20th ICCRTS

“C2, Cyber, and Trust”

“Mission Networks” Fostering Trust

Topic 10: Operational Issues

Topic 4: Collaboration, Shared Awareness, and Decision Making

Topic 2: Approaches and Organizations

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Abstract

There have been issues with command and control and information sharing to and from coalition, multinational, interagency, nongovernmental organizations and mission partners as long as we have been conducting operations with each other. Solving this is essential today because of the rapidly changing environment and the nature of operations. These are highlighted in the current Integrated Priority Lists from the Combatant Commands that identify the lack of a consistent and coherent framework or capability to share information and collaborate across multiple domains with a broad range of mission partners.

A “Mission Network” should be a mission focused capability that will be responsive, scalable and a reliable environment. This will enable any Task Force Commander with the flexibility required to operate over the Range of Military Operations from tactical to strategic levels, with both fixed positions and forces that are “On the Move,” facilitating coordination with all mission partners.

We must continue the evolution of a “Mission Network” that facilitates and supports agile decision making and information flow both independently and with mission partners. This allows the “Stakeholders” to maintain operational effectiveness and address projected fiscal constraints, gain efficiencies, and flexibility while leverage existing capabilities and remaining sufficiently responsive to improvements.
Introduction

In the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2010, President Obama indicates that to succeed we must take a “whole of government approach” that is “deliberate and inclusive of the interagency process, so that we achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies.” According to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Joint Doctrine Publication 5 (JP-5.0), achieving national strategic objectives, as specified in the NSS 10 “requires effective unified action resulting in unity of effort.” This accomplished by collaboration, synchronization, and coordination in the use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. To accomplish this integration, the DoD, Military Services, and agencies interact with other agencies and organizations to ensure mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and interagency actions.

“globally postured Joint Force... quickly combine(s) capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations”

“rapidly deployable...have operational reach... persistent...and [do] not constitute an irreversible policy commitment” Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, Sep 2012

In addition to the National Security Strategy and Military Joint Doctrine, there are numerous books, publications, and articles that reflect the requirement for viable interagency organizations and processes but none detail exactly how we are supposed to achieve this unity of effort in interagency operations.

“Operations will move at the speed of trust.” “Trust is the sinew that binds the distributed Joint Force 2020 together, enabling the many to act as one…” Mission Command White Paper CJCS, APR 2012

All U.S. Government departments and agencies must collaborate with each other to achieve national strategic goals and missions. Complex missions and multidimensional warfare such as cyber, combating weapons of mass destruction, combating transnational organized crime, and security cooperation remain priorities for U.S. national security and national defense. Achieving unity of effort to meet national security and national defense goals has always been problematic due to challenges in information sharing, competing priorities, geographic mismatches, differences in lexicon, and uncoordinated activities.

Every day, U.S. Government department and agency employees work to protect the safety and
security of the homeland and the American public from a wide range of threats. These threats include terrorism, natural disasters, cyber-attacks, national emergencies and disasters. The U.S. Government and the private sector must plan and coordinate their activities to prepare for these threats and to respond decisively when they arise. Success is dependent upon unity of effort enabled by collaboration and coordination among our partners over the full spectrum of operations from planning through execution in order to achieve our national goals and objectives.

This paper presents a proposed solution and repeatable processes to improve Unity of Effort that represents an effort by the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of State, and Department of Defense to use framework procedures, templates, and definitions to aid interagency planners in improving unity of effort for complex problems that require coordination of effort across agencies and departments. The ultimate goal of interagency unity of effort is to establish a broad, consensus based approach, comprised of common objectives, applied across different geographic regions by all elements of national and international power acting in concert.

**Background**

Mission Partner Environment (MPE) will offset the often-damaging excessive exclusiveness of using only the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) for warfighting, an operational framework that stymies combined efforts in the battlespace. The MPE paradigm proposes a mission network based on common standards, operational concepts, and tactics, techniques, and procedures among nations, commanders, and components for operations and warfighting, with information-sharing flowing naturally from effective command and control. MPE will contribute to the Chairman's vision of a globally integrated force that can arrive at the crisis scene with an MPE mindset enabling seamless work with allied, coalition, interagency, and intergovernmental partners.

We need innovation in how we operate—our ability to re-imagine the way we fight will determine if we succeed or fail.

—General Martin E. Dempsey

Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force
The joint force is undergoing a major cultural change. It is a fact that current and future operations will find the joint force organizationally and operationally integrated with allies, coalition members, interagency partners, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer groups, and private-sector partners. The days of each coalition member operating in defined areas and only on its respective national secret networks are over. Moving the coalition fight off of national secret networks to a tailored mission network in which all coalition members share and operate as equals is not only a major cultural shift but also a command and control (C2) force multiplier. Information-sharing bilateral agreements must transition to warfighting multilateral agreements on a single security domain allowing nations, including the United States, to bring their own equipment. To implement a Mission Partner Environment (MPE), the United States and its mission partners must repurpose materiel and nonmateriel capabilities used for training and operations today. MPE implementation increases combatant commander and component battlefield effectiveness and drives down costs through unity of effort.

The past decade of military operations has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with many enduring lessons that must be applied to the current and future joint force. From major combat operations to humanitarian relief efforts, the United States has encountered a challenging and complex operational environment including asymmetric threats and an array of actors. Furthermore, these operations were conducted with a diverse set of mission partners ranging from the familiar to the not so familiar. This multifaceted operational environment, coupled with the range of mission partners, demonstrates the need for commanders to possess a capability enabling unity of action.

Today’s combatant commanders and their components require a warfighting capability that improves mission partner integration and interoperability and sets the conditions for integrated operations. Forged in the lessons learned from current operations, MPE is an operations-based construct providing the commander the agility to rapidly and decisively act, bringing to bear the unique capabilities and collective force of all to achieve mission success.

U.S. and Angolan airmen discuss unloading C-130J Super Hercules as part of African Partnership Flight with Angolan and Zambian air forces (U.S. Air Force/Benjamin Wilson)
Past Is Prologue

In 2008, commanders noted that coalition forces in Afghanistan could not effectively communicate and share commander’s guidance, mission information, and critical intelligence. Additionally, any networks that supported operations in Afghanistan tended to be nation-specific and not oriented to coalition data-sharing and enterprise mission execution. The net effect of these problems was increased risk to life, inefficient use of resources, and jeopardized mission accomplishment. From the U.S. perspective, many of these problems stemmed from the joint force standard: the requirement that American formations be led only by American commanders and the U.S. military propensity to use only the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) for warfighting operations. This operational framework resulted in a C2 structure that provided little to no ability for commanders to effectively combine U.S. and non-U.S. formations in the same battlespace or realize their full combat potential. Additionally, this arrangement prevented coalition battlespace owners from effectively leveraging key U.S. enablers that existed solely on SIPRNet, such as joint fires and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Prior to Afghanistan, operations with mission partners did not demand an open framework for greater information-sharing. For instance, operations in Iraq did not present a significant challenge for mission partner operations due to the relatively small number of partners, their assigned missions, and their familiarity with U.S. operations. Even at the peak of the surge in Operation Iraqi Freedom during 2007, the mission partner contribution was only 6 percent of the total personnel strength, and except for one specific area, all battlespace commanders were American. The one exception was in southern Iraq in the vicinity of Basra. The United Kingdom (UK) controlled this sector, and the unique military relationship between Washington and London helped to mitigate the friction caused by disparate C2 systems. In this environment, the primary purpose for a mission partner network simply became a means for the United States to communicate with its mission partners but not a means to fight a true coalition fight. These early efforts at mission partner coordination were marked by heavy use of liaison officers and the manual (air gap) data transfers among American, allied, and coalition networks. This information-sharing process is slow and subject to errors, and it does not achieve the intended unity of effort or speed of command to deliver the required operational effects.

In Afghanistan, the mission partner dynamics dramatically changed. First, Afghanistan is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission. Second, in comparison to the surge in Iraqi Freedom, the task organization for the coalition force for the 2010 Operation Enduring Freedom surge consisted of over 40 troop-contributing nations. The influx of coalition forces resulted in
27 percent of the total strength being non-American. Third, many of the battlespace owners were not American. To realize the operational value of formations from the many contributing nations, commanders needed the flexibility to mix U.S. and non-U.S. formations down to the company level. These operational realities required a new way of thinking on how to share information and create the necessary unity of effort in theater. Simply put, the inability of commanders to speak with immediacy and share information equally with all mission partners inhibited the ability to rapidly direct U.S. and allied task forces. As the problem suggests, a single secure communication network became essential to the campaign objectives and priorities in Afghanistan. During 2008–2010, the Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN) became the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) primary mission network. This network remains the primary C2 framework for mission partner operations in Afghanistan today.

Technically, the AMN is a federation of networks linked to a NATO core mission secret network, complying with Alliance security and information assurance policies. Information and data shared between AMN participants are organized to support agreed upon mission threads. AMN put all network users on a common mission network separate from its own national networks to achieve ISAF operational priorities and objectives. By May 2011, 48 NATO and partner nations were successfully operating in the AMN federation. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw the need to ensure that the lessons learned from AMN are institutionalized as a future joint force capability. In August 2011 the Joint Staff J6 was assigned to “evolve the Future Mission Network.”

Culture Shock

General Stanley McChrystal once stated, “You don’t give a senior leader a Blackberry or an iPhone and make [him] a digital leader.” While these advanced technological solutions can enable a user, the commander must have the vision and skill to create a shared understanding of mission and purpose with a diverse set of team members. This task is daunting enough within the U.S. forces with their rich histories, insular cultures, specific systems, and unique lexicons. When allies and perhaps governmental and nongovernmental organizations are included, the mission commander is faced with a full-blown information-sharing crisis. Complex partnered operations demand the ability to establish and maintain a common understanding of the operational environment through shared situational awareness. To achieve this aim, the mission commander must provide timely, reliable, interoperable, and secure information-sharing capabilities for planning, directing, and controlling the activities of all assigned forces. Significantly, the information environment is accelerated by the idea of interconnected, integrated joint forces and mission partners conducting dispersed operations around the globe.
From moving supplies in the wake of a hurricane, to ordering troops to the Pacific, to addressing mission partners on joint task force operations, the global dependence on integrated networks and shared information is stated in the Chairman’s Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO). With an emphasis on globally integrated operations, the CCJO outlines the need for the joint force to partner and to possess the ability to integrate with U.S. agencies, partner militaries, and indigenous and regional stakeholders—in short, with mission partners. Globally integrated operations will rely on a robust and secure information environment envisioned by the new DOD Joint Information Environment (JIE).

The JIE provides a shared information technology (IT) infrastructure, responsive set of enterprise services, and mission-integrated single security architecture. The JIE represents the IT capabilities and infrastructure that enable the joint force commander’s ability to establish an MPE to support coalition operations. An MPE capability framework is inextricably linked to the JIE. Though IT and networks are critical elements of an MPE capability, these are merely the tools that allow the commander to visualize the battlespace, direct action in a timely manner, and establish trust with mission partners. An MPE capability framework is needed now to support the commander’s ability to create unity of effort through the seamless exchange of information with mission partners.

The MPE framework is commander-centric, providing the means for commanders to effectively share their intent, communicate mission orders, and empower decentralized execution during mission partner operations. There are currently plans for building a standing coalition network for the United States to put in place quickly for future operations with mission partners. No one can argue against the need for such a capability, but a great deal of caution on the development of a persistent coalition network is warranted in the current fiscal environment. When faced with a new requirement, the U.S. military often defaults to the most comfortable solution, seeking a technological fix or building a new materiel system. As already established, the United States is executing MPE in Afghanistan today and has most of what is already needed to establish an information-sharing capability to launch the next MPE and meet the commander’s next mission. By changing mindsets and simply adding some basic nonmateriel solutions, the joint force can apply current technologies and systems to meet warfighters’ demands.

What the joint force needs now is a mission partner organizational framework to drive policy, IT transport, security, systems, and applications, along with concept of operations and standards. This mostly nonmateriel framework provides for a continual and dynamic process to inform
improved information-sharing based on requirements and input from the combatant commanders and mission partners.

Sailor assigned to amphibious transport dock ship USS Ponce uses voice-recognition system to command virtual simulation of Ponce in Conning Officer Virtual Environment (U.S. Navy/Nathanael Miller)

Sailor assigned to amphibious transport dock ship USS Ponce uses voice-recognition system to command virtual simulation of Ponce in Conning Officer Virtual Environment (U.S. Navy/Nathanael Miller)

Describing the MPE

A Mission Partner Environment applies human and technical dimensions for sharing commander’s intent, communicating mission orders, and empowering decentralized operations in keeping with the tenets of mission command. The MPE capability framework is supported by a mission network in which partners plan, prepare, and execute operations at a single security classification level with a common language. The objective of the framework is to take the fight off SIPRNet, reduce the defended surface area, and leverage existing national networks. For instance, when the UK comes to fight alongside the United States, it does not have to drop what it has trained with and pick up an American product. The United States and its mission partners want to use familiar tools when it comes to a fight. The ultimate MPE vision is a framework of core services linked to authoritative data sources with the goal of allowing any partner to quickly join the network and receive specific services without major reconfigurations to their own national networks.

For success, MPE requires an overarching integrated approach that incorporates mission partners early in design, creation, and implementation. Early planning with partners builds a common basis for action, establishes the means and processes for mission partner integration, and identifies the methods to resolve knowledge management and interoperability challenges. Joint forces that effectively apply the principles of an MPE framework will have the tools to more rapidly form the collaborative networks (both IT-based and human) required for effective globally integrated operations with mission partners. MPE addresses the requirement for American forces to be able to lead a mission that includes partners and to operate a network separate and distinct from its national networks, specifically tailored to the mission and to the partners. Likewise, NATO has created a similar capability called Federated Mission Networking.
(FMN) to describe how Alliance forces will lead and operate a mission network. As expected, there are many conceptual and architectural similarities between the U.S. MPE and NATO FMN efforts. While this is a notable achievement, there is a need to implement the MPE and FMN concepts and architectures in a similar fashion and then train to them.

In keeping with the Chairman’s Mission Command philosophy, the MPE capability framework provides strategic, operational, and tactical flexibility for all commanders to execute; it provides the means to clearly communicate commander’s intent and achieves desired operational effects with all mission partners. MPE is a federated network concept supporting the connection of multiple networks through existing national systems with applications and tools to enable mission partner information-sharing within a single environment. Most important, the MPE is established within mission partner instructions where individual nations are resourced and equipped independently, each contributing its own equipment and resources to the mission network to achieve an optimal C2 environment. The MPE capability framework is not building or acquiring new systems; it addresses the need to shape and repurpose existing mission partner material and nonmateriel capabilities to address the commander’s need for unity of effort and operational effectiveness based on the seamless exchange of information throughout an operation.

In Practice

From a U.S. perspective, joint forces currently deploy with two basic networks that support the C2 of forces via IT: SIPRNet and the Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet). SIPRNet is used for sharing classified information among U.S. joint forces while NIPRNet is used for sharing unclassified information. The problem is that neither network can nor should communicate directly with a mission partner’s network. Although there are other solutions via bilateral agreements and cross-domain technologies, the preferred near-term technique for sharing information with multiple partners for an assigned mission is the method employed in Afghanistan. The MPE framework builds and improves upon the federated network model of AMN. As with AMN, a theater agnostic framework requires American forces to repurpose existing equipment (for example, switches, routers, encryption devices, and so forth) or possess another “stack” of equipment to establish their mission network.

Near-term emergent operations with mission partners require U.S. forces to deploy with SIPRNet, NIPRNet, and a mission network capability to connect with potential partners. The
initial MPE capability is focused on six core services that provide basic human-to-human communications to support information-sharing in a mission partner operating environment:

• email with attachments
• text chat
• Web browsing
• video-teleconferencing
• voice over Internet protocol
• global address list sharing.

These services have been demonstrated within AMN and are essential to the implementation of an MPE framework. For today’s fight, U.S. materiel and nonmateriel MPE capabilities will be whatever is “on the shelf”—it really is not new, but the environment in which these capabilities are employed and made secure will be new, as in a new concept of employment. As the American IT infrastructure of JIE evolves to cloud and virtualization technologies, so too must the MPE framework be able to adapt to improve the effectiveness and efficiencies associated with the establishment and operation of a mission partner network.

U.S. European Command’s exercise Combined Endeavor 2013 (CE13) represented a significant paradigm shift from previous years. No longer was point-to-point technical interoperability the overarching focus with a cadre of observers to document, assess, and report results. Rather, CE13 focused on implementing an MPE capability framework. The exercise provided the participating 40 nations and organizations a methodology for partners to plan, prepare, and execute a joint force mission on a single classification level with a common language. Employing core MPE precepts, CE13 provided the means to clearly communicate commander’s intent for desired operational effects with all mission partners. Mission partner joining and exiting instructions created by the exercise community during the planning process represent the collective knowledge of the participating nations/organizations gained over 19 years, as well as lessons learned from 12 years in Afghanistan. These instructions matured the MPE concept, and the participants gained a clear understanding of how to operate within and share information in a coalition environment. Upcoming combatant commander exercises can only improve mission partner unity of effort using this framework.

“Harmony—Even Vicious Harmony . . . [Is] Based on Trust”
The fundamental challenge of an MPE is changing the U.S. operational practice of relying on SIPRNet as the primary tool for information exchange during an operation. To that end, this current norm generates strategic, operational, and tactical limitations or restrictions to national leadership, as well as combatant and deployed commanders. As one general put it, “We must move the fight or operation off of SIPRNet to a new normal—a mission partnered environment including a mission network.”

This network belongs to the mission commander. In the past, it was normal for the commander in theater to rely on traditional networks such as SIPRNet for operations. A national network (such as SIPRNet) must meet the needs of a diverse user base with many missions and is controlled by a national authority that usually exhibits considerable stasis. Without ownership, the mission commander cannot readily mold the environment to the specific needs of the mission and its information-sharing requirements. The commander must be able to bend and mold the environment. This shaping extends to adding and removing mission partners as membership changes during an operation. In this construct, at the mission commander’s direction, information transmitted on the network must be releasable to all members, and all partners must be included on the network. Free flow of information to all mission partners is essential, so the use of firewalls or cross-domain solutions is eliminated in this environment.

In cooperation with the combatant commander and U.S. Cyber Command, the mission commander must balance the need to share information with the need to protect. Mission partner trust cannot be surged; it must be established upfront through informed and inclusive information-sharing policies, training, and rehearsals. As stated in the Chairman’s White Paper on Mission Command, “Building trust with subordinates and partners may be the most important action a commander will perform.” Coupled tightly with this element of trust is the commander’s responsibility to balance the operational benefits of federating networks with the inherent risks that must be addressed through information assurance. Adjusting the attitudes and operational approaches of the U.S. military to support effective MPE employment requires changes to doctrine, education, and training. As relationships are forged with partners through training and exercises, so too is trust. With shared trust comes an understanding of the shared risks and the need to address cyber vulnerabilities before they become issues. But more important are the operational benefits and gains offered by the MPE.
Looking Ahead

Many of the principles and best practices for more effective and efficient mission partnered operations are being applied in Afghanistan and need to be codified and institutionalized. Specifically, an agreed-upon MPE organizational framework to drive policy, transport, systems/tools/applications, and agreed upon mission partner joining and exiting instructions (across nations and combatant commands) for coalition operations is necessary. This requires a persistent DOD-level process orchestrated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and based on requirements and input from the combatant commands. Furthermore, combatant commanders should ensure there is an adequate governance structure in place to address their components’ and coalition partners’ requirements for an event that could happen tomorrow. Additionally, as forces draw down in Afghanistan, the Joint Staff needs to preserve the lessons learned by introducing MPE language into joint doctrinal publications and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Meanwhile, Service and joint schools should provide instruction on MPE while combatant commands explore and identify training exercises to introduce MPE precepts with mission partners. For the foreseeable future, Service components should remain equipped to support a mission network. This means forces deploy with SIPRNet, NIPRNet, and a third “stack.” In many cases, this third stack can be realized through repurposing Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System equipment.

The intent is to establish an MPE threshold capability in the near term (2014–2015) comprised of four recommended elements. First, each combatant command in coordination with its components should publish instructions for mission partners on how they can join and exit their theater mission networks. Additionally, these operationally focused instructions should be standardized across the regional combatant commands in recognition that mission partners often support more than one theater. Second, there should be Joint Staff activity focusing solely on finding and fixing mission partner interoperability issues before an operation occurs. For example, the Coalition Interoperability, Assurance, and Validation activity currently supporting operations in Afghanistan provides a viable model. It could be preserved and expanded. Third, the DOD Chief Information Officer could craft appropriate policy to specifically address rapid and efficient certification and accreditation processes for the establishment of mission networks and their associated systems and services. Finally, U.S. joint forces must begin practicing the principles and precepts of MPE in joint and coalition exercises. MPE needs a “if you can train to it and measure its readiness—it exists” mentality. Mission partner training and associated readiness metrics for an MPE capability framework would effect the necessary cultural changes to ensure joint forces are ready to operate on phase one/day one of any emergent operation. As
experience and trust with mission partners grow, interoperability improves, and technological capabilities advance, the MPE framework could expand to include more complex information-sharing such as a digital common operational picture, targeting, fires, and seamless C2 among nontraditional mission partners. From a U.S. training and readiness perspective, the pace for MPE implementation falls on the combatant commanders and their components. They should set the education and training conditions during peacetime for the successful institutionalization of an MPE capability.

Globally integrated operations emphasize the need to partner, which requires the joint force to integrate with the full range of mission partners (interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, private volunteer, and private sector). Moving the United States off SIPRNet for mission-partnered operations is more effective. MPE is a paradigm shift from information-sharing to coalition operations using a mission network for operations and warfighting with information-sharing as a byproduct of effective command and control. It is based on common standards, concepts of operations, and tactics, techniques, and procedures among nations, combatant commanders, and their components. An MPE capability is a critical enabling element of the Chairman’s Mission Command operational objective of a “deeply interdependent” joint force. As such, its key attributes and enablers must be recognized, understood, and embedded in training and exercise objectives by combatant commanders and their components, likely mission partners, and warriors in the field. To achieve the Chairman’s vision of a globally integrated force, the Armed Forces need to arrive on day one of the next crisis with a mission partner mindset ready to execute operations with allied, coalition, interagency, or intergovernmental mission partners.
Appendix A: References

B. Charter of the Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) Planning Group, September 2011
C. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
D. Department of Defense Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), April 2011
E. Foreign Disaster Emergency Manual 060, 061, 061.1, 2012 (Department of State)
F. Joint Publication 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. 24 October 2011
G. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November
H. 2010 (As Amended Through 15 November 2012)
I. Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007
J. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011
M. National Security Strategy (NSS), May 2010
N. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011
O. Theater Campaign Planning Planner’s Handbook, February 2012
P. United States Code (USC)
Q. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Glossary of Terms
Appendix B: Acronym List

A. 3D Defense, Diplomacy, Development
B. CCJO Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Joint Force 2020
C. CCMD Combatant Command
D. DHS Department of Homeland Security
E. DIMEFIL Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement
F. DOJ Department of Justice
G. DOS Department of State
H. FDR Foreign Disaster Relief
I. FMS Foreign Military Sales
J. FPP Federal Planning Process
K. HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
L. ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
M. IPC Interagency Policy Committee
N. JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
O. JP Joint Publication
P. MDMP Military Decision Making Process
Q. NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
R. NGB National Guard Bureau
S. NGO Non-Governmental Organization
T. NSS National Security Strategy
U. TCP Theater Campaign Plan
V. USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
W. USC U.S. Code
X. USG U.S. Government
Y. USNORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command
Z. USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command
AA. USSOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command
3D Planning Guide: A reference tool designed to help planners understand the purpose of each agency’s plans, the processes that generate them, and, most importantly, to help identify opportunities for coordination among the three. Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3Ds) – as represented by the Department of State (DOS), the USAID, and the DOD – are the three pillars that provide the foundation for promoting and protecting U.S. national security interests abroad.

Activities: For the Framework activities refers to how capabilities are accomplished in a Key Intersection.

Authority: USG agencies and organizations draw their authority from the U.S. Code, Presidential directives and executive orders, decisions of the Federal courts and treaties. (gpo.gov) Power to influence thought, opinion or behavior – implies the power of winning devotion or allegiance or of compelling acceptance and belief – the right or power to command, rule or judge.

Capability: For the Framework capability refers to the “what and why” that is taking place in a Key Intersection.

Capacity: For the Framework capacity refers to the “where and when/how often” a capability is exercised in a Key Intersection.

Categories of Effort: For the Framework Categories of Effort can be elements of national power or lines of effort. The type of exertion expended for a specified purpose. See Elements of National Power.

Common Objective: An objective agreed upon by all stakeholders.

Coordinate Objective: A statement of the condition or state one expects to achieve. (USAID Glossary of Evaluation Terms and DOD). The clearly defined, decisive and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. Objectives are developed within the context of existing U.S. national security and foreign policies, and are derived from higher-level guidance.

Contributing: For the Framework, refers to a Stakeholder or mission partner that is executing, supporting, sharing or involved at some level in an intersection in support of the lead organization.

Deep Dive: Stakeholders and mission partners will collectively conduct an examination with a primary
focus on capabilities (“what and why”), capacity (“where, when and how often”), and activities (“how capabilities are being accomplished”) at a specific Key Intersection of common objective and operating environment.

**Development**: The provision of aid and other assistance to regions that are less economically developed. The provision of assistance to developing countries. Sustained, concerted effort of policymakers and communities to promote a standard of living and economic health in a specific area. (DOS)

**Diplomatic Actions**: (DOD) Those international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad (JP 1-02—see Public Diplomacy). The diplomatic instrument of national power is the principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance U.S. values, interests, and objectives.

**Drill Down**: For the Framework project, to look at or examine something in-depth.

**Economic (Elements of National Power)**: Government agencies only partially control the economic instrument of national power. In keeping with U.S. values and constitutional imperatives, individuals and entities have broad freedom of action worldwide. The responsibility of the USG lies with facilitating the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services worldwide that promote U.S. fundamental objectives, such as promoting general welfare and supporting security interests and objectives.

**Elements of National Power**: The ways through which the interagency community is able to leverage the political, economic and military strengths of the USG in order to influence other states and non-state actors. The United States can make use of these elements directly, through the various agencies that make up the federal government, or indirectly, by mobilizing the population, industry and businesses of the country. (Derived from the National Security Strategy, 2010)

**End State**: Long-term strategic goals that are of an enduring nature. Organizations pursue these end states as they develop over-arching theater or functional strategies, which they translate into an integrated set of steady-state activities by means of campaign plans. (derived from 3D Planning Guide)

**Facilitator**: One who helps to bring about an outcome (learning, productivity or communication) by providing indirect or unobtrusive assistance, guidance, or supervision (Merriam-Webster). An organization or individual that leads the debate and ultimate
reconciliation of each agency’s characterization of the elements of the three-dimensional view (Framework).

**Financial (Elements of National Power):** The financial instrument of national power promotes the conditions for prosperity and stability in the United States and encourages prosperity in the rest of the world. The Department of Treasury is the primary federal agency responsible for the economic and financial prosperity and security of the U.S. and as such is responsible for a wide range of activities, including advising the President on economic and financial issues, promoting the President's growth agenda, and enhancing corporate governance in financial institutions. In the international arena, the Treasury works with other federal agencies, the governments of other nations, and the international financial institutions to encourage economic growth; raise standards of living; and predict and prevent, to the extent possible, economic and financial crisis.

**Foreign Disaster Relief:** Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally, it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; medical and technical material and personnel; repairs to essential services. (JP 1-02) Assistance in response to a foreign disaster, which is an act of nature (such as a flood, drought, wildfire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic) or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion-fire) that is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude, the United States may provide emergency relief assistance as a humanitarian service consistent with U.S foreign policy goals. Assistance shall to the greatest extent possible reach those most in need of relief and rehabilitation. U.S. assistance supports and encourages host country participation in disaster preparedness activities and supplements rather than replaces host country disaster relief resources. (Compiled from D S 2 FAM 061 and 061.1)

**Foreign Military Sales (FMS):** That portion of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and conducted based on formal contracts or agreements between the United States Government and an authorized recipient government or international organization. FMS includes government-to-government sales of defense articles or defense services, from DOD stocks or through new procurements under DOD-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Though specifically designed to support the provision of Security Assistance, the FMS process can be employed to procure defense articles, training and services using a variety of sources of funding, not just Title 22 funding. (JP 1-02)

**Framework:** For the Unity of Effort Framework project, a Framework is a mechanism that allows government agencies to visualize and preempt or resolve potential conflicts in their actions, activities and resources in order to support a specific national strategy or policy (e.g.,
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operation, or other operations).

**Gap:** A capability gap is an inability to perform a task because of a lack of equipment, training, doctrine, authority or support. (Defense Acquisition University [DAU]) A gap, the difference between needs and resources. They exist where no agencies have the capacity or authority to meet a requirement.

**Governance:** Consistent management, cohesive policies, guidance, processes and decision-rights for a given area of responsibility. The physical exercise of management power and policy.

**Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief:** Assistance rendered to a country or population in an emergency or crisis context. This could include natural or manmade disaster response or complex humanitarian emergency. (USAID) (3D Panning Guide) Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP I-02)

**Information (Elements of National Power):** The informational instrument of national power has a diffuse and complex set of components with no single center of control. In the United States, individuals exchange information freely with minimal government control. Information itself is a strategic resource vital to national security. This reality applies to all instruments, entities, and activities of national power and extends to the armed forces at all levels.

**Intelligence (Elements of National Power):** Intelligence, as an instrument of national power, provides the national leadership with the information needed to realize national goals and objectives while providing military leadership with the information needed to accomplish missions and implement the national security strategy.

**Interagency (IA):** Made up of, involving, or representing two or more U.S. government agencies; interagency cooperation, partners, or organizations. (Dictionary.com)

**Interagency Policy Committee (IPC):** An appointed committee that is responsible for designated national security issues that cut across the responsibilities of Executive Branch departments and agencies. Issues may be regional, such as U.S. policy toward Iraq or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, or functional, such as arms control

**Intersection:** A matrix or spreadsheet cell that crosses an objective with an operating environment.

**Key Intersections:** For the Framework, a Key Intersection is a matrix cell (intersection of column and row) that represents an activity for which the whole of government focuses a significant amount of planning resources. A cell that needs the most unity of effort, accounting for all of the capabilities and resources that are planned to contribute to the activities represented in that cell.

**Law Enforcement (Elements of National Power):** Through the law enforcement instrument of national power, the USG is accountable to its people and can govern its territory effectively. The USG has the capability and capacity to: Enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to law; Ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; Provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; Seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; Ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.

**Lead:** For the Framework, lead indicates that the organization has primary responsibility to coordinate and integrate USG effort involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities to prepare, plan for and conduct operations in an intersection of an objective and environment within the matrix of the Unity of Effort Framework. Lead may be determined by law (Title 50, Title 10), by directive (Executive Agent or Lead Federal Agency designation), or by precedent in terms of established mission roles, responsibilities, and authorities. There can be multiple leads identified in the Framework.

**Matrix:** For the Framework, the matrix is a spreadsheet view of the three elements: Common Objectives, Operating Environments, and Categories of Effort. It is the starting point where Stakeholders and Mission Partners begin collaboration and coordination of efforts.

**Matrix or Spreadsheet Cell:** For the Framework a column and row intersection within a Framework matrix to be populated by stakeholder organizations. This represents the intersection of a common objective and a specific operating area for a given mission.

**Major Contributions:** For the Framework a major contribution is an organization’s priority of effort for the issue objective and operating environments.

**Military (Elements of National Power):** In wielding the military instrument of national power, the armed forces must ensure their adherence to U.S. values, constitutional principles, and
standards for the profession of arms. While responsibility for wielding the other instruments of power rests outside the military establishment, U.S. military leaders are responsible for providing the advice and recommendation necessary for the overall U.S. effort to properly incorporate the military instrument with the other instruments of national power. Unified action within the military instrument supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.

**National Security Staff (NSS):** An interdepartmental body to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.

**Operating Environment:** A combination of conditions, surroundings, circumstances, and landscape: The Operating Environment can be looked at in many ways, some examples are; geographic regions, sectors, domains, critical terrain, countries, states, key border crossings between nations, mountainous areas, and land routes which are forms of identifying locations or areas where activities take place and bear on the decisions of leaders. Others may be more specific with identifying the operating environment for example; sub-regions, portfolios, seaports, bridges, roadways, waterways, airfields, air corridors.

**Planning:** The process to identify appropriate results, develop approaches to reach them, assign needed resources, organize to achieve results, and identify the means to measure progress (3D Planning Guide, DOD). An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (Derived from JP 5-0)

**Priority:** For the Framework project, the primary goal or goals in an endeavor. In interagency operations, each agency will have its own, sometimes competing, priorities. If not synchronized, these priorities must be aligned and de-conflicted during the planning process.

**Resources:** The personnel, materiel, and other assets or capabilities apportioned or allocated to the commander of a unified or specified command (Derived from JP 1-02). Available resources are a major factor in determining an organization’s capacity.

**Seams:** The divisions between different organizations attempting to collaborate. Seams develop from the cultural and practical differences between organizations and decrease the interagency community’s ability to develop complementary policies and plans, and to function as a cohesive community. (3D Planning Guide)
**Shortfall:** The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned to a combatant commander for planning that would adversely affect the command’s ability to accomplish its mission. (JP 5-0) The difference between the resources that are needed and those that are available.

**Stakeholder:** A person or group that has an investment, share, or interest in something, as an organization, business or industry. Organizations that play an important part in the design and outcome of a stated issue. (Dictionary.com and adapted from the Theater Campaign Handbook)

**Sufficiency:** The adequacy of quantity, quality, frequency and duration.

**Synchronize (Synchronization):** The act of arranging actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum effectiveness at a decisive place and time. Synchronization allows for a more efficient use of resources by minimizing the appearance and impact of redundancy. (Derived from JP 2-0)

**Theater Campaign Plans (TCP):** 1. Joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within specific theater during a specific time (JP 5-0). 2. TCPs link military engagement and security cooperation activities to current operations and contingency plans as well as broader foreign policy goals (3D Planning Guide).

**Threat:** A potential negative event that can cause a risk to become a loss, expressed as an aggregate of risk, consequences of risk, and the likelihood of the occurrence of such an event. A threat may be the result of both natural phenomena and intentional or unintentional human intervention. (Derived from the Business Dictionary)

**United States Code (USC):** The codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States based on what is printed in the Statutes at Large. It is divided by broad subjects into 50 titles and published by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives. These titles describe the legal capabilities and limitations of the various agencies within all three branches of the USG.

**Unity of Effort:** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. The product of successful unified action. (JP-1) (DOS) A cooperative concept, which refers to coordination and communication among USG organizations toward the same common goals for success; in order to achieve unity of effort. It is not necessary for all organizations to be controlled under the same command structure, but it
is necessary for each agency’s efforts to be in harmony with the short- and long-term goals of the mission. Unity of effort is based on four principles:

- Common understanding of the situation
- Common vision or goals for the R&S mission
- Coordination of efforts to ensure continued coherency
- Common measures of progress and ability to change course if necessary

**Unity of Effort Framework:** A multipurpose planning aid designed to improve unity of effort by setting the stage for Stakeholder's coordination, synchronization, visibility and information sharing.