

**Black-and-Tans vs. Lily-Whites:
Measuring the Racial Composition of Republican Party Organizations in the South after
Reconstruction, 1868-1952**

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Abstract:

Existing research has shown that following Reconstruction two groups – divided along racial lines – vied for control of Southern Republican state party organizations. These groups – the Black-and-Tans and the Lily-Whites – represented different faces of Southern Republicanism: the Black-and-Tans were descendants of the Reconstruction-era Southern GOP who sought to keep the Republican Party inclusive and integrated, while the Lily-Whites were segregationists who worked to turn the GOP into a whites-only party. Over time, the Lily-Whites were successful, as they took over most state parties in the late 19th or early 20th century. This intra-party conflict represents an important moment in American political history: the success of Lily-Whiteism meant the full exclusion of Southern blacks from American political life, as GOP convention involvement offered the last meaningful opportunity for Southern black political participation after the onset of Jim Crow. Despite the importance of this intra-party conflict, however, no consistent data exist to measure how it played out in each state. To fill this void, we present original data that track the racial composition of Republican Southern convention delegations between 1868 and 1952. In doing so, we provide new insight into the development of Lily-Whiteism both across the South as a whole as well as in particular states.

We thank John Aldrich, Robert Mickey, and Richard M. Valelly for comments and suggestions. We also thank Anthony Sparacino, Jennifer Simons, and Henry Ashton for their research assistance.

Introduction

Following the conclusion of the Civil War, the Grand Old Party (GOP) was in ascendance. Led by supermajorities in both chambers of Congress, Republican leaders sought to remake the social fabric of the Nation through a radical reconstruction of the former Confederate South. While meaningful civil and voting rights reforms would be made to enfranchise and elevate blacks, the “Radical Republican” vision for a colorblind society would be short lived. Within a decade, the white South – embodied in the Democratic Party – would rise up and wrest control of all state governments from the multi-racial Republican coalitions. With the Compromise of 1877, the national Republican Party began to slowly move away from their Reconstruction-era goals. And by the turn of the 20th Century, the GOP had all but conceded the South to the Democrats, with one-party Democratic rule becoming the status quo for the next three generations.

Scholarship on Republican Party politics has little to say about the GOP’s role or constitution in the South after Reconstruction. Aside from some works that examine the national party’s ill-fated “retreat” from its Radical vision during the Gilded Age,¹ research on Southern Republicanism is largely limited to the post-World War II era – specifically, the decades following the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, when a realignment of the white South helped create a new (and vibrant) Republican Party in the states of the former Confederacy.² This is not surprising, as the GOP had almost no congressional presence in the South after

¹ See Vincent De Santis, *Republicans Face the Southern Question: The New Departure Years, 1877–1897* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959); Stanley Hirshson, *Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans and the Southern Negro, 1877–1893* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962); Xi Wang, *The Trial of Democracy: Black Suffrage and Northern Republicans, 1860-1910* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997); and Charles W. Calhoun, *Conceiving a New Republic: The Republican Party and the Southern Question, 1869–1900* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

² See, for example, Earl Black and Merle Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); David Lublin, *The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Robert Mickey, *Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America’s Deep South, 1944-1972* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

Reconstruction – with the small number of Republican House seats drying up almost entirely by 1900 – and Republican presidential candidates generally failing to capture electoral college votes in the South between 1880 and 1948.³

While it is true that the GOP's Southern wing had no meaningful impact on national political outcomes after Reconstruction, it did retain a level of influence in one respect – *within the party itself*. That is, the South continued to play a role in the Republican National Convention, with Southern delegates maintaining their seats and voting rights – and most importantly, their ability to choose the GOP's presidential candidate. Indeed, for a time, the South commanded around a quarter of Republican convention delegates, even as it lacked ability to wield influence for the GOP on Election Day.⁴ This continued convention presence is relevant in two ways. First, it allowed Southern states to be pivotal in some Republican presidential nomination contests long after they ceased to matter on the national stage. Second, it provided some level of ongoing political representation for black Southerners, as they were increasingly excluded from participating in other forms of democratic politics back home.

But while Southern states would maintain substantial representation at national conventions, black Southerners would not. Research has shown, though mostly anecdotally, that in the late 19th and 20th century intra-party struggles between Republican groups divided along racial lines – Lily-Whites and Black-and-Tans – resulted in the exclusion of black Republicans from the Southern GOP.⁵ Lily-White Republicans sought to restrict party membership to whites only, while distancing themselves from Reconstruction-era efforts to ensure and protect civil and

³ The sole exceptions to this were Warren G. Harding in 1920 (winning Tennessee) and Herbert Hoover in 1928 (winning Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia).

⁴ Boris Heersink and Jeffery A. Jenkins, “Southern Delegates and Republican National Convention Politics, 1880-1928,” *Studies in American Political Development* 29 (2015): 68-88.

⁵ See Hanes Walton, Jr., *Black Republicans: The Politics of the Black and Tans* (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1975).

voting rights for blacks. In short, the Lily-Whites espoused white supremacy. Black-and-Tan Republicans were the descendants of the Reconstruction-era Southern GOP. They were comprised of blacks and any whites who supported a more inclusive party. The Black-and-Tans fought to keep the legacy of Reconstruction alive, by stressing the need to preserve the rights of blacks – especially in the face of intimidation, violence, and legal maneuvers to disenfranchise and segregate.

Understanding these post-Reconstruction racial divisions within the Southern GOP is important, we argue, because they closed down one of the last remaining avenues for meaningful black Southern political participation. Additionally, Lily-Whiteism also likely shaped how national party elites dealt with Southern party organizations. Existing studies on the topic, which are sparse and cursory in description, have suggested that presidents and other national party leaders often shifted their alliances between the two rival organizations, based on perceived strategic advantages (i.e., by discerning which group could be more easily or cheaply “bought”). This research has held that the Lily-Whites took control of most Republican state party organizations in the late 19th century, with an additional wave of Lily-Whiteism occurring during President Herbert Hoover’s administration.⁶ But when and how this conflict between Black-and-Tans and Lily-Whites played out across Southern states has never been consistently measured. Work is thus needed to more systematically examine the rise of the Lily-White movement, and how its conflict with the Black-and-Tans affected black political representation in the South, Republican convention politics, and Southern GOP development more generally.

In this paper, we present new data that track the racial composition of Republican convention delegations in Southern states from 1868 through 1952. These data – which match

⁶ See Walton, *Black Republicans*; Donald J. Lisio, *Hoover, Blacks, & Lily Whites* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985).

individual Southern delegates to original census forms, thereby allowing us to identify the racial composition of each state's delegation – provide crucial insight into the development of Lily-Whiteism across the South. Importantly, these data – for the first time – allow us to identify when particular delegations became Lily-White dominated, and which states managed to buck the Lily-White trend. To illustrate how these data can help document the history of Southern Republicanism during this period, we complement these racial accountings with case studies of two contiguous states – North Carolina and South Carolina – which detail how GOP organizational politics evolved over the same time frame. In so doing, we show how these data can guide and shape future research into both the general development of the Black-and-Tans vs. Lily-Whites conflict as well as state-specific political history.

The Onset of Redemption and the Creation of a Southern GOP Divide

In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, national leaders were confronted with the question of how to create a “reunion” with the eleven states that seceded from the United States and formed the Confederacy. President Andrew Johnson sought a swift reconciliation, which would have empowered the former white elite in the South and severely hampered the political and economic progress of the Freedmen.⁷ Congressional Republicans rejected Johnson's moderate reconciliation plan and devised a more “radical” version, which would place the Freedmen on equal civil and political footing with Southern whites. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided citizenship rights to the Freedmen, and the 14th Amendment broadened these

⁷ Case in point was the passage of various “Black Codes” by Southern state legislatures, which would have established a second-class citizenship status for the Freedmen through the adoption and implementation of draconian vagrancy laws. Such laws would have forced the Freedmen into low-wage work contracts on plantations, in order to pay fines accrued because they were considered unemployed “vagrants.” Simply put, the Black Codes were meant to mimic as closely as possible the political-economic aspects of the slave economy, given the post-Civil War realities (the abolition of slavery via the 13th Amendment) – and, in doing so, maintain the pre-Civil War system of white supremacy. See Theodore Brantner Wilson, *The Black Codes of the South* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1965); William Cohen, *At Freedom's Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial Control, 1861–1915* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991).

citizenship rights and created new federal civil rights that could be enforced by the federal courts. Johnson fought each of these initiatives to no avail, and the Congressional Republicans saw their hand strengthened by a strong pro-GOP tide in the midterm elections of 1866. Emboldened, the Radical faction of the GOP took control of Southern Reconstruction policy, establishing voting rights for the Freedmen (via the 15th Amendment) and designing a plan for the readmission of the Southern states back into the Union. The latter policy, instituted through a series of Reconstruction Acts, established five military zones in the former Confederate states and charged the U.S. Army with overseeing elections.⁸

Radical Reconstruction had positive effects initially for the Republican Party. Once enfranchised and protected by the military during the voting process, the Freedmen turned out for the GOP in large numbers. Their support, combined with some initial suffrage limitations for former (white) Confederate combatants, helped establish a Republican beachhead in the South. The GOP took control of the various Southern state governments, and won Southern-state majorities in both the House and Senate. The Southern GOP during this time was comprised of three types: Freedmen, carpetbaggers (whites who had emigrated from the North), and scalawags (white Southerners, many of whom were former Democrats). Often the Freedmen were the foot soldiers in the Southern Republican movement, with whites (either carpetbaggers or scalawags) filling prominent political roles. But the Freedmen also held positions of leadership within the party, especially at the state level. Between 1870 and 1876, for example, 633 blacks were elected to the various state legislatures, 15 to the U.S. House, and 2 to the U.S. Senate.⁹

⁸ Richard H. Abbott, *The Republican Party and the South, 1855-1877* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988).

⁹ Foner, *Reconstruction*, 354-55.

Yet, the GOP did not enjoy the fruits of Reconstruction for very long. As suffrage and office-holding restrictions on the white populace were eliminated, and as white opposition to Republican rule increased – in the form of intimidation of and violence toward blacks by paramilitary groups like the White League, the Red Shirts, and the Ku Klux Klan – the GOP’s beachhead in the South began to erode. The Democratic Party aggressively counter-mobilized, painting the Republican organizations as corrupt and illegitimate, and regained political control in Tennessee in 1869 and in Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia in 1870. Four years later, Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas were “redeemed” by the Democrats, and Mississippi followed a year later. In 1877, the Democrats reclaimed the final three Southern states – Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina – following the conclusion of the disputed presidential election of 1876.¹⁰

As Rutherford Hayes began his presidency in 1877, he and other national Republican leaders felt under fire. The party had appeared dominant as recently as 1872, when President Ulysses Grant won an easy reelection and the GOP controlled both chambers of Congress. However, an economic panic in 1873, tied to a railroad over-expansion following the Civil War, ushered in a depression that lasted until the end of the decade – and helped Democrats take majority control of the U.S. House following the 1874 midterms. By 1877, the Republicans had barely held onto the White House – and did so, many believed, via an explicit deal (the Compromise of 1877) that ended the military oversight that remained in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina and thereby conceded the governments in those states to the Democrats.¹¹ Now, the GOP had to reassess its position and develop a new strategy going forward, lest the Democrats continue to make gains and drive them from power altogether.

¹⁰ Boris Heersink and Jeffery A. Jenkins, “Republican Party Politics and the American South: From Reconstruction to Redemption, 1865-1880,” Working paper, 2016.

¹¹ C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

The strategy Hayes proposed was to rebuild the Republican brand in the South around the “Whiggism” of years past. Specifically, Hayes sought to recreate Southern Republicanism around issues of economic development, rather than civil rights, and in so doing hoped to convince white Southerners that their futures were better invested in the GOP than the Democratic Party.¹² Such a policy was not predicated on a rejection of the Freedmen and their concerns, but rather was a pragmatic response to the reality that a mostly black party in the South – amid attempts to limit the Freedmen’s participation – was untenable as a long-term winning strategy. In effect, Hayes sought to shift the focus away from race and make the case that “the South” as a society (or region) had more to gain from Republican economic policies than similar Democratic policies. To give this new policy teeth, Hayes made a concerted effort to bestow Southern Democrats with executive patronage – as a way to build good will and potentially shift allegiances. For example, Hayes appointed David Key (Tennessee) as postmaster general, thus allowing Key discretion to make a host of postmaster appointments – most of which went to Southern Democrats. This was a blow to the existing Republican organizations in the South, which normally would have been the beneficiary of this executive windfall.

In the end, Hayes’s “New Departure” strategy proved to be a failure. Southern Democrats gladly took the patronage offered to them, but continued to spurn the GOP and hold it in contempt. One reason was that Hayes’s attempt at relabeling the Republican “brand” was not persuasive. From a white Southerner’s perspective, the GOP was the “black party” – and, more specifically, the party that elevated blacks to the level of whites (or above the level of whites, in the minds of many Southern Democrats) by force, at the point of a bayonet. Any whites that belonged to such a party – per this view – were either Yankee opportunists (carpetbaggers) or Southern traitors to their race (scalawags). As a result, “respectable” Southern whites could not

¹² De Santis, *Republicans Face the Southern Question*; Hirshson, *Farewell to the Bloody Shirt*.

envision becoming Republicans, Hayes's efforts notwithstanding, as the GOP brand was established and invariant – and would shower anyone taking up the Republican mantle with shame and scorn. It was conceivable, some held, that a Whiggish Republican brand could have been established in the South after the Civil War, and efforts to create a party around (1) white businessmen, (2) yeoman white farmers, and (3) Freedmen – in opposition to the white planter class – might have been successful. But the Radical strategies, and the military-led Reconstruction of the South, created a general white identity (irrespective of economic interests) that would prove impervious to new GOP entreaties.

As the presidency shifted from Hayes to James Garfield and Chester A. Arthur (after Garfield's assassination), the GOP strategy vis-a-vis the South changed, but only in degree not in kind. That is, it was clear that Hayes's dalliance with white Southern Democrats was not successful. However, a segment of the white South – forced into taking on the Democratic label because of the “stain” of Republicanism – was unhappy with the conservative policies of the “Bourbon” Democratic establishment. This populist element emerged in the late-1870s and early-1880s, and ran as Independents. And in their identity as Independents, they were able to align with the Republicans in “fusion” arrangements in order to seek electoral success – and share in the spoils of office. In effect, some whites discovered that they could claim another partisan identity and collaborate with Republicans – and be successful.

Garfield and especially Arthur were open to aligning with the Independents, as a way to break the solid Democratic South.¹³ They believed winning white votes was necessary to make inroads in the South, and saw the Independent movement as a viable solution; but whereas Hayes tried to convince Democrats to switch to the GOP, Garfield and Arthur saw fusion as an easier

¹³ Vincent P. De Santis, “President Arthur and the Independent Movements in the South in 1882,” *The Journal of Southern History* 19 (1953): 346-63; Justin D. Doenecke, *The Presidencies of James A. Garfield and Chester A. Arthur* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1981), 114-23

road to hoe. The prototype for a fusion arrangement was in Virginia, as the Readjusters (led by William Mahone) took control of the state legislature in 1879 and elected a governor and U.S. senator in 1881.¹⁴ The Readjuster movement led to other such populist movements across the South, and Garfield and Arthur saw this as the key toward rebuilding Republican influence in the former Confederacy. To promote fusion, Garfield and Arthur used the carrot of executive patronage – Garfield sought to split such patronage between the Independents and regular Republican organizations, while Arthur was willing to hand over full patronage authority to the Independents. These fusion efforts bore some fruit in 1882, with some GOP gains (thanks largely to Readjuster success in Virginia) in the U.S. House, but largely melted away in 1884.

As national Republican leaders increasingly focused on winning the votes of white southerners, organizational GOP politics in the South evolved. The old arrangement of Freedmen, scalawags, and carpetbaggers, which had been the key to Republican success during Reconstruction, increasingly displayed rifts. White Republicans in various states began to complain about “negro domination” and made the case that the only reasonable (and realistic) future for a Southern GOP was to recast the brand around a more respectable image – that of “whiteness.” That is, as this argument went, the only way that the GOP in the South would become an electorally viable entity once again would be to increase its white membership – but that was only possible by making the party more hospitable to whites. And a party comprised of blacks, especially one where blacks held leadership positions, was anathema to “upstanding” Southern whites. Thus, as the Southern GOP foundered in the 1880s, new strategies were floated, and many national Republican leaders and northern intellectuals saw advantages in a Southern wing that moved away from its Reconstruction roots and composition.

¹⁴ On Mahone and the Readjuster movement, see Allen W. Moger, *Virginia: Bourbonism to Byrd, 1870-1925* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1968); Jane Dailey, *Before Jim Crow: The Politics of Race in Postemancipation Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

The Lily-White Movement officially started in Texas, when in 1886, Norris Wright Cuney, a black Republican, was elected state party chairman. White Republicans, who had been feuding with blacks in the party since the late-1870s, resented Cuney and rejected any black holding such a leadership role. In 1888, at the state party convention in Fort Worth, they fought to expel several black delegates, and proceedings degenerated considerably thereafter.¹⁵ Cuney held onto his position, but the general Lily-White vs. Black-and-Tan feud in Texas began spreading to other states in the South. This was due, partly, to the White Supremacy arguments discussed earlier. However, it was also the case that Lily-White organizations emerged as a way for Southern whites to vie for influence, when such influence was harder to achieve by working within traditional Southern GOP organizations – where blacks had played an active and meaningful role for a generation.

And the “influence” that Southern Republicans could hope to realize changed as the 20th century drew near. Electoral viability declined outside of a few states (like North Carolina and Virginia) in the late-1880s and 1890s, as Democrats cemented their control. Then, a pivotal institutional change was made at the state level, first by Mississippi in 1890 and then the other states of the former Confederacy by 1908.¹⁶ A series of disfranchisement provisions – such as literacy tests, residency requirements, and poll taxes, among others – were put in place, based on changes to the state constitution, which severely restricted the voting rights of blacks (and many poor whites).¹⁷ The result of these restrictions was that black registration and turnout rates dropped significantly, to the point of effectively wiping out blacks as a voting bloc in some areas.

¹⁵ Alwyn Barr, *Reconstruction to Reform: Texas Politics, 1876–1906* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971); Paul D. Casdorph, *A History of the Republican Party in Texas, 1865–1965* (Austin: Pemberton Press, 1965).

¹⁶ See J. Morgan Kousser, *The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Michael Perman, *Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888–1908* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

¹⁷ Many states also adopted “grandfather clauses,” which allowed poor whites to vote (despite their illiteracy and/or poverty), while still excluding blacks.

And as blacks comprised the bulk of Republican voters in most places in the South, the disenfranchising provisions drove the GOP's electoral viability in Dixie to zero.

Following the Democrats' formal disenfranchisement efforts, the Southern wing of the GOP remained relevant in only one respect – within the Republican National Convention itself, most specifically, in the choice of the GOP presidential nominee. That is, by the 1890s, as the Democrats securely locked down the electoral arena in the South, the only benefits that a Southern Republican could hope to achieve were limited to patronage and side payments associated with presidential politics. Thus, Lily-White and Black-and-Tan factions began to ignore organizational issues at home – i.e., what the composition of the Southern GOP should be – and increasingly fought over the more pragmatic issue of which group should represent their states at the National Convention. And national Republican leaders also began to ignore organizational issues in the South – i.e., largely conceding the region to the Democrats in the aftermath of the widespread disenfranchising initiatives – and increasingly saw the Southern states as a set of “rotten boroughs.”

Thus, in the years surrounding the turn of the 20th century, the Lily-White vs. Black-and-Tan conflict routinely emerged in the run-up to the Republican National Convention, as well as at the Convention itself. Battles over seating were common, as would-be delegates from each faction showed up and claimed to be the rightful occupants of the state's representational allotment. Presidential hopefuls vied for control of these delegates – through support at the seating stage or thereafter – with promises of executive patronage or straight side payments (bribes). The more strategic presidential hopefuls would get to work in the months before the convention, to get a jump on their rivals. William McKinley started this practice in 1896, by touring the South and meeting with representatives of both Republican factions. McKinley and

his immediate successors did not view the Lily-White vs. Black-and-Tan dispute in principled terms – while they may have had opinions on the racial composition of the Southern GOP, those opinions were overridden by the more practical question of which faction could be more easily and cheaply corralled for convention purposes.¹⁸

The remainder of this paper delves into the composition of GOP organizations in the South after Reconstruction. We do this by exploring the racial composition of convention delegations from all Southern states. In creating such an accounting, we can track how GOP politics evolved – both within and across states – across time. This provides leverage in assessing how the Lily-White vs. Black-and-Tan competition played out. This data subsequently can be used to help direct future research on this competition, for example on whether that competition was influenced by external factors – like the adoption of disenfranchising provisions, shifts in federal patronage provision, or other national or local variables.

Data and Summary Statistics

To measure the variation in the Lily-Whites vs. Black-and-Tans conflict in Republican Party politics in the South, we have collected data on the racial make-up of delegations from the eleven former-Confederate states to the GOP national conventions in the 1868-1952 period. To reiterate: we argue that the conflict between Lily-Whites and Black-and-Tans in the post-Reconstruction era should have been fought largely with the prize of convention delegate seats in mind. Specifically, as Reconstruction came to an end and Redemption took hold, voting restrictions excluded nearly all black Southerners from voting or holding elected office. Consequently, the GOP’s electoral viability in the South withered away, and being a delegate to

¹⁸ See Heersink and Jenkins, “Southern Delegates and Republican National Convention Politics.”

the national convention became the only remaining form of representative political office that most Southern Republicans could achieve.

For convention delegations during this period, the names and hometowns of each delegate (both regular and alternate) seated at the convention were published in the convention proceedings. Beyond these two basic pieces of demographic data, however, the proceedings do not provide any other information. Most importantly, the proceedings do not list the race of the individual delegates.¹⁹ Hence, we turn to the U.S. census, the most comprehensive dataset that *does* identify the race of nearly all American citizens.

As required in the constitution, the census has been executed every ten years since 1790.²⁰ The role of the census has changed over time, from focusing predominantly on providing population counts to collecting other statistics about American citizens – leading to a more expansive list of questions. However, the three-fifths compromise (reached during the constitutional convention) meant that measuring the racial make-up of the American population was (and would continue to be) an essential part of the census’ mission, from the first census onward.²¹ While the exact racial classifications and language used on the forms have changed over time,²² the census is the most consistent and reliable historical source for identifying the race of individual American citizens.²³

¹⁹ The sole exception being a set of Southern state delegations (Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas) printed in the proceedings of the 1896 convention: for these states, black delegates are identified as “colored” while white delegates receive no racial identification. *Republican National Convention, St. Louis, June 16th to 18th, 1896* (St. Louis; Haas Publishing and Engraving Company, 1896), 175-210.

²⁰ Specifically, Article I, Paragraph 3, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States: “The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.”

²¹ Margo J. Anderson, *The American Census: A Social History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 9-12.

²² Race – together with age and sex – has been one of the few items consistently asked in every census. However, the option available to respondents has changed over time: in censuses collected between 1790 and 1840 information was collected by household not individual and a distinction was made between free white males, free white females, all other free persons, and slaves. After 1850 the Census Bureau began relying on a form that identified each individual person in a household, whereby each free individual was identified as being white, black, or mulatto. After the Civil War the distinction between free and slaves was dropped, but the three-fold definition of

We have attempted to match each individual delegate listed in the state proceedings to their original census forms. To do so, we used the online demographic aggregation search engine Ancestry.com, which allows us to search for historical records based on the (limited) information we have for each delegate: name, residence, and year in which the delegate lived in that town or city. Census records that match on name and hometown, and for which the matching census respondents were of voting age at the time of the convention, were accessed and the race listed on the census form was matched to the delegate.

As can be seen in Table 1 and Figure 1, we were able to identify the race of almost 78% of the 8,660 delegates included in the data set. The extent of ‘unknown’ racial identification (22%) is not surprising given the limited biographical information in the proceedings: for example, a date (or even year) of birth for each delegate would dramatically increase the number of matching census forms, but the proceedings do not provide this information. Additionally, potential misspellings of names or hometowns in the proceedings, the census form, or both complicate the matching process further. Finally, with the exception of those elections that occurred in a year during which the census also took place, there is also a two or four year gap between the information provided in the proceedings and the most recent census: it is likely that

race remained in use. For the 1890 census, workers were given instructions as to how to further characterize black Americans (noting a distinction between black, mulatto, quadroon, and octoroon depending on the extent to which an individual was deemed to have ‘black blood’). The term ‘negro’ was introduced in the 1900 census. The term mulatto was not included in the 1900 census, but reappeared in 1910 and 1920. For the purposes of this study we identify any delegates whose census lists their race as any of the terms listed above as black. Margo J. Anderson (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of the U.S. Census* (Washington: CQ Press, 2000), 19.

²³ As Anderson notes, the end of slavery and, thereby, the three fifths compromise provides no reason to believe local Democratic Southern leaders would subsequently have an incentive to frustrate attempts by census workers to incorporate black Southerners; while black Southerners were banned from voting, post-Civil War they did count as full citizens, increasing the population count for the South and the number of House seats provided to Southern (solidly Democratic) states (Anderson, *The American Census*, 72).

some percentage of delegates may have moved inside or outside their state in that time, or may have even died.²⁴

[Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]

The number of delegates that could not be matched to a corresponding census form is also hampered by problems related to the 1890 census, which was the first to be counted and tabulated using electronic machines. As a result, no copies were made of the original census forms. A subsequent fire in 1921 in the Department of Commerce, where the 1890 census documents were stored outside of a fireproof vault, destroyed nearly all of the original forms.²⁵ For our purposes, this means that the data for delegates to the 1888 and 1892 conventions are particularly scarce. That is not to say that no data are available at all: delegates who were present at earlier or later conventions are frequently covered in the 1880 or 1900 census. Nonetheless, the percentage of delegates for whom we cannot identify race is highest for these two convention years (see Figure 1).

The summary statistics in Table 1 and Figure 2 largely confirm the traditional perspective of the Lily-White takeover of the Southern GOP organizations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (and their success at slowly but surely pushing black Southerners out of the party in the decades that followed). While never constituting a majority, blacks consistently represented between 40 and 50% of Southern delegates at Republican conventions between 1880 and 1896. However, starting with the 1900 convention (the first after the realignment election of 1896), the number of black delegates began to drop considerably. Between 1916 and 1924, less than 20%

²⁴ Finally, for delegates to the 1948 and 1952 conventions there is a limitation in that the U.S. Census follows the “72 years” rule; the individual census forms are not released until 72 years after the census was taken. As a result, the 1940 census is currently the last census that has been fully released. For the 1948 and 1952 conventions, delegate data is based on repeat delegates (that is, delegates who were also present at previous conventions) or on census data that was eight or twelve years old. As a result, coverage drops for these last conventions – from 14% of delegates for which a match could not be made to 16% and 34% in 1948 and 1952 respectively.

²⁵ Robert L. Dorman, “The Creation and Destruction of the 1890 Federal Census,” *The American Archivist* 71 (Fall-Winter 2008), 350-83.

of Southern delegates were black. While the number increased slightly for the 1928 convention, black Southern representation at the GOP convention showed a clear decline in the first decades of the 20th century, and a subsequent – and lasting – drop in the 1932 convention. This decline can be attributed to a general development of Lily-White challenges across the South, which resulted in a dramatic change of fortunes for black representation.

[Figure 2 about here]

However, as can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 3, these summary statistics disguise a set of important state-by-state distinctions: some states moved towards Lily-Whiteism considerably earlier, while others managed to avoid the Lily-White development through most of the early 20th century (or even entirely).

[Table 2 and Figure 3 about here]

In the first category, Tennessee and Virginia had relatively low levels of black representation in their delegations throughout this period (see Figure 4). In Tennessee, black representation was always low – hitting a high point of just 36.7% in 1884 – but blacks still remained a (small) minority part of the state’s delegations throughout this period. Virginia saw considerable black representation early on (44.1% in 1872), but from 1876 on black representation dropped quickly, considerably, and permanently.

[Figure 4 about here]

Virginia and Tennessee were outliers in this regard. Most Southern states saw a period of considerable black representation followed by major decline. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina all at some point had delegations in which a majority of delegates were black. But in most of these states, the level of black representation dropped considerably in the late 19th or, more commonly, early 20th century (see Figure 5). For example,

Alabama went from a high of a nearly 65% black delegation in 1888, to a mere 26.3% at the 1904 convention. Black representation in subsequent conventions continued to drop until by 1924 no black delegates represented the state – a condition that persisted in the conventions that followed. Similarly, while Florida’s delegation in the 19th century was generally between 40 and 50% black, in 1908 representation dropped considerably. In subsequent conventions, black participation continued to decline, and after 1924, black delegates never made up more than 20% of the Florida delegation. In Louisiana, blacks dominated the state’s delegation in the 19th century: between 1872 and 1896, blacks made up between 40% (in 1876) and 65.2% (in 1892) of the state’s delegation. However, in 1900, black representation dropped to 35%. While some blacks remained in the Louisiana delegation throughout all subsequent conventions, whites were consistently in the majority from then on.

[Figure 5 about here]

In contrast, South Carolina and Mississippi mostly bucked the trend of Lily-Whiteism (see Figure 6). In South Carolina, Lily-Whites did eventually take over the state’s delegation, but not until 1932. In every convention prior to 1932, blacks made up at least half – and as much as 80% – of the state delegation. Mississippi was even more unique; unlike any other Southern state, the Lily-Whites *never* displaced the Black-and-Tans. In fact, between 1892 and 1952, Mississippi’s delegation was majority black with only one exception (1920, when 45.8% of delegates were black). Surprisingly, black representation even *increased* starting in 1932, while in all other states during these years black representation decreased or was entirely non-existent.

[Figure 6 about here]

These data thus raise considerable questions. While it is true that Lily-White elements appear to take control of most state party organizations in this period, the data indicate that there

was also considerable variation across states as to *when* these shifts occurred. A number of factors could have produced such state-level differentiation, including the specific timing and context of black exclusion from electoral participation, and (un)related shifts in preferences of national party leaders with regard to the different competing organizational groups. A better understanding of some of these factors, and their relation to Lily-White vs. Black-and-Tan dynamics over time, requires extensive historical case study analysis of individual states. While we cannot do so for every Southern state in this paper, we provide two examples below to show both the value and possibility of such state-level case analysis. Specifically, we present detailed case studies of GOP politics in North Carolina and South Carolina, two contiguous states in which the racial composition of representation at national GOP conventions developed very differently across our time period.

Case Studies

In Figure 7, we compare the proportion of black convention delegates from North Carolina and South Carolina between 1868 and 1952. As noted, these neighboring states varied dramatically in their racial proportions of Republican convention delegates across the given timespan. North Carolina witnessed a significant decrease in black delegates after 1900, and this process of rapid decline continued until the 1908 convention – when the delegation became entirely white. In subsequent conventions, this became the status quo: not a single black delegate from North Carolina was seated in national conventions held between 1912 and 1952. However, blacks dominated the South Carolina delegation in the late 19th century (with a high of 69% in 1896), and the percentage of black delegates actually increased in the first two decades of the 20th century (with a high of 80% in 1920). Indeed, the results in Figure 4 suggest that Lily-Whiteism was not a particularly strong or successful phenomenon in South Carolina until 1932:

at no point in the 1868-1928 period did the percentage of blacks in the state delegation dip below the 50% mark. But a significant change did occur in 1932, when only 16% of South Carolina delegates were black. In the sub-sections below we document how this difference in the Black-and-Tans and Lily-White conflict played out.

[Figure 7 about here]

South Carolina: “Tieless Joe” and the Black-and-Tans

Given the spread of Lily-Whiteism across GOP organizations in the South during the early 20th century, the continuing domination of Black-and-Tanism in South Carolina through the late-1920s is surprising (see Table 3). The source of this domination was the strength of a local party machine built around one man – Joseph W. Tolbert – in the first decades of the 20th century. Based on a lucrative system in which his Black-and-Tan machine sold federal offices to local Republicans and in return provided a consistent South Carolina voting bloc at the GOP convention, Tolbert managed to hold on to a position of power that made him a reliable – if unattractive – negotiating partner for national leaders seeking South Carolina’s convention votes.

[Table 3 about here]

The son of a two-time failed Congressional candidate, Tolbert – commonly known as “Tieless Joe”²⁶ – was himself white but had managed to build up a party machine consisting of “himself, a few other whites, and handpicked Negroes over the state” with the aim to “choose delegates to the national convention and to distribute patronage.”²⁷ Building this machine did not make Tolbert a particularly popular political figure, either at the national level or at home. *Time* noted that Tolbert’s leadership of a largely black party organization meant that “to most

²⁶ Tolbert’s view on ties was as follows: “Ain’t never worn one. Don’t bother with nothing I can do without.” See “Joseph W. Tolbert of South Carolina,” *New York Times*, October 19, 1946.

²⁷ V.O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 288.

decent whites he is guilty of South Carolina's supreme sin."²⁸ The Tolbert family had direct experience with what the consequences of engaging in this 'supreme sin' could be: in 1898, during an attempt at collecting evidence of voter disenfranchisement, Robert Redd Tolbert – Tieless Joe's brother and himself a frequent delegate to Republican national conventions – was shot and wounded outside a polling station after a conflict with local white Democrats.²⁹ In the days that followed, white Democrats went on a rampage, killing several black men in revenge. Tolbert's father was arrested, and the local press blasted the Tolberts for inciting a race riot by encouraging black citizens to vote.³⁰

Despite the danger of running a Black-and-Tan organization in the post-Reconstruction South, Tolbert's machine became one of the most successful at fighting off Lily-White challenges. The basis of Tolbert's success lay in his ability to deliver patronage and charge considerable sums for it. The economics of this system became public in a series of accusations against Tolbert in the first half of the 1920s, after President Warren Harding nominated him to be U.S. Marshall for the Western district of South Carolina. Harding's decision was surprising, as he represented one of the few Republican presidents in this period that had not relied on a Southern pre-convention strategy to win the nomination.³¹ Additionally, the Harding administration in its first months in office postponed all federal appointments (the lifeline of the party machine) in South Carolina, in order to search for an alternative to Tolbert. By 1922, however, the administration had concluded that both the Tolbert machine and any alternative Lily-White organization shared a single-minded focus on controlling access to federal offices,

²⁸ "Palmetto Stump, Thirties Style," *Time*, August 24, 1936, 17.

²⁹ T.P. Tolbert had "set up a box outside the regular polling place in the community of Phoenix. Negroes who were refused the right to vote were asked to fill out a form affidavit and drop it into a box which was in the possession of Tolbert." After a white Democrat challenged Tolbert's right to collect this information, an altercation followed which ended in the death of the Democrat and the wounding of Tolbert. George Brown Tindall, *South Carolina Negroes* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1952), 256-57.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 256-58.

³¹ Heersink and Jenkins, "Southern Delegates and Republican National Convention Politics."

while displaying little passion for Republican policies.³² As a result, Harding appears to have made up his mind to stick with the devil he knew, resulting in “Tieless Joe’s” own nomination for a high profile federal office.

Tolbert’s nomination, however, set off a firestorm that damaged the reputation of the Republican Party in the South and revealed the Tolbert organization for the patronage machine that it was. While the scandal did not threaten Tolbert’s control over the South Carolina GOP in the short term, it provided insight into the way the Tolbert machine managed to remain in control of the party for so long. Additionally, Harding’s unwillingness to drop Tolbert after the scandal broke indicates the value he placed on building a relationship with South Carolina’s political boss and the important role local Southern Republican leaders played in the party, regardless of their region’s failure to provide any electoral votes in general elections.

In July 1922, several months after Harding had nominated Tolbert, Senator Nathaniel B. Dial (D-SC) criticized the nomination, and accused Tolbert of dividing “the State into districts, in each of which he had stationed a henchman who sold the Federal plums for one-half the first year’s salary.”³³ Dial claimed that Tolbert stood to gain \$100,000 from the sales of federal offices:

I am told of many instances where the offices were sold – one bringing \$750, another \$1,200, another \$600, another \$2,000, and different sums all around the State where there was competition. A recent case was reported where \$1,200 was paid and the party failed to get the office, and, after considerable wrangling, the funds were returned. It is alleged that appointees to small offices often have to contribute.³⁴

³² Richard B. Sherman, *The Republican Party and Black America: From McKinley to Hoover, 1896-1933* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973), 155-56.

³³ “Dial Charges Sale of Federal Offices in South Carolina,” *New York Times*, July 31, 1922.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

While Tolbert denied the allegations, the scandal did him in, as the Senate refused to confirm his nomination, despite the fact that Republicans controlled the chamber.³⁵ Instead of dropping his now toxic candidate, however, Harding chose to use a recess appointment to give Tolbert the position. Once the Senate reconvened, it again refused to confirm Tolbert, which resulted in a second recess appointment.³⁶ Finally, in late 1923, after Harding's death, Tolbert resigned his position.³⁷ His resignation, however, did not end the public scrutiny of the Tolbert party machine. In 1924, when a Senate committee on campaign funding heard testimony from J.T. Doyle, secretary of the United States civil service committee, Tolbert was further implicated in the sale of offices:

Doyle said that Howard A. Littlejohn, postmaster at Belton, S.C., had been told by Joseph W. Tolbert, Republican national committeeman in South Carolina, that he would get him reappointed postmaster "if your heart and pocketbook will get right." He also testified that Maj. James W. Bradford, at Sumter, S.C., had paid \$500 to get promoted from assistant postmaster to postmaster.³⁸

Despite these charges, Tolbert and his delegation were seated again at the 1924 and 1928 Republican conventions. Nonetheless, the negative national attention around Tolbert eventually led to the rise of a rival Lily-White coalition under the leadership of Joe Hambright. Throughout most of the 1920s, the Hambright organization failed to undermine the Tolbert machine.³⁹ But this would change after the 1928 Republican convention. Unlike most previous GOP presidential candidates, Herbert Hoover was quite popular in the South, thanks to his heading up the Coolidge administration's response to the Mississippi flood of 1927. Additionally, Hoover was willing to his likely Democratic opponent Al Smith's catholicism as an issue to convince

³⁵ "Tolbert Denies Sale of Offices," *New York Times*, August 1, 1922.

³⁶ "Tolbert Reappointment Seen Unconstitutional," *Washington Post*, March 10, 1923.

³⁷ "Joseph W. Tolbert of South Carolina," *New York Times*.

³⁸ "Sale of Patronage in South Carolina Charged at Hearing," *The Washington Post*, October 31, 1924.

³⁹ Indeed, while Tolbert himself was seated in every convention between 1900 and 1928, Hambright was not once a delegate in that period. Hanes Walton Jr., et al, *The African American Electorate* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2012, Volume 1), 454.

white Southern voters to desert the Democratic Party.⁴⁰ To achieve this, the Hoover campaign invested heavily in Lily-White organizations in the South, a move that Tolbert opposed during the 1928 convention.⁴¹

After the general election, Hoover hoped to continue the process of building a more viable Republican Party in the South, by overthrowing the existing leadership of the corrupt Black-and-Tan coalitions. For South Carolina, Hoover named Hambright the chair of the Republican Party, hoping to replace the Tolbert machine with one loyal to his administration. The move was largely a failure, but did initiate the end of the Black-and-Tan domination of the South Carolina GOP. Tolbert, working with Democratic Senator Cole Blease (D-SC), succeeded in delaying or blocking the confirmation of U.S. marshals and postmasters recommended for appointment by Hambright. As Donald J. Lisio notes, this subterfuge meant that Hambright did not have the necessary building blocks to create a viable alternative organization: without the jobs, Hambright “lacked security and the proof of leadership needed to build a new state party.”⁴²

Tolbert, meanwhile, also organized his own state convention, arguing that as a RNC member he represented the true Republican Party in South Carolina; in so doing, he elected party office holders of his own and declared the rival Hambright party to be illegal. The clash between the two competing party organizations reached its zenith during the 1932 convention, when Tolbert successfully convinced his fellow RNC members to recognize his organization alone – arguing that it was against the interests of local party leaders to allow the president to choose his own state party leaders.⁴³ Hoover, however, was not to be denied. During the convention, he

⁴⁰ Heersink and Jenkins, “Southern Delegates and Republican National Convention Politics.”

⁴¹ Lisio, *Hoover, Blacks, & Lily Whites*, 59-60.

⁴² *Ibid*, 181.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 261-66.

personally interfered to ensure that Tolbert's delegation would not be seated: when the Credentials Committee approved the seating of the Tolbert Black-and-Tan delegation, Hoover voiced his disapproval and the committee reversed itself and seated the Hambright delegation instead. As a result, black representation dropped dramatically: in 1928, 62% of delegates had been black, while in 1932 the seated (Hambright) delegation was only 17% black.⁴⁴

This victory for the Hambright organization proved to be a temporary one: after Hoover's landslide defeat in the 1932 general election, the South Carolina Lily-White organization lost its most prominent national defender and Tolbert succeeded in getting seated at the 1936 convention. However, during the New Deal, the Black-and-Tan machine no longer had access to the type of executive patronage that had been the foundation of its existence. By 1940, Tolbert was no longer capable of getting himself or members of his organization seated at the national convention. By the time of his death in 1946 – due to injuries sustained from a mysterious accident, as he was struck by a truck while walking along a highway in his hometown⁴⁵ – Tolbert's machine had been replaced by one led by J. Bates Gerald, who built an organization combining white leadership with a small minority of black representatives from among “Negro college presidents, lawyers, doctors, and [...] businessmen.”⁴⁶ Black representation in the South Carolina delegation thus remained below 14% for conventions after 1936 – even hitting zero in 1944 and 1952.

South Carolina's uncommon history helps reveal the elements that defined both the Black-and-Tan vs. Lily-White conflict as well as the Republican Party organizations in general across the South. First, it shows how important control of patronage appointments was to these

⁴⁴ Richard Oulahan, *The Man Who...: The Story of the 1932 Democratic National Convention* (New York: The Dial Press, 1971), 62.

⁴⁵ “Joseph W. Tolbert of South Carolina,” *The New York Times*.

⁴⁶ Key, *Southern Politics*, 288.

organizations. Once Tolbert's access to federal jobs was closed off – first by Hoover's opposition to his organization, followed by the Democrats' control of the federal government during the New Deal years – his organization collapsed. Importantly, however, the South Carolina case also shows that the Lily-White movement in the early 20th century did not possess the moral high ground. The Hambright organization's main opposition to the Tolbert machine appears to have been that *they* wanted control over patronage distribution, not that South Carolina's existing Republican Party was corrupt.

North Carolina: A Tale of Two Extremes

While the Lily-White movement in South Carolina made few inroads against Black-and-Tanism in the early 20th century, the same was not true in North Carolina (see Table 4). That is, while blacks comprised a significant proportion of North Carolina's GOP delegation up through the 1896 convention –between 36 and 43% of the delegates between 1880 and 1896 – that proportion plummeted to barely 14% in 1900 and 10% in 1904. By 1908, there were *no* blacks in North Carolina's delegation to the Republican convention. This remained true in every subsequent GOP convention for which we have collected data. The North Carolina case, then, shows not just a victory for the Lily-White movement, but the complete obliteration of the Black-and-Tan organization.

[Table 4 about here]

The disappearance of black delegates is particularly interesting since North Carolina was somewhat unique among Southern states, in that it continued to elect a considerable number of Republicans to Congress and the state legislature through the 1880s and 1890s. Thanks to a significant voting base of ex-Union soldiers in the Mountains, a substantial number of black voters who had not yet been disenfranchised, and successful fusion arrangements with Populists,

the North Carolina GOP remained competitive in North Carolina far longer than nearly anywhere else in the South.⁴⁷ Even more unique was the state's ongoing ability to elect *black* Republicans.⁴⁸

The most notable example of North Carolina's exceptionalism in this regard was the career of George H. White. White was the last black Southerner to be elected to Congress before Jim Crow legislation fundamentally disenfranchised blacks. White represented the second district of North Carolina (known as the "black second" – a district packed with black Republicans to help elect Democrats in surrounding districts), which elected a series of black Republicans in the 1872-1901 period.⁴⁹ White's career in public service provides some insight into the possibilities available to North Carolina's black population in the late 19th century: before becoming a two-term U.S. House member, White had been a state legislator, a district attorney (the only black prosecutor in the country at the time), and a delegate to two Republican National Conventions.⁵⁰ During his two terms in Congress, White "had the strong feeling he spoke for all the nation's Negroes,"⁵¹ not merely his own constituents, and opined frequently on the abuse that black Americans received in North Carolina and elsewhere. White also followed suit in his role as legislator, introducing the first anti-lynching bill in Congress.

Although White was perhaps the most prominent of the black Republicans in North Carolina in this period, he was far from alone: the second district elected about fifty black

⁴⁷ Rob Christensen, *The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics. The Personalities, Elections, and Events That Shaped Modern North Carolina*, 2nd edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 9.

⁴⁸ Helen G. Edmonds, *The Negro and Fusion Politics in North Carolina* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1951), 97. See, also, James M. Beeby, *Revolt of the Tar Heels: The North Carolina Populist Movement, 1890-1901* (Oxford: University of Mississippi Press, 2008).

⁴⁹ Aside from White, who was elected in 1896 and 1898, three other blacks were elected to the House during this period: John Adams Hyman in 1874, James Edward O'Hara in 1882 and 1884, and Henry Plummer Cheatham in 1888 and 1890.

⁵⁰ Christensen, *The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics*, 12.

⁵¹ Eric Anderson, *Race and Politics in North Carolina 1872-1901: The Black Second* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1981), 280.

members of the state legislature, as well as “numerous mayors, town commissioners, registers of deeds, sheriffs, and clerks of court.”⁵² While disenfranchisement and segregation efforts existed, they had not yet been codified in law and blacks were able to participate in society (including politics) at a level unlike most other Southern states. However, as Rob Christensen notes, “life for African Americans in the last decades of the nineteenth century was better in many ways than it would be for their children.”⁵³

The situation changed dramatically in the late 1890s, as white Democrats increasingly relied on violence to terrorize black voters and their white (Republican) supporters. While building up over several years, the critical juncture occurred in 1898 when the infamous Wilmington race riot resulted in what has been described as the only coup d'état in American history.⁵⁴ Despite intimidation attempts by ‘Red Shirts’ – a paramilitary arm of the Democratic Party in North Carolina – the 1898 election produced a victory for the Black-and-Tan fusionist ticket in Wilmington; while the newly elected mayor and two thirds of the city’s aldermen were white, black candidates were successfully elected despite the Democrats’ scare tactics and voter disenfranchisement efforts. In response to these election results, a group of 500 armed whites destroyed the offices of the Wilmington *Daily Record* – the only remaining black newspaper in the state. Alfred Moore Widdell, the leader of white supremacists, in his memoirs described the destruction as follows:

A negro printing office was destroyed by a procession of perfectly sober men, but no person was injured until a negro deliberately and without provocation shot a white man, while others, armed and defiant, occupied the streets, and the result was that about twenty of them were killed and the rest of them were scattered. [...] On the evening of the day of this revolution the Mayor and Board of Alderman, then in charge of the city of

⁵² Christensen, *The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics*, 14.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 12.

⁵⁴ On the Wilmington Race Riot, see David S. Cecelski and Timothy B. Tyson, eds., *Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

Wilmington, one by one resigned and in the same order their successors were nominated and elected.⁵⁵

Prior to the (forced) resignation of the mayor and aldermen, the group of supremacists – which had now grown to over 2,000 people – had driven opposing white business and political leaders out of town. The subsequent resignation of the elected officials was a non-negotiable demand of the Red Shirts, and Widdell was named the new mayor. In a matter of days, the democratically elected leadership of an American city had been overthrown in a violent coup. Neither the federal nor the state government intervened.⁵⁶

The Wilmington insurrection had a dramatic effect on North Carolina politics. Democrats were emboldened to push for the full exclusion of blacks from North Carolina politics, while at the same time, white Republicans largely embraced the concept of a Lily-White party as an alternative to the Black-and-Tan version, given the increasingly hostile racial relations. As the Hendersonville *Times* noted, “politically we believe the ‘elimination’ of the negro from politics will be a blessing in disguise for the Republican Party” because with the “negro bug-a-boo eliminated, the whites of the South are sure to split on economic issues.”⁵⁷ The Democratic majority in the state legislature then passed a constitutional amendment in 1899 limiting suffrage based on a literacy test and poll tax. Importantly, the North Carolina suffrage amendment included a ‘grandfather clause,’ which excluded any citizens or those in direct lineage to them who had held voting rights prior to 1867 from the new law. The intended effect of the amendment – which would still need to be ratified at the polls in 1900 – was clear: since

⁵⁵ Alfred Moore Waddell, *Some Memories of My Life* (Raleigh: Edwards & Broughton Printing Company, 1908), 243-44.

⁵⁶ Christensen, *The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics*, 22-27.

⁵⁷ Cited in Jeffrey J. Crow and Robert F. Durden, *Maverick Republican in the Old North State: A Political Biography of Daniel L. Russell* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 138-39.

slaves did not have voting rights prior to the Civil War, but poor whites often did, the suffrage amendment would almost exclusively affect blacks.⁵⁸

Despite opposition to the amendment by Republican Governor Daniel L. Russell, who called on all non-Democrats in the state to oppose the effort to make black voters the key issue in the 1900 elections, the Populists – who had previously worked with the Republicans – refused to condemn the suffrage amendment.⁵⁹ Meanwhile, Republicans actively discouraged black party members from running for public office in the 1900 election, arguing that black candidates would only buttress the Democrats’ argument in favor of the suffrage amendment. During the campaign, the Red Shirts once again terrorized black voters and newspaper offices and editors who did not support their supremacist views. Even Governor Russell did not vote on election day: voting would have required him to travel to Wilmington, which he feared would lead to further riots. The suffrage amendment was ratified by a landslide vote – 182,217 to 128,285 – and black citizens, from 1900 onwards, would face serious hurdles that would prevent them from participating in any elections.⁶⁰

The negative effects the suffrage amendment had on black participation in North Carolina elections were particularly clear in the second district: while George H. White had won reelection in 1898 by a comfortable margin (49.5 against 42.1% of the vote), based largely on his support from black voters, the Democratic candidate in the 1900 elections (during which blacks were not yet banned from voting but faced the very real threat of violence from Red Shirt Democrats if they chose to vote) won the seat with nearly 65% of the vote. By 1902, after the

⁵⁸ Ibid., 142; Beeby, *Revolt of the Tar Heels*, 191.

⁵⁹ Durden, *Maverick Republican in the Old North State*, 150.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 155-156; Beeby, *Revolt of the Tar Heels*, 209-10.

implementation of the new voting laws, the now incumbent white Democratic Congressman won reelection without a Republican opponent – and received 99% of the vote.⁶¹

The particularly noxious way in which Democrats excluded black North Carolinians from the political sphere can explain why black Republicans were banned entirely from their state's delegation after the 1900 convention. To some extent, black Republicans were a victim of their own success; by participating not only actively but also *successfully* in their state's political system prior to the 1898 Wilmington insurrection, they inspired a level of vitriol in the Democratic supremacist movement that not only disenfranchised black voters but also jump-started their own party's Lily-White wing. In effect, white Republicans in North Carolina chose to “blame the victims,” by scapegoating their black party members for the 1898-1900 demise of the state's Republican Party: in 1902, Lily-White Republicans began to officially excluded black Republicans from the state party.⁶² By 1904, only four delegates to the national convention were black; by 1908 there were zero.

Conclusion

Our data and case studies provide a window into the different factors that can help explain developments in Republican state party organizations in the South in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The data confirm that black representation in Southern convention delegations dropped dramatically in the late 1890s and early 1900s. Nonetheless, the data also make clear that there was considerable state-by-state variation in this regard, and that no uniform story can fully capture the nature and development of the Black-and-Tan vs. Lily-White conflict

⁶¹ *CQ Press Guide to US Elections* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010), 1108, 1113, 1118.

⁶² Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, “False Friends and Avowed Enemies: Southern African Americans and Party Allegiances in the 1920s,” in Jane Elizabeth Dailey and Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore (eds), *Jumpin’ Jim Crow: Southern Politics from Civil War to Civil Rights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 223. See also Richard B. Sherman, *The Republican Party and Black America from McKinley to Hoover: 1896-1933* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1973), 29-36; David C. Roller, “The Republican Party of North Carolina, 1900-1916,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1965), 100-10.

across the South in this period. Rather, GOP organizations were affected by national developments (most notably changes in the cost-benefit analyses national Republican leaders made with regard to investment in the South), but also by specific local circumstances that national party leaders did not control.

Indeed, while the Republican Party in both South Carolina and North Carolina experienced some version of intra-party conflict between Black-and-Tans and Lily-Whites in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the timing, context, and influence of national political actors was noticeably different. In South Carolina, a Black-and-Tans coalition managed to control the local Republican Party over a long period of time, largely because the (white) leader of the organization had constructed a highly effective machine built around the distribution of federal patronage. This machine was the product of an intricate dance between local GOP leader Joseph W. Tolbert and national elites like Presidents Warren G. Harding and Herbert Hoover. On the one hand, Tolbert's organization made him a reliable – if unpopular – provider of convention votes to non-Southern Republicans with presidential ambitions. As such, while Republican leaders may not have been particularly happy to deal with the local party machine, replacing it with some unknown alternative was costly and introduced considerable uncertainty, thus strengthening the position of the Black-and-Tans. On the other hand, Tolbert's machine relied entirely on his ability to provide a consistent stream of patronage jobs to his supporters back home. Once access to those patronage jobs disappeared – first due to Hoover's hostility towards the Black-and-Tan organizations in the South and, later and more permanently, due to continued Democratic control of the federal government – Tolbert's machine disintegrated and was replaced by a Lily-White organization.

In North Carolina, the story was decidedly different. Here, Black-and-Tans were an active part of the Republican Party – not merely as voters, but as candidates that could actually win elections. However, the fact that the Republican Party remained competitive in North Carolina until the late 19th century produced an even more violent response from the Democrats than had existed in South Carolina. The terrorization of (mostly black) Republican voters, elected officials, and newspaper editors in the late 1890s succeeded not only in suppressing the vote and disenfranchising blacks after 1900, but also in driving a wedge between black and white Republicans. If a party *with* blacks resulted in such violence that political participation became all but impossible for even the incumbent Republican governor, then a party *without* blacks became the preferred outcome for most white North Carolina Republicans. Importantly, the North Carolina case also shows that the role of national leaders in these local, intra-party conflicts was not always a deciding factor in the eventual outcome. Whether Republican presidents like William McKinley or Theodore Roosevelt would have preferred a Black-and-Tan or Lily-White organization in North Carolina became all but irrelevant after the 1900 elections: the expulsion of blacks, not just from the electoral process but from the Republican Party as a whole in the state, became simply a *fait accompli*.

Much more work is needed to comprehensively chart the different dimensions of the GOP organizations in the South during the late 19th century and early 20th centuries. In particular, future research must grapple with the way different political actors (black Republicans and white Republicans in the South, white Republican leaders at the national level, and Democrats in the South) affected the way that these organizations looked and functioned. Additionally, a more concrete assessment of the role patronage allocation played in creating and (perhaps most puzzling) sustaining these organizations (whether Black-and-Tan or Lily-White)

across the South will provide crucial insight into the economic basis of these machines. Finally, more work is needed to connect the specific party organizations to outcomes at the Republican convention. While it is clear that convention politics was the lynchpin that kept Southern party organizations relevant at a time when Republicans were all but powerless in any other political realm in their home states, we currently lack a comprehensive understanding of exactly when and how Southern Republicans affected decisions at the conventions – or how patronage payoffs led to, or followed, ‘correct’ Southern votes at the convention. Crucially, however, the data presented here can help guide researchers in answering each of these questions.

Table 1: Racial Division of Southern GOP Convention Delegates, 1868-1952

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total Delegates</i>	<i>White Delegates</i>	<i>Black Delegates</i>	<i>Race Unknown</i>
1868	175	72	13	90
1872	319	148	75	96
1876	339	155	71	113
1880	369	166	119	84
1884	404	156	130	118
1888	428	156	118	154
1892	451	178	142	131
1896	436	183	141	112
1900	444	213	120	111
1904	517	271	120	126
1908	520	313	116	91
1912	504	330	107	67
1916	404	281	69	54
1920	384	266	62	56
1924	377	252	62	63
1928	352	242	63	47
1932	458	383	37	38
1936	330	261	32	37
1940	337	260	34	43
1944	348	269	31	48
1948	379	279	40	60
1952	385	236	17	132
Total	8,660	5,070	1,719	1,871

Table 2: Percentage of Southern GOP Convention Delegates that Were Black, 1868-1952

	Alabama	Arkansas	Florida	Georgia	Louisiana	Mississippi	North Carolina	South Carolina	Tennessee	Texas	Virginia
1868	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	22.2	12.5	14.3	50.0	0.0	16.7	0.0
1872	31.0	11.1	20.0	37.9	42.9	40.0	24.0	63.2	13.0	23.8	44.1
1876	25.0	11.1	42.9	48.3	40.0	21.1	17.4	75.0	21.1	28.6	20.0
1880	48.6	33.3	42.9	60.6	52.2	35.7	36.4	60.9	28.1	23.1	35.3
1884	57.9	36.8	64.3	52.8	61.1	50.0	41.7	56.0	36.7	26.1	27.0
1888	64.9	41.2	50.0	59.5	38.9	40.9	22.7	76.2	14.8	35.7	24.2
1892	50.0	36.8	41.7	57.1	65.2	52.0	36.4	64.3	19.4	40.5	27.8
1896	53.1	19.0	53.3	61.5	58.8	63.0	42.9	69.4	7.9	36.4	23.7
1900	45.7	13.6	46.2	66.7	35.0	53.6	13.8	64.5	11.4	30.2	15.8
1904	26.3	21.7	44.4	42.9	15.6	58.8	9.8	67.9	9.4	44.6	9.8
1908	25.6	22.2	29.4	46.7	36.8	55.3	0.0	64.5	6.3	10.0	9.3
1912	13.0	17.2	27.3	46.2	20.7	52.8	0.0	78.1	6.1	18.3	2.2
1916	3.4	0.0	26.7	60.6	18.9	60.0	0.0	78.9	8.1	4.6	3.0
1920	4.0	0.0	27.8	66.7	25.0	45.8	0.0	80.0	3.4	7.2	0.0
1924	0.0	9.1	16.7	66.7	27.3	55.6	0.0	61.9	12.8	2.4	0.0
1928	0.0	16.7	6.3	64.7	16.7	56.7	0.0	61.9	13.3	0.0	0.0
1932	0.0	11.1	0.0	24.1	15.0	61.9	0.0	16.7	12.8	2.2	1.9
1936	0.0	15.0	0.0	19.2	9.5	81.3	0.0	35.3	10.0	0.0	0.0
1940	0.0	19.0	13.6	26.1	15.8	68.8	0.0	13.3	13.3	2.1	0.0
1944	0.0	10.0	13.8	54.5	9.5	70.0	0.0	0.0	10.7	1.7	0.0
1948	0.0	9.1	15.4	46.4	20.0	84.6	0.0	11.1	9.4	1.8	0.0
1952	0.0	11.8	0.0	22.2	16.7	77.8	0.0	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0

Table 3: Racial Division of South Carolina Delegation, 1868-1952

<i>Year</i>	<i>White Delegates</i>	<i>Black Delegates</i>	<i>% Black Delegates</i>
1868	7	7	50.0
1872	7	12	63.2
1876	5	15	75.0
1880	9	14	60.9
1884	11	14	56.0
1888	5	16	76.2
1892	10	18	64.3
1896	11	25	69.4
1900	11	20	64.5
1904	9	19	67.9
1908	11	20	64.5
1912	7	25	78.1
1916	4	15	78.9
1920	4	16	80.0
1924	8	13	61.9
1928	8	13	61.9
1932	15	3	16.7
1936	11	6	35.3
1940	13	2	13.3
1944	7	0	0.0
1948	8	1	11.1
1952	8	0	0.0

Table 4: Racial Division of North Carolina Delegation, 1868-1952

<i>Year</i>	<i>White Delegates</i>	<i>Black Delegates</i>	<i>% Black Delegates</i>
1868	6	1	14.3
1872	19	6	24.0
1876	19	4	17.4
1880	14	8	36.4
1884	14	10	41.7
1888	17	5	22.7
1892	21	12	36.4
1896	16	12	42.9
1900	25	4	13.8
1904	37	4	9.8
1908	40	0	0.0
1912	42	0	0.0
1916	35	0	0.0
1920	42	0	0.0
1924	40	0	0.0
1928	37	0	0.0
1932	55	0	0.0
1936	41	0	0.0
1940	43	0	0.0
1944	44	0	0.0
1948	46	0	0.0
1952	45	0	0.0

Figure 1: Percentage of Southern GOP Delegates without Racial Identification, 1868-1952




Figure 2: Percentage of Southern GOP Convention Delegates that Were Black, 1868-1952




Figure 3: Percentage of Southern GOP Convention Delegates that Were Black, 1872-1952



Figure 4: Percentage of GOP Convention Delegates that Were Black in TN and VA, 1868-1952





Figure 5: Percentage of GOP Convention Delegates that Were Black in AL, AR, FL, LA, NC, and TX, 1868-1952




Figure 6: Percentage of GOP Convention Delegates that Were Black in GA, MS, and SC, 1868-1952




Figure 7: Percentage of GOP Convention Delegates that Were Black in NC and SC, 1868-1952

