How Refugee Resentment Shapes National Identity and Citizen Participation in Africa.∗

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Abstract
As the number of refugees continues to rise globally, so do concerns about responses from host communities. This project examines how the presence of refugees affects national identity formation and political participation for nearby citizens, particularly in understudied developing contexts where state capacity and national attachments are considered low. I theorize that exposure to refugees leads host citizens to more strongly identify with their national identity as a way to distance themselves from a new migrant out-group. Coupled with feelings of relative deprivation with respect to humanitarian aid, this heightened solidarity with co-nationals drives citizen participation in demanding better public goods provision. I test this theory in a border region of Tanzania that has hosted an influx of over 230,000 Burundian refugees since 2015. Drawing on experimental survey and community focus group data of over 2,000 citizens, I find that greater exposure to refugees substantially increases national identification, resource resentment, and participation in public goods. Additional analyses using georeferenced primary school outcomes and interviews with government and NGO officials suggest positive downstream effects on public goods outcomes. By showing that animosity towards outsiders has consequences for national identity formation and development, this project highlights alternative pathways to nation-building.

Keywords: refugees, migration, national identity, public goods provision, development, Africa

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1 Introduction

How does the increasing presence of refugees affect identity formation and political participation for host citizens? The number of refugees – people who have fled their countries as a result of conflict and persecution – is at the highest ever recorded at 25.9 million.\(^1\) As this population continues to grow, so do concerns about how local communities will respond. Within the past decade, hosting refugees has become one of the most politically contentious issues throughout Europe and the United States. Yet the vast majority of refugees, more than 85%, remain in the developing world, almost always in the border regions of a neighboring country. Sub-Saharan African countries, for instance, host almost one-third of the world’s refugee population at 6.3 million. Unlike OECD countries, these countries often lack the capacity to monitor and close their borders (UNHCR, 2018).

This project examines the consequences of forced migration on nearby citizens’ national identification – the degree to which they feel attached to their national identity – in contexts where national attachments are considered low and historically difficult to build. For these regions, scholars generally infer that weak states, governance, and institutions simply beget the same (e.g. Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Migdal, 1988; Tilly, 1990; Goldstone et al., 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). However, I find that through increased migration, this set of circumstances can contribute to new sources of nation-building. I argue that as a consequence of porous borders and low state capacity, the pressures generated from refugee influxes prompt nearby individuals to cohere around their collective national identity. Especially when the state cannot project authority to the hinterlands, mass migration into these areas constitute significant events that make salient the negative consequences, real or perceived, of porous and artificial borders. Where these borders may not have felt consequential to local citizens before, an influx of migrants can imbue them with new significance. Since these borders frequently partition ethnolinguistic homelands, refugees and host communities often share ethnic ties (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). In order to distance themselves from this new out-group of migrants, nearby host citizens will turn to their national identity as the differentiating marker. Furthermore, by observing the material assistance given exclusively to refugees, these individuals are more likely to feel that together as citizens, they are equally if not more deserving of these resources. Inherent in this logic is the recognition that these citizens often feel intense hostility towards a vulnerable population, who have little agency in representing and defending themselves. Rather, these migrants become sources of symbolic and material threats. Thus, I predict that individuals who are more exposed to refugees – via geographic proximity and psychological priming – experience both

\(^1\)More precisely, a refugee is someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of her or his nationality, and is unable, or due to such fear, unwilling to avail him- or herself of the protection of that country.” Article 1, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
heightened national identification and feelings of relative deprivation. In turn, these two channels can spur new citizen participation in demanding more material resources from the state.

Empirically, I draw on multiple sources of evidence from a border region in north-west Tanzania, which experienced a recent influx of over 230,000 Burundian refugees starting in April 2015. First, in order to gather data on host citizens’ experiences with refugees, attitudes towards them, levels of national identification, and grievances with respect to public goods provision, I ran community (‘village’) focus groups with about 150 participants in the summer of 2015, followed by a regionally representative survey of over 2,000 respondents in 2016. I find that greater exposure to refugees substantially increases perceived fears of them and feelings of resource resentment, while also heightening attachment to one’s national identity. The experimental components of these data allow me to confirm that the mechanism behind increased national identification is out-group distancing.

Next, I supplement these data with interviews with officials from local and central government, public service providers, and humanitarian aid agencies to show that citizens in communities closer to the refugee camps are more likely to express grievances towards the state and make material investments to improve public goods. Finally, I find evidence that this leads to positive outcomes for development, namely that the quality of public education for communities closer to camps improves more compared to communities that are farther away post-refugee influx. For these analyses, I use geo-referenced primary school outcomes measured from 2012 to 2017.

This research seeks to make several contributions, foremost to the extensive literature in political science on nation-building and nationalism. This project examines how national identities can form around exclusion of foreigners, akin to Sahlins (1989) and Marx (2005), but in an African context, where national boundaries are typically colonial. The borders of most modern African states were constructed by colonial powers during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 without regard for preexisting political organization or the degree to which people share a common identity (Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski, 2011). Due to the colonial origins of African national states and their artificial borders, they are often low in state capacity outside of their capital cities, underprovide public goods, and need to contend with high ethnic diversity (e.g. Asiwaju, 1985; Davidson, 1993; Herbst, 2000; Young, 2001; Englebert, 2002; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). A common claim about contemporary African politics is that citizens feel less attached to their nation relative to their “tribe” or ethnic group, which is often the most salient determinant of social and political behavior. This has negative consequences for governance, accountability, and development. Low state capacity in the hinterlands means communities located in border regions often have limited interactions with the state and have less access to public goods and services (e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Nolutshungu, 1996; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Young, 2001; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Collier,
Following this extensive literature, we might expect increased instability from a refugee influx, but in fact I find that national identification, citizen mobilization, and public goods provision can emerge once foreign outsiders (refugees) come and settle.

My research also speaks to the connection between levels of social diversity and public goods provision. This literature generally upholds that while strong social divisions such as ethnicity can undermine citizen participation, a sense of shared national identity can lead to social cohesion and in turn, better public goods cooperation (e.g. Miguel, 2004; Putnam, 2007; Smith, 2013; Charnysh, Lucas and Singh, 2015; Robinson, 2016; Jeon, Johnson and Robinson, 2017). To understand what promotes attachment to national identity, these scholars have looked towards nation-building policies and symbols designed by the state to promote nationalism and interethnic cooperation. Yet especially in low state capacity contexts, few of these nation-building interventions have been successful. My research differs from this literature by considering the role that the presence of outsiders, specifically non-citizens, plays in these processes. Although migration increases social diversity, I argue that national identity becomes more salient for citizens when they are exposed to what they perceive as a foreign “threat.”

Lastly, immigration scholarship and policy debates have largely overlooked the consequences of not only forced migration in the global South, but South-South migration generally. Although more than 80% of African migrants, voluntary and forcibly displaced, remain within the continent, we know little about this type of migration (Özden et al., 2011; UNDESA, 2017). The insights we do have from intra-African migration studies, such as Landau (2008); Onoma (2013) and Adida (2014), often run counterintuitive to the North-South immigration literature with respect to how host-migrant coethnicity drives competition and conflict rather than integration. By studying forced migration and national identity in Africa, I seek to highlight the unique dynamics of citizen-refugee relations in an understudied region.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines my theory of how refugee exposure drives national identification and citizen participation and lays out the observable implications and associated empirical tests. Then, Section 3 describes the study context of the 2015 Burundian refugee influx into Tanzania. Next, Section 4 operationalizes exposure to refugees and presents the various concerns and perceptions of threat that local citizens feel. In Sections 5, 6, and 7, I detail the evidence and present the results for each step of the argument – first, refugee exposure increases citizens’ national identification, second, refugee exposure increases citizen resentment over resources, and third, for exposed communities, citizen participation in public goods provision increases and the quality of local public goods provision improve. Finally, Section 8 concludes with a discussion on the normative implications of this research. Although refugee resentment can ultimately lead to unexpected, positive development outcomes, these
are still exclusionary attitudes based on prejudice and often unfounded fears and stereotypes. Rather than implying that the state or other elite actors should further encourage these anxieties as a means of nation-building, I consider approaches that promote refugee inclusion alongside development.

## 2 A Migrant-driven Theory of National Identification and Citizen Participation

In this section, I theorize how exposure to refugees can increase national identification and citizen participation, and describe how my argument speaks to existing literatures on nation-building, migration, and public goods provision. Established theories describe how state-led nation-building drives national identification by emphasizing common national values, language, history, and culture (Anderson, 1982; Gellner, 1983; Putnam, 2007). In turn, a strong sense of national identification among citizens is critical for citizen participation in generating better development outcomes, especially since social norms integral to collective action are difficult to enforce in ethnically diverse communities (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Kpessa, Béland and Lecours, 2011; Robinson, 2016; Jeon, Johnson and Robinson, 2017).

Yet state-structured nation-building has largely proved unsuccessful in African countries – especially in border regions – due to the colonial legacy of artificially created nation-states, low state capacity, and the continued social and political salience of ethnicity (e.g. Asiwaju, 1985; Scott, 1998; Englebert, 2002; Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002; Herbst, 2000; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Smith, 2013; Schneider, 2014). In this context, low nationalism and citizen solidarity is an implied consequence of weak states and institutions (Bates, 1983; Manby, 2013; Smith, 2013; Keller, 2014).²

However, I argue that in certain cases, weak states and institutions present opportunities for new sources of state- and nation-building. Specifically, my theory outlined in Figure 1 posits how an external event, in this case the influx of refugees, can reshape how nearby citizens feel about their national identity,

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²There are exceptions; Miles and Rochefort (1991) find that citizens on either side of the Niger-Nigeria boundary did not value their ethnic identity above their national identity. Examining communities at the border between Niger and Burkina Faso, Bhandari and Mueller (2019) develop a theory of familial nationalism, in which marginalized border communities associate their national identity with family.
the quality of resources in their communities, and what they feel they deserve as citizens. Citizens most exposed to the refugees will feel heightened national identification and relative deprivation with respect to their own communities. In turn, these two channels lead to citizen participation for better public goods.

2.1 Exposure to Refugees

The key explanatory variable is exposure to refugees, which I conceptualize in two ways: geographic proximity to refugees and being psychologically primed with information and/or a discussion about them. Unlike nation-building policies intended to affect all citizens, we would not expect all citizens to feel similarly exposed to a refugee influx in their country. Those who are more likely to be affected by the refugees, or who believe they are more likely to be affected, are more exposed. Thus, a refugee influx would primarily affect those living in close proximity and who are reminded of the refugees near their communities.

This logic is consistent with recent research on public attitudes towards immigration in Europe and the U.S. showing that while citizens may generally support immigration and refugee resettlement in theory, they are much less supportive if it occurs in their own communities – a spatial collective action problem known as NIMBYism ("not-in-my-back-yard") (Maney and Abraham, 2008; Ferwerda, Flynn and Horiuchi, 2017). For instance, Enos (2014) finds that exposure to members of an outsider group, who in this study were randomly assigned to be in the physical spaces of a homogenous community, leads to increased exclusionary attitudes. More broadly, Enos (2017) argues and shows that social geography itself can shape “the experience of diversity.” Similarly, I contend that even in cases without opportunities for intergroup contact, for example when refugees remain in camps segregated from the local host population, these local citizens can form new perceptions and biases that have political implications.

2.2 Threat Perception, Out-group Distancing, and National Identification

First, I argue that an influx of refugees leads nearby citizens to perceive them as the new relevant out-group, thereby heightening attachment to their national identity as the most obvious point of difference. By national and ethnic identification, I am referring to voluntaristic attachments, not merely attributes or markers such as language spoken or place of origin.

A common understanding of contemporary African politics is that citizens feel low national identification relative to subnational identities tied to religion, language, and ethnicity. Low national identification is implicated in an array of problems in sub-Saharan Africa, from political instability and clientelism to economic underdevelopment (e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Young, 2001; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Collier, 2011; Lieberman and McClendon, 2013; Robinson, 2014). This literature exceptional-
izes African countries precisely due to their borders and border regions. While the conventional scholarship on state-formation relies on nation-states and their borders emerging endogenously through war and territorial consolidation (e.g. Tilly et al., 1985; Tilly, 1990), African borders are both artificial and arbitrary, set by European colonial powers with little regard for local geography and existing social groups (Herbst, 1989). Almost 80% of African borders follow latitudinal or longitudinal lines, the highest percentage across continents, which explains why African countries are the most ethnically diverse in the world (Asiwaju, 1985; Englebert, 2002; Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002; Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski, 2011).

Faced with artificial borders, post-independence African states have attempted to foster “imagined communities” tied to the territorial nation-state (Anderson, 1982) through various nation-building policies such as adopting a common language, relocating the capital, collectivizing rural development, and expanding access to education (Herbst, 2000; Smith, 2013). In many cases, low state capacity hindered implementation of these policies. When they were implemented, state-led nation-building still often privileged certain citizen groups over others. Thus, while post-independence African leaders were optimistic in their ability to motivate strong national consciousnesses, ethnic and other subnational divisions remain the basis of social and political life (Scott, 1998; Keller, 2014; Schneider, 2014). Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) confirm that in Africa, rule of law and national (as opposed to ethnic) identification weakens in the hinterlands.

State-structured nation-building policies are generally large-scale and occur over long periods of time. While it seems implausible for forced migration to offer an alternative pathway towards such long-term processes of nation- and state-building, I suggest that at least in areas exposed to refugee settlement, it is possible for African citizens to feel greater national identification, to become more aware of their shared citizenship, and to more actively engage as citizens in decision-making and governance. This claim is especially credible when considering the limited penetration of the state and national institutions in these hinterlands and the breadth of forced migration in African countries. Using novel data on refugee locations generated in collaboration with the UNHCR (Zhou and Shaver, 2018; Zhou, 2018), Figure 2 shows that as of 2015, there are 769 refugee settlements, both formal camps and informal settlements, across Africa, predominantly in border regions. The oldest refugee settlements have been open since the late 1960s and early 1970s when most African nation-states gained their independence. Additionally, every country in sub-Saharan Africa has hosted refugees, and aside from island nations, many have been doing so for the majority of their existence as nation-states. Figure S3 in the SI shows which years starting

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3This is in line with classic theories of nationalism based on processes of modernization such as urbanization, industrialization, universal education, and mass media (e.g. Anderson, 1982; Gellner, 1983). Yet many scholars of African politics note that these same processes have often led to civil conflicts in which nationhood and citizenship are defined along ethnic lines (e.g. “sons and daughters of the soil” claims over ancestral land) (Boone, 2007; Fearon and Laitin, 2011; McGovern, 2011; Boone, 2011; Smith, 2013). Yet Robinson (2014) finds that individual characteristics linked to modernization such as education, living in urban areas, and being formally employed are associated with greater national identification in Africa.
Figure 2: This map shows the 769 refugee settlements in Africa open as of 2015. The vast majority of sites are in border regions: half fall within 15km and 90% are within 75km of the international border. Data source: Author collaboration with UNHCR.

from independence African countries have hosted refugees. Thus, at least for communities with the greatest exposure to refugees, perceptions of threat from these large and visible new out-groups can drive citizen-led, as opposed to state-led, forms of national identification.

My argument draws from social identity theory on in-group bias, out-group discrimination, and inter-group behavior. Positive in-group bias is driven by the psychological desire to favor one’s own group above others (Allport, 1954; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, Brown and Tajfel, 1979; Brewer, 1999; Tajfel and Turner, 2004). Since individuals generally belong to multiple groups and identities, positive in-group favoritism can be extended to include previous out-group members when emphasizing a higher order identity group, which in this case is the nation, over subnational ethnic identities (Gaertner et al., 2000; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2014). This can occur when a new out-group, like refugees, is introduced.

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4For the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Djibouti, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Eritrea, and of course South Sudan, the UNHCR population statistics database shows these countries have hosted refugees every year since independence.

5A number of immigration studies in OECD countries have found a positive relationship between national identification and anti-immigration attitudes, arguing that individuals with a greater sense of national identification will espouse more anti-immigrant attitudes. Wimmer (1997) argues that xenophobia and racism emerge alongside appeals to national solidarity during times of societal crisis such as downward mobility of native citizens. In the Netherlands, through a series of survey experiments, one of which primes national versus individual identity, Sniderman, Hagedoorn and Prior (2004) find that national identity considerations surpass economic threat in predicting opposition to immigrants. On the other hand, Jackson et al. (2001) find in 15 Western European countries that higher levels of national pride are associated with decreased
According to optimal distinctiveness theory, individuals may also feel the need to differentiate themselves from an overly inclusive group, in this case coethnic refugees and host citizens (Brewer, 1991). Thus, out-group distancing of refugees by local citizens is likely more pronounced if the two groups share common identities and cultural practices. This is consistent with Adida (2014)’s finding in urban West African communities that immigrant groups who are coethnic with locals face greater exclusion and are less likely to integrate. Given the artificial borders in Africa that bisect ethnic groups, those on either side of the border are likely to belong to similar ethnic groups (Posner, 2004; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). Thus, in order to psychologically and socially distance themselves from an influx of often ethnically similar migrants that are associated with negative effects (i.e. perceived as threats), nearby citizens will feel compelled to turn towards the most obvious identity that makes them distinct – their national identity, thus protecting their in-group status as nationals (Brewer, 1999).  

In summary, when a perceived foreign out-group makes national identity contextually salient, individuals will feel more strongly identified with the nation and with fellow, formerly out-group citizens (Sahlins, 1989; Billig, 1995; Marx, 2005). Pressures from migration can also change beliefs of entitlement and abilities to coordinate between co-nationals, especially when they believe that refugees also pose a material threat by receiving international and government resources that local citizens feel they deserve. In the next subsection, the second proposed mechanism of material resentment details why unlike the other aforementioned foreign threats or migrants in general, refugees are theoretically important.

2.3 Resource Resentment and Relative Deprivation

Simply increasing national identification is likely not enough to affect levels of coordinated policy pressure on the government without also changing the belief that there is possibility for improvement. This is particularly relevant for communities where low state presence and poor public goods provision is the norm. Lacking such belief, even citizens with a strong sense of national identification are not likely to take new actions. By updating citizens’ beliefs about the resources that could be available to their communities, exposure to refugees is theoretically distinct to other types of migrants. I argue that willingness to deport immigrants, countering the positive relationship between nationalism and xenophobia. Rather than national identification explaining anti-migrant attitudes, my theory posits that the presence of forced migrants can heighten national identification.

Therefore, we would not expect internally displaced persons (IDPs) to have the same effect since they share national identity with host citizens.

This portion of the argument is also similar to other theories in which outside threats – external warfare (Tilly et al., 1985), terrorist attacks (Li and Brewer, 2004; McDaniel, Nooruddin and Shortle, 2016), and infectious diseases (Lieberman, 2009) – occur in the absence of strong states and institutions and consequently, spur national identification.

Additionally, unlike refugees, for whom migration is involuntary and uncertain in duration, voluntary migrants have more agency in choosing their destination and length of stay. Whereas the majority of refugees are hosted in less-developed countries neighboring the countries of origin, host communities of voluntary migrants are often in high-income, industrialized countries who possess greater capacity in securing borders and registering and policing them (Cortes, 2004; Taylor et al., 2016).
the resentment provoked by observing humanitarian aid to refugees creates new demand for community
development.9

An influx of refugees is often accompanied by aid that is explicitly earmarked for humanitarian relief
and therefore, is inaccessible to nearby host citizens.10 Jacobsen (2002) describes how the significant
flows of aid and resources associated with refugees could potentially build state capacity in the border
regions of Africa. Nevertheless, I consider how the presence of these resources can affect nearby citizen
beliefs and behaviors. In anticipation of local resentment, aid agencies sometimes offer services such as
access to health clinics to nearby host communities. Yet, because citizens generally fall outside the scope of
humanitarian relief, access to this assistance is rare. Thus, a sudden inflow of international and government
resources in response to the refugee influx stands in contrast to the poor quality of public goods in local
communities. Observing these resources can prompt citizens to feel outrage, resentment, and desire for
compensation. This speaks to the role that resource competition plays in anti-migrant sentiment, even
conflict (e.g. Hardin, 1995; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Dancygier, 2010; Adida, 2011).11

This mechanism is rooted in relative deprivation theory, which explains when individuals mobilize
because they feel they should have access to resources that others possess (Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 2015).
Yet rather than mobilizing as disparate citizen groups or viewing refugees as simply yet another out-group
among existing competitive citizen groups, local community members exposed to refugees feel collectively
aggrieved as citizens. Thus, by bringing humanitarian assistance to these areas, the presence of refugees
can alter what citizens believe their own communities deserve and should expect from the state.

2.4 Citizen Entitlement and Participation

Taken together, the mechanisms of strengthened national identification and feelings of relative depriva-
tion will lead to increased citizen participation. This participation likely takes various forms, such as
supporting anti-migrant political leaders or setting up and volunteering in community policing groups to
secure the border. This research, however, is focused on citizen participation in local community develop-
ment through public goods provision.

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9 Extant research on how refugees affect host communities focus on local economic dynamics and violent conflict. For
instance, many agree that refugees bring human and physical capital and actively engage with local, host economies. These
effects, nevertheless, are generally temporary and/or mixed, depending on hosts’ access to land and initial occupation
(Chambers, 1986; Whitaker, 2002; Cortes, 2004; Landau, 2004; Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014; Taylor et al., 2016). Another
direction of refugee-native research is situated in the civil war literature, which debates whether and to what extent refugees
spread violence to neighboring countries (Matthews, 1972; Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989; Loescher, 1992; Lischer, 2005;
Muggah, 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Onoma, 2013; Zhou and Shaver, 2018). Instead, this research studies other
outcomes important to host communities especially in developing contexts – national identification and citizen participation.

10 Aid inputs come in various forms: access to clean water, food rations, non-food aid such as clothes and household items,
construction materials and tools, health services, shelter, latrines and sanitation, vocational training and education, and
income generating programs such as microcredit (Jacobsen, 2005).

11 I expect this theory also extends to cases where voluntary economic migrants are also given exclusive access to state-
provided resources.
To clarify, although the term *public good* is commonly defined as a non-rival and non-excludable commodity, I adopt the definition from Lieberman (2015), in which public goods are those “funded and directly provided by the state to improve the welfare of citizens...that are at least nominally available to all citizens within the areas that they are provided. These include education, the provision of water and electricity, refuse removal, and health services” (p.482).

In a landmark report, the World Bank expressed frustration that much of the developing world still lacked access to basic public services even when their governments are elected (World Bank, 2003). Since electoral ("long route") accountability is often ineffective, scholars and policymakers have turned to understanding and promoting "short route" accountability – citizens actively monitor public service provision and take actions to apply pressure on service providers and other government actors (e.g. Olken, 2007; Björkman and Svensson, 2009; Banerjee et al., 2010; Joshi, 2013; Grossman, Humphreys and Sacramone-Lutz, 2014; Blair, Littman and Paluck, 2017; Lieberman and Zhou, 2018). Thus, by *citizen participation in public goods*, I am primarily referring to monitoring and demand-making actions along this accountability chain. But I also recognize community efforts in “co-production,” when community members directly contribute labor and pool material resources to help provide the good (Ostrom, 1996).

Returning to the importance of national identification in these processes, along the lines of scholarly inquiry discussed earlier, high levels of social diversity and low national identification can stymie citizen participation, particularly in the developing world. Therefore, fostering a more inclusive national identity – a shared sense of “we” as fellow citizens – is critical for citizen participation in public goods provision (Miguel, 2004; Putnam, 2007; Smith, 2013; Charnysh, Lucas and Singh, 2015; Robinson, 2016; Jeon, Johnson and Robinson, 2017).12

Additionally, Miguel (2004); Robinson (2016) and Jeon, Johnson and Robinson (2017) find that successful nation-building efforts and appeals to patriotism in certain African contexts can increase interethnic trust and better coordination in providing costly public goods. Relatedly, Lieberman (2003) finds that in the case of South Africa, the state through Apartheid institutionalized out-group distancing of Black South Africans and in-group national solidarity among white South Africans, which induced higher compliance in paying taxes. Thus, although an influx of refugees increases social diversity, my theory highlights how national identification and subsequently, citizen participation can increase once citizens feel psychologically...

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12Figure S4 in the SI also shows that for Afrobarometer respondents across 34 countries, the degree of national pride, measured on a scale of 1 to 5, is positively associated with citizen behaviors such as paying taxes, voting, and joining others to raise an issue, which are considered essential for public goods cooperation. These models control for demographic and geographic covariates. Although correlational, these patterns are consistent with theories that highlight the role of national identification in development.
Table 1: Summary of Observable Implications and Empirical Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observable Implications</th>
<th>Empirical Tests/Data Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Citizens who are more exposed to refugees are more likely to perceive them as a</td>
<td>– Geo-referenced community focus groups experimentally priming discussion on the refugee influx.</td>
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<td>threatening out-group.</td>
<td>– Geo-referenced survey experimentally priming information and questions on the refugee influx.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. (i) Citizens who are more exposed to the refugees will express greater attachment to</td>
<td>– Community focus groups.</td>
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<td>their national identity in order to (ii) distance themselves from the refugees.</td>
<td>– Survey experiment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Citizens who are more exposed to the refugees will be more likely to observe the</td>
<td>– Survey experiment.</td>
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<td>exclusive resources in the refugee camps and express resentment.</td>
<td>– Community focus groups.</td>
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<td>– Interviews with government and humanitarian aid officials.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Citizens who are more exposed to the refugees will make more demands of the state</td>
<td>– Community focus groups.</td>
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<td>and of humanitarian aid organizations for better public goods provision.</td>
<td>– Interviews with government and humanitarian aid officials.</td>
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<td>– Policy reports by humanitarian agencies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Public goods for the host communities nearest to the refugee camps will improve.</td>
<td>– Difference-in-differences analysis of the quality of geo-referenced primary schools pre- and</td>
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<td>post-influx.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>– Interviews with local government officials, bureaucrats, and primary school administration.</td>
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and materially threatened by them.

2.5 Observable Implications

To test this theory, I must compare patterns of citizen attitudes and behaviors as well as objective measures of public goods quality in areas with varying levels of refugee exposure. Table 1 summarizes the observable implications and the associated empirical tests. To examine citizens’ attitudes towards refugees, their levels of national identification, feelings of resource resentment, and participation for better public goods provision (implications 1–3), I carried out 10 community focus groups with about 15 citizen participants each and a survey of over 2,000 citizens. Both data ensured variation in refugee exposure by first, geographically sampling communities base on their proximity to the refugee camps, and second, including an experimental component prompting a discussion (focus groups) or information (survey) about
Figure 3: This map shows the study region Kigoma, which is located in the north-west of Tanzania (see inset map) and borders Burundi and the DRC. The administrative boundaries show the 111 wards in Kigoma, the blue triangles are the three current refugee camps – Nyarugusu (est. 1996), Nduta and Mtendeli (est. late 2016), and the red square is the regional capital, Kigoma Town.

the refugees. Next, to understand whether and how citizens nearer to the refugee camps were making demands for better public goods provision, my research assistants and I conducted almost 100 semi-structured interviews with appointed and elected officials from local government, various central ministries, the UNHCR, and other humanitarian aid agencies. Finally, in order to assess whether citizen actions have led to changes in local public goods provision near the camps, I use geo-referenced primary school outcomes data pre- and post-refugee influx.

3 Context of Refugees and National Identity in a Tanzania Border Region

I employ the multi-method empirical strategy described above in Kigoma, a region of north-west Tanzania. Figure 3 shows where this region is located within Tanzania bordering Burundi and the DRC to the north and west, the three refugee camps (blue triangles) with the largest, Nyarugusu located near the center, the regional capital of Kigoma town (red square) on the coast, and boundaries for the wards which are the smallest administrative units.

13 Throughout this paper, I refer to this region as ‘Kigoma region,’ because within this region, there is Kigoma rural district and Kigoma urban district, where the regional capital Kigoma Town is located.
Figure 4: This figure shows the number of refugees distributed across the three refugee camps in Tanzania – all within Kigoma region – from 2010 to 2017 measured in August of that year. The Burundi political crisis beginning in April 2015 led to this recent influx of over 230,000 refugees and the opening of Nduta and Mtendeli camps at the end of 2016.

3.1 The 2015 Burundian Refugee Influx

The most recent refugee influx in Tanzania began on April 2015, when Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza triggered a political crisis by changing the constitution so that he could be elected to a third term. This triggered protests, political violence against perceived opponents and civil society members,\(^\text{14}\) and an exodus of over 230,000 Burundians into Tanzania, specifically into Kigoma region.

Figure 4 shows the change in magnitude of the number of refugees hosted this region from 2010 to 2017 across the three refugee camps. Before April 2015, there were approximately 64,000 Congolese refugees in this region, most of whom had fled their villages in South Kivu due civil conflict in the late 1990s. This population remains relatively low and stable within Nyarugusu camp until 2015, when the number of refugees quadruples. To give another sense of the scale of the influx, Figure 5 shows aerial photos of Nyarugusu camp in 2014 pre-influx, and again in 2016 post-influx; this camp more than doubled in size to more than 12 square km. It is now the third largest refugee camp in the world. All refugees were hosted at Nyarugusu, located in Kasulu district, until late 2016, when two additional camps, Nduta and Mtendeli, opened in neighboring Kibondo district due to overcrowding.

Compared to the Tanzanian population of 2 million in this region, the 300,000 refugees pose a sudden and sizable demographic shift. The District Commissioner of Kasulu, where the camp is located, noted

\(^\text{14}\)These clashes were largely carried out by the youth league of the ruling party, the *Imbonerakure*. For more details, please see the Human Rights Watch Burundi Report.
that “the camps are so overcrowded. Some district (second-order administrative units) populations in Kigoma are even less than in the camp.”\(^{15}\) In fact, 6 out of the 8 districts in the region have populations under 300,000. The two newly opened camps in Kibondo district host 179,395 refugees, which is almost 70% of the local Tanzanian population of 261,300 in that district.

The institutional environment governing refugee-host relations is now predominantly one of segregation. While under first president Julius Nyerere, Tanzania was generally receptive of hosting and integrating refugees, multi-party electoral competition and political scapegoating of refugees have led to increasingly restrictive refugee policies (Whitaker, 2002; Chaulia, 2003; Landau, 2004; Kwéka, 2007).\(^{16}\) Since the mid-1990s, the Tanzanian government has mandated a strict encampment policy requiring refugees to remain within 4km of camp boundaries. For refugees to legally exit the camp, they must acquire an exit permit from the Ministry of Home Affairs. In practice, the process is unclear and so it is extremely rare. da Costa (2018) finds evidence that refugees illegally leaving the camps in order to travel to more economically developed regions of Tanzania, such as Mwanza, in search of employment. This policy legally prohibits refugees from locally integrating or engaging in income-generating activities, which makes them heavily dependent on humanitarian aid. There are limited interactions between refugees and local citizens using the markets at the entrances of the camps (da Costa, 2018).

Finally, it is important to note that refugee-hosting and related issues surrounding national identity and citizenship are not new to Tanzania.\(^{17}\) Similar to most sub-Saharan African states, Tanzania has hosted several waves of refugees since its independence. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, under the ‘Open Door’ refugee policy of President Nyerere, Tanzania hosted refugees fleeing post-colonial and national liberation conflicts in East and Southern Africa (Chaulia, 2003). The Burundian genocide of 1972 led to an estimated 150,000 Hutu refugees to settle in three sites, Ulyankulu settlement in Tabora region and Katumba and Mishamo settlements in Rukwa region in Western Tanzania, created under the Ujamaa villagisation program (Malkki, 1995). In 2008, for the group of 1972 refugees, over 200,000 were given a choice between repatriation to Burundi and Tanzanian naturalization, and about 80% chose to become Tanzanian citizens (Kuch, 2016). In 1993, another cycle of politically-motivated ethnic violence in Burundi drove approximately 350,000 refugees into Tanzania, this time largely into Kigoma region in North-west

\(^{15}\)Interview conducted on August 5, 2015 in Kasulu district, Kigoma region, Tanzania.  
\(^{16}\)For example, in June 2011 when the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) declared the refugees as a threat to national security and threatened deportation: IRIN news report  
\(^{17}\)For an in-depth discussion on the history of refugee-hosting policy in Tanzania, please see Kuch (2016).
Instead of living in rural settlements and having the chance to locally integrate, this group was sheltered in refugee camps and pressured to repatriate in the early 2000s as a result of the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (da Costa, 2018; Schwartz, 2019). The 2015 crisis, which is the focus of this project, effectively reversed this repatriation. Given the extensive and complex history of refugee-hosting in Tanzania, the implication for my argument is that local citizens likely have had previous experiences with refugees and the politics around hosting them. Therefore, the effects I find may be attenuated since this is a familiar phenomenon. Additionally, how citizens react in terms of their national identification and participation over resource grievances may be more strategic than spontaneous.

3.2 National and Ethnic Identification in Kigoma

Notably, national identification is already considered quite strong in Tanzania compared to other African countries. In the 1960s and 70s immediately after independence, Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) political party enacted several nation-building policies with varying degrees of success: adopting Swahili as the national language, guaranteeing universal primary education with a standardized curriculum emphasizing national and pan-African identity (1969-74 Development Plan), and instituting a massive villagisation program in which people moved into socialist ujamaa villages to serve as political and economic nodes (Arusha Declaration of 1967) (Miguel, 2004). Therefore if my theory is supported even in this context of high baseline national identification (i.e. ceiling effects), this suggests that effects may be even stronger in areas with lower baselines. On the other hand, Tanzania’s history of nation-building might suggest that national identity is more cognitively accessible for citizens (Bargh et al., 1986).

Nevertheless, at least for the border region of Kigoma, strong national identification is not a given. This region is ethnically diverse, home to over 35 ethnic groups and various local dialects. The majority ethnic group, the Ha – known more commonly in Swahili as Waha (plural) and Muha (singular) – is not the majority ethnic group in the country, which is the Sukuma people. In fact, as people of a border region, the Ha in this area are more closely tied to the Burundians than other Tanzanians in the coast and from other parts of the country, who generally stereotype the Ha as “barely Tanzanians” (da Costa, 2018, p.19).

Contrary to scholarship that has painted Tanzania as a diverse country in which ethnicity has no social or political salience, particularly in these areas, ethnic identities continue to be politically salient. From
a community focus group participant: “Yes, tribes are still important. And I am afraid that politicians here will use tribes to get support.” This concern was echoed by a senior government bureaucrat in Kigoma: “People are afraid to admit it, but we are going back to tribalism in Tanzania. Here there was a CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the ruling party) contestant who expected to be elected (in the primaries). After he was defeated, his tribe all threw away their CCM party cards. Every party has special seats for women to be in parliament, but this is all decided by the tribe, they all belong to the party chairman’s tribe...There was also a recent case of an ACT (ACT-Wazalendo, an opposition party) chairman who defected to form his own tribal party.”

It is also important to note that Kigoma is a political opposition area. The current elected Member of Parliament (MP), Zitto Kabwe is ACT. Given how funds for public goods from the central government are often tied to political support for CCM, this may also explain the marginalization and low levels of public goods provision in this area (Carlitz, 2016).

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18 Male participant, Kalinzi focus group, July 23, 2015.
19 Interview conducted on July 27, 2015 in Kigoma town, Kigoma region, Tanzania.
20 Although multiparty elections were first introduced in 1994, the same political party CCM has remained in power since independence, and the country is best described as a “hybrid” regime combining regular elections alongside a pattern of one party dominance and significant state restrictions on press freedoms.
3.3 Tanzania’s Border Politics

Similar to other hinterlands in Africa, Kigoma region is characterized by low state capacity and artificial borders, both important preconditions for my theory. First, as is often the case with peripheral border regions, there is minimal government presence, limited access to public services, and local communities are poor (da Costa, 2018). 90% live on less than the extreme poverty threshold of 1.25USD per day (Tatem AJ and C, 2013), and 67% are literate compared to the national 78% rate of adult literacy (World Bank, 2017).

Second, the international border that separates Tanzania and Burundi was originally drawn up during the Treaty of Versailles to divide German East Africa between Portugal and Great Britain. Today, there are hardly any indications except for an occasional stone marker to show approximately where the international border lies. People from this region recognize that this border is an artificial construct upon which their national identity is built. For example, from one focus group participant: “Nationalism is a western policy. I am Tanzanian because I am within the Tanzanian boundaries. Being Kenyan means being within the Kenyan boundaries. Those boundaries are not our boundaries.”

This also means that the border bisects an ethnic homeland; those on either side of the border are essentially coethnics. The majority of refugees coming from Burundi are of the Hutu ethnic group which is culturally and linguistically similar to the Ha. In fact, due to porous international borders, the two groups often engage in cross border trade, use of common markets and water sources, inter-marriages, and share many historical, socio-cultural, and economic connections (Whitaker, 2002; Landau, 2008; da Costa, 2018). As I describe in later sections, these dynamics have changed post-influx.

Lastly, not only are the borders artificial, they are also considered ‘weak.’ At the height of the refugee influx, the state also lacked capacity to block and control the flows of refugees. From the District Commissioner of Buhigwe: “We need more soldiers guarding the borders. They (refugees) come as businessmen, and they take advantage. They are criminals, and they take this chance to escape. If resources is not a problem, building a wall at the border is the best solution.” This call for a border wall, which sounds familiar given the political discourse around refugees in many other parts of the world, also echoes the nationalistic and exclusionary sentiments made by citizens in this region as described in the next section.

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21 Male participant, Buhinga focus group, August 5, 2015.
22 Interview conducted on July 27, 2015 in Buhigwe district, Kigoma region, Tanzania.
4 Refugee Exposure and Perceptions of Threat

In this section, I first present descriptive evidence that geographic proximity to refugee camps captures exposure to refugees. Next, I briefly describe how I conducted the community focus groups. From this data, I find that citizens located closest to the refugees view them as more threatening to the community.

4.1 Exposure as Geographic Proximity

To empirically validate whether geographic proximity reflects exposure to refugees and how contextually salient the settlement of refugees is to citizens’ daily lives, I examine responses from my survey, which I discuss in more detail in the following section, of citizen respondents surrounding Nyarugusu refugee camp. When I conducted the community focus groups and the survey, Nduta and Mtendeli camps had not yet opened. I compare how respondents at the 10th camp distance percentile (28.8km) with those at the 90th camp distance percentile (128.8km) answered general questions about refugees.23 Of respondents at the 10th percentile, an estimated 65% were familiar with the Nyarugusu refugee camp compared to 38% at the 90th percentile, 35% said they personally knew a refugee compared to 16%, and 38% believed that there were refugees living in their community compared to 16%. While some citizens living far from the camp still knew of its existence and believed that refugees could personally affect them, these proportions are substantially smaller than those closer to the camp. Across all of these measures, which taken together reflect how salient refugees are to the daily lives of local citizens in this area, those living closer to the refugees consistently scored substantially higher.

Recent policy reports by the large humanitarian organizations working in these camps also highlight the importance of geographic proximity. A 2018 report by the Danish Refugee Council, for instance, considers how “host communities are not monolithic and homogenous entities...not all Tanzanians can be categorized under the host community banner. Rather, the social and political category of host communities refers specifically to the Waha communities directly neighbouring the camps, who are also those who directly bear the social and material consequences of the sudden establishment of the camps” (da Costa, 2018, p.2).

23These questions were asked of all survey respondents: for the treatment group at the beginning of the survey and for the control group at the end, after the main outcomes of interest.
4.2 Negative Perceptions of Refugees and Proximity

Although anti-refugee hostility has unfortunately become commonplace in many parts of the world, coethnicty between those fleeing Burundi and the local Tanzanian Ha communities in Kigoma might have suggested a more hospitable reaction. However, from community focus group discussions which were later corroborated by survey responses, I find that citizens who are more proximate to refugees are more likely to feel threatened for a variety of reasons such as increasing crime, land disputes, and disease. These perceptions of threat related to the refugees reinforce their ‘othering’ as an out-group. In July and August 2015, four months after the start of the Burundian refugee crisis in Kigoma, my local research team and I conducted 10 community focus groups composed of 15 adult citizen participants each, balanced on gender. The communities were randomly selected stratified by proximity to the Nyarugusu refugee camp and proximity to the international border with Burundi in order to have variation in both the explanatory variable and a major possible confounder. Within communities, the participants were selected based on a convenience sample; my research assistants asked local village leaders to help gather community members from a mix of ages and occupations, balanced on gender. For more details on the sampling strategy, how the discussions were carried out, and the distribution of distances from the communities to the refugee camp, see Section S2 in the SI.

Figure S7 in the SI shows for each community focus group, the number of citizen comments made about refugees and whether those comments were positive, neutral, or negative, ordered by proximity to Nyarugusu refugee camp. Citizen attitudes towards the refugees are predominantly negative, but especially so for the most proximate communities. Participants from Makere, the community closest to the camp (less than 10km away) made the most comments about refugees, including the most negative comments. Ilagala, the community farthest from both the camp and from the border with Burundi, had the least to say about refugees.

Figure 6 overviews the refugee-related concerns expressed during the focus group discussions. Citizens often associated the new refugees with violent crime: “They are strangers who come here with guns. We no longer feel safe here... Maybe not all of the crimes are refugees, but you will find that when there is

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24 Interviews conducted with almost a dozen UNHCR officials in June/July 2018 reveals that coethnicty is considered a major factor for lack of conflict and possible long term integration of refugees.

25 Hostility towards refugees was exclusively directed at the new influx of Burundian refugees, not the existing Congolese refugees: “The Congolese do not cause problems. They live peacefully.” Male participant, Buhinga focus group, August 5, 2015.
a crime, at least some refugees are involved,”26 and, “We see a connection between people getting killed and the new refugees.”27 Community members from Makere also spoke of an incident in which a 10 year old boy was killed by a group of refugees who had left the camp, yet local district-level officials could not corroborate this event.28 According to interviews and statistics from the Ministry of Home Affairs, there appears to be no evidence that crime has increased in the area post-influx nor that of the crimes committed, refugees are disproportionately to blame.29 Instead, these fears are rooted in stereotypes and reputations about the refugees: “The new ones are not good people because of their nature. To kill a person, they see it as normal.”30 Similarly, “Some of their behaviors are not our culture like robberies and killing people.”31

Other major concerns include refugees decamping and hiding in their communities; using resources like water with the implication that these should be reserved for host communities or that citizens should be compensated; fearing that the refugees will want to settle long-term or naturalize as citizens; and bringing conflict and disease. The survey I conducted the following year with over 2,000 respondents confirmed that those living closer to the camp were more likely to believe that refugees increase local crime, bring disease, and worsen the local environment and that the government spends too many resources to help them (see Figure S19 from Section S3 of the SI).32 Ultimately these concerns underscore the perception of

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26 Female participant, Heru Juu focus group, August 6 2015.
27 Male participant, Makere focus group, August 4, 2015.
28 Interviews conducted on August 5, 2015 in Kasulu, Kigoma region, Tanzania.
29 Interviews conducted with officials at the Tanzania Police Force, Ministry of Home Affairs on June 29, 2016 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
30 Male participant, Makere focus group, August 4, 2015.
31 Female participant, Kibande focus group, July 29, 2015.
32 While affirming that many of these fears are unfounded, government authorities and humanitarian policy reports recognize
the Burundian newcomers, who before the crisis were considered ethnic kin, as an undesirable out-group from whom citizens wish to psychologically distance themselves.

5 National Identification through Out-Group Distancing of Refugees

To address the second observable implication from Table 1, I use observational and experimental data to show that citizens who are more exposed to the refugees express greater national identification in order to socially and psychologically distance themselves from the refugees. First, for implication 2(i), I find that survey respondents who are more proximate to the camp report greater attachment to their national identity. Randomly giving respondents an informational prime about refugees also substantially increases their national identification.

For implication 2(ii), to establish that this change in identification is due to out-group distancing, I randomly primed half of the community focus groups to discuss refugees before I asked them questions about citizenship and their national identity. For these treatment focus groups, I find that the participants make significantly more references to Burundians as an out-group and describe their national identity as innate or inherited. Additionally, they are more likely to say that access to citizenship should be restricted. In contrast, the control focus groups are more likely to describe Burundians as their coethnic neighbors and kin, which is in line with the traditional socio-cultural norms between the two groups pre-influx.

5.1 Refugee Exposure and Increased National Identification

To examine how refugee exposure affects levels of national identification, I conducted a geo-referenced survey of 2,025 citizen respondents across Kigoma region in June and July 2016. To ensure the sample was representative of the regional population with variation in main independent variable – proximity to Nyarugusu refugee camp, I used the 2012 census and distances from the camp to the centroids of the 111 wards to stratify sample 25 wards based on their proximity to the camp and population density. Each ward is composed of several villages. After randomly sampling two villages from each ward for a total of 50 villages, at each village my team of 10 enumerators were instructed to split up and start at two local landmarks (e.g. the church and the primary school) and employ a random-walk technique to sample households. Within households, they randomly selected an adult citizen, balanced on gender. Figure S5 real land disputes that emerged due to the creation and expansion of the refugee camps. Section S2.3 in the SI discusses land conflict in more detail. Additionally, Section S2.4 describes the positive/mixed comments.
in the SI shows the map of these survey respondents in relation to the camp, and Figure S14 shows the distribution of distances by direct path and by road (see Section S3.1 for more details on the sampling strategy and the enumeration team).

Within the survey, I also experimentally primed citizens to psychologically feel more exposed to the refugees, akin to how political elites might foment anti-refugee sentiment through their rhetoric. Nevertheless, it would have been unethical to include explicit anti-refugee language or spread falsehoods about the refugees. Thus, the survey treatment comprises the following questions about refugees and information on the influx, making it clear the massive demographic shift:

- Do you know which countries the refugees here in Tanzania come from?
- Do you ever talk about refugees with your friends and family?
- If so, how often in the past year?
- Are there any refugees living in your village?
- Do you personally know any refugees?
- Do you know about the Nyarugusu refugee camp?

The enumerator then showed a map of where Nyarugusu camp is located, pointing out where the respondent is located in relation. Next, the respondent would see a few photos of the camp and hear the following factual information:

As you may know, these refugees have fled from Burundi and the DR Congo. Currently, there are about 270,000 refugees living in Tanzania. This means that there is 1 refugee here in Tanzania for every 180 Tanzanians. Most of the refugees in Tanzania are living here in Kigoma region at the Nyarugusu refugee camp, which is located in Kasulu district (show map). Nyarugusu has been open for more than 20 years. In 2014, there were 64,000 refugees in this camp. Today, that number has more than doubled; there are more than 160,000 refugees living in Nyarugusu. This means that there is 1 refugee at Nyarugusu for every 13 Tanzanians from Kigoma. Nyarugusu is now one of the largest refugee camps in the world (show images).

The main outcome of interest is attachment to national identity. Based on constructivist theories of ethnic politics, identities as voluntaristic attachments are not fixed but fluid and endogenous to social, economic, and political processes (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Posner, 2004; Chandra, 2006; Lieberman, 2009; Chandra, 2012). This makes measuring identity attachments difficult. Taking inspiration from Lee (2009) of race as allocations of “identity points,” I developed the following question, reproduced in Figure 7:

We all have many identities. It is normal for some of these identities to be more important to us than others when we think of ourselves.

Now we will ask you do a small exercise about how close you feel to different identities. Here are 10 beads and 6 circles. Each circle represents an identity. Please divide the beads across these circles, putting down more beads into the identity circles you feel closest to.
Figure 7: Survey question measuring identity attachments.

This question allows me to assess both the relative and absolute strength of respondent affiliations with various subnational, national, and supranational identities. It still forces a tradeoff between the identities, but it does not explicitly place national and ethnic identities in direct opposition to each other. As an exercise using beads, it does not require formal education or numeracy. Ultimately, asking identification in this way respects how people have many identities with varying degrees of importance, and by allowing respondents to be high or low across multiple types of identities, coupled with a “no opinion” option, it removes some of the sensitivity around asking about ethnic or national identity on their own.

Figure S16 in the SI shows the distribution of the main outcomes of interest – attachment to various identities – across all respondents. Overall, they felt mostly attached to their national, regional, and even ethnic identities with very minimal attachment to their African and East African identities. While national identity is the bin with the largest average bead share, unsurprising given expectations about Tanzania, it does not make up the majority of the beads – on average it has 3.7 beads.

Turning to the hypothesis that refugee exposure increases national identification, I predict that respondents geographically closer to the refugee camp feel more national compared to those farther away. Additionally, respondents randomly given the prime should feel more national compared to the control group, and this effect should be larger for those closer to the camps since they would feel more affected. For this analysis, I use a semiparametric generalized additive model to allow for non-linearities, regressing the share of beads in the national identity bin on the survey experimental treatment and a smooth func-

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For example, in the Afrobarometer, national identification is measured by this question: “Suppose that you had to choose between being a [National/etc.] and being a [respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?” with response options on a five-point scale. 74% of Tanzanian respondents answered 5, or exclusively national, suggesting that national identity is the socially desirable response.
Figure 8: The plot on the left shows the predicted share of bead allocations (out of 10 total) for national identity by distance to Nyarugusu refugee camp (direct path) for the control condition, with 95% block bootstrapped CIs by village. Those closer to the refugee camp feel substantially more national, and this effect evens out after approximately 50km. The plot on the right shows the treatment effect of the survey prime moderated by camp distance, with 95% block bootstrapped CIs by village. Receiving the prime increases the bead allocation for national identity by about .7 of a bead. This effect decreases by distance and is no longer statistically significant past 105km.

Figure 8 confirms my predictions. The first plot shows the predicted share of bead allocations, out of 10 total, for national identity by distance to Nyarugusu refugee camp (via direct path) for the control condition, with 95% bootstrapped CIs (see Figures S20 and S21 in the SI for analysis on the other identity bins and a robustness check using distance by road rather than direct path). Citizens more proximate to the refugee camp feel substantially more national. Those at the 10th percentile put an average of 3.9 beads in the national identity bin compared to 3.2 for the 90th percentile. The difference between the two is statistically significant. Additionally, this effect evens out as the distance increases; we would not expect the same effect of proximity going from 15 to 30km from the camp as 115 to 130km away, for instance.

The second plot shows that receiving the psychological prime about refugees increases the bead allocation for national identity by about .7 of a bead. We would also expect citizens closer to the camp to feel more affected by this prime, because it would be more relevant to them. Indeed, this effect decreases by distance and is no longer statistically significant past 105km.

While these findings confirm implication 2(i), that citizens who are more exposed to the refugees...
through proximity and priming express greater attachment to their national identity, where citizens are located vis-à-vis the refugee camp is not random. With respect to where refugee camps in general and Nyarugusu in particular are located, we know from scholarship on forced migration that unlike voluntary economic migrants, refugees have considerably less agency and time to choose where they settle. No standardized international procedure exists to regulate where refugee settlement should be located, but key factors often cited by UNHCR officials as important to consider are proximity to roads so that aid and government agencies have access and distance away from the international border for security reasons (Jacobsen, 1996; Jacobson, 1996; Bariagaber, 2006).

Through my interviews with UNHCR officials, senior government officials from the Refugee Services Department in the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the District Commissioner of Kasulu, it is unclear how the location of this camp was originally chosen in the 1990s; many speculated that it was simply a place where a critical mass of Congolese refugees gathered. Although it is unlikely that these refugees were knowledgeable about local social and political dynamics or possess the resources to choose optimal settlement locations, host governments have more agency in deciding the precise location of a refugee settlement. If they have the ability, they generally choose rural, less developed areas (Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014).

In my analyses above, I control for rural area, distance to the border, and distance to the nearest road among other individual and household covariates. Nevertheless there may still be unobserved factors inherent to the location of the refugee sites that might also affect the national identification of nearby citizens. I test for the possibility of this bias using placebo tests to assess whether there is any relationship between national identification and distance to future refugee camps. I conducted the survey prior to the creation of the additional two refugee camps, Nduta and Mtendeli in late 2016. The logic behind these placebo tests is that future variables cannot influence past outcomes, so if there is an effect, other unaccounted factors are influencing the outcomes. Figure S22 in the SI shows that is no relationship between national identification and respondent distance to the future refugee camps, Nduta and Mtendeli. This suggests that there are no unobserved confounders biasing the results.

As additional support for these findings, I also conducted a paired conjoint experiment shown in Section

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35 Interviews with UNHCR officials conducted on May 24, 2016 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Interviews with government officials from the Refugee Services Department conducted on August 12, 2015 and July 1, 2016 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Interview with the District Commissioner of Kasulu conducted on August 5, 2015.

36 The locations of Nduta and Mtendeli camps were, according to my interviews, also selected based on being in a rural area, their distance from the border, and proximity to the road.
S3.10 of the SI. When presented with two hypothetical refugee profiles and instructed to select one to live in Tanzania, respondents revealed that their most preferred attribute was the ability to speak the national language of Tanzanian Swahili. Since general Swahili, not specified as Tanzanian, was also an option, the fact that the vernacular must be Tanzanian precludes the alternative explanation that human capital is driving this effect. Thus, this finding speaks to the heightened national identity of citizens when refugees become contextually salient.

5.2 National Identification through the Mechanism of Out-Group Distancing

Next, I examine whether this increase in national identification, prompted by exposure to refugees, is due to the psychological desire to distance oneself from the out-group. It is important to understand not only the degree of but also the channel for heightened national identification. An alternative hypothesis for instance, may be that by feeling inclusive to the newcomers and by wanting to extend membership (i.e. citizenship) to them, exposed citizens feel increased pride in their nation. Here, by including an experimental component to the community focus groups described in the previous section, I find that this is not the case.

I randomly selected half of the community focus groups for the refugee exposure treatment, meaning that I started the discussion by asking about refugees:

Can you tell me about the refugees in Tanzania? Have they affected your community? If yes, how?

After discussing refugees, I then asked about the main outcomes of interest, the meaning of their national identity and granting access to citizenship:

When I say 'national identity' or 'to be Tanzanian,' what does that mean to you?
If a foreigner wants to become Tanzanian, do you think he or she should be given the opportunity to do so?

For the control focus groups, I reversed the order of these questions, asking about refugees after discussing national identification and citizenship. Like the survey, the aim of this experimental treatment is to prime citizens to think about the recent influx of refugees into their region.

First, to give some context on how coethnic Burundians are viewed as in-group or out-group based on whether they are framed as refugees or not, when referring to Burundians, a typical quote from the control groups would emphasize shared ties: "We have villages on either side of the border that use the same river."

37In addition to language, other categories of attributes included occupation, level of vulnerability, country of origin, gender, religion, and whether the refugee received aid.
Of course we know each other. You will find a Burundian with uncles in Tanzania.”38 Whereas for the treatment groups, a more typical quote paints these people as an out-group: “If you live with a neighbor, a drunkard who beats his children, and they come live with you. You feed them every day. Do you think you have a good neighbor? How would you feel?”39

Next, to assess whether national identification was discussed differently between treatment and control groups, I coded the comments blind to treatment status on the following dimensions: whether statements about national identity are based on in-group values or out-group comparisons (distancing), whether national identity is inclusive of others versus an inherited/innate trait, and whether access to citizenship should be open to others or restricted. Table 2 gives examples of how the focus group comments were coded with respect to how host citizens describe national identity and citizenship.40

According to my hypothesis, citizens primed to discuss refugees first will be more likely to base their national identity on out-group comparisons, believe that nationality is inherited/innate and thus closed

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Table 2: This table shows examples of coded responses to Focus Group comments by type of national identification and citizenship expression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coded as:</th>
<th>Examples of Focus Group comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-Group National Identification</td>
<td>“Yes I am proud to call myself Tanzanian. We follow the teachings of our leaders. We contribute to help each other’s needs.” – Male participant, Bubango focus group, July 24, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Group National Identification</td>
<td>“For me, I am proud to be Tanzanian because it is a peaceful country. If any disagreement happens, we sit and discuss. Not like our neighbors. When they have disagreements, they become violent quickly, then a misunderstanding blows up into war.” – Male participant, Makere focus group, August 4, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identification as Inclusive</td>
<td>“There are two types of Tanzanians; those who are born Tanzanian and those who registered...and declare themselves Tanzanian. We do not see the difference between these two.” – Male participant, Bubango focus group, July 24, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identification as Inherited</td>
<td>“Nationalism is like a relationship between a father and son. For those given naturalization, they are still different. They will always be different due to the backgrounds of their fathers and grandfathers. They come with historical impurities. Internally, he knows he is not Tanzanian.” – Male participant, Munanila focus group, July 28, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Citizenship</td>
<td>“If the government wants to give naturalization, there there is no problem. They know best.” – Female participant, Ilagala focus group, July 30, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted Citizenship</td>
<td>“For the 1972 refugees who are now registered to be Tanzanian. We do not accept this. The central government decided by force without consent of the people.” – Male participant, Kalinzi focus group, July 28, 2015.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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38 Male participant, Buhigwe focus group, July 27, 2015.
39 Male participant, Munanila focus group, July 28, 2015.
40 As an additional check, a research assistant recoded these focus group responses without any knowledge of the research design for additional validation.
Figure 9: These figures compare the proportions of responses by national identity and citizenship type between control (light gray) and treatment (dark gray) focus groups, with 95% CIs and standard errors clustered by group. The treatment is prompting discussion of refugees before discussing their national identity. Treated groups make significantly more references to an out-group and describe their national identity as innate or inherited. Additionally, they are more likely to say that citizenship access should be restricted.

to outsiders, and support restrictions on citizenship access. Since I ask both treatment and control focus groups to define and describe their national identity, I do not expect the treatment group to make more statements about national identity, simply that the content of their statements are likely to be out-group oriented.

Figure 9 shows that as predicted, the treatment group were more likely to use more out-group comments when describing their national identity. Of these comments, 88.5% made by the treatment focus groups referenced an out-group, almost always Burundians, compared to only 13.6% by the control focus groups. And 93.3% of these comments made by the treatment focus groups described national identity as innate or inherited, as opposed to 35.3% of the comments for control focus groups. Lastly, with respect to comments about citizenship, 92.9% made by the treatment focus groups supported restrictions to access for outsiders, while only 31.6% of the control group comments did the same.

To put these findings in context, it is necessary to reemphasize the cultural and ethnic ties between refugees and the host citizens. Several participants in the control focus groups pointed out how they are closely tied to the Burundians on the other side of the border: “They are almost the same tribe. They have almost the same language (Kirundi), very close to Kiha (local dialect in Kigoma). You will find a Burundian with uncles in Tanzania. It is easy to come and go. So there are some among us that accept them to live with us due to same tribe and same language.”

Male participant, Buhigwe focus group, July 27, 2015.
specifically to the refugees, as opposed to the neighbors across the border, local Tanzanians reject the similaries between them, to “disassociate from the poverty and ‘other-ness’ of Burundians...to place a lot of effort into enacting and asserting their ‘Tanzania-ness’.” (da Costa, 2018, p.19).

6 Citizen Resentment of Refugee Resources

In this section, I use focus group and interview data to examine the third observable implication in Table 1, which hypothesizes that citizens with greater exposure to refugees are more likely to observe the resources in the refugee camps and express resentment.

With respect to the humanitarian aid and resources for the refugee camps, as of mid-2017, 25 organizations including the UNHCR, local and international NGOs, and government agencies were operating in Nyarugusu, Nduta, and Mtendeli to distribute aid and public services to the refugees. For example, in terms of healthcare, the camps have 3 hospitals and 14 health centers serving approximately 312,000 refugees, compared to 4 hospitals and 24 health centers serving over 2 million Tanzanians in Kigoma region. Across the three camps, there are also 35 primary schools, 9 secondary schools, 9 youth centers, 3 women’s centers, 7 food distribution centers, 7 police posts, 4 community rehabilitation centers, and approximately 300 solar-powered lights. Although these camps objectively provide more resources and services compared to local host communities, they are still a form of carceral institution. The refugees rely heavily on aid because they are barred by law from seeking employment.

By observing the convoys of UNHCR and other aid agency vehicles, including water tankers, citizens in nearby communities confirm that they are aware of the resources and social services provided in the camps: “We have no electricity, no running water. In the camps, we know the UNHCR provides the Burundians all these things.” Additionally, from Makere, the community closest to Nyarugusu camp: “(At Nyarugusu) we see the big trucks bringing water, and that they are drilling new boreholes. There is good quality free education for the children. And the disabled have wheelchairs. We know that they each are given rations every day.” In fact, both an interview with a senior European development agency official, and a recent report by the Danish Refugee Council (da Costa, 2018) describe multiple incidences in which local Tanzanians attempted to register as Burundian refugees in order to gain access to food.

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42 UNHCR Camp Profiles for Nyarugusu (April 30, 2017), Nduta (July 31, 2017), and Mtendeli (July 31, 2017).
43 Female participant, Kibande focus group, July 29, 2015.
44 Female participant, Makere focus group, August 4, 2015.
45 Interview conducted on May 28, 2016 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
rations and other supplies, which speaks to the extreme poverty levels in these communities.

For the most proximate communities, local citizens have some access to health services so they are able to enter and observe the camps directly: “There is no health center here (in our community). Sometimes we can use the camp hospital and dispensary. But before we can go, we need an introductory letter from our chairperson, then we need a permit from the camp commandant. This is not easy to get. Then we need to walk two hours by foot to get there. They will not let us use their transport. Aside from the clinic, we are not permitted to use other camp services.”

Aside from healthcare, local Tanzanians are not permitted to other forms of aid or send their children to the schools within the camps, which use a different curriculum taught in French rather than Swahili.

Not only are nearby citizens aware of the resources provided to refugees, they feel that their communities are more deserving of these resources and that as citizens, they are being deprived: “When refugees come, they utilize all the resources, including firewood and crops. The UNHCR does not bring the resources back to us.” Furthermore, some citizens even believe that the refugees are simply trying to economically take advantage of the state: “Most of the Burundians are here for economic reasons, they want more resources from the UN and from our government. Everytime there is a rumor of war, they will come. The Burundians are here for business. Whenever there is a war, it is an opportunity for them to profit.” From the survey, nearly all respondents either ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ with the statement that the government spends too many resources helping refugees (see Figure S19 from Section S3 of the SI). Although not statistically significant, since almost everyone felt strongly for this question, citizen respondents closer to the camp leaned more towards ‘strongly agree.’

Finally, by observing these exclusionary resources, these citizens feel intense resentment not only towards the refugees, but also towards service providers such as humanitarian organizations: “It seems the international organizations like the UNHCR, they prefer refugees to us Tanzanians. Even just one refugee, the UNHCR will pick him up. But if one of us is sick, we ask for a ride to the hospital, they do not pick him up at all. The whole bus is empty, and they do not take even just one of us. There are some here who cannot walk, who are very sick and very old.”

The UNHCR and other agencies recognize that excluding nearby host communities from these resources

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46 Female participant, Makere focus group, August 4, 2015.
47 Female participant, Heru Juu focus group, August 6, 2015.
48 Male participant, Kalinzi focus group, July 23, 2015.
49 Male participant, Kibande focus group, July 29, 2015.
Figure 10: The plot on the left compares the proportion of comments made about public goods grievances between control and treatment focus groups, with 95% CIs and standard errors clustered by group. The plot on the right shows that for the comments made about public goods grievances, the proportion identifying the various actors listed as responsible, again comparing control (light gray) and treatment (dark gray) groups. The proportions sum to 1 within each type of group.

drives resentment: “It’s very often that host communities resent camps because they are such a visible place of people being assisted. Very often in places where refugees are isolated and have no work permits, no land, when they are sitting in camps they are being assisted While the other population has to fend for itself.”

Nevertheless, they often feel constrained to their mandate as emergency humanitarian aid providers: “Areas close to the camps are remote and lack adequate social services. The nearly-exclusive focus that humanitarian actors have placed in supporting refugees, largely ignoring the needs of host communities (partially due to limitations in donor funding) has contributed to resentment by Tanzanian host communities which again translates in anti-refugee sentiments.” (da Costa, 2018, p.33).

In the next section, I find evidence that exposure to refugees, through the proposed dual mechanisms of resource resentment and increased national identification, can lead to increased citizen participation in public goods provision.

7 Refugee Exposure, Citizen Participation, and Public Goods Provision

The fourth observable implication from Table 1 states that citizens who are more exposed to refugees are ultimately more likely to collectively participate in improving local public goods by monitoring, making demands, and even in some cases co-producing the good. From the focus group evidence, I predict that groups treated by having to discuss refugees first will be more likely to complain that their communities

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50 Interview conducted with senior UNHCR Official on September 12, 2018 via skype.
lack the resources available exclusively to the refugees.

Similar to the analysis in Section 5 measuring in-group versus out-group national identity, I coded focus group comments blind to treatment group on whether the comment expressed a grievance about public goods. If so, I also noted which actors the participants felt were responsible to address them. As predicted, the plot on the left in Figure 10 shows that 75.2% of all comments made by treatment focus groups mentioned a public goods related grievance, compared to only 28.5% of control focus group comments. Additionally, from the comments I can discern which actors the participants have identified as primarily responsible to address their grievances. In Figure 10, the plot on the right shows that among the comments made about public goods needs within the treatment groups, the proportion of comments that identified various targets of their grievances. Note that these proportions sum to 1 within each group. For both treatment and control groups, the government (conceptualized generally) is the most responsible for their public goods needs. Afterwards, differences emerge. Control group participants, who again only account for less than a third of the public goods comments, believe that they, fellow citizens, and their village leaders are partially responsible. The treatment group participants, on the other hand, felt that the UNHCR was also obligated to address their issues. By being primed to think about and discuss refugees near their communities, these individuals were reminded of the very visible presence of foreign aid and how it could be distributed to their communities as well as to the camps.

In fact, many of these comments not only expressed a grievance, but also specified a plan for the community members to collectively bring their issues to the officials they felt were responsible. For example, “something that we should think about is the destruction of our roads. We should tell our local leaders so that the UN can compensate us...We can include these in our development plans and deliver them to the District Council.”51 Some of these discussions also turn towards holding service providers accountable: “Last year, almost 6 million shillings (2600 USD) disappeared. It was supposed to go to education. These school officials need to be held accountable for these funds. They should be going to our schools.”52 These discussions additionally reveal that citizens at times collectively contribute to co-produce a public good with the government: “The primary school is almost completed. The community has made bricks and provided the labor but we request outside help to complete it. We think either the government or NGOs can come and help us complete it.”53

51Male participant, Heru Juu focus group, August 6, 2015.
52Male participant, Munanila focus group, July 28, 2015.
53Female participant, Heru Juu focus group, August 6, 2015.
These behaviors – bringing up complaints about local public goods in meetings and making plans to collectively address them – are precisely the types of citizen actions necessary for the “short route” of accountability in development. Especially in rural areas, community members are crucial actors for public goods provision in Tanzania (Miguel, 2004). At the most grassroots level of government, each community (or “village”) comprises the village assembly, which includes all adults over age 18, who elect the village chairperson and council. These councils set up regular public hearings and service boards, open to all citizens, for participatory budget-making to discuss public goods needs and new projects (Baker et al., 2002). The output of these meetings – development plans – are then compiled by ward level committees to forward up the chain of hierarchy to the district councils, also known as the local government authorities (LGAs). Owing to decentralization efforts encouraged by foreign donors throughout the developing world in the 1990s, LGAs are the main authority for local public goods provision to promote local, democratic participation (Therkildsen, 2000).

From interviews conducted by my research assistants with government officials at the village and ward levels as well as with head teachers of government primary schools in communities near the refugee camps, I also find evidence that they recognize a change in citizen participation. For example, when asked whether they noticed any changes to community development meetings in the past 3 to 4 years: “Somehow they have started understanding that they are required to contribute. As a result construction of a clinic toilet project was implemented due to community contributions.”

Given this localized yet multi-step process, I recognize that for citizen participation to lead to real improvements in public goods, several other causal steps must hold, including that the targets of citizens’ demand-making acknowledge these complaints and take action. If existing forms of citizen participation had not persuaded the state to improve public goods, it seems implausible that refugee-motivated participation would be able to alter the status quo. Nevertheless, it may be that the scope and scale of the participation has changed, or local elite actors with the support of international organizations like the UNHCR have become more responsive in order to deter any possible conflict between refugees and nearby citizens. This seems to be corroborated by a senior official from a prominent humanitarian NGO working in the camps, who noted: “We have been receiving different requests from regional officials, district officials

54LGAs have the authority to levy taxes and fees. Nevertheless, Carlitz (2016) finds that transfers from the central government still account for the bulk of public spending, and this transfer favors LGAs with higher electoral support for the ruling party.

55Interview with Village executive official on June 22, 2018 in Bitare ward in Kibondo district.
and even local police for support in host communities and the MHA is calling for it. These demands might be as well coming out because Kigoma is a very poor region and citizens know how much resources are going into camps and how little to them. This provides evidence that government officials in Kigoma region have been experiencing increased pressure from local citizens and in turn, requesting assistance from NGOs.

7.1 Changes in Quality of Public Primary Education

Finally, I explore whether these citizen efforts led to downstream effects on the actual quality of public goods. To assess whether public goods outcomes near the refugee camps improve post-influx, I conduct a difference-in-differences analysis using geo-referenced data provided by the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) and the National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA) on primary school outcomes – average marks and national rank – for government and non-governmental schools measured from 2012 and 2017.

Primary education is an appropriate public good of interest for this analysis, because it is the sector that is most associated with citizen participation. According to Carlitz (2018), a recent survey of Tanzanians shows that between health, water, and education, citizens are most likely to take actions to improve service delivery in the education sector. These actions include attending and raising issues in committee meetings, raising issues with education officials, discussing problems in other civic groups and organizations, and directly monitoring the service delivery (e.g. teacher attendance). Figure S12, which ranks the types of public goods concerns mentioned in the community focus groups, also shows education in the top position. Thus, if there is no observed improvement in this sector for communities near the refugees, it is unlikely that we would observe improvement in other sectors.

For each public school in Tanzania, a school committee comprises of parents and other community members who meet on a regular basis to discuss school needs. Although primary school fees were abolished in 2001 under the Primary Education Development Programme, community members are still expected to contribute to other fees for school maintenance and security as well as monitor teacher attendance, which

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56 Interview conducted on March 9, 2018 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
57 http://www.moe.go.tz/
58 https://www.necta.go.tz
59 The data for this study was a household survey of Tanzanians conducted by the Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID) for the NGO Twaweza East Africa in 2011 and 2015.
60 In future research, when geo-referenced data from the Ministry of Water becomes available for post-2015 years, I plan to extend this analysis to water points.
Table 3: Comparing Government (columns 1-2) and Non-Government (columns 3-4) Primary School Outcomes on their Distance to the Nearest Refugee Camp pre- and post-influx using Difference-in-Differences OLS models, controlling for rural/urban, ward population in 2012, poverty rate (1 square km) in 2012, CCM votes share and voter turnout in 2010, and distances to the nearest road, international border, and regional capital. Below each model are the means and standard deviations of the outcomes pre-influx.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Average Marks Government Primary Schools</th>
<th>National Rank</th>
<th>Average Marks Non-Government Primary Schools</th>
<th>National Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nearest Camp Distance (km): Post-Influx</td>
<td>-.10***</td>
<td>-.13.00***</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(4.00)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(33.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Influx</td>
<td>29.00***</td>
<td>3.435.00***</td>
<td>42.00**</td>
<td>2946.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.00)</td>
<td>(347.00)</td>
<td>(20.00)</td>
<td>(3,518.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nearest Camp Distance (km)</td>
<td>.07***</td>
<td>-.5.00</td>
<td>-214.00</td>
<td>-19.728.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(4.00)</td>
<td>(148.00)</td>
<td>(26,614.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Influx Mean</td>
<td>102.02</td>
<td>6708.23</td>
<td>98.29</td>
<td>5821.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Influx SD</td>
<td>21.42</td>
<td>3904.53</td>
<td>24.19</td>
<td>4130.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,122</td>
<td>2,122</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R^2</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>3,629.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>3,561.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

are crucial tasks. While the 2001 policy drastically increased enrollment, the quality of education has deteriorated due to overcrowded classrooms, insufficient resources, and high teacher absenteeism (Palmer et al., 2007; Wedgwood, 2007; World Bank, 2018). For example, a report by the local education and governance NGO Twaweza found that only 13% of grade 3 pupils and 48% of grade 7 pupils could read a story in English meant for grade 2; 1 in 4 teachers were absent from schools; and only 24% of schools have a lunch program. Although this last statistic masks considerable regional disparities – only 6% of schools in Kigoma have a lunch program compared to 79% in Kilimanjaro. Thus, in this context, there is considerable need for community members to actively exercise their rights to engage with local councils, monitor service providers, and collectively contribute to public goods projects (Twaweza, 2015; Lieberman and Zhou, 2018).

Prior to the 2015 refugee influx, the quality of public goods provision in Kigoma region was extremely poor compared to other regions in Tanzania. Figure S26 in the SI shows that in 2014, Kigoma’s primary schools ranked third from the bottom. Yet by 2016, Figure S27 shows that the schools in this region improve considerably, ranking 9th or 10th out of 26 mainland regions. This notable development, reflected in interviews with government officials, suggest that the central government has allocated more resources
Figure 11: These plots show the marginal effect of post-refugee influx moderated by distance to the nearest camp on government primary school outcomes with 95% bootstrapped CIs. Post-influx, schools closer to camps improve substantially more compared to schools farther away, but this effect evens out by about 100km.

to the region in general in reaction to the refugee influx.61

Examining variation within the region, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to compare outcomes for schools farther and closer to the refugee camps pre- and post-influx. The outcomes of interest measuring school quality are average marks (250 is the highest possible mark) and national rank. For national rank, I flipped the scale for ease of interpretability so that lower numbers indicate worse ranking. Using OLS models, I regress the outcomes of interest on the interaction between distance to the nearest refugee camp and a binary indicator for being in the post-refugee influx period. This analysis also controls for whether the school is in a rural or urban area; distances to the nearest road, international border, and regional capital; and pre-influx baseline variables – ward-level population in 2012, poverty rate (measured at the 1 square km grid level) in 2012, and CCM voteshare and voter turnout in 2010 (see section S4 in the SI for descriptions of the data in greater detail, linear and non-linear estimation strategies, and pre-influx trends).

Table 3 shows the regression results for this analysis in the first two columns.62 The main explanatory variable, which is distance to the nearest camp, is continuous. Thus, the interpretation of the coefficient for just Post-Influx is the estimated change in the public goods outcomes post-influx when distance to the nearest camp is 0. The coefficient for the interaction term Nearest Camp Distance:Post-Influx shows the main effect – how the quality of the schools change on average with a 1km increase away from

61Interviews conducted with officials at the Refugee Services Department, Ministry of Home Affairs on August 12, 2015 and July 1, 2016 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
62In Section S4 of the SI, the expanded regression table includes the coefficients for all control variables and the intercept.
the nearest refugee camp during the post-influx period.

Across the outcomes, government primary schools worsen in quality the farther they are from a refugee camp (i.e. as the distance increases), and these results are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Next, to allow for more flexible nonlinear relationships across the distances, I use a kernel smoothing estimator to calculate the marginal effect of post-influx, moderated by distance to nearest camp, including the same control variables.\textsuperscript{63} Figure 11 shows this effect across the range of distances with 95% bootstrapped CIs. Post-influx, schools closer to camps improve substantially more compared to schools farther away, but this effect evens out by about 100km.

These changes in educational outcomes are also corroborated through interviews with officials from schools near the refugee camps. When asked whether they noticed any changes to parental participation and school committee meetings in the past 3 to 4 years: “Greater involvement of parents has contributed to the development of education. For example, their involvement has led to increases in the efforts of teachers to spend extra teaching time, which has made an increase in student performance on regional and national examinations.”\textsuperscript{64}

As a placebo test, I duplicate the same analysis for non-governmental – private and religious – primary schools in the region. In this context, the citizen-driven “short route” accountability chain of making demands on government for better public goods provision should not apply. The last two columns of Table 3 show that for these schools, there is no statistically significant relationship between the interaction term of nearest camp distance and post-influx. This null finding is also consistent with the theory. Although the sample size of these schools is considerably smaller, the effect size is also pointing in the opposite direction, which is consistent with pre-influx trends for which schools closer to where the future refugees would settle were of poorer quality compared to those farther away.

While primary schooling is just one area of public goods provision, these findings make a supportive case for positive downstream effects of citizen mobilization, which is driven by how nearby citizens feel they are affected – both psychologically and materially – by an influx of refugees. I plan to replicate this analysis with geo-referenced water points once the data is released by the Ministry of Water. Future research and considerations of the policy and normative implications are needed. I conclude by briefly discussing both issues.

\textsuperscript{63}I used the \texttt{inter.kernelf} function from the \texttt{R} package \texttt{Interflex} by Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2018).

\textsuperscript{64}Interview with a primary school head teacher on July 15 2018 from Rusohoko ward in Kibondo district.
8 Conclusion

This study highlights how forced migration, particularly in developing contexts with low state capacity and seemingly inconsequential borders, can prompt nearby citizens to more strongly identify with their national identity as a social psychological reaction. Challenging assumptions that migration waves indicate the loss of meaning for borders, I contend that migration makes borders feel more consequential and real. Furthermore, by observing the humanitarian assistance given exclusively to refugees, I theorize that nearby community-members are more likely to feel that as citizens, they are equally if not more deserving of these resources. In turn, these two channels of heightened solidarity with co-nationals and feelings of relative deprivation will drive citizen participation in demanding better public goods provision.

Regionally, I focus on developing countries, which host the vast majority of the world’s growing displaced populations, but are nonetheless understudied by migration scholars. Specifically, I empirically test my theory in a border region of Tanzania that recently experienced a massive influx of largely coethnic refugees. Through community focus groups and an original survey of citizen respondents, I find that exposure to refugees increases local citizens perceived psychological and material threats, attachment to their national identity, and feelings of relative deprivation. These citizens are also more likely to make demands about improving their own communities’ public goods, a finding supported by interviews with government officials and humanitarian aid agencies. Finally, analyses of geo-referenced government and non-government schools in the region reveal that post-influx, the quality of public goods nearest to the camps improve. This research shows that citizen mobilization and development can surprisingly emerge from anti-migrant bias.

Future research should aim to explore the scope conditions of this theory and address questions of external validity. Additional comparative case studies are needed to determine whether these findings hold if the refugees and host citizens did not share ethnic ties; if the institutional environment of hosting refugees was not camp-based; if the refugee population were smaller in scale; and if the refugees were not given the same level of exclusive aid.

Second, a concern about the observational study of public goods quality is that those nearest the camps improved simply because household wealth in these areas increased. If the local economy received a boost from the demographic changes and influx of resources, affected households may have been able to invest more in their children without demanding structural changes to school inputs and accountability. Thus,
additional research is required to disentangle processes of community mobilization from this alternative explanation.

Lastly, while my research makes an empirical case for how anti-refugee sentiment can have downstream positive consequences on citizen action, it does not imply that elites should strategically encourage unfounded fears and stereotypes against migrants as a tool of nation-building. The many pernicious effects of these sentiments are well-documented. For example, within sub-Saharan Africa alone, research points to cases of immigrant exclusion (Adida, 2011), xenophobic violence (Onoma, 2013), and public support for restricting legal access to citizenship (Zhou, 2018).

Instead, my findings underscore the need to design interventions and policies that promote both inclusive refugee-host relations and positive externalities for host communities. For example, humanitarian agencies working with refugees may consider implementing educational and recreational programs that encourage intergroup contact with local citizens. More work is needed to explore the effectiveness and ethical considerations of these types of interventions. Perhaps more realistically, even if these interventions may not be able to prevent anti-migrant bias at the onset, once new norms and institutions of citizen participation are created, gain momentum, and become path dependent – especially if these citizens are experiencing returns to their actions and feel more efficacious, the initial impetus (i.e. animosity towards refugees) could be addressed without eliminating the constructive processes that come after. Given current trends in displacement and reception of refugees, this research and proposed extensions are timely, urgent, and have real-world implications for those fleeing from crisis and for the communities that host them.
References


