# Refugee Proximity and Support for Citizenship Exclusion in Africa *

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**Abstract**

This article examines how the presence of refugees can change local citizens' opposition to citizenship inclusion within sub-Saharan Africa, an understudied region where sizable refugee populations are hosted. Using new data on the geographic locations of refugee communities, and 35,000 geo-referenced Afrobarometer respondents across 22 countries, I find that citizens who live near refugees in their country are substantially more likely to support restrictions on citizenship access – particularly with respect to granting birthright citizenship – compared to fellow citizens farther away. This effect is stronger for newer refugee sites. Placebo tests support the claim that there is no selection on unobserved confounders. Furthermore, citizens near refugees report lower confidence in the national economy and less interpersonal trust, which suggests that the threats they perceive from refugee proximity are both economic and social.

**Keywords:** refugees, migration, citizenship, Africa, geography, Afrobarometer

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# 1 Introduction

How does forced migration affect local citizens' support for inclusion or exclusion? By 2017, more than 25.4 million people have fled their countries due to war and persecution. These figures have been steadily rising for two decades, and the vast majority at more than 85% are hosted within the developing world, almost always in the border regions of neighboring countries (UNHCR, 2018). While few issues are as contentious in politics today as forced migration, researchers and policymakers know little about its effects on citizens of host countries, especially within the global South where the majority of this migration occurs (Chambers, 1986; Landau, 2008; Taylor et al., 2016). Given refugees' growing demographic size coupled with increased barriers for resettlement to the US and Europe, understanding how local host citizens respond to the presence of refugees can inform whether long-term local integration as a humanitarian policy is possible.

This article examines how refugee proximity can influence host citizens' support for citizenship inclusion in sub-Saharan Africa, where one-third of the world's displaced reside. First, I theorize that the presence of refugees reminds citizens of their nation's weak physical borders, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where territorial borders were artificially created and are difficult to defend. Second, I argue and show that this reminder can compel local citizens to support legal boundaries of exclusion, in this case, increased restrictions on birthright citizenship (*jus soli*) compared to the alternative mode of nationality, citizenship by descent (*jus sanguinis*).

Using new data of refugee sites, which includes both formal camps and informal settlements of refugee communities, in Africa from 2005 to 2015 compiled in collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Afrobarometer survey round 5 (2011 - 2013), I find that citizens who live near refugees in their country are substantially more likely to oppose birthright citizenship. This finding is robust to non-parametric specifications, whether the refugee site is a formal camp or informal settlement, when taking into account multiple nearby refugee sites, and whether the host citizens belong to a country that grants citizenship by birth, by descent, or adopts a mixed policy. Moreover, although this effect of proximity is present whether the nearby refugee site is recent or long-established, I find it is stronger for newer refugee sites. This suggests that opposition from host citizens may erode over time.

Futhermore, placebo tests show null effects of proximity to refugees sites yet to be established at the time of the survey, which suggests that there are no unobserved confounders that may bias results. Finally, I explore possible mechanisms of perceived threat that may explain host citizens' opposition.

This research seeks to make several contributions. First, it offers a new theory featuring migrant exclusion to the rich literature on political membership and boundary-making in Africa. It builds a comparative reference to current immigration debates in Europe and the US by highlighting South-South migration, which encompasses the majority of migration yet remains understudied (Adida, 2014).

Second, this project contributes to an emerging research agenda on how refugees affect their host environments. The majority of displacement studies focus on the refugee experience, often overlooking the broader social and political context of the host country (Chambers, 1986; Taylor et al., 2016). In response, a growing body of security studies examines violent conflict between host communities and refugees (e.g. Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989; Lischer, 2005; Muggah, 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). While these controversial cases are crucial to understanding the consequences of displacement, the vast majority of refugee-citizen relations is non-violent (Onoma, 2013; Hartman and Morse, 2015). Pertaining to these less extreme and more conventional experiences, we know little about how host citizens react to refugees.

Third, where migrant groups are located vis–à–vis citizen residents is generally endogenous, especially considering the slow-moving and deliberate voluntary migration from low-income to OECD countries. Compared to refugees, these migrants have more agency to choose to live in communities that are more accepting of them and where they may have pre-existing familial and social networks (e.g. Massey and Denton, 1988; Portes and Rumbaut, 2014; Enos, 2014). Thus, aside from using experiments such as Enos (2014), it is often difficult to address the problem of selection bias. This article attempts to do so using placebo tests. This strategy is based on the logic that future variables cannot influence past outcomes. And so, if there is an effect, other unaccounted factors are influencing the outcomes. The placebo tests in this analysis confirm that there is no relationship between citizen respondents' opposition to citizenship inclusion and their proximity to refugee sites established after the survey was conducted (i.e. "future refugee sites"). This supports the claim that the observed outcomes are due to the presence of refugees and not to characteristics inherent to the locations where they eventually settle.

Next, this article offers possible mechanisms for why citizens may be prompted to feel exclusionary

when refugees are settled nearby. Within the vast literature on immigration in Western industrialized countries, numerous considerations such as labor market competition, nationalism, and ethnic prejudice are shown to drive negative attitudes towards immigrants (e.g. Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Putnam, 2007). The major debate of this literature is whether economic or social threats drive anti-immigrant attitudes. Do these insights travel to forced migration in Africa? This article provides preliminary evidence showing that both economic and social threats are at play with respect to refugees as nearby citizens report lower confidence in the national economy and lower interpersonal trust.

Lastly, these findings have implications for current policy debates on the global forced migration crisis. Although refugee camps and settlements are intended to be temporary solutions to exigent cross-border crises, about one-third of the refugee sites open as of 2015 were established more than ten years prior. Furthermore, more than 20% of refugees are considered stateless, since those fleeing conflict often lose documentation of national identity and children born to refugees are often unregistered (UNHCR, 2018). The need for viable long-term solutions is urgent and critical. Expanding access to naturalization in host countries is a possibility, but my work suggests that efforts to do so will likely need to overcome opposition from local host citizens. Unfortunately, crises which generate refugee populations may result in more exclusionary citizenship policies in host nations, exacerbating the hurdle of legal and social integration for all types of migrants. Nevertheless, I also show that time may soften these citizens' opposition, which is promising especially for the numerous cases of protracted displacement.

## 2 Theory of Forced Migration and National Boundary-Making

**Defining concepts.** For clarity, *citizenship* (or nationality) refers to the legal relationship between an individual and a state, in which the state recognizes and guarantees the individual's rights (Manby, 2016). In this article, citizenship does not take on the broader meaning of full participation in the 'imagined community' of the nation (Marshall, 1963; Anderson, 1982; Gellner, 1983). Thus, the term *citizenship inclusion* (*exclusion*) implies expanding (limiting) legal access to citizenship. African nation-states, like most countries in the world, base their citizenship laws on the principles of *jus sanguinis* (literally, right of blood) or *jus soli* (right of soil) (Manby, 2016). Generally, laws based on *jus sanguinis* exclude individuals

descended from migrants from claiming nationality, while laws based on *jus soli* are more inclusive of new residents. There are several other factors pertinent to citizenship law – marriage to a citizen, naturalization for long-term residency, explicit provisions against statelessness, and dual citizenship; but while this article briefly touches on these, the reference to inclusion versus exclusion pertains to support for *jus soli* versus *jus sanguinis*.

From the 1951 Geneva Convention, a *refugee* is someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of her nationality and is unable, or due to such fear, unwilling to avail him- or herself of the protection of that country." (Article 1, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). The term *refugee sites* refers to the precise geographic locations where refugees settle; it encompasses all known communities of refugees including both *formal refugee camps* as well as *informal refugee settlements* (even those in which the UNHCR or other non-governmental organization (NGOs) are not actively working or have a mandate). Finally, the term *borders* refers the purely physical borders separating nation-states while *boundaries* are the psychological, social, and legal partitions between groups of people, in this context, who are and are not considered members of the nation-state.

**Extant research on refugee effects.** An emergent body of empirical work examines how refugees affect local economic and security dynamics in host countries. For instance, many agree that refugees bring human and physical capital and actively engage with local, host economies. The overall effects, however, are generally negligible, temporary, and/or ambiguous, depending on who has access to land and the occupations of refugees before they were displaced (e.g. Chambers, 1986; Whitaker, 2002; Cortes, 2004; Landau, 2004; Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014; Taylor et al., 2016).

Another direction of refugee-host citizen research is situated in the security studies literature. Beginning with case-studies of militarized refugees such as the Banyarwanda refugees in Eastern Congo in the 1960s and South African refugees during Apartheid, these scholars debate whether and to what extent refugees incite civil war or terrorism in host countries (e.g. Matthews, 1972; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989; Loescher, 1992; Lischer, 2005; Muggah, 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Onoma, 2013; Hartman and Morse, 2015).[1]

[1]Aside from refugees' affecting the local economy or civil conflict, the author is aware of only one scholar, Landau (2003,

Building on these insights, this article examines how conflict between host citizens and refugees could manifest in non-violent ways; those citizens who would be most likely to experience the positive or negative effects of refugees are also likely to support or oppose inclusionary immigration policies such as who can become a member of the nation-state.

**How refugees might enter citizenship debates in Africa.** This article makes the case that the presence of refugees can play an unexpected role in national boundary-making, specifically citizenship consolidation, for border regions belonging to nation-states that were artificially created. With the rise of nation-states, border regions have assumed many consequential roles. They are projections of state authority and security buffers (or lack thereof); arenas where social, political, and economic anxieties associated with globalization are contextualized; and opportunities for identities to be contested and reconfigured. Africa is notable precisely for its borders and border regions.

While conventional scholarship on state-formation relies on nations emerging endogenously through war and territorial consolidation (Tilly et al., 1985), African states were set up by European colonial powers with little regard for geography and no regard for existing geographic distributions of social groups and local circumstances. This means that the colonially imposed political borders, 80% of which line up with latitude and longitude lines, do not line up with communities of people (Herbst, 1989; Englebert, 2002; Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002; Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski, 2011). Today, the 104 distinct borders in Africa bisect an estimated 177 cultural or ethnic groups, making African nation-states the most ethnically and culturally diverse in the world (Asiwaju, 1985; Englebert, 2002; Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002).

Since these artificial borders combine multiple groups vying for independence and state control, the extant literature on citizenship in Africa has focused on internal conflicts between groups of people with the same nationality, often prompted by internal migration – migration within the territory of the nation-state. These conflicts are exemplified in African politics by *sons and daughters of the soil* claims over resources(e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2011; McGovern, 2011; Boone, 2007; Robinson, 2014; Keller, 2014).[2]

2008) who examines how refugees in Tanzania can make it more likely for local citizens to see the state and change their expectations of the state.

[2]For example, beginning in the late 1980s contention in Côte d'Ivoire over citizenship emerged over access to cocoa production on ancestral land in the South. This produced a narrow definition of citizenship based on ancestral, descent-based origins. The consequent notion of *Ivorité* excluded certain political candidates from office and led to two civil wars

Looking beyond these domestic conflicts over citizenship between subnational groups, this article seeks to shift scholarly attention to the impact of refugees from outside the borders on how citizenship should be defined and allocated. Manby (2013) points out that changes to citizenship laws precisely aim to exclude recent migrants and their descendents; for example, in response to the hundreds of thousands of refugees displaced during the Rwandan genocide, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) changed citizenship policy so that the Banyarwanda peoples could no longer qualify for citizenship. Similarly, for Herbst (2000), migration and citizenship are "inevitably intertwined because citizenship laws embody the identities that African states have tried to construct on the assumption that populations are no longer mobile" (p.227). Precisely by moving across borders, could the presence of refugees make them feel less artificial for local citizens, and thus more consequential to conflicts over citizenship?

I theorize that forces outside state control, such as refugee-inducing conflicts in neighboring countries, can influence citizens' (re)conceptualization of their national membership. By crossing the physical borders of a territorially defined nation-state and settling within them, I argue that refugees can contextually make salient the weakness of these borders for host citizens, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where territorial borders were artificially created and difficult to defend. This compels these citizens to turn to restrictions in nationality laws as another type of national boundary.

**Geographic proximity to refugees.** Nevertheless, we might not expect all host citizens to respond the same way. Those who *believe* that the refugees in their country can negatively affect them personally, whether these threats are real or perceived, are more likely to oppose citizenship inclusion. Thus, I focus on the host citizens most geographically proximate to refugee sites.

Recent research on public attitudes towards immigration in the United States show that while citizens may generally support immigration and refugee resettlement in theory, they are much less supportive if it occurs within their own local communities – a spatial collective action problem known as NIMBYism ("not-in-my-back-yard") (Maney and Abraham, 2008; Ferwerda, Flynn and Horiuchi, 2017). Similarly, Enos (2014) finds that increased intergroup contact with members of another ethnic group, who in this study were randomly assigned to be in the physical spaces of a homogenous community, could lead to increased exclusionary attitudes towards that group.

and several constitutional reforms (Keller, 2014; McGovern, 2011).

More broadly, Enos (2017) argues and shows that social geography, even without opportunities for intergroup contact such as in cases of segregatation, can shape "the experience of diversity," the perceptions of and bias towards other groups of people in politically important ways. This article hopes to contribute to this frame of thinking by considering what happens when groups of refugees come and occupy the same geographic space as some communities of host citizens.

I hypothesize that refugees might affect local support for citizenship inclusion through the following testable implication,

> **Hypothesis 1 (H1)**: Proximity to refugee sites within their country compels host citizens to support greater restrictions on citizenship access, specifically with respect to birthright citizenship (*jus soli*), as opposed to citizenship by descent (*jus sanguinis*), the more exclusionary form of access.

**Proposed mechanisms of perceived migrant threats.** Since citizenship implies permanent membership, preferences for restricting citizenship access likely stem from exclusionary attitudes towards migrants. Immigration scholars working mostly in OECD countries generally have two theoretical frameworks to explain anti-immigrant attitudes: economic versus social threat (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008).

The *economic threat* theory argues that host citizens prefer immigration restrictions due to concerns over economic well-being (e.g. Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Citrin et al., 1997; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Dancygier, 2010). Similar to the nascent research on the economic effects of refugees, standard economic models predict that immigration has negligible or ambiguous effects on the wages and employment of most native workers (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Nevertheless, as overall economic conditions worsen and/or public resources become scarce, the greater the impact of these instrumental concerns. Given immigrants' clear out-group status, these concerns may manifest or be channeled by political elites as perceived threats in which immigrants deprive citizens of economic opportunities (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Dancygier, 2010). For example, Adida (2014) finds that immigrant exclusion in urban West African communities are due to economic competition between indigenous and migrant traders, particularly during times of economic hardship when migrants become easy scapegoats.

The second theoretical framework, *social threat* argues that differences in social identities such as ethnicity, race, or political orientations, affect how citizens feel towards immigrants (e.g. Citrin, Reingold and Green, 1990; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Hood and Morris, 1998; Putnam, 2007). The highly educated, younger, and politically liberal have generally endorsed more tolerant views (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Citrin et al., 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Hood and Morris, 1998). Compared to instrumentalist fears, social differences challenge the demographic and identity makeup of a citizen's community. Therefore, the mere presence of immigrants as foreign outsiders may call into question who is ethnically, racially, linguistically, and culturally considered to be a citizen (Citrin, Reingold and Green, 1990; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993).

The following hypothesis examines these immigration theories in the context of refugees,

> **Hypothesis 2 (H2)**: Proximity to refugee sites within their country also compels host citizens to feel both economically and socially threatened; compared to fellow citizens, those close to refugee sites are more likely to report lower confidence in the national economy and lower interpersonal trust.

Nevertheless, this literature predominantly focuses on reactions towards voluntary migrants participating in North-South migration, who are different from South-South refugees in several obvious ways. Unlike refugees' displacement which is involuntary and uncertain in duration, voluntary migrants have more agency in choosing their destination and length of stay. Whereas the majority of refugees are hosted in less-developed countries neighboring the countries of origin, host communities of voluntary migrants are often in high-income, Western industrialized countries who possess greater capacity in securing borders, registering migrants, policing them, and recording data on them (Cortes, 2004; Taylor et al., 2016). By studying forced migration and citizenship within Africa, this article offers insights on the unique dynamics of citizen-refugee relations in an under-theorized region of the global South, within which mass migration and displacement dominates (Özden et al., 2011).

## 3 Context: Displacement and Citizenship Laws in Africa

**Levels of displacement.** Sub-Saharan Africa, the region which experienced the most conflict events in the last ten years, hosts more than 29% of the world's refugee population – 6.3 million people, and this number has been steadily rising for past decade (UNHCR, 2018). (See figure S1 in the Supplementary Information (SI) for levels of displacement across regions over time.) Most of these refugees were displaced due to the ongoing crises in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan. Consequently, the sites where these refugees congregated are just across the border in neighboring countries. Figure S2 in the SI maps the 769 refugee sites in African countries open as of 2015; half fall within 15km and 90% are within 75km of the international border. While the presence of these numerous refugee sites underscores the porous nature of Africa's borders, it also highlights the increasing significance of citizenship laws serving as an alternative boundary mechanism to securing physical borders (Onoma, 2013; Herbst, 2000).

**Citizenship laws.** At independence, African states initially based their legal systems on those of their colonisers. Commonwealth countries (former British colonies) drafted their constitutions and nationality law using the 'Lancaster House' template, which adopted *jus soli* attribution of citizenship; all persons born in the territory at the time of independence could be eligible for citizenship. Former French and Portuguese colonies adopted the civil code, in which persons born in the territory to at least one citizen parent would automatically be considered citizens (Manby, 2013, 2016).

Citizenship laws in African nation-states today, like most countries in the world, are still based on *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis* principles.[3] Figure 1 shows the types of citizenship regimes in sub-Saharan Africa over time; there is not only variation across countries, but substantial variation across time within countries. While more than half were *jus soli* at independence, only a handful of countries offer birthright citizenship today, many are considered mixed. These mixed countries still include *jus soli* provisions, which give

[3]Additional provisions include: *jus matrimonii* which is citizenship by marriage, allowing the spouse of a citizen to have access; these laws are prone to gender discrimination, about half of African states do not permit women to transmit their nationality to their foreign spouse and/or to their children if the father is not a citizen. *Naturalization* requires a formal process through which a person may be granted citizenship by meeting certain requirements and attaining the approval of certain government officials. All African countries in theory permit naturalization, however, few states provide clear procedures. Finally, the majority of African states recently adopted provisions for *dual citizenship*, yet these new provisions are often misinterpreted (Manby, 2016).




Figure 1: This figure shows citizenship regime types for countries in sub-Saharan Africa for the time periods for which data is available. It shows that there is not only variation across countries, but substantial variation across time within countries. Data sources: Manby (2016); Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative, Refworld.

citizenship to those born in the territory who are still residents when they reach age of majority (Manby, 2016).

The consequences of these citizenship policies cannot be understated. The more exclusionary burdens placed by *jus sanguinis* are often designed to promote nationalism by excluding groups who do not have ancestral claims, notably, migrants. Upon gaining independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, several

African countries such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone underwent extensive nation-building policies that not only closed their borders to new migrants but also forcibly uprooted non-citizens residing in these nations. For example, Ghana's Alien Compliance Order of 1969 expelled two hundred thousand foreigners even though prior, Ghana had a long tradition of hosting foreigners. Similarly, Nigeria expelled three million foreigners in 1983 (Peil, 1971; Adida, 2014). Ultimately, exclusionary citizenship and immigration practices still leave millions of Africans – the undocumented, foundlings whose parents are unknown, refugees and their offspring, and many other groups discriminated based on race/ethnicity/religion – at risk of statelessness.

Herbst (2000) notes that ironically, countries with more inclusive citizenship laws have been more successful in promoting national unity. For instance, Tanzania has a strong legacy of nation-building under first president Julius Nyerere, who also supported pan-African inclusion. Thus, it has also been historically hospitable to migrants from surrounding East African countries, including refugees. In the 1980s, Tanzania expanded citizenship access to 32,000 Rwandese refugees, and starting in 2009, approximately 200,000 Burundi refugees who arrived in 1972 have been undergoing naturalization to become Tanzanian citizens.[4]

**How displacement dynamics and nation-building have developed in parallel over time.** Given that the processes behind nation-building are large-scale, long-term and intentional, could unintended forced migration plausibly offer an alternative pathway for changing how certain citizens feel about citizenship and nationality? At least for border regions where refugee sites are located, it may be possible. While the particular events leading to forced migration are often fast and unpredictable, forced migration itself is not a recent phenomenon; every country in sub-Saharan Africa has hosted refugees, and aside from island nations, many have been doing so for the majority of their existence as nation-states. Figure S3 in the SI shows which years starting from independence African countries have hosted refugees. For the DRC, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Djibouti, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Eritrea, and of course South Sudan, the UNHCR population statistics database shows that they have been hosting refugees every year since independence, implying that they had been hosting these vulnerable migrant populations even before becoming independent nation-states. And due to how African state authority is projected from urban centers in the interior, those living in the hinterlands are less likely to see the state and experience

[4]Interviews with officials at the Tanzanian Department of Homeland Affairs in August 2015 and July 2016.

nation-building projects (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2000). For these citizens, I claim that proximity to refugee sites, many of which remain open for at least a decade, can compel them to feel more exclusionary with respect to national boundaries, specifically citizenship.

# 4 Data and Methods

To assess how refugee proximity can change local host citizens' support for restrictions on citizenship, the data combines new data of refugee sites from 2005 to 2015 with the Afrobarometer round 5, a stratified, nationally representative set of surveys of voting age citizens across 35 African countries. Of these, 22 countries both hosted refugees sites and included the survey questions about citizenship laws. The respondents of these countries comprise the data.

First, in collaboration with the UNHCR Population and Geographic Data Department, I compiled data on the geographic locations of refugees in Africa for 2010 - 2015. This data encompasses the universe of refugee sites, that is, any geographic point where a community of refugees resides whether in formal camps or informal settlements, even if the UNHCR does not have an active presence there. For each site, the data details the latitude/longitude coordinates, its creation date, its closing date (if closed), and whether the site is a formal camp or informal settlement. Unless there is a geographically concentrated and recognizable community of refugees within a city, refugee sites do not include major cities where dispersed individual refugees may have settled. Unfortunately, this data does not contain information on demographic or ethnic composition of the refugees living in these sites, the reason for displacement, countries of origin, and levels of aid, infrastructure or UNHCR involvement, or any measure of intergroup contact with host citizens.

Next, I geo-referenced each respondent's location using the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's Country Files for Geopolitical Areas (GNS 2013), the ESRI World Places locator in ArcGIS, and Google Maps.[5] By having geographic coordinates for each citizen respondent, I could then calculate their proximity

[5]The Afrobarometer includes at least three and up to five levels of location identifiers for each respondent. I first conduct searches for latitude/longitude coordinates on the respondents' most precise location level, which is a within-village identifier for rural areas and street level address for urban areas; 15.48% of the data is at this level. If unavailable, I search for the next administrative level which is at village or city level; 41.57% of the data is at this level. Failing this level, I search at the sub-province or district level; 42.94% of the data is at this level. Effectively, this means that a portion of distances to refugee sites are calculated using the centroid of a respondent's district rather than the exact household location. This additional noise decreases the precision of the estimates.

Table 1: Countries in the data

| Country | Year | Sample | RefPop |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benin | 2011 | 1200 | 7,217 |
| **Botswana** | 2012 | 1200 | 2,785 |
| Burkina Faso | 2012 | 1200 | 39,306 |
| **Burundi** | 2012 | 1200 | 41,813 |
| Cameroon | 2013 | 1200 | 114,753 |
| **Côte d'Ivoire** | 2013 | 1200 | 2,980 |
| Ghana | 2012 | 2400 | 16,016 |
| Guinea | 2013 | 1200 | 8,560 |
| **Kenya** | 2011 | 2399 | 566,487 |
| **Liberia** | 2012 | 1199 | 65,909 |
| **Malawi** | 2013 | 2400 | 5,796 |
| Mali | 2012 | 1192 | 13,928 |
| Namibia | 2012 | 1200 | 1,806 |
| Niger | 2013 | 1200 | 57,661 |
| **Nigeria** | 2013 | 2400 | 1,694 |
| Senegal | 2013 | 1200 | 14,247 |
| Sierra Leone | 2012 | 1183 | 4,204 |
| **Swaziland** | 2013 | 1200 | 507 |
| Tanzania | 2012 | 2400 | 101,021 |
| **Uganda** | 2012 | 2400 | 197,877 |
| **Zambia** | 2013 | 1200 | 23,594 |
| Zimbabwe | 2012 | 2392 | 4,356 |

(*jus sanguinis* countries boldfaced
Data sources:
Herbst, 2000; Manby, 2016, UNHCR)




Figure 2: This map shows the geographic distribution of respondents (points) and refugee sites (squares) in the data. Countries in gray are *jus soli* or mixed, countries in brown are *jus sanguinis*.

to refugee sites, how many sites are within certain radii of respondents, and their proximity to violent conflicts, roads, and major cities and capitals. Below details the variables included in the analysis.

Table 1 lists the 22 countries, the survey year, the respondent sample size, and how many refugees the country hosted that year. At the time of the surveys, countries listed in bold have descent-based (*jus sanguinis*) citizenship laws versus birthright (*jus soli*) or mixed citizenship. Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of respondents (n = 34,772, points) in relation to refugee sites (n = 753, squares) and whether respondents belong to a *jus sanguinis* or *jus soli*/mixed nation. Across the countries in this study, there is considerable variation not only in citizenship law, but also geographic region, size, and refugee populations.




Figure 3: Respondents' Distance to Nearest Refugee Site within their country: this figure shows the distribution of the main independent variable. About half of respondents live within 200km of a refugee site within their country (mean 213.8km shown as dashed line). The minimum distance is 0.05km and the maximum distance is 1254.36km.

**Independent variable: distance to nearest refugee site within one's country.** The main independent variable is respondents' `distance to the nearest refugee site` (km) within their country that was open at least five years prior to the survey year.[6] Although the refugee site geographically closest to a respondent may be across the border and outside of her country, the presence of refugees in another country should not affect the respondent's attitudes of restricting her country's citizenship policy; thus, this measure guarantees that the distance is calculated within each country. And while a site may be considered closed by the time of the survey, some refugees may remain in the area lawfully or unlawfully, hence this measure still takes into consideration sites that are recently closed.[7]

Figure 3 shows the distribution of the independent variable for all respondents in the data (figure S5 in the SI shows the distributions by country). Half live within 147.38km, 75% live within 358.31km, and the maximum distance is 1254.36km. Since this distribution is skewed to the left, I rerun the analysis using respondent *logged* distances from the nearest domestic refugee site, which is more normally distributed (see figure S4 in the SI).

To examine the possible heterogeneous effects of formal camps versus informal settlements, I replace this main independent variable with respondents' `distance to the nearest refugee camp (settlement)` (km) within their country open at least five years prior to the survey year.

[6]By changing the time cutoffs 4 and 6 years, substantive results remain unchanged.

[7]For example, several thousands of Liberian refugees chose to remain in Ghana even after Buduburam refugee camp closed in 2012 (IRIN news).

**Outcome variables: support for citizenship inclusion.** The main outcome variables are measured by the following two questions from the Afrobarometer round 5,

```
In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a
citizen of (Country X)? A citizen would have the right to get a (Country X)
passport and to vote in (Country X) elections if they are at least 18 years
old,

Q1. A person born in (Country X) with one citizen and one non-
citizen parent?
Q2. A person born in (Country X) with two non-citizen parents?

No ............................. 0
Yes ............................ 1
Don't Know ..................... 99
```

Question 1 (Q1) which refers to "one citizen and one non–citizen parent" requires descent for citizenship access (*jus sanguinis*), while question 2 (Q2) regarding "two non–citizen parents" maps onto the more inclusive birthright citizenship (*jus soli*). To be clear, neither these questions nor any other survey items in the Afrobarometer make any specific references to refugees or migrants. In fact, migration issues are not included in the Afrobarometer survey, so any effect of migration on these outcomes of interest cannot be attributed to within-survey prompts or survey wording, but rather to the respondents' own background and experiences with their environment.[8]

**Covariates.** The following covariates are included as controls in this analysis: `age, education level,`[9] `rural/urban, gender, ethnic majority, economic scarcity`[10]; `respondent distance to the international border, to the nearest major city (including capitals) in their country, to the nearest road, to the nearest violent conflict event within the past year; the duration`

[8]This section of questions also include:
Q3. The wife of a citizen husband, even if she was born outside of (Country X)?
Q4. The husband of a citizen woman, even if he was born outside of (Country X)?
Q5. A person who came from another country, but who has lived and worked in (Country X) for many years, and wishes to make (Country X) his or her home?
Q6. A person who wishes to hold dual citizenship, that is, to be a citizen both of (Country X) and some other country?
Questions 3 and 4 refer to citizenship by marriage (*jus matrimonii*), and question 5 refers to naturalization. Although these questions are not the main focus of this article, I also analyze these questions as outcome variables.

[9]Education level ranges from 0 = No formal schooling, 1 = Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2 = Some primary schooling, 3 = Primary school completed, 4 = Some secondary school/ high school, 5 = Secondary school completed/high school completed, 6 = Post-secondary qualifications, 7 = Some university, 8 = University completed, 9 = Post-graduate.

[10]Economic scarcity is constructed using principal component analysis normalized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The battery of survey items used asks how often in the past year did the respondent or anyone in her family gone without: enough food to eat, enough clean water for home use, medicines or medical treatment, enough fuel to cook your food, cash income.

and number of other nearby refugee sites, and country fixed effects. The analyses controls for these covariates for the following reasons.

First, according to the U.S. and European based immigration literature, certain individual characteristics may predispose citizens towards exclusionary attitudes. For instance, an individual's level of formal education and age are strong predictors of immigration attitudes, while findings on gender are mixed (Citrin, Reingold and Green, 1990; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993). Referencing the scholarship on economic competition prompting anti-immigrant attitudes, those with higher socio-economic status may feel less likely to face economic competition and wage reduction from an influx of immigrants. For Mamdani (1996) and Herbst (2000), the salience of citizenship differs between those who live in rural areas and urbanites, especially given state control in African countries is concentrated in and projected from cities. Similarly, greater access to cities and roads means citizens are more likely to see and experience the state, which may affect how they feel about protecting access to citizenship.

Second, ethnic diversity can strongly affect trust, community cohesion, and political preferences (e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Lieberman and McClendon, 2013; Robinson, 2016). Thus, I control for whether the respondent belongs to the majority ethnic group in their country. With respect to refugees, ethnic tensions could help explain how conflict first broke out in the refugees' countries of origin leading to their displacement as well as why new conflict might develop in the host country (Loescher, 1992; Rüegger, 2017; Lacina, Albert and VanMeter, 2017). Assessing feelings of threat to one's ethnic identity necessarily requires knowing the ethnicities of citizen respondents and the refugees near them. Ideally there would also be a measure to account for coethnicity with the refugees nearby. As of yet, however, the data of refugee sites does not contain information on the ethnicities or even nationalities of the refugees.[11]

Next, maps of refugee sites and migration research confirm that the vast majority of sites are clustered at international borders (Jacobsen, 1996; Jacobson, 1996; Bariagaber, 2006). Of theoretical interest and as a possible confounder, border regions in Africa are notable for state presence and unobstructed flows of people and goods. People living in these border regions have less interactions with the state, are likely

[11]Nevertheless, it is unclear from the scholarship on ethnic politics whether shared ethnicity would encourage citizens to be more inclusive of migrants. For example, Adida (2011) shows that when migrants in West Africa settle near ethnically and culturally similar groups, community leaders promote immigrant exclusion by highlighting other identity boundaries.

to cross the porous borders often to use markets and visit kin, and thus, may also feel differently about immigration and citizenship (Herbst, 2000). Therefore, the analysis also controls for respondents' distance to the border.

Furthermore, refugee sites are geographically concentrated in regions where conflict is endemic. This is unsurprising insofar as refugees are most frequently displaced due to conflict and tend to settle in neighboring countries that may also be affected by regional instability. Since refugees are strongly associated with conflict, I control for respondents' distance to the nearest violent conflict event within the past year using data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to try to disentangle perceptions of threat from refugees versus conflict.

Respondents may also feel differently about older refugee sites compared to newer ones. While older sites may cultivate resentment or allow for refugee-citizen relationships to form, newer sites can generate uncertainty and fears regarding security for local citizens. Additionally, being near multiple sites as opposed to just one would ostensibly influence respondents' attitudes. Thus, the number of refugee sites other than the nearest one within a 200km radius from the respondent is also included as a control.[12]

From the data, we can discern what types of citizen respondents live near refugee sites; figure S6 in the SI shows the bivariate relationships between these covariates and the main independent variable. Across demographic characteristics – age, education level, rural/urban, gender, ethnic majority, and economic scarcity – as well as distance to a major city, there seems to be no difference between citizen respondents living closer and farther away from refugee sites. However, respondents near refugee sites tend to be closer to the international border, roads, and violent conflict events which support what we know and expect about where communities of refugees feeling conflict across the border would be located.

Due to the many differences between the countries in the data, such as colonial background, number of refugees, government response to refugees, and levels of humanitarian aid, the analysis includes country fixed effects. Since the data is not panel, including country fixed effects entails that citizen respondents are only compared to their co-nationals at the same time. Thus, all findings speak to comparisons between fellow citizens reacting to refugees within their country, some located closer to those refugees than others. Table S1 in the SI summarizes the statistics for all variables included in the analysis.

[12]I also rerun the main analysis with this radius expanded to 200km; substantive results remain unchanged.

### 4.1 Estimation

The following multivariate logistic regression model estimates the relationship between conceptions of citizenship law and respondent distances to the nearest refugee site within their country, controlling for the set of covariates.

$$\begin{aligned} P(Y_i = 1) = logit^{-1}(&\beta_0 + \beta_1 DistancetoNearestRefugeeSite_i + \beta_2 Age_i + \beta_3 Education_i \\ &+ \beta_4 Rural_i + \beta_5 Female_i + \beta_6 EthnicMajority_i \\ &+ \beta_7 EconomicScarcity_i + \beta_8 DistancetoBorder_i + \beta_9 DistancetoCity_i \\ &+ \beta_{10} DistancetoRoad_i + \beta_{11} DistancetoConflict_i + \beta_{12} NearestSiteDuration_i \\ &+ \beta_{13} OtherSiteswithin200km_i + \gamma_{c[i]} + \epsilon_i) \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

in which $i$ denotes respondents and $c[i]$ denotes countries. $Y_i$ is the binary response for the citizenship inclusion questions; $DistancetoNearestRefugeeSite_i$ is distance to nearest refugee site within their country (km); controlling for respondent-level covariates: demographic characteristics which include age, education level, rural/urban, gender, ethnic majority, economic scarcity; distance to border (km), distance to major city (km), distance to road (km), distance to nearest violent conflict event within the past year (km), age of nearest refugee site (years), number of other refugee sites within 200km; $\gamma_k$ denotes country fixed effects; and $\epsilon_i$ is the respondent error term.

I also rerun all analyses using semiparametric generalized additive binomial models (GAM) to allow for more flexible, non-linear relationships between distance to refugee site and support for citizenship inclusion.

## 5 Results

Table 2 shows the logistic regression results of respondent distance to the nearest refugee site within their country on support for citizenship inclusion. (Demographic covariates and country fixed effects are included in the models, for brevity their coefficients are not displayed here. See table S2 in SI which includes all covariates and shows the models for additional support for citizenship inclusion outcomes.)

Positive coefficients entail greater likelihood of responding positively to granting access, which means the farther (nearer) respondents are to the nearest Refugee Site within country, all else equal, the more (less) supportive they are of the citizenship law in question.

Table 2: Logistic regression results of Support for Citizenship Inclusion on Distance to nearest Domestic Refugee Site

| | Outcome variables: | |
|---|---|---|
| | Q1: Jus sanguinis | Q2: Jus soli |
| Distance to Refugee Site (km) | −.0001 (.0001) | .001*** (.0001) |
| Distance to border (km) | −.0002 (.0003) | −.001*** (.0002) |
| Distance to city (km) | −.0001 (.0002) | −.001*** (.0002) |
| Distance to road (km) | −.0001** (.00005) | −.00003 (.00004) |
| Distance to conflict (km) | .001*** (.0003) | .0005* (.0002) |
| Site Duration (years) | .004 (.003) | .003 (.003) |
| Other Sites within 200km | −.001 (.004) | −.010*** (.003) |
| Intercept | 1.310*** (.432) | .091 (.427) |
| Covariates | Yes | Yes |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 24,755 | 24,796 |
| Log Likelihood | −10,467.000 | −16,125.000 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 20,998.000 | 32,315.000 |
| *Note:* | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

This table shows the Logistic regression results of Support for Citizenship Inclusion on Distance to the Nearest Refugee Site within their country. Positive coefficients entail greater likelihood of responding Yes to the question (i.e. being more inclusive in their conception of citizenship). The farther (nearer) respondents are to the nearest Refugee Site in their country, all else equal, the more (less) inclusive they feel with respect to the citizenship law in question.

For ease of interpretation, figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals of responses to Q1 Jus sanguinis (left column) and Q2 Jus soli (right column) across distances 0 to 800km. First, all citizens, regardless of their proximity to refugee sites, are highly supportive of *jus sanguinis*; since decent-based citizenship is already the most restrictive type of citizenship law, this is unsurprising – respondents generally agree that descent should permit access to citizenship. Nevertheless, citizens closer to refugee sites within their country are much more likely to reject granting birthright citizenship compared to fellow citizens living farther away, which confirms H1.

From the immigration literature, individuals with higher levels of formal education tend to be more




Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of Support for Citizenship Inclusion by Distance to Nearest Refugee Site, with 95% CIs. This figure shows all citizens, regardless of their proximity to refugees, generally support the more restrictive form of access Q1 Jus sanguinis (left column), while those living closer to refugee sites are more likely to support exclusion against birthright citizenship, Q2 Jus soli (right column).

inclusive (Citrin, Reingold and Green, 1990; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993). Thus, to contextualize the effect size of refugee proximity for Q2 Jus soli, we can consider how levels of formal education affect the same outcome. Running the same regression model, but replacing distance to the nearest domestic refugee site with level of formal education, controlling for covariates and including country fixed effects, figure 5 shows the difference between a post-graduate education and no formal schooling is only about 2.8 percentage points, which is about equivalent to the difference between living 145 and 0km from a refugee site.

Refugee sites are intended to be temporary solutions to exigent cross-border crises. Yet the average refugee site in Africa today has been open for a decade. Should the children of refugees born in host countries be eligible for citizenship? While this would be a strong protection against statelessness, for host citizens most geographically proximate to refugees, these findings suggest that this possibility poses a threat. For these citizens, refugees and their (real or perceived) negative effects are contextually salient. Refugee proximity can heighten citizen vigilance around protecting national membership, which is especially notable for border regions, where traditionally strong feelings of nationhood are considered low but also where refugee sites are more likely to be located.




Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities comparing the effects of Proximity to Nearest Refugee Site (left column) vs. Levels of Formal Education (right column) on Q2 Jus soli with 95% CIs. This figure shows that going from no formal education to being a post-university graduate is associated with a 2.8 percentage points increase, which is about the difference between living 145 and 0km from a domestic refugee site.

Referring back to table 2, for the outcome Q2 Jus soli, the negative coefficient for distance to the border suggests that the farther (nearer) citizen respondents are to the border, all else equal, the more (less) exclusionary they are. This effect for proximity to the border lends credence to the conventional wisdom of African state-formation; the artificial, porous borders of African nation-states allow for more open (or framed a different way, weaker) conceptions of nationhood and citizenship in their border regions (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Herbst, 2000; Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski, 2011). Thus, my finding suggests that having a refugee site nearby may counter the more open and inclusive effects of living near the border.

**Capturing non-linearities in the data.** To examine the relationship between distance to refugee sites and support for citizenship inclusion non-linearly, I use semiparametric generalized additive binomial models (GAM) controlling for covariates and country fixed effects. Specifically, GAM allows the coefficient of the independent variable, distance to the nearest refugee site within the country, to vary over distances based on natural cubic splines. Figure 6 shows the predicted probabilities of these non-linear GAM models. While there are subtle non-linearities for Q1 Jus sanguinis (left column), citizens across distances




Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities of Support for Citizenship Inclusion by Distance to nearest domestic Refugee Site, with 95% CIs. The estimates and the standard errors are calculated using GAM logistic regressions controlling for covariates and country fixed effects. This figure uncovers non-linearities in the effect size and confirms that respondents are more likely to support exclusion as a function of distance.

still generally support descent-based citizenship. More notably, this figure confirms that the greatest dip for supporting Q2 Jus soli (right column) is within the first 200km of a refugee site, beyond which support consistently increases.

**Qualitative example.** To give substantive context for this distance and provide some qualitative evidence, in 2015 and 2016 I conducted structured focus groups with about 100 Tanzanian citizens in villages across Kigoma, a northwest region of Tanzania hosting Nyarugusu refugee camp. At the time, this camp was composed of more than 160,000 refugees from Burundi and the DRC. Citizens in Uvinza and Ilagala villages reside about 135km and 175km away from the camp respectively, too far for regular intergroup contact. Yet they still knew of its existence; they regularly spoke with family and friends who lived closer to the camp, some knew that district and immigration officials had come to their village to speak with their elders, and some had observed increased NGO presence – specifically, UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) – in the region.

Even in Tanzania, a *jus soli* country known for its inclusivity of migrants, a majority of the citizens I interviewed expressed concerns about crime, environmental degradation, and the spread of disease which

they attributed to the refugees at Nyarugusu. Some not only affirmed their national identity as distinct from neighboring countries, but also spoke of it using descent-based rhetoric: "For those given naturalization, they are still different due to the backgrounds of their fathers and grandfathers. They will come with historical impurities. Internally, he knows he is not Tanzanian."[13]

**Additional robustness checks.** To ensure that the results robustly capture the relationship between proximity to refugees and support for citizenship inclusion, I conduct the following checks. First, I replace the independent variable of distance to nearest refugee site with logged distance; figure S7 in the SI shows that results do not substantively change.

Next, I recognize that citizen respondents may be proximate to multiple sites. I use natural cubic splines to model the effects of distances to multiple nearby sites. Figure S8 in the SI shows the predicted probabilities for proximity to refugees based on the summed distances of the three nearest sites and confirms the main results.

## 6 Heterogeneous Effects by Refugee Site Type and Citizenship Regime

Here I examine possible heterogeneous effects by the type of refugee site – old versus new and formal camp versus informal settlement – as well as by the actual citizenship regime – *jus sanguinis* versus *jus soli*/mixed – of the countries in this study.

First, citizens are likely to feel differently given how long nearby refugee sites have been established. Although I control for refugee site duration in the main analyses, it is worth investigating this difference. For example, the world's largest refugee camp, Dadaab, in Kenya has hosted Somali refugees since 1991; it is resented by many Kenyans for the concentration of crime, militant groups, and communicable diseases (Crisp, 2000). Citing security concerns, the Kenyan government recently announced it would finally close the camp. On the other hand, refugees in older sites such as Buduburam (established in 1990) in Ghana, have formed relationships with the local population over time (Dzeamesi, 2008). Although Buduburam

[13]Male participant of Munanila focus group, 07/27/2015.




Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities comparing respondents near new (top row, dotted lines) versus old (bottom row, dashed lines) refugee sites, with 95% CIs. New sites are those established for 5 years or less versus old sites established 10 or more years ago. Across distances, citizens near newer sites are more opposed to birthright citizenship.

officially closed in 2012, about 5,000 Liberian refugees were able to locally integrate.

Therefore, to disentangle whether local citizens' exclusionary reactions are largely due to new influxes of refugees versus refugees who have settled for a long time, I run the analysis separately for respondents whose nearest site is new (n = 10,755, dotted lines), which I classify as having been established for only 5 years or less, versus those whose nearest site is old (n = 20,549, dashed lines) or having been established for 10 years or more.

Figure 7 shows the effects of proximity to new sites (top row, dotted lines) versus old sites (bottom

row, dashed lines). For both Q1 Jus sanguinis and Q2 Jus soli, the intercepts for new sites at 78.8% and 42.5% respectively are lower than the intercepts for old sites at 84.2% and 55.3%, respectively. These differences suggest that new refugee sites bring a shock of uncertainty, leading citizens near these camps to more fervently support exclusion, fears which may be attenuated as sites become more established over time. Nevertheless, the effect of distance is similar for both new and old sites, meaning this attenuation is still filtered through refugee proximity.

Second, since refugee sites include both formal camps and informal settlements, I assess whether proximity to camps has different effects compared to proximity to settlements. According to discussions with UNHCR officials, whether a refugee site is designated a camp or a settlement is largely a political decision by the host country. They confirm that while camps are generally associated with more state control and international recognition and settlements are typically informal areas of refugee communities, there is no clear delineation between the two based on realities on the ground such as population sizes or levels of aid.[14] In fact, UNHCR operational protocols refer to camps and settlements together without explicitly differentiating the two.[15] Figure S11 in the SI shows that there is no substantive difference for support for citizenship inclusion comparing proximity to refugee camps versus settlements.

Lastly, I examine whether support for citizenship inclusion operates through the lens of the actual citizenship laws of respondents. I run the analysis separately for respondents belonging to countries with *jus sanguinis* laws (n = 16,805) versus those belonging to countries with *jus soli* or mixed laws (n = 15,575). Figure S12 in the SI confirms that respondents do not simply prefer the citizenship regime that matches their countries' policies. The exclusionary effect of proximity to refugee sites on Q2 Jus soli is present in both cases, but slightly stronger for citizens of *jus sanguinis* countries.

[14]Interviews conducted with the Field Information and Coordination Support Section (FICSS) of UNHCR on December 30, 2013 by teleconference.

[15]`www.unhcr.org/uk/448d6c122.pdf`

# 7 Placebo Test using Promixity to "Future Refugee Sites"

An obstacle inherent to research on migrant-host relations is the selection bias of where migrants are located vis–à–vis host citizens; voluntary migrants can choose to live in neighborhoods that are more accepting of them and/or whose residents share familial, cultural, and ethnic ties (Massey and Denton, 1987, 1988). Unlike voluntary migrants, however, refugees often have considerably less agency and time to choose where they settle since they are forcibly displaced. Nevertheless, to directly address concerns of selection bias, I use a placebo test strategy to show that there is no relationship between the outcomes of interest, support for citizenship inclusion, and respondent distance to *future* domestic refugee sites. These are sites that are established after the survey is conducted.

In short, the objective behind placebo tests is to confirm that an effect does not exist when it should not exist, because if it does then factors other than the proposed independent variable are driving the effect, revealing selection bias. Similar to how, among many others, Lee (2001) shows that future electoral outcomes do not affect past elections and how Rothstein (2010) shows that future teachers cannot affect students' past performance, this same logic applies; since these areas eventually do host refugee sites in the future, they are good candidates for counterfactual refugee-hosting areas in the present; they embody the selection characteristics (e.g. geographic, sociological, legal, etc.) that would determine where a potential site could be located.

Since the Afrobarometer round 5 was conducted either in 2011, 2012, or 2013 depending on the country (see Table 1), there are a dozen refugee sites that have opened after the survey, specifically in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, and Cameroon. For these countries, I rerun the analysis replacing the main independent variable with respondent distances to the nearest future domestic refugee site, keeping all covariates except for the duration of the nearest future domestic refugee site (years) since this variable is not applicable in this context.

Figure 8 shows the predicted probabilities for proximity to future domestic refugee sites (see table S3




Figure 8: Placebo Test: Predicted Probabilities of affirmative Support for Citizenship Inclusion by Respondent Distances to the nearest Future Domestic Refugee Site, with 95% CIs. The estimates and the standard errors are calculated using logistic regressions controlling for covariates and country fixed effects. There is no evidence of positive selection effects.

in the SI for the regression table). There are no effects across the range of distances, which suggests that there are no unobserved confounders biasing the results.[16]

Migration research and qualitative interviews with UNHCR officials lend further credibility to this claim. How are locations for refugee sites chosen? First, no standard international procedure exists to regulate how refugees are distributed within a host country or where refugee sites should be located. Patterns of refugee movements and settlements are foremost determined by the exogenous shocks of conflict and other exigent crises in neighboring countries. Within the host country, refugee sites are generally situated in areas where a quorum of refugees congregate based on access to roads and proximity to the border, which I control for (Jacobsen, 1996; Jacobson, 1996; Bariagaber, 2006). Once settled, host governments are bound by international humanitarian law to the principle of non-refoulement – the obligation to not send refugees away (Article 33, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees).

Furthermore, interviews with UNHCR officials contend that while a few refugee camps, such as those in Turkey, are planned and controlled by the state, "refugee sites in general are almost always established *ad*

[16]Nevertheless, since the citizens from these placebo tests are from only four countries, it may be the case that these particular citizens do not exhibit the main effects of refugee proximity to begin with. Figure S9 in the SI confirms that this is not the case; it shows that the main results of distance to nearest domestic refugee site still hold for the subset of these countries to ensure that there is no ecological fallacy.

*hoc* or unplanned."[17] It is unlikely that refugees are typically aware of local social and political dynamics or have the resources to carefully determine optimal settlement locations. Instead, refugees tend to settle on an *ad hoc* basis. Humanitarian organizations like the UNHCR and state security forces then respond by deploying resources to these sites as they are being established or sometime thereafter.

# 8 Exploring Mechanisms

Finally, I investigate possible mechanisms for why host citizens may feel more exclusionary when refugees are settled nearby. Turning again to the immigration literature, this section provides preliminary evidence that citizens may feel both economically and socially threatened by refugees. This evidence is only suggestive, because the Afrobarometer round 5 does not ask respondents reasons for wanting to restrict citizenship access nor does it include any questions about refugees or immigration. Thus, questions about the perceived strength of the national economy and interpersonal trust proxy for economic and social threat. With respect to H2, compared to fellow citizens far from refugee sites, near-refugee respondents are less likely to perceive that the national economy is doing well and more likely to report low interpersonal trust.

To proxy for economic threat, the following question about perceptions of the national economy question reads,

```
In general, how would you describe the present economic condition of
this country?

Very bad ..................... 1
Fairly bad .................... 2
Neither good nor bad .......... 3
Fairly good ................... 4
Very good ..................... 5
Don't Know .................... 99
```

To proxy for social threat, the following question about interpersonal trust reads,

```
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you must be very careful in dealing with people?
```

[17] Interviews conducted with the Field Information and Coordination Support Section (FICSS) of UNHCR on December 30, 2013 by teleconference and January 12-18, 2015 in person at the UNHCR headquarters in Geneva.




Figure 9: Predicted Probabilities of Possible Mechanisms: National Economy Assessment and Interpersonal Trust, by Distance from nearest Refugee Site with 95% CIs. The estimates and the standard errors are calculated using ordered logistic (National Economy Assessment) and logistic (Interpersonal Trust) regressions controlling for covariates and country fixed effects. This figure shows that moving closer to refugee sites, respondents tend to feel more pessimistic about the national economy and lower interpersonal trust.

```
Must be very careful ..... 0
Most people can be trusted ..... 1
Don't Know ..... 99
```

Figure 9 shows the predicted responses/probabilities.[18] For assessment of the national economy, as respondents are farther away from the refugee sites their responses shift from "fairly bad" to neutral – "neither good nor bad." This suggests that citizens closer to refugee sites are more pessimistic about the state of their country's economy compared to fellow citizens who live farther from refugees. This finding is supportive of the economic threat theory.

A similar pattern emerges for interpersonal trust. While trust is generally low, those nearer to refugee sites have only a 20.1% likelihood of believing that most people can be trusted. Across the range of distances, there is a 3.1 percentage point increase, which is supportive of the social threat theory. These findings are in line with recent immigration scholars who believe that these two types of migrant threats are not mutually exclusive (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008).

[18]Table S4 in the SI shows the full regression table. Figure S10 in the SI shows the predicted probabilities when replacing the independent variable with logged distance to nearest domestic refugee site; results are substantively unchanged.

While these results lend credibility to economic and social migrant threats as possible mechanisms for citizenship exclusion in Africa, they are not conclusive. Understandably, both questions are imperfect proxies for fears of economic competition and social threat in reference to migrants. Nevertheless, I justify using these two proxies thusly. To the extent that perceptions of economic conditions are partially the result of personal sociotropic calculations, the first proxy measures whether those nearer to refugee sites believe their economic conditions to be worse than those farther away. Second, the proxy of interpersonal trust generally measures social capital and community cohesion. The fact that respondents did not need to be primed on the survey to think about migration when responding to these questions suggests that simply having refugee communities nearby is a strong enough trigger to feel economically and socially threatened.

# 9 Conclusion

This article uses novel, geo-referenced data of refugee site locations and citizen respondents across 22 African countries to show how proximity to refugee sites can lead to opposition of inclusionary citizenship policy, specifically granting birthright citizenship. I confirm these results through several robustness checks and placebo tests showing that refugee sites created after the survey have no effect on survey outcomes. I also show that citizens feel more exclusionary when the refugee communities nearby are newly established. With respect to possible mechanisms, I find that citizens who are geographically proximite to refugee sites have a lower assessment of their country's economy and report lower levels of interpersonal trust.

This project speaks to growing research on migrant-host relations with broader theoretical implications for nation-building and citizenship in Africa. While border regions in Africa are generally characterized by low state presence, porous borders, and greater inclusivity, when refugees cross those borders and settle, I find that host citizens may feel compelled to fortify other national boundaries, such as citizenship policy. By challenging physical borders, refugees may motivate citizens to support more restrictive citizenship laws in order to maintain national boundaries. Additionally, much of the extant literature on migration

speaks solely to North-South migration in OECD countries. By focusing on displacement and citizenship in Africa, this article brings attention to an under-theorized region in the global South.

Given these findings, there are several avenues for future research. First, additional data collection is required, especially on the demographic characteristics of refugee sites including their population size, nationalities of origin, ethnic composition and levels of aid and state involvement. This data could help parse out heterogeneous effects and mechanisms. Second, given the preferences of host citizens to restrict citizenship access when refugees are in their country, we might ask: when and how do political elites respond by changing citizenship policy due to electoral and other political concerns? Figure 1 in section 3 confirms that there is considerable variation of citizenship policy across time within countries. Herbst (2000) and Manby (2013) point to the role of migration in changing citizenship law in Africa, and Adida (2014) shows that in response to migration, elites can respond by adopting exclusionary policies and practices.

Finally, this research may have practical implications for humanitarian policymaking. Home to sizable and long-term refugee populations spanning hundreds of sites, countries in sub-Saharan Africa have the potential to ease the burdens of protracted displacement and statelessness by adopting or putting into practice more generous immigration policies. Humanitarian organizations currently pursuing durable solutions to displacement can advocate for the physical and social integration of refugees into host communities, as well as legal integration through citizenship law. While my findings suggest that these inclusive policies may be most intractable with nearby host communities, citizen opposition may lessen over time, which is especially promising for the numerous cases of protracted displacement.

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# Supplementary Information

## Contents

# S1 Summary Statistics

This section shows descriptive statistics for the data: the summary statistics table S1; the number of forcibly displaced by region over time from 1960 to 2016 in figure S1; a map showing all refugee sites in Africa open as of 2015 in figure S2; figure S3 showing whether or not a country hosted refugees in any given year starting at the country's year of independence up to 2015; the distribution of respondents' logged distance to the nearest domestic refugee site as an alternative independent variable in figure S4; the distribution of respondents' distance to the nearest domestic refugee site by country in figure S5; and respondent covariates plotted against their distance to the nearest domestic refugee site in figure S6.

Table S1: Summary Statistics of the Data

| Variable | N | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Respondents | 34,772 | | | | |
| Countries | 22 | | | | |
| Distance to nearest domestic Refugee Site (km) | 34,772 | 213.795 | 187.548 | 0.048 | 1,254.364 |
| Distance to nearest domestic Refugee Camp (km) | 20,389 | 297.864 | 203.317 | 0.048 | 960.091 |
| Distance to nearest domestic Refugee Settlement (km) | 14,392 | 264.198 | 217.407 | 0.789 | 1,254.364 |
| *Support for Citizenship Inclusion Questions*: | | | | | |
| Q1: jus sanguinis | 33,882 | 0.850 | 0.357 | 0 | 1 |
| Q2: jus soli | 33,923 | 0.569 | 0.495 | 0 | 1 |
| Q3: wife of citizen husband | 33,846 | 0.704 | 0.456 | 0 | 1 |
| Q4: husband of citizen wife | 33,706 | 0.516 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Q5: lived and worked in country | 33,605 | 0.656 | 0.475 | 0 | 1 |
| Q6: hold dual citizenship | 33,066 | 0.329 | 0.470 | 0 | 1 |
| *Mechanism Questions*: | | | | | |
| National Economy | 34,341 | 2.471 | 1.251 | 1 | 5 |
| Interpersonal Trust | 34,162 | 0.199 | 0.399 | 0 | 1 |
| *Demographic Characteristics*: | | | | | |
| Age | 34,557 | 36.801 | 14.314 | 18 | 105 |
| Education (0 = No formal, 9 = Post-grad) | 34,707 | 3.127 | 2.111 | 0 | 9 |
| Female (0 = Male, 1 = Female) | 34,772 | 0.500 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Ethnic Majority (0 = Minority, 1 = Majority) | 34,772 | 0.352 | 0.478 | 0 | 1 |
| Rural (0 = Urban, 1 = Rural) | 34,772 | 0.318 | 0.466 | 0 | 1 |
| Economic Scarcity | 34,385 | 0.032 | 0.985 | −1.442 | 2.891 |
| *Other Covariates*: | | | | | |
| Nearest Refugee Site Duration (years) | 34,772 | 14.161 | 11.577 | 0 | 48 |
| Nearest Refugee Camp Duration (years) | 20,389 | 7.179 | 6.080 | 0 | 18 |
| Nearest Refugee Settlement Duration (years) | 14,392 | 16.147 | 11.996 | 1 | 48 |
| Number of Additional Refugee Sites within 200km | 34,772 | 0.931 | 0.945 | 0 | 3 |
| Distance to the border (km) | 34,772 | 66.562 | 67.185 | 0.005 | 383.748 |
| Distance to major city (km) | 34,772 | 105.274 | 125.960 | 0.224 | 945.436 |
| Distance to road (km) | 34,772 | 193.444 | 426.044 | 0.003 | 3,294.472 |
| Distance to violent conflict (km) | 26,561 | 82.259 | 89.320 | 0.0001 | 575.632 |




Figure S1: This figure shows the levels of displacement across regions from 1960 to 2016. The numbers of forcibly displaced hosted in sub-Saharan Africa has been steadily rising since the early 2000s, and the proportion is second only to the Middle East - North Africa. Data source: UNHCR population statistics database.




Figure S2: This map shows the 769 refugee sites, both camps and settlements, in Africa open as of 2015. The sites' start years range from 1966 to 2013; they are colored by duration with oldest to newest sites shaded from darkest to lightest. Almost all refugee sites are located in border regions; half fall within 15km and 90 percent are within 75km of the international border. Data source: UNHCR.




Figure S3: This figure shows whether a country has hosted refugees in any given year, beginning at the country's independence (although cropped for South Africa (1931 from Britain), Liberia (1847 from the American Colonization Society), and Ethiopia (never colonized)). Every country has hosted refugees, and aside from islands, many have been doing so for the majority of their existence as nation-states. Data source: UNHCR population statistics database.




Figure S4: Respondent Logged Distance to nearest Refugee Site within their country: this figure shows the distribution of respondent logged distances to the nearest refugee site in their country. Since the distribution of the main independent variable Respondent Distance is skewed to the left, all analyses are rerun using this measure Respondent Logged Distance as a robustness check, results are substantively unchanged.




Figure S5: Distribution of Respondent Distance to nearest Refugee Site within their country, by Country.




Figure S6: This figure shows respondent demographic covariates (y-axis) and distances to the international border, major city, road, and violent conflict within the past year by distance to nearest refugee site within their country (x-axis) with 95% CIs.

# S2 Robustness Checks

## S2.1 Logged Distance to nearest Domestic Refugee Site

Since the distribution of the independent variable – Respondent Distance to the nearest domestic Refugee Site – is skewed to the left, figure S7 confirms that the main results in figure 4 are substantively unchanged when the logged measure (see figure S4 for the distribution) is used instead.




Figure S7: Predicted Probabilities of Support for Citizenship Inclusion by Logged Distance to nearest domestic Refugee Site, with 95% CIs. The estimates and the standard errors are calculated using logistic regressions controlling for covariates and country fixed effects.

## S2.2 Distances to Multiple Domestic Refugee Sites

Here, figure S8 shows the effect of proximity to the three nearest domestic refugee sites. It confirms the main findings in figure 4.




Figure S8: Predicted Probabilities of Support for Citizenship Inclusion by Summed Distances to the three nearest Refugee sites using natural cubic splines on these distances, with 95% CIs. The estimates and the standard errors are calculated using logistic regressions controlling for covariates and country fixed effects.

## S2.3 Ecological Fallacy Check for Placebo Test

Since the respondents included in the placebo test are from only four countries – Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, and Cameroon – I repeat the main analysis using respondents subsetted to these four countries to ensure that there is no ecological fallacy; figure S9 confirms that the main results in figure 4 hold even in just these four countries.




Figure S9: Ecological Fallacy check for Placebo Test: Predicted Probabilities of Support for Citizenship Inclusion by Distance to nearest domestic Refugee Site for countries included in the Placebo Test, with 95% CIs.

## S2.4 Mechanisms with Logged Distance to nearest Domestic Refugee Site

Similar to section S2.1, this section uses the loggest measure of refugee proximity. Figure S10 confirms the the findings from figure 9 on respondents' assessment of the national economy and interpersonal trust.




Figure S10: Predicted Probabilities of Possible Mechanisms – National Economy Assessment and Interpersonal Trust– by Logged Distance from nearest Domestic Refugee Site with 95% CIs. The estimates and the standard errors are calculated using ordered logistic (National Economy Assessment) and logistic (Interpersonal Trust) regressions controlling for covariates and country fixed effects.

# S3 Heterogeneous Effects Analysis

This section shows the heterogeneous effects by refugee camp versus settlement, and by the actual citizenship regime – *jus sanguinis* versus *jus soli*/mixed – of the countries in this study.

## S3.1 Comparing Respondent Proximity to Formal Refugee Camps versus Informal Settlements




Figure S11: Predicted Probabilities comparing proximity to nearest formal refugee camp (top row, dotted lines) vs. proximity to nearest informal settlement (bottom row, dashed lines), with 95% CIs. The estimates and the standard errors are calculated using logistic regressions controlling for covariates and country fixed effects. The effects are similar regardless of formal versus informal site type.

## S3.2 Comparing Respondents from Jus Sanguinis versus Jus Soli countries




Figure S12: Predicted Probabilities comparing citizens from *jus sanguinis* countries (top row, dotted lines) vs. citizens from *jus soli*/mixed countries (bottom row, dashed lines), with 95% CIs. The estimates and the standard errors are calculated using logistic regressions controlling for covariates and country fixed effects. Support for birthright citizenship exclusion is slightly more pronounced for citizens of *jus sanguinis* countries.

## S4 Regression Tables

This section presents the regression tables for the main analysis of the proximity of domestic refugee sites on support for citizenship inclusion for all questions in the Afrobarometer Citizenship Battery, the placebo analysis, and the mechanisms analysis.

With respect to the main analysis shown in table S2, although the other citizenship inclusion questions Q3 through Q6 covering *jus matrimonii*, naturalization, and dual citizenship were not the main focus of this article, we see similarly exclusionary effects for Q4 Husband of citizen, Q5 Naturalization, and Q6 Dual citizen.

Comparing the results for Q3 Wife of citizen and Q4 Husband of citizen, there is a greater acceptance of women taking on their husband's nationality than vice versa. This reflects the gender discrimination of more than half of the citizenship laws in Africa which do not allow women the right to transmit their nationality to a foreign spouse or their children (Manby, 2016).

Table S2: Logistic regression results of Support for Citizenship Inclusion on Distance to nearest Domestic Refugee Site

| | Outcome variables: | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Q1: Jus sanguinis | Q2: Jus soli | Q3: Wife of citizen | Q4: Husband of citizen | Q5: Lived and worked | Q6 Dual citizen |
| Distance to Refugee Site (km) | −.0001 | .001*** | .00003 | .0002** | .0003*** | .0004*** |
| | (.0001) | (.0001) | (.0001) | (.0001) | (.0001) | (.0001) |
| Age | .004*** | .0005 | .005*** | .003*** | .003*** | −.001 |
| | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) | (.001) |
| Education | .082*** | .018** | .065*** | .055*** | .081*** | .076*** |
| | (.011) | (.008) | (.008) | (.008) | (.008) | (.008) |
| Rural | .167*** | .128*** | .019 | .112*** | .196*** | .114*** |
| | (.044) | (.033) | (.035) | (.032) | (.034) | (.035) |
| Female | −.062* | −.078*** | −.090*** | −.034 | −.081*** | −.032 |
| | (.036) | (.027) | (.029) | (.027) | (.028) | (.030) |
| Ethnic Majority | .012 | −.003 | −.083** | −.104*** | −.082*** | −.033 |
| | (.041) | (.031) | (.032) | (.030) | (.031) | (.034) |
| Economic Scarcity | −.026** | −.017* | .010 | .013 | −.035*** | .033*** |
| | (.012) | (.009) | (.010) | (.009) | (.009) | (.010) |
| Distance to border (km) | −.0002 | −.001*** | −.001** | −.001*** | −.001*** | −.0004 |
| | (.0003) | (.0002) | (.0002) | (.0002) | (.0002) | (.0003) |
| Distance to city (km) | −.0001 | −.001*** | −.001*** | −.001*** | −.001*** | −.001*** |
| | (.0002) | (.0002) | (.0002) | (.0002) | (.0002) | (.0002) |
| Distance to road (km) | −.0001** | −.00003 | −.00003 | −.0001 | .00001 | 0.00000 |
| | (.00005) | (.00004) | (.00004) | (.00003) | (.00004) | (.00004) |
| Distance to conflict (km) | .001*** | .0005* | .001*** | .001*** | .001*** | .001*** |
| | (.0003) | (.0002) | (.0003) | (.0002) | (.0002) | (.0003) |
| Site Duration (years) | .004 | .003 | −.003 | −.005** | −.002 | −.009*** |
| | (.003) | (.003) | (.003) | (.003) | (.003) | (.003) |
| Other Sites within 200km | −.001 | −.010*** | −.0002 | −.004 | −.007** | .001 |
| | (.004) | (.003) | (.003) | (.003) | (.003) | (.003) |
| Intercept | 1.310*** | .091 | .575 | −.160 | .380 | −1.070** |
| | (.432) | (.427) | (.430) | (.421) | (.423) | (.430) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 24,755 | 24,796 | 24,698 | 24,636 | 24,534 | 24,164 |
| Log Likelihood | −10,467.000 | −16,125.000 | −14,467.000 | −16,679.000 | −15,268.000 | −13,753.000 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 20,998.000 | 32,315.000 | 28,998.000 | 33,421.000 | 30,599.000 | 27,570.000 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the full Table 2: Logistic regression results of Support for Citizenship Inclusion (all questions) on Distance to the Nearest Refugee Site in their country for all citizenship inclusion questions. Positive coefficients entail greater likelihood of responding Yes to the question (i.e. being more inclusive in their on citizenship). The farther (nearer) respondents are to the nearest Refugee Site within country, all else equal, the more (less) inclusive they become on the citizenship law in question. In comparison, the farther (nearer) respondents are to the border, all else equal, the more (less) exclusionary they become.

Table S3: Logistic regression results of Support for Citizenship Inclusion on Distance to nearest Future Domestic Refugee Site (Placebo Test)

| | Outcome variables: | |
|---|---|---|
| | Q1: Jus sanguinis | Q2: Jus soli |
| Distance to Refugee Site (km) | −.0003 (.001) | .0002 (.001) |
| Age | .013* (.007) | −.004 (.005) |
| Education | .086** (.044) | .007 (.029) |
| Rural | −.111 (.187) | −.095 (.127) |
| Female | .272 (.171) | −.160 (.116) |
| Ethnic Majority | .982*** (.271) | .295* (.157) |
| Economic Scarcity | .175*** (.054) | .087** (.037) |
| Distance to border (km) | .0001 (.002) | −.004** (.002) |
| Distance to city (km) | .004* (.002) | −.004*** (.002) |
| Distance to road (km) | −.0003 (.0004) | .0001 (.0003) |
| Distance to conflict (km) | −.001 (.002) | .004*** (.001) |
| Site Duration (years) | .003 (.010) | .008 (.006) |
| Other Sites within 200km | .800 (.794) | .019 (.520) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1,300 | 1,291 |
| Log Likelihood | −487.000 | −870.000 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,002.000 | 1,768.000 |
| *Note:* | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

This table shows the Placebo Test results, specifically the Logistic regression results of Support for Citizenship Inclusion on distance to the nearest Future Refugee Site within their country. This table shows null effects, suggesting that there is no selection on unobserved confounders.

Table S4: Regression results of Possible Mechanisms on Distance to nearest Domestic Refugee Site

| | Outcome variables: | |
|---|---|---|
| | National Economy | Interpersonal Trust |
| | *ordered logistic* | *logistic* |
| Distance to Refugee Site (km) | .001*** (.0001) | .0005*** (.0001) |
| Age | −.003*** (.001) | .004*** (.001) |
| Education | −.018*** (.007) | −.070*** (.010) |
| Rural | −.232*** (.028) | −.316*** (.041) |
| Female | −.052** (.024) | −.009 (.033) |
| Ethnic Majority | −.003 (.026) | .046 (.036) |
| Economic Scarcity | −.223*** (.008) | −.024** (.011) |
| Distance to border (km) | −.0001 (.0002) | .0002 (.0003) |
| Distance to city (km) | .001*** (.0001) | .001*** (.0002) |
| Distance to road (km) | −.00004 (.00003) | −.00002 (.00004) |
| Distance to conflict (km) | −.0003 (.0002) | −.001** (.0003) |
| Site Duration (years) | .007*** (.002) | −.006 (.004) |
| Other Sites within 200km | .016*** (.003) | .005 (.004) |
| Intercept | | −1.330*** (.434) |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 25,029 | 24,890 |
| Log Likelihood | | −11,929.000 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | | 23,923.000 |
| *Note:* | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

This table shows the Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression results of possible mechanisms – National Economy Assessment and Interpersonal Trust – on Distance to the Nearest Refugee Site in their country. Positive coefficients entail greater likelihood of responding Higher/Yes to the question.