and other parts of the world, contributing not only to academic discussions, but also to creating a fertile environment where non-mainstream ideas and perspectives on development can flourish.

The contributions presented in this fifth issue offer valuable debates and analyses that resonate with the contemporary transformations and challenges faced by Latin America and the world. The different papers offer both theoretical and empirical discussions on a variety of issues including Buen Vivir, climate change vulnerability, food sovereignty and gender, popular participation, urban inequality, the indigenous movement and the modernisation of peasantry.

Melisa Gorondy Novak’s contribution examines the emergence of MINKA (Indianista Katarista Movement), a Bolivian indigenous social movement whose main aim is to reflect on indigenous identities and knowledge in the contemporary context. The movement criticizes how the idea of the indigenous has been constructed and enacted by the MAS government, producing specific forms of power and knowledge. In addition, the movement aims to challenge colonial forms of power and bring a new layer of politicization to Bolivian society. The article uses the concept of “power-knowledge regimes” in order to analyze how MINKA, through specific knowledge-practices, is challenging what is conceived as ‘the indigenous’.

Margit Ytsanes’ article seeks to analyse the eviction of over 22,000 families from their home as Rio de Janeiro prepared to host the 2016 Olympics. Margit argues that while often applied as part of ‘urban renewal’ processes in different locations, forced evictions are highly problematic. The discussion is based on ethnographic fieldwork

\textsuperscript{1}The article has been originally published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2018/7/10/opinion-the-nicaraguan-tiger-and-the-april-rebellion, on July, 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2018.
of the author in Vila Autódromo and among former residents, during and after the eviction process. It is inspired by the concept of ‘root shock’ developed in psychiatric studies. This concept takes the loss of home and its surrounding environment as a traumatic event with enduring impacts for individuals as well as for communities.

Javier Cuestas-Caza’s essay seeks to deepen and broaden the discussion on the translation of the term *Sumak Kawsay* into Buen Vivir. By this way, Javier discusses its meaning from each epistemic community, its cultural referent and its relationship with development. Despite being widely used as synonyms, the author argues on the imprecise translation, their different epistemology, and different ontology. These three arguments are the result of an extensive bibliographic review of more than 150 documents from academic databases and gray literature as well as partial results of the ethnographic and coexistence work in progress in the province of Imbabura in Ecuador. The analysis of texts and information collected was guided by referential elements of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Decolonial Theory.

Maurice Tschopp’s article seeks to explore some of the tensions engendered by the quinoa boom. Maurice argues that the high degree of market integration of quinoa production accelerated an economic and social restructuration of the Southern Altiplano. The author discusses some of the impacts of the boom, not only in terms of socio-ecological consequences, but also in terms of counter reactions and adaptation of local social and political systems. The analysis suggests that some of the impacts of the boom may be usefully explained by means of the commoditization framework. Yet the research also shows that the quinoa boom led to a household- and community-level restructuring that has contributed to strengthening normative and social frameworks in quinoa-producing communities. Finally, the paper concludes on how this case is illustrative of the blurring boundaries that can exist between peasantry and entrepreneurial farming.

Gabriela Pinheiro Machado Brochner’s article aims to analyze how the concept of food sovereignty in Latin America has been constructed as a political tool for peasant women. In addition, it examines the practices found in this everyday life construction, by drawing on a multiscale perspective stemming from feminist
political geography. Gabriela discusses the tensions between food security and food sovereignty as two opposed concepts, and how food sovereignty has been performed to include gender issues.

In their article, Antonio Luis Hidalgo-Capitan and Ana Patricia Cubillo-Guevara discuss the different and sometimes contradictory meanings attributed to the concept of Buen Vivir in Ecuador. They identify three ways of understanding Buen Vivir considered as a trinity: one indigenist, another socialist and another ecologist/post-developmentalist. The authors conclude on the confluence of these three streams in one conceptualization of Buen Vivir, based on the search for identity, equity and sustainability, through the transformation of Ecuador into a pluri-national, post-capitalist and bio-centric society.

Anna Heikkinen’s article discusses small-scale farmers’ vulnerability to climate change in the Peruvian Andes, using the case of the Quillcay River Basin. The study measured vulnerability of local smallholders to climatic and hydrological changes by analyzing relations between glacier recession, changes in precipitation and socioeconomic factors. The objective of the study was to contribute to the existing discourse on climate vulnerability in the Andes and other regions with similar challenges using a different perspective and a less common method. The findings of the study also aim to provide guidelines for local policymakers to plan more holistic adaptation strategies to mitigate climate vulnerability of the rural highland communities.

Finally, Valesca Lima’s article seeks to analyze the implementation of popular participation measures in Brazil taking as a case study the housing movement. Valesca studies how a variety of social programs were created to tackle social issues in the country, but addressing these issues properly has proved to be difficult for two reasons. Firstly, social problems are deeply embedded in Brazilian society and current social investment in these areas has been selective. Secondly, despite the Workers’ Party’s social project and their success in some areas over the years, those social programs focused on the effects, not on the causes of social inequalities.
In 2016, along with a guest editor (Gerardo Muñoz), Alternautas published a dossier focusing on the end of the progressive cycle in Latin America. The dossier sought to reflect on the observed “failure” of various left-wing governments of the continent in improving democratic inclusion and reducing social inequalities. It engaged with a critical discussion on the meanings of the progressive cycle and the possibility of post-hegemonic alternatives.

In the second half of the year, Alternautas published its first special issue focusing on water and (neo)extractivism in Latin America. In general, the authors highlighted both the attempts to establish durable alternatives in water management, and the difficulty of profoundly changing the (neo)extractivist structures that dominate the region.

In 2017, Alternautas published its second special issue on “Agribusiness, (neo)extractivism and food sovereignty: Latin America at a crossroads”. This special issue explores the tensions, changes and conflicts arising from the expansion of agribusiness as the dominant model of accumulation and food production in the region.

Along with publishing original content, Alternautas also engages in research and diffusion activities to the scientific community. Following this objective, the editorial team has organised and contributed to panels in relevant academic conferences, such as the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) congress, the Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS) conference at the University of Glasgow, and the Nordic Latin American Research Network (NOLAN) at the University of Gothenburg.

Alternautas has seen its audience increasing over the years: since its creation in 2014, the blog has received over 50,000 visits and almost 80,000 pages views, and our social media accounts have over 1,000 followers. The blog has a global impact but has garnered the most attention in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Spain, Switzerland, and more. It is mainly read by English, Spanish and Portuguese-speaking audiences, but also by German and French-speaking people among others. Alternautas is now aiming to undertake a process of transformation, following the success and visibility gained
since its creation. The current Editorial Board is therefore seeking to transform Alternautas into an indexed Open Access Journal, which will offer an improved capacity to share and make visible critical research on development on and from Latin America.

We are happy to share with you the great news that in the second half of 2018, Alternautas will be publishing a third special issue on “The Making of Caribbean Not-so-Natural Disasters”. It seeks to explore what kind of alternative Caribbean futures are being imagined and enacted in the wake of the 2017 hurricane season, and how are these entangled with a sense of greater infrastructural, relief or racial justice – both local and regional. Tentative special issues and calls are currently being discussed for the future, and could range from indigenous epistemologies to memory studies. More ideas and projects are always welcome!

The Alternautas Editorial Team,

Adrian E. Beling, Ana Estefanía Carballo, Gibrán Cruz-Martínez, Alexander D’Aloia, Emilie Dupuits, María Eugenia Giraudo, Juan Loera González, María Mancilla García, Maria del Pilar Ramírez Gröbli, Sue Iamamoto, Diego Silva, Julien Vanhulst, and Johannes M. Waldmüller

From a virtual Abya Yala, July 2018.
The case of MINKA movement in Bolivia and its aim to re-politicize indigenous peoples

Since the dawn of the 21st century, indigenous identities and knowledge stand at the center of a scenario where new levers for social change are desperately sought for. In that scenario, indigenous knowledge and practices are taking on an increasingly important role in economic and social progress (Briggs 2005; Cleaver 1999). However, several authors argue that indigenous experiences and understandings have been idealized, leading to a process of de-politicization (Briggs 2005; Cleaver 1999; Zimmerer 2014). Their criticism is not based on the effectiveness of indigenous knowledge, but on its instrumentalization in order to support actions demanding social change (Cleaver 1999). These arguments made by Briggs, Cleaver and Zimmerer inevitably raise questions about the ways in which politics (and academia) produce knowledge about indigenous people and practices that reproduce de-contextualized representations.

The case of Bolivia is paradigmatic due to the contradictions observed in the current government of President Evo Morales’ party MAS that had claimed as its main objective the decolonization of Bolivian society (Kohl et al. 2010). Evo Morales’ election to office was based on broad support from indigenous social movements,

1 MELISA GORONDY NOVAK has a license degree in International Relations from the Universidad Católica de Córdoba, and a master degree from the Global Studies Programme of the Albert-Ludwigs-University, FLACSO Argentina and Jawaharlal Nehru University.

who pinned their hopes on the promise of change for Bolivian society, where political structures of colonialism are still present (Canessa 2012). However, through its years in power, the MAS government lost support from a lot of those movements because its discourses were not reflected in practice (Gudynas 2010, Hoetmer 2007), and the agenda of the social movements was not fulfilled (Escobar 2014). Furthermore, “speaking like an indigenous state” (Zimmerer 2014) allowed the government to self-position in the electoral competition and also in the international arena whereas the promise of de-colonization is still a pending question (Canessa 2012).

It is against this background that we examine the emergence of MINKA (Indianista Katarista Movement), a Bolivian indigenous social movement whose main aim is to reflect on indigenous identities and knowledge in the contemporary context. The movement criticizes how the idea of the indigenous has been constructed and enacted by the MAS government, producing specific forms of power and knowledge. In addition, while consciously reflecting on the idea of “the indigenous” within the contemporary context, the movement aims to recognize forms of engagement and oppression that pervade the present in the country, thereby challenging colonial forms of power and bringing a new layer of politicization to Bolivian society.

This article\(^3\) explains how MINKA’s knowledge production, developed through embedded social practices, seeks to challenge “power-knowledge regimes” (Foucault, 1980) that oppress ‘the indigenous’ within the Bolivian society. Hence, through their knowledge-practices, which imply reflecting on historical processes, critically analyzing particular contexts, experiencing daily life, and re-thinking indigenous theories, they are challenging what is conceived as ‘the indigenous’.

\(^3\) This paper is based on my master’s thesis “RECOGNIZING KNOWLEDGE-PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: The case of MINKA in Bolivia and its aim at re-politicizing the indigenous” submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (M.A.) awarded by the Philosophical Faculty of Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br (Germany) and FLACSO (Argentina). 27 of January 2016.
Describing MINKA

MINKA is a group of young activists based in El Alto, whose thinking revolves around two political lines: Indianismo and Katarismo. They describe themselves as part of a generation of activists that crystallized in 2003 with Felipe Quispe, in peasant-led blockades in La Paz city. As a formal organization, the Indianista Katarista Movement was born in May 2009 and was consolidated as a social movement after a conference on indigenous issues held in Puno, Peru, in the same year. Before the conference, MINKA members had met to discuss how they could contribute to conference debates. However, when MINKA participated, the event turned out to be a disappointment for them. According to one of its members, “it was made only for people who dress up ‘as indigenous’. They were using feathers and taking pictures of themselves, more interested in showing their bodies than in discussing anything” (anonymized, 08 December 2015). ‘The indigenous’ was stereotyped as folkloric.

This motivated MINKA to continue as a group. They began to organize courses and seminars, and to participate in demonstrations, while continuing the discussion about their key beliefs: Katarismo and Indianismo, but situating ‘the indigenous’ within the contemporary moment and criticizing its romanticization. Therefore, MINKA’s main objective has been to rethink ‘the indigenous’ renovating and

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4 The paper is based on a Participatory Action Research methodological approach that proposes to develop the research in dialogue and collaboration with social movements (Casas-Cortes 2008, p. 28). It implies a relational mode of engagement that replaces traditional causal explanation for description, recreation, and translation (Escobar 2014; Latour 2005; Strathern 1991; Tsing 2005). Methodological tools suggested by Participatory Action Research are the ethnographic ones. (Escobar 1992; Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Touraine 1988). The research uses qualitative methods to gather and interpret empirical materials, including ethnographic interviews. The information was gathered from open interviews to all MINKA’s members conducted during december 2015 and january 2016, and from materials developed by MINKA, such as texts, videos and other digital documents. Afterwards, communication with the activists continued, in order to be coherent with Participatory Action Research proposal. Regarding analytical tools, the research utilizes a combination of both global analysis and qualitative content analysis.

5 El Alto is the second-largest city in Bolivia, located adjacent to the Bolivian capital city: La Paz. El Alto is today one of Bolivia’s fastest-growing urban centers, with a population of 974,754 in 2011. It is also one of Bolivia’s poorest cities. Approximately 64% of the population live below the monetary poverty line, compared to a country-wide average of 60%. (Nilsson, & Gustafsson 2012)
updating the Indianista-Katarista theories to reflect on actual problems related to indigenous.

**The Bases: Indianismo and Katarismo**

MINKA members explain that their name comes from Indianismo and Katarismo ideologies. They understand the importance of recovering these ideas because of their historical relevance within indigenous struggles.

MINKA explains that, influenced by a context of colonial domination, in 1962 the Aymara and Kechua Indian Party (PIAK) was founded as an initiative of indigenous intellectuals. They developed what is known as Indianismo, which sees ‘the indigenous’ as the subject of colonization. They argued that, the political character of ‘the indigenous’ had been denied. In that sense, Reinaga (1970), one of its founders, argued that for the indigenous themselves to become the subjects of history, they have to be aware of their own history under colonial structures.

As of the Indianista movement was formed what is now known as Katarismo. The founders developed themselves closer to the struggle of labor movements and fought against the dictatorship in Bolivia. According to MINKA, Katarista struggle went further than indianista, because they not only developed an intellectual process about the condition of ‘the indigenous’ immersed in colonial relations as indianistas did, but they also sought to involve themselves in political actions.

**MINKA’s Knowledge-Practices**

Through their critical thinking about ‘the indigenous’, MINKA’s activism turned into an alternative space for knowledge production. They exemplify how social movements are engaged in the production of ideas that influence the creation of alternative political imaginaries, which are, in turn, intertwined with mechanisms of power.
Knowledge-practices\textsuperscript{6} theory has become a key framework that provides tools to explore these dynamics between power and knowledge (Casas-Cortes 2008). Such theorizing highlights the forms of power and knowledge that produce a kind of subjectivity, and the ways this can be challenged through knowledge production. It invites us to understand social movements as actors in the production of knowledge (Casas-Cortes 2008). Adopting arguments from this theoretical framework (Casas-Cortes 2008; Escobar 2012, 2014; Botero 2012; Santos 2005; Benford and Snow 2000; Goodwin 2004) one can observed how social movements are challenging contradictions embedded in society, rooted in historical processes and hegemonic power-knowledge regimes (Foucault 1980). That is why focusing on social movements as knowledge-producers, and not as simple “objects of study”, provides better intellectual tools to reflect about socio-political contradictions and also to understand alternative political imaginaries that social movements develop.

Based on K-P theory, this paper analyzes MINKA’s knowledge-practices and their influence on the production of alternative political imaginaries. Due to the fact that the experience itself is vast and rich, and in order to operationalize the knowledge-practice approach, two main sets of knowledge-practices are highlighted. a) Starting from concrete participants’ experiences, focusing on the micro-politics of their action; and b) reflecting on their critical analysis of reality. Moreover, this paper places a special emphasis on power relations that are cross-cutting to the production of knowledge.

It is important to highlight that MINKA’s thoughts are developed by a group of young indigenous activists living in El Alto in Bolivia, where many of them went to

\textsuperscript{6} Concept of knowledge-practice: knowledge is a type of social practice, which is embodied (Haraway 1991, 1997; Latour 1988, 2005; Varela 1999) and can take the form of experiences, narratives, and ideologies, but also theories, as well as critical analyses of particular contexts. Their creation, modification and diverse enactments are what is called “knowledge-practice” (Casas-Cortes 2008). Here the attention is placed on two components: MINKA’s experiences and critical analysis about Bolivian context in the contemporary moment and the situation of ‘the indigenous’ within this context.
university. The development of their critique is, as Haraway (1988) states, located, contextualized and acquired through their own experiences.

Worth noting is that their embodied knowledge intends to challenge hegemonic understandings about ‘the indigenous’. MINKA challenges hegemonic knowledge both endorsed by the actual government of Bolivia and in other contested spaces, such as academia.

MINKA’s embodied knowledge production is significant because of the recognition of MINKA members reflecting and theorizing about themselves, commingling the notions of subject and object.

Concrete lived experiences of MINKA members as sources of knowledge: the importance of micro-politics of knowledge

“We want to provoke a debate in the field of ideas” (anonymized, 04 December 2015). In other words, MINKA’s aims as a social movement are not only based on activism or mobilization, but also on rethinking and problematizing issues/received wisdom, and especially politicizing people through seminars, lectures, debates, reading sessions in public squares, presentations, training forums, and humor, among others. Since 2009, MINKA has been working on producing articles, conducting interviews, and have published three magazines.

The movement places importance on paying attention to the day-to-day experiences of its participants in the (circular) production of knowledge about ‘the indigenous’ in contemporary times. For MINKA, individuals’ experiences are considered a source of knowledge and reflection. In this sense, each member of MINKA brings

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7 MINKA criticizes that academia in Bolivia also plays a role in the construction of an ideal indigenous. Therefore, not only does the government spread this notion but also other institutions do. Moreover, it is experienced in everyday life. However, due to limitations of the present research, the analysis places its attention on the criticism against the government of Evo Morales.
knowledge from different fields and locations⁸. Their sources for knowledge production may be in academia, and also in community work and individual experiences. For instance, one member writes from his experience as a bricklayer, another from his university activism and yet another from mining and its relation with indigenous subjects.

This process of knowledge production is closely related to the notion of ‘prácticas-senti-pensantes’⁹ proposed by Arturo Escobar (2014) which implies the continuous and deliberate articulation of experiences, emotions, reasoning (or cognition), and the perceptions about the contexts that social movements aim to change.

Within these experiences that shape MINKA’s knowledge production, their early activities in public spaces are notable. During the initial years of the movement, the members would sit in public squares in La Paz and read authors who had reflected on the indigenous condition, such as Fausto Reinaga. The exchanges with people who came to hear them and the dialogues and debates they generated became a source of reflection and knowledge production.

Moreover, MINKA introduced art as part of their process of knowledge production. According to one of its members, they art is another way in which politics can be expressed: “politics is everywhere, also in music, that is why we decided to start expressing our ideas through these means” (anonymized, 03 December 2015). A notable activity was the first Aymara rock festival organized by MINKA in La Paz. Worth noting is that these practices are usually accompanied by a collective critical analysis in which participants reflect on how they felt and thought.

In order to understand the meaning of knowledge practices, it is necessary to break away from the understanding of politics as an ideal order, as a normative concept beyond questioning hat it cannot even be discussed. Hence, reflecting on how MINKA creates and disputes areas of power, it seems necessary to seek knowledge

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⁸ It is worth emphasizing that ‘location’ here does not refer only to geographical situation, but also social conditions, academic background, work and other factors that shape the different experiences of MINKA’s members.
⁹ This concept can be translated as ‘felt-thought-practices’.
production on the walls, in the streets, and other unconventional spaces. When opening the spectrum of spaces for knowledge production, diverse and innovative forms of political participation and collective action are observed in Latin America (Yung 2002). Songs, poetic imagery and parodies are developed with the intention of seeking approval and also of disturbing complacency.

*MINKA and the micro-politics of Knowledge*

MINKA’s thought process is understood as a political process. It means that their knowledge production is involved in (concerned with?) power relations. They argue that “guided by Indianista and Katarista ideologies, MINKA develops itself, not only based on political activism, but also on proposals. In the present day, we understand our main objective as a struggle for power. However, this struggle is not for singular political power, but for total and diversified power” (anonymized, 04 December 2015).

MINKA’s members try to problematize and rethink themselves in the current context of classical assumptions about ‘the indigenous’ and determining how these assumptions relate to power. This critical understanding is politically crucial in its aim to deconstruct, de-normalize and challenge power regimes, due to the inextricable relationship between knowledge and power. Therefore, MINKA’s knowledge an integral part of power struggles.

MINKA’s activists are convinced that changing power relations at the micro level can influence relations at the systemic level. Thus, they argue “we try to act from the micro practice of politics” (anonymized, 07 December 2015).

One concept emerging from MINKA’s micro-politics of knowledge is the combination of community and individuality as a characteristic feature of their organization. MINKA proposes combining personal as well as collective elements, conceptualizing both characteristics as part of an interactive process in which the personal is influenced by the collective and vice-versa.
Moreover, MINKA’s purpose is to develop the individual-collective production of knowledge as a horizontal process. These practices are premised on the belief that there is not absolute ignorance or absolute knowledge (Freire 2006).

In addition, this collective way of knowledge construction aims to establish relationships based on friendships in contrast to an instrumentalized and utilitarian association aimed at strategically bringing forward the diverse claims of the movement. In their own words, “if we only respond collectively, it affects individual creativity. Thus, we seek to challenge the romanticized criteria of the ideal indigenous community where the concept of the individual vanishes. Instead, we propose a combination of both individual and collective decision-making” (anonymized, 01 January 2016).

A final, fourth element involved in MINKA’s process of knowledge-production is the concept of social ‘rotativity’\textsuperscript{10}. This notion, related to the idea of circularity, implies temporary possession of power, where no one centralizes power and all have access to it.

**Reflecting on MINKA’s critical analysis of reality**

This section aims to analyze another component of MINKA’s knowledge practices. As was explained, due to the richness of the MINKA case, but also because of methodological and time-constraints limitations, the present research focuses on two components of knowledge practice: experiences and critical analysis of reality. The paper then looks at the influence of these knowledge-practices in the creation of political imaginaries that intervene in important arenas of power.

**De-politicization through romanticizing**

\textsuperscript{10} According to MINKA the word is an interpretation of indigenous conception which in Spanish is translated as “rotatividad social”
MINKA’s knowledge production is reflected in their criticism of the current government in Bolivia that, according to MINKA, reproduces classical stereotypes about ‘the indigenous’ and consequently de-politicizes them. The movement argues that the MAS government promotes an idea of ‘the indigenous’ that is abstract, idealized and romanticized, resembling the notion of “peasantry”. The indigenous is identified as a “person who does not steal and who lives in a harmonious relationship with nature, someone who is not corrupt, a good person who lives in rural areas” (anonymized, 08 December 2015). This constitutes a form of ideology about ‘the indigenous’ which differs from those of indigenous people own experiences.

MINKA has shed some light on the fact that, through the romanticizing of ‘the indigenous’, the government ends up depoliticizing actual indigenous peoples. In MINKA’s own terms, “the idealization of the indigenous has become political” (anonymized, 04 December 2015). Therefore, as Briggs (2007) argues, this process of homogenization of ‘the indigenous’ leads to the disregard of individual action, and ignores its relation to political power. It means that, if indigenous peoples are perfect and represent the expected human ideal, there is no need for conflict and for political struggle and therefore, there is no need to participate in the political sphere.

These reflections can be related to the argument put forward by Zimmerer (2014), who pointed out that romanticization can develop an image of ‘the indigenous’ and its practices and knowledges as static and timeless, frozen in time. Romanticization thus de-politicizes ‘the indigenous’ and rejects the role of indigenous peoples in the production of political imaginaries.

MINKA also challenges what Canessa (2004) defines as the myth of the homogeneous nation. The movement criticizes the idea of indigenous whose visions are apart from their position in society, cultural and social capital, and from intellectual and economic processes. Furthermore, “people are not concerned about finding ‘difference’. There are no boundaries, yet one has influenced the other. In the Aymara communities, diverse forms of knowledge coexist and blend. There is no pure essence of ‘the indigenous’” (anonymized, 08 December 2015).
The racialization of the Bolivian society

Adopting elements from indianismo, MINKA understands the Bolivian society to be based on cultural and racial\textsuperscript{11} relationships. The movement argues that Evo Morales’ government has not gone beyond colonial relations that existed before. The MAS government has failed in its aim to break with traditional colonial relations in Bolivian society. Rather, these colonial relationships are reproduced within the party. MINKA claims that power relations in general have not changed, and although ‘the indigenous’ occupy center stage in MAS’s discourse, “it is [just] a pretext” (anonymized, 08 December 2015).

In the context of their claim against colonial boundaries, the movement denounces the reproduction of colonial relations within traditional political institutions such as ministries. Indeed, the latter are still dominated by “white people or traditional ‘patrones’ (i.e. employers or bosses), and indigenous peoples only serve for mobilizations sponsored by these institutions, or minor jobs such as driving or messaging” (anonymized, 03 December 2015). Hence, the long-awaited decolonization has not found a real institutionalized direction, because it is reduced to certain elites that are not characterized as indigenous.

It is important to briefly explain the main elements of MINKA’s reflection about how colonial relations work\textsuperscript{12} in Bolivian society. MINKA suggests that colonial mechanisms have historically denied the racialized condition of ‘the indigenous’, which engenders self-denial. Racialization has been based on the construction of a naturalized idea of ‘the indigenous’ as an inferior ‘race’ which has also underpinned

\textsuperscript{11} Here the notion of ‘Race’ is considered as a political and social construct. Moreover, it is an “organizing discursive category around which has been constructed a system of socio-economic power, exploitation and exclusion, such as racism” (Gunaratnam 2003, p. 4). In that sense, the concept of racism from Hall is taking into account that: “Racism operates by constructing impassable symbolic boundaries between racially constituted categories, and its typically binary system of representation constantly marks and attempts to fix and naturalize the difference between belongingness and otherness” (Hall 1996, p. 445). Then racism must be understood as a sort of discursive practice “that has its own logic” (Hall 2000, p. 222). In that sense, it is a discursive practice of segregation, separation: “Racism is a structure of discourse and representation that tries to expel an Other symbolically —blot it out, put it over there in the Third World, at the margin” (Hall 1989, p. 16).

\textsuperscript{12} This understanding was taken mainly from MINKAs publications, but also from interviews.
economic and political relations. Therefore, colonization through racialization has not only operated through representations, i.e. construction of the indigenous as inferior, but also based on material conditions. This denial of indigenous racialization made by the government is not a casual or unexpected result; rather, it has a specific function, which can be clearly observed in periods of political confrontation.

According to MINKA, in contemporary times, new mechanisms of colonization have been generated. The current situation of the indigenous “has changed from denying the condition of the racialized subject to vindicating the ‘indigenous identity’” (anonymized, 08 December 2015). Moreover, the recognition by the mainstream political institutions of the negation of the racialization process is made from a culturalist approach, which is reflected in the romanticizing of ‘the indigenous’ that consequently, de-politicized them.

According to MINKA, the government has re-created the colonial stigma of the Bolivian society, “characterizing the indigenous as superhuman and revitalizing racial prejudice, giving racism a charming appearance” (anonymized, 05 December 2015). Here Foucault’s idea that power should not be understood just as repressive, but as “productive” (of effects, subjectivities, practices) acquires central relevance. The romanticized, depoliticized but also racialized subject in contemporary moments is what MINKA seeks to deconstruct and challenge through their critical understanding of reality as part of their knowledge production.

MINKA recognizes that moving from a situation of devaluation to one of overvaluation of ‘the indigenous’ already implies a change. However, they argue that this change does not go beyond (or is limited to) the culturalist form of expression. To go beyond, MINKA proposes to “consider the past, not as a refuge, but as an experience of struggle, and the present, as the current time of struggle, with its economic and political configurations” (anonymized, 04 December 2015). This implies that the racialized subject should avoid attempts at self-affirmation through neo-colonial stereotypes.

*Speaking like an indigenous state: the instrumentalization of indigenous knowledge*
“The government contributes little to the indigenous reality; it only reproduces ‘pachamamismos’” (MINKA)

MINKA criticizes the strategic use of indigenous knowledge made by the government, arguing that this instrumentalization enables the government to position itself not only at the national level, but also within the international arena. Therefore, MINKA questions the MAS government’s claims to power based on a “recurrent use of standardized linguistic expressions” (anonymized, 08 December 2015). MINKA argue that power depends on a manipulative, de-historicized and de-politicized instrumentalization of indigenous knowledge. In this process, although indigenous identity may seem to be actively supported, the actual effect is its potential de-politicization. The MAS government uses indigenous knowledge in order to “help establish and consolidate its governing power, political legitimacy, and moral authority” (anonymized, 08 December 2015).

The re-politicization of ‘the indigenous’ through MINKA’s knowledge production: remaining challenges

As explained above, this paper aims at recognizing knowledge practices in social movements that bring about alternative political imaginaries that challenge hegemonic knowledge entrenched in power relations. Using theoretical tools that consider social movements as active actors in the production of knowledge, research focused on the particular case of the MINKA movement, which brings a novel perspective and processes of alternative reflection on the current situation of

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13 The notion of “Pachamama” can be translated as “mother earth”. According to MINKA, “pachamamismo” is a political category that mirrors the discourse and political practice of the MAS-government. In idealizing Pachamama or aspects of the Andean world, the government conceals colonialism within Bolivian society.

14 Worth noticing is that MINKA does not reject indigenous knowledges or the achievements of social movements, and activists like them that have been struggling to render their knowledges visible. However, they question the strategic use of those knowledges. For instance, as was developed, MINKA adopts the indigenous notion of rotativity, yet the government adopts the same concept. However, MINKA argues that, in practice, this principle is not developed, it is only adopted rhetorically. This is an example from MINKA that intends to clarify their criticism about the instrumentalization of indigenous knowledges.
indigenous peoples’ recognition in Bolivia. However, some Minka’s critical analysis can be challenged from a number of perspectives that worth mention here.

Through their deliberate process of reflection and knowledge production, MINKA seeks to deconstruct the hegemonic understanding about ‘the indigenous’, and consequently, help in the process of rebuilding of a new understanding. They develop theoretical understandings about reality and reflections about the condition of ‘the indigenous’ in order to contribute to re-politicization of indigenous people. Therefore, MINKA’s knowledge production should not be understood as separated from their political aim.

MINKA argues, “we do not have a romantic idea about the indigenous. We want to see ourselves as who we are, talking about the specific problems we have; that is, demystifying the indigenous and becoming political subjects” (anonymized, 05 December 2015). Therefore, a new notion of ‘the indigenous’, far from an abstract and romanticized perspective comes through a conscious production of knowledge. According to the movement, the idea of ‘the indigenous’ “must be understood beyond the historical resentment of 500 years, ethnocentrism, cultural folklore or from a biological vision” (anonymized, 08 December 2015). Similarly, they consider “the indigenous as a social, economic, political and historical subject, who in the economic sphere is the cheap and impoverished worker, in the political sphere, the person used for demonstrations and in the social sphere the one discriminated against because of his ‘inferior race’” (anonymized, 08 December 2015).

One of the challenges related to the knowledge MINKA develops about the Bolivian society, particularly about the MAS government, has to do with the explanation about the connection MINKA build between romanticization of ‘the indigenous’ and their depoliticization. While it is clear that these ideas are based on indianismo and katarismo thoughts, the application of them in contemporary Bolivia lacks concrete and specific arguments. Therefore, the challenge for MINKA is to develop those arguments to justify their intention in the re-politicization of ‘the indigenous’. This challenges their knowledge-practices and process of reflection.
Secondly, aspirations for change among MINKA-members require slow and steady effort to build political action and to articulate provisional agendas for political transformation. In that sense, as stated by MINKA members, they do not have a political programme to challenge the actual platform of the MAS government. Nevertheless, in a desired process of re-politicization, not only are a critical argumentation about the contemporaneous idea of ‘the indigenous’ and the practices that support this construction needed, but also required are new and specific political mechanisms that articulate political transformation.

Finally, the construction of a politicized indigenous people hence requires complex, time-consuming negotiation across boundaries of language, location, citizenship status, histories of resource control, gender, generation, and education among diverse subjects. However, none of factors is present in MINKA’s argumentation. Therefore, it is relevant for them to include multidimensional elements in their reflection about the idea of ‘the indigenous’.

**Drawing Conclusions**

The paper analyzed MINKA’s knowledge practices and their influence on the production of alternative political imaginaries. Its main argument was that social movements themselves, through their knowledge-creation practices, are providing alternative ways of knowing, in contrast to dominant understandings. These critical understandings carry important political and social implications. The main research question arose from the initial problematization about the strategic use of indigenous knowledge within the contemporary moment, where Bolivia appears as a paradigmatic case.

Regarding the theoretical framework of “Knowledge-Practice” theory, the article provided some key understandings of MINKA as an alternative space of knowledge creation. In that sense, the paper argued that social movements are challenging understandings and ideas embedded in society, rooted in hegemonic power-knowledge regimes. It focused on social movements as knowledge-producers, and thereby gathered alternative political imaginaries that social movements develop.
The analysis began with a description of MINKA. The Bolivian organization was characterized as a social movement, based on Indianista and Katarista ideologies, which brings together young indigenous activists from El Alto in Bolivia. Engaged in collective knowledge construction, MINKA critically rethinks ‘the indigenous’ in the contemporary era, and seeks to develop new subjectivities in order to engage itself in the re-politicization of ‘the indigenous’. This explanation aimed at situating the experience of MINKA based on its origination, main beliefs, the content of their arguments, purposes and activities.

Due to the limitations of the research, the analysis focused on two of the components of alternative knowledge-practices: a) starting from lived experiences; and b) critical analysis of a particular context. After this analysis, a reflection was made of power relations that are cross-cutting to knowledge production.

The analysis initially focused on the processes and means used by MINKA in their knowledge production. It reflected on the development of MINKA’s knowledge practices, how the movement organized itself to create knowledge, and the activities the movement followed (or pursued / undertook) in order to make their understandings known. MINKA’s knowledge practices revealed their situated, embodied, and political conception of knowledge. These were based on concrete reflections of lived experiences within a varied space. Furthermore, among some of the alternative aspects of MINKA’s practices the current use of art as part of their process of knowledge production can be considered.

A second element from MINKA’s knowledge practices under analysis was MINKA’s criticism of the present government. In order to generate new subjectivities in relation to the idea of ‘the indigenous’, MINKA’s first step was to understanding their actual conception. Here, MINKA reflects on the Bolivian government which reproduces classical stereotypes about ‘the indigenous people’, and consequently, depoliticizes them. MINKA’s understanding about Bolivian society, based on cultural and racial relationships, acquires special importance in understanding the power-knowledge regimes they deconstruct and challenge. In this sense, MINKA’s main criticism is
that the MAS government has failed in its aim to break with colonial relations in Bolivian society.

A last critical analysis introduced by MINKA focused on the strategic use of indigenous notions by the government in its discursive aim to decolonize Bolivia. This allows us to reflect on the idea of power as intrinsically related to knowledge. This last reflection provided initial tools to understand the subsequent section about the relation between knowledge and power in MINKA’s case.

The paper identified socio-political implications that emerged from MINKA’s experience. MINKA’s knowledge production shows its commitment to challenge power-knowledge regimes within Bolivian society. In this sense, while reflecting on and criticizing the idea of ‘the indigenous’ as foreign, MINKA sheds light on the notion of power as producer of relational subjectivities, exercised at the micro-level. Moreover, the paper explained that MINKA’s struggles in politicizing ‘the indigenous’ imply - after reflecting on the movement’s own construction of the idea of the indigenous - thinking about the indigenous as immersed in social, economic and political spheres, experiencing concrete problems in daily life.

A final section focuses on the challenges MINKA needs to tackle, according to my own perspective. One of the challenges relates to the knowledge MINKA members develop about Bolivian society and particularly the MAS government in relation to the connection built between the romanticization of the indigenous and its depoliticization. Secondly, aspirations for change among MINKA-members require a slow and steady effort to build political action and to articulate agendas for political transformation. Finally, it is important to reflect that the production of a politicized indigenous requires complex, time-consuming negotiations across languages, locations, citizenship status, histories of resource control, genders, generations, and education among diverse subjects. Nevertheless, not all of these factors are yet present in MINKA’s arguments.

To conclude, I consider it important to reflect on research itself as a process of growth and constant self-challenge. Through the present research I have been constantly challenged, especially in relation to the ‘what for’ of engaging in research, and about
my role in perpetuating or challenging ‘systems of truth’ at the micro-level. In relation to Casas Cortes’s (2008) argument, understanding social movements as knowledge producers implies - for the researcher - blurring the boundaries between the ideas of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ of study. This has implied, for me, continuous enquiry about my role as a researcher, and about the purpose of the research process. I consider it important to reflect that learning also refers to being aware of the systems of power-knowledge in which we are immersed, and which we can help to perpetuate or challenge. We should therefore understand learning as a complex process of questions and temporary reflections, and reject the notion of knowledge as fixed and complete.

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Lives Uprooted: Urban Inequality and Olympic Evictions in Rio de Janeiro

Introduction

What is the significance of a home? As we know, a home holds social, cultural and psychological meanings far beyond its functions as a shelter. The architecture of houses are adapted to and reflect local ways of socialising, and may also be constructed in accordance with cultural symbolism (Bourdieu 2003; Robben 1989; Ystanes 2011). Psychologists and psychiatrists emphasise the role our homes and their surrounding environment plays in the formation of human wellbeing and belonging (Fullilove 2004). In literary works, the house is commonly used as a symbol for the self, as seen for example in Isabel Allende’s novel The House of the Spirits (1994). Here, the protagonist Clara’s house symbolises both her self (reflected in her reworking of the house while alive) and her body (as the house falls into decay after her death). This profound connection between a person’s life and the place they call home reflects social processes we find across the globe, in different configurations. The connection extends beyond the house; it also includes the place where it is located and the relationships and histories embedded in this social landscape; the

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2 This article was originally published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2018/2/18/lives-uprooted-urban-inequality-and-olympic-evictions-in-rio-de-janeiro on February 18th, 2018.
presence and knowledge of neighbours, friends, kin and forefathers (see e.g. Feld and Basso 1996).

As Rio de Janeiro prepared to host the 2016 Olympics, over 22,000 families were evicted from their homes. The official reasons for evicting families are often unclear or misleading, yet at least 4000 of these cases can be directly tied to Rio’s Olympic preparations (Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro 2015). One of the neighbourhoods targeted for evictions was Vila Autódromo, a self-built community adjacent to the area the city of Rio made available for constructing the Olympic Park. Many of those evicted from Vila Autódromo had such a profound connection to their homes as described above.

As I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Vila Autódromo during the evictions, one of the residents told me; “We are like a family here. Nobody wants to leave this place”. Nevertheless, almost all of the around 600 families living in Vila Autódromo had to leave as the Olympics drew closer. Many lost their homes in brutal ways. Some came home one day to find that their houses had been demolished. Others were shaken out of their sleep at dawn as demolition workers accompanied by riot police had arrived to tear down their house. The violent ways this unfolded must be read against the backdrop of Vila Autódromo’s status as a low-income neighbourhood in a city marked by complex socio-economic inequalities. Those who experienced this process talk about it as an extremely difficult time in their lives. They characterise it as traumatic and confusing, a period when fear and insomnia darkened their days, and important relationships were lost. Many forms of medical conditions are attributed to this experience, in particular depression and heart disease, but also death. They say the removals have negatively impacted upon important relationships, their quality of life, their economic situation and their sense of security, belonging and dignity.

In the following, I argue that while often applied as part of ‘urban renewal’ processes in different locations, forced evictions are highly problematic. The discussion is based on ethnographic fieldwork in Vila Autódromo and among former residents, during and after the eviction process. It is inspired by the concept of ‘root shock’ coined by the psychiatrist Mindy Fullilove (2004). This concept takes the loss of home and its
surrounding environment as a traumatic event with enduring impacts for individuals as well as for communities. I will describe this concept more in detail before proceeding.

**Root shock**

Given the profound connections we make with our surroundings, moving can be a difficult experience, even when we make the choice to do so ourselves. Human lives unfold within a social geography of houses, streets, parks, forests, fields and other spaces. We are rooted here, as are our relationships, our sense of meaning, identity, security and belonging. What happens when these places are violently lost, for example through forced evictions? The psychiatrist Mindy Fullilove, who has conducted long-term research on urban renewal processes in the USA, argues that we enter in to a state she calls ‘root shock’ (2004).

Fullilove compares this state of emergency to the shock the body suffers after a life-threatening blow to its internal balance (2004:11). Just like our bodies have a system to preserve their internal balance, individuals have ways of preserving the external balance between themselves and the world. Fullilove describes this system as a way of moving through the environment that helps both our physical survival and to nurture relationships. She uses the analogy of a maze to describe this, and calls the chosen pattern of movement “a way to run the maze of live”, or a “mazeway” (2004:11). When the mazeway, or the external system of protection is damaged or destroyed, for example through an earthquake, a hurricane or a terrorist attack, the person will go into root shock.

Just like a burn victim requires immediate replacement of fluids, victims of root shock requires the help of emergency workers who can erect shelter, provide food and otherwise provide safety until the victims have stabilised and are ready to perform these functions again. In other words, the fundamental process that engenders root shock is the disruption of the context in which the individual or the group is immersed. The experience of root shock does not end with emergency treatment, but
stay with the individual for a lifetime – it can even affect generations of people (Fullilove 2004:11–12).

At the level of the individual, root shock is a profound emotional upheaval that destroys the person’s pre-existing working model of the world:

   Root shock undermines trust, increases anxiety about letting loved ones out of one’s sight, destabilizes relationships, destroys social, emotional, and financial resources, and increases the risk for every kind of stress-related disease, from depression to heart attack (Fullilove 2004:14)

At the level of community, root shock ruptures bonds and disperses people in all directions. People who were near end up too far away, and people who where far away, end up too close by. Even when neighbourhoods are rebuilt elsewhere, the restored geography is not enough to repair the many injuries to the mazeway produced by the destruction (Fullilove 2004:14).

This description of root shock as the destruction of a person’s entire way of safely moving through the maze of life resonates with the experiences of people from Vila Autódromo. When I initiated my fieldwork there in November 2015, the eviction process was already advanced. Even in the midst of the destruction this entailed, the remaining residents outlined the kind of mazeway Vila Autódromo was for them through their unwavering resistance to leaving and their narratives of the past.

The mazeway of Vila Autódromo

Vila Autódromo was a self-built, low-income neighbourhood in attractive area, surrounded by middle and upper class neighbours. Many would call Vila Autódromo a *favela*, as such neighbourhoods are generally referred to in the Brazilian context. The term favela is contested, however, as it is strongly associated with poverty, drug trafficking and other social problems (see e.g. Brasil 2015; Larkins 2015). While activists in Rio often use the term favela aiming to promote more positive and complex connotations to these neighbourhoods, many residents in Vila Autódromo resisted or were ambivalent to the term. While sometimes engaging the term favela
to refer to their disadvantaged position in Rio de Janeiro’s social hierarchy, more often they talked about their neighbourhood as a *comunidade* (community). Sometimes residents likened it to a reservation for indigenous people because it had been named an “area of special social interest” by the State of Rio de Janeiro; an area designated for low-income housing. The legal status of Vila Autódromo was hence different from that of most other self-built neighbourhoods in Rio.

Vila Autódromo was established as a community of fishers in the 1960s, on the shores of the Jacarepaguá Lagoon. Later, a racetrack was built nearby. This attracted construction workers who settled in the community with their families. Eventually, the settlement grew into a neighbourhood that paid homage to the racetrack – *O Autódromo* – in its name.

Residents describe Vila Autódromo as a good place to live. It was considered safe, with no presence of organised crime. People could trust each other; children could be left with neighbours while doing errands, and there was no need to lock the doors at night. Furthermore, people lived in close proximity with nature; a great luxury in a big city such as Rio de Janeiro. Here, on the shore of the Jacarepaguá Lagoon, the residents cultivated fruit in their patios and between the houses. Before sewage contamination from nearby condominiums made this impossible, residents also fished and bathed in the lagoon. The community was densely populated, and people lived in close proximity to their neighbours, with all the challenges and joys this involved. Many residents had built their own houses, little by little as they could afford bricks and other building materials. With time, they had been able to construct the houses they wanted, adding more space and additional floors as their families grew.

Like most other self-built neighbourhoods, they had limited access to public services. The residents had to organise much on their own, for example sewage treatment. The roads were never paved, and as a result, there was a lot of dust. The children had to walk under the burning sun on their way to school, so the residents planted trees along the route to provide shade. Despite the challenges arising from the
abandonment of the authorities, life in Vila Autódromo had qualities that imbued many residents with a strong desire to remain.

**The eviction process: the destruction of the mazeway**

The eviction of Vila Autódromo was a political idea long in the making by the time the Olympics descended upon Rio de Janeiro. Since the community was established, Rio has expanded. In the areas around the Jacarepaguá Lagoon, closed condominiums and shopping centres have popped up. Here, many of Rio’s middle and upper classes have found a retreat from the crime and exorbitant prices of the city’s central areas. In this new context, Vila Autódromo was considered an eyesore that hindered progress in the region. Hence, in 1993, the city administration opened a legal process against the community accusing the residents of aesthetic and environmental damage on the Jacarepaguá Lagoon and surrounding areas. The city did not win this case; instead the residents secured their right to remain in the area.

When Rio de Janeiro was awarded the 2016 Olympics in 2009, this represented a watershed moment for Vila Autódromo. As proposed in Rio’s bid book, the Olympic Park was to be built on the land next to Vila Autódromo, where the racetrack had once been (Comité de Candidatura Rio 2016 2009). The original, official plan did not involve the removal of Vila Autódromo (Rio 2016.com 2011). The community was to remain and be integrated into a new residential area to be constructed on the Olympic Park area after the Games. However, this plan was abandoned. Rio’s city administration used the state of exception that accompany sporting mega-events (Boykoff 2016; Gaffney 2010) to push through evictions in Vila Autódromo.
Vila Autódromo’s location by the shores of the Jacarepaguá Lagoon makes the area attractive for real estate developers. The Olympic Athletes’ Village, Ilha Pura, can be seen in the background. Photo: Margit Ystanes

Initially, residents were encouraged to leave in exchange for replacement flats in public housing projects or monetary compensation of varying sizes. When it became clear that many resisted, the city administration applied methods the residents describe as “psychological terror”. The resistance continued despite this situation, yet little by little the construction area encroached upon Vila Autódromo’s land, while a mayoral decree served as a highly contested legal basis for demolishing individual houses. One of the public defenders providing legal assistance to residents in Vila Autódromo described the eviction process as ‘completely illegal’ (interview 15 December 2016).
As Rio’s Olympic Park rose in the background, remaining Vila Autódromo residents lived surrounded by the rubble left behind by demolitions. Photo: Margit Ystanes

The above picture was taken during a fieldwork in February and March 2016, and at the time, around 40 households remained in the community. They all lived amongst the ruins of demolished houses, in what resembled a war zone. Residents kept comparing it to Gaza and Syria. Where previously there were houses, there were now just remnants of the lives once lived in them; broken bricks and tiles, damaged toys, a shoe pressed into the gravel, a mirror on a wall left standing, a staircase to nowhere. The workers did not clear the area after demolishing a house, thus leaving dents that filled with water when it rained. Here, the mosquitos that carry the zika and dengue viruses bred quickly, causing illness among the residents. There were also constant interruptions in the provision of water and electricity.

The residents describe the demolitions as traumatic. Demolition workers often arrived unannounced at dawn, accompanied by the riot police of the municipal guard to subdue any potential resistance. There were also numerous cases of houses being demolished while the residents were away. They would later arrive home from work,
school, vacations and doctor’s appointments to find they no longer had a home. As the city administration executed demolitions at unpredictable times and with the use of force, the experience of terror amongst the residents heightened.

To live under these conditions implied practical challenges and emotional hardships. Uncertainties about the future, the constant pressure to leave the community and the use of force during the demolition of houses, were all part of this. Residents describe this process as a period marked by sleepless nights, fear that their house might be demolished the next morning, the rupture of many relationships, and endless pressure from the city and district administrations to leave the community. Psychological terror is how they sum up these experiences. Some people say they became “crazy” and confused from the continuous loss of neighbours and the ever-increasing ruins, not knowing whether people were lying dead below the rubble or were just somewhere else.

Sofia³, a woman in her forties described the eviction process in the following way:

For me, this period was the most difficult... because I had this really strong sense of fear... you have to have faith that it is possible, if you don’t, you will not be able to resist. You see the city administration use a gigantic force, much larger [than you], it’s a very unequal struggle. You wake up to find the community surrounded by the riot police of the municipal guard, a squad of uniformed and armed men... and you are a simple citizen, without weapons, without anything. And you have to go and argue with them, struggle, demand your rights. [...] The place gave the impression of a post-war zone, houses in ruins, debris, dark streets because the public illumination was cut, the water was cut. It was like a warzone, a horrible thing.

In such circumstances, even the spaces in which nothing happens are impregnated with fear and agitation. As Larkins writes of the intervals separating armed confrontations between the police and the drug traffickers in the Rocinha favela, “the

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³ Sofia is a pseudonym. Research contributors are anonymised in accordance with guidelines for research ethics in social anthropology.
terror of these spaces of waiting, even as the fear they hold is often normalized by residents, must also be taken as part of the experience of violence” (Larkins 2015:11). In equal measure, the psychological terror experienced by residents as the evictions unfolded, was not isolated to the moments of destruction, but imbued their very existence.

After a dramatic period of struggle and resistance, only a few households remain in Vila Autódromo. The original houses of these residents were demolished, and they were gathered in a single street. Hence, today, 20 identical project houses are all that remains of what was once a vibrant and diverse neighbourhood.

Residents protest before the house of the Residents’ Association was demolished in February 2016:”The Olympics should be for everyone as a social legacy. One cannot construct a city and a nation without listening to everyone’s needs. Housing, health and education”. Photo: Margit Ystanes

Many of those who left Vila Autódromo were given replacement flats in public housing projects. Officially, such projects are described as elevating poor people to
the standard of the middle class (Rio Prefeitura 2015). These claims aim to legitimise the eviction policy implemented by the city administration ahead of the 2016 Olympics. They also cultivate the idea that even though people are moved against their will, the change represents an improvement, an approximation to middle class lifestyle. However, this is far from reality. The project buildings are often of poor quality, fall quickly into decay, and offers a living environment marked by concrete, asphalt and absence of shade (Rio on Watch 2016).

Furthermore, paramilitary militias limits the residents’ political freedom and makes their lives more expensive by charging residents inflated prices for the enforced provision of services such as ‘security’, gas, cable and basic food baskets (Abdala 2015; Vasconcelos 2015). Housing project apartments also come with a mortgage of 75 000 R$ that must be paid during 10 years, in addition to a monthly condominium fee. While the city administration promised to shoulder this debt for the forcibly evicted, numerous residents have found that they have been made personally responsible for the debt – and that no documents of ownership have been issued (FOLHAPRESS 2016; Mota 2016). Until the debt is paid, residents are not allowed to let or sell their apartments, and as such, find themselves trapped in housing projects controlled by organised crime.

Lives uprooted: living with root shock

How can the concept of ‘root shock’ help us think about these processes and their consequences? What we might call the adverse effects of forced evictions are manifold; a large number of social, cultural, economic and psychological difficulties affect people as they work to reassemble their lives in new locations (Fullilove 2004; Pearlman 2010). The long-term outcomes for those evicted from Vila Autódromo remains to be seen. What can be discussed at present is the immediate aftermath of the evictions. There is not space here to discuss all facets of these outcomes, so in the following I will outline in some detail how root shock manifests itself in the life of Amélia, a woman in her 60s who was evicted from Vila Autódromo. This will be
contrasted with the experience of those who were allowed to remain in the community.

Amélia was among those forcibly evicted from Vila Autódromo and relocated to a public housing project. She describes the loss of her community as equally painful as the loss of her child, who had died years earlier. She says, “Without the people I know around me, I just don’t know how to defend myself”. The housing project does not provide an environment where she can rebuild her mazeway. Amélia explains that the residents in her housing project are from different favelas all over Rio. She considers both the mixture of people from different places, and the fact that so many are unknown to her, frightening. This reflects a society where trust relationships are ideally established via introduction by friends and family. Establishing trust with complete strangers without such channels can be difficult.

Amelia’s experience also illustrates how, in the absence of a comprehensive welfare state, trust relationships are crucial for getting by. For example, Amélia’s old neighbours provided vital support immediately after she lost absolutely all of her belongings when her house was demolished without previous notice. She came home one day to find her home in ruins. Everything she owned was lost. For several months, until the district administration gave her a new apartment, she stayed with a family in Vila Autódromo who took her in. People from her church donated clothes, and the family she stayed with gave her some furniture when she left. Other friends and relatives also contributed. In her new home, surrounded by strangers, Amélia does not have an appropriate way to build the relationships she needs to “defend herself”. She feels scared, isolated and unprotected. When the bus she takes to run errands passes by Vila Autódromo, the loss she has suffered rushes to the front of her consciousness, sometimes making her cry uncontrollably. She emphasises that she does not know how to live anywhere else” than Vila Autódromo.

Thinking with Fullilove, we could say that Amélia’s mazeway was devastated by the gradual destruction of her community, and eventually her eviction from it. This mazeway remains damaged, as Amélia struggles to settle into her new life, not knowing how to live or feel safe in this new place. This is the case also for others.
Some persons continued to fight for the remaining residents after they themselves were evicted, struggling to preserve the community even though they were no longer allowed to live there. Others still, more than a year and a half after the Olympics, have not given up hope that some day they will be able to return to Vila Autódromo. This emphasises the point that our homes and communities are locations where our sense of identity, belonging and our most important relationships are rooted. It is not something people easily let go of. While they were united in their community, the residents showed a remarkable resilience despite their tribulations. The common resistance made their relationships stronger. “We used to be good neighbours, but because of the struggle we have also become very good friends”, one of them told me. However, as they were dispersed by evictions, the relationships this resilience was rooted in became complicated, reconfigured or lost.

The losses suffered by those forcibly evicted are therefore complex and multifaceted. As they work to reassemble their lives in the housing projects, they find that this new geography does not facilitate the reparation of their mazeways, their way of moving safely through life. Quite the contrary; numerous new stresses, such as debts and organised crime, are added to the trauma of forced evictions.

For those who managed to remain in Vila Autódromo, the new houses provided by the city administration represent an improvement for some, a deterioration of standards for others. What they all emphasise as more important than the state of the houses, however, is permanência, remaining amongst their friends and neighbours, even though their numbers have been dramatically reduced. As they started the work of reassembling their lives in this new social and physical geography, some also found that the struggle itself had produced new strengths and forms of knowledge.

For example, Sofia explained that her participation in the struggle had made her children see her in a new light, and they now respect her more. She also considered the struggle for Vila Autódromo a class struggle, and felt empowered by what the continued permanence of some of the residents signified in this respect. Even though the small project house the city had given her was identical to everyone else’s, and she had lived there for a very short while when I interviewed her, it was nevertheless
already imbued with deeply personal meaning for Sofia; it was the fruit of her struggle and testament to her history. The struggle had also left her as well as other residents with a network of supporters – activists, students, journalists, researchers – some of whom continue their engagement in the community through the establishment of a Museum of Removals as well as other forms of political activism.

Hence, for those who remain in Vila Autódromo, even though it is radically reconfigured and reduced, this appears to be a continuing source of resilience. This does not mean they did not suffer negative consequences of the eviction process; this period put unfathomable stress on everyone, regardless of the outcome. Both those who were evicted and those who were able to stay refer to it as traumatic. However, as Amelia’s story shows, being isolated from a context of significant relationships and places imbued with meaning and knowledge of how to be in the world, contributes to exacerbate the effects of root shock.

**Concluding thoughts**

So what does it imply to violently lose one’s home? The literary symbolism discussed in the introduction provides some food for thought. In Allende’s novel, the protagonist Clara’s continuously reworks her house throughout her life, thus emphasising the profound connection between her person, her dwelling and the social world in which it exists. This connection is configured differently across the globe, yet constitutes a fundamental aspect of human lifeworlds. The literary symbol works because we recognise it. When a community is forcibly evicted, this connection is violently disrupted. Symbolically as well as literally, forced evictions are a negation of a person’s right to exist where their sense of security and belonging is located. Root shock hence reverberates powerfully in the lives of persons and communities; affecting them psychologically, physically, socially, culturally and economically.

It is significant that Sofia thinks about the struggle for Vila Autódromo as a class struggle; she points us to the numerous violent eviction processes Rio’s city government has unleashed upon less privileged sectors under the guise of urban development – historically as well as recently (Barbassa 2015; de Magalhães 2013;
Pearlman 2010; Rolnik 2015). As many pointed out during my fieldwork, it is difficult to imagine that the city would expropriate homes in more upscale neighbourhoods such as Ipanema or Copacabana with the force and violence applied in Vila Autódromo. The residents of Vila Autódromo described the eviction process as a dehumanising experience involving constant attacks on their dignity and their right to influence how their lives unfold. Fullilove (2004) emphasises that this approach to urban development causes disruptions well beyond the community of evicted – the adverse effects resound in the whole society as socio-economic inequality and segregation deepens.

The new, cleared out spaces created by ‘urban renewal’ processes may not provide a vantage point from which to see this very clearly. In recognition of this, the residents resisting eviction in Vila Autódromo fought not just for their own community, but also for a “Rio without removals”. Their struggle was in essence about the right of the less privileged to forge the kinds of connection with their home and the social world it exists in that humans need to thrive. The city of Rio’s use of forced evictions as a vehicle for urban development is problematic because it implies that this right is reserved for the wealthier sections of society, while for the poor, it can be negated at whim.

References


Sumak Kawsay is not Buen Vivir

Introduction
Nowadays, the paradigm of development-consumerism is responsible for the desolating panorama of social injustice and unrestrained exploitation of natural resources that leads to self-destruction of life on the planet (Huanacuni-Mamani, 2010). From the Global South, the voices that question in depth the philosophical and civilizational presuppositions of the Eurocentric developmental model are becoming stronger and more frequent. No one is surprised that these voices emanate from the population disillusioned by the promises of global culture (Álvarez, 2014; Estermann, 2013). From the Andes, a philosophical otherness arises, denominated "Andean Philosophy", which is a sapiential manifestation of an ancient tradition that questions the civilizational centrism of the Western (Estermann, 2015). The purpose of Andean’s thought is reflected in the Sumak Kawsay.

At this point, it is important to recognize that the thought about Sumak Kawsay has evolved within epistemic communities, which are responsible for determining the validity of their postulates. Epistemic communities are networks of knowledge-based communities, for example: the scientific community, a group of professional specialists, or a school of thought. Their members share knowledge expertise, beliefs, or ways of looking at the world (in the sense of a Foucauldian episteme); due to their

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2 This article was originally published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2018/3/2/sumak-kawsay-is-not-buen-vivir, on March 2nd, 2018.
specialized knowledge, epistemic communities have sufficient legitimacy in the policy area within a particular field (Haas, 2016; Oxford Reference, 2018). It is also important to understand that epistemic communities are associated with changes in social patterns. Through their institutionalized influence, they persuade decision makers towards decisions and practices consistent with the ideas of the epistemic community in question (Haas, 2016).

The first epistemic community is known as *indigenous-culturalist* (Villalba-Eguiluz & Etxanoa, 2017). This epistemic community understands the *Sumak Kawsay* from a cultural frame of reference, as a philosophy of life based on ancestral indigenous knowledge and practices, where *ayllu* (family-community) coexists in harmony with the *pacha*\(^3\) through certain principles and values. On the other hand, the second epistemic community has been denominated as *post-developmentalist* (Cubillo-Guevara, Hidalgo-Capitán, & Domínguez, 2014; Le Quang & Vercoutère, 2013) making reference to the western frame of reference under which they have studied the *Sumak Kawsay*. For this epistemic community, Buen-Vivir and *Sumak Kawsay* are the same. In the practices, post-developmentist current seeks to bring together, as a collage, the best of *Sumak Kawsay* and other postmodern theories. In addition, from the post-developmental perspective, Buen Vivir could be considered as the South American version of the Degrowth, which emerged in Europe as an alternative search for capitalist development models. Finally, the third epistemic community called "*socialist-statist*" (Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2014; Le Quang & Vercoutère, 2013) is the one that is further from the central ideas that shape *Sumak Kawsay*. Its interpretation of ancestral knowledge has been superficial which has resulted in an appropriation of the term *kichwa* and its subsequent institutionalization as a political project (Simbaña, 2012) through the 2008 Constitution and the renamed *Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir*. In any case, I intend to point to one epistemic community as better than another one. The contributions of the three have been fundamental in

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\(^3\) In the Andes, the concepts of space and time are concurrent and indivisible and are represented in a single term, which is Pacha. Pacha, followed or preceded according to other words, serves to: a) determine the spaces (cosmogonic or metaphysical); b) delimiting historical phases (ages and periods); c) express the relative times (present, past and future); d) talk about fundamental changes (natural and social); e) mark harvest times; f) define time-space as a globality of conjunction and in other tasks (Manga, 1994).
the theorizing of alternatives to development. However, beyond the common denominator of the critic to the meta-narrative of the development, the consensus become diffuse.

In this document, I try to deepen and broaden the discussion on the translation of the term *kichwa*, and discuss its meaning from each epistemic community, its cultural referent and its relationship with development. I start from the question: are Buen-Vivir and *Sumak Kawsay* the same? Despite being widely used as synonyms, my answer is no. My answer has three arguments: an imprecise translation, a different epistemology, and a different ontology. These three arguments are the result of an extensive bibliographic review of more than 150 documents from academic databases and gray literature as well as partial results of the ethnographic and coexistence work in progress in the province of Imbabura in Ecuador as part of the research of my doctoral thesis. The ethnographic work has been carried out during the months of August to December 2017 in the cantons of Ibarra, Otavalo and Cotacachi as well as in the communities of Angochagua, Peguche and Zuleta. The analysis of texts and information collected was guided by referential elements of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Decolonial Theory.

**Alli Kawsay better than Sumak Kawsay**

First, like other authors, I defend the idea that there is an incorrect translation between Buen-Vivir and Sumak Kawsay. For the majority of actors related to the "indigenous-culturalist" discourse, *grosso modo, Sumak*, translates as harmony, plenitude; and *Kawsay* as life, coexist. The most common translation is Life in Plenitude (*Vida en Plenitud*), although it is also possible to find: Beautiful Life (*Vida Hermosa*), Harmonious Life (*Vida Armónica*), Balanced Life (*Vida en Equilibrio*) or Harmonic Living Together (*Convivir Armónico*) (Kowii, 2011; Simbaña, 2012; Pacari, 2014; Ińuca, 2017).

If we looked for an expression similar to Buen-Vivir in the Kichwa language, it could possibly be found in the term *Alli Kawsay* and not in the term *Sumak Kawsay*. *Alli Kawsay* expresses the integrality and aspiration to improve the quality of life in
interdependence with the beings of the environment, at the personal level (runa), at
the family level (ayllu), at the community level (llakta) and at intercommunity level
within a territory. The social subjects involved come and go in search of the Alli
Kawsay through day-to-day actions. The expression Alli Kawsay combines "inherited
cultural notions" and "learned cultural notions" such as money, the market, and
capital (Guandinango, 2013; Guandinango & Carrillo, 2015), although we could
certainly refer to them as forced or imposed cultural notions (Cuestas-Caza, 2017).

Alli refers to the "good", to a social, material and ethical life in the human sphere
(Guandinango & Carrillo, 2015). In this way, Alli Kawsay seems to express in a better
way the postmodern combination that seeks Buen-Vivir. Alli Kawsay, represents a
frequent expression in the everyday linguistic, historical, spiritual and experiential
level of the Kichwa communities of the north of Ecuador (Guandinango, 2013;
of the Kichwa, while Sumak Kawsay refers to the ideal and imaginary of beautiful
life. In this way, we understand that Sumak Kawsay (Life in Plenitude, Beautiful Life)
does not translate as Buen-Vivir (Good-Living). In this sense, the incorrect synonymy
present in many academic texts could be interpreted as a subtle form of epistemic
neocolonization through the sophisticated use of language, which speaks "by" or
"over" the Andean populations but with Western glasses.

**Sumak Kawsay as an input of the Buen-Vivir**

Once the subject of translation has been overcome, it is necessary to discuss the
content of the terms. Both in the case of the socialist-statist current, and in the case
of the post-developmentalist current, the Sumak Kawsay appears only as part of the
epistemological content that is combined with other theoretical referents.

First, the socialist-statist epistemic current (which I prefer calling "neo-
developmentalist") took the indigenous concept of Sumak Kawsay and turned it into
a political project, renamed Buen-Vivir. In 2008, with no time for deeper discussions
or interpretations, a swift career began to include the concept of Buen Vivir in
Ecuador’s national legislation and planning. Thus, the new Constitution of 2008 and
the renamed *Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir* would become the main instruments for the institutionalization of Buen-Vivir in public policies and in the life of Ecuadorian society. On paper, "rational" proposals to achieve Buen-Vivir seemed to be related to post-developmentalist criteria such as building a new post-capitalist socioeconomic system, to what Ramirez (2010) called as citizen bioequality or republican biosocialism. In the first instance, the discourse was accepted for its novelty, its intellectual base and the political euphoria of the moment. However, the practice would end up clarifying the scenario, only to realize that the Governmental Buen-Vivir (GBV) was just a new adjective to development. The basis of the speech of the neophyte Governmental Buen-Vivir (GBV) focused on a social transformation through equity and harmonious relationship with nature (Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2014). Regrettably, when economic resources were scarce, the nature rights declared in the new Constitution fell into the background. Hence, it is possible to explain, for example, the failure of the Yasuní ITT Initiative to leave oil underground, which was a post-developmentalist proposal of non-extractivism that ultimately ended up reinforcing the “progressive neo-extractivism” (Gudynas, 2011) in Ecuador. Thus, the ideal of the Andean *Sumak Kawsay*, turned into rhetoric, was gradually removed from the governmental discourse to give way to a politicized, coapted and criticized Buen-Vivir. Almost 10 years after the inclusion of Buen-Vivir it is possible to affirm that the epistemological content that sustained GBV was related to theoretical sources such as: Eco-socialism Human development, Sustainable development, Endogenous development, Social justice and Happiness economies (Hidalgo-Capitán & Cubillo-Guevara, 2017).

Secondly, we have the post-developmentalist current, which has generated the most dissemination and theoretical discussion, surpassing even the geographical boundaries where Buen-Vivir emerged. The post-developmentalist current conceives Buen-Vivir as a critical paradigm of eurocentric, anthropocentric, capitalist and economistic modernity, but also as a new intercultural political project (Vanhulst, 2015), a comprehensive policy proposal (Altmann, 2016) even as part of a trans-developmentalist project (Cubillo-Guevara & Hidalgo-Capitán, 2015). The discourse of this current is characterized by the biocentrism that promotes the
preservation of nature, in other words, that promotes a reunion with nature (Acosta, 2015) which includes human beings and indigenous peoples as the centerpiece of biodiversity conservation (Le Quang & Vercoutéré, 2013). For post-developmentalist, the utopia or semi-utopia represented by Buen-Vivir (Acosta, 2015; Altmann, 2016) is under permanent construction (De la Cuadra, 2015). Post-developmentists deny development as a universal meta-narrative and what they are looking for are multiple strategies of future emanated from the own vision of each town. One such strategy would be Buen Vivir (Cubillo-Guevara, Hidalgo-Capitán, & García-Álvarez, 2016). Hence, this current also suggests that Buen-Vivir is a plural concept and that the existence of “Buenos Vivires” should be considered (Acosta, 2015; Loera, 2015). Academics related to this current usually use the terms Buen-Vivir and Sumak Kawsay indistinctly within the texts although in practice they prefer to speak of Buen-Vivir and not of Sumak Kawsay (Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2016). This decision would seem obvious since in fact, it is not possible to compare the whole with a part and it is exactly what happens in this case. The epistemology of “post-developmental theoretical Buen-Vivir” is based on a process of intellectual liquidity (Bauman, 2013). In other words, it uses certain elements of Andean thought (such as Sumak Kawsay) and combines them with diverse intellectual wellsprings like: deep ecology, ecofeminism, intercultural feminism, degrowth, post-extractiveism, human scale and barefoot economy, among others (Hidalgo-Capitán & Cubillo-Guevara, 2017) to construct a kind of postmodern collage (Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2016).

In this context, Sumak Kawsay has been converted into a useful input to gain symbolic capital in think tanks. This process has overshadowed the reflection about the epistemological content of the term Kichwa, leaving it still at a very abstract level, which requires further research and systematization. However, from the extensive literature review and ongoing field research, I would dare to sketch that the

4 The post-developmentalist current is not entirely homogenous. There is a trans-developmental variant led by professors Hidalgo-Capitán and Cubillo-Guevera who are currently theorizing about the construction of a Global Good Living, which could be understood as a meta-narrative contrary to the idea of plural Good Living. The monograph: “Good living goals as an alternative to sustainable development goals” could be ready for the summer of 2019.
epistemology of *Sumak Kawsay* rests on critical and decolonial thinking, community thinking, reciprocity and solidarity, and aesthetic-symbolic relationality.

**Different ontological matrices**

*Sumak Kawsay* and Buen-Vivir belong to two different ontological matrices. In the first place, Buen-Vivir (governmental version or theoretical-post-development version) constitutes a modern word for the Aristotelian happiness. That is to say, its ontological matrix is located in the West, in reality Buen-Vivir is not a new term. In fact, for centuries, Buen-Vivir has been a term commonly used to represent happiness (*eudaimonia*), pleasure (*hedoné*) and wellbeing. Professor Alberto Fierro in his work "La Filosofía del Buen Vivir" (2009) details the course of the term in question, from the Greek philosophers like Aristotle or Epicurus, to the most contemporary ones like Spinoza, Kant or Schopenhauer. For example, while for Aristotle, Eudaimonia is his favorite word to express Buen-Vivir (Good Living) and the supreme end of life to which humans aspire without exception, for Epicurus, the Good Life is more a proposal of pleasure. This proposal is related to happiness around the body and the bodily senses that seeks to liberate humans from all kinds of fears: to the gods, to death and to eternity (Fierro, 2009). For his part, Schopenhauer speaks of "eudemonology" to designate the study of happy life, but the Good Life that this author mentions is actually a euphemism to refer to living life in the most bearable way possible. Professor Fierro (2009) rightly points out that in the variety of philosophies of those centuries, we can hardly find more common theme about good living, than the question of whether happiness is possible or impossible. Later in time, in 1973, the term happiness appears for the first time in the indexes of the journal Psychological Abstracts International and for 1974 the term "subjective wellbeing" is officially introduced as object of study through the publication of several articles in the journal Social Indicator Research. At that time began a race to quantify happiness through different measuring instruments, which has led to extensive research on subjective well-being (García-Martín, 2002).
In reality, Buen-Vivir, appears again to (re) conceptualize itself, (re) structure itself and (re) adapt to a complex context marked by the ecological crisis, plethoric social inequalities and the critique of capitalist hegemony (Cuestas-Caza, 2017). The “classic” Buen-Vivir” (Oviedo, 2014) and the “current” Buen-Vivir (neo-developmentalist or post-developmentalist) share the Western DNA. In this way, when academics and politicians allude to Kichwa words “as a discursive construction critical to conventional developmentalism but firmly based on the Western episteme” (Bretón-Solo, 2013, p. 80) what they are really doing is ignoring the ontology of the terms Buen-Vivir and Sumak Kawsay.

On the other hand, Sumak Kawsay is an ancestral Andean conception of life that has remained valid in many communities of the Ecuadorian Andes until today (Kowii, 2011). Its conception is located within a framework of reference different from Western thought, known as Andean philosophy. The purpose of Andean’s thought is reflected in the Sumak Kawsay, which is a mode of existence that is in equilibrium with all other elements of Pacha. This mode of existence includes other beings, animals, plants, minerals, stars, spirits and divinities and is governed by the principles of relationality, complementarity, correspondence, reciprocity and cyclicity (Estermann, 2013, 2015). Sumak Kawsay represents the ideal of the indigenous social project, understood as an epistemic proposal based on the Andean ways of life and their institutions (Rodríguez, 2016), as it is (or was at some point) Aristotelian eudemonia for Western’s thought. For Tavares (2013), Sumak Kawsay is an interpellation, an exhortation, and in a certain way, a claim to the foundations for Western’s thought. In that sense, it proposes the deconstruction of its ideological foundations.

The ideal represented by the Sumak Kawsay emerges and develops within an Andean cultural reference, which resists cultural homogenization through language recovery (runashimi) and Andean practices such as: minka, waylla, ayni, tuminkuna, wakakuna, ayamarkay, among others. In this way, it is possible to understand why the imposed category of "Indian" or "indigenous" does not correspond with the self-definition of the original peoples, who defend the use of the word "rune" that would be translated as a human being. This simple example in the use of language allows us
to identify the ontology behind Andean thought, different from the colonial and racist matrix of the West. Table 1 summarizes the differences between *Sumak Kawsay* and Buen-Vivir discussed throughout the previous sections.

Table 1. Differences between Sumak Kawsay and Buen-Vivir

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Sumak Kawsay</th>
<th>Buen-Vivir (governmental version)</th>
<th>Buen-Vivir (post-developmentalist version)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approximate translation</td>
<td>Vida Hermosa; Vida en armonía</td>
<td>Alli Kawsay</td>
<td>Alli Kawsay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>● Critical and decolonial thinking, ● Community thinking, ● Reciprocity and solidarity ● Aesthetic-symbolic relationality</td>
<td>● Sustainable Human Development ● Ecosocialism ● Social justice ● Eudaimonia</td>
<td>● Ecofeminism ● Community economy ● Deep ecology ● Degrowth ● Post-extractivism ● Decoloniality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>Andean cultural matrix, Otherness</td>
<td>Western cultural matrix (solid)</td>
<td>Western cultural matrix (liquid)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions and discussion

I argue that Buen-Vivir is not synonymous with *Sumak Kawsay* and I dare say that neither is the *Suma Qamaña* of the Aymara communities, nor the *Balu Wala* of the Kuna communities of Central America, nor the *Ñande Reko* of the Guarani communities, nor any other indigenous term that expresses the ultimate aspiration of life. Under the three differences presented in this document, lies the existence of a “cognitive extractivism” (Simpson & Klein, 2017) regarding the use of the term indigenous, mainly because the socialist-statist and post-developmentalist currents continue to be developed under the hegemony of western or westernized intellectuality. In this way, it is explained that useful knowledge continues to occur in the center and the periphery plays a role of passive receiver where their knowledge
has been subalternized and subordinated (Jo, 2013). Ramon Grosfoguel (2016) points out that encompassing and marketing with the knowledge of the original peoples within Western knowledge removes political radicalism and its critical origin. This type of extractivism, newly minted, does not seek horizontal dialogue between equals, but seeks to extract ideas as raw materials.

Synonymy used by most academic evidences the presence of an epistemic neocolonialism through the sophisticated use of language, speaking "for" or "on" Andean populations but with Western glasses. Accepting the fact that Sumak Kawsay and Buen-Vivir are not synonyms or exact translations is part of the resistance to an epistemic globalization that starts with the recognition of the "others", of the alterities that are not (or do not want to be) part of Western hegemonic discourse. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the academic world of the South has been and is a prisoner of the criteria of scientificity imposed by modernity and positivism. Giving voice to silence with the theoretical instruments of silencers distorts the culture that is intended to rescue (Tavares, 2013). In that sense, the use of the runashimi (Kichwa language) would be the fundamental basis of the identity strengthening of the native peoples.

Although Buen Vivir and Sumak Kawsay are not synonyms, their discussion has certainly opened the doors of both the Western and the Andes to initiate an intercultural dialogue on an equal terms, where two different civilizational matrices can establish an exchange despite the fact that their principles can be considered irreconcilable (Tavares, 2013). This dialogue is indispensable to compensate for the wear and tear suffered by Buen-Vivir and thus Andean thought, after years of neo-extractivist governmental policies.

Finally, despite the categories or translations that the study currents can make on Buen-Vivir and Sumak Kawsay, central questions remain: How do native peoples understand and live Sumak Kawsay? Regarding the case study in Imbabura, I could affirm that there is indeed a different life horizon to the western version. The experience in the communities has helped me to show that the social project of indigenous life is certainly based on the principles of Andean philosophy. This alterity
rests on a deep relationship with nature and on an institutionalized communitarian sense, which is evidenced mainly in rituals, parties and different celebrations. For the communities investigated, *Sumak Kawsay* is understood as a “recreated tradition” that represents their social project of life, their utopia if you like, and although it is a recent term in his vocabulary, they have begun to appropriate it.

How to build a true epistemology of *Sumak Kawsay* outside the westernized interpretation? *Sumak Kawsay*, according to several interviews, is still a very abstract concept, which needs to be nourished by the empirical study of the practices and knowledge of native peoples. The studies should be based on real coexistence and mutual learning, leaving aside characteristics of classical ethnography to introduce elements of decolonial and critical ethnography. Hence, the academy has a great responsibility that goes beyond westernized ethnography and the intellectual comfort of cross references. In that sense, I agree with Oviedo when he points out that:

> “The least and adequate for a responsible and serious investigator is to try to enter the consciousness of a people, from there dare to create theories, although the main thing would be to internalize a culture to speak with propriety and depth. If a philosophy is not lived in the first person, it becomes manipulative and deformable. Thus, for more good intentions that encourage some people, even being able to be descendants of the native peoples, their positions may end up being part of the indoctrination and perennial civilizational catechization” (Oviedo, 2014, p. 293).

**References**

5 There are several indigenous and non-indigenous scholars who have worked on the theorization of *Sumak Kawsay*, among which I can mention: Mónica Chuji, Nina Pacari, Ariruma Kowii, Floresmilo Simbaña, Benjamin Ińuca, Atawallpa Oviedo, Pablo Dávalos, Philipp Altman, among others. In addition, there are other academic initiatives working on issues related to *Sumak Kawsay* such as the UNESCO Chair on Indigenous Peoples of Latin America of the “Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar” and the originative intercultural and community higher education proposal of the Pluriversidad “Amawtay Wasi”.


The quinoa boom and the commoditisation debate: critical reflections on the re-emergence of a peasantry in the Southern Altiplano

Introduction

In the span of two decades, quinoa went from being a virtually unknown indigenous crop cultivated and consumed almost exclusively in Bolivia and Peru to being arguably the most famous “superfood” sold and cultivated all over the world (Bazile, Jacobsen, and Verniau 2016). Gourmets, vegetarians, and even scientists contributed to the success of this pseudocereal, in particular by promoting its exceptional nutritional and agronomic properties (Nuñez de Arco 2015). High demand on international markets led to rising quinoa prices, which in turn spurred an increase in the area under quinoa cultivation across Bolivia’s Southern Altiplano. While the origins of the quinoa boom can be traced back to the late 2000s, it reached its peak in 2013–2014. In 2013, when international organizations promoted the “International Year of Quinoa” in Rome, prices paid to local producers reached 2,000
Bolivianos per quintal (46 kilos) – or almost 8,000 USD per ton – a price previously unimaginable to Bolivian farmers.

Several scholars have examined the impacts of the quinoa boom. Some highlight basic consequences of the boom, such as the increasing mechanization and modernization of local agriculture (Vieira 2012) or the expansion of quinoa cultivation into plains areas, and as a consequence, increasing vulnerability of quinoa crops to pests and wind erosion (Orsag et al. 2013; Felix 2008). Others emphasize the potential socio-economic impacts of the quinoa boom on outmigration and regarding so-called pluriactivity4 (Vassas-Toral and Vieira Pak 2010; Kerssen 2015). Jacobsen (2011) has argued that the quinoa boom led to a decrease in quinoa consumption among Bolivians; however, this analysis has been criticized as based on scant evidence (Winkel et al. 2012). Concerns surrounding the quinoa boom have also made it into the mainstream media. For example, in January 2013 an article titled “Can vegans stomach the unpalatable truth about quinoa” was published in the UK newspaper The Guardian. It suggested a negative reality behind the production of quinoa, constructing a narrative of Bolivian farmers as victims of “damaging North–South exchanges” (Blythman 2013).

This essay seeks to explore some of the tensions engendered by the quinoa boom. I argue that the high degree of market integration of quinoa production accelerated an economic and social restructuration of the Southern Altiplano. I discuss some of the impacts of the boom, not only in terms of socio-ecological consequences, but also in terms of counter reactions and adaptation of local social and political systems. My analysis suggests that some of the impacts of the boom may be usefully explained by

4 The term pluriactivity designates a livelihood strategy characterized by the existence of several professional activities or income sources (Kay 2008, Urioste 2017). While agriculture plays an important role, there are several other livelihood options and income sources available to quinoa producers. In the Southern Altiplano region, pluriactivity is an important livelihood strategy used by many quinoa producers. There are several livelihood options available, including tourism related to the Salt flats that are a major draw in South America. In addition, there are several mining facilities operating in the region, including the San Cristobal mine, which is one of the biggest in the region. In addition, labour migration to other geographical areas (e.g. the neighbouring countries of Chile and Argentina) has been common (Vassas Toral 2011) – though in recent years migration flows slowed, and even reversed in some cases, due to high prices of quinoa spurring the return of Bolivian migrants.
means of the commoditization framework. As I illustrate, land and labour have been increasingly treated as commodities in the region. Yet my research also shows that the quinoa boom led to a household- and community-level restructuring that has contributed to strengthening normative and social frameworks in quinoa-producing communities. Based on my analysis of several strategies implemented by peasant communities in the Southern Altiplano, I argue that this case is illustrative of the “grey zone” that can exist between peasantry and entrepreneurial farming (van der Ploeg 2008; Kerssen 2015).

A mixed-method approach was used – combining quantitative and qualitative data – to examine the consequences of the quinoa boom in the province of Nor Lipez (municipalities of San Pedro de Quemes and Colcha K), Bolivia (Figure 1). Most of the data discussed in this article was derived from 52 interviews and focus group discussions conducted with quinoa producers, Non-governmental Organization (NGO) representatives, cooperative leaders, local public servants, and traditional authorities. In addition, data were collected in a survey of 305 households carried out in November 2015.
The commoditization debate

The process of commoditization is an important concept widely used in discussions over agrarian change, and more generally in Marxian sociology and human geography (Castree 2003; Friedmann 1980). Harriss (1982) has called it the most important process driving agrarian change. According to Harriett Friedmann, commoditization may be defined as the “process of deepening commodity relations within the cycle of reproduction. Commoditization occurs to the extent that each household is severed from direct reciprocal ties, both horizontal and vertical, for renewal of means of production and of subsistence, and comes to depend increasingly on commodity relations for reproduction” (Friedmann 1980: 162-3). Further, Friedmann (1980) describes the process of commoditization as running counter to peasant identities, which are characterized by reciprocity links, subsistence farming, and the search for autonomy (Van der Ploeg 2010; Scott 1976). Notably, the phenomenon of commoditization echoes the concept of fictitious commodities described by Hungarian economist and philosopher Karl Polanyi. In The Great Transformation, Polanyi proposes drawing a distinction between real and fictitious commodities (Polanyi 1992). He defines fictitious commodities as goods that are not produced for the market but are nevertheless exchanged as commodities. In his corresponding analysis, Polanyi describes three fictitious commodities – land, labour, and money – and highlights how land and labour are treated as commodities in contemporary European societies. However, Polanyi emphasizes that treating such natural elements as commodities is perilous. He stresses that applying a rationale of self-regulating markets to land and labour is doomed to fail because their supply and demand do not follow the same logic as commodities. As a result, these fictitious commodities can and do trigger economic instabilities, necessitating state intervention. Finally, Polanyi applies moral arguments in his critique, referring in particular to the concept

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5 Different theoretical traditions apply the terms commodification and commoditization with similar meanings. Friedmann, in a Marxian tradition, speaks of commodification. We have opted to use the most current spelling applied in agrarian studies: “commoditization”.
of alienability – regarded as one of the key aspects of capitalist commoditization according to Marxian scholars (Castree 2003).

Land and labour: two aspects of the commoditization process in the context of the quinoa boom

In Nor Lipez, commoditization of land has been gradually occurring in recent decades, even though the existing legal system technically places significant constraints on the extent to which land may be treated as a commodity. In this province, the most important official land designation is Territorio Indigena Originario Campesinons (Native Community Land, TIOC). TIOC lands belong to the community, such that it cannot be sold or transferred to anyone outside of the community. Traditional authorities govern access to land through community norms that are formulated in village assemblies.

There are two major types of land within the communities: pasture land and agricultural land – the latter for quinoa production. Pasture land is held and used in common. By contrast, agricultural land is used privately for quinoa cultivation and users’ rights are transmitted within the same family over generations. Traditionally, a family could acquire additional agricultural land by converting a section of community pasture land, but the conversion required a lot of personal labour and typically took several months (Vieira 2012). The quinoa boom has posed major challenges to community norms governing access to land, however, with massive conversion of pasture land occurring in response to rising prices (Tschopp 2017; Winkel et al. 2016). Mechanization made it possible to convert important areas of pasture land into quinoa fields much faster than in the past. Our 2015 survey showed

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6 These territories were designated Tierra communitarian de Origen in the agrarian reform law that entered into force in 1996 (Ley Inra). In 2006, their status was changed to TIOC in the new Bolivian constitution. TIOC are recognized as an official territorial unit, in which autonomous forms of local government can be established. More information on this topic may be found in Fundación Tierra (2011) and Ruesgas (2017).
that, on average, quinoa producers increased the size of land they used for quinoa cultivation by over a third (from 15.3 to 20.8 hectares, including fallow lands).7

“With the quinoa boom, when prices were between 1,800 and 2,000 Bolivianos [per quintal8], it was an uncontrollable chaos. Nothing was functioning, no community norms or anything. In order to grab some unused land, the residents [new producers] would regularly plough land during the night with a tractor. The following day, we would find it all “tractored”.9

These land conversions triggered conflicts within communities in the region. In our survey, 35% of households reported being involved in a conflict and stated that claims on land and disagreements over land boundaries were major causes. This form of “local land grabbing” is a clear manifestation of commoditization of land. Land titles do not change hands and the areas appropriated still officially remain “community land”. But the process is primarily driven by desire for financial gain through quinoa exports. In this way, the land conversions epitomize privatization of a common good, which is presented by Castree (2003) as the “first step” of commoditization of nature.

A commoditization of labour?

Another interesting consequence of the quinoa boom has been the commoditization of labour on behalf of quinoa production. Previously, when quinoa was regarded as a subsistence crop, peasants mostly relied on the informal exchange of labour with neighbours and families in order to manage the harvest. These practices were called ayni (reciprocity) by quinoa producers, and were sometimes described as a response

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7 Fallow periods are typically very long for quinoa in the Southern Altiplano because of local soil characteristics. After harvesting, a quinoa field is usually left fallow for at least two or three years - occasionally even longer than 10 years. During the fallow period, the land may be used as pasture area for llamas, a practice that helps increase the amount of organic matter in soils.

8 A quintal is the equivalent of 46 kilos. At the peak of the quinoa boom, the price paid to producers went as high as 8,000 dollars per ton.

9 Interview B13; NGO technician.
both to the unavailability of credit and lack of labour force in the communities (Walsh-Dilley 2013). Our results suggest that with the development of export markets and the rise in areas under quinoa cultivation, these practices became increasingly rare. Increasing financial resources enabled quinoa producers to pay hired farm workers, eventually making it common practice. About 75% of the households in our survey confirmed hiring casual labour for their agricultural activities. These workers were especially present during harvesting and sowing times, when more labour force is required. In addition, the quinoa boom resulted in significant capital accumulation in several communities. Following the spectacular increase in prices, quinoa producers invested some of their earnings in different assets – especially productive assets (tractors, agricultural machines) and vehicles (Tschopp 2018). Though the introduction of tractors in the region goes back as far as the 1970s, their use appears to have intensified along with the quinoa boom. They effectively symbolize mechanization of quinoa production in recent decades (Vieira Pak 2012; Laguna 2011), contributing to expansion of the agricultural frontier by increasing the amount of land that individual households could cultivate on former pasture land.

10 It is, of course, important to show how labour exchanges have been affected by the increasing size of areas under quinoa cultivation and the high prices of quinoa on international markets. However, our findings do not point to the disappearance of all forms of reciprocity. Instead, our findings suggest that new strategies of reciprocity and collaboration are being developed by quinoa producers. In this way, our results echo Marygold Walsh-Dilley who observed that “increasing integration into ‘modern’ systems and processes need not, as is often supposed, undermine the moral economy and can potentially invigorate it”. (Walsh-Dilley 2013: 678).
A significant share of the ploughing and sowing activities are now undertaken with tractors. The few producers who own these assets can extract important benefits by renting them to other quinoa farmers. This process may also contribute to increasing wealth concentration in the hands of a few particularly successful producers. Where exchanges of labour in times of harvest or sowing were previously practised as reciprocal exchanges and manifestations of solidarity (Vieira Pak 2012), they are now increasingly commoditized.

**Re-peasantization and new strategies adopted by quinoa farmers**

Despite the ongoing commoditization process, the quinoa boom simultaneously provided local peasant communities with more resources and capacities overall. These resources were partly used to develop new strategies of autonomy and collective
control over resources. These strategies are characteristic of a new peasantry that is arguably emerging in the region.

**Characteristics and definitions of the new peasantry**

Resistance to commoditization is often described as one of the characteristics of the peasantry and is embodied in several strategies, including farming models centred on reproduction and subsistence (Friedmann 1980). Ploeg provides several ideal-typical traits and specificities of the peasantry in comparison to entrepreneurial and capitalist farming. He stresses that the peasantry must not be understood in terms of simple oppositions (subsistence vs. market) and he acknowledges that the contemporary peasantry often evolves in a “grey zone” between entrepreneurial and subsistence farming (van der Ploeg 2008).

According to Ploeg, the new peasantry is defined by three attributes: a struggle for autonomy, a self-controlled resource base, and co-production (see Figure 3). In a context generally characterized by marginalization, deprivation, and dependence of peasant farmers worldwide, the new peasantry is actively engaged in seeking new models of autonomy that support “creation and development of a self-controlled and self-managed resource base” (van der Ploeg 2008). Control over the resource base is the key element enabling co-production, which is defined as the productive interaction and mutual transformation of human actors and natural resources. Co-production may be seen in the complementarity of different modes of farming in traditional peasant farms (e.g. fertilization with manure from livestock; crop rotations). It is also partly embodied in the idea of multi-functionality of agriculture, or in livelihood strategies such as pluriactivity (Schneider and Niederle 2010). To achieve these aims of greater autonomy, new strategies are developed by individual farmers as well as peasant organizations. In the following section, I show how this framework can be used to explain some of the changes that have occurred in the Southern Altiplano region in the decade following the quinoa boom.
Reinforcement of local institutions and development of a label of denomination of origin

Several phenomena related to the quinoa boom may be seen to have created conditions enabling many producers to increase their autonomy and control over key resources in the region. With the election of Evo Morales in 2005 and the rising political hegemony of his party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism, MAS), the general political context became more favourable to indigenous communities. In the new Bolivian constitution, which came into effect in 2009, additional rights were granted to indigenous and local communities. Land access rights were further developed and the right of local communities to govern territories designated TIOC was reaffirmed.

At the same time, these new rights presented new challenges for local traditional authorities. In the context of the quinoa boom, local authorities had to deal with the agricultural expansion of quinoa producers driven by higher prices (see, among other
sources: Vieira 2012; Argandoña Espinoza 2016; Tschopp, Bieri, and Rist 2018). Land and community boundaries in particular were unclear, giving rise to conflict in some specific cases (Walsh-Dilley 2016). In this context, reinforcing local rules and community norms was identified as a priority. NGOs such as the Agrónomos y Veterinarios Sin Fronteras (AVSF) and the Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA) played an important role in strengthening traditional authorities through the formulation of clear community norms (Argandoña Espinoza 2016; Felix 2008). Other NGOs focused on capacity building of other organizational forms, including quinoa cooperatives and groups of llama herders.

Meeting of the cooperative SOPROQUI, community of Aguaquiza, Nor Lípez (Photo: Maurice Tschopp)

One important example that highlights the strengthening of local institutions is the ongoing effort to establish a denomination of origin label for quinoa from the
Southern Altiplano. Those behind it seek to make the label comprehensive, covering private producers as well as the most important quinoa cooperatives of Bolivia. The advantage of such an approach is that it is inclusive and will bind all producers of the region to a minimum set of production rules, while building trust among different categories of producers. Although the process is very inclusive, representatives of cooperatives feature prominently as leaders. The Bolivian government also supports these efforts by providing technical support and serving as a facilitator between different stakeholders. While the label of origin already exists and is recognized by three South American countries (Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador), the regulatory council is currently working for the recognition of the label by the European Union. Producers participating in this process view it not only as a way to promote sustainable production practices, but also to defend and promote traditional Andean farming models.

**Co-production: self-provisioning and pluriactivity**

According to one distinct narrative found in newspapers and several scientific articles (Jacobsen 2011), the increase in exports resulting from the quinoa boom made this dietary staple too expensive for Bolivians themselves. However, other studies have revealed that quinoa consumption remained high in producing regions, though it decreased significantly in Bolivian cities (Winkel et al. 2012). Our survey, limited to rural areas, showed that quinoa consumption stayed high among quinoa farmers. Households participating in the survey indicated consuming an average of 6.8 quintals (312 kilos) of quinoa every year. In addition, quinoa farmers in the region regularly saved part of their harvest for use as seeds in subsequent years. Most of the quinoa producers interviewed also engaged actively in llama herding and used llama

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11 More information on the denomination of origin of quinoa from the Southern Altiplano can be found at http://www.doquinoareal.com/es/

12 It should be noted that this process can be complicated. The author assisted a discussion of the denomination of origin label at which cooperative members demanded the exclusion of private sector companies from the process. At the meeting, private companies were accused of buying quinoa contaminated with pesticides or even Peruvian quinoa and exporting it as *Quinua real organica*. 
manure as fertilizer, a practice encouraged by the most important farmer cooperatives in the region, which are exclusively producing and exporting organic quinoa. Notably, however, several producers did not raise enough llamas to provide for adequate fertilization of fallow lands. There is a local market for shipments of manure (Kerssen 2015).

These findings illustrate the need for refined analysis of peasants’ self-provisioning. As Ploeg suggests, peasants should not be characterized on one or the other side of a dual opposition of commercial vs. peasant. Indeed, my results do not support the suggestion of Bernstein (2001) that peasants are reduced to petty commodity producers. My findings show that even in a context characterized by a high degree of integration into export markets, self-provisioning remains an important strategy for peasants; others have found similar results in other locations (Henderson 2017; Laney and Turner 2015).

Pluriactivity is also an important livelihood strategy of peasants in the region. Traditionally, the Southern Altiplano region was characterized by outmigration to important Bolivian cities or to the neighbouring countries of Chile and Argentina (Vassas Toral 2011). In our survey, 59% of households indicated being employed in activities outside of quinoa production and 40% of households had at least one family member engaged in regular or yearly activities outside of the community. At the same time, however, the quinoa boom encouraged several farmers to return to their communities, sometimes abandoning their other employment activities. As noted by Kerssen (2015), the quinoa markets have fostered a repopulation and revitalization of the region, as evidenced by population increases in several rural municipalities between the censuses of 2002 and 2012.

Over the last two years, however, fears have emerged that falling quinoa prices might retrigger massive outmigration. Interestingly, several stakeholders we surveyed emphasized their desire to take advantage of the current positive image of quinoa in order to develop new livelihood activities rooted in their local communities. The farmer cooperatives SOPROQUI and CECAOT, pioneering exporters of Bolivian quinoa, decided to sell a share of their local quinoa production through the state
programme desayuno escolar (“school breakfast”), which encourages municipalities to rely on local food production for school meals. In addition, the cooperative SOPROQUI has expressed aims of developing agro-tourism on quinoa farms, taking advantage of the influx of tourists who visit the Salar de Uyuni region every year. Other quinoa farmers have already created community-owned hostels in the region. These examples illustrate how quinoa farmers are shifting from a logic of pluriactivity to one of multifunctionality, pursuing strategies that reinforce the social and economic fabric of local communities.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have sought to show that the quinoa boom in Bolivia not only gave rise to effects commonly associated with commoditization, it also resulted in new means of local control and ownership of resources and reinforced local social and political institutions. As such, our findings lend support to Kerssen’s observation that quinoa boom-related re-peasantization occupies a “grey zone at the interface between peasantness and entrepreneurial farming” (Kerssen 2015: 501). The commoditization process is often described as a threat to traditional modes of production of the peasantry or even to its very existence. Yet our results suggest that quinoa farmers can take advantage of the influx of resources to fashion new strategies of co-production and control over natural resources. The peasants in our study took advantage of the opportunities the quinoa boom presented to them, exemplifying a process of negotiation and hybridization (Walsh-Dilley 2013).

The present essay attests to the multiple tensions and sometimes contradictory forces that characterize Bolivia’s agrarian sector in the Morales era. The recent alliance between the Bolivian state and between agrarian elites in the lowlands helped in part to maintain and reinforce commercialized agriculture as opposed to new peasant models (Webber 2017). It is vitally important to account for the hybrid strategies pursued by the new peasantry in order to understand and support them in the twenty-first century (van der Ploeg 2008).
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Food Sovereignty in Latin America: a gendered and multiescalar perspective

Introduction

This article aims to analyze how the concept of food sovereignty in Latin America has been constructed as a political tool for peasant women. In addition, it examines the practices found in this everyday life construction, by drawing on a multiscale perspective (Martin, 2004) stemming from feminist political geography.

With regard to peasant women, or rather, transnational networks of peasant women, it is necessary to take into account where their demands come from and how they lead women in one region to create networks with other women movements in the world in order to achieve their goals. In Latin America, the life of rural women in agriculture revolves around family care and food production (FAO, 2013a) at the local scale, and also at the regional scale. Women experience different forms of...
violence (by state, transnational companies, partners, etc.), and their consequences are perceived in everyday life. What occurs at the local scale is reflected in other scales, such as the state, the region, and the global. Peasant women are capable of recognizing their demands as women, particularly as peasant woman, which allows them to identify a point of convergence with women from different places in Latin America, sharing demands within the region since scales are mutually constitutive (Cabezas, 2012).

In this vein, the multiscale view from the perspective of feminist political geography allows us to better understand how these women are organized at different geographic scales, seeking to break with the classic state centric vision, and also valuing the local scale, where the daily lives of these women is built.

In the next section, I will sketch this theoretical perspective by shedding light on the discussion about some differences and tensions generated around the concept of food security as it has been presented by the FAO and the contraposition of this concept/model proposed by the Via Campesina as food sovereignty in 1996. I will then point out how food sovereignty has been performed to include gender claims and to influence power spaces from peasant women. Lastly, I offer some final thoughts about the way these gender claims are being carried out throughout the region and why these political processes should be studied in depth from a multiscale perspective.

Food sovereignty versus food security: a multiscale view

Several studies have examined food issues in Latin America as a contention not only among social actors but also among spatial scales—here, we are talking about geographic scales as local, national, regional, global, etc. In this way, these embody demands that not only have to do with the local scale, where the production of food

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4 According to the primer about violence against la vía campesina (the way of life of peasant women), gender violence is not only understood as domestic violence but also the lack of public policies (in the case of the state), the concentration of lands, and the production of transgenic seeds, among other factors. This primer was produced in Brazil: Vía Campesina, Cartilla: Basta de violencia contra las mujeres, 2012.
takes place but also at scales that involve states and regional and international organizations. An example that epitomizes this process is the debate between food security and food sovereignty, how this has been considered by social movements, and the extent to which both elements have come to the fore.

A brief description of the context in which these terms can be understood as concepts, models and practices is required to understand why they develop in different ways and serve different political needs. The world experiences the aggravation of a food crisis that continues to this day as a result of the dominant economic development model (Rosset, 2008) based on the opening of peripheral markets, import and export of consumer goods and raw materials, as well as the emphasis on privatizing public enterprises of several services. In response to this, FAO (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization) created the concept of food security after World War II (Trauger, 2014) with the aim of ensuring that governments have a responsibility to provide food for all citizens, in an attempt to eradicate hunger. As Trauger (2014) suggested, an important issue is that in a context of economic restructuring, as in the case of Latin America during the 1980s (Schneider et al, 2010), and parallel opening of markets, the concept of food security can no longer guarantee local development since it does not imply an obligation for developing local markets or local production, even within states, without affecting domestic agricultural production and structure (distribution of land, promotion of familiar agriculture, etc.).

According to Rosset (2003), food security can be a way for states to continue implementing business agriculture, increase exports, and ease the pressure of countries such as the United States over others by encouraging free trade treaties. In this same vein, Trauger argues that "many of those in the developing world are landless former peasants or farmers struggling to live off the commodity exports to the global North." (2014: 1132).

The concept of food security is clearly based on a state-centric geopolitical view (Agnew, 2005), in which other spatial scales are not considered beyond the global and State; this classic view ignores the subjects of these policies, social movements, and their repercussions in people’s daily lives at the local scale.
The concept of food sovereignty developed in Latin America, however, was presented in 1996 by La Vía Campesina (LVC) at the FAO World Food Conference in order to counteract the previously proposed concept of food security (Trauger, 2014). The argument carried forward by LVC, aimed to show that the origin of food and its forms of production also matter, especially for the countries considered in development (Pimbert, 2009), as in the case of Latin America countries.

The meaning of food sovereignty itself has changed over the years (Agarwal, 2014), changes which have been largely driven by women who are predominantly responsible for feeding families and are often responsible for seed conservation and subsistence farming (Desmarais, 2007). Therefore, this concept directly concerns women who are responsible for producing 60-80% of food in developing countries (FAO, 2001). Paying attention to what occurs at the local scale and breaking with a hierarchical view of spatial scales is thus also a way of making women visible (Staeheli and Kofman, 2004). Among the notable differences between the two concepts, their origin marks the difference in relation to gender. Food sovereignty allows greater visibility of women and their work, since it starts from a vision of “local to global”, rather than the other way around.

The last definition of food sovereignty, adopted at the Nyéléni conference in 2007, prevails until now. In this declaration, not only is the importance of food production highlighted, but aspects of ecology and sustainability are also emphasized. Accordingly, local peasants find in food sovereignty a form of resistance and opposition to the current model of development, positioning themselves against free trade treaties and corporatism, placing the needs of small farmers and local markets above companies and international agreements:

It puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. […] Food sovereignty prioritizes local and national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal-fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social
and economic sustainability. [...] Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social and economic classes, and generations (Nyéléni, 2007).

The comparison of models by Rosset (2003) makes clear that both have different objectives, starting from different perspectives. On the one hand, one we could call “bottom-up”, i.e. from the social movements and organizations and their demands stemming from daily life, and at the other, one that comes from the "top" of the United Nations in which the State and global markets are the main protagonists. These differences between models are mainly marked by the points of view we have about food and its relation to the market. In the case of food security, alimentation is understood as a product, a commodity, and on the other hand, food sovereignty is understood as a human right, as well as its production (Rosset, 2003). In the same vein, Trauger (2014) argues that the differences are related to the actors involved in both and to their respective scales. While one is about the states, the other is about people and small producers. This also means that public policies are viewed from different perspectives and the model of food sovereignty puts more emphasis on the local scale when defining how it is produced, emphasizing also the control over territories, the distribution of lands, etc. (ibid.).

Since food sovereignty is a concept that draws on peasant social movements, daily life is central. The local scale becomes indispensable to understand this demand. In everyday life, the gender role assigned to peasant women is directly related to food production. Therefore, it becomes difficult to speak of food sovereignty without understanding how women are able to appropriate this demand, finding in it the opportunity to jointly launch other demands related to gender, which stem from transnational practices that effectively enable them to increase their participation in political spaces in a way to focus on public policies at different spatial scales.

The State is also very important as a scale of analysis, despite transnational networks. For women, the goal is to apply pressure at the State scale, so that governments adopt policies that strengthen smallholder agriculture and ensure some basic rights for rural
population (health, education, retirement, etc., see Schneider, 2010). Another frequent objective for rural women is to impede free trade agreements that treat food as a commodity and often include the commercialization of GM seeds. In Latin America, one of the most popular demands is related to land reform as well. In consequence, to pursue the aim of food sovereignty, LVC affirms that it is necessary to have policies that enable the production of agroecological food and restrain large scale monoculture (CLOC – Via Campesina, 2013).

As shown above, both models focus on one particular scale, respectively, rather than analyzing how different scales are constituted through contention and imaginaries in and of themselves. Instead of focusing on one closed scale, in this work the spatial scales are not understood as containers, isolated elements, or mere administrative levels (Brenner, 2001; Agnew, 2002); nor does it prioritize one scale over another. Instead, the understanding put forward here is that they are all political constructs of equal importance for analysis (Marston, 2000). For these reasons, I first suggest a multiscale view, in which the scales are simultaneously constitutive (Howitt, 1998, Marston et al, 2005), going beyond the institutional, and in which their importance does not depend on the "level of geographical resolution in which the conflict is analyzed" (Brenner, 2004: 9) to define the scale but also the way each affects the public policies of where and for whom, related to food sovereignty.

Second, part of the analysis of feminist geography is to move between different scales (Gilmartin and Kaufman, 2004: 122) to better understand the underlying power relations as well as how scales are related to each other and how they are present in women’s lives. From this perspective, the transnational networks of peasant women are constructors of spatialities and scales too. The production of scales here is understood as the tensions between the structure and the actors, being constantly negotiated and produced through social and political dispute (Marston, 2000, Harrison, 2010, p.; Herod, 2010). In this vein, I draw on the concept of ‘boomerang pattern’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), which refers to the practice within organizations to take a demand from one scale to another, whether regional or global, as a form of pressure and resistance against the State, and within the same organizations, as an expansion of their demands in the domestic sphere. Here, this concept is useful to
understand how women construct and create their demands within different spatial scales alongside transnational networks, and how these demands can be key to their empowerment. Being nationally and internationally organized, peasant women are constantly moving between local, regional and global networks, and this helps to sustain their demands and grant them recognition.5

Therefore, organized rural women’s organizations use the “jumping scale” (Haarstad and Floysand, 2007; Smith, 1996; Brenner, 1999; Cox, 1998) this way to achieve their objectives. That is, from their articulation in transnational networks, they pressure states to adopt public policies which prevent free trade agreements, or protect against open markets that would foster transnational agribusinesses based on monoculture (soy is an example), often supported by organizations at the global scale, such as the FAO, or at the regional scale, as in the case of MERCOSUR (Butto et al, 2014).

Women and the food sovereignty claim in Latin America

In Latin America, rural women account for the majority of food production in their countries (FAO and IDB, 2016). In this report, only women active in agriculture are included. Although women with non-agricultural labor constitute an important part in many countries, they do not enjoy decent labor rights, and the social movements of rural women are all related to agricultural labor (FAO, 2013b).

At a global scale, in the sense of the total of the global food production, women represent at least 50% of the food production (Senra and León, 2009: 11). According to the “Political Note about Rural Women” (2013) by the FAO, in South America

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5 For instance, the very political space of the Vía Campesina could be seen from this point of view. Since women movements carry out local collective demands, running through the movement on a larger scale as the purpose of lobbying the proper motions (Brochner 2014: 95), this space allows women to have a double incidence, affecting everyday life and regional policies, moving and returning among scales as ‘a boomerang’.
women represent more than 50% of those dedicated to agricultural work, while in Central America they are less than 50%. These percentages help to understand why these women use the claim for food sovereignty as a tool for the introduction of gender-related demands, in particular the South American peasant women’s organizations. Despite producing food, rural women in Latin America represent a minority of household heads, and are also a minority of landowners (FAO and BID, 2016; FAO, 2013b; Deere and León, 2002). For Latin America, they represent between 8% and 30% (FAO, 2013a: 1).

In short, women still do not occupy power spaces and are not broadly involved in relations between States and socio-economic policies (Roberts, 2004, Negar, 2004); however, the decisions made and policies applied by the state directly affect women, indicating that when analyzing food policies on a local scale, we must also consider the different scales that intercept and interact by combining different structures and discursive practices in different places (Negar, 2004: 47). As mentioned earlier, women are the main producers of food, and therefore many aspects of food sovereignty are related to the gender roles attributed to them (Senra y León, 2009). In fact, much of the knowledge required for food sovereignty to be put into practice comes from peasant women. For example: food care, cultivation and seed care (Ramos and Drago, 2013, Pimbert, 2009b).6

In addition, within the framework of the Coordinator of the Field Organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean (CLOC), rural women who participate in the organization have different ethnic origins, while considering themselves as peasants. Nevertheless, they are also partly black and indigenous, thus having a class component as rural women and peasant communities. This allows them to be able to divide up spaces of struggle, create networks and develop transnational practices. Their class identity can be seen when they relate their gender demands to their demands as peasants, for example, identifying capitalism, patriarchy and colonialism

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6 In this regard, the testimony of women related to the experience of food sovereignty linked to food production establishes the relationship of ownership of seed to food. Also, to reinforce what has already been said, these women feel responsible for the preservation of biodiversity and ecological production, and reproduction of resources (Ramos and Drago, 2013:143).
as the main source of their problems and their inequalities (García, 2014: 99). If we think of Nancy Fraser’s (2008) concept of social justice, gender is a two-dimensional category. These women do not only seek recognition, in the case of rural women, in recognition of their knowledge and their work (García, 2014) but also redistribution due to the problems faced by family agriculture that are more acute in the case of women (ibid.).

The demand for food sovereignty started to become appropriated by women in Latin America with a project of La Vía Campesina called “Peasant Women on the Frontiers of Food Sovereignty” at the beginning of the 2000 decade (Desmarais, 2007). The statement of the Fifth Assembly of Women of CLOC - Vía Campesina (2015) affirms:

> It was our knowledge that started agriculture, we have continued, through a history that we have made possible, the continuity of food for humanity, through which we create and transmit much of the knowledge of ancestral medicine, and today we are those who produce most of the food, despite the usurpation of land and water, and the multiple policies and programs that persistently discriminate and attack us. [...] We will have no rest in our struggle against all forms of appropriation of Nature, food sovereignty and the defense of our seeds.\(^7\)

In sum, I argue that women find in food sovereignty a form to influence and participate in power spaces and in building political leadership as they appropriate the claim by connecting both gender and specific peasant demands. This conjoint demand marks a new regional agenda for peasant women, who through the organization of women from different collectives manage to exert pressure to have greater political influence and put gender issues on the table. Indeed, the gender claims of peasant women for food sovereignty are related to gender violence but also to political participation and equity (Brochner, 2014).\(^8\) These are the two main

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\(^7\) Translated by the author.

\(^8\) In the primer against violence against women, as well as in the declaration of the Fifth Women’s Assembly of the CLOC, they relate to different forms of gender violence with their everyday life including the production of food.
vindications from peasant women in Latin America, and they can in fact be combined. If women don’t participate in the process of food production, agroecology and sustainable production cannot come about, and the increase of their political participation and leadership are central to take it forward.

Through the women’s statement at the Fifth CLOC Women’s Assembly, cited above, it is possible to see how women recognize the different spatial scales involved in the process as relational: on the one hand they speak of their daily life, placing relevance on their knowledge, regional and global, such as water scarcity, and on the other, of transnational companies, which produce genetically modified seeds, such as monocultures.

With respect to transnational corporations, peasant women understand that not only State violence represents gender violence, for example through the lack of adequate public policies. In reply, they actively seek to influence in the creation of public policies, for example with regard to the use of genetic modified seeds, agrotoxins, etc. (Vía Campesina, 2012). They struggle against these transnational corporations that are recognized as a principal enemy, because of the consequences they experience in everyday life regarding their access to land and credits but, most importantly, to agroecological food production (Desmarais, 2007, Senra and León, 2009). Organized peasant women not only vindicate a gender identity but also a class identity that defines their relation with large scale production as they oppose the capitalist structure of production (Siliprandi, 2014).

In this case, transnational networks become used as an empowerment strategy to pressure mechanisms at different scales, from local to global and vice versa. Women’s demands, the fight for their gender demands, undergo several scales, from the local, bridging the regional scale to reach the global scale, in this case the LVC, which, at the same time, turns their claims into multiple shares, returning to the local scale, where empowerment takes place.

Overall, the claim for food sovereignty can be a key for the empowerment of peasant women, promoting the value of women’s tasks that have long been considered of minor importance. Another aspect to highlight is that food sovereignty is based on
principles such as autonomy, respect, sustainability and equality, which are also tools for women to have the perception that gender equality is ensured across all facets of food sovereignty (Sepúlveda, 2012: 79). In addition, the demands that are intertwined with food sovereignty are accompanied by questions about the distribution of power and gender relations. All of these issues are brought into the agenda through transnational networks as a political tool for peasant women. From a multiscale view, food sovereignty is therefore not only about the local scale, but rather a political weapon, which, by running from a scale to another in intertwined contention, serves to put forward multiple claims of women in the whole region.

**Final Thoughts**

From a multiscale perspective, this contribution has analyzed how the concept of food sovereignty has expanded as a political tool for peasant women in Latin America, critically engaging with and discussing the food security concept proposed by the FAO. While food security focuses on the recognition of agricultural production from a state-centric vision that allows reproducing business agriculture, food sovereignty emphasizes, at a first glance, the importance of daily life and local production. In addition to this, I argued that a multi-scalar analysis, drawing on a feminist geopolitical perspective, allows us to understand how demands are first generated and then taken to other scales, with the objective of influencing public policies within the State and regional and international organizations. In this sense, the analysis dimension of the social and political reference scale also differs and with it the impact of public policies linked to food sovereignty in the region. Thus, while in the case of food security, there is a hierarchical and state-centric scalar perspective—determined by the needs of a 'global' mercantile scale—food sovereignty emphasizes the reverse movement and explains how the local scale and agricultural production based on daily needs, not merely commercial ones, can effectively influence state, regional and/or global public policies.
From this perspective, peasant women have taken the struggle for food sovereignty as a beacon, thus forming transnational networks and combining various gender demands, to act also as a tool for gender justice. The identification of women in this movement relates to the valuation of their work and their knowledge, which strengthens the question of recognition as well as the search for autonomy and respect. This, in turn, relates to participation in power positions and also to action against gender violence. This represents an empowerment that brings together more gender-related issues and demands, causing women to adopt a feminist stance that questions their established social roles and their position in power distribution on different scales.

Women manage to work within transnational networks, from local to global, and vice versa, allowing them in their daily lives to enact transformations and contribute to gender justice, while creating new meanings and forms of organization to pressure different supranational institutions and organizations at the regional and global scales, by applying what I identified as the “boomerang pattern” (Keck and Sikkink, 1999) of multi-scalar movements.

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The Trinity of Buen Vivir in Ecuador

Buen Vivir, as an alternative concept to development (Acosta 2012, Cubillo-Guevara & Hidalgo-Capitán 2015a), emerged in Ecuador at the beginning of the 1990s, with the contribution of some Amazonian Kichwa intellectuals, under the name of sumak kawsay (Viteri et al. 1992, Viteri 1993, Viteri 2000, Cubillo-Guevara & Hidalgo-Capitán 2015b); however, it did not gain relevance until the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitutions included it as a principle (Vanhulst and Beling 2016).

This concept has been defined as a way of life in harmony with oneself (identity), with society (equity) and with nature (sustainability) (Cubillo-Guevara, Hidalgo-Capitán & García-Álvarez 2016). This definition was commonly accepted by the majority of intellectuals and politicians who used the term since the drafting of the 2008 Constitution; but here the consensus ended, since this way of living in harmony took on very different meanings according to the ideological position of each intellectual and politician who used the concept. Thus, there have been at least three ways of understanding Buen Vivir in Ecuador: one indigenist, another socialist and another ecologist / post-developmentalist (Le-Quang & Vercoutère 2013, Cubillo-Guevara, Hidalgo-Capitán & Domínguez-Gómez 2014, Vanhulst 2015).

The first conceptualization was part of the indigenist thought of the intellectuals associated with the Ecuadorian indigenous movement (Hidalgo-Capitán, Guillén & Deleg 2014) who understood the Buen Vivir as sumak kawsay or plenty life, and rejected modern development as a social aspiration, considering it as another form of

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colonization (coloniality of power) (Quijano 2000). These intellectuals proposed the re-creation in the 21st century of the harmonious conditions of life that the original peoples of Ecuador enjoyed. They tried to do so by positioning the so-called Andean worldview (Estermann 1998) as the main cultural reference of the country, in a way that would allow a recovery of the lost Andean identity and instigate a change of civilization. This approach placed great importance on the self-determination of indigenous peoples and proposed converting Ecuador into a Plurinational State, following the mandate set forth in the 2008 Constitution. In addition, these intellectuals considered the recovery of the ancestral traditions of these peoples to be of great importance and paid special attention to the spiritual elements related to Buen Vivir (for example, Pachamama) (Oviedo 2011). Most of these positions correspond to a premodern conception of the world, of Andean and Amazonian ancestral natures. The intellectuals who defended this conception of Buen Vivir were considered by some intellectuals of the other two streams as pachamamistas (folkloric), caught in the discourse of an infantile indigenism and without the ability to implement Buen Vivir. Indigenist thought about Buen Vivir had a certain relevance during the constituent debates of 2007 and 2008, while the Ecuadorian indigenous movement was allied with the ruling party Alianza PAÍS. Nevertheless, the movement’s subsequent distancing from the latter meant that its positions were not included in the Ecuadorian public policy. However, the indigenist concept of Buen Vivir, such as sumak kawsay, was part of the political discourse of opposition to the government of Rafael Correa and Alianza PAÍS.

The second conception was part of the neo-Marxist thought of intellectuals associated with the government of Ecuador (Ramírez 2010, SENPLADES 2010), who understood the good life as the socialism of sumak kawsay, or as the 21st century Ecuadorian variant of the socialism, assimilating modern development in its neo-Marxist strand. These intellectuals proposed the implementation of a new development model, through a revolutionary process called citizen revolution, aimed essentially at improving equity and supported initially by extractivism while the transformation of the Ecuadorian productive matrix occurred (SENPLADES 2012; Braña, Domínguez & León 2016). In this sense, they left the achievement of identity
and sustainability objectives in the background. This approach placed great importance to the role that the State should play in the implementation of Buen Vivir (SENPLADES 2011), which became the main political agent and sole interpreter of the popular will, excluding from political action the different social movements that contributed to making Buen Vivir part of the Constitution (for example, to the indigenous movement or the environmental movement). In addition, they aspired to transform the Ecuadorian socioeconomic system into a post-capitalist one, in an economy with a market, but not a market economy, where the entities of the popular and solidary economy played a major role (Coraggio 2007). Most of these positions correspond to a modern conception of the world, of a Western and socialist nature. The intellectuals who defended this conceptualization of Buen Vivir were considered by some intellectuals of the other two streams as practitioners of a deliquescent developmentalism. They also were criticized for having substituted the term ‘development’ in their discourses for the term Buen Vivir, thus equating both concepts and emptying Buen Vivir of most of the dimensions that were incorporated into the constitutional process. The neo-Marxist conceptualization of Buen Vivir, which developed after the constitutional debates of 2007 and 2008, has been the most influential in Ecuadorian public policy, inspiring the National Plans for Buen Vivir (SENPLADES 2009 & 2013) of the governments of Rafael Correa and Alianza PAÍS.

The third conception was part of the ecologist/post-developmentalist thought of the intellectuals associated with Ecuadorian social movements (Acosta & Martínez 2009, Acosta 2012) who understood Buen Vivir as an utopia to (re)build (Acosta 2011), or as the territorial concretization of the constitutional concept of Buen Vivir, and who rejected modern development as a social aspiration, considering it a form of domination. These intellectuals proposed the creation of local processes of social participation through which each community had to define its own Buen Vivir, or Buen “Convivir”, making environmental sustainability a prerequisite for the construction of such good co-livings (Gudynas & Acosta 2011). In this sense, they subordinated the achievement of the objectives of equity and identity toward the maintenance of harmonious relations with nature, through respect for the Rights of
Nature set forth in the Ecuadorian Constitution (Acosta & Martínez 2011). In fact, they proposed the construction of a bio-centric society, where nature occupied the center of the concerns of Ecuadorians, who should be considered as an inseparable part of it. Most of these concepts correspond to a postmodern conception of the world, of a Western nature. The intellectuals who defended this conception of Buen Vivir were considered by some intellectuals of the other two streams as lacking in political pragmatism, imbued in certain nihilism. They were criticized for being trapped in a discourse of infantile ecologism and for having distorted the meaning of Buen Vivir, by filling it with Western contents alien to the Andean worldview. The ecologist/post-developmentalist thought about Buen Vivir had certain relevance during the constitutional debates of 2007 and 2008, when some of its main representatives were part of the official party Alianza PAÍS and its affiliated social movements. However, the subsequent distancing between the social movements and this party meant that its positions lost weight in Ecuadorian public policy and only had certain relevance in the National Plans for Buen Vivir 2009-2013 (SENPLADES 2009). That said, as with the indigenist conception, this conceptualization of Buen Vivir formed part of the opposition’s political discourse against the government of Rafael Correa and Alianza PAÍS.

Despite the trifurcation of the concept of Buen Vivir (indigenist, socialist and ecologist/post-developmentalist), it was a legitimate goal to aspire to the confluence of these three streams in one conceptualization of Buen Vivir, based on the search for identity, equity and sustainability, through the transformation of Ecuador into a pluri-national, post-capitalist and bio-centric society (Cubillo-Guevara, Hidalgo-Capitán & García-Álvarez 2016). This was not possible under the Rafael Correa governments, but it could be more viable now, after the Lenin Moreno’s replacement of Rafael Correa as the head of the Presidency of the Republic of Ecuador, and with a rapprochement between the new Alianza PAÍS of Moreno and the different Ecuadorian social movements, including the indigenous movement. However, this moment coincides with the abandonment of Buen Vivir as a central principle in the speeches of the different progressive Ecuadorian political actors (Cubillo-Guevara 2016) and with the loss of relevance of the concept of Buen Vivir in Ecuadorian
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public policies, especially in the National Development Plan 2017-2021 (SENPLADES 2017).

In the international academic field, the concept of Buen Vivir is gaining increasing prominence, emerging as a synthesized concept that includes elements of the three versions of Buen Vivir in the discursive framework of trans-modern trans-development (Cubillo-Guevara & Hidalgo-Capitán 2015c; Hidalgo-Capitán & Cubillo-Guevara 2016), which contributes to the twinning of Buen Vivir with the European concept of degrowth (Unceta 2013). This view of Buen Vivir make it a trinity, a concept that is both one and triune; converging the three different conceptions (indigenist, socialist and ecologist/post-developmentalist) in one true Buen Vivir (trans-modern).

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El buen vivir, como concepto alternativo al desarrollo (Acosta 2012; Cubillo-Guevara e Hidalgo-Capitán 2015a), surgió en Ecuador a comienzos de la década de los noventa, de la mano de algunos intelectuales kichwas amazónicos, bajo la denominación de sumak kawsay (Viteri et al. 1992; Viteri 1993; Viteri 2000; Cubillo-Guevara e Hidalgo-Capitán 2015b); sin embargo, no adquirió relevancia hasta que fue incluido como precepto en la Constitución ecuatoriana de 2008 (Vanhulst y Beling 2016).

Dicho concepto ha sido definido como una forma de vida en armonía con uno mismo (identidad), con la sociedad (equidad) y con la naturaleza (sostenibilidad) (Cubillo-Guevara, Hidalgo-Capitán y García-Álvarez 2016). Esta definición fue comúnmente aceptada por la mayoría de los intelectuales y los políticos que utilizaban dicho término desde la redacción de la Constitución de 2008; pero aquí terminó el consenso, ya que dicha forma de vida en armonía cobró significados muy diferentes según la posición ideológica de cada intelectual y político que utilizaba el concepto. Así, han existido al menos tres maneras de entender el buen vivir en Ecuador: una indigenista, otra socialista y otra ecologista / posdesarrollista (Le-Quang y Vercoutère

La primera concepción fue la propia del pensamiento indigenista de los intelectuales vinculados con el movimiento indígena ecuatoriano (Hidalgo-Capitán, Guillén y Deleg 2014) que entendían el buen vivir como sumak kawsay o vida en plenitud, y rechazaban el desarrollo moderno como aspiración social por considerarlo una forma más de colonización (colonialidad del poder) (Quijano 2000). Estos intelectuales proponían la recreación en el siglo XXI de las condiciones armónicas de vida que tenían los pueblos originarios de Ecuador; y pretendían hacerlo por medio de la colocación de la llamada cosmovisión andina (Estermann 1998) como el principal referente cultural del país, de manera que permitiese recuperar la identidad andina perdida y propiciar un cambio de civilización. Dicho enfoque concedía gran relevancia a la autodeterminación de los pueblos indígenas y proponía convertir a Ecuador en un Estado plurinacional, siguiendo el mandato recogido en la Constitución de 2008. Además, otorgaban gran importancia a la recuperación de las tradiciones ancestrales de dichos pueblos y prestaban una especial atención a los elementos espirituales relacionados con el buen vivir (por ejemplo, la Pachamama) (Oviedo 2011). La mayor parte de estos postulados se corresponden con una concepción premoderna del mundo, de naturaleza ancestral andina y amazónica. Los intelectuales que defendían esta concepción del buen vivir fueron considerados por algunos intelectuales de las otras dos corrientes como pachamamistas (folclóricos), atrapados en el discurso de un indigenismo infantil y sin capacidad para implementar el buen vivir. El pensamiento indigenista sobre el buen vivir tuvo una cierta relevancia durante los debates constituyentes de 2007 y 2008, mientras el movimiento indígena ecuatoriano fue aliado del partido oficialista Alianza PAÍS; sin embargo, su posterior distanciamiento de éste hizo que sus postulados no fuesen incluidos en la política pública ecuatoriana. No obstante, el concepto indigenista de buen vivir, como sumak kawsay, formó parte del discurso político de oposición al gobierno de Rafael Correa y Alianza PAÍS.

La segunda concepción fue la propia del pensamiento neomarxista de los intelectuales vinculados con el gobierno de Ecuador (Ramírez 2010; SENPLADES 2010), que
entendían el buen vivir como socialismo del sumak kawsay, o como la variante ecuatoriana del socialismo del siglo XXI, y lo asimilaban al desarrollo moderno en su variante neomarxista. Estos intelectuales proponían la implementación, por medio de un proceso revolucionario denominado Revolución Ciudadana, de un nuevo modelo de desarrollo orientado esencialmente a la mejora de la equidad y apoyado, inicialmente, en el extractivismo, mientras se producía la transformación de la matriz productiva ecuatoriana (SENPLADES 2012; Braña, Domínguez y León 2016). En este sentido, dejaban en un segundo plano la consecución de los objetivos de identidad y de sostenibilidad. Dicho enfoque concedía gran relevancia al papel que debía jugar el Estado en la implementación del buen vivir (SENPLADES 2011), el cual se convirtió en el agente político principal e intérprete único de la voluntad popular, excluyendo de la acción política a los diferentes movimientos sociales que contribuyeron a llevar dicho concepto hasta la Constitución (por ejemplo, al movimiento indígena o al movimiento ecologista). Además, aspiraban a la transformación del sistema socioeconómico ecuatoriano en un sistema socioeconómico poscapitalista, en una economía con mercado, pero no de mercado, donde las entidades de la economía popular y solidaria tuviesen un gran protagonismo (Coraggio 2007). La mayor parte de estos postulados se corresponden con una concepción moderna del mundo, de naturaleza occidental y socialista. Los intelectuales que defendían esta concepción del buen vivir fueron considerados por algunos intelectuales de las otras dos corrientes como practicantes de un desarrollismo senil y criticados por haber sustituido en sus discursos el término desarrollo por el término buen vivir, equiparando así ambos conceptos y vaciando al buen vivir de la mayoría de las dimensiones que se incorporaron en el proceso constituyente. El pensamiento neomarxista sobre el buen vivir, que se desarrolló con posterioridad a los debates constituyentes de 2007 y 2008, ha sido el más influyente en la política pública ecuatoriana, por cuanto inspiró los Planes Nacionales para el Buen Vivir (SENPLADES 2009 y 2013) de los gobiernos de Rafael Correa y Alianza PAÍS.

Y la tercera concepción fue la propia del pensamiento ecologista/posdesarrollista de los intelectuales vinculados con los movimientos sociales de Ecuador (Acosta y Martínez 2009; Acosta 2012) que entendían el buen vivir como una utopía por
(re)construir (Acosta, 2011), o como la concreción territorial del precepto constitucional del buen vivir, y rechazaban el desarrollo moderno como aspiración social, por considerarlo una forma de dominación. Estos intelectuales proponían la creación de procesos locales de participación social por medio de los cuales cada comunidad debía definir su propio buen vivir, o buen convivir, poniendo la sostenibilidad ambiental como requisito imprescindible para la construcción de dichos buenos convivires (Gudynas y Acosta 2011). En este sentido, subordinaban la consecución de los objetivos de equidad y de identidad al mantenimiento de relaciones armónicas con la naturaleza, por medio del respeto de los Derechos de la Naturaleza recogidos en la Constitución ecuatoriana (Acosta y Martínez 2011). De hecho, proponían la construcción de una sociedad biocéntrica, donde la Naturaleza ocupase el centro de las preocupaciones de los ecuatorianos, los cuales debían ser considerados como parte inseparable de la misma. La mayor parte de estos postulados se corresponden con una concepción posmoderna del mundo, de naturaleza occidental. Los intelectuales que defendían esta concepción del buen vivir fueron considerados por algunos intelectuales de las otras dos corrientes como carentes de pragmatismo político, imbuidos en un cierto nihilismo, y criticados por estar atrapados en un discurso propio de un ecologismo infantil y por haber tergiversado el significado del buen vivir, al llenarlo de contenidos occidentales ajenos a la cosmovisión andina. El pensamiento ecologista/posdesarrollista sobre el buen vivir tuvo una cierta relevancia durante los debates constituyentes de 2007 y 2008, cuando algunos de sus principales representantes formaban parte del partido oficialista Alianza PAÍS y de los movimientos sociales coaligados con éste; sin embargo, el posterior distanciamiento entre los movimientos sociales y este partido hizo que sus postulados perdieran peso en la política pública ecuatoriana y sólo tuviesen una cierta relevancia en el Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir 2009-2013 (SENPLADES 2009). Aunque, al igual que con la concepción indigenista, su concepto de buen vivir formó parte del discurso político de oposición al gobierno de Rafael Correa y Alianza PAÍS.

A pesar de la trifurcación del concepto de buen vivir (indigenista, socialista y ecologista/posdesarrollista), era legítimo aspirar a la confluencia de las concepciones de estas tres corrientes en un único concepto de buen vivir, basado en la búsqueda de
la identidad, de la equidad y de la sostenibilidad, por medio de la transformación de Ecuador en una sociedad plurinacional, poscapitalista y biocéntrica (Cubillo-Guevara, Hidalgo-Capitán y García-Álvarez 2016). Ello no fue posible bajo los gobiernos de Rafael Correa, pero podría ser más viable ahora, tras la sustitución de Rafael Correa por Lenin Moreno al frente de la Presidencia de la República del Ecuador, y cuando se está produciendo un acercamiento entre la nueva Alianza PAÍS de Moreno y los diferentes movimientos sociales ecuatorianos, incluido el movimiento indígena. Sin embargo, este momento coincide con el abandono del buen vivir como concepto estrella de los discursos de los diferentes actores políticos progresistas ecuatorianos (Cubillo-Guevara 2016) y con la pérdida de relevancia del concepto de buen vivir en las políticas públicas ecuatorianas, especialmente en el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2017-2021 (SENPLADES 2017).

No obstante, en el ámbito académico internacional, el concepto de buen vivir está cobrando un creciente protagonismo, perfilándose como un concepto sintético que recoge elementos de las tres versiones del buen vivir en el marco discursivo del transdesarrollo transmoderno (Cubillo-Guevara e Hidalgo-Capitán 2015c; Hidalgo-Capitán y Cubillo-Guevara 2016), que contribuye a hermanar el buen vivir con el concepto europeo de decrecimiento (Unceta 2013).

Y todo ello convierte al buen vivir en una trinidad, en un concepto trinitario, en un concepto que es a la vez uno y trino; tres concepciones distintas (indigenista, socialista y ecologista/posdesarrollista) y un único buen vivir verdadero (transmoderno).

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Small-scale Farmers’ Vulnerability to Climate Change in the Peruvian Andes: A Case in the Quillcay River Basin

Before, when it was raining, the rain was calm. But now when the rain arrives, it is torrential... and it washes away all the soils.

(Small-scale farmer, the Quillcay River Basin)

Why is Climate Change a Threat for Andean Societies?

Peru has been ranked as one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to the consequences of climate change (UNEP, 2013). Most of the world’s tropical glaciers (71%) are found in Peru (Vuille et al, 2008). During the past decades, scientists have observed the alarming impacts of global warming in the Peruvian Andes—thirty per cent of the glacier snowpack has been lost in a 30-year period (Urrutia & Vuille, 2009) and abnormal changes in seasonal precipitation patterns have been monitored (Sanabria et al, 2014). These changes in hydrological cycles pose a serious concern for populations living in the Andean lowland communities where glacier meltwater and precipitation provide a fundamental source of water.

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In some regions of the Andean highlands, rural populations already have restricted access to potable water and irrigation. Poor highland communities often have less capacity to respond to the increasing water scarcity due to weak infrastructure, low income, strong reliance on agriculture and limited opportunities for alternative livelihoods. It is, therefore, projected that livelihoods and the daily survival of rural populations in the Andes will be threatened as the water supply continues to decline (Mark et al, 2010).

Myriad studies have been conducted on climate change in the Andean region from the standpoint of the natural sciences, revealing the biophysical threats climatic changes are posing to local ecosystems (Perez et al, 2010; Drenkahn et al, 2015). However, fewer studies have focused on climate vulnerability of local people in the rural highlands (Bury et al, 2011; Lynch, 2012). Andean highland populations have also suffered from political marginalization and discrimination for centuries in the Peruvian society, and some studies have suggested that climatic changes will further increase their vulnerability (Lynch, 2012; Rasmussen, 2015).

In this article, I will discuss small-scale farmers’ vulnerability to climate change in the Peruvian Andes, using a case of the Quillcay River Basin. The study measured vulnerability of local smallholders to climatic and hydrological changes by analyzing relations between glacier recession, changes in precipitation and socioeconomic factors. The study was implemented using a mixed-method approach, intertwining open-ended interviews with statistical regression analysis. The objective of the study was to contribute to the existing discourse on climate vulnerability in the Andes and other regions with similar challenges using a different perspective and a less common method. The findings of the study also aim to provide guidelines for local policymakers to plan more holistic adaptation strategies to mitigate climate vulnerability of the rural highland communities.

**The Quillcay River Basin**

The study was conducted in small communities along the Quillcay River Basin in the proximity of Huaraz city, belonging to the Department of Ancash, Peru. The
region pertains to Cordillera Blanca, representing the largest glacier cluster in Peru (Mark et al., 2010). The Quillcay River Basin was chosen for the case study region due to previously reported threats related to glacier recession, changes in climate, and small-scale farming being the main livelihood of local population. Glacier melt water provides a major water supply in the region, particularly for populations living in the upstream portion of the basin. During the rainy season (October-April), precipitation contributes to the river watershed along the whole stream (Rivas et al., 2014; Gurgiser et al., 2015).

Map 1. Location of Huaraz
Small-scale production in the Andes is mostly rain-fed and during the wet season and when it rains less, water for irrigation is received from glacier melt water (Sanabria et al., 2014). In the Quillcay River Basin, seventy per cent of the fields are still rain-fed and rely on precipitation for irrigation. The rest of the farmers (30%) use irrigation systems that are fed by glacial melt water (Castro, 2016). Recent studies have shown that in the last decades, rain-fed agriculture in the Andes has deteriorated due to decreased rain, earlier wet seasons, and extreme rain events destroying yields and subjecting farmers to remarkable economic losses (Gurgiser et al., 2015).
Between February and April in 2016, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 16 small-scale farmers (11 men, 5 women) living in the Quillcay River Basin. Furthermore, I interviewed eight representatives from distinct, national, and local agriculture, climate, glacier and water institutions. Although vulnerability assessments have traditionally been qualitative, vulnerability can also be measured by objective, material measures of well-being, such as income, wealth and access to education (Adger, 2006). In my study, I chose to use changes in harvested area and farm gate prices of the most cultivated crops of the region—corn, potato and wheat (MINAGRI, 2015)—together with growth rates of rural populations as measures of vulnerability. I applied quantitative regression analyses to examine the relation of
these socioeconomic measures to climatic proxies of changes in glacier mass-balance and precipitation.

**Vulnerability Framework**

Analytical frameworks of vulnerability are advantageous tools in research on socio-ecological systems’ exposure to climate hazards, weak resilience and marginal social conditions (Adger, 2006). In this study, I applied vulnerability framework of the Research and Assessment Systems for Sustainability Program (RASSP) by Turner et al. (2003) as an analytical tool to examine the adverse impacts of climatic and hydrological changes on smallholders in the case study site. Here, I will first provide short introductions on concepts of vulnerability and resilience, which are the key components of the RASSP framework, followed by more detailed explanation of the RASSP framework and how it was applied in the analysis.

‘Vulnerability’ as a state refers to a situation in which a socio-ecological system is exposed to external stresses and has low adaptive capacity. ‘External stresses’ imply adverse human or environmental influence outside the system, such as climatic hazards or unequal distribution of resources in the society (IPPC, 2014). Vulnerability is regarded as being constituted by the following elements: exposure and sensitivity to hazards or stresses, resilience, and capacity to adapt. ‘Exposure’ refers to the magnitude and duration that the system is subjected to environmental or human-influenced stresses. ‘Sensitivity’ implies the degree of external stresses the system encounters and the system’s potential to respond to the exposure of human forces or those originating from the environment. ‘Adaptive capacity’ is defined as the extent the system can adjust to the harm caused by stresses.

‘Resilience’ is the capacity of a system to cope with stresses and still maintain a relatively stable state after exposure (Gallopín, 2006). The resilience of a system can be assessed by measuring its vulnerability to shocks across time and its ability to

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3 The concept of socio-ecological system (SES) implies the intertwining of nature and human subsystems that are scrutinized as a solid entity in vulnerability assessments (Gallopín, 2006).
recover from them. In order to increase resilience of a system, its exposure to biophysical, economic or social shocks should be tackled to strengthen its adaptive capacity (Gitz & Meybeck, 2012).

The RASSP framework by Turner et al (2003) was chosen for this study due to its capacity to capture myriad linkages affecting vulnerability, which is often lacking from other vulnerability frameworks. The framework allows us to broadly explore the interactions of coupled human-environmental systems at three levels (world, region, place), how these systems respond to hazards, and to what extent they are vulnerable to outside stresses. The RASSP framework seeks to answer following questions: ‘Who

Figure 1. Place-dimension of framework of the Research Assessment System for Sustainability Program by Turner et al, (2003) applied in this study
is vulnerable to the environmental changes?’, ‘What are the consequences of the changes?’, and ‘How can the vulnerability caused by changes be reduced? However, the drawback of fitting in so many variables in one framework makes a case study based analysis somewhat complex. The author therefore suggests that each study should adjust the framework to the context and dimension of the research (Turner et al, 2003). This study, therefore, focused on the place dimension of the framework (figure 1). The vulnerability aspect was examined through assessing the sensitivity of small-scale farmers to the stresses caused by climatic and hydrological changes in the Quillcay River Basin. This was implemented firstly by examining the magnitude of the climatic and hydrological stresses; secondly, by evaluating the impacts on well-being and livelihoods of the farmers due to exposure of stresses; and lastly, by identifying the amount of resilience (i.e. what the adaptation capacity of the small-scale farmers to climatic and hydrological changes is, which factors have facilitated successful adaptation, and what the elements that should be addressed to strengthen their resilience are). A summary of factors that arose in the analysis of interview material is illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2. Factors that had affected smallholders’ vulnerability in the Quillcay River Basin, and adaptation strategies in use and factors strengthening adaptive capacity to enhance resilience. Source: Author, based on the RASSP framework by Turner et al, 2003.

Smallholder’s Vulnerability to Climatic Changes in the Quillcay River Basin

When interviewing the smallholders of the Quillcay River Basin, many of them talked about diverse climatic changes they had observed in the region during the last decades. However, the interviewees were most concerned about shortened rainy
periods and that the precipitation was no longer ‘soft and continuous as it used to be’ but nowadays came down as torrential rain followed by periods of drought.

Melting of the glaciers was also worrying the local farmers, especially from a cultural perspective. The white glacier peaks have traditionally been a landscape trademark of Huaraz. Furthermore, the small-scale farmers were also feeling uncertain about how glacier retreat would affect the amount of water flowing in the rivers that they were using to irrigate their fields. I was told that that it could be already seen that there was less water in the rivers than before. The interviewed farmers were also concerned that in recent years their yields had declined or been completely damaged due to anomalies in precipitation.

For example, we have sowed potatoes…and now there is almost nothing anymore… everything is lost…there hasn’t been any yields. Why? Because of the rain, it hasn’t rained! With what else could we irrigate [our fields]? (Small-scale farmer, The Quillcay River Basin)

The smallholders also perceived that they now gained less money from farming than before. However, I was told that the main reason for the decreased income from farming was a growing need to use fertilizers. I was explained that since the fertilizers are very costly, their use lowers the net income received from agricultural products. Some of the farmers also mentioned that prices for agricultural products had fallen considerably during the past years. They said it was not worthwhile descend to the markets in the city of Huaraz to sell their products since the prices did not even cover the investments made on agrochemicals and their own labor input.

Many smallholders had also already moved to the city of Huaraz, coastal cities such as Chimbote or to the capital Lima, to search for other sources of income. Most of them now worked in low-skilled jobs (mainly in the construction sector) or had started in their own business selling clothes or other commodities. Some of the farmers who had stayed in the region had attempted to construct irrigation systems or use expensive fertilizers. One of the interviewees said that he had begun to experiment how other crops or vegetables such as avocados would grow in the changed climatic conditions in the highlands. All the farmers who had planned
successful adaption strategies also had some educational background, professional skills or sufficient economic assets, which was not the case with all the interviewees.

Yes, I have thought about it [moving to Huaraz] but when you don’t have that economic situation… you just can’t. (Small-scale farmer, The Quillcay River Basin)

External support was found to have a key impact on strengthening adaptive capacity of the smallholders, especially of those who otherwise had low financial or social capacities. The Municipality of Huaraz was the major actor constructing new canals and water reservoirs in the region as well as providing material aid for the rural residents. Nevertheless, it remained unclear how the projects were distributed since some of the farmers said that they had never received any kind of help from the municipality. Local NGOs were said to have helped in the construction of reservoirs for potable water in some villages. Overall, the smallholders who had received construction materials or financial aid from external actors to construct canals and reservoirs said that they had enough potable and irrigation water, while those who had not received any kind of help claimed that they were suffering from lack of water and declining yields.

During interviews, some of the smallholders also began to discuss their feelings of “being forgotten” compared to urban residents. The interviews were conducted during the presidential election campaigns of 2016, and some informants said that at that time, politicians came to visit them with “hands full of promises”. Their experience from previous political campaigns was that these promises were later never fulfilled.

How could I say… now they are looking for votes and these people arrive with their hats and traditional costumes. They want to show that they are as we are, rural people. But when they enter [parliament]… they don’t listen to us anymore.” (Small-scale farmer, The Quillcay River Basin)

The interviewed government officials agreed that changes in precipitation and accelerated glacier recession have already affected the highland watersheds and consequently pose challenges for small-scale farming in the region. However, some
of them mentioned that it was sometimes difficult to begin developing projects in the rural communities because local people do not always want to cooperate with authorities.

They also mentioned additional factors such as low education of rural residents, weak knowledge in efficient water use, skills in modern agricultural practices, and lack of political entitlement in rural areas. In their opinion, these were the major reasons behind socioeconomic problems in the rural highlands and that the interference from climatic changes only makes the situation worse. They emphasized that the key in building efficient adaptation strategies would be promoting education, providing novel research on agriculture and strengthening government involvement in the rural regions.

…we would need good state policies that would be capable and adequate to resolve these great problems with social sensibility and sustainable methods. For great problems, we need great solutions, and this would only be possible through good policies and good government. With the articulation of these components, these problems could be solved. And in Peru, the current situation is not quite like that. (Sántillan, 2016).

**Statistical Analysis on Climate Change and Smallholders’ Vulnerability**

In the study, I used Pearson’s correlation and ordinary linear regression analysis (OLS) to complement the qualitative analysis and to test the correlations and their strength between climatic and socioeconomic variables. The climatic variables chosen for the study were changes in precipitation and glacier mass balance. For the socioeconomic measures, I used the growth rate of the rural population and the harvested area and price of corn, potato and wheat.

The results from Pearson’s correlation suggest that accelerated glacier retreat has had an impact on the decline in harvested land of all the three crops measures in the study. On the other hand, changes in precipitation did not show great impact on decline in
harvested area. Moreover, weak correlations were found between prices of the crops, growth rate of rural population and climate proxies.

In the OLS analysis, climate proxies were found to only modestly explain the changes in all the socioeconomic measures. Changes in glacier mass balance had the strongest relation with decline in harvested area of wheat, but precipitation was not found to be significant in explaining any of the changes in harvested areas. On the other hand, precipitation had stronger relations to the prices than glacier retreat. Lastly, the two climate proxies only weakly explained the changes in the growth rate of the rural population.

**Discussion on Contradicting Results**

Findings of the study suggest that there are some discrepancies between how the interviewed small-scale farmers perceive their vulnerability to climatic changes, how the interviewed governmental representatives view the situation, and what statistical evidence demonstrates. In line with the results of interview data, quantitative analysis confirmed that glacier retreat has influenced agricultural practices in terms of decline in the harvested area of corn, potato and wheat. However, statistical analysis did not show strong relations between decreased rain and farming, although the interviewed farmers reported harvest failures due to lack of rain. However, the smallholders’ perceptions on shortened rainy period and variability in precipitation seem to respond to the statistics. Therefore, it is suggested that it is the irregular rain events that pose challenges for small-scale agriculture in the study site rather than lack of precipitation.

The statistical measurements did not endorse either the farmers’ statements on decreased income from agriculture. First, after correcting for the impact of inflation4,

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4 The 1980s was a turbulent decade in Peru’s economic history. Throughout the decade, the country confronted several periods of hyperinflation; between 1979 and 1989 prices were rising and falling heavily due to various economic crises and climatic disasters caused by El Niño in 1983 (Webb, 1988; Cermeño & De la Cruz, 1991). In this study, in order to offset the impact of the inflation, farm gate prices were converted from nuevos solesto U.S. dollars.
the data series showed an increase in farm gate process of all the three crops, especially since the 1990s. Data on prices thus suggest that income from agriculture should have increased. Secondly, according to the regressions analysis, precipitation only partly explains growth in farm gate prices, whereas glacier retreat had almost no significance in explaining changes in the prices.

The smallholders also considered that changes in climatic conditions were the major reasons why people had begun to migrate from the highlands to the cities. In the statistical analysis, however, the climatic variables explained the negative trend in growth rate of rural population only to a certain degree. Furthermore, during interviews, both smallholders and governmental representatives mentioned other reasons for migration such as current state policies favoring export-oriented large-scale agriculture production, families abandoning farming for more stable income, and the young generation moving away to seek better education and work opportunities.

There are several reasons why partly contrary results were obtained in this study. Firstly, when evaluating qualitative data based on people’s memories, the researcher should be aware of fallibility of the human mind. For example, exceptional weather of recent years can lead to unintentional exaggeration of climate change, despite the fact that the phenomenon might well be part of natural year-to-year climatic variability. Moreover, awareness of participating in a study measuring impacts of climate change might have led participants to assume climate to be the culprit for all the socioeconomic challenges they are encountering.

Secondly, the findings of the study suggest that vulnerability of smallholders in the rural highlands seems to consist of multiple factors rather than solely climatic changes. Therefore, it might be that the statistical indicators that were chosen for this study failed to capture the diverse dimensions affecting vulnerability. For this reason, creation of more complex statistical indicies could be beneficial in quantitative climate vulnerability assessment to capture the myriad linkages.

Thirdly, due to limitations of this study, variables that may have had an impact on the vulnerability of the smallholders had to be excluded. The authorities for instance
brought up the influence of larger political and economic structures on the contemporary socioeconomic struggles in the rural highlands. Previous studies have also suggested that since the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s in Peru, social inequality and deprivation have increased, especially among the poor highland farmers. The new neoliberal scheme led to favoring large-scale agriculture units on the coast due to their higher productivity. The small-scale producers in the highlands, with smaller yields and more challenging sowing circumstances, were left with little importance, albeit, they have historically had an important role in producing traditional Peruvian crops (Crabtree, 2003).

Similar experiences were described by the smallholders of the Quillcay River Basin. Future studies are therefore encouraged to explore how complex dynamics of historical, social, economic, political and environmental factors could be coherently embedded in evaluations on climate vulnerability of marginalized populations in the Andes and other regions with similar concerns.

Conclusions

In this article I have discussed the findings of the study in which I examined to what extent climatic and hydrological changes have adversely affected vulnerability of smallholders in the Quillcay River Basin. The study was based on less commonly used mixed methods, intertwining perceptions of local farmer, governmental officials and statistical measures.

In contrast to previous studies on climate vulnerability in the Andes, this paper revealed that climate factors may not be as substantial in the increasing vulnerability of the Andean highland populations. Due to the limitations of this study, the additional factors that could have possibly had an even more significant impact on the local farmers’ vulnerability could not be examined in as much depth as would be required. However, the findings hint that the vulnerability of the Andean populations is interconnected with complex linkages of historical, cultural, political, social and economic issues that climatic changes only trigger. The significance and relations of these multiple drivers in the dynamics of climate-related vulnerability should be
further examined in future vulnerability assessments. Lastly, in order to mitigate vulnerability on a policy level, it would be essential to design adaptation strategies that focus on improving educational, social and economic capacities of the smallholders to be better prepared for climatic threats.

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References


**Interviews**


Introduction: Underlying Issues for Social Inequality

When assuming power in 2003, Lula promised the inclusion of civil society and social movements in the policy-making sphere. It was partially addressed through the creation of councils and other actions to protect cultural and women’s rights, for example. However, in Rousseff’s government, civil society and social movements continued to be excluded from the higher spheres of power and were not properly listened to. They have demonstrated a great interest in participating in and collaborating with the process of formulating public policy, as civil society members have a high attendance on forums and put forward a high number of motions on those topics. However, it is possible to observe a disconnect between the Workers’ Party leadership and its grassroots. Consequently, since 2012–2013, Brazil has entered into a political crisis, as well as an economic one, without precedent in the history of the country, as the population is angered at revelations of widespread corruption, along with rising inflation and unemployment (Perry, 2016; Melo, 2016).

Brazil became a regional power in Latin America and a strong economic power in the 21st century. During this time, the predominant practices of patrimonialism and the oligarchical model of administration marginalised popular classes politically and economically. Even considering the relative improvements in the level of human

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2 This article was originally published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2018/8/7/housing-movements-and-participation-in-institutional-spaces on August 7th, 2018.
development in the region, particularly in Brazil, poverty and socio-economic inequalities continue to be widespread (ECLAC, 2014). High levels of corruption, the politicisation of the courts, and political coercion have a strong role in protecting the interests of the traditional elites in the context of neoliberal domination in Brazil and more broadly in Latin America (Dagnino, 2007).

The states in the north and in the north-eastern regions of the country, such as Alagoas and Roraima, are more likely to see the poor and the less fortunate mobilised in favour of local politicians, extending this authority to traditional families that dominate the local political scene. In some states in the north-east, families that currently dominate the political sphere are the same ones that governed the state before the transition to democracy. These families continue to control the state’s legislature and local media enterprises (Power, 2016; Lewin, 2014). The return to democracy in Brazil in 1985 marked not only a significant political transition, but also the ascendancy of civil society organisations and social movements. The new 1988 constitution introduced a wide range of participatory mechanisms, including management councils in different areas (education, health, housing, and social security) and new responsibilities for local governments. Decentralised reforms have had a direct impact on enhancing the capabilities of civil society and have provided social movements with meaningful opportunities for shaping local development (Heller, 2012).

Brazil faces problems that are common in developing countries, such as high poverty levels, low living standards, shantytowns, high crime rates and deep social inequality (HDR report, 2015). However, among middle-income countries, Brazil’s inequality rates have been falling since the 1990s, with the associated impact of reducing extreme poverty (National Household Sample Survey – PNAD, 2013). By promoting the economic emancipation of the poor and improving living conditions for the middle class, economic stability was achieved for a certain period and the Workers’ Party obtained legitimacy and electoral support, as shown by its electoral success in winning four consecutive presidential elections.
A variety of social programs were created to tackle those social issues, but addressing these issues properly has proved to be difficult for two reasons. Firstly, social problems are deeply embedded in Brazilian society and current social investment in these areas has been selective. Secondly, despite the Workers’ Party’s social project and their success in some areas over the years (e.g. income distribution programs, such as “Bolsa-família”), those social programs focused on the effects, not on the causes of social inequalities.

The rest of this article is organized as follows: In section 2, I discuss the process of inclusion of new voices from civil society, with the creation of policy councils, and I discuss, in particular, key outcomes of the processes of inclusion of social groups that had been systematically excluded from spheres of decision-making. In section 3, I examine the introduction of popular participation in democratic institutions, taking the creation and implementation of housing councils as a reference. In section 4, I briefly analyse the challenges of expanding citizen participation in the area housing policy-making. Finally, section 5 concludes and offers some suggestions for future research.

The Inclusion of New Voices

Over the last 30 years, social movements and civil society organisations have taken advantage of a series of political opportunities made available by the new democratic regime since the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution. Once democracy began to be consolidated during the 1990s, one democratic innovation to promote popular participation stood out among participatory experiences: Participatory Budgeting. Municipalities where the Workers’ Party had a mayor were the first to introduce this model of citizen participation. Participatory practices promote significant advances in city management. They are said to stimulate the inclusion of the poor in decisions on public spending, to allow more social control over public investment, to encourage active citizens and to break typically clientelistic relations (Fedozzi, 2016; Sousa Santos, 2007; Cornwall, 2008). The practices of Participatory Budgeting have been internationally acclaimed and implemented in many Brazilian cities, including large
urban areas, such as Porto Alegre, São Paulo and Recife and around the world (Chicago and Utrecht, for example).

Despite some variation in design and implementation from one municipality to another, the baseline institutional features include the creation of local assemblies composed of ordinary citizens that decide and prioritise demands for their communities. In turn, these demands are voted on by a large assembly and then included in the city budget (Baiocchi et al., 2008). Since its creation, Participatory Budgeting has undergone great expansion, initially in Brazil and later on an international scale. According to Ribeiro and Grazia (2013) the number of municipalities implementing Participatory Budgeting went from 10 (1993-1996) to 355 (2008-2012). In more recent studies, Spada (2012) shows that, after the expansion in previous years, these numbers have consistently declined, reflecting political and economic changes that are possibly connected with the weakening of the Workers’ Party and the economic crisis affecting municipalities, which has affected the cities’ capacity to invest in Participatory Budgeting events.

Local governments in particular have committed to these democratic innovations and have succeeded in many cases. One of the best-known accomplishments has been the increase and strengthening of participatory institutions, both in terms of numbers and scope, represented by the large number of councils and conferences that have taken place over the years. This process started just after Collor de Mello’s (president from 1990-1992) tenure, but it only saw significant improvements during Lula’s term. During this period, the volume of institutional investments, government resources and people involved in participatory democracy practices significantly improved.

It is possible to observe from the data released from a joint research by Instituto Pólis and Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos Institute (INESC) on democratic governance in contemporary Brazil that, at national level, more than one third of the councils were created during the Workers’ Party administration (see Figure 1). The second highest peak happened just after the new 1988 constitution, in a period that covers three presidencies (Sarney, Collor and Itamar).
Most of the areas mapped are prior to the administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Some of those councils were created in non-democratic periods, which appear to be a contradiction. A closer look at the creation date of those councils suggests that most of them were created before the beginning of military rule in 1964, such as the National Council of Culture, which was created in 1938, but was maintained and restructured in line with the prevailing ideology of the military government. Most of the councils came into existence during the democratisation process.

In the year of the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, and the following two years, seven councils were created. Nevertheless, the highest number of national councils was created in 2003 with eight new councils in total. However, in contrast with the participatory models implemented systematically during the Workers’ Party administration, until early 2000’s such councils had no participatory format. They existed as in a traditional institutional model, without the mechanisms that guarantee participation of ordinary citizens (i.e. members of the council were not elected but rather appointed by government).

Councils are distinguished by their goals and ways of working. A policy council is a council that contributes to the formulation of public policies for a given area, such as policies on health, education, welfare, urban planning, and rural development etc. The majority of the mapped councils are policy councils, a total of 40, as shown in Figure 1.
Rights councils are councils that deal with the rights of a particular population, generally marginalized groups that are supposed to need specific policies. Of course, all councils deal directly with the issue of social rights (Dagnino and Teixeira, 2014). However, in this case, the right of the population in question is the focus of the council. In the INESC-PÓLIS research, 11 councils are of this type. Examples of this kind of council are the National Council for the Rights of the Elderly and the National Council for Fighting Discrimination and Promoting LGBT Rights.

Those councils reflect new thematic areas and the inclusion of new voices in spaces that have never been to social sectors before. The CONSEA (Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar or Food Security Council) was created just after Lula’s inauguration in 2003, as a strategic part of his nationwide program against extreme poverty - Zero Hunger (Fome Zero). The CONSEA gives representation to a multiplicity of social sectors—connected to, for instance, human rights, women, blacks, indigenous peoples, quilombola communities, agrarian reform, and several others—aiming for increased inclusion by expanding representation and creating spaces for policy decision-making (Dagnino and Teixeira, 2014). As a council, the CONSEA deals issues related to family farming, school food projects, and the
creation of a commission to unite civil society and government in order to formulate public policies in the area.

A good example of the expansion of policy themes and the inclusion of new voices has occurred in cultural areas, which have received a boost with the creation of the National Council of Cultural Policies. This latest initiative came about as a result of demands from popular artists and cultural producers involved in Lula’s electoral campaign. Before that, cultural policies were characterised by an unequal and unclear funding distribution (Souza, 2008).

Civil society and social movements have not been limited to only exerting pressure on the government from the point of view of institutional change. Their mobilisation has brought them beyond these spaces. As an example, the creation and implementation of the Maria da Penha law can be cited, which increased punishment for violence against women, a long-time demand from NGOs and groups fighting for women’s rights. In the same way, groups defending racial equality were included in participatory processes to formulate policies for Afro-Brazilians, including quotas in third level institutions and more rigid laws to curb racism.

The key outcome of those processes was the inclusion of social groups that had been systematically excluded from the sphere of decision. Their inclusion did not come as a gift; it came as a result of the strong pressure exerted by the public sector on the Workers’ Party administration but also as a result of the party’s own social agenda. The engagement of these social groups in new policy-making venues helped to broaden relevant themes and extend the right of participation and social control to those groups. This social control, nevertheless, comes with limitations. In the next section, I examine how the inclusion of social movements in spaces of decision-making has taken place, especially in the social housing area.

The Introduction of Popular Participation in Democratic Institutions

In order to understand the impact of councils at the local level, it is important to clarify the process that has promoted the integration of social movements in
democratic institutions. Since the inclusion of mechanisms of participatory democracy in the 1988 Constitution, social movement organisations have slowly been included in the formulation and implementation of social policies. This process of institutionalisation was considered by many as one of the main successes achieved by civil society and social movements at the time. These participatory spaces, however, were not implemented immediately, since legislation demanded complementary laws to regulate participatory practices. In that sense, it was down to the political will of the incumbent in power if this legislation was to be implemented or not.

The 1988 Constitution created municipal-level councils for healthcare, education, social assistance and housing, amongst other areas. These participatory institutions normally designate half of the seats for civil society and the other half to government officials. This allocation of seats varies from council to council, according to internal regulations and local contexts. Another difference is in the allocation of funds: municipalities that have established specific municipal funds for social policies generally decide where and how funds will be used – as is the case with municipalities with specific funding for housing.

Within this scenario, 2012 data from IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) shows that councils for municipal health, welfare and children’s rights exist and are fully operational in 99% of Brazilian cities. Councils for the elderly, culture and the environment are present in over 50% of Brazilian municipalities, which demonstrates the scope and potential of these instances of participation. Municipal housing councils are present in 76% of Brazilian municipalities. In some cases, the so-called “municipal council of the city” includes social housing issues (IBGE, 2012).

In the housing area, the Constitution stipulates that the municipality is the entity at the local level responsible for implementing housing policies. For this reason, municipal housing councils have an important role in defining housing policies locally. In many municipalities, the council in charge of housing policies is the municipal council of cities (Conselho Municipal das Cidades), following the model of Ministry of Cities and the National Council of Cities and covering areas of urban
public policies, including housing. Each municipality elaborates its own local housing council plans, determining mechanisms to establish rules for the composition of the council, frequency of meetings, members’ duties and the general scope of the council decision-making authority. Both government and society are responsible for drawing up an agenda for social housing. However, government plans to tackle the housing issue often clash with demands emanating from housing movements. I will therefore now consider social movements for housing rights that have been influential in defining the change in pro-poor social housing policies.

Taking housing councils as an example, social movements for housing were important for the inclusion of housing rights in the Constitution and they influenced the creation of the national housing council and municipal housing councils. Housing movements are responsible for pressing governments to implement the national social housing policy. For the most part, social movements connected to the housing issue in Brazil focus their agenda on social housing provision and land redistribution. Other issues, such as security of tenure and the urbanisation of shanty towns are also their concern. Entities connected to social mobilisation for housing rights range from small neighbourhood associations to national level organisations, (Donaghy, 2013) including NGOs—such as the “Instituto Sertão” and the “Ação Moradia”—and social movements, such as the National Union for Popular Housing (União Nacional por Moradia Popular).

Social movements connected to housing rights grew in strength from the 1980s onwards, during the process of democratisation, especially in the 1990s after the economic crisis. Despite the concentration of bigger social movements for housing in Rio and Sao Paulo, social groups from other parts of the country were also demanding housing. These groups also started to re-organise themselves following the creation of housing councils, which gave a boost to the social movements in the area, after a period of strong NGO-isation. While groups based in urban areas are more preoccupied with the urbanisation of favelas and the reallocation of families to new house units, social movements based in rural areas have different demands, which include programs to provide construction material, plots of land and credit strategies (Donaghy, 2013).
Land and building occupations are central tactics used by social movements to call attention to their cause. Some movements have used them as their main tactic and have become stronger after conducting many land and building occupations in different cities around the country, such as the Landless Movement (Movimento dos Sem Terra) and the Homeless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto) in São Paulo. Police violence is usually extreme against these groups. Although the position of Lula’s government came closer to that of popular housing demands during his eight-year term, the current administration does not maintain the same good relations with social movements. While public resources have been allocated to housing in the urban centres, under the current administration, rural areas have had the lowest investment over the last 20 years, according to the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária - INCRA).

Urban social movements for housing rights had been strong supporters of President Lula da Silva’s candidacy since the first direct election in 1990. When he eventually came to power as President in 2003, social movements for housing were strong enough to pressure the government into creating the National Council of Cities (ConCidades—Conselho Nacional das Cidades), where housing policies were discussed in conjunction with other urban policies. In 2005, new legislation—the Social Housing National System (Sistema National de Habitação Social)—was created, in which municipalities seeking funding could obtain membership in order to obtain access to federal funds.

The National Social Housing System was created to implement innovative and democratic procedures to promote public participation in decision-making. It seeks to encourage municipal governments to play a more active role. In order to obtain funding from this program, municipalities must set up a council (at the state or local level) and contribute to 10-20% of the housing investment—depending on the region. This system is an instrument that provides housing to those who cannot have access to credit without a subsidy from government. This program targets families earning less than three times the minimum monthly wage (Valença and Bonates,
Despite this government intervention in social housing, the literature has criticized this model, as it usually benefits certain social groups with a better income.

**Social Housing and the Limits of Participatory Institutions**

Quantitatively, there has been a significant increase in participatory spaces in previous years (Dagnino, 2005; Dagnino and Teixeira, 2014). However, it is crucial to consider the quality of this participation and the challenges posed to social movements. Housing councils were created with a view to including the voices of those most affected by housing issues. However, controversy continues as to how open those spaces are and whether the popular demands are being listened to and dealt with.

Although included in the UN charter and in Brazilian legislation as a basic human right, housing continues to be a social good that is inaccessible to a significant part of the population. Movements for social housing are comprised of a vast number of diverse organisations, especially in medium and large cities. These movements have been able to mobilise a large number of people and sometimes have different demands. Some will demand homes for their members, while others exert pressure on the government for public investment in the sector and changes in housing legislation (Boito and Berring, 2014). These social movements are inserted in a model of development that is said to share decision-making power with popular sectors.

As a political opportunity structure, municipal housing councils permit the inclusion of new voices, but this is limited by the very institutions that open up this structure. In previous studies, housing movements have been studied in the context of participatory democracy by measuring whether they are successful and if their participation generates more social housing units. Those studies found that, since the introduction of participatory experiences in housing policies, there are more housing projects and there is more investment in housing in general. There is greater availability of funding, security of tenure, urbanisation of informal settlements, title possession, etc., and it is clear this “success” is connected to the existence of a council (Touchton & Wampler, 2014). Donaghy (2013) found in particular that
municipalities that have an active housing council have a tendency to implement a wider variety of social housing programs, and that participatory democracy has an impact on policy outcomes.

The creation of the Ministry of Cities in 2005 reflected decades of struggle by the National Urban Reform Movement to change federal, state and municipal institutions. A key component of these struggles was the focus on the creation of formal arenas for civil society participation (Abers et al. 2014, Saule and Uzzo, 2012). The promotion of participatory democracy was one of the main social compromises of the Workers’ Party before it came to power. Looking at the numbers, as participatory spaces were created, people were mobilised and new public policies and new voices were included in this process. However, those newly-created entities did not have the impact they were expected to, especially for social movements and Workers’ Party activists. Instead of spaces for debate and new proposals, in many cases they turned out to be spaces for dialogue and listening to public demands (Dagnino and Teixeira, 2014). A good example to support this claim is that 58% of the councils are only consultative (INESC and Pôlis, 2011), meaning that the deliberations coming from the council do not have to be followed by government.

Advances in the creation of new government agencies to promote popular participation were not aligned with concrete changes in the way those agencies are functioning. New policy areas were included and attention was focused on new social themes. However, the inclusion of civil society in those spaces and the acknowledgment of their demands by the government were not followed by action to promote change in a substantial way. As argued by Abers et al. (2014), despite the creation of a great number of participatory institutions over the years, changing the notion of popular, the Lula administration did not have a centralized and uniform project that aimed at institutionalizing participatory policies. Participatory capacities already existed, and the new routines that seem to have proliferated during the Workers’ Party administration should be understood as a result of the maturity and complexity of specific Brazilian social movements, combined with opportunities for institutional participation.
Conclusion

An analysis of the political and social context of Brazil highlights the relationship between citizens and the state. The inclusion of citizens—represented by social movements—in spaces of decision-making, marked a period of intense dialogue and negotiation, which led to legislation that guarantees popular participation in the implementation of social policies. The challenge for social movements has been to keep the channels of popular participation open and to try to convert social innovation into meaningful public policies. Rather than merely including more citizens in the public sphere, the challenge here is to create a more inclusive public sphere by promoting citizenship, defending accountability and avoiding re-clientisation.

During the Workers’ Party, an intense process of institutional innovation took place. However, since 2016, with the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff by means of a parliamentary manoeuvre, participatory policies have been systematically dismantled. While a decline in the relationship between social movements and government had been already observed during Rousseff’s administration (Abers et al., 2014), the recent cuts in social spending has threatened the function of national and municipal councils. If a decade ago Brazilian democratic innovations attracted academic attention and gave hope for building stronger democracies around the world, currently, participatory spaces, such as council and national conferences, are under risk of being disarticulated by conservative political agendas.

If one achievement was the expansion of participatory spaces to new thematic areas to promote meaningful changes in public policy-making, the challenge to academics is to understand what is at stake for social movements under the right-wing government, which has consistently dismissed the system of popular participation via institutional politics. More than ever, the quality and modes of participation in these spaces deserve a more in-depth analysis. In other words, the way decision-making power is shared with social movement organisations is central to the analysis of participatory democracy. The effectiveness of participation cannot be defined only in
quantitative terms, but it can be demarcated by the way social movements have been able to influence change.

References


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