Background briefing on gender equality in the creation of the UK’s new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

Summary

The intended merger of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), to create the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has raised important questions about how this new department will prioritise, and work on, gender equality. Lessons learnt from similar mergers in other countries highlight the potential risks to this area of work.

This background briefing provides some recommendations on what a successful merger might look like from a gender equality perspective. It provides data on spending and staffing on gender equality within DFID and the FCO and reviews the quality of UK aid spend on gender equality to identify opportunities for development in the new department. Finally, some lessons learnt from similar mergers in Canada, Australia and New Zealand are explored.

1. Introduction

On 16 June 2020, the UK’s Prime Minister announced the merger of DFID with the FCO to form the FCDO. This new Department will be established in early September 2020 under the leadership of the Foreign Secretary.1 The objectives of the FCDO will be shaped by the outcome of the Integrated Review of foreign policy, defence, security and international development, which was announced in February 2020.

In the details released to date, the aim of the merger has been described as producing a ‘blended organisation,’ rather than a separate Official Development Assistance (ODA) department within the FCO. It has also been confirmed that the FCDO will have only one secretary of state and one permanent secretary.2 In answer to a parliamentary question, Wendy Morten MP replied:

“The UK remains fully committed to supporting gender equality and women's empowerment, including every girl's right to 12 years of quality education. The integrated foreign policy review is expected to conclude later in the year, which will define the Government's ambition for the UK's role in the world and its outcomes will shape the objectives of the new Department. Both the review and the merger are evidence of the Prime Minister's commitment to a unified British foreign policy that will maximise our influence around the world, including on gender equality and women's empowerment.”3
However, beyond this, it is not clear how DFID’s role in ensuring the UK’s development policy actively promotes gender equality will be taken forward by the FCDO.

The next two months are crucial to engage with the work to establish the new Department, to ensure that gender equality remains a priority and that DFID’s Strategic Vision for Gender Equality is integrated across the UK’s foreign policy, economic diplomacy and development efforts.

This background briefing covers the following: Section 2 considers what success might look like in the merger and outlines some specific recommendations. Section 3 includes data on funding for projects with a gender equality focus (as a proportion of the UK’s ODA) as well as current staffing levels for gender teams, in order to provide a baseline against which to monitor the impact of the merger. Section 4 then looks at the quality of UK aid on gender equality, including what is good and what could be improved in the new department. Finally, Section 5 provides background information on lessons learned from mergers in other countries which can inform the approach in the UK.

2. Challenges and Opportunities

Any period of integration is likely to present challenges for gender equality commitments, no matter what structural form the new department may take. Specific steps to ensure gender equality is prioritised and supported by responsive processes, resources and ways of working is therefore crucial. However, the experience of mergers in other countries has shown that they can also present an opportunity for new policy and accountability measures, such as gender equality-related targets and a new policy framework to ensure gender equality is a core part of the foreign policy, economic diplomacy and development work of the UK. Civil servants and Ministers have been keen to frame the discussion around opportunities for the new department rather than protecting elements of DFID and have asked questions around what success looks like. Below are some reflections that are not meant to be an exhaustive list.

2.1 What does success look like?

- A clear commitment to gender equality from the top of the FCDO.
- Recognition that gender equality requires a holistic, multi-sectoral approach covering all the different areas of gender discrimination: violence against women and girls (VAWG), sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), girls’ education, women’s economic empowerment (WEE) as well as women’s political empowerment.
- Continued funding for what is known to work, on VAWG, support and funding for Southern women’s rights organisations and other programmes proven to be effective.
- Strong advocacy on gender equality on the international stage, including at the G7, and COP26, – all rooted in Agenda 2030 and the Beijing Platform for Action.
- A commitment to promoting anti-racism across the new department’s work.

To this end, and based on some of the detail in the following sections, we suggest some more detailed recommendations which are also not intended as an exhaustive list.
2.2 Recommendations

• The FCDO should adopt specific commitments on the promotion of gender equality across all aspects foreign policy, economic diplomacy and aid work in its core strategy.
• Leadership and commitment should be demonstrated from the top, with the new Secretary of State at the FCDO publicly committing to the promotion of gender equality, globally, at an early public address.
• The number of staff in the FCDO dedicated to gender equality should be at least as high as the combined staff of DFID and the FCO. There should also be at least as many senior staff in key decision-making posts with gender expertise and a specific mandate to promote gender equality through both standalone and mainstreaming projects and programmes.
• Advantage should be taken of the opportunity to structure a new department and learn lessons on mainstreaming across all the work of the FCDO by resourcing senior staff with gender expertise and authority in this area.
• By 2024, the new department should commit to ensuring that the proportion of UK aid which has gender equality as a ‘principal’ objective under the OECD DAC gender marker increases to 10 percent, with 75 per cent of bilateral aid having gender equality as a ‘significant’ objective.
• The FCDO should agree an ambitious target in relation to the percentage of investments that go to feminist and women’s rights organisations that can be coded to OECD DAC code 15170 to ensure that this effective form of aid can be clearly measured.
• There should be annual reporting of the FCDO’s work on promoting gender equality and the FCDO should make gender equality and women’s empowerment policy commitments visible in budget documentation, at all levels, to allow for the proper monitoring of the effectiveness of aid.
• The Strategic Vision on Gender Equality should be used as a framework for agreeing the strategy on gender equality in the FCDO, based on a multi-sectoral approach that includes VAWG, SRHR, girls’ education, WEE, as well as women’s political empowerment.

3. Spending and staffing on gender equality

Pre-merger analysis of the UK’s spend on gender equality within the overseas development budget, as well as gender focussed human resources within FCO and DFID, provides an important baseline to assess the impact of the merger. It also provides a means of assessing the pre-merger commitment to gender equality within FCO and DFID and highlighting potential risks of joining the two departments.

3.1 UK’s commitment to funding projects with a gender equality focus

The UK’s International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 legally requires all overseas development funding to meaningfully consider the impact of how it will contribute to reducing gender inequality. It says that “Before providing development assistance … the Secretary of State shall have regard to the desirability of providing development assistance that is likely to contribute to reducing poverty in a way which is likely to contribute to reducing inequality between persons of different gender.” 5
3.2 Measuring the UK’s bilateral aid on gender equality

The OECD DAC has developed a ‘gender marker’ which is a useful way of identifying whether aid is allocated to projects or programmes that are intended to promote gender equality. However, it should be noted that it is not possible to screen all bilateral aid using this tool – percentages are of the total development assistance that has been screened, sometimes referred to as ‘allocable’. It also only measures the intent of the project or programme – not the outcome. Two concepts are used:

- **Principal**: Gender equality is the main objective of the programme and is fundamental to its design and expected results. The programme would not have been undertaken without this objective.
- **Significant**: Gender equality is an important and deliberate objective, but not the principal reason for undertaking the programme, often explained as gender equality being mainstreamed in programmes”.

According to the most recent data available on reporting against the OECD DAC gender equality policy marker (for 2018) five percent of the UK’s bilateral allocable ODA had gender equality as a principal objective. Meanwhile 53 percent of the UK’s bilateral ODA went to projects that significantly target gender equality; an increase from 37 percent in 2015.

Looking at this another way, the UK spent US$ 6.5 billion (58 per cent) of its bilateral allocable ODA on development activities that targeted gender equality in 2018 (see Figure 1 below). Of this total, nine percent (US$ 589 million) of this spend on gender equality went towards activities that targeted gender equality as a principal objective.

![Figure 1: The UK’s Bilateral ODA for Gender Equality](image)

Any changes to the UK’s multilateral contributions on gender equality should also be monitored after the merger has taken place. The UK is also currently one of the largest contributors to UN Women, contributing US$ 185 million between 2011 and 2018, as well as a major contributor to UNFPA, funding US$ 153m in 2018.
The amounts coded to OECD DAC code 15170 - supporting women’s right’s organisations and movements and government institutions - and DAC code 15180, on ending violence against women (VAW), are also an important tracking tool. In 2017, US$ 59.2 million of the UK’s ODA was coded as supporting women’s rights organisations and movements and this dropped to US$ 29.7 million in 2018. In 2018, US$ 43.9 million of the UK’s ODA was coded as supporting ending VAW.

### 3.3 DFID’s spend on gender equality

The figures above apply to ODA from across the UK Government. The recent National Audit Office (NAO) report examining DFID’s gender work also uses OECD DAC 2018 figures to specify DFID figures. According to these figures, 6 per cent of DFID’s aid spending went to projects where the principal objective was gender equality, with another 60 per cent on projects where gender equality was a significant objective. It should be noted here though that the NAO report raised concerns over the way that the gender marker was being implemented by DFID and suggested that more training was needed.

### 3.4 Comparing analysis of DFID and FCO work on gender equality

Recent analysis by Development Initiatives about the proportion of aid spend reported as having gender equality as a principal or significant objective demonstrates similar findings for DFID. In comparison, the FCO reports only a small proportion of its aid as targeting gender equality as well as a large proportion of aid which has not been screened using the gender marker.

**Figure 2: Proportion of the FCO’s aid targeted to projects with a gender-equality focus**

Source: Development Initiatives based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
Figure 3: Proportion of DFID aid targeted to projects with a gender-equality focus

![Graph showing proportion of DFID aid targeted to projects with a gender-equality focus](chart)

Source: Development Initiatives based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

### 3.4 Staffing levels

As lessons from other countries illustrate, there is a risk of loss of expertise as a result of merging departments and also that staffing levels may change depending on the identified priorities of the new department. To enable this impact to be tracked it is useful to have a baseline indication of current staffing levels. This information is to the best of our knowledge as of July 2020, noting that this data is not readily available.

**The FCO’s Gender Equality Unit**

The FCO has a Gender Equality Unit (GEU) which sits in the Multilateral Department and has responsibility for gender within the FCO. Staff within the Gender Equality Unit include a Head of the Unit, a Deputy Head, leads for gender and conflict, girls’ education, and the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI). The team also covers gendered aspects of Protection of Civilians and Children and Armed Conflict. There are approximately 15 officials in the Unit. The key priorities for the GEU are Women, Peace and Security (including the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security), PSVI and increasingly girls’ education. The FCO and Cabinet Office house the Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). There are four Gender Advisors for CSSF (three regional, one strategic level) and three at Posts (Nairobi, Abu Dhabi and New York City).

**DFID’s Gender Equality Team**

DFID currently has the Gender Equality Team (GET) with a half-time team leader plus six full time staff and one at 60 percent. There is also a separate VAW team with a half-time team leader plus four full time staff and one at 70 percent. There are then 12 full time staff working on SRHR, 5.5 on girls’ education and two social development advisors for child marriage and education. Women’s leadership and political participations has a part time staffer plus a part timer on DESA. On Women Peace and Security, there is a full time lead plus one full time and one part time member of staff. On
economic issues, it is less clear but there is a staff person on social protection and roughly the equivalent of one full time and three part time staff with one full time lead on the WOW programme.

4. The quality of UK development assistance on gender equality

The Strategic Vision for Gender Equality has provided a useful framework to shape ODA. It was developed as a result of extensive consultation and research and was widely welcomed when introduced in 2018. The multi-sectoral approach to achieving gender equality centers around evidence-based programming across the Strategic Vision’s five foundation areas – VAWG, SRHR, girls’ education, WEE and women’s political empowerment. In our experience, a core strength of this work is the way that it is responsive both to local contexts and to evolving best practice. The work on VAWG, and the recognition of the importance of women’s rights’ organisations have been two recent examples where DFID plans have been sufficiently flexible to respond to new evidence and learning. While there is room for further improvement in the new department, the Strategic Vision for Gender Equality has proved itself robust in shaping the pandemic response, and provides a solid, well researched basis for work on gender equality moving forward.

One area on which the FCDO could improve is on mainstreaming. The recent NAO Report ‘Improving the lives of women and girls overseas’ recommended that an action plan is needed to overcome the barriers to mainstreaming gender across all of DFID’s work.\(^1\)\(^8\) However, the good work of the gender specialists is not always reflected across the department, and that the failure by many teams in DFID to recognise the importance of gender relations can undermine the effectiveness of aid. Moreover, the need for gender analysis across DFID’s COVID-19 response is now particularly apparent. Furthermore, the NAO Report’s recommendation for an action plan on gender mainstreaming will need to be extended to the new FCDO, with sufficient resources and support from senior staff to ensure that this happens.

In the current context, a focus on anti-racism, considering new forms of aid modalities which recognise the historic inequalities between the Global South and the Global North is another area on which the FCDO could progress - bringing together development assistance and foreign policy.

The UK Government has also developed a reputation for global leadership on gender equality across different fora. 2021 will provide significant opportunities for the new department to continue this international advocacy work while hosting both the G7 and COP26. For this to be most impactful, maintaining an approach to international relations and development assistance that is rooted in Agenda 2030 and the Beijing Platform for Action is key.

5. Lessons from other mergers

Several other countries have faced similar mergers in recent years; namely, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. As time has elapsed since these mergers, there have been several reviews
assessing the impact of integration and providing lessons which can inform the creation of the new department in the UK.

Table 1: Comparable Mergers

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<th>Australia</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
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<td>AusAID was integrated into the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in November 2013.</td>
<td>The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) were amalgamated in March 2013 to form the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). In 2015, the Department was renamed Global Affairs Canada (GAC).</td>
<td>NZAID is division of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). Previously a semi-autonomous body, it was reintegrated back into the Ministry as the International Development Group following a restructure in 2009.</td>
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**Australia**

In Australia, AusAID employees were rapidly and totally integrated into DFAT with an approach which merged foreign policy and aid 'country desks' rather than maintaining the aid program as a separate identity within DFAT.\(^1\)\(^9\) Budgetary and policy responsibility were disbursed across DFAT and principal responsibility for bilateral programs was "vested in already overstretched Heads of Mission."\(^2\)\(^0\) This has been assessed as a particularly disruptive form of integration.\(^2\)\(^1\) Notably, the word 'development' was not even incorporated into the title of the merged department.

**New Zealand and Canada**

In contrast, New Zealand and Canada adopted a model of partial integration. Canada’s consolidation was a much longer process that the Australian approach and retained a distinct development function.\(^2\)\(^2\) Bilateral development cooperation was integrated in geographic units but a separate Global Issues and Development branch was retained as well as an International Assistance Policy Directorate.\(^2\)\(^3\) In New Zealand, an aid division, the International Development Group, was maintained within the foreign ministry so that integration was less deep. This was evaluated as resulting in less disruption; although New Zealand eventually moved to a more integrated model like Australia.\(^2\)\(^4\)
5.1 How did commitments to gender equality fare?

Any period of integration is likely to present challenges for gender equality commitments, no matter what structural form the new department may take. However, integration can also present an opportunity to align processes with policy commitments and ensure these commitments are resourced and implemented.

Despite the shortcomings of the DFAT-AusAID integration, a 2019 review of the merger noted that gender equality was accorded higher whole-of-department priority and that a dedicated structure and expert leaders have seen policy dialogue on gender equality improve since the merger. For example, DFAT’s Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Strategy, introduced in 2016, makes clear that gender equality and women's empowerment are a core part of the foreign policy, economic diplomacy and aid work of DFAT. Anecdotally, however, there are concerns that this prioritisation has not been reflected in an organisational culture that is responsive to gender equality.

Notably, as part of DFAT’s new performance framework, introduced in 2014, gender equality was one of ten strategic targets. This target requires that at least 80 per cent of investments, regardless of their primary objectives, must also effectively address gender issues in their implementation. While this target has yet to be achieved, there is evidence that it has been effective in supporting DFAT to increase its gender analysis capacity and to take gender considerations into account in the design of new investments.

However, lessons from the practical implementation of this target demonstrate the need for systems and processes to track actual expenditure towards gender equality and women’s empowerment. At present, DFAT’s financial tracking and reporting arrangements only track and report actual expenditure where gender equality and women’s empowerment are a ‘principal objective’. No financial information is available about expenditure on activities to mainstream gender equality elsewhere in the program. This makes it impossible for the government to know the extent of its investment and to allocate adequate resources.

In New Zealand, while the Cabinet recommitted to having gender as a cross-cutting issue at the time of integration, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade was unsupportive of gender equality. Analysis notes that the comprehensive gender policy NZAID had developed was rendered void, leaving staff unsure of where gender equality and women’s empowerment stood in the aid programme. A three-year strategy on cross-cutting issues was put in place in 2012 but there is limited evidence to suggest that this strategy has improved the integration of cross-cutting issues. Six years after the integration, NZAID had one gender equality advisor, with no delegated authority.
or budget and no staff with specific responsibility for gender equality in any of the country missions.\textsuperscript{34}

As the New Zealand example illustrates, the risk for marginalisation of a women's rights agenda is high at the point of integration unless there is supportive political leadership and unless specific steps are taken to require ways of working and processes which support cross-department commitment to gender equality.

In Canada, the ‘Global Issues and Development’ branch was retained to house expertise in core development areas, including gender and CIDA’s strong gender equality integrated programming approach was reportedly maintained in the new department.\textsuperscript{35} However, limitations to an integrated approach to gender equality remain more than five years later. As Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy notes, “…when it comes to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, a more integrated approach is needed—one that also includes diplomacy, trade, security and the expertise of a wide range of Canadian government departments and agencies.”\textsuperscript{36} Both Australia and Canada have moved to develop policy frameworks to guide a cross-government approach to gender equality and women’s empowerment within the overseas aid program, reflecting the need for an integrated approach beyond a structural merger.

Canada has also set targets for the proportion of bilateral international development assistance investments that specifically target and integrate gender equality. In Canada, by 2021-22 at the latest, at least 95 percent of its bilateral international development assistance investments will either target or integrate gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls (15 percent of which should specifically target gender equality).\textsuperscript{37}

5.2 Other lessons

In addition to the evidence around gender equality work, there are also other relevant findings.

a) The impact of mergers on efficiency and effectiveness – a mixed picture

Assessment of the mergers in Australia and Canada indicate that the mergers have not necessarily created greater efficiency or performance improvements.\textsuperscript{38} Post-merger in both Australia and Canada, evidence suggests that organisational limitations reduced effectiveness.\textsuperscript{39} The 2015 ‘Australian Aid Stakeholder Survey’ revealed that more than three quarters of respondents felt that the merger of AusAID and DFAT had impacted aid staff effectiveness as a result of staff losses as well as a devaluing of development expertise.\textsuperscript{40} There was also a major impact on the transparency of Australia’s foreign assistance. This ultimately resulted in a parliamentary inquiry into Australian aid to restore efficiencies.\textsuperscript{41}

Any improvements in efficiency in both the Australia and Canadian context are assessed as more likely related to policy choices unrelated to the mergers themselves. For example, the policy decision to transition towards a ‘commissioning’ agency role rather than direct implementation of development activities.\textsuperscript{42} This is borne out by the fact that DFID, as an independent ministry, has retained one of the lowest administrative cost profiles among DAC members as well as the UK
achieving a higher score than both Australia and Canada in the Commitment to Development Index.\(^4^3\)

**b) Impact on development expertise**

In Australia, a 2019 review of the AusAID-DFAT integration concluded that the loss of development expertise as a result of the merger has had a significant impact. It is estimated that almost 2000 years of expertise has been lost as a result of the merger.\(^4^4\) Much of this initial skills loss was attributed to deliberate decisions to reduce expertise without an understanding of the skills needed to successful manage and implement development projects.\(^4^5\) This reduction in senior, locally engaged staff - including staff with gender expertise - has had a lasting impact with core functions now being contracted out or delegated to others due to lack of expertise.\(^4^6\) Interestingly, a recent review of DFAT- AusAID integration, recommended the establishment of a Directorate for International Development, which would centralise development policy responsibilities and house development inter-disciplinary expertise.\(^4^7\) This hub of expertise was recommended to rebuild the capability of the department to respond to the needs of a 21\(^{st}\) century development agenda.

Considerable turnover and a shortage of expertise in certain disciplines was also noted as a consequence of the reintegration of NZAID.\(^4^8\) However one positive result reported over time, is that more of New Zealand’s commissioners and ambassadors to developing countries now go into their roles having had practical experience with aid.\(^4^9\)

In the Canadian context, the placement of a significant number of senior CIDA staff in equally senior DFATD roles (not necessarily roles confined to development) and quick action to provide employment certainty to key personnel, have been assessed as having a positive impact.\(^5^0\)

**c) Challenges for policy coherence**

Experiences in Canada and Australia suggest that the cultural differences between development and diplomatic approaches and practice can impede the achievement of policy coherence through structural mergers.\(^5^1\) In a survey conducted two years after the Canadian merger, former CIDA staff relayed concerns over the conflict between development and diplomatic mandates and a failure to fully integrate and value development expertise.\(^5^2\) Another report found it would take up to a decade for CIDA employees to accept the cultural change of the integration.\(^5^3\) Similarly, the 2015 Australian ‘Aid Stakeholder Survey’ revealed an assessment of a DFAT organisational culture that failed to value development expertise.\(^5^4\)

At the time of integration, the Canadian Government was critiqued for not articulating an overarching policy framework for Canadian aid at the earliest opportunity.\(^5^5\) Australia has also been critiqued for failing to “frame Asia-Pacific development as a key national interest to be vigorously pursued by multiple means,” which would have provided a basis for diplomacy and development cooperation.\(^5^6\)
d) The importance of leadership and political authority

Research has demonstrated the importance of political authority and leadership for development agency performance, no matter what departmental structure is adopted. For the most part, donors with a cabinet rank minister for development cooperation (such as Canada and the UK) achieved better performance on aid quality and quantity than donors whose portfolio for development cooperation was managed by a junior minister. However, appointing a single representative with dedicated oversight of international development, rather than a minister with dual responsibilities, even in a subordinate role to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, may strengthen representation of development.

Legislation implementing the merger presents an opportunity to enshrine political authority and ensure that development remains a priority within the newly merged entity. For example, in Canada, the legislation implementing the merger for the first time mandated a minister for international development. It also preserved the Official Development Assistance Accountability Act, which defines Canada's poverty alleviation role.

Recent analysis has also highlighted the importance of retaining, post-merger, deconcentrated and decentralised decision-making powers to ensure local knowledge and expertise can inform development priorities and practice. There is also a need for a clear chain of command on development-related matters within the merged department. This was identified as a gap in the Canadian merger.

e) Accountability mechanisms

The Canadian Government established an external advisory group to advise on and monitor the integration process. A similar advisory body could be considered in the UK context. Parliamentary committees with mandates to monitor the whole-of-government effort on development can also provide a formal structure for accountability of the merged institution. In the UK, the mandate of the Standing Parliamentary Committee on International Development (IDC) could be reshaped to include ODA expenditure across FCDO.


7 SEEK Development, Donor Tracker, https://www.donortracker.org/node/11281

8 SEEK Development, Donor Tracker, https://www.donortracker.org/node/11281

9 Reproduced from Donor Tracker, https://www.donortracker.org/node/11281

10 See Donor Tracker, https://www.donortracker.org/node/11281


14 Ibid p.42

15 Ibid p.43


18 See Note 13, Paragraph 12 and Paragraph 22


24 See Note 21

25 See Note 23


29 Ibid


Ibid


Ibid


See Note 38


See Note 38


Ibid

Ibid

Ibid

See Note 33

See Note 21


See Note 38


See Note 40

See Note 50
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The Gender and Development Network (GADN) brings together expert NGOs, consultants, academics and individuals committed to working on gender, development and women’s rights issues. Our vision is of a world where social justice and gender equality prevail and where all women and girls are able to realise their rights free from discrimination. Our goal is to ensure that international development policy and practice promotes gender equality and women’s and girls’ rights.

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For more information about GADN, please email the GADN Coordinator at coordinator@gadnetwork.org

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