19th ICCRTS
“C2 Agility: Lessons Learned from Research and Operations”

A Methodology to Improving Unity of Effort for Mission Partner Planning

Topic 3: Data, Information and Knowledge
Topic 4: Experimentation, Metrics, and Analysis
Topic 2: Organizational Concepts and Approaches

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Abstract

Unity of effort is the desired end state of Mission Partner planning and should be based on the following four principles: Common vision, goals and objectives for the mission, Common understanding of the situation, Coordination of efforts to ensure continued coherency, and Common measures of progress and ability to change course or direction as needed.

Our methodology to develop a framework began with the importance of comprehending and respecting that each mission partner’s approaches to planning and strategy development differ according to their needs. Whereas some approaches are formal and structured, while others are informal in nature. A framework methodology will support improved unity of effort in mission partner planning as well as assist in addressing complexity across organizations, but only if we agree to attempt to develop strong relationships while learning to speak each other’s language, or better yet, use a common lexicon (common definitions and terms for greater understanding).

One fundamental step toward developing mitigation strategies to bringing mission partners together is the identification of inhibitors to achieving unity of effort. The Unity of effort Framework is intended to assist mission partners to better understand a problem or issue by identifying common goals, areas of interest, and common categories of effort to be applied by each of the organizations for the problem set. Application of the framework requires representation, participation, and collection of information from mission partners.
Introduction

In the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2010, President Obama indicates that to succeed we must take a “whole of government approach” that is “deliberate and inclusive of the interagency process, so that we achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies.” According to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Joint Doctrine Publication 5 (JP-5.0), achieving national strategic objectives, as specified in the NSS 10 “requires effective unified action resulting in unity of effort.” This accomplished by collaboration, synchronization, and coordination in the use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. To accomplish this integration, the DoD, Military Services, and agencies interact with other agencies and organizations to ensure mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and interagency actions.

“globally postured Joint Force… quickly combine(s) capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations”

“rapidly deployable…have operational reach… persistent…and [do] not constitute an irreversible policy commitment” Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, Sep 2012

In addition to the National Security Strategy and Military Joint Doctrine, there are numerous books, publications, and articles that reflect the requirement for viable interagency organizations and processes but none detail exactly how we are supposed to achieve this unity of effort in interagency operations.

“Operations will move at the speed of trust.” “Trust is the sinew that binds the distributed Joint Force 2020 together, enabling the many to act as one…” Mission Command White Paper CJCS, APR 2012

All U.S. Government departments and agencies must collaborate with each other to achieve national strategic goals and missions. Complex missions and multidimensional warfare such as cyber, combating weapons of mass destruction, combating transnational organized crime, and security cooperation remain priorities for U.S. national security and national defense. Achieving unity of effort to meet national security and national defense goals has always been problematic due to challenges in information sharing, competing priorities, geographic mismatches, differences in lexicon, and uncoordinated activities.

Every day, U.S. Government department and agency employees work to protect the safety and security of the homeland and the American public from a wide range of threats. These threats include terrorism, natural disasters, cyber-attacks, national emergencies and disasters. The U.S. Government and the private sector must plan and coordinate their activities to prepare for these
threats and to respond decisively when they arise. Success is dependent upon unity of effort enabled by collaboration and coordination among our partners over the full spectrum of operations from planning through execution in order to achieve our national goals and objectives.

This paper presents a proposed solution and repeatable processes to improve Unity of Effort that represents an effort by the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of State, and Department of Defense to use framework procedures, templates, and definitions to aid interagency planners in improving unity of effort for complex problems that require coordination of effort across agencies and departments. The ultimate goal of interagency unity of effort is to establish a broad, consensus based approach, comprised of common objectives, applied across different geographic regions by all elements of national and international power acting in concert.

**Background**

In the summer of 2010, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in partnership with United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) proposed a Planning Synchronization Framework to the Joint Staff as a solution to improve interagency unity of effort for planning complex interagency national challenges at the operational and theater campaign level.

The U.S. military develops subject matter experts or “Masters” of the art and science of military planning through a formal education process from the time they enter the profession. This process includes extensive instruction in U.S., foreign and international policy and strategy. They can quote the nine principles of warfare in their sleep, name the seven steps of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) on demand, cite chapter and verse of Sun Tzu’s the “Art of War,” to a man (or woman) have read Carl Von Clausewitz’s “On War” cover to cover and have it on their bookshelf. Most importantly, and unlike their civilian counterparts, they practice and exercise this critical skill on a frequent basis.

On the other side of this “planning equation,” the non-DOD interagency planners often chosen for their departmental expertise and skill, but usually are not highly trained, or practiced, or exercised at the strategic and theater-level steady state or disaster relief planning. These organizations processes usually designed to produce long-range plans that communicate policy, detailed resource data, priorities, and action to stakeholders. Civilian-run operations are less rigid in terms of leadership, interchangeability, and command and control. Additionally, Civilian plans usually based on those who create policy and strategy, and those who execute actions. Generally, there are no non-DoD Joint Task Forces that execute operational campaigns on a theater or regional level as with DoD. With the exception of DoD, you will be hard pressed to find a department or agency that could devote a group of full-time planners to any long-term planning situation. This can be seen in the initial demographics survey of the 34 participants in
chart below. When you combine these mismatches in planning level, expertise, and work force, you frequently find yourselves with a planning challenge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Demographics - Department</th>
<th>Demographics - Job Position</th>
<th>Demographics - Years Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>4-7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>4-7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>4-7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>4-7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>4-7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>4-7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>1-3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Operations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>4-7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>4-7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>4-7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Manager/Supervisor</td>
<td>More than 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Planner/Analyst</td>
<td>4-7 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Initial demographics survey**

**What is Interagency Planning for Unity of Effort?**

From a DoD perspective, IA coordination is “the interaction that occurs among USG departments and agencies, including DOD, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective” Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. However, it is interesting that neither JP 5-0 (Joint Operations Planning)
nor JP 3-08 (Inter-organizational Coordination during Joint Operations) have a definition for IA planning. The 3D Planning Guide (3DPG), written to document the differences in planning cultures among USAID, DoS and DoD (yet never formally signed by all three), also has no definition for IA planning. However, a decent definition and one we propose for argument’s sake is; “interagency planning is a systematic and comprehensive approach to planning that is inclusive of perspectives from other agencies with resulting plans reflecting a unity of U.S. government effort.

Unity of effort, defined by 3DPG: “A cooperative concept, which refers to coordination and communication among USG agencies toward the same common goals for success; in order to achieve unity of effort, it is not necessary for all agencies to be controlled under the same command structure, but it is necessary for each agency’s efforts to be in harmony with the short- and long-term goals of the mission.” Unity of effort is based on four principles:

- **Common vision, goals and objectives for the mission**
- **Common understanding of the situation**
- **Coordination of efforts to ensure continued coherency**
- **Common measures of progress and ability to change course as needed**

Unity of effort is the desired end-state of interagency planning. Google “Interagency planning” and nine times out of ten it will come back “Interagency Coordination.” That is because interagency planning is a misnomer, it does not actually exist in the real world, and the best we have been able to get so far has been some degree (a very small degree) of interagency coordination. Our leaders, tell us to plan together, we know we should plan together, but we also know it is just too hard, for a variety of reasons, so in reality we never really plan together. On occasion we coordinate, we sometimes collaborate, and we often times attempt to de-conflict, but synchronized planning…that has always been a “bridge too far.”

Many may find this surprising because the U.S. Government, including DoD, have for many years emphasized the importance of “whole-of-government planning” and other “buzz” words or terms such as “unified action.” The U.S. Congress has long understood the reluctance or inability of government departments to plan collaboratively and has taken steps to strengthen interagency collaboration for national security issues. For example, in the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed that the Secretary of Defense develop and submit to Congress a plan to improve and reform the department’s participation in and contribution to the interagency coordination process on national security issues. The lesson(s) learned from every conflict and natural disaster in the last decade has been that the USG must improve interagency planning, and that has led to Congress placing the other government departments and agencies on notice that they must also participate in the interagency planning process.
Today, there are several very high-level USG Interagency Policy Committees, every USG Department and Agency has at least one “Office of Interagency Planning,” and within DoD; the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and each Military Service has an Office of Interagency Planning and Coordination. This does not include the interagency branch of liaisons that is a part of every combatant command (CCMD). But despite, or maybe because of, the numerous councils, offices, departments, and branches dedicated to interagency planning, we still do not have one “accepted” or “institutionalized” framework for interagency planning…it remains today an ad hoc process at best. Maybe another lesson learned is creating interagency councils and offices may be a necessity but is not sufficient to improve interagency planning to achieve unity of effort. Interagency planning is “hard” because it requires “unity of effort.” It is worth it simply because we cannot afford not to do it.

Some people might say that if the President of the United States, the U.S. Congress, and all the major departments and agencies of the USG recognize that we need “all or whole-of-government planning” then this should not be such a difficult problem, we need to just make it happen. Those same people might point to DoD’s reorganization a few decades ago for “Jointness” (unity of effort) as an example of how cooperation can be mandated by authorities. Others, however, might argue that this may be a case of comparing apples and oranges.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Public Law 99-433, (signed by President Ronald Reagan), made the most sweeping changes to the United States Department of Defense since the department was established in the National Security Act of 1947 by reworking the command structure of the United States military. Goldwater-Nichols changed the way the Services interact. The Services themselves “organize, train and equip” forces for use by the CCMDs, and the Service chiefs no longer exercise any operational control over their forces. The restructuring afforded a combination of effort, integrated planning, shared procurement, and a reduction or elimination in inter-Service rivalry. It also provided unity of command, conforming to leading military art and science. Individual Services changed from relatively autonomous war-fighting entities into organizational and training units, responsible for acquisition, modernization, force-development and readiness as a component of the integrated force. Thus, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) for example, would be assigned air, ground, and naval assets in order to achieve its objectives, not the inefficient method of individual Services planning, supporting, and fighting the same war (JP 1).

Some, however would argue, that Goldwater-Nichols, while not exactly a huge victory was an extremely difficult transformation, that required direct oversight of the U.S. Congress on military training, billet assignment, and promotions over a twenty-year period before it could be called a “success in progress.” Those same people would argue that in an organization with a culture of “following orders,” even with guidance from a President, the oversight of Congress, and a mandate from Secretary of Defense, DoD’s determined effort to resist this transformation for twenty years is not a good indication for other government transformation. If you expand this problem to include the Department of State (DoS), Department of Commerce (DoC), Department
of Justice (DoJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), etc., one can begin to see that “mandating” unity of effort may not an easy fix to a very old problem. Yet we must start somewhere.

So if “mandating cooperation” may not be a good solution to effective interagency planning, then what can we fix or change to reach common ground with all of our interagency partners? We need to look at that “unity of effort” problem again. The USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM planners and other stakeholders began researching the problems inherent in interagency planning. The collectively identified over twenty reasons, rationales, and explanations, which we will call inhibitors to unity of effort. Below, as identified by planners, are the Top 12 Inhibitors to unity of effort (and interagency planning):

### Top 12 Inhibitors to Unity of Effort

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Stovepipes/silos (lack of information sharing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>No visibility of efforts and activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Partner nations confused over mixed messages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Lack of planning resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Differing lexicon/taxonomy/language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Disparate activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>No established process (ad hoc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>No global repository of information</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>No forcing function to drive unity of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>No established process (ad hoc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Uncoordinated efforts</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Competing priorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the above 12 inhibitors degrade unity of effort and by extension, interagency planning, then it would be a logical assumption that to mitigate one (or more) of those inhibitors would thereby improve interagency planning. To keep us in the sphere of reality, it must be pointed out that there are certain “inhibitors” that by their very nature are impervious to any type of attack or treatment (vampire inhibitors if you will). Developing a global repository of information is a great idea, so is curing the common cold, but both are outside our capability. As already mentioned, developing a “forcing function” for whole-of-government cooperation, while possibly a silver bullet, it is probably decades in the future (if then).

Due to the disparate nature and functions of the various government agencies, we will always have different planning timelines. With resource shortages always on the horizon, an increase in “planning resources” within interagency organizations is probably not going to happen. Within DoD, after 40 years of Goldwater-Nichols, stovepipes and silos not only survive but also flourish, and their reduction in other government agencies is probably not going to occur in the near future (or our lifetime). However, that still leaves us with seven inhibitors that we may be able to eliminate or reduce:

### Top 7 Inhibitors to Unity of Effort that we can Attack

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>No visibility of efforts and activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Partner nations confused over mixed messages</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Uncoordinated efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Competing priorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Top 7 Inhibitors

To attack the seven identified inhibitors what we need first is an established process (a Framework) that uses a common lexicon (language and definitions) to establish agreed-upon priorities that will lead to improved interagency visibility and planning of activities.

The Unity of Effort Framework, designed to improve collaborative planning and synchronization among agencies to address security issues and disaster response. Utilization of the Framework by various USG agencies and stakeholders can help address complex challenges and improve unity of effort by revealing key intersections between agencies in order to synchronize their planning. These intersections can highlight opportunities, threats, respective agencies’ mission priorities, as well as authorities. A data collection plan was designed by the analysis team to measure progress as stakeholders were engaged, seen below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Measure (Attributes)</th>
<th>Operational Definition</th>
<th>Data Source and Location</th>
<th>How Will Data Be Collected</th>
<th>collector</th>
<th>When Will Data Be Collected</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Stratification Factors</th>
<th>How Will Data be used?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common View</td>
<td>Agreement on objectives, geographic regions, and elements of national power</td>
<td>Excel</td>
<td>Tabletop Event &amp; Survey; Reviewed 9 survey questions taken by 34 participants, converted responses to number scale; calculated quality weighted scores; summed across the scores to determine the overall score for “Common View” per survey participant.</td>
<td>analyst, team and SMEs</td>
<td>Survey 1 collection ranged from March to April</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Demographics collected by Department, Job Position, Experience Level</td>
<td>Stability, Capability, Additional analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Understanding</td>
<td>Agreement on lead and contributing agencies; identification of key intersections for planning</td>
<td>Excel</td>
<td>Tabletop Event &amp; Survey; Reviewed 15 survey questions to determine quality weighted</td>
<td>analyst, team and SMEs</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>To evaluate and refine the proposed solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of efforts for coherence</td>
<td>Compare and plan for resources and capabilities</td>
<td>Excel</td>
<td>Tabletop Event &amp; Survey; Reviewed 15 survey questions to determine quality weighted</td>
<td>analyst, team and SMEs</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>To evaluate and refine the proposed solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common measures of progress</td>
<td>Agreement on reporting requirements and criteria to determine how well the plan is meeting stated objectives</td>
<td>Excel</td>
<td>Tabletop Event &amp; Survey; Reviewed 9 survey questions to determine quality weighted</td>
<td>analyst, team and SMEs</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>To evaluate and refine the proposed solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Unity of Effort</td>
<td>Combined quality from Common View, Understanding, Coordination &amp; Measures of Progress</td>
<td>Calculated by analyst team and SMEs</td>
<td>Calculated by mapping the survey responses to each attribute for Unity of Effort. Assigned a quality weighting for each attribute; then, calculated the overall Unity of Effort Score for each survey participant. For the Unity of Effort goal – a survey response of at least “average” was desired and used to calculate the desired score for each attribute and the overall Unity of Effort.</td>
<td>analyst, team and SMEs</td>
<td>Calculate d April-May</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>As baseline performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data collection plan

The reality is that the USG stakeholders face significant hurdles to ensure the proper organizational alignment between plans and programs, while concurrently accounting for each other’s priorities. In 2012, the Joint Staff (J6 and J7) in partnership with USNORTHCOM and
USSOUTHCOM began efforts to execute a series of collaborative events to improve DoD’s ability to conduct collaborative interagency planning, with improved unity of effort, in complex mission areas where DoD is in support of a civilian federal agency. This type of USG interagency planning has met with only sporadic success and remains a significant challenge for our CCMDs. The Building Partnerships – Planning Synchronization Framework (BP-PSF) project evaluated and refined what became the Unity of Effort Framework with participation from interagency stakeholders to improve unity of effort for interagency planning. Identification is the first step toward developing solutions or mitigation strategies.

The Unity of Effort Framework focuses on addressing the various problems that hinder interagency planning. That is, it identifies the national objectives or objectives at the highest level possible for the problem set, the categories of effort applied and the operational environments of interest. Once the boundaries of the mission or problem sets are established, each of the USG stakeholders is able to understand its role (authorities, function, and mission) in relationship to the others, and with whom coordination must occur.

**Unity of Effort Framework – The Concept**

This conceptual approach to building a Unity of Effort Framework is a way to visualize components of existing plans, programs, and activities to improve the distribution and application of scarce interagency resources with maximum positive effect. The structure, definitions, templates, and how-to instructions of the Unity of Effort Framework is repeatable and reusable. However, each application of the Framework will produce unique, products for each stakeholder, mission set, and operating environment. The Framework consists of a how-to guide (the Solution Guide), a set of templates for the Stage 2 three-dimensional view, Stage 3 matrix view, and Stage 4 that we call the deep dive or detailed stage of planning.

The Need for “Unity of Effort”, within DoD, there is no doctrinal Framework for achieving unity of effort for planning and synchronizing scarce interagency resources in mission areas that are inherently civilian-led and military-supported. Meeting the challenges of current and future operations requires the concerted effort of all instruments of US national power plus foreign government agencies and military forces and civilian organizations. Problems arise when each USG agency interprets national security policy guidance differently, sets different priorities for execution, and does not act in concert with the others. Consequently, there is a need to conduct integrated planning to effectively employ the appropriate instruments of national power.

The Framework is a logical method to convey information across agencies, and improve how stakeholders work with complex problems that require coordination of effort across agencies and departments. The Framework may contribute to stakeholder unity of effort toward achieving national objectives. Ultimately, this may highlight opportunities for resource savings or repurposing to a greater national need.
The Framework helps to identify coordinated and complementary efforts, planned redundancies, as well as gaps, seams, shortfalls, duplicated efforts among stakeholders, and thereby helps focus de-confliction, synchronizing, combining efforts and capabilities to their best effect in order to achieve national goals and objectives. Additionally, it helps to identify assumptions and major issues for continued leadership engagement and communication that will support informed decision-making.

The intent of this framework should not interfere with any official policy within an individual department or agency, or on-going authoritative interagency efforts that take place through the Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) processes chaired by the National Security Council. Below is a graphic view of the thoughts used to develop the UOE framework.

**Unity of Effort Framework – Considered**

As previously mentioned, in 2011, USNORTHCOM in partnership with USSOUTHCOM proposed a planning synchronization Framework as a solution to improve unity of effort for planning complex interagency national challenges at the operational/regional theater campaign level. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved this project for solution evaluation and consideration.
In response to this JROC-approved project in October 2011, the Joint Staff J7 supported by the Joint Staff J6 created a partnership with USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM in May 2012. The intent was to conduct a project that would evaluate and refine the DRAFT proposed Planning Synchronization Framework focused on improving "unity of effort" across the interagency planning efforts.

The project’s purpose was to evaluate and refine a set of instructions, templates, definitions, and visualizations that comprise a flexible and adaptable Planning Synchronization Framework to enable theater/regional steady state planning between/across CCMDs with their interagency partners.

The project’s goal was to improve unity of effort in complex mission areas where DoD was in support of a civilian federal agency. A collateral goal emerged to identify key or critical multi-agency common problem sets (“gaps or seams”) and common understanding of a mission or operation. A mission was selected as the case study by USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM because of their specific, cross-CCMD efforts to provide support to law enforcement and building partnership capacities in the Western Hemisphere.

Project Design:

One of the first collaborative events was a Table Top event (TTX 1) conducted as of a series. TTX 1 focused on defining and refining project objectives, categories of effort, and the operating environment (geographic regions for this problem set).

Table Top 2 Event (TTX 2) held at the Metro Washington DC area continued to build on TTX 1 results and selected key intersections to further focus our refinement of the Framework. The image and captions below are a sample of stakeholder participation at the TTXs.
A one day Writers Workshop held in Washington D.C. and was the third event in the series. The Unity of Effort Solution Guide is the conceptual document that serves as the key reference for the project and as a “how to instruction” for applying the Planning Synchronization Framework. Along with the Solution Guide is a Joint Knowledge Online course that provides an overview of the Unity of Effort Framework for interagency planners.

There were also weekly telephonic and virtual collaborative session to fill the communication and face-to-face shortfalls. These session allowed stakeholders to both ask and respond to questions or needed clarification. This type of session allowed stakeholders who have limited or non-insistent travel funds to continue to be a valued participant in shaping the processes.

The main event in this series consisting of an in depth examination (deep dive) of the selected “Key Intersections” identified in TTX 2, stage 3 of the process. Stakeholders were requested to complete the stage 4 deep dive templates and worksheets to help identify coordinated and complementary efforts, planned redundancies, as well as develop recommendations for gaps, seams, shortfalls, and duplicated efforts amongst stakeholders. This in depth examination assisted with de-confliction and synchronization to enable greater unity of effort and objective accomplishment.

The project focused on providing CCMDs a consistent and institutionalized approach to plan and resource military support to civilian agencies as well as improve unity of effort toward meeting national and strategic objectives at the theater level. That being said, the UOE framework is adaptable to many types of application. Some organizations found that there is utility within an organization itself to support alignment and prioritization.

**The Framework Project Results**

The Framework is a viable repeatable process for improving interagency planning. In just the first two stages of the Framework; identifying stakeholders, having them develop (and reach consensus on) common objectives, and explaining their operating environment removes and/or mitigates four out seven key inhibitors (differing lexicon, no visibility, no established process, competing priorities).

Below is a graphic view for building the quick reference guide and attributes for each stage. This view has been used as a trifold that can be distributed to stakeholders for reference.
The project has shown value in using the Unity of Effort Framework to help overcome inhibitors to interagency planning (focus is on theater/regional, steady state planning). Below is a snapshot of final analysis overview as well as project success criteria and results.

Final Analysis: “Significant Improvement” and “Gaps that need to be worked” (below) are based on three factors: majority agreement, percentage increase, and statistical significance. The evaluation metrics were based on identification of the top 12 inhibitors to unity of effort by an expert panel of planners from USNORTHCOM, USOUTHCOM, DoJ, and DoS and were verified in various interagency reports, studies, and initial survey responses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unity of Effort Attribute</th>
<th>Evaluation Metric</th>
<th>Initial Survey (%)</th>
<th>Final Survey %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Vision</td>
<td>Does the framework provide a process to establish a common view of the problem and strengthen interagency relationships?</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Understanding</td>
<td>Does the framework improve info sharing and streamline and focus interagency requests for information?</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of Effort</td>
<td>Does the framework improve the identification of gaps related to planning resources?</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the framework improve the means to synchronize disparate interagency activities?</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the framework help identify or highlight competing priorities?</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the framework improve visibility of interagency efforts?</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the framework identify critical areas to synchronize disparate activities?</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the framework improve awareness and understanding of differing interagency planning timelines?</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**“Significant Improvement”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unity of Effort Attribute</th>
<th>Evaluation Metric</th>
<th>Initial Survey (%)</th>
<th>Final Survey %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Vision</td>
<td>Does the framework mitigate the occurrence of mixed messages from the interagency to our partner nations?</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Understanding</td>
<td>Does the framework provide for a common interagency lexicon and planning terminology?</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the framework mitigate the need for a global repository of interagency information?</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of Effort</td>
<td>Does the framework identify critical areas to apply planning resources across the interagency?</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the framework help in prioritizing planning resources across the interagency?</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the framework improve the ability to coordinate efforts of non-governmental organizations?</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the framework provide a forcing function for interagency planning?</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Measures of Progress</td>
<td>Does the framework provide the means to determine common measures of progress and provide for timely achievement of objectives?</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**“Gaps that need to be worked”**
The pre-solution score is based on a survey of 34 interagency participants collected April 2012 prior to the first Tabletop Event. The Success Criteria was determined by setting a target response to all survey questions at a score of 3 or better on a scale of 1 to 5 – a response of 3 or better would mean that there is no negative reaction to the attribute (neutral=3, agree=4, strongly agree=5). Tabletop 2 represents a stronger understanding of the solution between first introduction in April and execution of tabletop 2 in Jun and therefore is the basis for statistical analysis of the solution although tabletop 1 provides useful data for interim examination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEASURE (Four Attributes included in a Total Score for Unity of Effort)</th>
<th>Success Criteria (Quality Weighted Score)</th>
<th>Pre-Solution Score</th>
<th>Score - Tabletop 1</th>
<th>Score - Tabletop 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Common View- Agreement on objectives, geographic regions, and elements of national power</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Common Understanding- Agreement on lead and contributing agencies; identification of key intersections for planning</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Coordination of Effort for Coherency- Compare and plan for resources and capabilities</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Common Measures of Progress- Agreement on reporting requirements and criteria to determine how well the plan is meeting stated objectives</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Unity of Effort Attributes 1 thru 4</td>
<td>13416</td>
<td>12326</td>
<td>14492</td>
<td>13995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Project success criteria and results**

Impacts of this project include greater unity of effort in planning for complex security issues and in disaster response as well as:

- Delivering a Framework that, if applied, improves CCMD operational design, mission analysis, planning, and commander’s decision making in support of complex interagency missions
- Enabling orchestrated development of CCMD and interagency partner planning to achieve regional and national objectives
- Improving use of scarce interagency resources by identifying and focusing planning on critical areas requiring unity of effort for any given mission
- Changes to doctrine, education, leadership, and training related to unity of effort and interagency planning have been formally submitted to revise the DoD definition for Unity of Effort and reference the use of a framework to improve interagency planning to improve unity of effort.
Conclusion

The UOE framework is meant as a multi-purpose planning aid to facilitate USG stakeholders’ coordination, synchronization, visibility and information sharing for improving unity of effort. The framework helps to identify gaps, seams and redundancies amongst stakeholders, and helps focus similar efforts to achieve national goals and objectives.

The CCMDs need a consistent and institutionalized approach to plan and resource military support for Civilian Agencies and improve unity of effort toward meeting national and strategic objectives at the operational/theater campaign level. The goal is to achieve broad interagency consensus on the approach to work towards common objectives, applied across different geographic regions by all elements of national and international power acting in concert.

“One of the explicit lessons of the last decade of conflict is the absolute necessity to share information, plan, and operate in concert with our interagency and foreign partners.” Admiral McRaven, Commander, USSOCOM, SEP 2011

In an ideal world, USG organizations concerned with national security would operate from an overarching joint strategic plan at the global, regional and country-level to ensure alignment of various USG efforts. The reality is that USG organizations face significant hurdles to ensuring that their plans and/or programs are based on shared assessments of conditions and appropriately aligned and account for each other’s capabilities, capacities, and activities.

Within each organization, differences in organizational priorities result in critical differences that effect theater and regional planning. These differences were viewed in this project as inhibitors to unity of effort.

The most important difference between the Unity of Effort Framework and other approaches to Interagency Planning is that each organization can continue to operate using their own planning and programming processes while mapping to a common Unity of Effort Framework. To apply the UOE Framework, stakeholders must meet, must communicate, and must gain consensus of a common view and common understanding of the situation at the strategic, theater, and tactical or execution level of operations and planning. These “consensus” gathering meetings, by their very nature, improve unity of effort and may be the most important part of this process. The number one goal is to create a common understanding of who is doing what, where, and when in the area of operations to work together to improve unity of effort towards meeting our national goals and objectives.

More than ever before, we share security responsibilities with other nations and Mission Partners to help address security challenges in their countries and regions, whether it is fighting alongside our forces, countering terrorist and international criminal networks, participating in international peacekeeping operations, or building institutions capable of maintaining security, law, and order,
and applying justice. Successfully providing transparent solutions to DoD and Mission Partners help achieve collective goals.

**Further UOE framework application beyond its intent.**

Based upon the UOE “Dashboard” (below) and published solution guide, the Global University Alliance and LEADing Practice community awarded the Unity of Effort Framework, the 2014 "Frontier Runner of the Year" in recognition of the innovation and development.

The Global University Alliance which consist of +300 Universities that research and work around Enterprise Standards, Enterprise Framework, Enterprise Methods and Enterprise Approaches. It is a non-profit organization and international consortium of university lecturers and researchers whose aim it is to provide a collaborative platform for academic research, analysis and development to explore leading practices, best practices as well as to develop missing practices. It is supported by the LEADing Practice community of 3100+ practitioners, the fastest growing open source standard development community based on years of university research and packed into reusable standards and templates. Empowering organizations to structure a common way of thinking, working and modelling that enables them to innovate, transform and deliver value.

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**Unity of Effort “Dashboard”**
Appendix A: References

B. Charter of the Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) Planning Group, September 2011
C. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
D. Department of Defense Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), April 2011
E. Foreign Disaster Emergency Manual 060, 061, 061.1, 2012 (Department of State)
F. Joint Publication 1-0, Joint Personnel Support. 24 October 2011
G. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 (As Amended Through 15 November 2012)
H. Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007
I. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011
L. National Security Strategy (NSS), May 2010
M. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011
N. Theater Campaign Planning Planner’s Handbook, February 2012
O. United States Code (USC)
P. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Glossary of Terms
Appendix B: Acronym List

A. 3D Defense, Diplomacy, Development  
B. CCJO Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Joint Force 2020  
C. CCMD Combatant Command  
D. DHS Department of Homeland Security  
E. DIMEFIL Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement  
F. DOJ Department of justice  
G. DOS Department of State  
H. FDR Foreign Disaster Relief  
I. FMS Foreign Military Sales  
J. FPP Federal Planning Process  
K. HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief  
L. ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement  
M. IPC Interagency Policy Committee  
N. JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff  
O. JP Joint Publication  
P. MDMP Military Decision Making Process  
Q. NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
R. NGB National Guard Bureau  
S. NGO Non-Governmental Organization  
T. NSS National Security Strategy  
U. TCP Theater Campaign Plan  
V. USAID U.S. Agency for International Development  
W. USC U.S. Code  
X. USG U.S. Government  
Y. USNORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command  
Z. USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command  
AA. USSOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command
Appendix C: Glossary

3D Planning Guide: A reference tool designed to help planners understand the purpose of each agency’s plans, the processes that generate them, and, most importantly, to help identify opportunities for coordination among the three. Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3Ds) – as represented by the Department of State (DOS), the USAID, and the DOD – are the three pillars that provide the foundation for promoting and protecting U.S. national security interests abroad.

Activities: For the Framework activities refers to how capabilities are accomplished in a Key intersection.

Authority: USG agencies and organizations draw their authority from the U.S. Code, Presidential directives and executive orders, decisions of the Federal courts and treaties. (gpo.gov) Power to influence thought, opinion or behavior – implies the power of winning devotion or allegiance or of compelling acceptance and belief – the right or power to command, rule or judge.

Capability: For the Framework capability refers to the “what and why” that is taking place in a Key Intersection.

Capacity: For the Framework capacity refers to the “where and when/how often” a capability is exercised in a Key Intersection.

Categories of Effort: For the Framework Categories of Effort can be elements of national power or lines of effort. The type of exertion expended for a specified purpose. See Elements of National Power.

Common Objective: An objective agreed upon by all stakeholders.

Coordinate Objective: A statement of the condition or state one expects to achieve. (USAID Glossary of Evaluation Terms and DOD). The clearly defined, decisive and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. Objectives are developed within the context of existing U.S. national security and foreign policies, and are derived from higher-level guidance.

Contributing: For the Framework, refers to a Stakeholder or mission partner that is executing, supporting, sharing or involved at some level in an intersection in support of the lead organization.

Deep Dive: Stakeholders and mission partners will collectively conduct an examination with a primary
focus on capabilities ("what and why"), capacity ("where, when and how often"), and activities ("how capabilities are being accomplished") at a specific Key Intersection of common objective and operating environment.

**Development:** The provision of aid and other assistance to regions that are less economically developed. The provision of assistance to developing countries. Sustained, concerted effort of policymakers and communities to promote a standard of living and economic health in a specific area. (DOS)

**Diplomatic Actions:** (DOD) Those international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad (JP 1-02-see Pubanc Dnpaomacy). The diplomatic instrument of national power is the principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance U.S. values, interests, and objectives.

**Drill Down:** For the Framework project, to look at or examine something in-depth.

**Economic (Elements of National Power):** Government agencies only partially control the economic instrument of national power. In keeping with U.S. values and constitutional imperatives, individuals and entities have broad freedom of action worldwide. The responsibility of the USG lies with facilitating the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services worldwide that promote U.S. fundamental objectives, such as promoting general welfare and supporting security interests and objectives.

**Elements of National Power:** The ways through which the interagency community is able to leverage the political, economic and military strengths of the USG in order to influence other states and non-state actors. The United States can make use of these elements directly, through the various agencies that make up the federal government, or indirectly, by mobilizing the population, industry and businesses of the country. (Derived from the National Security Strategy, 2010)

**End State:** Long-term strategic goals that are of an enduring nature. Organizations pursue these end states as they develop over-arching theater or functional strategies, which they translate into an integrated set of steady-state activities by means of campaign plans. (derived from 3D Planning Guide)

**Facilitator:** One who helps to bring about an outcome (learning, productivity or communication) by providing indirect or unobtrusive assistance, guidance, or supervision (Merriam-Webster). An organization or individual that leads the debate and ultimate
reconciliation of each agency’s characterization of the elements of the three-dimensional view (Framework).

**Financial (Elements of National Power):** The financial instrument of national power promotes the conditions for prosperity and stability in the United States and encourages prosperity in the rest of the world. The Department of Treasury is the primary federal agency responsible for the economic and financial prosperity and security of the U.S. and as such is responsible for a wide range of activities, including advising the President on economic and financial issues, promoting the President's growth agenda, and enhancing corporate governance in financial institutions. In the international arena, the Treasury works with other federal agencies, the governments of other nations, and the international financial institutions to encourage economic growth; raise standards of living; and predict and prevent, to the extent possible, economic and financial crisis.

**Foreign Disaster Relief:** Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally, it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; medical and technical materiel and personnel; repairs to essential services. (JP 1-02) Assistance in response to a foreign disaster, which is an act of nature (such as a flood, drought, wildfire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic) or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion-fire) that is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude, the United States may provide emergency relief assistance as a humanitarian service consistent with U.S foreign policy goals. Assistance shall to the greatest extent possible reach those most in need of relief and rehabilitation. U.S. assistance supports and encourages host country participation in disaster preparedness activities and supplements rather than replaces host country disaster relief resources. (Compiled from D S 2 FAM 061 and 061.1)

**Foreign Military Sales (FMS):** That portion of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and conducted based on formal contracts or agreements between the United States Government and an authorized recipient government or international organization. FMS includes government-to-government sales of defense articles or defense services, from DOD stocks or through new procurements under DOD-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Though specifically designed to support the provision of Security Assistance, the FMS process can be employed to procure defense articles, training and services using a variety of sources of funding, not just Title 22 funding. (JP 1-02)

**Framework:** For the Unity of Effort Framework project, a Framework is a mechanism that allows government agencies to visualize and preempt or resolve potential conflicts in their actions, activities and resources in order to support a specific national strategy or policy (e.g.,
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operation, or other operations).

**Gap:** A capability gap is an inability to perform a task because of a lack of equipment, training, doctrine, authority or support. (Defense Acquisition University [DAU]) A gap, the difference between needs and resources. They exist where no agencies have the capacity or authority to meet a requirement.

**Governance:** Consistent management, cohesive policies, guidance, processes and decision-rights for a given area of responsibility. The physical exercise of management power and policy.

**Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief:** Assistance rendered to a country or population in an emergency or crisis context. This could include natural or manmade disaster response or complex humanitarian emergency. (USAID) (3D Panning Guide) Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02)

**Information (Elements of National Power):** The informational instrument of national power has a diffuse and complex set of components with no single center of control. In the United States, individuals exchange information freely with minimal government control. Information itself is a strategic resource vital to national security. This reality applies to all instruments, entities, and activities of national power and extends to the armed forces at all levels.

**Intelligence (Elements of National Power):** Intelligence, as an instrument of national power, provides the national leadership with the information needed to realize national goals and objectives while providing military leadership with the information needed to accomplish missions and implement the national security strategy.

**Interagency (IA):** Made up of, involving, or representing two or more U.S. government agencies; interagency cooperation, partners, or organizations. (Dictionary.com)

**Interagency Policy Committee (IPC):** An appointed committee that is responsible for designated national security issues that cut across the responsibilities of Executive Branch departments and agencies. Issues may be regional, such as U.S. policy toward Iraq or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, or functional, such as arms control

**Intersection:** A matrix or spreadsheet cell that crosses an objective with an operating environment.

**Key Intersections:** For the Framework, a Key Intersection is a matrix cell (intersection of column and row) that represents an activity for which the whole of government focuses a significant amount of planning resources. A cell that needs the most unity of effort, accounting for all of the capabilities and resources that are planned to contribute to the activities represented in that cell.

**Law Enforcement (Elements of National Power):** Through the law enforcement instrument of national power, the USG is accountable to its people and can govern its territory effectively. The USG has the capability and capacity to: Enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to law; Ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; Provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; Seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; Ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.

**Lead:** For the Framework, lead indicates that the organization has primary responsibility to coordinate and integrate USG effort involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities to prepare, plan for and conduct operations in an intersection of an objective and environment within the matrix of the Unity of Effort Framework. Lead may be determined by law (Title 50, Title 10), by directive (Executive Agent or Lead Federal Agency designation), or by precedent in terms of established mission roles, responsibilities, and authorities. There can be multiple leads identified in the Framework.

**Matrix:** For the Framework, the matrix is a spreadsheet view of the three elements: Common Objectives, Operating Environments, and Categories of Effort. It is the starting point where Stakeholders and Mission Partners begin collaboration and coordination of efforts.

**Matrix or Spreadsheet Cell:** For the Framework a column and row intersection within a Framework matrix to be populated by stakeholder organizations. This represents the intersection of a common objective and a specific operating area for a given mission.

**Major Contributions:** For the Framework a major contribution is an organization’s priority of effort for the issue objective and operating environments.

**Military (Elements of National Power):** In wielding the military instrument of national power, the armed forces must ensure their adherence to U.S. values, constitutional principles, and
standards for the profession of arms. While responsibility for wielding the other instruments of power rests outside the military establishment, U.S. military leaders are responsible for providing the advice and recommendation necessary for the overall U.S. effort to properly incorporate the military instrument with the other instruments of national power. Unified action within the military instrument supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.

**National Security Staff (NSS):** An interdepartmental body to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.

**Operating Environment:** A combination of conditions, surroundings, circumstances, and landscape: The Operating Environment can be looked at in many ways, some examples are: geographic regions, sectors, domains, critical terrain, countries, states, key border crossings between nations, mountainous areas, and land routes which are forms of identifying locations or areas where activities take place and bear on the decisions of leaders. Others may be more specific with identifying the operating environment for example; sub-regions, portfolios, seaports, bridges, roadways, waterways, airfields, air corridors.

**Planning:** The process to identify appropriate results, develop approaches to reach them, assign needed resources, organize to achieve results, and identify the means to measure progress (3D Planning Guide, DOD). An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (Derived from JP 5-0)

**Priority:** For the Framework project, the primary goal or goals in an endeavor. In interagency operations, each agency will have its own, sometimes competing, priorities. If not synchronized, these priorities must be aligned and de-conflicted during the planning process.

**Resources:** The personnel, materiel, and other assets or capabilities apportioned or allocated to the commander of a unified or specified command (Derived from JP 1-02). Available resources are a major factor in determining an organization’s capacity.

**Seams:** The divisions between different organizations attempting to collaborate. Seams develop from the cultural and practical differences between organizations and decrease the interagency community’s ability to develop complementary policies and plans, and to function as a cohesive community. (3D Planning Guide)
**Shortfall:** The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned to a combatant commander for planning that would adversely affect the command’s ability to accomplish its mission. (JP 5-0) The difference between the resources that are needed and those that are available.

**Stakeholder:** A person or group that has an investment, share, or interest in something, as an organization, business or industry. Organizations that play an important part in the design and outcome of a stated issue. (Dictionary.com and adapted from the Theater Campaign Handbook)

**Sufficiency:** The adequacy of quantity, quality, frequency and duration.

**Synchronize (Synchronization):** The act of arranging actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum effectiveness at a decisive place and time. Synchronization allows for a more efficient use of resources by minimizing the appearance and impact of redundancy. (Derived from JP 2-0)

**Theater Campaign Plans (TCP):** 1. Joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within specific theater during a specific time (JP 5-0). 2. TCPs link military engagement and security cooperation activities to current operations and contingency plans as well as broader foreign policy goals (3D Planning Guide).

**Threat:** A potential negative event that can cause a risk to become a loss, expressed as an aggregate of risk, consequences of risk, and the likelihood of the occurrence of such an event. A threat may be the result of both natural phenomena and intentional or unintentional human intervention. (Derived from the Business Dictionary)

**United States Code (USC):** The codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States based on what is printed in the Statutes at Large. It is divided by broad subjects into 50 titles and published by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives. These titles describe the legal capabilities and limitations of the various agencies within all three branches of the USG.

**Unity of Effort:** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. The product of successful unified action. (JP-1)

(DOS) A cooperative concept, which refers to coordination and communication among USG organizations toward the same common goals for success; in order to achieve unity of effort. It is not necessary for all organizations to be controlled under the same command structure, but it
is necessary for each agency’s efforts to be in harmony with the short- and long-term goals of the mission. Unity of effort is based on four principles:

- Common understanding of the situation
- Common vision or goals for the R&S mission
- Coordination of efforts to ensure continued coherency
- Common measures of progress and ability to change course if necessary

**Unity of Effort Framework:** A multipurpose planning aid designed to improve unity of effort by setting the stage for Stakeholder's coordination, synchronization, visibility and information sharing.