19th Edition

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Foreward from the Department Head</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Letter from the Editor-in-Chief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Editorial Board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>La Revolución Será Machista: A Gendered Approach to the Micropolitics of the Sandinista Revolution</td>
<td>Astghik Hairapetian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Normalizing Queer Spaces: Have Pride Parades Lost Their Political Touch?</td>
<td>Andy Holmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Political Geography and Subaltern Potentials of a Post-Paris World</td>
<td>Tiago de Souza Jensen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>A Question of Integration: Why Foreign and Defence Policy Stumbles Within the European Union</td>
<td>Anson Kai Yiu Ma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Russia, the West, and the Arctic: Global Conflict and Regional Escalation</td>
<td>Will Trefiak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dear Reader,

Please find enclosed your copy of the UBC Journal of Political Studies! For the last nineteen years, this journal has held a unique place in the Political Science community at UBC, because undergraduate students, not professors, are the authors of the articles. Published by the Political Science Students’ Association in conjunction with the Department of Political Science, the journal itself is edited and produced by a team comprised of, and led entirely by, students. As a result, this journal is a showcase for the intellectual abilities of UBC undergraduates. It is an expression of the important link between learning and research, and the value of encouraging new voices to speak out on the issues that affect us all.

I hope you will take a moment to enjoy your copy of the JPS, and to take pride in the accomplishments of our students.

Sincerely,

Allen Sens
Director of Undergraduate Programs
Department of Political Science
Letter from the Editor-in-Chief

One of the things that drew me to the Journal of Political Studies was its interdisciplinary understanding of itself. We have never been a journal of one department, but rather a space in which disciplines intersect and interact, challenging us all to broaden our perspective. The nineteenth edition of the JPS is no different. We enclose five papers from four different departments, all of which ask us to view issues from a light we may not have yet considered. Some will ring true, some will challenge, and all will warrant discussion among friends and colleagues.

As higher education becomes more specialized and increasingly silo-driven, the importance of platforms that allow for students to come together from different areas of expertise to collaborate and grow as a collective cannot be overstated. It is my sincere hope that the JPS will continue to fill this need in the years to come and be to others the interdisciplinary opportunity it was for myself.

The journal before you is a product of hard work and one or two sleepless nights from an incredibly talented and creative team of editors. It would not have been possible without Ana Merino’s insight, Bailey Ramsay’s dedication, and Parmida Esmaeilpour’s invaluable advice. On behalf of myself and my team, I would like to thank our faculty reviewers for their insight, and our Department Head, Professor Barbara Arneil, for her continued support. To my editors: I could not have asked for a better team. Thank you all for your wit, your humour, your patience, and your time.

Emma Saddy
Editor-in-Chief
Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief
Emma Saddy
This is Emma Saddy’s third year with the Journal of Political Studies and her final year as an undergraduate at the University of British Columbia. After completing her degree in Political Science with a minor in Economics, Emma intends to pursue either a graduate or a law degree, but not before a well-earned break. Currently, her interests include issues in the international political economy, as well as critical approaches to international security. Time permitting, Emma is also a musician, slam poet, and avid collector of museum exhibition books.

Managing Editor
Ana Merino
This is Ana’s second year with the Journal of Political Studies, and her final year as an undergraduate student at UBC. Ana is completing a major in International Relations with a minor in Political Science. She is passionate about Latin American Politics. In her spare time, Ana loves to read, write, and dance. After graduation, Ana will continue to work on personal and professional projects before pursuing a graduate degree. She will be forever grateful for everything she learned, and everyone she met, during her time with the JPS.

Publishing Director
Bailey Ramsay
This is Bailey’s fifth and final year at UBC studying English literature and creative writing. Aspiring to pursue a career in the publishing industry, she has been an editor at The Ubyssey for two years among numerous other internships. With an unparalleled enthusiasm for grammar, Bailey is eager to begin her time working with the JPS.
Senior Editors

Amy Gill is working towards a Double Honours in Political Science and English Literature. Her research interests in Political Science include constitutional challenges within the Canadian context as well as Indian politics. As an English student, her interests include the Asian diaspora literature and transnational/intercultural productions of Shakespeare. Amy is also an active member of Amnesty International UBC here on campus and will be taking on the position of Co-President next year.

Harmillan Oberoi is completing his final year as an undergraduate student at UBC and his second year with the Journal of Political Studies. He is excited to be back as an editor and has since completed political science courses in immigration and human rights. Outside of the classroom he enjoys reading, listening to music and playing tennis.

Nikos Wright was first published in the JPS in 2015, and subsequently served as an editor for the journal last year. He is glad to be back with the journal this year as a senior editor. Aside from the JPS, Nikos also serves as the Arts Undergraduate Society Representative for the International Relations Students Association. He also has experience working in the Canadian federal government, with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation and Western Economic Diversification Canada.

Tiago de Souza Jensen is a fourth year International Relations and Geography double major student at UBC and this is his second year with the JPS. His academic interests focus on sustainable urban development and critical theory. Tiago helped create the Model United Nations Student Association at UBC and host the inaugural UBC Model Parliament last year. In his free time, Tiago studies languages, consumes too much tea and wine, and loves an espresso as dark as his favourite dystopian novels.
Vivian Wan is in her final year at UBC completing her degree in Political Science Honours with a minor in International Relations. This is her second year with the Journal and she is excited about another fulfilling opportunity to review work done by her peers. After her undergrad, she hopes to work with advocacy groups in areas of environmental policy or immigration law as well as to travel throughout Europe. Outside of school, she is an avid cappuccino consumer, half-marathon runner, and musical theatre lover.

Editors

Andrea Cruz is a third year undergraduate student at UBC, completing a major in Political Science and a minor in commerce. Her interests in political science include North American and Latin American politics particularly in the topics of immigration, education and income inequality. She also enjoys looking at the role that multinational corporations have in international affairs and the relationship between the public and private sector. In her spare time Andrea loves to travel, meet new people and watch documentaries.

Carolina Ortiz is in her third year at UBC, currently pursuing a double major in Political Science and Creative Writing. As a proud Colombian, she is passionate about coffee and Latin American Politics. In creative writing, she loves writing for children, in which she hopes to use this platform to introduce children to political issues in a way they can understand and relate to them. In her spare time, Carolina loves reading, cooking, crocheting, and trying new brunch spots with her friends.

Colin Kulstad is entering his fourth and final year at UBC, pursuing a major in Political Science with a minor in International Relations. Fluent in French and Japanese, Colin has
extensively studied in Japan and Germany and he hopes after graduation to continue to work between both countries. Outside of JPS Colin has held executive positions within both the Japan Society and Japan Career Network, is active within various international diasporas on campus and works within the Vancouver film industry.

**Felipe Alfaro** is in his third year at UBC, pursuing a major in International Relations with a minor in Political Science. Felipe is passionate about Latin American politics, especially in regards to education and foreign policy. In his spare time, he enjoys playing soccer and reading history books, especially when they have to do with the Russian Revolution. He currently works as a Residence Advisor on campus and after graduation he plans to pursue a master of International affairs or return to his home country, Panama, to study law.

**Grace Kamara** is in her final year at UBC, pursuing a Major in International Relations and a Minor in Gender, Race, Sexuality and Social Justice. Grace hails from Ghana and is particularly interested in International Development and African Politics, taking a feminist approach to understanding institutional failure in Africa and seeking to propose sustainable solutions to resist geographical, disease, and human resource challenges. After graduation, Grace intends to pursue an Msc in Development Studies at the Graduate Institute, Geneva.

**Gray Morfopoulos** is in his fourth year at UBC, pursuing a major in International Relations. His interests include international trade policy, foreign policy, and international political economy, especially from a European perspective. Upon graduation he intends to study Canadian law, specializing in international trade law. Outside of academics he is a Residence Advisor, a member of UBC Vice, and enjoys playing soccer, guitar, and classic films. This is Gray’s first year with the Journal of Political Studies.
Jack Jefferson is in his third year at UBC, currently pursuing a double major in Economics and Political Science. His academic interests include international trade theory, international political economy, and the implications of issues such as international investment and monetary relations. After completing his degree, Jack intends to gain a few years of work experience and eventually pursue graduate studies. In his spare time Jack enjoys drinking far too much coffee, travelling, and scuba-diving any chance he can get.

Kaelin Hickford is in her final year of Honours Political Science, and intends to pursue an MSc in Politics next year. Kaelin is passionate about European Politics and does research at the Institute for European Studies. Last year, Kaelin co-founded PSSA’s Moot Court and the Panel Policy Institute, a student run recommendation and policy organization. Kaelin is also a TA at UBC. Aside from being a huge nerd, she loves to travel, learn languages, and collect shameless amounts of tea.

Maria José Valverde is in her third year as an undergraduate student from the Dual Degree Programme between UBC and Sciences Po. She is passionate about discovering the well-known theories of economics in everyday lives, learning as many languages as possible and pursuing her studies focused international development. In addition to this, she enjoys listening to mystery podcasts and, like every Costa Rican, takes great pleasure in drinking a strong cup of coffee every day.

Marina Favaro is in her final year as an undergraduate in International Relations, intending to pursue an MPhil in the same field. Her academic interests involve intersectional feminist dimensions in security studies, as well as Indigenous affairs and critical theory. She also works with the Global Reporting Centre, a journalism organization based out of UBC that forgoes the neo-colonial dynamic of foreign correspondence, opting for an “empowerment journalism” model. Marina also studies languages, does yoga, and reads.
Michelle de Haas is graduating this spring with a BA in Political Science. After completing her degree Michelle hopes to pursue a career in law, after which she intends on becoming the Canadian Prime Minister in about 30 years (vote for her!). She is interested in examining the role of power in global politics, and the impact of gender and race in social and political development. Michelle also loves political theory, dancing, traveling, and anything to do with Harry Potter.

Philip Finkelstein is graduating after his fourth year at UBC with a Bachelor's in Political Science. Serving as an editor for the JPS sets the stage for what will hopefully be a future career in journalism. After a few months of travel, he will be starting work in Vancouver as a technical writer, committed to promoting innovative technology alongside the Canadian government. No matter where life takes him, his passion for politics will always find its way to the forefront.

Puneet Heer is in her third year at UBC, pursuing a degree in Political Science. Puneet is passionate about the Canadian government and the International system. She is interested in understanding the implications of globalization and the global politics that dictate our system along with immigration and domestic politics. After completing her degree, Puneet hopes to attend graduate school to obtain either a law degree or Master of Public Policy and Global Affairs to eventually work within the Canadian Government.

Robin Hadac is in her final year at UBC completing a double major in Psychology and Political Science. Her political interests include American public and foreign policy, political theory, feminism and global environmental politics. She enjoys connecting psychology and political science in research to offer an expanded approach to political analysis. After graduation, she hopes to work for an environmental NGO that offers international placements so that she can continue her love for travel and her passion for political activism.
La Revolución Será Machista: A Gendered Approach to the Micropolitics of the Sandinista Revolution

Astghik Hairapetian

This paper examines the gendered experiences of two Sandinista revolutionaries, Leticia Herrera and Omar Cabezas. Though both face a position of inferiority, Herrera due to her male comrades and Cabezas due to the U.S.-backed Contras, they undergo radically different trajectories of gender consciousness. Cabezas embraces changing notions of masculinity and redefines his softness as strength, whereas Herrera recognizes the added burden of womanhood in a masculine revolution. Additionally, the article observes how this normalized masculinity facilitates the deferral of women’s interests as secondary to the cause. This finding reaffirms the masculine bias of legal and normative systems that separate “women’s interests” from the greater good.

They told us women to be quiet. “Wait,” they said. “When socialism triumphs, we’ll make everyone equal.”

—Leticia Herrera, Cuerpos Sin Vergüenzas: ¿Qué Nos Dejó La Revolución a Las Mujeres?

1 Astghik is a fifth-year student completing a double major in International Relations and Spanish. From Los Angeles and of Armenian descent, her interests include diaspora studies, gender studies and Hispanic literatures. She will begin her studies in law after graduation.
Although most studies on gender in the Sandinista Revolution focus on how the revolution impacted women's rights once the revolutionary government was in power, very little has been written about the individual and personal experiences with gender before the triumph of the Sandinista movement. In this piece I will explore to what degree gender advancement formed insurgents’ motivations to participate in the revolution, and how their conceptions of “masculinity” and “femininity” changed during the revolution, impacting their understanding of what they were fighting for.

With the help of the existing literature on gender and revolution, I will examine the memoirs of two armed insurgents of the Sandinista Revolution. First, Omar Cabezas’ “neo-testimonial” Fire from the Mountain, chronicles the beginnings of his involvement in the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) from 1967 to about 1975, just four years before the triumph of the revolution. He traces his work for the Front in the city, his subsequent deployment to the mountain, and his premature return to the city after he suffers an infection. The personal transformation he undergoes is heavily influenced by ideas of masculinity within the context of revolution. Second, Leticia Herrera’s memoirs are essentially an extended interview. This narrative is more complete, beginning with her youth, focusing on her time working in clandestinity in urban areas, and ending much later in 2007. The work as a whole reflects the chaos of real lives, as compared to the clear thematic threads that exist in Cabezas’ text.

Although examining the narratives of just two participants can be limiting, these particular voices have the potential to expose much about the way gender was lived during the revolution. On the one hand, Cabezas has been one of the predominant testimonials of

3 McCallister, “La Cuestión De Género En La Montaña,” 170; Cabezas, La Montaña Es Algo Más Que Una Inmensa Estepa Verde.
4 González Casado, Sabater Montserrat, and Trayner Vilanova, Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante.
the revolution, and masculinity is an ever-present subcurrent in his text. On the other hand, Herrera’s is one of the most complete testimonials available from a female Sandinista insurgent, and her high rank within the movement provided for extended interactions with men. Thus, due to both the quality of the texts and the personal situations of the insurgents, Cabezas and Herrera’s narratives provide a fertile starting point to study gender relations during the Nicaraguan revolution.

In this paper, I will argue that the two insurgents undergo different arcs of gender consciousness: Cabezas joins the revolution with traditional ideas of masculinity foremost in his mind, and later changes his understanding of masculinity to fit the precepts of a revolution in the periphery; meanwhile, Herrera joins the revolution for strictly political reasons, discovering along the way how gender impacts her role in the movement. In both of these processes of gender consciousness, the insurgents recognize their own position of inferiority: Cabezas against the U.S. supported dictatorship, and Herrera against her male comrades.

Even so, their negotiations with gender in this similar context lead to radically different results. Cabezas, like the proper “New Man,” who is driven by personal responsibility and moral obligation to his community, upon recognizing his softness as a weakness, embraces it as a source of masculine strength. However, this is only possible because his experiences with reproductive labour allow him to romanticize gender roles in his perception of his purpose within the revolution. Herrera, on the other hand, begins to recognize how her womanhood is an obstacle to her participation in the revolution. Faced with a very different dynamic of inferiority, she must approach the use of “softness as strength” not as a romantic source of inspiration as in the case of Cabezas,

but as proof of her commitment for overcoming this added burden. These experiences also help clarify the very masculine orientation of the revolution, adding to the problematic perception that women’s interests and broader revolutionary interests do not align.

I will begin by contextualizing the revolution and its relationships of subordination, as well as its consequent impact on reformulations of gender. Then, I will trace the process of gender consciousness the two insurgents undergo, along with their changing perceptions of gender and its role in their own participation in the revolution. To do this, I will examine two experiences that both revolutionaries undergo: romantic relationships and parenthood, with a special focus on motherhood.

**Historical Background**

Anastasio Somoza ruled Nicaragua from 1967 until the triumph of the Sandinista revolution in 1979. The dictatorship was marked by merciless oppression of opposition of any sort, often through the National Guard. The Sandinista Revolution was led by the FLSN, which was established in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca, Silvio Mayorga, Tomás Borge, and aimed to overthrow Somoza and install a socialist government.

Beyond the general narrative, however, this particular revolution requires an understanding of the relationship of dependency between the United States and Nicaragua. The U.S. involvement in Nicaraguan politics goes beyond simply supporting the Somoza regime. On the eve of the establishment of the FLSN, nearly every state institution under Somoza was U.S. sponsored, from the banking system to Congress and, most importantly, the National Guard.\( ^6 \) The National Guard and its association with the United States comes to figure prominently in the narratives of the insurgents, as they

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6  Baracco, *Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation*, 57.
represent the efforts of Somoza to crush the revolution. Author Luciano Baracco sums up the complete submission of Nicaragua to the U.S. when he writes, “national sovereignty over the state was reduced to a fiction. The Somocista regime represented the final outcome of a long-drawn-out process to stabilize Nicaragua on the part of, and in the interests of, the U.S.” The FSLN adopts the name of Augusto César Sandino, the Nicaraguan who led another rebellion against U.S. occupation between 1927 and 1933, to construct and appeal to the “Nicaraguan people’s inherently rebellious, anti-imperialist identity.”

This dynamic involving a physically superior enemy becomes very important with respect to conceptions of masculinity. As scholar Lorraine Bayard de Volo notes, the clear difference in military strength between the FSLN and the U.S. backed Somoza regime complicates the traditional binary that equates strength with masculinity. For example, she explains that “the revolutionary state thus discursively positioned itself in relation to the primary enemy, the United States, in a secular David-and-Goliath relationship in which the smaller and seemingly weaker force was the more sympathetic, dedicated, and ultimately victorious (masculine) figure.”

This idea of a sympathetic guerrillero appears frequently in Cabezas’ book, as well as in Che Guevara’s discourse on the “New Man.” Upon joining the FSLN, Cabezas manifests his desire to “be like Che.” He learns that the New Man is “a tender man, who sacrifices himself for others, a man who gives everything for others, a man who suffers when others

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7 Baracco, Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation, 57.
8 Ibid., 64.
10 Ibid., 429-430.
11 Guevara, Socialism and Man in Cuba, and Other Works
12 “Hay que ser como el Che.” Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own; Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 7.
suffer, a man who also laughs when others laugh.” As will become apparent, this performed masculinity contrasts greatly with his initial notions of manliness. Likewise, on a wider scale, the New Man was the revolutionaries’ response to a power dynamic that rendered traditional conceptions of masculinity unavailing.

The struggles of the revolution also changed conceptions of femininity. De Volo observes that “women who participated in the overthrow of Somoza discovered new levels of courage, stamina, and strength.” In theory, the FSLN integrated women’s rights explicitly into its goals, proclaiming in its Historic Program that “the Popular Sandinista Revolution will abolish the odious discrimination that women have suffered in relation to men; it will establish economic, political and cultural equality between women and men.” In reality, however, this was not the case. Author Ilja Luciak remarks that there was a clear discrepancy between what was set forth in the Historic Program and daily practice, namely the “recognition of women’s potential was self-serving and was not grounded in support for women’s rights.”

Maxine Molyneux, in her insightful work on women and the Nicaraguan revolution, also notes that the revolution required “the subordination of their specific interests to the broader goals of overthrowing Somoza and establishing a new social order.” One investigation called “Re-Evaluating Gender Roles and Revolutions” in 2013 went so far as to measure the participation of women as a factor of utility in relation to the success of revolutions in Nicaragua, Russia and Ireland.

13 “un hombre tierno, que se sacrifica por los demás, un hombre que da todo por los demás, un hombre que sufre cuando sufren los demás, un hombre además que ríe cuando ríen los demás.” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 47.
14 Bayard de Volo, Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs, 38.
15 “La Revolución Popular Sandinista abolirá la odiosa discriminación que la mujer ha padecido con respecto al hombre; establecerá la igualdad económica, política y cultural entre la mujer y el hombre.” Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, “Programa Histórico Del FSLN.”
16 Luciak, After the Revolution, 20.
17 Molyneux, “Mobilization without Emancipation?,” 229.
This instrumentalization of women produces a “New Woman” that focuses heavily on women’s reproductive utility: images of combatant mothers or combatant-bearing mothers become “mobilizing identities,” according to de Volo.19 Thus, the New Woman is on the surface similar to the “New Man,” as both “insisted that tenderness and toughness were not contradictory and that the revolutionary must develop both qualities.”20 However, they arose with very different intentions. Whereas the New Man offered a novel way for men to see themselves in light of clear physical inferiority, the image of the New Woman rationalized subordination to serve a revolution by and for men. If women’s interests did not align with the revolution’s interests, it is because the revolution was not neutral, but rather defined by men.

The Revolutionaries’ Experiences

The Beginning

In the beginning, Cabezas characterizes himself as “an emblematic macho college student who drinks, smokes, philanders with women and gambles to pass the time, activities that suggest a form of competition with other males and thus reinforce long-established masculine patterns.”21 This behaviour will later produce a clear contrast between the tenderness and fraternity he learns when he is deployed to the mountain.

Herrera, on the other hand, offers a memoir coloured with greater hindsight, which blurs our view of her development of gender consciousness. Nevertheless, her actions and thoughts reveal that she also took for granted traditional views on gender before and even during her formal involvement in the FSLN. One clear example comes in her youth, when she wins a scholarship to study in the School of Nursing in San José, Costa Rica. Her father, taking advantage of

19 De Volo, Mothers of Heroes, 38-39.
21 Orr, “From Machista to New Man?”
a clause that allows for the scholarship to be passed to a blood relative, chooses to pass the opportunity to Herrera’s sister.\textsuperscript{22} Though she feels betrayed by this decision, she “didn’t say anything, because really with my father I was always very un-conditional, and I had this conception of obedience and loyalty and sincerity, due to the way he raised me of course.”\textsuperscript{23} She does not challenge this injustice based on her learned understanding of power dynamics between parent and child, and man and woman. She also notes that he considered her an economic factor in the family, highlighting again the greater importance of a woman’s utility over her needs.\textsuperscript{24}

\textit{Taking up Arms}

Although it might be easy to assume that gender played a greater role in women’s decisions to join the revolution compared to men’s,\textsuperscript{25} the reverse seems to be true. Cabezas tells of a former classmate who convinces him to join the cause by appealing to Cabezas’ sense of masculinity: “he put forth the question of being a man, not in the sense of the macho, but rather in the sense of the man that acquires historic responsibility and a commitment to others, who gives everything for the happiness of others.”\textsuperscript{26} Orr clarifies this point further: “Cabezas eventually participates in Sandinismo not necessarily because of his beliefs or ideals, but as a means to surpass the insecurities related to his ‘fragile’ male identity.”\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} González et al., \textit{Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante}, 41.
\item \textsuperscript{23} “No le dije nada, porque realmente yo con mi papá siempre fui muy incondicional y tenía esa concepción de la obediencia y de la lealtad y de la veracidad, gracias a él por supuesto,” González, et al., \textit{Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante}, 41.
\item \textsuperscript{24} González et al., \textit{Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante}, 43.
\item \textsuperscript{25} “te planteaba la cuestión de ser hombre, pero no ya en el caso del macho, sino del hombre que adquiere responsabilidad histórica, un compromiso para con los demás, de quien lo da todo para felicidad de los demás.” Cabezas, \textit{Fire from the Mountain}, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Orr, “From Machista to New Man”
\end{itemize}
Evidently, gender roles figure prominently in Cabezas’ motivations to join the Sandinista cause.

Herrera operates on a different logic. Luciak tells us that apart from rare exceptions, in general “women did not join the struggle to advance a feminist agenda but were motivated by a much broader desire to fight for social justice.”27 This reflects Herrera’s motivations, who muses that she cannot pinpoint a date when she began her involvement in the movement: “for as far back as I can remember, my house had been a place where I always saw clandestine meetings, the transfer of clandestine documents, activities that were clandestine… that was the environment in which I grew up.”28 In a 1997 interview, Herrera further relates that:

We as women joined the movement, maybe not because of gender consciousness, but with the realization that we would fight for substantive, profound changes. We did not foresee that we would have to face a dual struggle— the struggle against the system of government and the fight against the men in the movement.29

Though Cabezas’ conception of masculinity is a driving factor spurring his involvement, Herrera’s conception of femininity is not. Her comment, however, makes it plain that gender consciousness is quickly acquired through her participation in the revolution.

Romance or Solidarity?
The insurgents’ experiences with romantic relationships (though that adjective could be contested in the case of Herrera) exempli-

27  Luciak, After the Revolution, 19.
28  “Desde que tengo uso de razón, mi casa fue un lugar donde siempre vi reuniones clandestinas, trasiego de documentos clandestinos, actividades que eran clandestinas… ese fue el ambiente donde me fui formando.” González, et al., Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante, 21.
29  Luciak, After the Revolution, 18.
fy the goals of the revolutionaries upon joining the movement. In the case of Cabezas, he admits that often his love for Claudia, his girlfriend, was what “helped me keep going, helped me live, helped me be better… I felt the necessity to be an example for her and for the little girl that had been born.”

Though we will touch on the theme of his daughter later, at this point Cabezas’ love life not only precedes, but in a way inspires his life as a revolutionary.

For Herrera, her relationship with René Tejada is very nearly the opposite. “My relationship with René,” (who in fact serves as a mentor for Cabezas) she says, “did not come about because I fell in love, or because of some feeling born spontaneously in the heart, instead it was more a feeling of solidarity.” For her, the revolution comes first. When she officially joins the FSLN, for example, she makes this priority plain. Tejada leaves the Soviet Union, where they were both studying, for Nicaragua to join the Front first. When it is her turn to sign up, he believes she wants to go to Nicaragua to be with him: “see how far machista egotism goes,” she says, “With you or without you, I’m going to Nicaragua, so you can forget that I’m going because I’m following a man.”

Placing the revolutionary cause before her relationship contrasts not only with Cabezas’ priorities, but with Tejada’s as well. Since Tejada (or Tello, to Cabezas) served as Cabezas’ mentor, we are privy to a special window into his perspective in Cabezas’ book. “He looked hardened by the mountain… but I felt that Tello also had a great feeling of solitude. Afterwards he

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30 “me ayudaba a seguir adelante, me ayudaba a vivir, me ayudaba a ser mejor… sentía la necesidad de ser ejemplo para ella y de la niña que habla nacido.” Cabezas, *Fire from the Mountain*, 103.
31 “mi relación con René no fue a partir de un enamoramiento, de un sentimiento así nacido del corazón espontáneamente, sino más bien fue un sentimiento de solidaridad.” González et al., *Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante*, 49.
32 “mirá hasta dónde llega la egolatría machista…” “Con vos o sin vos, yo me voy para Nicaragua, así es que olvidate que voy porque voy detrás del hombre.” González, et al., *Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante*, 52.
told me that a woman that he had loved very much had left him... and he became very nervous when speaking of this.” Though we do not know for sure, we can guess based on the time that this exchange took place that he is speaking of Herrera, and that she plays the same role of muse as Claudia did for Cabezas. This episode represents the beginning of Cabezas’ acceptance of the “softness” of the New Man, and the beginning of Herrera’s recognition of her position as a woman in a machista revolution. A pattern of the gender dynamics during the revolution emerges: the sense of solidarity encompassed in the New Man existed only between men. Women continued to play a supporting role in the fraternity.

Interestingly, Cabezas also faces a relationship of solidarity between a man and a woman. While on the mountain he receives a letter from Claudia in which she explains that she is in love with someone else: “I hope that you understand, just know that I will always love you, and I will always respect you and admire you, fraternally.” During the subsequent onset of overwhelming solitude, he rejects her offer of love in solidarity; instead, he finds his purpose in a renewed commitment to the revolution. He expresses this in a poem: “Now that I have lost you/ I realize/ that if it weren’t for PLOMO/ it would have been shit.” Up to this point, his relationship with Claudia took emotional precedence over the revolution.

Herrera’s emotional priorities upon losing Tejada are the opposite. Upon learning of his death, she is impacted by the news, but meditates that “I refuse to accept that you have succumbed, when

33 “se miraba endurecido por la montaña... pero lo que yo sentía también era que Tello tenía un gran sentimiento de soledad. Después me contó que lo había dejado la mujer a quien había amado mucho... y se ponía muy nervioso al hablar de eso.” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 41.
34 “Espero que comprendáis, dejame decirte que siempre te querré, o que siempre te respetaré y te admiraré, fraterna.” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 103.
35 “Hoy que te he perdido/ me doy cuenta/ que si no fuera “PLOMO”/ fuera mierda.” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 107. PLOMO refers to Patria Libre o Morir, Free Homeland or Death.
there is still so much left to do.”  

Her priorities are further evidenced when Carlos Fonseca, one of the founders of the FSLN, passes away. She says “that was the blackest day of my life.” In contrast to Cabezas, Herrera prioritizes her commitment to the cause and solidarity with its participants before her personal relationships.

Besides highlighting how the insurgents gained gender consciousness during the revolution, this comparison of priorities brings forth another important observation. Though often it is rightfully asserted that women relegated their needs and prioritized the revolution, there is an implicit assumption that the needs of the revolution align with the needs of men. This may be true in the context of a revolution designed by men—“it was men who formed, who initiated the movement, and machista men at that,” says Herrera—however, these examples demonstrate that this alignment was no coincidence. Men had clear needs (i.e. the preservation of women’s roles as supporters) outside of the goals of the revolution (i.e. overthrow the Somoza regime), and unlike women they certainly did not defer them.

This dynamic also helps explain the lack of progress in regards to women’s rights after the triumph of the Sandinistas: reactionary men, particularly in rural Nicaragua, feared the possibility of women gaining more agency, which means that after the revolution, “as men resisted Sandinismo’s push to modernize patriarchy, the Sandinista state yielded to men’s interests.” Though it is outside the scope of this paper to address the full range of men’s interests at the time of the rev-

36 “me resisto a aceptar que hayas sucumbido, cuando aún falta mucho por hacer.” González et al., Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante, 180.
37 “Ese día fue el más negro de mi vida.” González et al., Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante, 222.
38 “realmente son hombres los que estaban formando, los que iniciaron el movimiento, y hombres machistas.” González et al., Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante, 351.
39 Rosario Montoya, Gendered Scenarios of Revolution, 152.
olution, it is important to signal that they existed, and that if they aligned with the goals of the revolution it was because the movement was initiated by men; the revolution and its goals were not gender neutral.

Doting Fathers and Combatant Mothers

*A feeling of great tenderness overcame me*
—Omar Cabezas, *Fire From the Mountain*

*I was just an object*
—Leticia Herrera, *Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante*

These opposing responses to parenthood sum up the development of the insurgents’ gender consciousness. Through her experiences as a revolutionary, Herrera discovers what it really means to be a woman fighting in a machista revolution, and Cabezas submits himself to the softness of the New Man. In the case of Herrera, she explains that she and Tejada “had agreed that I wasn’t to end up pregnant.”

40 Here again, men’s interests (divergent from the goals of the revolution) not only exist, but take precedence. Herrera explains that “men, for example, when they enter those emotive, emotional, sentimental trances, when they see clearly that they’re not really going to survive, an anguish came upon them that they wouldn’t have children, that I’m not going to leave behind any children. Who would continue the fight?”

41 In Tejada’s conception of the revolution, the old theme arises again: it is more important to the cause for women to bear sons than for them to participate in the revolution. For this reason, ac-

40 “habíamos hecho el compromiso de que yo no debía salir embarazada.” González, et al., *Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante*, 72.
41 “los hombres, por ejemplo, cuando entran en sus trances emotivos, emocionales, sentimentales, de tener claro que realmente no iban a sobrevivir, les entraba la angustia de que no tener hijos, de no voy a dejar hijos.” González et al., *Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante*, 77.
cording to Herrera, Tejada, who is a trained medical professional, takes advantage of the fact that Herrera is not fully informed about female ovulation and makes a unilateral decision.42 “It was him, really, who belligerently made the decision regarding the pregnancy,” she says.43 It is this experience that decisively makes it clear to Herrera that her womanhood is incompatible with this machista interpretation of her cause.

Her bitterness at this realization is directly at odds with Cabezas’ experience (or non-experience) with reproductive labour. He finds out that Claudia is pregnant with his child while he is on the mountain. Unlike Herrera, for Cabezas becoming a parent is a softening and empowering feeling. “I felt so delicate, so tender, you know?”44 However the New Man does not eliminate all the vestiges of the Old Man. Before he finds out he will be having a daughter, there are rumours that Claudia is pregnant with twins. This is associated with the masculine strength of Cabezas, as his companions bleat in response, “Look at that power! What a brute!”45 Parenthood, in the case of Tejada and Cabezas, is an empowering experience that inspires softness. For Herrera, on the other hand, it is an impediment that inspires bitterness.

These reactions to parenthood also show us how the revolutionaries faced their position of inferiority. De Volo, analyzing Cabezas’ memoir, explains that tenderness as a way to show toughness meant that “the male guerrilla, in becoming a New Man, became indisputably masculine, but through a new masculinity that incorporates traditionally feminine attributes.”46 She further argues that this New Man didn’t show love just for his male comrades, but also “expresses tenderness and love for ‘the people,’ a trait more specif-

42 González et al., Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante, 78.
43 “fue él, el que realmente tuvo la beligerancia en la forma de decisión en cuanto al embarazo.” González et al., Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante, 86.
44 “me sentí tan delicado, tan tiernito, ¿ves?” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 80.
45 “¡qué clase de poder, qué barbaridad!” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 79.
ic to revolutionary combatants aiming for social transformation.”

Though this is true to a certain point, I argue that this tenderness is inspired by but excludes women. Traditionally feminine qualities of softness are adopted by the revolutionaries in view of their physical inferiority; however this tenderness omits women and keeps them in their traditional roles, offering a sort of foil for masculinity to maintain its superiority (in the traditional sense) to someone, even if not the enemy.

Although parenthood evokes the radical difference in approaches to reformulating gender in the context of symbolic and concrete inferiority, these differences are particularly acute specifically in the realm of motherhood. Any attempt to draw a parallel between men and women who adopt softness as strength in their position of inferiority is artificial. The “softness” of motherhood that women were encouraged to embrace was not empowering in the way it was for men. Herrera reminds us that women, in every way except physically, are stronger than men. Specifically, she explains that “the woman who is a mother has felt more pain…. It wasn’t just the birth, it was living a life of suffering, and suffering just for the fact of having male children; because just for the fact of being male...for the Guard he was a potential guerrillero…. So the woman who is a mother is more hardened.”

The strength that women acquire from the “softness” of motherhood during the revolution is in fact thanks to overcoming the difficulties of not only being a single mother, but also of loving men who are born to die.

Her position contrasts greatly with that of Tejada, who actively wants sons to continue the struggle. It so happens that Cabezas also believes he is going to have a male child. In contrast to Herrera’s reflection, upon thinking he himself is going to die asks only

48 “La mujer madre ha sentido más el dolor… Era no solamente la parida, era vivir una vida de sufrimiento y sufrimiento por solo el hecho de tener hijos varones; porque con solo el hecho de ser varón…para la guardia era un potencial guerrillero… Entonces la mujer madre es más aguerrida.” González et al., Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante, 278.
that his friend tell his son that his father was a revolutionary “who fulfilled his obligation, so he can be proud all his life for the father that he had.” 49 Again, parenthood is a source of pride and a show of potency for Cabezas, as it is a way to ensure his legacy continues. Parenthood creates strength for Herrera not for its symbolic value of continuity, but because it tests her commitment for the cause by literally asking for her sons as sacrifice. With this in mind, Herrera’s opening remark in this section coheres with her experiences: she is an object of reproduction. This dynamic is even clearer when she laments that often her daughter, born some years later, resented her absence. “What was my priority? My daughter… or the Revolution?” 50

The men of the revolution, on the other hand, are the beneficiaries of reproduction. Particularly near the end of the book when Cabezas has accepted the tenderness of the New Man, he uses the symbol of motherhood as inspiration. Land, one of the essential elements of the Sandinista platform, suffers the tired metaphor of becoming a sort of mother for the peasant. “How is he supposed to just take it and not fight for what for him is mother, wife, livelihood, affection, feeling, secret relationship - such as is the earth?” 51 The earth produces and provides for the man. The mountain plays a similar role, when Cabezas explains that “the mountain was our protector, she helped us, she hid us, she kept us in her depths.” 52 Here the mother plays the role of the protector, the woman who tries to keep the men she loves safe from death, similar to the role Herrera saw for herself.

49 “que cumplió con su deber y que se enorgullezca toda la vida del padre que tuvo.” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 66.
50 “¿Qué era para mí prioritario? Mi hija… o las tareas de la Revolución?” González et al., Guerrillera, Mujer y Comandante, 370.
51 “¿Cómo aguantarse y no combatir por lo que para él es madre, mujer, medio de vida, cariño, sentimiento, relación secreta, como es la tierra?” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 111.
52 “la montaña era nuestra protectora, que nos ayudaba, que nos escondía, que nos guardaba en sus entrañas.” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 66.
Finally, on a grander scale, Nicaragua itself becomes a sort of mother to Cabezas. He meets don Leandro, who was part of the original movement of Sandino, and Cabezas says “never had I felt more like a son of sandinismo, a son of Nicaragua than in this moment.” Even more poignantly, he relates that this episode put him in touch with “the essence of Nicaragua, I found my genesis, my ancestors...I found my energy source... but I hadn’t seen materially my umbilical chord... I discovered it in that moment.” In this metaphor, he combines the two images of motherhood above: the idea of a mother that provides materially for her child, and a mother that protects the child. The maintenance of the traditional role of the woman allows him to use this metaphor as inspiration. Herrera does not allude to the abstract idea of a mother as a source of revolutionary inspiration, because she herself plays that role. There is no room for romance in her lived experiences with motherhood.

Notably, like Herrera, Cabezas also has a moment to reflect on his absence from his daughter’s life. However, he uses a wallet photograph of his daughter and Claudia to build sympathy and trust with the wife of the peasant who is housing him. He says that he is not able to see his daughter because “we the sandinistas abandon everything because we want to liberate the people.” This technique works and the woman begins to sympathise with Cabezas. This of course is not the standard to which Herrera is held as a mother. Cabezas’ obligation as a parent is provided for, which allows him to fight in the revolution. Herrera must face both obligations and choose which to prioritise.

53 “nunca me sentí más hijo del sandinismo, más hijo de Nicaragua que en este momento.” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 115.
54 “la esencia de Nicaragua, encontré mi génesis, mis antepasados... encontré mi fuente de alimentación...pero no había logrado ver materialmente mi cordón umbilical...lo descubrí en ese momento.” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 116.
55 “nosotros los sandinistas abandonamos todo porque queremos que se libere el pueblo.” Cabezas, Fire from the Mountain, 101.
These examples confirm what de Volo alludes to when she describes the use of motherhood to “capture Nicaraguan hearts and minds.” Molyneux calls this phenomenon the “revolutionary appropriation of the symbol of motherhood.”

No matter how it is phrased, this discussion about motherhood in a revolutionary context raises the same questions we saw upon examining the insurgents’ romantic relationships. Are men’s needs not prioritised when women’s care of children is normalised? Molyneux claims that the subordination of women’s interests to the universal goals of the revolution raise:

An important question which lies at the heart of debates about the relationship between socialist revolution and women’s emancipation. For if women surrender their specific interests in the universal struggle for a different society, at what point are these interests rehabilitated, legitimated, and responded to by the revolutionary forces or by the new socialist state?

I argue that this in fact is not the question we should be asking. Instead, we should question the universality of the struggle for a different society. In a struggle defined by men, it would be natural to assume that women’s interests do not align. However, this interpretation ignores the fact that women’s interests are relegated because it is in men’s interest to maintain these traditional feminine roles, such as motherhood. Women’s interests are subordinated exactly because men’s interests are not. The struggle for a new society will not be universal so long as it is led and defined by one gender.

57 Molyneux, “Mobilization without Emancipation?,” 228.
58 Ibid., 229.
Conclusion

The Sandinista Revolution emerges as a fascinating case for gender studies. Nicaragua’s extremely peripheral position in relation to the United States creates a situation where not just feminine but also masculine identities are renegotiated. These historical processes occasion the adoption of traditionally feminine attributes in the redefinition of masculine strength; this in turn precipitates the birth and enactment of the New Man. The New Woman, on the other hand, arises from a speciously similar context. She embraces the “softness” of the traditional woman and mother not as a path to empowerment, but to serve a (masculine) revolutionary cause.

The narratives of Herrera and Cabezas do, of course, represent very personal trajectories: their decisions would have been strongly influenced by their individual personalities and attitudes. Nonetheless, on a wider scale, their stories have served as case studies for the evolution of gender consciousness that revolutionaries underwent, and the ways the insurgents interacted with reformulated gender identities. Most importantly, their experiences offer valuable insight into our own gender bias when theorizing the micro-politics of revolution. In the Nicaraguan case, the New Man adopted feminine attributes only when it was convenient, maintaining the privilege of his superior position. Accordingly, the cry for women not to relegate their interests in the name of a “universal” cause was insufficient; perhaps a more constructive demand would have been to ask that men do relegate their interests in the name of a truly universal cause. And so, every time it is asserted that women’s rights—be it the right to choose, the right to maternity leave, or the right to reproductive health care—are not in line with the greater good, we must question not only those who make these rules, but a society whose “good” is defined by one (masculine and cis)gender.
Bibliography


Normalizing Queer Spaces: Have Pride Parades Lost Their Political Touch?

Andy Holmes

Has equality for everyone within the LGBTQ2+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer, two-spirit) community been met? This paper addresses this line of inquiry by demonstrating how Pride parades have become de-politicized by resisting anti-racist activism. The backlash to Black Lives Matter’s (BLM) protest against police racism in Toronto’s 2016 Pride parade highlights the politics of assimilation to a heterosexual and cisgender society. In this world, BLM’s plea for safety is disregarded in the presence of a political landscape that has now become driven by profit and consumerism in a ‘homonationalist’ ‘post-gay’ movement that this paper explores.

On July 3rd, 2016 Toronto’s 36th annual Pride parade made headlines when members from Black Lives Matter (BLM)—an organization aimed at combating racism towards black people of colour—halted the parade with a 30-minute sit-in protest. Due to its lack of inclusivity for racialized and Indigenous people, BLM argued that police officers in armed-uniform should not be permitted to march in the parade.

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59 Andy Holmes is a third-year teaching assistant and Sociology Honours student doing a minor in Critical Studies in Sexuality. He acknowledges that his paper extracts knowledge from his studies rooted in the occupation of the unceded lands of the Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh First Nations. Andy is interested in studying queer and feminist discourses in an intersectional framework to understand how social inequality manifests in post-colonial societies. He hopes to pursue graduate studies in sociology.
BLM’s protest of Toronto’s Pride parade has become a controversial topic within LGBTQ2+ discourse, including Canadian columnist Christie Blatchford’s assertion that it was “hijacking the Pride agenda.” Blatchford’s comments about the “Pride agenda” are timely considering Toronto’s 36th Pride parade also made headlines when Justin Trudeau became the first Canadian Prime Minister to march. Undoubtedly, Trudeau’s participation in this parade signified a sense of progress for LGBTQ2+ rights.

This sense of progress was not equally experienced by everyone within the LGBTQ2+ community, transcending race, class, gender, and disability, among other identities. As a consequence of competing perceptions of inclusion in Pride parades, cities across Canada are discussing whether police floats should be permissible therein. This debate is ongoing across Canada; Toronto and Halifax have decided that police floats should not be permitted, while cities like Vancouver are considering what action to take. Ultimately, the grim reality of violence that racialized LGBTQ2+ people continue to face brings into question whether all LGBTQ2+ lives are equally protected by police.

In order to explore the controversy of BLM contesting the presence of police marching in Pride parades, this paper first outlines a
history of BLM as a movement, followed by contesting perspectives on the role of police in Pride parades. Subsequently, the theory of intersectionality is explored to offer a framework for understanding BLM’s arguments. Following this, the historical roots of Pride parades will be analyzed to recognize that current fragmentation in LGBTQ2+ communities because of racial and class-based inequality is not unprecedented. Next, we explore the theoretical framework of “homonationalism” and “homonormativity”, which both refer to the assimilation of lesbian and gay rights through nationalism and economic consumerism at the expense of excluding ‘undesirable’ individuals, such as racialized, non-gender normative, and lower-class people.

Multiple iterations of assimilationist policies ultimately contribute to a “post-gay” society where gays and lesbians with privilege seek to assimilate into heterosexual-mainstream culture. A post-gay society is characterized by a rejection of the rigid boundaries which define gays and lesbians as different from heterosexuals. An important characteristic of a post-gay society involves gay and lesbian activism to be less about heterosexual exclusion (“Us versus Them”) and more about inclusion (“Us and Them”). By applying post-gay logic to the controversy of BLM’s request for the removal of police marching in uniform, it is evident that opposition to BLM exists in a post-gay context where participants of Pride parades wish to identify as aligned with the institution of law enforcement as “Us and Them” rather than as inclusive rather than exclusive. I argue that a post-gay society de-politicizes Pride through this inclusive attitude towards law enforcement and corporate sponsorship. Comparatively, resistance to BLM’s request for the removal of uniformed police in Pride parades arises from an intersectional, homonormative framework.

64 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages.
65 Duggan, “The New Homonormativity”
Black Lives Matter
The call for the removal of police floats in uniform exists in the context of racial profiling by police; whereby racialized and Indigenous peoples in Canada have been disproportionately victim to oppressive law enforcement. As a movement, BLM started in the United States following the fatal shooting of Trayvon Martin, a 17-year old African-American teenager, in February 2012 by George Zimmerman, a ‘neighborhood watch’ volunteer (who was acquitted) in Sanford, Florida.67 Both the Vancouver and Toronto chapters of the organization have explicitly stated that the incarceration and violence that Indigenous peoples experience is inextricably connected to the violence black people face in the context of British and French colonialism.68 Furthermore, the critique of police brutality by BLM as a whole accompanies the fact that many members of BLM are queer69 themselves, and are invested in deconstructing the violence that racialized queer people face.

That being said, BLM has been criticized for exaggerating the existence of anti-black racism in Canada. Unlike in the United States or in Great Britain, police in Canada are in fact not required to document the ‘race’ of the people they arrest.70 By not documenting the ‘race’ of those arrested, a deficit of invaluable information on the possible presence of racially-prejudiced police prevents amending policies critical of how police interact with the public.71 In spite of this lack of data, multiple schol-

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67 Black Lives Matter Website, “The Creation of a Movement”
68 Black Lives Matter Vancouver Website, “Why are you Attacking the VPD for Actions in the US?”
69 The word “queer” will be used interchangeably with “LGBTQ2+” in this paper. One reason for this is to be expansive of as many identities beyond heterosexual and cisgender that the LGBTQ2+ acronym does not cover.
ars have proven the existence of racial profiling of black people in Canada.\textsuperscript{72} In a quantitative study of black, white, and Chinese people’s experiences of police stop search activities in Toronto, Wortley & Owusu-Bempah found that 57\% of black respondents perceived racial profiling to be a major issue, while only 21\% of white and 14\% of Chinese respondents reported the same (2011). Numerous scholars have demonstrated that the association between racially-motivated violence targeting black people is hardly coincidental.\textsuperscript{73} Given these points, the counter-argument that anti-black racism is not a prevalent issue in Canada has been undermined, which legitimates BLM’s presence in Canadian Pride parades.

In spite of an institutional history of racially-motivated violence, one side of the debate asserts that police should be able to march in uniform to signify their institutional support in protecting the safety of LGBTQ2+ lives. As Constable Chuck Krangle in Toronto notes:

\begin{quote}
Police officers are significantly represented in the LGBTQ community and it would be unacceptable to alienate and discriminate against them and those who support them. They too struggled to gain a place and workplace free from discrimination and bias.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

On the other hand, police have the option to march in parades off-duty as civilians in everyday clothing. BLM supports this option because,

The pride parade is supposed to be a celebration of communities and individuals that are oppressed or marginalized, such as the LGBTQ community. The police, as an institution, do not face these

\textsuperscript{72} Cao, “Visible Minorities and Confidence in the Police,” 1-26; Wortley & Owusu-Bempah 2011; Sprott and Doob, “Confidence in the Police” 367-379. \textsuperscript{73} Wacquant, “From Slavery to Mass Incarceration,” 41-60; Blomley, “Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence,” 121-141; Satzewich and Liodakis, “Race”.
kinds of discrimination and are in a position of authority and power, therefore it does not make sense for them to participate.  

For this reason, BLM has argued that Pride parades which permit police marching in uniform normalize the ongoing institutional violence towards racialized bodies. The BLM Chapter in Vancouver, Canada, argues that the institution of law enforcement has deep and important historical implications:

We acknowledge that in certain contexts police presence to perform a job of civil service may deter acts of homophobia and violence, especially at designated queer events such as Pride. However, we cannot divorce the policing institution from its historical and continued violence against Indigenous and PoC [people of colour] communities, racial profiling, or inaction around our missing Indigenous women. We stand with BLM-Toronto and many other BLM chapters in their discontent with police being involved in the parade itself.

**LGBTQ2+ Intersectionality**

Ultimately, BLM’s criticism of police brutality within the context of Pride parades can be understood with the concept of intersectionality: the matrix of one’s multiple identifiers. If some participants of Pride parades are queer and racialized, an intersectional perspective highlights the importance of the different experiences racialized queer people face among their more privileged white queer counterparts.

Understanding intersectionality exposes how homophobic violence is complicated by racism. Violence can be experienced on the basis of multiple identities; “queer people of colour highlighted the role of racism, as well as homophobia and sexism” in their experi-

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75 Vancouver Black Lives Matter Website, “FAQ.”
76 Black Lives Matter Website, “Open Letter to the Vancouver Pride Society.”
77 Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing intersections,” 139.
ences, according to a study on intersectional violence in 2008.\textsuperscript{79} One participant from this study, Kevin, a 62-year-old Black gay man, describes, “when the police beat me up, they called me a fag…I would be surprised if they would [have] done the same thing to a White gay guy, though.”\textsuperscript{80} Although Kevin recalls his experience from a different era of gender and sexual expression activism, his sentiment rings true today, whereby police brutality persists for racialized queers. Queer people of colour often find it difficult to discern if their experiences of violence are provoked by their sexuality, gender expression, or race, which are all intersecting. With this in mind, not all racialized LGBTQ2+ people will celebrate police marching in Pride parades if these police represent an institution of law enforcement that continues to target racialized people.

**Pride Parades Were Once About Political Resistance**

Considering that contemporary Pride parades face the issue of police marching because they still target racialized queer people, it is important to understand that the origin of Pride parades is rooted in a political resistance towards violence against sexual and gender minorities.\textsuperscript{81} The Stonewall Riot of 1969 in New York is often credited as a catalyzing event for annual Pride parades. Sexual and gender minorities at Stonewall mobilized and fought back against police brutality when law enforcement raided the Stonewall Inn’s bar. Subsequent Pride parades in 1970 across the United States occurred in Los Angeles and Chicago, and by 1971 Atlanta, Buffalo, Detroit, Washington D.C., Miami, Philadelphia and Ann Arbor had held parades.\textsuperscript{82} Despite the prominence of these events resisting oppressive law enforcement, historians today have chal-

\textsuperscript{79} Meyer, “Anti-Queer Violence,” 269.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 269.
\textsuperscript{81} I am choosing to refer to activists in the 1960s as gender and sexual minorities because the LGBTQ2+ acronym is a more recent invention. To refer to the activists at Stonewall and similar events as LGBTQ2+ would be anachronistic.
\textsuperscript{82} Armstrong and Crage, “Movement and Memory.”
lenged the popular idea that the Stonewall Riot was the first act of resistance to police brutality.

In fact, the Stonewall Riot of 1969 was successful because similar events preceded it. Throughout the 1950s-1960s, multiple police raids of gay, lesbian, trans, and cross-dressing spaces occurred in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Chicago, yet these raids failed to be historically canonized like the Stonewall Riot. Stonewall, in particular, was able to garner more media attention due to the fact that affluent, well-educated gay men with a connection to newspaper publishers chose to view Stonewall as newsworthy.83 In San Francisco between 1965-1966 notable lesser-known sexual and gender minority liberation events involving police coercion fuelled by prejudice similarly occurred. For instance, in the 1966 Compton’s Cafeteria Riot, transgender customers at a cafeteria resisted police arrest by throwing silverware, plates, cups, and trays at them.84 Another notable event was the New Year’s ‘Black Cat’ raid in Los Angeles in 1967 where shortly after New Year’s arrival, kisses were exchanged at a gay bar and “a waiter [of the bar] was beaten in the parking lot badly enough to rupture his spleen, and was booked on a felony charge of assaulting an officer.”85 These, and other events created a foundation of political resistance that facilitated the success of Stonewall in 1969.86

In fact, BLM’s protesting for racial inclusivity is hardly unprecedented; the very history of the Stonewall Riot’s activist groups were also fragmented on the axes of race, class, and gender. As BLM Vancouver notes, “we feel that Pride no longer represents community action, resistance and revolution.”87 Unsurprisingly, incipient Pride parades following the Stonewall Riot were rooted in exclusivity where “the movement took shape [by] center[ing on] the experience of upper-middle-class white gay

83 Armstrong and Crage, “Movement and Memory.”
84 Stryker, Transgender History.
85 Armstrong and Crage, “Movement and Memory,” 734.
86 Ibid., 734.
87 Black Lives Matter Vancouver Website, “FAQ.”
men and marginalized the concerns of less-privileged individuals. One specific example of this exclusivity occurred one month after the Stonewall Riot, when its activists began to fragment into different activist groups. Originally, activists from the Stonewall Riot formed the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) which included a heterogeneous group of people; gays, lesbians, bisexuals, transgender, working-class, middle-class, and even people of colour. However, soon after its formation, the GLF became dominated by its young male white middle-class members who later broke apart to form the more conservative Gay Activists Alliance (GAA), which sought to reform laws rather than invoke radical activism.

As a consequence of the GAA serving the interests of white middle-class cisgender men, lesbians joined women’s movements, and transgender people, who were explicitly not welcomed in the GAA, formed their own movements. Two important activists who participated in the Stonewall Riot, Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson, were trans women of colour, sex workers, and community leaders who established the Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaries (STAR) in response to being excluded from the GAA. Both Rivera and Johnson created STAR to support particularly impoverished black and Latino trans street youth. Moreover, similar to BLM today, Rivera and Johnson largely spearheaded a resistance to police violence committed against ‘marginalized others’—racial minorities and sex workers—in the 1960s. All things considered, by recognizing that the activists behind the Stonewall Riot similarly disbanded due to competing political interests, BLM’s criticism of contemporary Pride parades for their police presence is a debate that has been integral within Pride Parades since their inception.

When BLM protested in Toronto’s Pride parade, this protest

89 Stryker, Transgender History.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Armstrong and Crage, “Movement and Memory.”
stemmed from a liberation movement steeped in the resistance to police brutality. In the same way that the Stonewall Riot and preceding events in the United States were resisting police raids of spaces occupied by sexual and gender minorities, BLM’s request for the removal of police floats in Toronto’s 2016 Pride parade runs parallel to the very pleas made by activists for the removal of police raiding queer spaces in the 1960s-1970s. BLM argues that those most commonly targeted by police include sex workers, trans people, and queer people of colour; who comprised a significant portion of activists in the 1960s whose concerns were distinguished from those of the GAA. If Pride parades today reflect a normalization of the experiences of particularly privileged gays and lesbians through race and class, then BLM’s plea reminds us that Pride parades should not detract from its political origins of resisting social inequality, including racialized and class-based violence vis-à-vis police officers.

Theory of Homonationalism
To better understand BLM’s 2016 protest, it is critical to discuss the ways in which nationalism intersects with queer identity. Because the imagined notion of a Canadian society is predicated upon the image of whiteness, LGBTQ2+ people who are racialized face unique barriers to being accepted within Canadian society. Queer theorist, Jasbir Puar’s notion of “homonationalism” (short for homonormative nationalism) refers to the political process in which predominantly middle-to-upper-class white gays and lesbians have been granted rights in the United States by engaging with American patriotism in disassociation with the racialized and queered

93 Armstrong and Crage, “Movement and Memory.”; See also: Kinsman, “Cold War Against Queers.”
94 Armstrong and Crage, “Movement and Memory.”; Shepard, “Community Organization.”
‘terrorist other’ in a post-9/11 milieu. Furthermore, Puar notes the significance of the American flag appearing in privatized gay bars, gay gyms, and gay Pride parades, which she posits demonstrates a “pledge of allegiance…to national unity.” The American flag appearing in privatized gay spaces is significant, as these spaces are not accessible to everyone in the public who cannot afford to attend bars or gyms, which can act as important sites of community. Although Puar utilizes a nationalist discourse that centres whiteness in order to enable white gays and lesbians to gain rights in the United States, the theory of homonationalism is applicable to BLM’s critique of Pride parades for becoming homonationalist.

In addition, Lisa Duggan’s theoretical argument of “homonormativity” (2002) refers to the normative assumption that homosexuality is white, cisgender and upper-middle class. This reflects the normalization of gay rights in the United States through de-politicization and neoliberal consumerism. Neoliberal consumerism; the purchasing of products in a free-market capitalist economy, poses the implication of further marginalizing those within the LGBTQ2+ community who are poor. Homonormativity therefore demonstrates which social and political processes are necessary for a previously marginalized group to assimilate into mainstream society. Additionally, Duggan’s critique of neoliberalism demonstrates how Pride parades characterize a form of neo-liberal consumption byways of the proliferation of funding from corporate sponsorships.

With this in mind, one of the demands that BLM Toronto made in their protest of the city’s 2016 Pride parade is the “doubling of funding for Blockorama [a black queer float].” Because LGBTQ2+ culture and politics are often seen as separate to ethnic or other minority groups, media representations of LGBTQ2+ people often focus on displaying the images of upper-middle class

97 Ibid., 70.  
98 Regarding homonormativity, see Ward 2008.  
99 Ibid.  
100 Black Lives Matter Toronto Website
white gay people in order to offer a simplified image for non-LGBTQ2+ consumers in a society where whiteness is normative and hence profitable.\textsuperscript{101} If corporate interests rely on the marketability of whiteness to sell products in a neoliberal homonationalist economy, then Pride parades can be criticized for marginalizing lower-class racialized participants, as BLM argues.

The connection between neoliberal consumption with homonationalism provides the foundation for BLM’s discursive critique of police floats in Pride parades. Further, opposition to BLM’s protest of police can be similarly understood through a counter-terrorism discourse. As Puar argues, in the United States a considerable amount of gays and lesbians began advocating for more rampant policing and law enforcement following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Accordingly, American gays and lesbians began to identify alongside mainstream Americans in a victimhood discourse to terrorism by claiming gays and lesbians are uniquely victimized by terrorism, considering that Islamic countries violently oppress homosexuals.\textsuperscript{102} Further, Puar demonstrates that homonationalist rhetoric allows gays and lesbians to advocate for increased military protection against homophobic terrorism.

One implication of advocating for military protection is its potential translation into a stronger police presence in Pride parades. This is the root of backlash against BLM’s request for the removal of Canadian police floats in Toronto’s Pride parade, which was prompted by the fear of homophobic violence. Notably, the Orlando shooting at Pulse, a gay nightclub, on June 12, 2016, was the deadliest terrorist attack by a single shooter in American history where 49 people were killed and 53 injured. Due to the shooter’s association with ISIS and was Arab, it is reasonable that LGBTQ2+ spaces,

\textsuperscript{101} Binnie and Skeggs, “Cosmopolitan knowledge and the production and consumption of sexualized space” 39-6.
\textsuperscript{102} Puar, “Mapping US Homonormativities.”
including Toronto’s Pride parade, felt their safety would be guaranteed by the presence of police.¹⁰³

Aligned with this anti-terrorism rhetoric, Puar argues that gays and lesbians gain rights by the framing of their identities as less threatening than that of racialized violent terrorists, such as the Orlando Pulse club shooter. As a consequence of the Pulse club shooter’s racialized identity, homonationalism would depict Arab and brown queer bodies as non-conforming to a nationalistic identity. Therefore, two consequences pertinent to BLM emerge. Racialized Arab and brown people who are also queer are then excluded from a homonationalist discourse. Secondly, BLM’s request for the removal of police in Pride parades is faced with resistance due to fear of violent homophobia.

As compared to homonationalism where gays and lesbians have had their rights advance by identifying with their country’s nationalism juxtaposed by militant racialized terrorists, privileged middle-to-upper-class gays and lesbians have also socially progressed by identifying with whiteness.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the progression of social and geographic mobility for particularly upper-middle class white, cisgender gay men in Vancouver’s Downtown West Side between 1975-1985 was largely made possible by the expulsion of active sex workers, some of which were racialized Indigenous women.¹⁰⁵ Similar to Puar’s argument that American gays and lesbians gained rights in a post-9/11 society by contrasting themselves with radicalized Islamic terrorists as a new group of social undesirables, Vancouver’s gay rights movement gained momen-

¹⁰⁴ Becki, “Sex and (Evacuation from) the City,” 197-218. (See for the gentrification of Vancouver’s Davie Village through the expulsion of sex workers)
tum at the expense of the rights of sex workers. Hence, in a discussion around BLM it is noteworthy to recognize they support the protection of the “trans sex worker community and those who are unhomed, [who also] face disproportionate levels of discrimination and harassment from the police.”

In Vancouver…police violence is often [directed] towards Indigenous communities, sex workers and homeless/street-involved communities. We stand in solidarity with them as their experiences are comparable to those of Black folks in the US, where [BLM] started as a movement.

BLM’s expression of solidarity between people who experience prejudice-based violence by police facilitates a critique of the larger institution of law enforcement that particularly disadvantages Indigenous peoples, sex workers, the homeless, alongside various other racialized bodies.

Post-Gay Law Enforcement?
To further understand the intersectionality of queer violence and Pride parades through homonormativity, the notion of a post-gay society is illustrative. Gay rights in the United States have also ‘progressed’ according to a post-gay society (1998-present) which represents the assimilation of middle-to-upper-class gays and lesbians into the American heterosexual mainstream. Gays and lesbians who fall outside of this exclusive category have limited access to the benefits of normativity in a heteronormative mainstream society. An important characteristic of a post-gay society involves gay and lesbian activism to be less about heterosexual exclusion (“Us ver-
Consider that “to be post-gay means to define oneself by more than sexuality, to disentangle gayness with militancy and struggle, and to enjoy sexually mixed company.”

By applying post-gay logic to the controversy of BLM’s request for the removal of police marching in uniform, we can deduce that opposition to BLM exists in a post-gay context where participants of Pride parades wish to identify as aligned with the institution of law enforcement as “Us and Them” rather than as “Us versus Them.” Accordingly, the major criticism BLM has encountered is their exclusionary tactic to remove police, which becomes interpreted analogously to an “Us versus Them” statement. Yet, as post-gay theory implies, activism in the 1960s at events like the Stonewall Riot, in fact, involved distinguishing their unique struggles by invoking an “Us versus Them” framework to highlight their unique struggles against the institution of homophobic and transphobic law enforcement.

Similarly, BLM largely identifies that racism is a continuing struggle even if LGBTQ2+ rights have been achieved. Assuming that not everyone within the LGBTQ2+ community today has the privilege of identifying within the framework of a post-gay society, BLM’s request to remove police in uniform marching in Pride parades is an understandable one. To return to intersectionality, if there are participants in Pride parades who are both black and a member of the LGBTQ2+ community, for example, their inclusion is compromised by the presence of police in uniform who may be complacent in oppressing their racialized identities despite celebrating their LGBTQ2+ identities.

Hence, in “blurring the boundaries” between a queer/non-queer binary, queers — queer people of colour and trans people especially — who refuse to identify with heterosexual and cisgender people are disenfranchised. Importantly, this creates an internal politi-

110 Ibid., 102.
111 Ibid., 117.
cal struggle in the LGBTQ2+ movement by dividing and further subdividing its members. This framework is key in understanding the BLM Pride case. Privileged queers who wish to identify with the institution of law-enforcement merely out of privilege, and not because of a genuine perception that their safety is in jeopardy in the absence of police presence, further demonstrate the ramification of a post-gay society. The implications of a post-gay society with an internally divided queer community are demonstrated by the backlash to BLM in Toronto that this paper addresses.

**De-politicized Pride Through Consumerism**

To further understand BLM’s protest in Toronto requires an analysis of the consumerist quality of Pride parades. Although political in origin, some scholars argue that since the 1980s, Pride parades transitioned from political activism towards advertisement venues for corporate interests who saw large crowds of people as an opportunity to market their products to the masses.\(^{112}\) As sodomy laws were being overturned and “out” gay and lesbian celebrities such as Ellen DeGeneres began to shift attitudes towards gay and lesbian rights, corporate sponsors began to market themselves in Pride parades.\(^ {113}\) Not only are corporate sponsors of Pride parades pervasive in parade floats, they also imply that LGBTQ2+ people (mainly gays and lesbians) have moved beyond a need for political equality; they now are socially recognized and accepted to participate in a consumerist culture within a heterosexual/cisgender dominant mainstream society.\(^ {114}\) Pride parades demonstrate that the interests of corporate companies have created a political reality in which the rights of gays and lesbians can be interpreted similarly to the following statement, “you are what you buy.”\(^ {115}\)

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112 Gudelunas, “Consumer myths and the gay men and women who believe them,” 53-68.
113 Ibid.
In a neoliberal society, gays and lesbians are figuratively allocated citizenship status (within the framework of homonation-alism) as a result of their “privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption.”\textsuperscript{116} Scholars have noted that gays and lesbians have become valued due to their consumerist potential by way of advertising media.\textsuperscript{117} Thus a predominantly ‘normative’ type of ‘gay’— white, middle-to-upper-class, and cisgender have been recognized by corporate businesses as valuable consumers. Correspondingly, those who are not considered to be in the interests of corporate sponsors (i.e. racialized people who earn lower wages) is worthy of discussion.\textsuperscript{118} Ultimately, LGBTQ2+ discourse contingent on the functioning of Pride parades that appeal for financial capital growth currently limits the contours of LGBTQ2+ liberation.

In discussing how BLM’s protest in Toronto’s parade received criticism, it becomes clear that Pride parades have become more focused on consuming products under the façade of ‘liberation.’ The political roots of Pride and its current iteration as an opportunity to consume LGBTQ2+ identity are mutually incompatible. Representing LGBTQ2+ communities as a consumer group, in spite of diverse ethnic and sexuality-based groups, is a perpetuation of media images of predominantly a middle-to-upper-class white gay community.\textsuperscript{119} The normalization of race, class, and gender within the LGBTQ2+ community thus reshapes the meaning of the rhetoric of LGBTQ2+ progression when primarily white, upper-middle-class, cisgender gay men have been granted social, economic, and political power. Anti-racist groups, such as BLM, are critical of this normalization process in a mainstream society that sees LGBTQ2+ issues

\textsuperscript{116} Puar, “Mapping US Homonormativities,” 38.
\textsuperscript{117} Coon, “Sun, Sand, and Citizenship,” 511-534.
\textsuperscript{118} For more information on media produced in the interests of corporate business interests, see Herman and Chomsky 1998.
as separate to issues of racism. Those who are not represented in Pride parades remains a salient issue, which demands equal attention to that garnered by the inclusion in police in uniform. As a post-gay shift emerges, we must critically engage with how Pride parades mediate both cultural identity and mobilizes the normalization of specific groups within LGBTQ2+ populations through media and Pride parades.

Conclusion
The discourse that police presence in Pride parades offers a sense of safety for the LGBTQ2+ community remains an important argument to consider. Nonetheless, an intersectional framework further draws attention to the fact that not all LGBTQ2+ people who attend Pride parades have the privilege to advocate for the institution of law enforcement as police continue to target racialized and other disenfranchised bodies. BLM’s protest of Pride parades must also be analyzed in the context of Pride’s historical roots, which prioritized resistance to police brutality. Knowing that Pride parades were once political acts of resistance to police violence further consolidates the grounds for BLM’s argument.

Understanding the progression of LGBTQ2+ through a homonationalist and post-gay framework—by centering race, class, and gender (among other identities) in a process of assimilation to a mainstream heterosexual/cisgender society—explains the existence of resistance towards BLM. Furthermore, the current consumerist model for Pride parades explains the depoliticization of Pride parades. Ultimately, further research is needed in understanding the implications of queer political equality in relation to Pride parades, consumerism, and racism in a complex matrix of social inequality.
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Political Geography and Subaltern Potentials of a Post-Paris World

Tiago de Souza Jensen

The Paris Agreement’s widespread support, in the context of the increasing urgency of climate action, intensifying inequality, and neoliberal economic policy, demands critical analysis. Through an adaptation of David Harvey’s exploration of spatial meaning in “Space as a Key Word,” this paper will demonstrate the importance of resituating Paris-related discussions in a historicized, class-focused context. Consequently, international norms must shift to prioritize the needs and rights of marginalized populations if real, equitable climate justice remains an aspiration of the global community.

The 2015 Paris Agreement, signed by all Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has been widely supported as a breakthrough effort in global climate negotiations. Despite outspoken support from prominent political figures on the international stage, outcomes of the Paris Agreement still require critical analysis. The increasing urgency of coordinated climate action, intensifying global inequality, and continually evolving neoliberal economic policy-making situate climate policy

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in an ever-shifting theoretical landscape. Understandings of what is “appropriate behaviour on environmental issues in global environmental governance stems from [norms]” which structure the dialogue and possibilities of environmental governance.121 Without an understanding of how the conceptual sustainability landscape is geographically and politically bounded, the Paris Agreement’s impacts cannot be fully understood. By placing post-Paris emissions in David Harvey’s spatial matrix, this paper will demonstrate the importance of resituating Paris-related discussions in a historical context of society, space, and ideas about nature and political being.122 In doing so, this paper will show that disenfranchised and deterritorialised peoples have little to no voice and power in the current international sustainability regime. For this reason, norms must shift to realize the needs and rights of such populations if climate justice remains an aspiration of the international community.

In “Space as a Key Word,” David Harvey explores the importance of space in studies of politics and geography. In his article, Harvey builds a matrix (Figure 1) depicting how space is formulated and understood. He follows the development of understandings of space through Newton, Descartes, Einstein, and Deleuze’s theoretical work. Crucially, Harvey outlines how space-time is conceived through rationalist and positivist understandings as linear, measurable, and controllable rather than constructed, malleable, and contested. Ultimately, Harvey reminds us that accounting for space-time is key in most geographical endeavours, and that all notions of space-time, and consequently sustainability, exist within a historical nexus of competing notions. In essence, these notions in society shape “a political universe, the latest stage in the realization of a specific historical project — namely, the experience, transformation, and organization of nature as the mere stuff of domination.”123 Harvey’s spatial matrix, though intended to help outline the diversity of interpretations of space-time, also has the potential to structure

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122 Harvey, “Space as a Key Word,” 143.
a spatial exploration of other topics, facilitating analysis of how hegemonic discourse is continually contested. International work on sustainability demands a close analysis of the way political discourse on sustainability is reified.

This paper presents a second matrix (Figure 2) based off of Harvey’s spatial matrix to outline the broad theoretical landscape of sustainability and highlight the way certain understandings of sustainability dominate international discourse. The matrix is thus a helpful tool in understanding how the Paris climate negotiations fit into a broader material, ideological, and philosophical project. Figure 2 is particularly important because spatial interpretations are neglected in analyses of spatial dimensions of sustainability discourse. Harvey states that “an event or a thing at a point in space cannot be understood by appeal to what exists only at that point. It depends upon everything else going on around it.”124 Similarly, Doreen Massey explains that space “is not [just] a surface, but a constellation of ongoing trajectories.”125 In other words, material objects and places are intimately linked with processes, people, and objects in other places and times. These claims reinforce the critical importance of the spatial approach in evaluating discursive norms surrounding sustainability; the constellation of spatial forms around climate change, such as emissions, disasters, and development, are tightly linked to the way discourses about climate action are structured.

Moreover, the role of international norms in structuring sustainability discourse cannot be understated. As Finnemore and Sikkink assert, “customary international law is norms.”126 In sustainability discourse, we must be attentive to how normality in discourse holds power. Massey reminds us that “for present [political] relations, it is precisely often ‘normality’ itself that must be challenged . . . it is

124  Harvey, “Space as a Key Word,” 124.
normality that is the disaster.”¹²⁷ Looking at climate work and system change specifically, Wallerstein notes that one of the primary mechanisms holding the international system back from this process is “the pervasiveness of an ideological commitment to the system as a whole.”¹²⁸ Evidently, an exploration of how the international system functions and the problems with its maintenance is an important part of any analysis of climate change and political economy. Figure 2 helps us understand the relations between the material dimension of climate change and sustainability as well as the discourses and systems that surround the actual events.

Furthermore, the matrix also allows for better conceptualization and understanding of a relational, critical analysis of the capitalist approach to sustainability. Maintaining capitalism as a target for critical analysis is important as the international capitalist system must be viewed as dialectically related to those objects, events, and understandings. Harvey shows us that “capitalist solutions provide no foundation for dealing with [problems] which are structurally necessary for the perpetuation of capitalism.”¹²⁹ The sustainability problem is undoubtedly such a problem. Wallerstein also encourages a turn to Marxism(s) in order to pursue a fuller picture of social reality.¹³⁰ Clémençon, in an analysis of the norms behind the Paris Agreement, tells us that this approach to sustainability “does not address fundamental problems with the global capitalist economic system.”¹³¹ Consequently, without a Marxist, subaltern perspective, it is unlikely that productive critique will arise from analysis of existing regimes of truth. This paper will thus approach a breakdown of sustainability discourse by prioritizing these neglected positions and highlighting the ways dominant norms are contested.

¹²⁹ Harvey, “Revolutionary and Counter Revolutionary Theory,” 10.
Post-Paris Emissions and Spatial Geography
The sustainability matrix (Figure 2) aims to contextualize how different facets of the sustainability issue interact. A step-by-step movement through the matrix illustrates how the matrix allows for dialectical analysis of sustainability discourse. The first column of the climate matrix (1-2) relates to the realm of material trends and impacts. Record-breaking climate events (2-2) will continue to develop as the focus of international debate and media attention as have floods in India, typhoons in Southeast Asia, and hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico. Though evidently devastating on a local level, the way catastrophic climate events are discussed on the international stage shapes how climate change is conceptualized.

Relative space and friction of distance (3-2), which refer to the way space is related to itself, has been decreasing as technology allows ever-faster global travel and interaction. In the context of climate change, this adds the new climate stressor of global travel, but also provides new opportunities for global cooperation. Looking, finally, at (4-2), we know “for every degree the average global temperature rises, so do the mass movements of population, the number of failed and failing states, and very probably the internal and international wars.”\(^\text{132}\) Consequently, the way different populations are represented on the world stage must be a consideration of climate negotiations. These material aspects of sustainability and climate change are the functional base of norm development and adoption.

In the second column, the matrix explores representations of space and how the preceding material themes are situated within the context of the international system. These representations (especially 3-3 and 4-3) speak to the politicised nature of all climate negotiations and the system of norms that set the boundaries of what is possible during negotiations. Representations of climate change and sustainability structure international discourse by delimiting how such events can and should be understood. For example, the discourse of material ‘natural resources,’ which reifies the material

\(^\text{132}\) Dyer, Climate Wars, xii.
environment as a resource to be extracted, dominates international conceptualizations of the commons. This notion resists the idea of ‘limits to growth,’ and human economic equilibrium, which signals an important representation of material climate space.

Success of norm entrepreneurs in mainstreaming ecological issues has perversely created an easy out for neoliberal policymakers. Rather than confront the true root of the crisis, that of ongoing modes of unsustainable production and consumption under capitalism, the climate crisis is cast as an unfortunate and perhaps unavoidable ecological process. In the context of the matrix, this involves a conceptual displacement. Instead of understanding the climate crisis in the context of capitalism and international political norms (column 3), neoliberal policymakers have a vested interest in maintaining the absolute nature of the climate crisis (column 1), which amputates the systematic nature of the crisis.

This process is clearly played out on the international stage. International policy organizations such as the IPCC and the COP frame the crisis as almost outside the scope of individual, society, state or international society-originated reform and until fairly recently, not of normative importance. For example, under ‘Drivers of Climate Change’ in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report, capitalism, political power, international norms, and other significant drivers of climate change are not mentioned, in favour of dehumanized pseudo-natural processes such as CO2 levels and ocean acidification. This is in part due to the great effort needed to mobilize support for a materialist, scientific understanding of climate action in the first place. Consequently, selective representations of space have been constituted in such a way as to sideline radical change and envelop environmentalist discourse within existing problematic international norms.

133 Behrens, Meadows, Meadows, and Randers, Limits to Growth, 172.
134 Meadows, Meadows, and Randers, Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update, 295.
Neoliberalism in particular has played a significant role in shaping this landscape of norms. Peck and Tickell note the importance of taking a process-based view of neoliberal norms and remind us that there is no hegemonic global neoliberalism. Instead, compromises in norms and discourse development are critical to the norm adoption process.\(^{137}\) In the context of climate negotiations, states continually negotiate their positions within narratives of development and success in order to leverage unity and diplomatic power as is necessary.\(^{138}\)

The Paris Agreement is perhaps the ultimate expression of the neoliberal discourse in politics as the emissions-trading scheme or marketization of the climate are ways to capitalise on climate change instead of addressing it as a crisis proper.\(^{139}\) Burke et al. assert that the “continued commitment of the UNFCCC to market mechanisms is fetishistic and bizarre.”\(^{140}\) With both developing and developed states accepting the neoliberal norms of the international regime as today’s reality, these norms shape the global political reality which leaves out any discussion of responsibility and accountability. Thus, I conclude that ongoing neoliberal approaches to climate management will strongly oppose any movement towards adopting a relational representation of space (4-3).

The third column speaks to the dialectical tension between material spaces and spaces of representation. This layer exposes assumptions about the relationship between nature and human society (including the construct of nature itself) as well as power relations that constitute international relations. These beliefs influence how climate change should be managed, how international power relationships are structured, and how processes of international justice are shaped.

At present, the taken-for-grantedness of state and population materiality, which stems from matter-of-fact support for the sys-

139  Ibid., 4.
140  Burke et al., “Planet Politics,” 510.
tem in its current form, strips the nation-state of its epistemological heritage. Situated in its historical context, we understand that neocolonial and neoliberal states wield power over their subjects through diffuse cultural means, rooted in longstanding practices. Coulthard quotes Taiaiake Alfred in reminding us that colonial governance is constituted in part through a “fluid confluence of economics, psychology, and culture” rather than visible territorial aggression.141 In the same vein, agreements like the Paris Agreement, which reifies specific values about how international society should work, arise through norms that validate and enforce a colonial, capitalist political arrangement. These international norms can result in negative social consequences at national and regional levels, which arise from a marginalization of deterritorialized people. Canadian treatment of First Nations, which involves the “enfranchisement” of Indigenous communities with the purpose of cultural and social annihilation, is a powerful example of the potential of these state projects.142

As a result, many thinkers are now seeking political reform to the current political system. Daigle, for example, explores a movement for Indigenous self-representation “outside and/or alongside formal state and intergovernmental structures.”143 Boggs also calls for a diffuse anticapitalist movement, stripped of the charisma and vanguards of patriarchal revolutionary movements, shaped by “individuals and groups responding creatively with passion and imagination” to global crises.144 These are extremely important subaltern calls to action; not within or in partnership with the capitalist, colonial international sovereign state system, but outside of it by contesting its hegemony and calling into question its ongoing value. These calls to action must be understood within the context of constantly shifting dominant notions of sustainability. By

143 Daigle, “Awawanenitakik,” 259.
144 Boggs, The Next American Revolution, 178.
understanding these heterogeneous, localized movements within global norm contexts, we can resist the hegemonic power of international norms and create new, sustainable futures.

Conclusion

It remains important to stress that this paper does not claim that contemporary hegemonic understandings of climate action potential are the best we have. Instead, as Bernstein notes, “any cooperative solution on [climate change] is most likely to be accepted if it fits within this set of legitimated norms.”145 This perspective has allowed us to explore the ways material elements like emissions and the post-Paris Agreement itself mix with international norms, politics, and representation.

There are two potential ways of looking forward beyond the current limits of our statehood and societal organisation. First, self-determination, especially anti-colonial Indigenous self-determination in colonial contexts, should be a central part of climate change discourse. Second, because capitalism is the issue, the importance of abandoning capitalist modes of addressing the climate crisis is clear.146 We need to begin reconsidering what rights non-Anthropocentric ecology holds and how we want to penalise violence against these systems.147 In addition, it is critical to continue holding space, capital, the State and the climate in dialectical tension with each other when undertaking sustainability projects to retain all possible avenues for thought and discussion.148 With these principles and the broad ideological context in mind, we can aim for deeper thought and more diverse discourse surrounding climate change and international agreements while remaining focused on the ultimate goal of locally-empowered sustainability movements.

146 Burke et al., “Planet Politics,” 514.
147 Ibid., 516.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>1-1</th>
<th>Material Space</th>
<th>Representations of Space</th>
<th>Spaces of Representation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-3</td>
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<td>2-2</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tensions and exhilarations of space-time compression, speed, motion</td>
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<td>3-3</td>
<td>3-4</td>
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<td>Psychic states (vertigo, claustrophobia)</td>
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<td>4-2</td>
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Figure 1. Harvey’s combined matrix of spatial dimensions.
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<th>Representations of Space</th>
<th>Spaces of Representation</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Space</td>
<td>Natural disasters, resources</td>
<td>Newton, Descartes: Euclidean geometry, placement and positionality</td>
<td>IPCC, Environmental stability, resource scarcity/plenty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative Space</td>
<td>Changing flows of resources and distributions; flows of commodities, people, information, capital; friction of distance</td>
<td>Einstein, Riemann: Non-Euclidean geometry, metaphors of situated knowledges, time-space compression</td>
<td>COP, Human (social, emotional) impact of creative destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>3-2</td>
<td>3-3</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational Space</td>
<td>Emissions concentrations, Social relations, development potentials, pollution concentrations</td>
<td>Liebniz, Deleuze: ecojustice, intergenerational equity</td>
<td>Psychic states (insecurity, objectivity, rationality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-1</td>
<td>4-2</td>
<td>4-3</td>
<td>4-4</td>
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Figure 2. Harvey and Lefebvre’s spatial matrix from a sustainability-focused perspective.
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A Question of Integration: Why Foreign and Defence Policy Stumbles Within the European Union

Anson Kai Yiu Ma

While the European Union represents the world’s premier initiative in supranational integration, it noticeably lacks comprehensive foreign and defence policies. This paper examines the disjointed nature of the foreign and defence policy domain, arguing that the predominant cause of this phenomenon is due to internal misalignment. Further compounding factors are also examined, including the role of external incentives from strong neighbouring countries and pre-established organizations such as NATO. In light of increasingly isolationist sentiments across Europe, the conclusion of this paper suggests that immediate action in this policy domain is not only suggested, it is critical.

The European Union (EU) is one of the world’s leading supranational entities, tightly integrating its membership of twenty-eight...
countries across Europe into many common policy areas. The organization’s responsibilities are broad, spanning from the Schengen Agreement, which allows for citizens to work freely and reside in any of its member nations, to cooperative educational schemes for students to study anywhere within the EU. Integration in the EU is further compounded by the common market and the Eurozone, where no customs barriers exist between member states, facilitating most states to operate on a single currency system. Suffice it to say, the EU is by far the most ambitious project for transnational cooperation yet.

Despite broad policy cohesion, however, one important policy sphere has failed to keep up in this wave of closer integration: defence and foreign policy. Most of these decisions are decided upon inside an intergovernmental forum: The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP details the foreign and defence policies agreed upon by the EU, with a particular focus on empowering the organization’s ability to act on foreign situations that violate international law or democratic principles. Contrary to the relative successes of many other EU schemes, however, this field has encountered many difficulties in the attempt to amalgamate diverging domestic foreign and defence policies, ranging from member states circumventing policy enforcement to actively avoiding EU defence proposals in favour of regional ones with their neighbours.

This paper argues that the individual preferences of the EU’s diverse base of member states has an adverse effect on EU foreign and defence policy. It will begin by giving context to the stakes and mechanics of past discrepancies by investigating the background behind the consequences of a disjointed policy stance between the member states and the EU. An overview will then follow as to the history behind these issues, helping explain what has been done so far towards unifying these policy domains. Following the overview will be an analysis of current research on why and how the foreign and defence policy that does come out at the EU level, as well as its partial formulation by the European External Action Service (EEAS), differs from the preferences of member states, leading
to non-compliance. Finally, a summation of the findings within this paper will allow for an insight into potential areas for further research, and a note on the rising difficulties for further EU integration in implementing policy changes.

There are many reasons why defence and foreign policy stands out as one of the greatest challenges to the EU’s integration. A sustained resistance from member states has pressured the EU to stay out of this area, and set a tone of national autonomy within this policy sphere. Upon assessment, it appears illogical that the EU would run into so many difficulties here. This is partially due to the Treaty of Lisbon, which was enacted in 2009 to overhaul internal functions of the EU. The Treaty elaborates on the EU’s sphere of influence through operatives such as the EEAS, which is tasked with overseeing a cohesive EU foreign policy, and through a Commission mandate to intervene in matters that do not involve security or economics.\textsuperscript{150} With precedents such as the EEAS established for the purpose of unifying policy, it appears that further integration of foreign and defence policy would be fairly straightforward.

Regardless, there are still immense difficulties with reconciling foreign and defence policy between member states. One of the leading causes of these reconciliation challenges is the inaccurate representation of member state negotiations. Less than one-third of delegates receive national guidance on foreign and defence policy, resulting in divergent courses of action and a subsequent discrepancy between member state policy and delegate representation.\textsuperscript{151} This is exacerbated by the informal nature of most policy negotiations, the onus falling on delegates to write policy directives without constant state-delegated communication.\textsuperscript{152} This often results in delegates from different member states easily deviating from the presupposed EU framework or forming external working groups, causing increased polarization between different

\textsuperscript{150} Müller, “EU Foreign Policy,” 362.
\textsuperscript{151} Delreux and Keukeleire, “Informal Division of Labour,” 3.
\textsuperscript{152} Chelotti, “Analysing the Links,” 1059-1060.
member state policies.\textsuperscript{153}

Such an environment hints that common policy stances which do come to fruition without outright conflict are usually lacking in supervision from their national governments. Thus, taking both the informality of the delegations into account, as well as the lack of clear mandates from national governments, this would mean that policies decided upon inside the Council of the EU may not raise any objections from the governments of the voting parties immediately during the adoption, although it may be opposed after the fact. This would follow the earlier observations that there are very few outright rejections and vetoes when they are voted on, hence projecting the sense of unity in national stances observed immediately after adoption.\textsuperscript{154} As such, this would go a long way into explaining why states may resort to deviations after the fact rather than before their ratification.

Given that foreign and defence policy is encompassed by the CFSP, it is worth examining the role that is played by the EEAS. This agency is filled by both European and national staff, and recently launched to represent EU interests worldwide, and especially regarding CFSP objectives.\textsuperscript{155} The EEAS is tasked with a large range of responsibilities, including the role of dictating all policy stances, and relaying EU interests and values through their delegations to individual countries.\textsuperscript{156}

As an organization with such a broad and relevant agenda to foreign and defence policy, it is important to examine how, and if, national interests affect the inner workings of an agency that is designed to interpret national consensuses into one united action. However, the relatively recent creation of the EEAS and its unique position between the European Commission and member states has meant that there have been some ambiguities in its role while it

\textsuperscript{153} Delreux and Keukeleire, “Informal Division of Labour,” 11-14.
\textsuperscript{154} Portela, “Member States Resistance,” 41.
\textsuperscript{155} “What We Do,” European External Action Service.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
transitions into a routine.\textsuperscript{157} It has been the subject of criticism from a range of parties, including EU auditors themselves, who declared the EEAS as being underprepared for their role, and rushed into creation.\textsuperscript{158} As the EEAS is comprised of representatives from both the European Commission and from member states, then from a theoretical perspective, it was intended to be an arena where representatives from both member states and the European Commission can collaborate closely with their counterparts for a unified policy as an integrated actor between the two sides, and with emphasis on tight control by the member states.\textsuperscript{159} Given this structuring, this should theoretically lead towards greater unity on foreign and defense policies, with member states taking the lead.

To the contrary, recent findings have shown that the European Commission implicitly takes a dominant role in the everyday operations of the EEAS. While key diplomatic staff sent by member states act in a somewhat impartial and informational role between the EEAS and their governments, there is a noticeable discrepancy in attitude when it goes down to the rest of the service.\textsuperscript{160} Based on a survey of worker attitudes, both Commission and national employees prioritize following the procedures of their respective institutions when required, but admit that on average, they have a greater sense of loyalty towards the regulations set by the EU.\textsuperscript{161} Other nuances also exist: while it is of no surprise that Commission staff pay closer political attention to the workings of the EU, representatives of the EU’s member states implicitly place a bias by focusing their attention and favours towards the larger member states inside this arena, at the expense of other EU states within the EEAS.\textsuperscript{162} This creates a risk that any foreign and defence policy created here will

\textsuperscript{157} Henökl, “EU Foreign Policy-Makers Decide?,” 682-683, 689-701.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 2; Riddervold and Trondal, “Integrating Nascent Organizations,” 6.
\textsuperscript{160} Henökl, “EU Foreign Policy-Makers Decide?,” 689-690.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 692.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 694.
be tilted towards the interests of the major EU players as well as the Commission, rather than the level playing field originally envisioned by the EU.

The leanings of the EEAS are further demonstrated when we look at it again through the lens of informality, as seen earlier by Tom Delreux and Stephan Keukeleire. This also concurs with Nicola Chelotti’s observations that negotiators from national governments typically have a great deal of autonomy to act, and independence on solidifying a stance. While its formal institutions allow for member states to have a great deal of leeway into the EEAS’ actions, the informal nature of the CFSP extends beyond the EEAS and its burgeoning norms and procedures.\(^{163}\) Coupled with Thomas Henökl’s survey that shows an inclination across all EEAS representatives towards the EU’s interests, this explains why the European Commission is shown to be tightly integrated, to the extent that collaboration on defence, a formal prohibition, occurs.\(^{164}\)

As emphasized earlier within this paper, the predominance of informal links across several EU policy arenas implies that the formal institutions designed for equality instead can become unconstrained, allowing for representative bias to occur. Within these contexts, the EEAS appears to lean towards the interests of the EU rather than its member states. While its nationally-appointed employees do continue to serve their member states when required, their work tends to be on observing and working with the major European countries. This means that there is incomplete representation of the member states regardless, particularly smaller ones.

On the subject of defence, it is worth seeing if external influences, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), may help to explain whether EU members are looking away from the EU for military collaboration, given the likelihood of close overlap in the sphere of defence policy. After all, there has already been precedent set in the past for international collaboration within defence policy itself, such as NATO operations or United Nations peace-

\(^{164}\) Ibid., 8, 10.
keeping missions. Even solely within Europe, for example, there is already the multinational military regiment of the Eurocorps, integrating many soldiers across several European countries into one cohesive unit.

The possibility of external influence is proposed by Patrick Müller, who finds that instead of following an EU-wide mutual defence scheme, member states tend to work inwards (e.g. Scandinavia, or Benelux), or find an alternative military alliance inside NATO, rather than following the EU proposal to coordinate mutual defence. By looking at recent NATO operations such as Libya, some observers have indeed argued that major EU members (e.g. the UK, France, and Germany) have recently tended to break ranks from the relatively slow EU, instead co-opting NATO to emphasize a more European command. This is made further evident by French president Sarkozy’s calls for the “Europeanization” of NATO, and fueled by the elevation of European general staff to command positions within the alliance.

It is important to note, however, that European member state preference for external military collaboration does come with exception. Member states have continued to work closely across and within the EU in the domain of cyber security. Luukas Ilves et al. observe that while NATO is centred on military defence, the EU has taken over the conspicuously missing role of protecting computer networks, through concurrently developing regulations and agencies with the United States. This initiative has already seen early achievements, with highly successful multinational operations and close cross-country collaboration under the lead of the EU. Hence, while the EU did gain additional capacity to take action through attempting to mobilize a unified

165 Müller, “EU Foreign Policy,” 365-366, 369-370.
167 Ibid., 84.
169 Ibid., 134.
defence scheme, it has been argued that the capacity remains largely unused as countries avoid delegating such power in the security domain to the EU.

An alternative explanation to the split between member state preferences and EU policy is that crises, such as that of the recent conflict in Ukraine, strengthen the CFSP in initial posturing as a united front against a target. However, these incidents instead create a paradox by providing an even stronger incentive for outsiders to undermine it. This argument runs on the basis that the CFSP is non-binding for its members and the historically strong and rivalrous influence that Russia has held on its border European states; claiming that members have an incentive to break away in a crisis situation.\(^{170}\) This is in contrast to Müller, who sees it more as an issue of member states actively turning away from the CFSP for the purposes of cooperation elsewhere. Instead, Mitchell Orenstein and R. Daniel Kelemen posit that the CFSP does strengthen itself during a crisis.

Due to the fact that the CFSP does allow member states to take an independent domestic position in foreign policy, however, the result is that countries who sought to undermine the EU before now have a greater impetus to do so.\(^{171}\) This analysis also implies a link that is similar to a feedback loop, and suggests that a strengthening of the CFSP will worsen the security conditions unless it is drastically reformed to discourage deviation. In any case, while it has been demonstrated that crises may have potential benefits for building up cooperation inside a security context, the net result will offset this. Instead, the outcome is likely to end up fragmenting the CFSP further due to national tendencies to work outside the EU framework, or due to the incentives of further fracturing becoming more attractive to the EU’s rivals.

The consequences that have occurred due to the EU’s relatively inconsistent and unenforced policy, has provided member states with incentives to deviate from the policies that the EU’s member

\(^{171}\) Ibid., 98-99.
states have agreed upon. This has caused small member states near Russia (e.g. Cyprus, Hungary, and Greece) to demand payment from both the EU and Russia in considering which actor to support.\textsuperscript{172} Foreign policy domains that have shared jurisdiction, such as humanitarian and developmental aid, have also caused the delegitimization of EU policies. For instance, France places the least emphasis on democracy and human rights as a precondition for aid, which is contrary to the common stance of the EU. Given its economic power and its entrenched position within the EU, it matches to counter any EU funding cuts to its former colonies, and develop its own influence in its absence.\textsuperscript{173} While this case differs in scope from the former, it does suggest that deviation occurs comprehensively across the broad spectrum of EU policy, further complicating any solution towards harmonizing domestic and supranational positions.

Although disharmony exists within EU foreign and defence policy, unification strategies have been suggested to encourage countries in following the collective policy established by the EU. One school of thought suggests launching EU-sponsored regional cooperation initiatives in foreign and defence policy. This program would reconcile the lack of coordination within the EU framework, with the tendency for member states to consolidate policy by geographic proximity to one another.\textsuperscript{174} This solution would also address member state deviation from EU policy platforms. As observed earlier within this paper, small member states such as Cyprus and Hungary are incentivized to break off individually and reach out to sanctioned nations for benefits, undermining CFSP stability.\textsuperscript{175} This can be offset through the regional coordination initiatives, which suggests close collaboration between neighbours as a mechanism for disabling external influences, such as Russia.

One example that the EEAS has taken towards this is their recent

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\textsuperscript{172} Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses,” 97-98.
\textsuperscript{173} Portela, “Member States Resistance,” 56-60.
\textsuperscript{174} Müller, “EU Foreign Policy,” 361.
\textsuperscript{175} Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses,” 87.
\end{flushleft}
leadership EU foreign and defence policy initiatives. While falling short of an EU-wide comprehensive strategy, this has had success at the regional level, suggesting that a large-scale implementation of EU-sponsored regional cooperative schemes may be a prudent mechanism for addressing stagnation of foreign and defence policy integration.176 These sponsored initiatives would promote working within the structures of the EU while having a great deal of autonomy, rather than the previous examples where states worked completely independently from the EU. This plan will also give the EU some more leverage in coordinating the general direction of the overall policies between each region, rather than each cluster of member states deciding upon their own path with no guidance.

Another proposed solution to offset member states’ lack of foreign and defence policy cohesion is a legal clarification of the EEAS’ role. It has been observed throughout this paper that one of the most pressing issues affecting the EEAS is the lack of legal clarity as to its jurisdiction, and great amount of ambiguity in its exact duties. It is notable that the EEAS has begun to serve as the epicentre for policy coordination between the EU and its member states, and it has shown some success in creating regional agreements.177 Its relatively new position and diverse staff, however, has caused internal conflict, and the transitory atmosphere has created lots of inconsistencies in the areas of responsibility between its broad range of staff.178

This has led to the suggestion that the EU should prioritize the issue of clarifying the legal responsibilities between EU agencies and the member states, rather than creating a bureaucracy that will continue to struggle against this central issue.179 By providing greater clarity in the duties of the EEAS, this will create a stronger mandate for its existence, rather than its current image of disorga-

177 Ibid., 13.
178 Ibid., 9-10; Henökl, “EU Foreign Policy-Makers Decide?,” 682-683, 689.
nization. In addition, with such a stricter mandate, this should encourage member state delegations to work within the better-defined official channels of the EEAS. These outcomes should minimize the post-agreement deviations that were seen earlier, and such a solution would provide a solid foundation for greater cohesion from the top-down.

The EU still struggles to reach its objective of a united and consistent foreign and defence policy. As it currently stands, the dynamics of preferences between individual member states stifles the EU’s ability to act cohesively as a whole within this policy field. This continues despite the recent post-Lisbon reforms to improve the situation, such as the establishment of the EEAS’ cohesive policy initiatives. Despite the mandate of the EEAS, there has only been minor success at foreign and defence policy integration because of the ambiguous nature of the service and post-agreement deviations by member states. Member states also have to grapple with balancing their alliance commitments, such as cooperation with NATO for defence on one hand, and with the EU for cybersecurity on the other.

In addition, the established practice of member states’ representatives lacking directive and diverging from member state practices is an issue that has consistently undermined greater integration initiatives. The internal bias favouring both the Commission as well as larger countries amongst EEAS staff further mitigates the power of individual states to pursue their preferred policies. Furthermore, even at times where a policy passes inside the EU, the voluntary nature of the CFSP, and the precedent of collaborating outside the EU framework in defence, has given participants the ability to pursue their own policies regardless of such decisions, which threaten to undermine future supranational cooperation within this policy field.

Some future areas of research that would contribute to finding foreign and defence policy integration solutions would be a more quantitative analysis of what factors compel a member state to deviate, rather than cooperate with a sanctioned nation. Since the EEAS is growing as the centre of defence policymaking between the EU
and the member states, it would also be invaluable to seek solutions
to the issue of ambiguity within this policy sphere, and determine
whether this course of action should be continued, or if there is an
alternative forum that can bridge differences between the preferenc-
es of the EU and that of its member states.

Given the potential chaos of politics and how quickly policies
can change, it is important to acknowledge the impacts of upcom-
ing difficulties that are currently facing the EU. With the British
referendum to exit from the EU, as well as the surge in support
for right-wing populist parties across several member states, there
will likely be greater challenges in finding the political will to ac-
commodate further integration into the EU as governments begin
to look inwards. If such parties take power, the likelihood that new
governments may withdraw their support in favour of greater sov-
ereignty will be incredibly detrimental to the goal of a stable and
coherent foreign and defence policy. As the EU deals with these
crises, it is now more important than ever for the EU to reconcile in-
dividual preferences and take firm leadership in this policy domain
before it is too late.
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Russia, the West, and the Arctic: Global Conflict and Regional Escalation

Will Trefiak

In the field of international security studies, it seems that scholars are divided on the issue of Russia-West relations. ‘Diplomatic compartmentalization’ is one commonly presented theory used to understand Russia-West relations. Here, these relations are viewed in ‘compartments’ of amicable or antagonistic diplomatic practices. Using the scope of ‘compartmentalization,’ I analyze three regions where Russia-West relationships dominate scholarly discourse: Syria, Eastern Europe, and the Arctic. From here, my aim is to outline the implications of spill-over from one of these supposedly compartmentalized regions into others, providing insight into a possible ‘tipping point’ of conflict between Russia and the West.

Russia, The West, and Diplomatic Compartmentalization

The contemporary geopolitical landscape can be primarily defined by conflicting national agendas of a select group of actors.

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With China, Russia, and the United States creating a scenario of global multi-polarity, divisions between states to the ever-so-prominent ‘superpowers’ are becoming more important than they have been since the Cold War period. With the ending of the Cold War a mere 35 years ago, many geopolitical tremors have resonated through international relations as a result. The most crucial of these tremors lies in Russian ambitions for regional influence in various global theatres, such as Syria and Eastern Europe, namely Ukraine and the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{181} Unsurprisingly, Russian ambitions and interventions are completely antagonistic to Western agendas, which emphasize that maintaining the current global order is paramount. As a result, this has led to less communication, cooperation, increased tensions, and overall mistrust between the Russian Federation and member states of NATO.

This multi-regional interaction between superpowers therefore forces us to examine Russia-Western relations from a broader scope of ‘compartmentalization.’ The term compartmentalization is one that outlines Russia-Western relations from a more objective perspective. As defined in Svante E. Cornell’s article, “The Fallacy of ‘Compartmentalization’: The West and Russia from Ukraine to Syria,” compartmentalization is “the separating of areas of agreement from areas of disagreement.”\textsuperscript{182} Regardless of the effectiveness and practicality of this approach to diplomacy, it can be used as a tool to dissect various regional ambitions and draw correlations between theatres where the West and Russia have active objectives they wish to achieve. Simply put, cases where antagonistic ambitions are prominent, such as Eastern Europe and Syria, will display less cooperation between Russia and the West. Conversely, a region where ambitions are more congruent, such as the Arctic, will display a cautioned, multilateral approach that tends to be far more amicable between parties.

\textsuperscript{181} When referencing Eastern Europe, I will be referring to Ukraine and the Baltics.
\textsuperscript{182} Cornell, “The Fallacy of ‘Compartmentalization,’” 98.
As this compartmentalized approach is acknowledged and understood by both Russia and the West, a small degree of amicability has been preserved on the global stage of politics. Due to the lucrative economic potential of the Arctic in terms of shipping and natural resources, all stake-holding parties wish to keep conflict at a minimum so that mutual benefit can be reaped from the region. For the time being, this ‘play by the rules’ approach has worked with minimal spillover from other theatres. However, it is also necessary to consider the military strategic importance of the Arctic to both Russia and Western powers. Therefore, I argue that while successful diplomatic compartmentalization has stymied tensions between Russia and the West in multiple theatres, contrasting national agendas could lead to a conflict in which the security of the Arctic is a matter of critical importance.

By first highlighting the rapidly degrading Russia-Western relations in Syria and contentious developments in parts of Eastern Europe, I hope to display the implications of a worst case scenario in which the Arctic becomes a region of contention. Once this has been established, I will proceed with an analysis of the potential impacts felt by the Arctic when placed in the context of rising global tensions. The final aim of this methodology is to display the Arctic as a region that could be brought further into the fold of Russia-Western power politics through either spillover from other conflicts — such as Syria and Eastern Europe — or through its own intrinsic sources of contention.

**Diplomatic Degradation in Syria and Eastern Europe**

Moving forward, we will now look at the overarching implications of antagonistic Russia-West diplomacy in two regions. By first discussing Syrian military operations, and then the current state of diplomacy in Eastern Europe, my aim is to display the potential for the eruption of full scale conflict between Russia and the West whereby both regions become immensely contested. In other words, this section acts as a diagnosis of potential facets of each respective conflict in order to pinpoint potential triggers of mass hostilities.
The Syrian Conflict
Starting with the Arab Spring movement of 2011, the Syrian conflict can be considered the worst case scenario in terms of inciting a political regime change. After five years, the internal struggles of Syria have become a complex international issue with very clear divisions between key actors. Specifically, both Russia and the United States have taken it upon themselves to assist the Assad regime and the Free Syrian Army, respectively. While this support began in the form of weapons provision and training, it has now escalated to both superpowers carrying out airstrikes.183

Since the advent of this conflict, Russia and the US have disagreed as to how they should address the Assad regime in terms of legitimacy. While Russia was incremental in the disarmament of chemical weapons from the Assad regime, they have received international criticism for the amount of Syrian citizens being unintentionally impacted by their bombing campaign. Conversely, the US has also come under criticism as there are some who view their support of the Free Syrian Army as the sponsorship of a terror group and effectively indistinguishable from the Islamic State.184

The presence of conflicting regional agendas in Syria is perhaps the most obvious due to the respective pro and anti-regime alignment of Russia and the US. This divisiveness is liable to cause increased tensions when US and Russian military operations are taken into account. In their article, “Does This Change Everything? Russia’s First Strikes on Syria From Iran Airbases,” scholar Juan Cole discusses the ramifications of Russia carrying out military operations in Syria from Iranian bases. Cole brings forward two pertinent indicators of the conflict escalating: the first being a Russian breach of agreement in terms of air strike notifications, while the second discusses the implications of Russia using Iran — a historically unfriendly state to the US — as an ally.185

184 Ibid., 27.
185 Cole, “Does This Change Everything?”
The timing of Russian airstrikes in Syria is perhaps the most prominent indicator of escalating conflicts. In a deal brokered by the US and Russia, both parties agreed to provide ample notification of military operations and airstrikes in the region to allow the other party to plan accordingly. However, US military forces have reported a lack of ample notification from Russia, essentially giving US military personnel “last minute notice: enough so the US could make the necessary arrangements, but only barely so.” The implications of this practice cannot go unnoticed as they set a potentially dangerous precedent for other actors within the region to proceed in the same manner. With France, the US, and Russia all carrying out independent objectives in Syria, operational overlap could lead to a climate where Russian or Western personnel suffer mutually perpetuated casualties, which could further deteriorate diplomacy and lead to a greater escalation of tensions.

The second indicator of conflict brought forward by Cole lies in the strengthening of Russian and US allegiances with other actors in the Middle East. By using Iranian airbases as a launchpad for operations in Syria, Russia has effectively positioned itself with a historical enemy of the US, further ingraining the sectarian nature of this regional conflict. As a result, other historical enemies of Iran, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, will view this alignment as threatening. Although US relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel are already well established, we could see further strengthening of these partnerships as not only a response to recent developments between Russia and Iran, but also as a means of maintaining regional primacy.

With allegiances being further entrenched between respective actors, the risk of full scale global conflict becomes...
more pronounced for two reasons. Firstly, more actors aligned with global superpowers essentially means more groups will be brought into the fold if a full scale military conflict were to erupt, ensuring a total war scenario. Secondly, it is important to consider the historical animosity between actors within the Arab world and the implications this could have for the US and Russia. If conflict were to break out between Saudi Arabia and Iran, there is a high likelihood of intervention from both Russian and US military forces on their respective sides of allegiance. Coupled with the Russian precedent of providing little notification to other actors during their operations, we see multiple indicators that could act as priming agents for increased tension. With these considerations in mind, let us now move on to the potential indicators of conflict in Eastern Europe.

Eastern Europe: Ukraine and the Baltics
In late 2013, the brokerage of a major economic deal between Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and Russia sparked mass protests throughout Ukraine. What followed was a country torn between two contesting spheres of influence, effectively throwing the former Soviet state into turmoil. In rejecting an association agreement with the EU for the Russian economic agreement, Yanukovych created a chain of events that led to a civil war in much of eastern Ukraine. With civil unrest being perpetuated by Russia leading to a full scale annexation of Crimea, the future of Ukraine and its alignments are still very unclear.

Throughout Eastern Europe, Russia and the West again have very contrasting views on how to resolve the conflict. One opinion often presented by scholars is that Russia is interested in securing a substantial sphere of influence of its own, and its behaviour in this theatre is very indicative of this.

189 McMahon, “Ukraine in Crisis.”
specific agenda. For instance, Russian and Eurasian studies scholar Elias Götz, describes this agenda broadly as “revisionist Russia” namely, “an aggressive, neo-imperialist power that wants to overturn Europe’s post-Cold War order.” 190 Although Götz presents three different perspectives to explain Russian foreign policy: “Victim Russia”, “Troublemaker Russia”, and “revisionist Russia,” it is the latter that lends itself more readily to the realities of contemporary international politics. 191 Therefore, if Russia is in fact a revisionist power, then it must follow that the agenda of the West – and specifically of EU-NATO members – is one of maintaining the European status quo given that both parties have highly contrasting views. That being said, it is important to note that the majority of conflict in this theatre has been limited to the eastern portion of Ukraine and has not expanded westward.

However, this containment of conflict does not invalidate claims about Russia’s agenda in the region. While the annexation of Crimea is perhaps the most glaring example of Russia looking to re-establish its influence over former Soviet states, recent developments in the Baltic countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia share similar characteristics to what was observed during the height of the Ukraine crisis. Perhaps the largest similarity we see between Ukraine and the Baltics is the omnipresent Russian motivation to establish an alternative to Western hegemony. Evidence of this motivation presents itself in Russian ambitions to effectively fractionalize and undermine NATO and its international legitimacy. Ilya Ponomarev, a former member of Russia’s Lower House (Duma), and the

190 Götz, “Russia, the West, and the Ukraine Crisis.”
191 Victim Russia: “Russia is, at root, a status-quo power with limited aims and ambitions. Instead, the greatest threat to peace and stability on the European continent stems from Western hubris.” Troublemaker Russia: “The ruling elite in the Kremlin stirs up trouble abroad, so the argument goes, to maintain control at home.” in Götz, “Russia, the West, and the Ukraine Crisis,” 250, 255.
only Russian politician who voted against the motion to annex Crimea, provided insights into the Russian strategy:

‘To [challenge the West] by military means is now impossible for Russia. But it is possible to ensure that NATO collapses,’ he wrote. He went on to say that Putin would provoke a conflict in one of the Baltic states in order to see at least one of them trigger NATO’s Article 5.192

While these fears have yet to materialize in the Baltics, much of the cause for concern comes from Russia’s explicit intention to provoke NATO and effectively manipulate the Baltic states towards the Russian sphere of influence. Perhaps even more important is the idea that Russia is willing to gamble on whether or not NATO would invoke Article 5, which is the mandate that allows NATO to intervene in allied conflicts through any means it deems necessary, including the use of force.193 When compounded with the fact that Russia is willing to incite instability and conflict in another sovereign state, it shows a willingness to push NATO to a point of no return and escalate conflict in the Baltics.194

Sections of Eastern Europe, specifically Ukraine, also have the potential to erupt into full scale conflict from direct provocation of NATO forces and institutions in the region. Although both the US and Russia have some degree of involvement in Syria, much can be credited to proxy war-style conflict with the risk arising from the aforementioned challenges to regional stability; and as of now, the US and Russia are not in direct contention with one another. What sets the developments in Eastern Europe apart is not only the provocation of NATO forces in both the

193 Nato “The North Atlantic Treaty Article 5.”
Baltics and Ukraine, but also the mass mobilization of troops in and around the Crimea region during the height of the crisis. Although this mass mobilization has dissipated in recent years due to heavier Russian involvement in Syria, Ivan Krastev, a member of the Vienna Institute of Human Sciences, holds the perspective that “Russia’s willingness to violate Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty is the gravest challenge to the European order in over half a century.” It is also important to note that while the number of Russian troops directly involved in the Ukrainian conflict is relatively low, their assistance to insurgent Russian revolutionaries in the Donetsk region has been brought into visibility as outlined by Götz below:

There is broad agreement among observers that regular Russian combat units intervened on behalf of the rebels in the autumn of 2014 to push back advances of Ukrainian government forces.

While these skirmishes have been viewed as negligible by NATO forces for the time being, this inaction in the face of an agenda that aims for the fragmentation of NATO should not be taken lightly. If the Ukrainian crisis is left to simmer and brought out of the international spotlight – a process already underway due to Russia’s involvement in Syria – then Russia could potentially gain free reign in the region while simultaneously tarnishing the reputation of NATO. With a reluctance to take further measures besides the Aegis missile defense system, NATO has been relatively inactive in this theatre compared to its Russian counterpart. This inaction could be costly as it not only sends the message that Crimea’s annexation was justified, but also gives Russia reason to believe inciting conflict in the Baltic states will

195 Götz, “Russia, the West, and the Ukraine Crisis,” 250.
196 Ibid., 257.
197 Ibid., 250.
198 Ibid.
not be met with intervention through use of NATO's Article 5. Although this may tread close to the realm of conjecture, it appears that from Moscow's perspective, NATO's previous inaction during the Ukraine crisis aided in harming the legitimacy of the organization. In order to maintain its legitimacy in the contemporary geopolitical realm, NATO will have no choice but to respond to a developing Russian incited crisis through the utilization of Article 5, potentially leading to a full scale conflict between Russia and the West.

To summarize the previous two sections, both Syria and Eastern Europe pose unique challenges that could be indicative of further conflict to come. With the increasingly chaotic overlap of military operations in Syria, we see a potential trigger of conflict with the ramifications of one operational misstep escalating military presence on both sides. In addition, the entrenchment of respective Russian and American alliances could further increase divisiveness between superpowers, leading to full scale global conflict. In Eastern Europe, these indicators may not be as pronounced, but they are present. With Russia's willingness to encroach on sovereign territory and incite political instability at a national level within NATO member states, the international alliance could be forced into a difficult position. NATO will have to either maintain a strategy of inactivity and further tarnish its legitimacy, or intervene in a militaristic fashion that could very well lead to full scale conflict with Russia.

From here we analyze a region that, under compartmental diplomacy, has been all but insulated from the woes of international conflict. The Arctic, as it currently stands, is a theatre in which both Russian and Western powers have a vested economic interest in preserving—for the time being. Contingent on the two examples of Syria and the Ukraine further escalating, the Arctic will rapidly become a theatre in which securitization becomes a paramount concern in the agenda of Russia and the West.
The Arctic and Militarization

Currently, the Arctic stands as one of the only regional theatres in which Western and Russian ambitions seem to be remotely congruent with one another. With an abundance of natural resources, from diamonds to oil, and the prospect of further ship traffic coming through the Arctic, it seems that the economic implications of this region trump all conflicting agendas. However, as resources become increasingly scarce in other geopolitical regions, securitization of Arctic assets is becoming an increasingly critical concern for Arctic nations. Through the negotiation of exclusive economic zones and extended continental shelf claims, every Arctic nation seeks to stake a claim on the relatively untapped economic potential of the Arctic.

In a similar vein to other theatres of Russian-Western participation, this securitization process extends beyond the negotiation of economic zones and land claims. With increasing interest in resource securitization also comes the willingness to increase military presence in the region, ensuring all parties know who is serious about preserving their economic sovereignty. Here, we also begin to see how the contention of other regions will inevitably spill into the compartmentalized Arctic.

To further portray the Arctic as a region on the brink of potentially transforming into a region of conflict, I will proceed with internal and external diagnoses of potential indicators of rising tensions. This section will initially address the activation of the Arctic as a theatre of active military mobilization, positioning, and nuclear strategy to display the implications of the aforementioned spillover from other theatres. The second portion takes a look at the Arctic from the position of security dilemma and places arctic securitization in the context of rising, Cold War-like tensions. In doing this, the true potential for contention in the Arctic region is displayed through a combination of global influence and reactionary diplomacy.
**Spillover of Conflict in The Arctic**

As discussed in section two, there are numerous indicators in both the Syrian conflict and Eastern Europe that could potentially lead to disastrous events in which full scale conflict becomes a reality. While these are unwanted outcomes for both Russia and the West, government bodies are still taking the necessary precautions to ensure they are not caught off guard in such a situation.

As a result of this anticipatory behaviour, Western and Russian administrations have accepted the increasing contention in areas such as Syria and Eastern Europe, and have mobilized troops in other regions of the globe as a display of their military might: the Arctic being no exception.

In addition, the revamping of Russian military infrastructure in the Arctic must be given careful consideration. With six new bases recently completing construction or upgrades along the Russian Arctic archipelagos, Russia is operating from a reactionary position that is aware of contentious international developments elsewhere.\(^{199}\)

This position is further solidified in a 2016 quote from a Russian Defence Ministry official, stating that “the strengthening of the Russian presence in the Arctic is today one of our biggest priorities.”\(^{200}\) While the ministry maintains that these bases are in place to help ensure the securitization of increasing economic activity in the region, it is important to note the potential outside factors of influence in their re-establishment of these bases. Earlier this year, the US government pledged to refurbish their nuclear arsenal to the tune of $1 trillion USD, a significant threat to a state like Russia, who

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\(^{200}\) Ibid.
looks to upend global American hegemony.201

Many scholars and critics see the departure from non-nuclear proliferation as an undoing of the international post-Cold War order. With both the US and Russia becoming dissuaded by nuclear deterrence practices, stockpiles of nuclear arms continue to grow, and the theatres of conflict between Russia and the West are becoming increasingly more contentious.

In a 2014 article from the International Business Times, the Ukraine crisis is cited as one of the primary causes for a call to revamp the American nuclear arsenal.202 To make matters more concerning, the IBTimes article also provides a Kremlin announcement regarding the boycott of the International Nuclear Security Summit scheduled in 2016 over contentions in Ukraine. When understood together, the revamp of the American nuclear arsenal and the establishment of further Russian military infrastructure in the Arctic have serious implications for the region. Since the American nuclear arsenal expands further than the contiguous United States into Alaska, sites in close proximity to Russia will also have upgraded capacity for nuclear weapons. Combined with the upgrade of Cold War era Russian bases, nuclear capacity will be effectively increased by both parties in the Arctic as a result of influence from other theatres of conflict.

While the refurbishment of Arctic military capacity is indicative of spillover from other theatres of conflict, so too are the military exercises being performed in the Arctic by not only Russia and the US, but also other NATO member states. In February 2016, NATO launched exercise COLD RESPONSE, a Norwegian led exercise that involved around 15,000 military person-

nel from 14 participating NATO states. COLD RESPONSE was organized to deal with a substantial military threat in the Arctic region by utilizing the forces of NATO member states, five of which are also Arctic nations. From the perspective of NATO, of the remaining three Arctic countries—Russia, Finland, and Sweden—only one can be considered a legitimate threat to Arctic security. Therefore, COLD RESPONSE is an exercise conducted with the intention of displaying NATO military capacity in the Arctic as a means of counteracting Russia’s antagonistic maneuvering in other parts of the world.

With this in mind, let us now consider the intrinsic challenges of the Arctic itself that have potential to spark armed conflict between Russia and the West, and how these contribute to our overall understanding of a supposedly compartmentalized region. Contemporary understandings of Arctic diplomacy often label the region as one where international law takes precedence over power politics. As a result, the intrinsic challenges to Arctic security often manifest in the form of diplomatic squabbles over minor breaches of sovereignty in the northernmost reaches of Arctic states. While not inherently threatening to Arctic security, these diplomatic squabbles do assist in the perpetuation of rhetoric that places the Arctic at the forefront of national identity, as defense and security policy scholar Kristian Åtland highlights.

Although Åtland argues that the emergence of a security dilemma in the Arctic, and the associated increase in militarization, primarily pertains to issues of sovereignty and national identity, it seems that much of the motivation behind increased Arctic security measures can be credited to the aforementioned effects of regional “spillover.” In fact, these statements of sover-

203 The Canadian Ministry of Defence, “Exercise COLD RESPONSE.”
205 Åtland, “Interstate Relations in the Arctic,” 155-156.
206 Ibid., 154.
Soignty encroachment seem to be an anomaly rather than a norm. Furthermore, one must only look to the multitude of international treaties promoting Arctic cooperation to understand how anomalous this rhetoric is in the region. An example of such a treaty is the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration on Arctic cooperation, which promotes “safety of navigation, search and rescue, environmental monitoring and disaster response” among other important areas where cooperation seems necessary. Since this declaration was ratified by all of the Arctic states, it can be gathered that there is a willingness to sacrifice a degree of sovereignty to make room for cooperation. Now, does this mean that Åtland’s claims about a “classic security dilemma” emerging in the Arctic are invalid? Not necessarily. As previously mentioned, it seems that Åtland credits the militarization of the Arctic to intrinsic challenges that have yet to produce any real-world ramifications. However, when placed in the context of rising tensions in Syria and Eastern Europe, Åtland’s security dilemma argument seems to carry more weight. Here, the aforementioned undoing of post-Cold War order and its contemporary implications come into play. Through the waging of proxy wars in Syria and the Russian strategy of quasi-brinkmanship in Eastern Europe, it seems parallels are emerging between the contemporary and Cold War eras. Similarly, militarization of the seemingly dormant Arctic points to an emergence of Cold War style diplomacy that can be characterized as both reactionary and preeminent. The resulting combination of these factors is where a potential intrinsic conflict could manifest in the region and come to fruition in a multitude of forms.

Although the manifestation of this increase in Arctic tension is still unclear, analyzing historical incidents between the Soviet Union and the US could help in drawing comparisons of how conflict escalation may occur in the region. The 1965 VilKitsky incident is one example of the omnipresent tensions during

208 Åtland, “Interstate Relations in the Arctic,” 146.
the Cold War era that could have pushed humanity towards international conflict. The incident refers to a series of events surrounding the VilKitsky strait, a waterway claimed as internal waters by Russia.\textsuperscript{209} However, the contention initially arose with the American reservation of VilKitsky as an international strait.\textsuperscript{210} These two positions came to a boil when the American vessel USCGC \textit{Northwind} approached the VilKitsky strait with intention to pass through.\textsuperscript{211} However, this intention never came to fruition due to a severe amount of pressure placed on the \textit{Northwind} by the Soviet Union. This pressure, according to the US state department, included a threat to “go all the way” if the \textit{Northwind} refused to change course.\textsuperscript{212} Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and a mass global conflict was avoided.

This brings us back to Åtland’s theorization of an Arctic security dilemma, but framed in a slightly modified fashion. While the VilKitsky incident nearly boiled over due to issues of sovereignty encroachment, this was clearly not the only factor at play in Russia’s reactionary ultimatum. Much of Cold War history is set against a backdrop of unprecedented global tension that drove decisions beyond the margin of rationality. With tensions again rising between Russia and the West over regions such as Syria and Eastern Europe, a modern VilKitsky incident could very well be used as an opportunity to hash out both historical and contemporary resentment between Russian and Western powers, with the Arctic acting as a theatre of conflict.

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{209} “Internal Waters” refers to a body of water that a state claims to have sovereignty over, meaning a voyage into these waters would be perceived as a breach of sovereignty by the claimant state.
\item\textsuperscript{210} “International Strait” refers to an ocean passage that is stateless and therefore accessible to vessels from any country.
\item\textsuperscript{211} Byers, \textit{International law and the arctic}, 145.
\item\textsuperscript{212} Petrow, \textit{Across the Top of Russia}, 352.
\end{itemize}
Conclusion
While intrinsic factors of conflict have not yet presented themselves in the Arctic, rising tensions in areas where Russia-West agendas are incongruent have the potential to escalate security measures in the region. With relations between Russia and the West facing dissipation in Syria and Eastern Europe, potential triggers could take many forms: the multilateral overlap of military operations in Syria, increasingly divisive alliances of the US and Russia, and the inactivity of NATO in contrast to Russian objectives in Eastern Europe. The encapsulation of this trend in conflict between Russia and the West can be classified as an overall mutual mistrust based on historical tensions and contemporary political landscapes.

Unsurprisingly, all of these factors could contribute to a more tense geopolitical climate in various ways. While numerous causal theories and examples have been provided as to how interstate relations between Russia and the West could further deteriorate, the chief concern of this body of work is to address the potential of the Arctic becoming a disputed, tensile region that is simply reflective of the macrocosm of international politics. By understanding the operatives and agendas of both Russian and Western powers, it becomes highly apparent that external factors of contention will inevitably transform the compartmentalized Arctic from a region of cautious amicability into a region of Cold War-like paranoia. Consequently, one of the final bastions of cooperation between Russia and the West will dissipate, providing a stark reminder that Russia-West relations still echo sentiments from the Cold War-era. In order to rebuild Russia-West relations, the trajectory of foreign policy agendas must redirect in a way that is constructive, diplomatic, and above all else, cooperative.
Bibliography


