

# THE CENTER OF THE SUNLIT SKY

## *Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition*

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*Including a Translation of Pawo Rinpoche's Commentary  
on the Knowledge Section of Śāntideva's The Entrance  
to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (Bodhicaryāvatāra)*

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## *Some Remarks on the Bodhicaryāvatāra and Pawo Rinpoche's Commentary*

### **A Brief Account of Śāntideva's Life**

THE BODHISATTVA LATER KNOWN as Śāntideva was born in a small kingdom in Saurāṣṭra in India as the first son of King Kalyāṇavarman and was named Śāntivarman.<sup>1443</sup> From an early age, he had visions of Mañjuśrī in his dreams. As the young crown prince grew up, the day approached when he was to ascend the throne. The night before his coronation, Śāntideva had a dream in which he saw the throne of the kingdom already occupied by Mañjuśrī, who said to him, "This is my throne and I am your spiritual friend. It is very inappropriate to sit on the same throne as me." He also dreamed of Āryatārā in the guise of his own mother, who poured hot water over his head. When the young prince asked her why she did so, she replied, "A kingdom is just like the boiling waters of hell, and I am blessing you with this water." Śāntideva regarded these visions as clear indications that he should not take over his kingdom, and thus, before the break of dawn, he ran away. After twenty-one days of walking, tired and thirsty, he happened upon a beautiful spring at the edge of a forest. As he was about to have a sip, a beautiful young lady suddenly appeared. She told him not to drink this water—which turned out to be poisonous—and offered him some much more delicious water to quench his thirst. She then escorted him to her teacher Mañjuśrīvarjāsiddhi, who was meditating nearby, and Śāntideva stayed to study with this master for a long time. Needless to say, the young lady was none other than Tārā, and the teacher was Mañjuśrī.

After about twelve years, Śāntideva's teacher said that he should go to the eastern part of India, so he went and lived among the attendants of King Pañcamasimha. Because of Śāntideva's skill in all arts and crafts as well as his intelligence, the king requested him to become one of his ministers, and he accepted for the time being. During that period, Śāntideva had a strong and beneficial spiritual influence in the kingdom, which made the other ministers jealous. They said to the king, "This man is very deceitful. Even his sword is not a real one; it is just made of wood." (In fact, this sword, which Śāntideva always carried, was the symbol of his teacher Mañjuśrī.) Upon hearing this, the king asked all the

ministers to show him their swords. When Śāntideva's turn came, he said, "O Lord, it is not good for you to view my sword, it will harm you." Of course, the king only became more suspicious and insisted on seeing the sword. Śāntideva answered, "If you really want to see it, please cover your right eye and look at it only with your left." When Śāntideva drew his sword out of its sheath, the shine was so powerfully dazzling that the king's left eye went blind for a while. Quickly Śāntideva put the sword back, and everybody realized that he was not just an ordinary person but a great siddha. The king and his ministers requested him to stay on, but he refused and advised the king to rule the country in accordance with the dharma and to establish twenty centers for Buddhist learning.

Having given this advice, he left the kingdom and journeyed toward the central part of India. When he arrived at the great Buddhist university of Nālandā, he was ordained by the preceptor Jayadeva and received the name Śāntideva. After his ordination, he lived among all the other great masters and mahāpañḍitas at Nālandā. Inwardly, he continuously received teachings from Mañjuśrī and, in his cell, wrote two scriptures known as *The Compendium of Training* and *The Compendium of Sūtras*.<sup>1444</sup> In his outer appearance, however, Śāntideva was just sleeping day and night. The only time his fellow monks would see him was at meals, when he would eat a huge amount of rice. After a while, everybody became quite upset about him. They said, "He is just wasting the offerings of food and drink that people make to the monastery out of devotion. Monastics are supposed to engage in study, reflection, and meditation, but he is doing none of these."

So the paṇḍitas discussed the matter and decided to expel him from Nālandā. They came up with a scheme to have the monks take turns reciting the scriptures. They thought this would make Śāntideva leave on his own, since he would have nothing to say. When his turn came to recite something, at first he refused to do it. Upon being repeatedly pressed, he eventually agreed and asked the monks to set up a seat for him. At this, some of them became a little suspicious, but nevertheless they built a throne and assembled with the intention to humiliate Śāntideva. He came, sat on the throne, and asked them, "What do you want me to teach, something that has already been taught or something that has never been taught before?" Eager to make fun of him, they cried, "Recite something new!" So Śāntideva recited the entire *Bodhicaryāvatāra* as spontaneous verse. It soon became clear to this audience of great scholars that his teaching was something extraordinary, and they started to memorize it. Eventually, Śāntideva came to verse IX.34:

Once neither entities nor nonentities  
Remain before the mind,  
There is no other mental flux [either].  
Therefore, it is utter nonreferential peace.

At this point, he rose up into the sky, and soon his body disappeared completely, but his voice continued to be heard until the end of the last chapter. After his voice had stopped, the paṇḍitas compared what they had memorized and found that among them they had three versions. The Kashmiri scholars had memorized more than a thousand verses but had missed the verses of homage in the beginning. Of course, nobody had been paying attention at the beginning, since everybody thought that Śāntideva had no clue about anything. The scholars from eastern India had only seven hundred verses, again missing the homage and also the second and ninth chapters. The version of the scholars from central India was missing the homage and the tenth chapter on dedication. So they discussed the matter and finally decided to send three scholars to see Śāntideva and ask for his advice.

Tāranātha's account says that Śāntideva was staying in a place called Kālīṅga in Trilīṅga, while other historical reports say that he lived in Śrī Dakṣiṇa in south India. When the three scholars found Śāntideva, they supplicated him to return to Nālandā, but he refused. They then asked, "So how should we study *The Compendium of Training* and *The Compendium of Sūtras* that you mentioned in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*? Where are these three texts?" Śāntideva replied, "The first two texts are written on birch bark, and you can find them on the windowsill of my cell at Nālandā. As for the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, the version of the scholars from central India is the correct one."<sup>1445</sup>

At that time, Śāntideva was living with five hundred other monks in a great Buddhist monastery located in a nearby forest full of deer and other animals. These creatures were very tame and used to come to the humans in the monastery. However, many of the deer that Śāntideva's fellow monastics saw going into his room never came out again. They also noticed that the number of wild animals in the forest kept decreasing. So some monks started to peep through his window, and they saw Śāntideva eating the flesh of these animals. Especially for a monk, this was considered a really bad thing to do in India. However, when the monks accused him of doing this, Śāntideva instantly revived all the animals, and they came out of his room stronger and healthier than before. As usual, he was asked to stay and, as usual, he refused.

This time, though, Śāntideva did not just leave the monastery but left monasticism altogether. He became a wandering yogin practicing Vajrayāna in many unconventional ways. Thus, he acted just like other great siddhas, such as Nāropa and Maitripa, who had also been mahāpaṇḍitas at Nālandā and also left. Śāntideva went to southern India and engaged in contests of debate and magic with non-Buddhist scholars and yogins. He performed many supernatural activities for the benefit of others, such as miraculously providing food or stopping a war. Thus, he became one of the well-known mahāsiddhas of this time in India.

*The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life and Its Ninth Chapter*

As can be seen, *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* was not created as a scholarly work but as a *dohā*, a spontaneous yogic song of realization. All mahāsiddhas, such as Saraha, Tilopa, and Nāropa, sang many such songs, and Milarepa's *Hundred Thousand Songs* are very well known by most Buddhists. In a similar way, Śāntideva delivered his text as extemporaneous verses in superb Sanskrit poetry. However, it is more than just a masterpiece of Sanskrit literature. More important for the Buddhist practitioner is that, because of the way this text originated, it also carries the blessing of the supreme realization of a great bodhisattva and mahāsiddha. At the same time, in terms of its content, Śāntideva's text describes the entire path of a bodhisattva in a lucid style that is very practice oriented and often sounds like personal advice. For these two reasons, this text is said to represent the lineage of practice and blessing.<sup>1446</sup> Thus, it is highly accessible even for ordinary beings who wish to follow the path of a bodhisattva and at the same time masterfully spreads both of the two great wings of this path: the knowledge of cultivating the profound view of emptiness and the compassionate means of vast skillful activities. Therefore, the text is said to represent the lineage of the unity of view and activity,<sup>1447</sup> starting with the cultivation of the mind of enlightenment as the root of all practices of the great vehicle and then presenting detailed instructions on all six perfections, from generosity up through supreme knowledge. For all these reasons, at all times, Buddhist scholars and practitioners alike consider Śāntideva's text to be very special, and it has enjoyed great popularity to the present day.

In this vein, its ninth chapter on the perfection of prajñā has to be seen as an organic and integral part of the whole text and not as standing in sharp contrast to the other chapters that seem so much more accessible and down-to-earth. Despite Śāntideva's rising into the sky while reciting the ninth chapter, it is not something far out. Just like the rest of *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, it is meant to be practiced, not just read or studied. People going through this text from the beginning are often quite shocked upon encountering the acuity and dissecting quality of the ninth chapter. It seems to annihilate the entire beautiful edifice of the path of compassion that Śāntideva so eloquently built throughout the first eight chapters. To put it bluntly, many feel that they plunge from "love and light" right into "brainy hairsplitting." However, after all that has been said about the project of Centrism, it should be clear that this is not at all what the ninth chapter is about. Rather, as the chapter's title says, it is about perfecting the most profound insight into the true nature of all phenomena. Moreover, Śāntideva uses reasoning in other chapters of his text too, particularly in the sixth on patience. Obviously, for him, intellect and compassion—or insight and means—are not mutually exclusive, nor do they obstruct each other. Rather,

the whole text is an expression of the inseparable unity of wisdom and compassion. It is precisely through cultivating this unity that one practices the way of life of a bodhisattva. Thus, the other chapters of *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* are in fact included in the ninth and support it, while the spirit of this chapter pervades them all. This is expressed by verse IX.1:

All of these branches  
Were taught by the Sage for the sake of knowledge.  
Therefore, those who wish for suffering  
To subside should develop knowledge.

As for Śāntideva's view, Pawo Rinpoche quotes Atīśa as saying that his ultimate view is the undifferentiable unity of wisdom and the expanse of dharmas. His approach in the chapter on prajñā is aimed at opening our minds into wakeful spaciousness by relentlessly undermining all clinging to reference points. By mainly just formulating absurd consequences that follow from the positions of others, he clearly follows the style of a Consequentialist. In a way, Śāntideva surveys the whole range of Centrist opponents and arguments from the time of Nāgārjuna to the eighth century. For example, Nāgārjuna mainly challenged the realism of the Buddhist systematizers of the Abhidharma. Āryadeva concentrated on the ātman of the Enumerators and the theories of the Logicians and the Analyzers. Later, Candrakīrti launched his attack on Mere Mentalism and Bhāvaviveka's way of reasoning. Śāntideva addresses both Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents but focuses on the systems of the Enumerators, Logicians, and Analyzers as well as on the notion of a creator god in the form of the Hindu deity Īśvara.

### Śāntideva's Presentation of the Two Realities

In verse IX.2 of his *Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, Śāntideva describes the two realities as follows:

The seeming and the ultimate—  
These are asserted as the two realities.  
The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.  
It is said that cognition is the seeming.

Here, "cognition" translates the Sanskrit term *buddhi* (Tib. blo), which has a wide range of meanings. In its most general sense, it refers to the basic cognitive capacity or intelligence of the mind, be it in sense perception or conceptual thinking. More specifically—as outlined in detail in the teachings on valid cognition—this term is applied to all facets of the entire spectrum of consciousness, be they

conceptual or nonconceptual, ordinary or yogic. Both in this verse and in general, the usual translation of this term as “intellect” or “conception” suggests only the conceptual aspect of the mind.<sup>1448</sup> However, in the next verse, Śāntideva clearly refers to the entire way in which the world is seen:

Thus, two kinds of world are seen:  
The one of yogins and the one of common people.<sup>1449</sup>

Almost all commentaries explicitly state that the term “cognition” refers not only to conceptual thinking but to all consciousnesses that entail the duality of subject and object; that is, it also applies to nonconceptual cognitions, such as sense perception. Pawo Rinpoche says:

Thus, the native nature of all phenomena was not, is not, and cannot become the sphere of the consciousnesses of any ordinary beings, noble ones, learners, or nonlearners whatsoever, be they conceptual or nonconceptual [consciousnesses], perceptions, or inferential cognitions.<sup>1450</sup>

*The Sūtra of Richly Adorned* agrees:

[The ultimate] is free from cognition and knowable objects.  
Measure and faculties have been relinquished.  
It is not the object of minds and consciousnesses.  
This is the object of those who are released.<sup>1451</sup>

Atiśa’s *Entrance into the Two Realities* declares:

The learned master Bhavya said  
That the scriptures are clear about  
[The ultimate] being realized neither through  
Conceptual nor nonconceptual consciousnesses.<sup>1452</sup>

Moreover, if it were just the intellect and its objects that constitute seeming reality, then sense perceptions and other nonconceptual consciousnesses would not be included in such a seeming reality. Either they would then have to be a third category of reality altogether or, if the definite number of only two realities is retained, sense perceptions and so on would have to be ultimate reality and thus the perceivers of the ultimate. As *The Sūtra of the King of Meditative Concentration* says:

Neither the eye, the ear, nor the nose is valid cognition,  
Nor is the tongue, the body, or mental cognition valid cognition.



If these sense faculties were valid cognition,  
Whom would the path of noble ones do any good?<sup>1453</sup>

Prajñākaramati's commentary on *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* quotes *The Sūtra of Engaging in the Two Realities*.<sup>1454</sup>

Devaputra, if ultimate reality were ultimately the sphere of body, speech, and mind, it would not fall into the category of "ultimate reality." It would be nothing but just seeming reality. However, Devaputra, ultimate reality is beyond all conventions. Actually, it is unarisen and unceasing, free from any object of expression or means of expression, free from knowable object and knower. It even transcends being an object of the omniscient wisdom that is endowed with the supreme of all aspects. This is ultimate reality.<sup>1455</sup>

As illustrated by such passages, the majority of sūtras and all Indian commentaries on Śāntideva's text support the reading of the above verse on the two realities as it was explained. Thus, no type of dualistic consciousness can perceive ultimate reality. Rather, it is often said that ultimate reality is seen by "personally experienced wisdom." There are two major objections that can be raised here:

- 1) In general, in Buddhism, the terms "cognition" and "consciousness" are equivalent. Thus, if the ultimate is not the sphere of cognition, this contradicts the explanation that the ultimate is the sphere of personally experienced wisdom. Thus, this verse cannot be taken literally.
- 2) It follows that the ultimate is not a knowable object, because the definition of knowable object is "that which is suitable to be taken as an object of a cognition."<sup>1456</sup>

The first objection does not apply to Śāntideva's verse, as this verse is surely not to be understood as negating that the personally experienced wisdom of the noble ones sees the nature of phenomena just as it is. When all mistaken clinging has completely vanished, the nondual unity of expanse and awareness in the mental continua of noble ones is without any conceptual entanglement. It is like a still pond when the wind has subsided: free from waves. In this unity of expanse and awareness, there are no reference points of subject and object. However, following this meditative equipoise, the consciousness during the phase of subsequent attainment applies the conventional terms "what is realized" and "what realizes" to expanse and awareness respectively. The expression "personally experienced wisdom realizes the ultimate" is used solely in this way. On the other

hand, in meditative equipoise, there are not even the most subtle characteristics of cognition, such as realizing or not realizing. So how should any perceptual mode of self-awareness or a perceptual mode that is not self-awareness remain there? With this in mind, the reason Śāntideva did not assert personally experienced wisdom and such in this context was to reverse our clinging to characteristics with regard to the ultimate. Had he asserted personally experienced wisdom and such, it would be difficult to relinquish the Mere Mentalists' clinging to the existence of self-awareness. Moreover, from the perspective of debate, such an assertion would have amounted to a claim—such as “This is the self-awareness that we call the ultimate”—that could be attacked through reasoning. Also, one does not get any closer to the nature of phenomena merely by thinking, “The ultimate is the object of personally experienced wisdom.” On the other hand, the elimination of all characteristics of reference points does not become an obstacle to approaching the nature of phenomena via cultivating and refining a conceptual mental image of the ultimate during the paths of accumulation and junction.

The second objection also does not apply. To state the definition of knowable object as “that which is suitable to be taken as an object of a cognition” is only taught in texts for beginners<sup>1457</sup> as a step in order to unfold their intelligence. However, these texts also give the definition of consciousness as “the cognition that is clear and aware of objects.” Thus, not only in terms of definition but also in the actual process of perception, consciousness and the object that it cognizes mutually depend on each other. Thus, one can never ascertain one of them without the other. In general, knowing consciousnesses and knowable objects are only imagined by the ignorance of ordinary beings. Actually, there are no such entities. When the Buddha used such labels, he did so only provisionally for certain purposes, such as to communicate his teachings about ultimate reality.

So then is the ultimate a knowable object or not? For beginners, the following is taught: Through knowing the seeming, one just cognizes worldly conventional terms and events, but this has no greater significance. Through knowing the ultimate, one goes beyond cyclic existence. Therefore, the only correct object to be known is the ultimate. However, again, this is said only for a specific purpose, which is to introduce beginners to the nominal ultimate. For those who are already intensely trained in the path and then conceptualize the ultimate as a thing with characteristics, it is taught that the ultimate is not even a mere knowable object, since knower and knowable object are just conventions on the level of seeming reality. This is said in order to remove all mental reference points that cling to the ultimate in terms of subject and object. If these are not removed, they function as subtle obstacles to “actually” perceiving the ultimate as it is. The direct cognition of the ultimate only engages in the nature of phenomena just as it is, when there are no more remainders of knower, knowable object, true seeing, false seeing, and so on in such a cognition.

In brief, existence, nonexistence, and so on are nothing but what is grasped at by the mind through certain modes of apprehension. No matter how cognitions apprehend the nature of phenomena, this is not how it actually is. When analyzed, in principle, there is no phenomenon whatsoever that could be apprehended by cognition. Still, due to mistaken habituations, we imagine that we apprehend and seize “something,” although it is unreal. Thus, some intrinsic “existence” or “nonexistence” that is more than just an imaginary notion apprehended by certain cognitions is impossible. As *The Sūtra That Unravels the Intention* says:

Conditioned phenomena are neither conditioned nor unconditioned. As for unconditioned phenomena, they are also neither unconditioned nor conditioned. O son of good family, “conditioned phenomena” are words that are imputed by the Teacher. Words that are imputed by the Teacher originate from imagination and are expressed as conventional terms. What is expressed as the conventional terms of various imaginations is not at all established.<sup>1458</sup>

How does mind apprehend existence and nonexistence? To take an example, neither the horns of a cow nor the horns of a rabbit are real in the sense of intrinsically existing or intrinsically nonexisting. Still, when we see these two things that stand out from the head of a cow, we ascribe certain characteristics to them; we say, “These are horns” and “There are horns on the head of this cow.” When we see a rabbit later, we do not see on its head the things we saw on the cow’s head. Therefore, we ascribe the feature of nonexistence to the mere fact of not seeing here and now what we saw somewhere else before and say, “There are no horns on the head of a rabbit.” So the common consensus that the horns of a cow exist while the horns of a rabbit do not exist comes from common conventional expressions. If there is no cognition that apprehends the existence of horns on a cow in the first place, there will also be no cognition that apprehends the nonexistence of horns on a rabbit. Thus, we may apprehend what we imagine as existence or nonexistence, but none of this is real as some kind of intrinsic existence or nonexistence apart from what appears to our mind. We may see a movie in which a cow and a rabbit appear, or we may dream of them, but once the movie stops or we wake up, we gain certainty that both the existence of the cow’s horns and the nonexistence of the rabbit’s horns were equally unreal. Even while watching such a movie or a dream, there is not the slightest difference between the existence of cow horns and the nonexistence of rabbit horns, or between the one being real and the other delusive. If even the very bases—cow and rabbit—to which we attribute certain features do not really exist in any way other than being mere appearances, what is there to say about any real specific features, such as the existence or nonexistence of horns, that we attribute to these bases?

In this way, all our mental operations of imputing existence, nonexistence, entities, nonentities, being real or delusive, and so on are compared to tying knots into space. When these dissolve, there is nothing else that binds us. Thus, what is conventionally called “seeing true reality” or “seeing the ultimate” is just like the subsiding of our grasping at a mirage as being water. At this point, neither do we see something that did not exist before nor does anything that existed before cease. It is not that the water of the mirage dried up, nor that the nonexistence of water is added. However, as long as our apprehension of this water has not dissolved, we tire ourselves out trying to get there to drink it. As soon as we become “dis-illusioned” from this fantasy of water, we know that such efforts are pointless, and we relax.

Again, the essential point here is to let go of our grasping that constantly superimposes or denies something with regard to the display of mere appearances. It is not a matter of annihilating or eradicating the appearance of things and producing some spacelike nothingness instead. As Śāntideva says:

How something is seen, heard, or known  
Is not what is negated here.  
Rather, the object of refutation  
Is the cause for suffering, which is the conception of reality.<sup>1459</sup>

When our clinging to a mirage as being water stops, this obviously does not depend on whether or not the mere visual aspect of some shape and color that looks like water appears to us. Likewise, we now entertain ordinary worldly types of consciousness that take whatever appears to be real in just the way that it appears. On the Buddhist path, we might furthermore try to make these appearances nonexistent through the remedy of a misunderstood and contrived emptiness. Thus, we might cling to the ultimate as being like an extinguished flame or like the empty space that is left after an old house has collapsed. Once both of these mistaken cognitions—clinging to real existence or some kind of nonexistence—have subsided, in terms of the plain appearance of illusionlike phenomena when their specific causes have come together versus their nonappearance when their causes are incomplete, there is no difference between the time when superimposition and denial were still operating and the time when these have vanished. However, there is a difference as to whether the nature of these appearances is realized or not. Therefore, from the point of such realization onward, one is not under the sway of either appearances or the lack thereof, much like someone who, while dreaming, recognizes this dream as a dream and just enjoys its appearances. This is what it means to abide within cyclic existence without being affected by its flaws, just like a lotus grows in muddy water without being stained by it.

Since such realization is undecieving, it is called “seeing what is true.” As it is the opposite of worldly seeing, it may also be called “not seeing anything.” Since it is the opposite of reification, it is expressed as “seeing emptiness.” It is also referred to as “being released from empty and nonempty,” because neither something empty nor something nonempty is observed. Since emptiness is nothing but a name, it is also described as “not seeing emptiness.” Because it is the source of all positive qualities, it is designated as “seeing the emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects.” It is called “seeing identitylessness,” for it is the opposite of clinging to personal and phenomenal identities. Since it is the opposite of both clinging to a self and clinging to the lack of a self, it is said to be “seeing the genuine self.” As any notion of a mind has vanished, it is labeled as “mind having vanished.” It is also referred to as “realizing or seeing one's own mind,” because the primordial basic nature of one's own mind is realized in just the primordial way it is. When “not seeing anything” is explained as “seeing what is true,” this is to be understood just like our immediate certainty that we see space when we do not see anything. As the Buddha said:

Beings constantly use the words, “I see space.”  
You should examine the point of how you see space.  
Those who see in this way see all phenomena.  
I am not able to explain seeing through another example.

### The Indian Commentaries on the Bodhicaryāvatāra

Tibetan sources say that there existed more than one hundred Indian commentaries on *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, but only a few of them have survived. The only one that is preserved in Sanskrit is Prajñākaramati's *Commentary on the Difficult Points*. All others exist only in Tibetan translations.<sup>1460</sup> In due order, volume 100 of the *Tengyur* lists the following ten texts as commentaries on *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*:

Prajñākaramati (ca. 950–1000). *Commentary on the Difficult Points of The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*. (Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā. Byang chub kyi spyod pa la 'jug pa'i dka' 'grel). Commentary on chapters 1–9. P5273, pp. 11.7–113.1.5.

Anonymous (possibly Dānaśīla). *Commentary on the Difficult Points in the Exposition of The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*. (Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravivṛttipañjikā. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i rnam par bshad pa'i dka' 'grel). P5274, pp. 113.1.5–141.3.5.

Kalyāṇadeva (11th c.). *The Excellent Composition of The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*. (Bodhisattvacaryāvatārasaṃskāra. Byang chub sems dpa'i syod pa la 'jug pa'i legs par sbyar ba). P5275, pp. 143.1.1–186.4.7.

Kṛṣṇapāda (10th/11th c.). *The Ascertainment of the Points in The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life That Are Difficult to Understand*. (Bodhisattvacaryāvatāraduravabodhanirṇayanāmagranthā. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i rtogs par dka' ba'i gnas gtan la dbab pa). P5276, pp. 186.4.7–189.2.4.

Vairocanarakṣita (11th c.). *Commentary on the Difficult Points of The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*. (Bodhisattvacaryāvatārapañjikā. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i dka' 'grel). P5277, pp. 189.2.5–218.5.7.

Anonymous. *Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Knowledge Chapter*. (Prajñāparicchedapañjikā. Shes rab le'u'i dka' 'grel). Commentary on chapter 9 only. P5278, pp. 218.5.7–228.2.5.

Anonymous. *Exposition of The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*. (Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravivṛtti. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i rnam par bshad pa). Commentary on chapters 9 and 10. P5279, pp. 228.2.5–233.4.2.<sup>1461</sup>

Dharmapāla<sup>1462</sup> (ca. 1000). *A Summary of The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life in Thirty-six Points*. (Bodhisattvacaryāvatāraṣaṭtriṃśatapiṇḍārtha. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i don sum cu rtsa drug bsdu pa). P5280, pp. 233.4.2–235.2.5.

Dharmapāla. *A Summary of The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*. (Bodhisattvacaryāvatārapīṇḍārtha. Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i don bsdu pa). P5281, pp. 235.2.5–235.5.8.

Vibhūticandra (12th/13th c.). *Commentary on the Intention of The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life, Called The Illumination of the Distinctive Features*. (Bodhicaryāvatāratātparyapañjikāviśeṣadyotanināma. Byang chub kyi spyod pa la 'jug pa'i dgongs pa'i 'grel pa khyad par gsal byed ces bya ba). P5282, pp. 235.5.8–281.3.4.<sup>1463</sup>

Considering the fact that P5279 is just a part of P5274 and that the two works of Dharmapāla are only brief outlines of Śāntideva's text, this leaves us with seven actual commentaries on *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* (P5278 is on the ninth chapter only). From among these, Prajñākaramati's extensive work is regarded as the most important commentary.<sup>1464</sup>

### Selected Tibetan Commentaries

As for Tibetan commentaries on *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, a huge number have been written throughout many centuries. Apart from Pawo Tsugla Trengwa's commentary, I have consulted the following ones:

*A Commentary on The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* (Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa), the earliest extant Tibetan commentary by Sönam Tsemo (1142–1182), the second head of the Sakya school.<sup>1465</sup>

*The Ocean of Good Explanations* (Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa legs bshad rgya mtsho) by the Sakya master Ngülchu Togme<sup>1466</sup> (1295–1369), a widely used commentary.

*A Stepping-Stone for the Children of the Victors* (Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad rgyal sras 'jug ngogs) by Gyaltsab Darma Rinchen (1364–1462), one of the two main disciples of Tsongkhapa.

*The Lamp for the Middle Path* (Spyod 'jug 'bru 'grel dbu ma'i lam gyi sgron ma) by the Drugpa Kagyü master Padma Karpo (1527–1596).

*An Easily Understandable Explanation of the Words and the Meaning of the Chapter on Knowledge, The Ketaka Jewel* (Shes rab le'u'i tshig don go sla bar bshad pa nor bu ke ta ka) by the Nyingma master Ju Mipham Gyamtso<sup>1467</sup> (1846–1912).

*The Drops of Nectar That Are the Excellent Words of Guru Mañjughoṣa* (Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa 'jam dbyangs bla ma'i zhal lung bdud rtsi'i thig pa) by Mipham Rinpoche's disciple Khenpo Künzang Pelden<sup>1468</sup> (ca. 1870–1940), which preserves many of the famous oral instructions on Śāntideva's text by Dza Patrul Rinpoche Orgyen Jigme Chökyi Wangbo<sup>1469</sup> (1808–1887).

### Introduction to Pawo Tsugla Trengwa's

#### *Commentary on The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*

In the Karma Kagyü school, Pawo Rinpoche's commentary on *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* is considered both the standard commentary on this text and—together with the Eighth Karmapa's *Chariot of the Tagbo Siddhas*—the standard presentation of Madhyamaka, especially in its Consequentialist approach. Since the Second Pawo Rinpoche was a disciple of the Eighth Karmapa, his commentary preserves many of the Centrist pith instructions of Karmapa Mikyö Dorje.

Of all the commentaries on Śāntideva's text, it is by far the most voluminous (975 folios). However, not only its length distinguishes it from other Tibetan commentaries. First, in terms of its scriptural sources, there is an unparalleled abundance of at times extensive quotes from the sūtras to support the main points of the commentary. It is the only commentary that gives synopses of the relevant passages from the major Indian commentaries for each topic of the text.<sup>1470</sup> In addition, it quotes a number of the earliest Tibetan commentaries, such as those written by the Sakya master Sabsang Mati Panchen Jamyang Lodrö<sup>1471</sup> (1294–1376) and the Kadampa master Tsonaba Chenbo Sherab Sangbo<sup>1472</sup> (fourteenth century).

In terms of its approach and contents, Pawo Rinpoche's commentary generally follows the Consequentialist brand of Madhyamaka. Usually, Centrist texts instruct us in relinquishing all reference points but hardly mention what it might be like when the mind actually *is* free from all reference points. Having followed the thorough Centrist dissolution of reference points, unlike most other such texts, Pawo Rinpoche's commentary also offers us a few glimpses of the experience of a mind free from reference points. Thus, having made sure that there is no ground to stand on through the typical Consequentialist approach of relentlessly pulverizing our ordinary world, he does not shy away from describing the resultant groundlessness in somewhat more positive, experiential terms. In this way, he addresses the question of what happens when Centrist reasoning has been successful in emptying our mind of its mistaken constructions and grasping. Of course, by its very nature, the experiential ultimate result of the Centrist path is beyond imagination. However, it is clearly not a mere negation or blank nothingness. Rather, when both the objects of refutation and their remedy—reasoning—dissolve, they do so within the empty and luminous expanse of our mind. From the perspective of this expanse, all analyses and their objects, including the mind that performs all these analyses, are still somewhat externally oriented and essentially dualistic. Finally, mind turns its looking “inside” toward the center of its own open space that is completely without direction or duality. In the words of Pawo Rinpoche:

Apart from all phenomena just being mere imputations, they neither abide as any nature whatsoever, nor do they abide as anything at all. Just this is what is seen as the very expanse of mind that is empty and luminous. This puts you in a position where you have complete power over everything you could possibly wish for, just as if all phenomena were resting in the palm of your hand. Thus, . . . compassion for the assembly of sentient beings who do not realize this in the same way wells up unbearably. . . . To the same extent that great compassion



increases, also this very [realization] that, primordially, nothing can be observed . . . grows and increases. This is the ultimate seeing which is like the orb of the sun. When it becomes stable and increases in such a way, great compassion—which is like the light rays of the sun—will grow even more than before. [Beings with such realization] do not behold sentient beings, but great compassion still flowers in them. They do not behold themselves either, but they still lend their support to all sentient beings. They do not behold anything to be attained whatsoever, but they still establish beings in great enlightenment. Just as there is no place whatsoever to go to beyond space, they do not behold anybody who would go somewhere beyond, but they still display [the activity of] liberating sentient beings from cyclic existence.<sup>1473</sup>

and

Once clinging in terms of superimposition and denial has come to an end in such a way, just this empty and luminous nature of phenomena in which there is nothing to be removed or to be added is the fundamental state of phenomena. This is expressed as primordial nirvāṇa as such.<sup>1474</sup>

In addition to being a commentary on *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, Pawo Rinpoche's text provides several long accounts on such topics as Madhyamaka in general, the distinction between Autonomists and Consequentialists, prajñā, emptiness, the two realities, and the nature and qualities of Buddhahood. It describes the four major Buddhist philosophical systems and how the great vehicle represents the words of the Buddha. In addressing the issue of so-called Shentong-Madhyamaka, he also elaborates on the lineage of vast activity and shows that it is not the same as Mere Mentalism.

As for the structure of Pawo Rinpoche's specific commentary on the ninth chapter of *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, its brief outline is presented through five main points:

- 1) Teaching the benefit of prajñā, or knowledge (verse 1)
- 2) Identifying the nature and scope of this knowledge (2–55)
  - Showing that everything that is contained in the two realities is emptiness (2–29)
  - Demonstrating that realizing emptiness constitutes the path of bodhisattvas (30–55)
- 3) Outlining the actual way to meditate on emptiness (56–110)
  - Meditating on personal identitylessness (56–77)
  - Meditating on phenomenal identitylessness (78–110)

4) Refuting reification (111–150)

- Showing that there are no means to prove the notion of real existence (111–115)
- Teaching the means to invalidate this notion (116–150)

5) The result of having meditated on emptiness (151–167)

- Transcending cyclic existence through not being carried away by afflictions (151–155)
- Not falling into the one-sided peace of nirvāṇa through compassion (156–165)
- Protecting all sentient beings (166–167)



*The Ninth Chapter of Pawo Rinpoche's  
Commentary on The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's  
Way of Life*

Exposition of *The Entrance  
to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*

**The Essence of the Immeasurable, Profound,  
and Vast Ocean of the Dharma of the Great Vehicle**

**The Ninth Chapter on Knowledge**

Completely free from conceptions and concepts,  
Not an object of cognition, suchness,  
To her, this perfection of knowledge,  
I prostrate in the manner of such realization.

Even the arising of doubt about her  
Is able to tear existence into shreds.  
I shall comment on the chapter on knowledge  
That elucidates inconceivable true reality.

Through such efforts in perfect meditative stability [as explained in the eighth chapter], one manifests [the various types of] knowledge up to the knowledge of termination and nonarising. Therefore, the explanation of the perfection of knowledge follows right after [the explanation of] meditative stability.

Here, Vibhūticandra says:

Without meditative stability, knowledge does not originate.  
If calm abiding does not exist, this also does not exist.<sup>1475</sup>

On this first [verse] that establishes the connection [with the preceding chapter], Kalyāṇadeva [comments]:

Since from settling in meditative equipoise a cognition of true reality will  
arise . . .<sup>1476</sup>

*The Great Commentary on the Difficult Points* reads:

Because the perfection of knowledge that has the name superior insight  
is taught . . .<sup>1477</sup>

*The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Knowledge Chapter Only* says:

Superior insight is taught after the explanation of meditative stability  
that has the defining characteristic of representing the assembly of the  
causes for the accumulation of merit, such as generosity, as well as the  
cause for the accumulation of wisdom, which is calm abiding. In order  
to [teach] it . . .<sup>1478</sup>

In this way, the connection [with the preceding chapters] is established.

You might raise this objection: “It is stated, ‘Without superior insight, there is also no calm abiding.’ But if superior insight is the topic of this chapter, then, since meditative stability must arise from superior insight, the order of the previous and this [ninth] chapter [in Śāntideva’s text] must be reversed. Or, otherwise, the mistake of mutually dependent conceptions<sup>1479</sup> would follow, because superior insight does not arise without relying on calm abiding, and calm abiding too does not arise without relying on superior insight.”

In those of sharper faculties, superior insight that fully qualifies as such arises first, and, through their settling one-pointedly in this with meditative equipoise, the purpose [of calm abiding] is fulfilled too. In those of weaker faculties, [642]<sup>1480</sup> calm abiding arises through settling [the mind] while focusing on merely partial superior insight. Through this, the knowledge that ensues from meditation—superior insight—increases further. On the basis of that, in turn, stable calm abiding comes about in the way that a bird flaps its [two] wings. In this way, unified calm [abiding] and superior [insight] of the respective ground become very stable. Thus, one proceeds on the path of partial concordance with definite distinction.<sup>1481</sup>

Then, the knowledge of one single moment sees the nature of phenomena. This is the arising of the path of seeing, that is, [the arising] of superior insight that fully qualifies as such. On the path of meditation, this very [insight] becomes more and more stable in the form of unified calm [abiding] and superior [insight]. Consequently, at the end of the seventh ground, superior insight with pure observation in [meditative] equipoise and subsequent [attainment] arises.

Since this becomes [even] more stable, all meditative concentrations are per-

fect. At the end of the continuum of the tenth ground, one-pointed meditative concentration and the knowledge that knows extinction and nonarising—the knowledge that knows the means for the extinction of contaminations—are inseparable. This is the vajralike meditative concentration that vanquishes all stains so that they never arise [again]. This is true and perfect enlightenment of all phenomena through the knowledge of one single moment. It is the unwavering achievement of the inseparability of ultimate calm abiding—not rising from the great cessation—and ultimate superior insight—the knowledge of the suchness and the extent [of phenomena].

Therefore, both calm [abiding] and superior [insight] have limitless subdivisions on each [ground], starting from a beginner with very weak faculties up through the ground of a Buddha. When specified in terms of [different] sentient beings, the development of calm [abiding] and superior [insight] in individual persons is something that should be guided by spiritual friends according to the constitutions and faculties of these [individuals]. However, nobody is able to write down all the possible ways of doing so.

This means that these [calm abiding and insight] are just taught in a very general manner in terms of the main issues. Therefore, the meditative concentration that focuses on approximately concordant superior insight is called meditative stability. That which is generated through this, that is, [643] the actual knowledge that sees true reality, [is called] superior insight. Thus, they are taught in the manner of cause and effect.

The actual text has five parts:

- 1) The benefit of knowledge
- 2) The identification of knowledge
- 3) The way to meditate on emptiness
- 4) The refutation of reification
- 5) The result of meditating on emptiness

## 1. The Benefit of Knowledge

All of these branches

Were taught by the Sage for the sake of knowledge.

Therefore, those who wish for suffering

To subside should develop knowledge. [1]<sup>1482</sup>

All of these five branches, such as generosity, were taught by the Sage, the Blessed One, solely for the sake of developing the main body or result, knowledge. This is the case because the result—the accumulation of wisdom (knowledge)—arises from the cause—the accumulation of merit, which is the five

[perfections], such as generosity. *The Mother* [*Sūtras*]<sup>1483</sup> say:

Without the accumulation of merit being gathered, the perfection of knowledge will not even come to one's ears.

**Therefore, those who wish for all suffering**—their own and others'—**to subside should** not be content with just five [perfections], such as generosity, but should make further serious efforts to solely **develop knowledge**. You might disagree and say, "This contradicts the explanation that one needs knowledge before [one develops] the five [perfections], such as generosity:

As for generosity, knowledge is that which precedes generosity.  
Ethics, patience, vigor, and meditative stability are just like that."

This refers to the five [perfections], such as plain generosity, which are like [people] who are born blind. If they are led by a guide—knowledge—they will also become [true] perfections. Therefore, this teaches that they need knowledge in order to be presentable as [true] perfections. But since knowledge also does not arise without the accumulation of merit, the plain five [perfections], such as generosity, are implied here. As it is said in *The Precious Garland*: [644]

Due to small merit, about this dharma  
Not even the slightest doubt arises.  
Even the arising of doubt about this  
Will tear existence into shreds.<sup>1484</sup>

## 2. The Identification of Knowledge

This has two parts:

- 1) The proof that the objects to be known—the two realities—are emptiness
- 2) The proof that the knowledge of this is the path

### 2.1. The Proof That the Objects to Be Known— the Two Realities—Are Emptiness

This has four parts:

- 1) The classification of the two realities
- 2) Their definitions
- 3) Establishing the [two realities]
- 4) Removing objections to that

## 2.1.1. The Classification of the Two Realities

**The seeming and the ultimate—**

**These are asserted as the two realities. [2ab]**

The nature of these [two realities] has already been taught extensively in the general topics of the fourth chapter. Still, a brief summary is given here:

That which is to be understood are **the seeming reality and the ultimate reality**: **These** temporary knowable objects are definitely accepted as **the two realities** by the great being Śāntideva himself when he says “**asserted.**”

In this context, [the etymology of “seeming” (literally “all-deceptive”) is as follows:] “All” is a plural and has the meaning of [all phenomena] that appear in various forms. “Deceptive” has the meaning of delusive: This means that since [appearances] are not real in the way that they appear, they are nothing but mere vanities, nullities, and insignificances.

You might wonder, “Why then is the seeming presented as a reality?” This is [done] provisionally for the sake of conventions in order to guide the world. It is presented as a provisional reality, because worldly people cling to [appearances] as being real in just the way that they appear, and also because causes and results appear to perform their functions unmistakably from the perspective of provisional reasoning. It is not a stable reality, [however,] because it does not withstand analysis and because it does not appear as an object of the meditative equipoise of the noble ones.

[The etymology of “ultimate” (literally “supreme object”) is as follows:] It is called “object” because one engages in the fundamental nature in dependence on the seeming, and because it is what is to be strived for. It is “supreme” because it is essential for those who wish for liberation and undeceiving with respect to the result, which is Buddhahood. Thus, it is a term for [such] a common locus.

Through this [etymology], [645] the assertion [of others] that “ultimately real” is a term for a basis of attribution and an attribute is also eliminated.

This [ultimate reality] is what abides as the actual nature of all phenomena. It is the object of the profound meditative equipoise of noble ones. Therefore, it is presented as a stable reality in dependence on the seeming. [However,] it is not [such a stable reality] independently through its nature, because the Buddhas themselves behold neither real nor delusive phenomena.

(The word “and” [in line 2a] is both a term that differentiates “the seeming and the ultimate which is other than that” and a collective term [indicating that] “both of these are equal insofar as they are just realities.”)

## 2.1.2. Their Definitions

**The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.**

**It is said that cognition is the seeming. [2cd]**

You might say, “However, in this dichotomy of the two realities, what is ultimate reality and what is seeming reality?”

[The first one] is that for which it does not matter whether Buddhas have arrived or not; it is what could not be contrived even by the Buddha. He taught:

Even I did not behold it, do not behold it, and will not behold it.

Thus, the native nature of all phenomena was not, is not, and cannot become the sphere of the consciousnesses of any ordinary beings, noble ones, learners, or nonlearners whatsoever, be they conceptual or nonconceptual [consciousnesses], perceptions, or inferential cognitions. For this expanse of dharmas just as it is, the conventional term “ultimate reality” is used.

You might object, “What do you mean? If it is not an object of any consciousness whatsoever, one is not even able to focus on it. Therefore, how can it at the same time be presented as the ultimate?” In general, in all this labeling with conventional terms, it is not the case that the direct observer of a given phenomenon is doing the labeling. [For example,] when one labels [something] with the conventional term “blue utpala,”<sup>1485</sup> the observer of that is a [visual] sense consciousness. But this [consciousness itself] does not conceive of the attribute that is the name “utpala” or the attribute “blue color,” [646] because it is nothing but mere direct and nonconceptual experiencing.

That which labels with conventional terms is a subsequent apprehending conception of this [direct experience]. This [involves] the presumption that the preceding nonconceptual sense consciousness—the [actual] experiencer—is the apprehending conception itself. By apprehending the object—the mere utpala [flower]—as something else, the [subsequent conception] conceives of it as name and color while presuming, “I see this.” [This] is like a carpenter who presumes, “I have made this” with respect to a clay pot that was made by a potter.

Also, when one thoroughly analyzes a continuum on the seeming level, [one finds that] the utpala at the time when it is seen and the utpala at the time when it is [conceptually] apprehended are different entities. Furthermore, the sense consciousness that experiences it and the apprehending conception are different entities [as well]. They are just like a stream of water. If perception does not conceive of the object and conception does not experience it, which consciousness focuses on what kind of utpala? [This is the point here,] because, if one analyzes, this is nothing but seeing utter mistakenness.



For example, when one [mentally] analyzes the Brahmā world, [such an investigation] is nothing but an analysis through imagining [this world within] one's own cognition that thinks, "The Brahmā world is something like this." [Thus,] this [cognition] possesses the aspect of an object generality in the form of the Brahmā world. However, through that, the Brahmā world does not come here, and neither does the analyst go to the Brahmā world. Hence, this [type of analysis] mistakes the analysis of one's own mind through one's own mind for [an actual analysis when one directly faces the Brahmā world and thus may say,] "I analyze the Brahmā world." Consequently, [even] focusing on the ultimate is also nothing but this kind of [mistakenness]. Therefore, **the ultimate is definitely not the sphere of cognition.**

You might say, "However, since the seeming is also nothing different, it is not the sphere of cognition." [Ultimately,] this is very true indeed. Therefore, it is definitely stated that all phenomena have one single reality and that just this that is called "real" or "delusive" is not observed. Nevertheless, in order for naïve beings to be able to leave their fear behind, the provisional presentation of subject and object [647] is [given as] something that leaves the status quo of mere common worldly consensus as it is. Thus, naïve beings are guided by using the conventional term "seeming reality."

You might wonder, "Why is the ultimate not the sphere of cognition?" Because **it is asserted that cognition**, or consciousness, **is the very seeming** and it is impossible for the seeming to take the ultimate as its object.

[You continue,] "Through what is it certain that the ultimate is not an object of cognition?" This is certain through the reasoning of the inconceivable nature of phenomena. When the great noble ones settle in meditative equipoise within the expanse of dharmas, then this becomes all the more subtle and inconceivable the more they settle [within it]. This is so for the following reasons: That very something that is settled in meditative equipoise and the one who settles it will subside, while one is not able to realize a limit of the expanse of dharmas. Even the Thus-Gone Ones do not state any extent of the expanse of dharmas.

Thus, it is seen that the expanse of dharmas is not an object of speech, reflection, or expression. It is for just this [type of seeing] that the conventional terms "penetrating the nature of phenomena" and "beholding ultimate reality" are used. The conventional term "personally experienced wisdom" is then used for the very knowledge that does not observe the characteristics of discursiveness in terms of subject and object. Thus, the nature of phenomena is not seen through apprehending a subject and an object. Rather, if one knows that subject and object are not observable, one engages in the nature of phenomena. Therefore, [the expression] "personally experienced wisdom realizes the nature of phenomena" is a conventional term that is used based on something else. However, in no way does this abide in the mode of subject, object, something to be realized, and a realizer in

the way that these are imputed by cognition. Subject, object, something to be realized, and a realizer are merely entities that are based on superimposition; they are never entities that exist in this way through a nature of their own.

### 2.1.3. Establishing the Two Realities

Thus, two kinds of world are seen:

The one of yogins and the one of common people. [648]

Here, the world of common people

Is invalidated by the world of yogins. [3]

Also the yogins, due to differences in insight,

Are overruled by successively superior ones [4ab]

You might object, “Of course, the seeing of ordinary beings is not ultimate. Nevertheless, since the ultimate is the direct object of the noble ones, it is reasonable that the vision of the noble ones is ultimate.” In order to teach the answer to that, [the text says]: **Thus, in the world, two kinds of the seeming are seen: the seeing of common worldly people and the seeing of yogins** who have entered the [Buddhist] path.

Here, common worldly people are of two [kinds]: average individuals who are not engaged in philosophical systems and non-Buddhists who are engaged in philosophical systems. As for yogins, there are many types, classified by the proponents of the four [Buddhist] philosophical systems, the five paths, and the ten grounds on [the paths of] seeing and meditation.

For [all of] them, [it is true] that the seeing of the respective former ones is invalidated by the reasonings of the respective following ones. This is the case for the following reasons: The assertions of individuals who are not engaged in philosophical systems are invalidated by the reasonings of those non-Buddhists who are engaged in philosophical systems, that is, those non-Buddhists who are trained in linguistics and valid cognition and who regard the others as just like cattle. [On the other hand,] the [Buddhist] seers take people who cling to assertions as their objects of compassion.

**Here, common people** may be engaged in philosophical systems or not, but they all cling to the five aggregates as being clean, an identity, blissful, and permanent. **Their world is invalidated by the world of the Buddhist yogins** who are the Followers of the Great Exposition, that is, through their reasonings of the seeming level that demonstrate that [the aggregates] are unclean, identityless, suffering, and impermanent.

**Also, as for the yogins themselves, due to the great differences in higher or lower insight** that exist [among them]—such as having purified their continua

or not, or being of sharp or weak faculties—the assertions of the respectively inferior ones are **overruled** by the reasonings of **successively superior ones**. [649] [As a consequence, the former] are not able to give answers that are concordant with the dharma.

The assertion of the Followers of the Great Exposition that object and consciousness [actually] meet is invalidated by the Sūtra Followers' reasoning that negates the lack of an aspect. The assertion of both the Followers of the Great Exposition and the Sūtra Followers that specifically characterized referents and consciousnesses are substantially established is invalidated by the Mere Mentalists' reasoning that refutes outer objects. The assertion of the Mere Mentalists that mind is real is invalidated by the Centrists' [reasonings of] "freedom from unity and multiplicity" and "the negation of arising from the four possibilities."

Surely the emptiness of the Centrists is not deliberately hit by invalidations through reasoning. Nevertheless, during the phase of engagement through devoted interest with [its stages of] heat, peak, patience, and supreme [phenomenon] and during direct engagement in this [emptiness] on the ten grounds, the presumptions that any previous seeing [of emptiness] was perfect become just like games of little children when the respectively following [kinds of seeing] are attained. Even the manner in which someone on the tenth ground beholds [emptiness] does not remain on the ground of a Buddha. Therefore, [emptiness] is not an object of the cognitions of hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas. Due to the complete change of state of the five aggregates, the Thus-Gone Ones do not have any flux of discriminations. Hence, [emptiness] is also not an object of [something like the] cognition of Buddhas, because they do not have [such a thing as] cognition.

You might say, "It is an object of the knowledge [of a Buddha]." Since true, perfect enlightenment of all phenomena in every way has been found, no other object that is something to be known is left over. Furthermore, since such a knowledge without something to be known is untenable, ultimately, Buddhas do not have anything called "knowing" or "not knowing" at all.

#### 2.1.4. Removing Objections

This has two parts:

- 1) The brief introduction
- 2) The detailed explanation

##### 2.1.4.1. The Brief Introduction

Through examples that are asserted by both,  
While not analyzing what serves the result. [4cd]

In the way that worldly people see things,  
 They conceive them as facts  
 But not as illusionlike.  
 Herein lies the dispute between yogins and worldly people. [5]

[650] You might argue, “However, if all cognitions were mistaken, consciousnesses that apprehend form and such would be completely nonexistent, since mistakenness is something nonexistent itself. If this were the case, it would be impossible for forms, sounds, and such to appear.”

Forms, sounds, and such as well as the cognitions that apprehend them are not entities that appear due to the fact that they exist. Rather, they are solely entities that appear through the delusive appearance of dependently originating collections and do not [really] exist. This is the case because one is able to illustrate it **through examples**, such as illusions and dreams, **that are unanimously asserted** as entities that appear while not existing **by both** common people and yogins, or proponents and opponents.

Again, you might say, “If all cognitions were mistaken, then even the five perfections, such as the mental state of generosity, would not be the path.” They represent the cause—the accumulation of merit—from which **the result**—the accumulation of wisdom—arises. Since Buddhahood is attained due to these [two accumulations], for the time being, **while not analyzing** whether they are real, delusive, existent, or nonexistent, one engages in them by means of the mere correct seeming, **which serves** to attain this state [of Buddhahood]. Thus, there is no mistake here.

In brief, **worldly people**—whether they are engaged in philosophical systems or not—think, “**Things**, such as forms, are real **in just this way that we see them**.” Thus, **these** [people] **conceive** mere appearances and experiences **as facts, but do not understand them** as entities that do not withstand analysis nor **as illusionlike** [phenomena] that appear but are without nature. **Here, in this explanation** that [things] are illusionlike, **the dispute between yogins and worldly people** has its start. As [the sūtras] state:

Sentient beings like abodes and wish for objects.  
 To abide in grasping and be foolishly ignorant without any skill is like  
 darkness.  
 The dharma to be attained is without abiding and without grasping.  
 Therefore, dispute happens in the worlds.

and

The world disputes with me, but I [651] do not dispute with the world.

#### 2.1.4.2. The Detailed Explanation

This has eight parts:

(Teaching the six [points] that remove objections about the seeming)

- 1) Removing contradictions to valid cognition
- 2) Removing contradictions to scripture
- 3) Removing the consequence that no merit would come about by offering to the Buddha
- 4) Removing the consequence that sentient beings would not be reborn after death
- 5) Removing the consequence that no negativity would occur from killing
- 6) Removing the consequence that even the Buddha would circle again [in cyclic existence]

([Teaching] the two [points] that remove objections about the ultimate)

- 7) Removing the consequence that an illusion would not exist even on the seeming level
- 8) Removing the consequence that there would be no support for talking [about cyclic existence]

##### 2.1.4.2.1. Removing Contradictions to Valid Cognition

**Also perceptions of forms and such**

**Are based on common consensus and not on valid cognition.**

**This is delusive, just as the common consensus**

**That something unclean is clean and so on. [6]**

You might think, “Forms, sounds, and such factually exist, because they are directly experienced.” **Also perceptions of seeing forms and such are** nothing but the arising of cognitions that [perceive] these [objects], which is [in itself entirely] **based on** mere **common** worldly **consensus**. This means that such [perception] is [just something that comes from our] habituation through clinging to successive chains [of events] **and not** something that is established through **valid cognition**. This is like the following: Because of one’s habituation to latent tendencies of apprehending water, clinging to water arises even when one sees an illusory river. Also *The Sūtra of the King of Meditative Concentration* says:

Neither the eye, the ear, nor the nose is valid cognition,

Nor is the tongue, the body, or mental cognition valid cognition.

If these sense faculties were valid cognition,

Whom would the path of noble ones do any good?<sup>1486</sup>

In *The Great Commentary*, one finds the following quotation [from Nāgārjuna's *Praise to the Inconceivable*]:

If just this that the sense faculties observe  
Were true reality,  
Naïve beings would be aware of true reality.  
So what would be the point of realizing true reality then?<sup>1487</sup>

Therefore, one grasps at something that [merely] appears while it does not exist [and takes it] to be something that is directly [652] seen. **This is just as the common consensus that an unclean thing**—such as the body, which is the source of feces and urine—**is clean.** The term “**and so on**” includes [other cases of common consensus, for example, the notion that] an impermanent thing like water that flows downward is a permanent water stream. Such is of an unreal and **delusive** nature.

#### 2.1.4.2.2. Removing Contradictions to Scriptsure

For the sake of introducing worldly people,  
The protector taught in terms of entities.  
In actuality, these are not momentary phenomena.  
You might object, “On the seeming level, they are incompatible.” [7]

There is no flaw in that they are the seeming of yogins.  
When compared to worldly people, this refers to seeing true reality.  
Otherwise, the ascertainment  
That women are impure would be invalidated by the world. [8]

The Followers of the Great Exposition and the Sūtra Followers in our own [Buddhist] faction might say, “If forms and such were not existing, that would contradict the Buddha's statement that conditioned phenomena are momentary.” **For the sake of introducing worldly people to true reality, the protector merely taught in terms of entities** in order to counteract coarse conceptions of reality:

All conditioned phenomena are momentary. You should not rely on them.

However, this is not a statement that [phenomena] are established as something momentary. For example, it is like when one says, “This is illusory water.” This points out that [what appears] is illusory, yet it does not point out that [this appearance] is established as water. *The Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning* says:

It was for a purpose  
That the Victors spoke of “I” and “mine.”  
Likewise, they talked about aggregates, sources,  
And elements for a purpose.<sup>1488</sup>

Therefore, **these** [entities] are not [phenomena] to which one could cling as being momentary phenomena **in actuality**, because, if analyzed, they **are not** established as **momentary phenomena** either.

**You might object**, “However, if momentary phenomena are not the ultimate, it is even more **incompatible** to present **them on the seeming level**, since the seeming is just how [things] appear for the world, and momentary phenomena are not what appears for the world. Thus, it follows that either they are not included in the two realities [653] or they are a third reality.” Although momentary phenomena are not the seeming of worldly people, **they are the seeming of yogins**. Thus, **there is no flaw**.

You might say, “This contradicts the Buddha’s statement that seeing momentary phenomena is seeing reality.” It is not contradictory, because it is stated that, **when compared to the seeming of worldly people, this refers to seeing the true reality** of these [phenomena].

You might say, “It is unjustified to present the seeming of yogins.” Yet it is justified, because if it were not presented [as the seeming of yogins], **the ascertainment** and vision **that women are impure** and [nothing but] skeletons—which is what yogins [see] who are familiar with [the meditation on the body’s] repulsiveness—would have to be presented as the seeming of worldly people. However, in this case, the [yogic understanding] **would be invalidated** by common worldly consensus, that is, **by the world** that apprehends bathed women as pure and beautiful.<sup>1489</sup>

#### 2.1.4.2.3. Removing the Consequence That No Merit Would Come About by Offering to the Buddha

Merit in relation to illusionlike Victors  
Is just the same as in the case of real entities.<sup>1490</sup> [9ab]

You might say, “However, it follows then that offering to the Buddhas would not constitute any merit, because the Buddhas are like an illusion.” Illusionlike **merit** is obtained **in relation to** making offerings to **illusionlike Victors**. This is **just the same as in the case** when you proponents of [outer] referents assert that through offering to Buddhas who are real **entities**, one obtains some merit that is a real entity.

2.1.4.2.4. Removing the Consequence That Sentient Beings  
Would Not Be Reborn after Death

You might wonder, “If sentient beings are illusionlike,  
How can they be reborn after death?” [9cd]

For as long as the conditions are assembled,  
For that long even an illusion will manifest.  
How should sentient beings be really existent  
Merely because their continua last for a longer time? [10]

You might wonder, “If sentient beings are also something illusionlike, how can they be reborn after death?” There is no mistake: **For as long** [654] **as the conditions** for an illusion—[such as certain] mantras and performances<sup>1491</sup>—**are assembled, for that long even an illusion will manifest.** Likewise, for as long as the causes and conditions—such as basic unawareness—are assembled, for that long illusionlike sentient beings will manifest.

You might think, “Since an illusion is something adventitious, it is unreal. But since sentient beings have come [a long way] from beginningless [time], they are real.” **How should sentient beings be really existent** in any way **merely because** they appear **for a longer time?** [They are not any more real,] for whether dreams and illusions appear for such [a long time] as eighty thousand eons or just for one single moment, their duration does not make a difference in terms of their being real or delusive.

2.1.4.2.5. Removing the Consequence That No Negativity  
Would Occur from Killing

When illusory beings and such are killed,  
There is no negativity, because they do not have minds.  
Merit and negativity originate  
With those who possess the illusion of a mind. [11]

Since mantras and such do not have the potential,  
They do not manifest illusory minds.  
Having manifested from manifold conditions,  
Illusions are manifold too. [12]

Nowhere is there a single condition  
That has the potential for everything. [13ab]



You might say, “However, then it follows that there would be no negativity even if one has killed sentient beings, because sentient beings are something illusionlike and there is no negativity in having killed an illusory individual.” There is no mistake: **When illusory beings and such**—that is, mechanical beings or magical creations—**are killed, there is certainly no negativity**, even when [it looks as if] they have been killed, **because they do not have minds**. However, it is not like that with sentient beings, because they are illusory beings **who possess illusory minds**. Therefore, **merit and negativity originate** from benefiting and harming **those who possess the illusion of a mind**.

You might wonder, “However, what is the reason that illusory minds do not originate in illusory beings?” **Since mantras and such** that are [used] for [creating] illusions [655] do have the potential to produce illusory shapes of horses, elephants, and such, but **do not have the potential** to produce illusory minds, **they do not manifest illusory minds** in these [illusions].

You might disagree, “If they have the potential to magically create illusory human beings, they should also have the potential to magically create minds.” **Having manifested from manifold distinct conditions**, accordingly, **illusions are manifold** and distinct **too**. This is just like the conditions that produce horses and elephants, which do not, however, [produce] a palace and such; or, the conditions that produce a palace, which do not, however, [produce] horses and elephants. Therefore, **nowhere** and at no time is **there** such a **single condition** that has the potential for producing everything.

#### 2.1.4.2.6. Removing the Consequence That Even the Buddha Would Circle Again in Cyclic Existence

“If those who have ultimately passed beyond it  
Still circle in cyclic existence on the seeming level, [13cd]

Then even Buddhas would circle in it.  
Therefore, what is the point of bodhisattva conduct?”  
If the continuum of its conditions is not interrupted,  
Even an illusion will not cease. [14]

However, if the continuum of conditions is interrupted,  
It will not manifest even on the seeming level. [15ab]

You might say, “However, if the obscurations were nonexistent by their nature, one would always have been enlightened [already]. If this were the case, cyclic existence would not be possible.” We answer: It is not contradictory that what

has primordially been pure still appears as cyclic existence on the seeming level under the influence of not realizing it as just this [purity].

Then the proponents of [outer] referents might say, “If it is not contradictory that **those who have ultimately passed beyond cyclic existence still** appear to **circle in it on the seeming level**, then one would have to **circle in** cyclic existence again **even** after **Buddhahood** [is attained], since [your] very reasoning equally applies [to this case too]. **Therefore, what is the point of bodhisattva conduct?**”

Here we say: There is no difference between Buddhas and sentient beings in terms of being pure by nature. However, on the seeming level, there is a difference as to whether they circle in cyclic existence or not. This is the case because in Buddhas the continuum of conditions for cyclic existence—such as basic unawareness, craving, and grasping—has been [permanently] interrupted, whereas in sentient beings [656] the continuum of these [conditions] has not been interrupted. Therefore, this is the same as [with illusions]: **If the continuum of its conditions is not interrupted, even an illusion will not cease. However, if the continuum of conditions for an illusion is interrupted, the illusion will not manifest even on the seeming level.**

#### 2.1.4.2.7. Removing the Consequence That an Illusion Would Not Exist Even on the Seeming Level

“When even mistakenness does not exist,  
What would observe the illusion?” [15cd]

[657] These two lines present the objection that it follows that an illusion is not observed unless mistakenness exists.<sup>1492</sup>

The Proponents of Cognizance argue, “Although it is certainly true that outer objects are without nature, this explanation of illusions and such by you Centrists as examples that are held in common by both debaters does not apply to yourselves: **When** you claim that **even mistakenness does not exist**, **what would observe the very illusion?** That is, where should the illusion exist, if mistakenness does not exist?”

**When, according to you, the illusion itself does not exist,  
What is observed?** [16ab]

These two lines express the equal applicability of this [reasoning].

We answer you Mere Mentalists: **When, according to you, even the illusion itself does not exist**, **what** example of an illusion **is observed**, since you yourselves assert that outer objects do not exist? Thus, the entailment [of your objection in lines 15cd] [658] applies equally [to your own position].<sup>1493</sup>

You might say, “It is an aspect of mind itself,  
Even though there is something other in terms of its own  
state.” [16cd]

These two lines present the assertion of the Real Aspectarians.<sup>1494</sup>

The Real Aspectarians **might say**, “Illusions and such do not exist as outer objects. However, **there is something other in terms of the plain own state** of these examples, such as illusions, that is, an aspect that appears as this [illusion]. **It is an aspect** that is [only] real as that for which [the illusion] appears, that is, **mind itself.**”

Once mind itself is the illusion,  
Then what is seen by what?  
The protector of the world has declared,  
“Mind does not see mind.” [17]

Just as the blade of a sword  
Cannot cut itself, so it is with the mind. [18ab]

These one and a half verses refute self-awareness in general.

If outer objects do not exist, it is contradictory that aspects of outer objects exist. It is certainly the case that this is just as unreasonable as the difference between the nonexistence of the horns of a rabbit and the existence of their aspect. [Moreover,] the mind itself too entails dependence, does not withstand analysis, and is like an illusion, because it was declared that [everything] from form up through omniscience is [that way], and if there existed a phenomenon superior to nirvāṇa, then this [phenomenon] as well would be illusionlike. Therefore, **once even mind itself is illusionlike, then what** object to be seen **is seen by what** seer? [There is no such object,] because there is nothing to be seen other than mind, and mind does not see itself.

This is also established through reasoning, because it is contradictory that a given thing is itself [both] object and agent, and because something to be seen and a seer do not meet in the same place simultaneously when those who are involved in yoga internally examine their own minds. This becomes more profound and subtle in direct proportion to the extent to which it is examined, until finally the very discursiveness of something to be seen and something that sees subsides. This is like when one [tries to] gauge the proportions of the width and the circumference of [the flame of] a butter lamp with a thread, during which the thread itself is burned. Thus, this leaves one unable to determine the size [of the flame].

This is established through scripture too, because **the protector of the world has declared** in *The Sūtra Requested by Crown Jewel*:

Mind does not see mind.<sup>1495</sup>

He stated that, **just as the blade of a sword cannot cut itself, so it is also with the single mind** that [cannot] simultaneously be the triad of the object to be seen, the seer, and the seeing. This is so because he said in [*The Sūtra of*] *the Arrival in Laṅkā*:

Just as a sword and its own blade [659]  
Or just as a finger and its own tip  
Do not cut or touch [themselves],  
Likewise, mind does not see mind.<sup>1496</sup>

If it were just like a lamp  
That perfectly illuminates its own entity, [18cd]

The lamp is nothing to be illuminated,  
Because it is not obscured by darkness.  
“Just like the blue of something like a crystal  
And blueness that does not depend on something other, [19]

Some things are seen to depend on others  
And some to be independent.”  
What is not blue  
Cannot make itself blue by itself. [20]

You might say, “A lamp is said to illuminate  
Once this is known by a consciousness.”  
Upon being known by what do you state  
That cognition is illuminating? [21]

Once this is not seen by anything,  
“Illuminating” and “not illuminating”  
Are like the looks of a barren woman’s daughter—  
Even if described, they are meaningless. [22]

These four and a half verses refute the assertion of self-illumination.

The Proponents of Cognizance might answer to the [above], “**Just like a lamp** is self-illuminating, since itself **perfectly illuminates its entity** of [being a] lamp, the mind too is self-illuminating.” [The refutation of] this is explained as follows: This is an example that does not apply. “Illuminating” means that some form is

illuminated by having ended darkness. This is presented as the conventional expression that a lamp illuminates [something]. But **the lamp** itself does **not** need **to be illuminated**, because the lamp is **not obscured by darkness**. *The Fundamental Verses on Centrism* says:

In a lamp and wherever  
It stands, there is no darkness.  
How does a lamp light up [things]?  
It is something that lights up by eliminating darkness.<sup>1497</sup>

Furthermore, if a lamp were self-illuminating, one would have to assert that it lights up other things too. If that were the case, then darkness would obscure both itself and others:

If a lamp did light up  
Itself and other things,  
Then there is no doubt that also darkness  
Would obscure itself and other things.<sup>1498</sup>

The Proponents of Cognizance might answer, “There is no mistake: **Something like a translucent crystal** is not blue, but it appears to be **blue** through the condition of blue silk being close [to it]. This is [a case of an] illumination that depends on other conditions. **And** [on the other hand, there is] the **blueness** of such things as an utpala [flower] **that does not depend on some other** conditions but is naturally blue. **Just like this, some phenomena are seen to depend on other** conditions, **and some** [are seen] **to be independent** just as they are by their very nature. Therefore, consciousness does not depend on other conditions but is self-illuminating by its very nature.”

The refutation of this is [threefold]:

[Natural] blue is not a concordant example for self-awareness, [66o] because, first, the blue of an utpala has certainly not primordially existed as blue by its very nature. Rather, it has been produced as blue through other causes and conditions, such as the translucence of the elements. However, self-awareness has not been produced as something self-illuminating by causes and conditions. Furthermore, awareness depends on something that it is aware of and something that is aware, while illumination depends on the phase of nonillumination. Therefore, once there are [such] counterparts to depend on, self-illuminating self-awareness is not established due to the mistake of mutually dependent conceptions.<sup>1499</sup> And if there are no counterparts to depend on, it would be even less established than if there were.

[Second, the example of the crystal is also not concordant] because of the fol-

lowing: A crystal may certainly appear blue through such conditions as silk or a colored glass vessel [next to it]. However, this is nothing but seeing the color of the silk or the colored glass vessel in an unobscured way because of the translucence of the crystal, whereas the crystal [itself] did not become blue.

[Third, this example is furthermore not concordant] because, even through these conditions, **what is not blue**—the crystal—cannot be made into a **blue** crystal and the crystal **cannot make itself blue by itself** either.

All of this is certainly true, but we still ask, upon being known by whom it is stated that **the lamp illuminates? You might say**, “Such is said once this [illumination] is known by a consciousness.” However, **upon being known by what do you state that cognition is illuminating?** You will affirm, “This is [known] by self-awareness.” [However, in this case, your reason, which is self-awareness,] which [should] prove [the probandum], is equivalent to the probandum, so prove self-awareness itself!<sup>1500</sup>

**“If self-awareness did not exist,  
How would consciousness be recollected?”  
Recollection comes from the connection with other experiences,  
Just as with the rat’s poison. [23]**

**You might say, “Since it sees through its association with  
other conditions,  
Self-awareness is self-illuminating.”  
Through applying the eye lotion of accomplishment,  
You see the vase and not the eye lotion itself. [24]**

These two verses refute [the attempt to] prove self-awareness.

The Proponents of Cognizance might ask, **“If self-awareness did not exist, how would** a previously experienced **consciousness be recollected** later?” The Centrists say: Such recollection is not due to the existence of self-awareness. At the given time, the arising of a **recollection** that focuses on a previous situation **comes from the** influencing **connection with experiencing other** causes and conditions.<sup>1501</sup> However, this is nothing but mistaking a present experience for a previous situation. However, this [recollection] is not the previous situation itself, because that has already ceased. It is never and nowhere possible that something that has ceased could arise again.

Therefore, [661] this is **just as with** the [following story]: Once upon a time, a snake proudly said [to a rat], “I seize people with powerful poison and make them afraid by doing that, but nobody is afraid of someone like you.” To that, the rat answered, “It is not your poison [that makes them afraid] but just their

thoughts. If you do not believe me, I will show you.” They both sat beside the road. When a man came by, the rat bit his foot without him noticing it, while the snake showed itself to him. This made the man [cry out], “I have been stricken by the poison of a snake.” He fainted and writhed on the ground. Another man came by, and the snake bit him without the man seeing it, while the rat pretended to be the one who had bitten him. Then the man said, “Why would anyone be afraid after being bitten by a rat?” (The [corresponding] thought “Nothing really went wrong at all” is also well known to many people practicing meditative stability.)

When such a recollection has arisen that involves the concern that one has been poisoned, great harm is produced through the notion that the bite of the rat is the [deadly] poison[ous bite] of the snake. On the other hand, when one has the notion that the attack by the snake is [just] **the rat's** [mildly] **poison**[ous bite], there is no harm.<sup>1502</sup> This fits well with the following statement:

For example, through one's anxious assumptions,  
One will faint, although the poison is gone and did not enter inside.

Here, Kalyāṇadeva has explained the meaning of this example in the following way:

This is connected to the question “How will the poison of the rat be recollected?” When in the summertime rats become poisonous and one realizes that they are around, then right after one has been seized by the fangs of a snake, one may not see the snake but sees the harmful changes [caused by its poison] in one's body. Therefore, while there is no poison of a rat, a [seeming] recollection that one has been seized by the poison of that [rat] certainly does happen, whereas the poison of the snake is definitely something other than that. While there are only the wounds or other discomforts, but no consciousness of a rat's poison, still [such] a recollection [arises]. Similar to this, what is expressed as the very absence of self-awareness [662] constitutes the origination of a recollection of consciousness.<sup>1503</sup>

You Proponents of Cognizance **might say**, “**Through its association with other conditions**, such as meditative concentration, **self-illuminating self-awareness** is existent, **since it** [then] **sees** its own knowledge of the minds of others and recollections of previous situations of oneself and others.” Though one may know the minds of others and such, through this one does not see [one's] own mind. The reason is that [this is similar to the following example:] just through seeing forms, the eye does not see the eye itself. It is like this: **Through applying** such

things as a concoction of **the eye lotion of accomplishment**—administering warmth, smoke, and blazing light to the eyes—you see and obtain **the** excellent [treasure] vase, jewels, and such that exist far away below the earth and so forth. However, you do **not** see **the eye lotion itself** that was administered to the eye or the eye itself.<sup>1504</sup>

You might continue, “The very consciousness that recollects previous situations and such is self-illuminating, because it has arisen as something that has the nature to be illuminated through the condition of meditative concentration.” However, then it follows that also the [treasure] vase would be an eye with the eye lotion, because it has arisen as something that has the nature to be illuminated through the condition of the eye. Therefore, [all of] the following are superimpositions: the object of awareness itself, what is aware of it (consciousness), and the way of being aware (apprehension in an illuminating way). Rather, this very consciousness does not exist as something that would rise as all three of these simultaneously.

**How something is seen, heard, or known**

**Is not what is negated here.**

**Rather, the object of refutation**

**Is the cause for suffering, which is the conception of reality. [25]**

This one verse teaches that the object of negation is solely the clinging to reality.

It might be said, “However, when self-awareness does not exist, then awareness of something other is not justified either. Therefore, all experiences of consciousness and all experiences of forms, sounds, and such would not be justified.” The knowledges of **how** they are experienced—such as seeing forms and hearing sounds—are **not what is negated here** in this context of analyzing true reality.<sup>1505</sup>

**Rather, the object of refutation is solely the cause for the suffering** of cyclic existence, **which is the** clinging to the **reality** of such [phenomena] as the consciousnesses that see and hear. [663]

This corresponds to what the Mere Mentalists do when they negate the outer objects [that] the proponents of outer objects [assert]: They do not prove that, as by deaf and blind people, forms are not seen and sounds are not heard, but they solely negate the grasping at forms and sounds as real. Also here, the mere experience of illuminating consciousness is not negated, but the grasping that this is established as the experience of illumination is negated. Therefore, we cannot be rebutted with such [an objection as the one above]. However, if we state the reverse [of your objection] to you Proponents of Cognizance by saying, “When awareness of something other does not exist, then self-awareness would not exist either,” then you lack an answer.



If an illusion is not something other than mind  
And is not conceived as not something other either,  
Then, if it is an entity, how could it not be something other?  
If you say, "It is not something other," [mind] would not  
exist as an entity. [26]

"An illusion is not real, but it can still be seen."  
Well, likewise is the mind that sees. [27ab]

These one and a half verses are the refutation of the assertion of the Non-Aspectarians.<sup>1506</sup>

Furthermore, the Non-Aspectarians state, "It is certainly the case that these mistakes apply to those who assert that the aspect [of mind that appears as an object] is real. However, there is no mistake [in our position], since we assert that also this aspect is delusive like an illusion and that it cannot be expressed as being the mind itself or something other either."

The rebuttal of that is as follows: You assert that **an illusion is not something other than mind** and assert that it **is not something other** than that—that is, it is not the same—**either**. So if you assert that it cannot be expressed as [mind] itself nor as something other, what is left [that would justify] to rebut us by [adducing lines 15cd] "When even mistakenness does not exist . . ." because you yourselves have accepted [then] that an illusion does not exist.

They might say, "We did not accept this, but since it was accepted by others [in this verse], we will [accept] it here." Then you should also accept that all phenomena are without nature, because others accept this.

Well, **then, if** you assert that an illusion **is an entity, how could it not be something other** than mind? In fact, it must be something other than mind. You might say, "Why?" [It is something other] because an illusion depends on being magically created by an illusionist with [certain] substance mantras, whereas consciousness does not depend on an illusionist. **If you** assert, "An illusion **is not something other** than mind," then, since these two are not different, mind **would not exist as an entity**, [664] because illusions [too] do not exist as entities.

Wanting to remove this objection to their [position], they might try, "**An illusion is not real, but** it is the common consensus of the world that **it is still** just something that **can be seen**." Well, that is fine, but you should know that also **the mind that sees** [it] **is not real** as anything—such as self-awareness—and that it is merely in terms of common consensus that it is the seer.

2.1.4.2.8. Removing the Consequence That There Would  
Be No Support [for Talking about Cyclic Existence]

You might say, “Cyclic existence entails an entity as its support.  
Otherwise, it would be just like space.” [27cd]

These two lines present the objection.

You Proponents of Cognizance **might** say, “This **cyclic existence** certainly is a nonentity, because outer objects do not exist. However, it still appears, since it **entails being supported by an entity**, which is self-awareness. **Otherwise**, if this were not the case, **it would be** something without appearance, **just like space**.”

Even if a nonentity is supported by an entity,  
How could it become active?  
Your mind would be isolated  
And completely solitary. [28]

If the mind is free from apprehended objects,  
Everyone is a Thus-Gone One.  
In this case, what qualities are gained  
By conceptualizing it as “merely mind”? [29]

These two verses refute that [objection].

Even if a nonentity is supported by an entity, how could it become active? It is like the horns of a rabbit. No matter what they might be supported by, they will not be able to pierce [anything]. If you accept that, Proponents of Cognizance, it **would** follow that **your mind is isolated** from cyclic existence and a **completely solitary** ultimate [entity], that is, nirvāṇa. And if you accept that, there would be no need to accept an ultimate self-awareness for the sake of its being a support for cyclic existence.

Therefore, **if the mind is free from** all observed or **apprehended objects** to which it clings, it will be seen that **every phenomenon is** not different from the very nature of the **Thus-Gone Ones**. Also, just what is seen will be realized in the manner of nonseeing. [665] You might agree, “It certainly is like this.” **In this case**, what purpose does it have that you emphatically **conceptualize it as “merely mind”** and furthermore as “self-awareness”? It is as purposeless as gauging the size of space through clinging to it, although one has [already] understood that space has no limit.

[Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

With respect to these [verses up to now, master Dharmapāla] from Suvarṇadvīpa has taught that the whole chapter on knowledge is summarized in the following three and a half verses that can be found in both of his [summaries of *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, entitled] *A Summary in Thirty-Six Points* and *A Summary in Eleven Points*.<sup>1507</sup>

Thus, all of these  
Were stated by the Sage for the sake of knowledge.  
Therefore, those who wish for nirvāṇa  
And bliss should develop knowledge.

The ultimate and the seeming  
Are asserted as the two realities.  
The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.  
Cognition and terms are the seeming.

So the world is seen in the two fashions  
Of yogins and common people.  
Here, through the world of yogins,  
The world of common people is refuted.

Through the differences of respectively superior ones,  
Yogins are refuted too.

*The Great Commentary on the Difficult Points* ascertains the nature of knowledge:

Thus, the very nonexistence of a nature is the fundamental state of entities. It does not abide through the nature of the ultimate. Just that is expressed as the supreme and especially noble purpose of individuals. [However,] one should not firmly cling to this either. Otherwise, there is not the slightest difference between firmly clinging to entities and firmly clinging to emptiness, because both [types of clinging] are obscurations that have the character of an imputation. There is not even the slightest self-nature [that is established] through the nature of an imputation in the sense of nonexistence, nor is “nonentity” the reverse of “entity,” because a reverse is without nature.

Therefore, there is not the slightest nature of “real entity” [666] that could be called “nonentity.” Through stating “entity” and “nonentity”

in this order, they are [both] taught to be nonexistent. Thus, neither is there something that has the character of both being mixed, nor is there any nature of the negation of both. Since this very conception of [real] entities is the cause of all conceptions, by negating the one [conception of entities], all these [other conceptions] are eliminated through a single negation. Therefore, something existent, something nonexistent, something that is both existent and nonexistent, and also something that has the character of neither—none of these should be conceived of as an object of clinging even in the slightest way.<sup>1508</sup>

[In this context, the commentary] presents [several] quotes:

As the *Prajñāpāramitā* [*Sūtras*] say:

Venerable Śāriputra, here the correct understanding of “form is empty” by a son or a daughter of the noble family of those who belong to the vehicle of bodhisattvas but are not skillful in means is [just a type of] clinging.<sup>1509</sup>

This is to be applied to [everything] up through [the category of] phenomena.

[*The Praise to the Supramundane*] says:

In order to relinquish all imagination,  
You taught the nectar of emptiness.  
However, those who cling to it  
Are also blamed by you.<sup>1510</sup>

[Bhāvaviveka’s *Heart of Centrism* states]:

Its character is neither existent, nor nonexistent,  
Nor [both] existent and nonexistent, nor neither.  
Centrists should know true reality  
That is free from these four possibilities.<sup>1511</sup>

As for the presentation of the two realities, [*The Great Commentary*] says:

Here, seeming reality is the nature of worldly unmistakeness. In terms of ultimate reality, reality is what is undeceiving. True reality is the [reality] of the noble ones. This is the difference. . . . All these entities perfectly arise through bearing two natures: the seeming and the ulti-

mate. The first [nature] is the clinging of those whose eyes are obscured by the blurred vision of basic unawareness. These ordinary beings who [see] that which bears the character of falsity [cling to the fact] that precisely their delusive seeing of objects is the correct seeing. The other [nature] is [667] the object of those who are endowed with the eyes of perfect knowledge [that result] from the elimination of the membrane of basic unawareness with the ophthalmological scalpel of complete distinction. This is [the object] of the perfect knowledge of the noble ones who are aware of true reality. Thus, it is presented as the [actual] nature.<sup>1512</sup>

Thus, [this commentary] explains the seeing of naïve beings as the seeming and the seeing of the noble ones as the ultimate. [It continues:]

You might say, “That may well be the case. However, since the seeming is displayed through basic unawareness, it is of the nature of a false superimposition. Hence, if it disintegrates hundreds of times due to thorough analysis, how could it be a reality?” You are absolutely right. However, it is [only] due to the clinging of worldly people that such is expressed as “seeming reality.” It is just worldly people who assert a “seeming reality.” In compliance with this, [whenever] the Blessed One spoke about the “seeming reality,” he did so by setting aside true reality. This is why master [Nāgārjuna] in his treatise [called *The Fundamental Verses on Centrism*] said:

Worldly seeming reality . . . <sup>1513</sup>

Actually, there is just a single [reality], which is ultimate reality. Thus, there is not even the slightest fallacy [here]. The Blessed One said:

Oh fully ordained monks, this ultimate reality is single. It is as follows: Nirvāṇa has the property of being undeceiving, whereas all formations have the property of being delusive and deceiving.<sup>1514</sup>

As for the way in which [ultimate reality] is not the sphere of cognition, [*The Great Commentary*] says:

The gist of this is: “Cognition” refers to all consciousnesses. Since [ultimate reality] is beyond the objects of all consciousnesses, it is not [their] sphere; that is, it is not an object [at all]. No aspect whatsoever

of all these cognitions is able to take this [ultimate reality] as its object. So how could they show its nature as it is? Thus, it is the nature of complete release from all discursiveness, suchness, the true reality that is ultimate reality. Therefore, it is not seen by conceptions in any fashion whatsoever, [668] because it is free from all distinctive features.<sup>1515</sup>

Thus, it is explained that [ultimate reality] is primarily not an object of conception.

Furthermore, as for [verse 6,] “Also perceptions of forms and such are based on common consensus and not on valid cognition,” [*The Great Commentary*] says:

These words were spoken by people who dedicatedly work on refutations for the perspective of the seeing of those with blurred vision. Although they have expressed these statements in such a way, [actually] there are no negations or proofs that have been carried out. . . . Thus, the ultimate is not an object of expression. However, it is taught in correspondence with the seeming by using imputations in a way [that is informed] through seeing ultimate true reality. On the other hand, through relinquishing all conventional terms without exception, one is not able to speak about the nature of entities. As it is said [in *The Sūtra of the King of Meditative Concentration*]:

As for the dharmas without letters,  
What listener and what teacher would there be?  
The meaning<sup>1516</sup> that is listened to and taught is superimposed.  
Therefore, it is without letters.

Thus, by relying on these two conventional realities, the ultimate is taught. To realize the teaching about the ultimate is to reveal the ultimate, because this very [teaching] is the means for the [realization of the ultimate].<sup>1517</sup>

[*The Great Commentary*] quotes *The Sūtra of Engaging in the Two Realities*:

Devaputra, if ultimate reality ultimately were the sphere of body, speech, and mind,<sup>1518</sup> it would not fall into the category of “ultimate reality.” It would be nothing but just seeming reality.

Because of precisely this, [the ultimate] is not an object of conceptions. Entity and nonentity, self-entity and other-entity, real and

unreal, permanence and annihilation, permanence and impermanence, happiness and suffering, clean and unclean, identity and identitylessness, empty and not empty, one and many, arising and ceasing—all such distinctive features are not possible as the true reality, because they are seeming phenomena.<sup>1519</sup>

I see these detailed elucidations [from *The Great Commentary*] as objects for paying my respects.

As for the poison of the rat and so on [in line 23d], *The Great Commentary* says:

It is like the poison of the rat that strikes the body instantaneously and becomes active later due to the condition of thunder.<sup>1520</sup> [669] Therefore, one is not aware of a self-aware consciousness in even the slightest way. [Nāgārjuna's *Commentary on the Mind of Enlightenment* says:]

A mind with the aspects of what is to be realized and what realizes  
Is not seen by the Thus-Gone Ones.  
In whomever there is realization and realizer,  
There is no mind of enlightenment.<sup>1521</sup>

Thus, because all conceptions have vanished in this way, release from every obscuration arises.<sup>1522</sup>

[In] Vibhūticandra's [commentary,] the following statement [about line 2c] appears:

The ultimate is not even the sphere of omniscient wisdom. The vajralike meditative concentration that focuses on the ultimate that is [both] naturally [pure] and pure of adventitious stains is Buddhahood. In it, not even a fraction of an aspect exists.<sup>1523</sup>

However, the vajralike meditative concentration is not Buddhahood, because it is what vanquishes the obscurations of the continuum of the tenth ground, and [only the state] thereafter is presented as Buddhahood. This [vajralike meditative concentration] is also not the phase in which all phenomena are presented as the nature of Buddhahood.

Furthermore, [concerning the example of the illusionist,] he says:

The people [in the audience] see nothing but the manner in which these magically created elephants and so on [appear], whereas the magician sees [them] as just wood and such.<sup>1524</sup>

[However, this explanation] is not appropriate, because if a magician were to see [his magical creations] as [just] wood, the [opponent's] answer in the [later] debate [in lines 30cd]

Attachment for an illusory woman  
Might arise even in her very creator

would become meaningless.

About killing illusory human beings [in lines 11ab], he says:

The actual part of taking life does not occur, because [illusory human beings] do not have any life. [However,] the negativity of beating them, which leads to [this killing], does happen.<sup>1525</sup>

[This phrase] is not nice, because it is a joke that there should be no negativity through killing whereas there is negativity through beating. Some might still argue, "This is due to the wish to beat." Well, then why should the wish to kill not produce negativity?

Therefore, if one kills [illusory beings] with the knowledge that an illusion is an illusion, since there is no motivation in terms of the wish to kill that really qualifies as such [a wish to kill], there is no negativity. However, if one beats or kills [illusory beings] while clinging to autonomous continua [of theirs], although there certainly is no beating or killing of anybody at all, still, through the intention of killing and the intention of beating, one produces negativities that come from hatred. [670] This is the case because it is equal to the statement that one produces negativity if one awakes while one is killing [someone] in a dream and then rejoices [in this killing]. Therefore, the implication in [verse 11] "When illusory beings and such are killed . . ." is that one knows that these are illusions.

Concerning [lines 23cd] "Recollection comes from . . .," [Vibhūticandra] states:

[The example of] the rat here [refers] to applying [remedial] arsenic [to the rat bite]: The poison of the rat that has spread previously throughout the body through the wound of the bite will become active later at the time when thunder resounds. Thus, [the poison] was not active at the time of the bite but became active at another time. Likewise, consciousness is not experienced at the time of experiencing the object but is recollected at some other time.<sup>1526</sup>

With respect to [verse 25] "How something is seen, heard, or known . . .," he says:



I ask you, “Are you saying that seeing and hearing do not exist ultimately, or are you saying that they do not exist on the seeming level?” If the first is the case, I accept, because everything seeming does not exist within this [ultimate]. If the latter is the case, it is not established: [This here] is not a negation of what is seen, heard, and known. Rather, just leave these [as they are] without analyzing them—they are not ultimate. As it is said:

The Sage did not state  
That seeing, hearing, and such are real or delusive.  
Because one side has an opposite side,  
These two do not exist ultimately.<sup>1527</sup>

With respect to [verse 26], “If an illusion is not something other than mind, . . .” he asks:

Is an illusion something other than mind, not something other, both,  
or neither—which of these four possibilities is it?<sup>1528</sup>

He then [answers in the following vein]: [An illusion] is not something other than mind, because [the Mere Mentalists themselves] assert that it is established as mere mind. If it were something other, the illusion would be nonexistent, because they assert that there are no phenomena apart from mind. It is not both, since that is [internally] contradictory. So they might say, “It is neither.” [However,] if one [possibility out of the two dichotomous possibilities of] being something other or not being something other does not apply, then one cannot reject the other [possibility either, because there is no third option in a dichotomy]. Therefore, it is impossible that [an illusion] is this fourth possibility [of being neither].

On [lines 27cd–29ab] “You might say, ‘Cyclic existence . . . ,’” he comments as follows:

If cyclic existence were mind, it follows that it would be what is purified, since the mind is naturally luminous. If it were not mind, your own philosophical system collapses, since you then accept an entity that is not mind. If cyclic existence were a nonentity, it would not perform a function. Or, [671] since it then would be without nature, you would enter the philosophical system of Centrists. . . . If you say that mind alone is the ultimate, you must assert that it is free from apprehended and apprehender. If this is the case, it follows that all sentient beings are Buddhas.<sup>1529</sup>

*The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points*<sup>1530</sup> comments:

[As for lines 2cd:] Not to be the sphere of cognition is the expression for being free from all defining characteristics. The reason for this is: If there were any defining characteristics, they would necessarily be the sphere of the mental state of omniscience. [However, omniscience does not see any defining characteristics.]

A knower of entities and nonentities  
Is not even seen by the All-Knowing One.  
What kind of entity  
Would be analyzed by the view of utter peace?

Therefore, the definition of the ultimate is freedom from all [kinds of] nature, because it is expressed as the very nonexistence of defining characteristics. For example, it is like [saying], “Is the very freedom from qualities not the quality of [phenomena]?” To say “all objects of cognition” is regarded as stating the definition of seeming reality.

[Line 3b:] “Yogins” start with those who are stream-enterers and so on, and include solitary realizers, bodhisattvas on the ten grounds, and Buddhas. “Common people” are the followers of Kapila, Akṣapāda,<sup>1531</sup> and so forth.

[Lines 7–8ab:] You might object, “This contradicts the statement that momentariness and identitylessness are the ultimate.” [They are taught] “for the sake of introducing worldly people . . .” You might ask, “Do you not accept that those who are called yogins see true reality? How could momentariness and such that they see be the seeming? Then it follows that they do not see true reality.” When compared to the world, they see true reality. Those who are superior to ordinary people belong to the ranks of yogins.

[Lines 13cd–15ab:] You might say, “It follows that it is possible that even the Buddha circles [in cyclic existence], because natural purity and the existence of adventitious stains are not contradictory, just as this is the case in the impure phase [of sentient beings].” In terms of natural purity, there is no difference between Buddhas and sentient beings. However, on the seeming level, they are distinguished by having the causes for cyclic existence or not.

[Lines 23cd:] Though one did not feel any sign that the poison of the rat had entered the body, due to seeing its results, one remembers, “The poison of the rat has entered me.” [672] Likewise, though one does not experience consciousness itself, through seeing the object connected to it, one will remember, “A consciousness has arisen in me.”

[Verse 24:] You might wonder, “If one knows the mind of a distant individual, why should one not be aware of one’s own mind, which is so close? If one sees a distant needle, why should one not see a vase close by?” If one sees the treasure vase through putting the eye lotion onto [one’s eyes], why does one not see the eye lotion itself?

[Lines 27cd–28ab:] This is like [the fact that] one cannot prove that the horns of a rabbit pierce [something] through being supported by a vase.

[Lines 28cd–29:] Since [mind in] cyclic existence were then free from the counterpart of the seeming, ultimate nirvāṇa would be singular. If this were the case, it follows that one would attain liberation without effort. If it were like this, despite your claim of self-awareness as the support for cyclic existence, [self-awareness] would not be able to create cyclic existence. Hence, it would be without purpose to claim ultimate self-awareness.

*The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Knowledge Chapter* states:

The poison of the rat has entered [the body] at one time, but its potency awakens at another time. Likewise, self-awareness does not exist even in the slightest.<sup>1532</sup>

*The Synopsis of Good Explanations*<sup>1533</sup> points out [knowledge]:

In terms of the support, [there are] two sufferings: physical and mental [sufferings]. In terms of nature, [there are] three: the suffering of suffering, [the suffering of] change, and the suffering of conditioned existence. In terms of time, [there are] three: the suffering of the visible phenomena [of this life], [the suffering] in the next [life], and suffering in the long term. Having thus identified the factor to be relinquished—suffering—one eliminates the harms of this life and lower migrations through the knowledge that knows action and result.

The suffering of conditioned existence is relinquished through the knowledge that realizes the ultimate for the following reason: Contaminated actions arise from afflictions, and these arise from reification. As the opposite [of reification], the knowledge that realizes the lack of a nature vanquishes [reification] at the root.

It quotes [Nāgārjuna's] *Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning*:

If there is the claim of entities,  
The sources of desire and hatred—  
Improper bad views—are grasped  
And dispute will arise from this.

By taking any standpoint whatsoever,  
You will be snatched by the cunning snakes of the afflictions.  
Those whose minds have no standpoint [673]  
Will not be caught.<sup>1534</sup>

[and continues:]

At the time of preparation, one analyzes with reasonings—such as the freedom from unity and multiplicity—and ascertains emptiness through the knowledge of discriminating examination. At the time of meditative equipoise, through a mental state that does not see any object whatsoever, one cultivates a meditative stability that does not conceptualize [emptiness] as anything at all. Having risen from this [meditative equipoise], through being mindful of the lack of nature of appearances, one knows them to be dreamlike. Through this, one should be without attachment or aversion toward the eight [worldly] dharmas.

You might say, “It follows that the ultimate is not an object of meditation, because its nature is not established.” Ultimately, this is accepted. However, on the seeming level, the entailment is not established.<sup>1535</sup> As a nonimplicative negation, the ultimate serves as the remedy for reification. As an implicative negation, it functions as the remedy for discursiveness. Hence, these [two] are not contradictory in the sense of [one of them] not being an object of meditation. [Experiencing] the death of a child in a dream is a wrong consciousness, but it still serves as a remedy for the superimposition of apprehending the existence of this child. Likewise, the illusionlike seeming is a wrong

consciousness, but it still serves as a remedy for some factors to be relinquished. Thus, it is reasonable to meditate [on this seeming]. The result is as follows: Provisionally, one relinquishes one's own afflictions, and, out of compassion, one seizes a completely pure [form of] cyclic existence for the welfare of others. Finally, through being familiar with the lack of a nature, one attains the Dharma Body in which all mistakenness has become extinguished. Through the impetus of compassion and aspiration prayers, one attains the Form Bodies for the welfare of others.

[As for line 2c:] The ultimate is a knowable object in terms of negative determination. However, it is not a knowable object in terms of positive determination.

Here, [lines 4ab] “Also the yogins, due to differences in insight, . . .” teach the four grounds of yoga: [the yogas of] the two identitylessnesses, of the nonexistence of discursiveness, and of signlessness; or the three grounds of yoga: the yogas of identitylessness, of nonentity, and of no mental engagement; or the two grounds of yoga: the yoga that focus on existence or nonexistence and the nonreferential yoga. [674]

## **2.2. The Proof That the Knowledge of This [Emptiness] Is the Path**

This has three parts:

- 1) The proof that seeing [entities] as illusions is the path
- 2) The proof that seeing [entities] as emptiness is the path
- 3) The summary of the function of both of these [types of seeing]

### **2.2.1. The Proof That Seeing [Entities] as Illusions Is the Path**

This has six parts:

- 1) Removing objections
- 2) Teaching that the remedy for reification is emptiness
- 3) Attaining one's own welfare—the Dharma Body—through being free from apprehending extremes
- 4) The way in which the Form Bodies effortlessly originate from this
- 5) The way in which enlightened activity is uninterrupted through the impetus of aspiration prayers
- 6) Obtaining merit through worshipping despite the fact that [the Buddha] does not possess a mind

## 2.2.1.1. Removing Objections

“Even if you understand the similarity to illusions,  
 How should afflictions cease?  
 Attachment for an illusory woman  
 Might arise even in her very creator.” [30]

Her creator did not relinquish the afflictions’  
 Latent tendencies toward knowable objects.  
 Thus, when he sees her,  
 His latent tendencies of emptiness are very weak. [31]

The Proponents of Cognizance might say, “Even if you Centrists understand that all phenomena are similar to illusions, how should afflictions cease? [They do not,] because attachment for an illusory woman might arise even in her very creator, the illusionist.” All that her creator—the illusionist—did was to practice mantras [that are used] for [producing] illusions. However, he **did not** suppress the afflictions toward knowable objects nor relinquish [their] latent tendencies. Thus, when he sees the illusory woman, his latent tendencies of emptiness are very weak. Therefore, he cannot help it that attachment arises [in him].

## 2.2.1.2. Teaching That the Remedy for Reification Is Emptiness

Through familiarity with the latent tendencies of emptiness,  
 The latent tendencies of entities will be relinquished.  
 Through familiarity with “utter nonexistence,”  
 These too will be relinquished later on. [32]

Once this “utter nonexistence”—  
 The entity to be determined—cannot be observed,  
 How should a nonentity without a basis  
 Remain before the mind? [33]

[675] One should cultivate the discriminating notion that all phenomena are illusionlike. Once one is familiar with this [notion], [phenomena] will not even be observed as mere illusions [but] will be seen as empty aspects. **Through familiarity with the latent tendencies of emptiness, the latent tendencies of entities—which apprehend all such varieties as the same and different—will be relinquished.** All phenomena will be seen as nothing at all. You might wonder, “Is this very ‘utter nonexistence’ the ultimate?” Also this [“utter nonexistence”] is just some kind of discriminating notion, [a step in] a remedial sequence. However, it is not the per-

fect nature [itself], because it does not even abide as this very “utter nonexistence.” Venerable Nāgārjuna [said] in his *Praise to the Supramundane*:

In order to relinquish all imagination,  
You taught the nectar of emptiness.  
However, those who cling to it  
Are also blamed by you.<sup>1536</sup>

Nevertheless, this laxative of seeing nothing at all is applied as the remedy for the disease of apprehending discursiveness [that exists] in sentient beings who are in trouble merely because of this discursiveness. **Utter nonexistence**, such as attaining something or not attaining it, being bound or being released, seeing or not seeing, means seeing [emptiness] as the aspect that is the extinction of all discursiveness. **Through** becoming increasingly accustomed to and **familiar with** exactly this [notion of utter nonexistence], **this** cognition that apprehends utter nonexistence **will be relinquished later on too**.

Through one's seeing all phenomena as illusionlike, the reification that is entailed in the conception of reality is reversed. Then, even **this “utter and complete nonexistence”**—the very nonexistence that is **the entity to be determined** [here]—**cannot be observed**. **Once** [such is the case,] all phenomena do not exist as any entities or nonentities whatsoever, and there is freedom from all flux of discriminating notions, such as [notions] about a basis and something based on it. However, **how should** even this firewoodlike entity—a mere **nonentity without a basis**—**remain before the** immaculate knowledge of true reality that is [676] a **mind** similar to the conflagration at the end of time? Once the firewood is consumed, the fire also subsides on its own. Likewise, also this very mind of immaculate knowledge subsides in such a way within the expanse of true reality that is always at peace in that it is the very nature of primordial nonarising and nonceasing.

### 2.2.1.3. Attaining the Dharma Body through Being Free from Apprehending Extremes

Once neither entities nor nonentities  
Remain before the mind,  
There is no other mental flux [either].  
Therefore, it is utter nonreferential peace. [34]

[793]<sup>1537</sup> On the respective grounds [of bodhisattvas], one has generated the aspiring mind [that is directed] toward enlightenment and has truly trained in the nature of the engaging mind of enlightenment, that is, the perfections. Through this, one arrives at the final culmination of supreme familiarity with the ultimate

mind of enlightenment: emptiness and great compassion as one taste. This has the [quality of] nonabiding abiding in any phenomenon whatsoever and is the actuality in which there is nothing with which to be familiarized as anything by anybody in any way. Thus, **once** the knowledge that lasts for one single moment sees true reality in the manner of nonseeing, **neither entities nor nonentities remain before the perfect mind** of immaculate knowledge.

Here, one should understand the distinctive feature that the phrase “neither [entities] nor [nonentities]” is not [just] a dual<sup>1538</sup> but serves as a plural: Exemplified by entities and nonentities, anything that is observed as a phenomenon—such as cyclic existence and nirvāṇa, conditioned and unconditioned, empty and nonempty, permanent and impermanent, real and delusive, seeming and ultimate—[does not remain before immaculate knowledge]. Through having revealed the very [actuality] that these phenomena do not abide by their nature in any form whatsoever, one has reached the final culmination of the supreme [actuality] that no phenomenon has been seen, is seen, or will be seen.

For example, by their nature, there are certainly no floating hairs in space whatsoever, be they long or short, very thin, tangled or untangled, and so on. However, from the perspective of someone with blurred vision, floating hairs appear in various forms. Once the blurred vision is completely healed by treating it with medicine and mantras, any observation of such floating hairs has completely subsided too, no matter whether [these floating hairs] had been observed [before] as tangled (which illustrates samsaric phenomena), untangled (which illustrates nirvanic phenomena), long (the seeming), tiny (the ultimate), or even very thin (the expanse of dharmas) [794]. Then, there is no conditioned mental flux of such [aspects] as the enlightenment that is attained, the one who attains it (the bodhisattva), the place where it is attained (Akaniṣṭha and such), or the manner in which it is attained (the gradual progression of becoming enlightened), nor is there any **mental flux** of some **other** [aspects] than these. **There is not** even enlightenment itself as something observable. Through **not** even **referring** to whether there is something to be observed or not, one is not able to label the expanse of dharmas just as it is as being one or different. Thus, in any case and in every way, all entities are just **utter peace** in exactly the way they primordially have been at peace. Even all the perfect Buddhas themselves do not mention, think, or express the very nature of this. Nevertheless, for the sake of indicating just this for those who are to be trained, [the Buddha] taught:

Through knowledge that lasts one single moment, in the place Richly Adorned Akaniṣṭha which encompasses the entirety of the expanse of dharmas, I became enlightened as the Ultimate Body that is my own welfare. [This happened] in a manner of there being no phenomena whatsoever to become truly and perfectly enlightened.



2.2.1.4. The Way in Which the Form Bodies  
Effortlessly Originate from This

Just as a wish-fulfilling jewel and a wish-fulfilling tree  
Fully satisfy [all] desires,  
Likewise, appearances of the Victors are seen  
Because of their aspiration prayers and those to be trained. [35]

There is no question that at that point [of utter mental peace] all observed objects, such as oneself and others, completely vanish and that the motions of discrimination entirely discontinue. This [mental peace] is not something without discrimination, nor does it possess any motivational aspects at all. Still, it is stated:

Because they delight in all endeavors . . .

Accordingly, since beginningless [time] before this [state], [bodhisattvas] did not have even an atom of considering their own welfare. Rather, the benefit of others was simply all they had in mind. [At last,] supreme familiarity with this has reached its final culmination, and inconceivable aspiration prayers are accomplished. Therefore, when discursiveness is at peace like space, the welfare of all sentient beings will be simultaneously and uninterruptedly accomplished without any effort through the impetus of aspiration prayers and enlightened compassion.

**Just as a wish-fulfilling jewel** [795] grants those who pray [to it] all needs and wishes without thinking **and** [just as] all that one wishes—such as garments, jewelry, food, and drink—comes forth from **a wish-fulfilling tree**, ready to be picked, **likewise, because of their aspiration prayers**, the enlightened activity [of Buddhas] will interact with the assembly of **those to be trained**. For the pure ones to be trained, it appears as the Body of Perfect Enjoyment that is like a wish-fulfilling jewel. Through this, the oceanlike needs and wishes in terms of the dharma are granted. For those who are [only] slightly pure, it appears as a supreme Emanation Body that is like a wish-granting tree. Through this, the beginners are given the vehicle of higher states that is like food and drink; the common ones to be trained [are given] the vehicle of definite excellence<sup>1539</sup> that is like garments; and the special ones to be trained [are given] the dharma of the great vehicle that is like the best of jewelry. It promotes great welfare through appearing in all possible and impossible forms for those who are not yet ripened, starting with such [appearances] as bodhisattvas, hearers, solitary realizers, and Brahmā up to such [appearances] as ships and bridges. Thus, for those to be trained, the very Dharma Body that does not abide anywhere happens to be **seen** as the **appearances** of the Form Bodies of the Victors.

2.2.1.5. The Way in Which Enlightened Activity  
Is Uninterrupted through the Impetus of Aspiration Prayers

For example, when a worshipper of Garuda  
Has built a pillar and passed away,  
It still neutralizes poisons and such  
Even when he has been long dead. [36]

Likewise, through following enlightening conduct,  
The pillar of the Victor is built too.  
It continues to promote all welfare  
Even after the bodhisattva has passed beyond. [37]

For example, an individual who has practiced the awareness-mantra of **Garuda** may have built a **pillar** out of jewels on the shore of the ocean and formed an effigy of Garuda on its top.<sup>1540</sup> After he **has built** this [pillar] through such a mantra, its constructor **passes away** some time later. **Even when he has been dead** for a very **long** time, such as many millions of years, there is no difference in the state of this pillar [compared to] the time before [when he was alive]: When one sees or touches it, **it still neutralizes** visible poisons, consumptive poisons, ingestive **poisons**, or [poisons that work through] contact and [pacifies] the torments through *nāga* diseases **and such**.

Likewise, through following enlightening conduct, the pillar of the Victor is **built too** by the bodhisattva. [796] The continuum of mind and mental events that served as the basis to ascribe the name **bodhisattva** terminates completely upon the realization of true reality through the vajralike meditative concentration. Thus, [the bodhisattva] **has passed beyond** the locations of cyclic existence and *nirvāṇa*. Through such enlightenment in the expanse of dharmas, there is no observation of oneself and others. However, **even after** [enlightenment], enlightened activity takes place and **continues to promote** the **welfare** of **all** sentient beings without exception in a nonconceptual way.

2.2.1.6. Obtaining Merit through Worshipping Despite the Fact  
That [the Buddha] Does Not Possess a Mind

“Worshipping someone without a mind—  
How could that have any result?”  
The reason is that being alive and having passed into *nirvāṇa*  
Are explained to be exactly the same. [38]

No matter whether on the seeming or the actual level,  
According to the scriptures, this has a result,  
Just as worshipping a real Buddha  
Will yield a result. [39]

[Buddhist] realists might say, “However, if the perfect Buddha does not have a mind, **how could worshipping someone without a mind** be a positive action that **has any result?**” The reason is that worshipping a Buddha who is **alive**, such as by [offering] a midday meal, **and** worshipping relic pills from the physical remains of someone who **has passed into nirvāṇa** are **explained to be exactly the same** inasmuch as they do not differ in merit. This is the case because *The Flower Mound Dhāraṇī*<sup>1541</sup> says:

One should know that the merit of someone who sees the Buddha  
and then worships him with confidence and [the merit] of someone  
who worships a reliquary of relic pills of the Thus-Gone One are equal.

Those who worship someone alive  
Or the physical remains of somebody who has passed into nirvāṇa  
With attitudes of equal confidence  
Will receive equal merit through such worship.

[*The Sūtra of the Scriptural Collection of Bodhisattvas*<sup>1542</sup> says:

Those who worship someone alive  
And those who worship a relic pill of somebody who has passed  
into nirvāṇa  
That has the mere size of a mustard seed  
Are equal in attitude as well as result.

The same is also stated in *The Basis of Scriptural Medicine of the Vinaya*.<sup>1543</sup>

You might ask, “Is it on the seeming or the ultimate level that a result comes about through worshipping an illusionlike Buddha?” The answer is: For the time being, it does not **matter whether** this refers to **the seeming** [level] **or the true**, [797] **actual level**, because **the scriptures** of both the greater and the inferior vehicle state that meritorious actions **have** abundant **results**. This is something one should trust in. Here, for the time being, the two realities do not need to be analyzed, because even our Teacher himself said such without analyzing the two realities. As *The Precious Garland* says:

Other than the Victor, who could have a valid cognition  
Of this actuality that is superior?<sup>1544</sup>

*The Sublime Continuum* says:

You wonder why? In this world, there is no one who is more skilled than  
the Victor . . .  
Therefore, do not mess up what represents the sūtra collection that was  
presented by the Seer himself.<sup>1545</sup>

One can also see the following alternative formulation of this answer: Worshipping someone who does not have a mind results in benefit too. This is like the benefit of worshipping reliquaries and volumes of texts. Through worshipping illusionlike Buddhas, the merit [from this] arises as a mere illusion. This is **just as** the assertion by you realists that worshipping a **real Buddha will yield** the manifestation of a real **result**.

#### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

As for these [verses], Kalyāṇadeva explains:

Emptiness is the wisdom of true reality. The seeds of this are the latent tendencies [of emptiness]. To cultivate it means to develop complete familiarity with cultivation. This relinquishes and eliminates the latent tendencies of entities, which are the seeds of the conceptions of form and such. [Lines 32cd] “Through familiarity with . . .” refer to nonentities. . . .

Having explained the nirvāṇa with remainder in this way, [verse 33] “Once . . .” [is taught] in order to teach the [nirvāṇa] without remainder.

[Verse 37:] After the Body of the Victor is accomplished, the bodhisattva who has a mind has passed away. Still, through the twofold force of aspiration prayers and those to be trained, the welfare of all sentient beings [798] will be brought about. Thus, this is not a total nirvāṇa like in the case of the hearers. . . .

[Verses 38–39:] Before it was explained that merit arises from a mind that is equal to an illusion, and [now] it is said, “Although the [bodhisattva] is not here now, . . .” [However,] this case is special. Here, it

is established through scriptural valid cognition that the result of merit is equivalent. Therefore, whether this applies to the seeming or to the ultimate level, [making offerings to a Buddha who has passed away] yields results in a similar way as when one makes offerings to a Buddha who is alive.<sup>1546</sup>

Vibhūticandra explains:

[As for lines 32cd:] You might maintain, “There is nothing wrong in apprehending emptiness.” Through familiarity with [the notion] that “entities or [even] emptiness does not exist at all,” later the latent tendencies of emptiness also are relinquished, because the means are like a boat [to be left behind upon reaching the other shore].

[Verse 34:] As for the lack of an ultimately existing entity, not even [this] lack of entity exists. Therefore, these two [entity and nonentity] do not appear from the perspective of [this] mental state. Since a third alternative that would be neither an entity nor a nonentity does not exist either, there is no observed object and no support. Like a fire whose firewood has been exhausted, the mind has then passed into nirvāṇa.

[Verse 37:] The Body of the Victor that is endowed with the major and minor marks will appear. You might wonder, “From what [does it appear]?” It does so from the fully ripened roots of virtue of those to be trained and the aspiration prayers of the Blessed One . . .

[Verse 38:] It is like this: A physician who eliminates poison and has attained the potency of mantra, through that mantra, prepares plants, such as trees [as antidotes to poison]. When he dies, he thinks, “Even if I am not here [anymore], may all poisons still be eliminated through this [remedy].” Then, even if a long time has elapsed [since his death], [the remedy] still eliminates the negative influences of poison, spirits, and so on . . .

[Verse 39:] Here, reasoning is not necessary. The result [of worshipping Buddhas who have passed away] can be found in the scriptures.

One has to assert this as the seeming of the Centrists and your ultimate.<sup>1547</sup>

*The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points* comments:

You might wonder, “Is the conception that [everything] is illusion not relinquished?” It surely is. [799] [This is indicated by lines 32cd] “Through familiarity with ‘utter nonexistence,’ . . .”

Even the very apprehension of nonexistence is relinquished, [which is shown by verse 33] “Once this ‘utter nonexistence’ . . .” You might ask, “What is nonexistence?” The answer is, “It is a vase.” If a vase is not established through mundane seeing, also [its] negation, which depends on this, is not established. Hence, this very nonexistence too is not observed. You might think, “However, what is seen by the knowledge of a Buddha that is the final seeing of true reality?” Since ultimately no consciousness whatsoever engages [an object], there is no arising of a consciousness that sees this [ultimate nature]. This is taught by [verse 34:] “Once neither entities nor nonentities . . .” Just as the nonobservation of all aspects of form is expressed as “seeing space,” likewise, all that is done here is to express the very nonobservation of all aspects of signs as “the expanse of signlessness.” *The Sublime Continuum* says:

The assertion is that all exertion is at peace  
And the reason [for this] is mind’s nonconceptuality.<sup>1548</sup>

Thus, through knowledge that lasts one single moment, the suchness of all phenomena has become truly and perfectly enlightened. After that, when the path of complete release has become manifest, the continuous engagement of mirrorlike wisdom is the Body of Enjoyment. Due to this, various emanations that accord with the individual intentions [of sentient beings] engage in all the worlds. This is the attainment of the Emanation Body.

This mirrorlike [wisdom] is the dominant cause for the appearance of the Form Bodies, or the cause for form. . . . Emanations are the Form Bodies that have the defining characteristic of appearing as form, because they are seen as form in the world.

There appears no explanation in *The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points* for [verse 39] “No matter whether on the seeming or the actual level . . .” However, *The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Knowledge Chapter Only* explains:

If Buddhahood itself and the results of generosity and such are [established] through the scriptures, then [800] no matter whether these are seeming or ultimate, there is no problem—what is the difference?<sup>1549</sup>

The [master] from Sabsang<sup>1550</sup> supplements the following words:

This is adequate for both the seeming—the Form Bodies—and the ultimate, the Dharma Body. . . . The pillar that was accomplished by the Brahman Śaṅku before . . .

Some notes on *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* that were transmitted through the Great Lord [Atiśa] say:

In former times, in the area where the Brahman called Śrī Śaṅku lived, everybody was afflicted by nāga diseases. So he went to look for a mantra that would bring the nāgas under control. [On his way,] he saw a black woman who had laid down a small child [next to a field]. While she was weeding, the small child cried, and the woman strewed white mustard seeds upon it. This caused a black snake to come forth and lick the [child], which made it appear to be dead. When [the woman] had finished weeding, she strewed another substance [upon the child]. This caused a white snake to come forth, which licked [the child] and thus revived it. [The Brahman] then requested the awareness mantra from the [woman]. When she made him drink eight one-ounce [cups] of milk from a black bitch, he drank seven and then poured off the [last cup that was still] full. Thus, he won mastery over seven nagas, but he did not win unlimited mastery over the eighth one. Therefore, a child told [him], “When poisonous ulcers on the shoulders appear, scoop some foam from the ocean and drink it.” In this way, the Brahman pacified many diseases. [However,] later on he did not obtain [enough] foam from the ocean for all the limitless afflictions. So he carried a corpse [from] a house to a garuda pillar and leaned it against [the pillar], thus reviving it. For a long time he benefited the people and made aspiration prayers that this pillar would be able to neutralize all poisons.

[This pillar] appears [today] in the same way as when the Brahman Śaṅku was alive. In general, since it is certain that there is a clear source for this example, it is appropriate to search for this [pillar].<sup>1551</sup>

## 2.2.2. The Proof That Seeing [Entities] as Emptiness Is the Path

This has two parts:

- 1) The proof through scripture
- 2) The proof through reasoning

### 2.2.2.1. The Proof through Scripture

This has three parts:

- 1) Presenting the objection
- 2) The brief answer in the scriptures
- 3) The proof that the great vehicle is Buddha's speech

#### 2.2.2.1.1. Presenting the Objection

[801] **"You will be released through seeing the realities,  
But what is the point of seeing emptiness?"** [40ab]

[803] A proponent of the philosophical system of the hearers might say, **"You will be released from cyclic existence through seeing the four realities** in sixteen aspects,<sup>1552</sup> **but what is the point of seeing emptiness?"**

#### 2.2.2.1.2. The Brief Answer in the Scriptures

**The reason is that the scriptures declare  
That there is no enlightenment without this path.** [40cd]

**The reason is that the scriptures** of our very Teacher **declare that there is no attainment of enlightenment without this path** of seeing emptiness, because this is extensively stated in such texts as *The Mother of the Victors*.<sup>1553</sup>

Those with the discriminating notion of "entities" lack the meditation that is [characteristic of] the perfection of knowledge. They lack it starting from all the gates of meditative concentration and dhāraṇī, the powers, the fearlessnesses, and the individual perfect awarenesses up through the meditation on the unique qualities of a Buddha.

*The Sūtra of Entering Equality*<sup>1554</sup> says:

O Mañjuśrī, through mentally engaging in emptiness, this attainment



of all three [types of] enlightenment is the case and there is the chance for it. For those with the discriminating notion of “entities,” this attainment of the three [types of] enlightenment is not the case and there is no chance for it.

The path of all the past and future Victors and of those who live in the ten directions [at present]  
Is this perfection. [Everything] else is not [their path].

It is not possible that the noble ones of the hearers reject the great vehicle [804], for the following reason: It is stated that it is not the case and that there is no chance that any arhat who hears this great vehicle will not have true confidence. Through this, it can be illustrated that [there is a tendency in this] direction [of the great vehicle] all the way down even to stream-enterers. Also among those who have attained any of the twenty discriminating notions<sup>1555</sup> and who dedicatedly work on meditative stability, there are generally few who reject the great vehicle, because there is a majority of those who are dedicated to examining the status of their own continua.

However, once one has attained the actual state of the fourth meditative stability and then attains the meditative absorption without discrimination in which discriminations and feelings have ceased, one might [still] cling to the idea that “I have attained arhathood.” This is called “[an arhat] with the manifest pride of being an arhat.” It is possible that one rejects the great vehicle through this [pride] for the following [two] reasons: Such is explained in *The Jewel Casket Sūtra*. In general, seers who possess the five supernatural knowledges can see five hundred former lifetimes with the [kind of] supernatural knowledge that remembers former states, [but] they do not see beyond this [time span]. Therefore, wrong philosophical systems of a fixed number of former and laterlives—such as [thinking], “Beyond that [time] I do not exist”—have originated.

Thus, it is mainly hearers fond of dialectic who cling to any mere words from the three scriptural collections<sup>1556</sup> and become arrogant through presuming that this [clinging] is the self-confidence of awareness and release.<sup>1557</sup> They are well known and self-appointed as paṇḍitas and such. While not understanding the inconceivable dharma of the Buddha, they presume to apprehend and grasp the scope of the unlimited space of dharma with their own understanding that is like the wingspan of a bee. They say that everything that is not in accordance with this is not dharma and angrily denounce and reject it.

This is the case because [of the following:] We find reports of this kind—such as in *The Great Cloud [Sūtra]*<sup>1558</sup> and *The Great Drum [Sūtra]*—about [people] who were self-appointed hearers and rejected the great vehicle in India’s central

provinces as well as in its east, west, and so forth. These [reports] include prophecies that they will all descend into countless bad migrations through their obscurations of rejecting the dharma. [805]

Also here in the land of Tibet, it seems that there were limitless people who negated the “view that eliminates the four extremes” by calling its [propounders pejoratively] “those who [have the view of] neither existence nor nonexistence”;<sup>1559</sup> who dismissed the “meditation that is free from cognition and without mental engagement”<sup>1560</sup> by saying, “This is the tradition of the Chinese Hvasang”; who held that the “teaching about the nature of conception being the true nature of phenomena”<sup>1561</sup> and the “teaching that there is nothing to be adopted or rejected”<sup>1562</sup> and so forth are limitless perverted dharmas. They presumed that [they themselves] are the suns of speech.<sup>1563</sup> Even today, their followers greatly enhance their talking in the style of mangy horses,<sup>1564</sup> which rejects the dharma, and thus open the gates [that lead] beneath the earth.

### 2.2.2.1.3. The Proof That the Great Vehicle Is Buddha’s Speech

If the great vehicle is not established,  
How are your scriptures established?  
“Because they are established for both [of us].”  
[However,] they were not established for you at first. [41]

You should apply the conditions that made you believe in them  
In the same way to the great vehicle too. [42ab]

These six lines express the equal applicability [of the reason].

Thus, those who have such a bad fate and are like evil spirits say, “A great vehicle does not exist for the following reasons: (a) Those in the direct retinue of our Teacher, such as Śāriputra, did not hear it. (b) If they had heard it, it would be reasonable that it would have come to us hearers, but that did not happen. (c) It was stated that something is Buddha’s speech if it is contained in the sūtra collection, appears in the vinaya, and does not contradict the true nature of phenomena. However, the great vehicle is not something like this, because it is not contained in our sūtra collection and so on.”

Here, we ask in return: **If it is not established that the great vehicle is the Buddha’s speech, how is it established that the scriptures of you hearers—the three scriptural collections—are established?** They might say, “[They are established,] **because they are well known and established for both of us.**” So do you believe that they are the Buddha’s speech since beginningless time, or did you come to know them as the Buddha’s speech later by virtue of spiritual friends?

The **first** alternative does not apply, because it was **not established for you** that

the [scriptures of the hearers] are the Buddha's speech when you were a newborn child that was not grown up yet and when you were a lay person who was not engaged in any philosophical system and thus was ignorant even about the conventional term "Buddha's speech."

If there are certain **conditions**, such as spiritual friends, [806] **that made you believe in the Teacher** being the Buddha, his teaching being the genuine dharma, and the guides being the spiritual community, **you should equally apply** these [conditions] **to the great vehicle too**. [This is just the same case,] because the belief in the inconceivable Dharma Body and the Form [Bodies], the limitless scriptural collections of the great vehicle, and the marvelous spiritual community of bodhisattvas arises from the conditions that are the spiritual friends of the great vehicle and the profound and vast scriptural collections.

It is also not the case that great hearers, such as Śāriputra, did not hear the [great vehicle], because their names are mentioned in the introductions to great sūtras of the great vehicle and [because] they and the great bodhisattvas ascertained the dharma through questions and answers. That imperfect hearers who are not vessels for the great vehicle did not hear and experience it does not serve as a correct reason to prove that the great vehicle does not exist. One might as well say, "It is not possible that bees extract honey from a lotus, because if the lotus had honey, the insects and frogs that continuously hang on to the roots of the lotus must have tasted it, but they do not taste it." What would be the difference [between this and your statement above]?

**The discourses that are included in the sūtra collection**

**You assert as the words of the Buddha.**

**Does this not simply amount to asserting**

**That most of the great vehicle is equal to your sūtras? [49]<sup>1565</sup>**

This verse proves that [the great vehicle] is included in the sūtra collection and so on.

**You certainly assert the discourses that are the words that are included in the sūtra collection**, appear in the vinaya, and do not contradict the true nature of phenomena **as the words of the Buddha**. However, then [it follows that] all three scriptural collections of the hearers are not the Buddha's speech either, because they are not included in the sūtra collection of the great vehicle, do not appear in its vinaya, and contradict the true nature of phenomena.

If you think, "There is no such mistake, because they are included in just the hearers' sūtra collection and so on," well, then, since also the dharma of the great vehicle is included in the great vehicle's sūtra collection and so on, why should one not be able to prove [through this] that [the great vehicle] is the Buddha's

speech? Consequently, **most of the great vehicle too is equal to your sūtras.** Why **do you not simply assert that** [the great vehicle] is the Buddha's speech that was spoken at certain occasions?

Here, the [Tibetan] translation [of line 49c] as “Does this not . . . ?” [reads] like a [plain] interrogative phrase and is [807] not a very effective translation. [The phrase,] “Why do you not simply assert . . .” [used in the preceding paragraph] is explained to mean that “even you [hearers] who do not assert [the existence of the great vehicle] would still have to accept it.”

**If the entirety were flawed**

**On the basis of a single aspect that is determined as unsuitable,**<sup>1566</sup>

**Why would not the entirety be the Buddha's word**

**On the basis of a single corresponding sūtra? [50]**

This verse shows that if one were able to negate [that the great vehicle is the Buddha's speech] through a [flawed] mode of negative [entailment], one is [equally] able to prove this through the [corresponding] mode of positive [entailment].

You might argue, “Our sūtras teach impermanence and such, whereas the great vehicle teaches emptiness. Thus, it is not Buddha's speech.” If one were able to prove **on the basis of a single aspect that is determined as unsuitable**—or on the basis of a single divergent reason—that **the entire** scriptural tradition is **flawed**, [your above objection] could be formulated as the following probative argument: “The sūtras of the great vehicle as the subject are not Buddha's speech, because, unlike the sūtras of the hearers, they do not teach impermanence.” In this [sentence] also the reason certainly does not apply. However, for the time being, the equal applicability of the reverse [formulation of the reason and the predicate] is used in a way that is analogous [to your sentence]: “Well, then the sūtras of the great vehicle as the subject are Buddha's speech, because, just like the sūtras of the hearers, they teach the four realities and the thirty-seven factors for enlightenment.” So **why would one not** also be able to prove that **the entirety** [of the great vehicle] is **the Buddha's word on the basis of such a single** reasoning **that** [one aspect of its sūtras] **corresponds** to your sūtras?<sup>1567</sup>

**Mahākāśyapa and others did not fathom**

**The depth of these discourses,**

**So who would regard them as unacceptable**

**Just because you do not understand them? [51]**<sup>1568</sup>

These four lines teach that not realizing [something] oneself cannot serve as an argument to negate that others [realize it].

Thus, **these discourses** of the great vehicle possess the meanings of limitless aspects of intentions<sup>1569</sup> and flexible intentions.<sup>1570</sup> Even **Mahākāśyapa**, Śāriputra,<sup>1571</sup> **and others did not fathom their depth** for the following reasons: When Śāriputra was asked about all the profound points, he had a hard time answering, since he had reached the end of his self-confidence. Then [his questioner said,] “What, did the Thus-Gone One not prophesy you as the most excellent one among those who possess knowledge?” [Śāriputra] answered, “He taught that I am the most excellent one among those who possess knowledge in terms of the hearers who are endowed with one-sided knowledge. However, he did not [say this] in terms of the bodhisattvas who are endowed with inconceivable knowledge.” [Furthermore,] it has been taught that the young lady Excellent Moon,<sup>1572</sup> the woman [called] “Renowned to Be without Change and Stain,” [808] and others have outshone great hearers with their self-confidence.

Why **would** anybody **regard the** great vehicle **as an unacceptable** [source of] valid cognition **just because** of the reason that **you** dialecticians with your one-sided knowledge **do not understand these** [teachings] that possess such inconceivable meanings? If one were able to prove that something is not correct because someone does not understand it, then that would apply in the same way to the inferior vehicle too, because an ox does not realize it.

If something were true just because two different parties assert it,  
Then also the Vedas and such would be true. [42cd]

If you say, “Because the great vehicle is disputed,”  
You should abandon your scriptures,  
Because these scriptures are disputed by the forders,  
As are certain of their parts between you and others. [43]

These six lines [802] teach that one is not able to establish any kind of reason through [the power of] entities, neither through the reason that something is asserted by both [parties] nor [through the reason] that it is disputed.

[808] Furthermore, also your [previous] answer [in line 41c], “You wonder why? These are established for both [of us]” is uncertain as to the mode of positive concomitance. **If something were true just because two** disputing parties—oneself and someone **different**—provisionally **assert that it is established, then also the four Vedas and such would be** something to be accepted as **true**, because they are provisionally accepted by both Buddhists and non-Buddhists. **If you say**, “This is not the same, **because the great vehicle is disputed** as to whether it

is the Buddha's speech or not," it would follow that **you should also abandon your scriptures** of the inferior vehicle. This is **because the scriptures** of the inferior vehicle **are also disputed by the non-Buddhist forderns**, such as when they say, "Alas, what the Erudites<sup>1573</sup> say is like the footprints of a wolf."<sup>1574</sup> There **are also disputes about certain of the parts** of these Buddhist scriptures **between your own faction** [within the lesser vehicle]—the Proponents of the Existence of All Bases<sup>1575</sup>—**and others**, that is, all [remaining] of the eighteen sects, such as the Venerated Ones.<sup>1576</sup>

### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

The learned one of *The Great Commentary*<sup>1577</sup> and Vibhūticandra explain:

Since these verses [49–51, beginning,] "The discourses that . . .," are unrelated [to Śāntideva's text], they do not represent the words of this master .<sup>1578</sup>

Kalyāṇadeva and Dānaśrī explain:

It is stated that [these verses 49–51] are not considered to be related [to this text], since it is a text that emphasizes practice.<sup>1579</sup>

Such explanations certainly do exist. However, personally, I think that these [verses] do not entail any mistake whatsoever of being unrelated [to this text] for the following reasons: The meaning of the great vehicle is inconceivable. [809] Thus, [Śāntideva] gives an answer [here] by establishing the great vehicle's own texts as a [source of] valid cognition [by saying], "How should you fathom something whose depths Mahākāśyapa and others were not able to fathom before?" If this [verse 51] did not represent the words of master [Śāntideva], [what remains of this whole] *śloka*<sup>1580</sup> would be very little, because then line [51e] "This would apply in the same way to the inferior vehicle too"<sup>1581</sup> would be empty of something that is expressed [by it].

Such [considerations] certainly do apply. However, in this Land of Tibet, it is not that the great vehicle is negated by people who claim to be hearers. Rather, the profound essential points of the great vehicle are negated only people who claim to be followers of the great vehicle. In this newly founded great tradition of rejecting the dharma in such a way, they exclaim, "We distinguish between dharma and nondharma." This seems to be a great abyss for those who wish for liberation.

With respect to these [verses], Kalyāṇadeva explains:

[Line 41d] “[However,] they were not established for you at first” means: Without the great vehicle, one would not become enlightened, and without this [enlightenment], your scriptures are also not established.<sup>1582</sup>

*The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points* formulates the thesis of the opponent [in lines 40ab] as follows:

One will be released through seeing what is real—the nature that actually exists—but not through seeing that nothing whatsoever is established.

*The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Knowledge Chapter* supplements the following words:

As for [the words] “for both [of us]” [in line 41c]: The [scriptures of the hearers] are established for both the opponent and the proponent. [Line 41d] “[However,] they were not established for you at first” means that the [scriptures of the hearers] were not established [for you hearers] before you accepted them.<sup>1583</sup>

The [master] from Sabsang appears to give the following explanation:

You might say, “The inferior vehicle is the Buddha’s speech, since both the persons of the great vehicle and those of the inferior vehicle assert it as the Buddha’s speech. However, the great vehicle is not the Buddha’s speech, because we hearers do not assert it as the Buddha’s speech.” However, then also the inferior vehicle would not have been established as the Buddha’s speech during the time when, first, nobody else believed in it. [810]

The Blessed One Maitreya proves in *The Ornament of Sūtras*<sup>1584</sup> that the great vehicle is the Buddha’s speech. [Here,] the way in which he does so shall be given as an ancillary explanation.

Those who reject the dharma are those who have inferior faculties by nature and are controlled by negative friends:

They aspire to what is inferior, and their constitutions are also very much inferior.

They are completely surrounded by inferior friends.

If to this dharma that excellently explains what is profound and vast  
They do not aspire, it is established [as supreme].<sup>1585</sup>

The way they reject [the great vehicle] is by saying, “Since there were a great many who attained arhathood by means of the vehicle of the hearers, the demons<sup>1586</sup> taught the great vehicle in which one must stay in cyclic existence for the welfare of others until cyclic existence is emptied. Therefore, everybody entered this [vehicle] and those who attain arhathood have become less. Thus, it has been taught as an obstacle to liberation.”

Some also say, “This great vehicle was concocted by dialecticians in order to mock the teachings. [This is the case] because the texts of those dialecticians who are the Mundanely Minded teach that nothing at all exists, and this [great vehicle] also teaches that—from form up through omniscience—nothing exists. [Moreover,] the definition of the Buddha’s speech is: ‘That which serves as the remedy for cyclic existence and teaches the unmistakable view.’ However, this [great vehicle] does not function as a remedy for cyclic existence, because it teaches that one has to remain in cyclic existence for a long time. [Also,] its view is mistaken, because it teaches nonexistence. Therefore, it is not the Buddha’s speech.”

Here, [Maitreya] invalidates wrong conceptions through a sevenfold reasoning:

[The great vehicle is Buddha’s word,] for [the following] reasons:

There was no prophecy before; it originated simultaneously;

It is not an object; it is established;

If it exists, it exists, and if it did not exist, [the inferior vehicle] would not exist either;

It is a remedy; its terms are different.<sup>1587</sup>

1) It was not concocted by demons, because if this were the case, it would have been reasonable that the Buddha Kāśyapa,<sup>1588</sup> just as in his prophecies in relation to the dreams of [King] Krikri,<sup>1589</sup> had prophesied, “The so-called great vehicle that was created by demons [81r] will originate.” But he did not teach this.

Some people think, “He did not prophesy this, since he did not know about it, or considered it to be of little purpose, or did not see it because it happened at some future time.” This is not reasonable because of the following: [The Buddha] has direct vision of all knowable objects. Since there is nothing higher and superior to the teaching of the Buddha, it is not suitable for him to be indifferent about the great essential points in it. [The Buddha] does not have obscurations of wisdom with respect to the past and the future.



The Buddhas [have] direct vision,  
They also protect the teachings,  
And their wisdom is unobscured in terms of time too.  
Therefore, it does not make sense that [the Buddha] was indifferent.<sup>1590</sup>

2) Furthermore, [in general,] if something is an obstacle, then the obstructing phenomenon must happen after the prior occurrence of the phenomenon that is obstructed. In contrast, the great vehicle and the inferior vehicle occurred together at the same time. Thus, how could one set them up as something that obstructs and something that is obstructed? This [teaching of the inferior vehicle] was given in order to avoid frightening the followers of the inferior vehicle and in order to guide them. Correctly speaking, in this teaching [of the great vehicle], the inferior vehicle is nothing but the first discourse for the group of five [disciples].<sup>1591</sup> However, the great vehicle [itself] is limitless, [which is] also [illustrated by] the dharma collections that were taught before the first wheel [of dharma on earth], such as the teaching of “the one hundred eight gates that illuminate the dharma” that [the Buddha gave] when he was about to move from Tuṣita<sup>1592</sup> and the proclamation of *The Sūtra of Vast Arrays of Buddhas*<sup>1593</sup> when he became enlightened [in Akaṇiṣṭha].

3) [The great vehicle] was not concocted by dialecticians for the following reason: Since their dialectic depends on naïve beings and does not have any essence, it is something uncertain, does not encompass perfect actuality, and teaches the seeming.

Dialectic is dependent and uncertain,  
Not encompassing, seeming, and involves weariness.  
It is asserted that it depends on naïve beings.  
Therefore, this [great vehicle] is not their object.<sup>1594</sup>

Such profound and vast points [812] like these [in the great vehicle] are not the sphere of dialecticians.

4) Some people claim, “Though [the great vehicle] is not an object of other dialecticians, the seer Kapila and others have become omniscient. Thus, it was created by so-called special Buddhist dialecticians.” Or, some say, “It was taught by a Buddha other than the Blessed One.” However, then the great vehicle is established as Buddha’s speech. This is just the same as the Buddha speech of Buddha Kāśyapa and the Buddha speech of Buddha Śākyamuni being equal in that [both] are Buddhas’ speech. Not only is this definitely the case, but moreover, it is explained even in the sūtras of the inferior vehicle that a second teacher [who is

a Buddha] does not manifest in the single sphere [of one Buddha's activity]. In consequence, these people claim something that is contradictory to the sūtras, because they claim the Buddha speech of Buddha Kapila and [thus] that a Buddha other than our teacher has manifested in this sphere here during the present time [of our teacher].

5) Again, does a great vehicle exist or does it not exist? If it exists, it is reasonable that it is solely this [great vehicle under consideration], because if another [great vehicle] than this one existed, it should be suitable to appear, whereas, in fact, another [great vehicle] is not observable. If [the great vehicle] did not exist, the means for attaining Buddhahood would not exist [either]. If this were the case, also the inferior vehicle would not be Buddha's speech, since Buddhahood is not possible [given this absence of means for attaining it].

Some might say, "This very vehicle of the hearers is the great vehicle." This vehicle of the hearers is not the great vehicle—which is the means to accomplish Buddhahood—for the following reasons: (a) The ten perfections are not complete [in the vehicle of the hearers]. (b) It contradicts the path of great enlightenment, since it accomplishes only the minor welfare of oneself. (c) It is not the means for perfection, maturation, and purification.<sup>1595</sup>

[It is] incomplete, contradictory,  
And not the means. Since it does not teach the like,  
This vehicle of the hearers  
Is not called the "dharma of the great vehicle."<sup>1596</sup>

Thus, this vehicle of the hearers and solitary realizers is inferior in its intention, which means that it intends the limited welfare of oneself. That it is inferior in its teaching [813] means that it teaches nothing but solely the means for liberation from cyclic existence. It is inferior in its training; that is, it is not conjoined with special means and knowledge. That it is inferior in its reliances means that it relies only on small accumulations and personal identitylessness. It is also [inferior] in terms of time, since [its practitioners] wish for a quick limited nirvāṇa, because they are not able to don the armor [of vigor] for the time of inconceivable eons. Since it is contradictory [to the great vehicle in these ways], it is called the "inferior vehicle."

In intention, teaching,  
Training, reliance,  
And time it is contradictory. What is inferior because of these [factors]  
Is just something inferior.<sup>1597</sup>

6) Furthermore, [the great vehicle] is qualified by the three seals that indicate Buddha's speech, for the following reasons: (a) It applies to its own sūtra collection, since it teaches the inconceivable actuality. (b) It appears in its own vinaya, since it vanquishes the afflictions, including their latent tendencies. (c) It is not contradictory to the profound and vast nature of phenomena. Hence, it is perfect Buddha speech.

Because it applies to its very own [sūtras]  
And also appears in its own vinaya,  
Because it is profound, and because it is vast,  
There is no contradiction to the nature of phenomena.<sup>1598</sup>

[The great vehicle] is the supreme of remedies because it releases numberless sentient beings from cyclic existence, to say nothing of vanquishing one's own cyclic existence. This is the case because it teaches the vast dharmas—seeming reality, the accumulation of merit, and the Form Bodies—in order to completely mature [beings] as well as the nonconceptual profound dharmas—ultimate reality, the accumulation of wisdom, and the Dharma Body. Thus, this [teaching] is the unsurpassable great means.

Because it is vast, because it is profound,  
And because it is completely maturing and nonconceptual,  
Both [dharmas] are taught in this one here.  
This is the unsurpassable means.<sup>1599</sup>

7) Also, such [expressions] as “nonexistence” are to be taught through words of implications and flexible implications as such terms that differ [from their superficial meanings]. Certainly, [814] these are not to be taken literally. It is explained that they were stated in the texts of profound view in order to eliminate superimposition and denial and that they were stated in the texts of vast conduct with the implication of the threefold lack of a nature. However, they are not to be clung to as exclusively this.

[The great vehicle is the Buddha's word,] because there are no others  
than this [and because] it is very profound and concomitant.  
It entails teaching the whole variety and teaching continuously through  
a multitude.  
Its meaning is not just literal and the implications of the Conqueror  
are very profound.  
If the learned ones examine properly, they will not be frightened by  
this dharma.<sup>1600</sup>

Therefore, if one listens to and hears the collection of the great vehicle with its profound and vast meanings, proper mental engagement in its meaning that is approximately concordant with meditative concentration will arise. From this, special knowledge of having attained certainty about perfect actuality will arise.

Here, proper mental engagement that relies on hearing originates first.  
 From proper mental engagement comes wisdom that has perfect actuality  
 as its object.  
 From this the dharma is obtained, and, due to its presence, intelligent  
 insight arises vividly.<sup>1601</sup>

Therefore, the causes that make one reject the dharma originate from inferior intelligence, little confidence, great haughtiness due to pride about [having] some little knowledge and so on, clinging to solely the sūtra collection with expedient meaning, craving for gain and honor, and relying on friends or tutors who delight in rejecting the dharma. *The Sublime Continuum* says:

Because they are of inferior intelligence, because they lack the aspiration  
 for the bright [qualities], because they rely on improper pride,  
 Because they have the character of being obscured through missing the  
 genuine dharma, because they grasp at the expedient meaning as being  
 the definitive, true reality,  
 Because they yearn for gain, because they are under the sway of [wrong]  
 views, because they rely on those who criticize the dharma,  
 Because they fend off the holders of dharma, and because they have  
 inferior aspirations, they reject the dharma of the arhats.<sup>1602</sup> [815]

Except for rejecting the dharma, there is no action whatsoever to be afraid of. Here, even such actions as the five deeds without interval<sup>1603</sup> cannot be adduced as [counter-]examples, because these deeds without interval will certainly be shattered by [the power of one's] regret. In contrast, [usually,] one does not regret having rejected the dharma and, on top of this, [even] regards [such rejection] as something superior. [*The Sublime Continuum* states:]

Learned beings should not be as deeply afraid of fire, the poison of  
 venomous snakes, executioners, or lightning  
 As they should be of falling away from the profound dharma.  
 Fire, snakes, enemies, and thunderbolts may only end your life,  
 But the beings in [the hell of] utmost torture will not be very afraid of  
 them.

Some persons may have relied on evil friends again and again and thus  
committed the heinous actions  
Of heeding a bad intention toward a Buddha, killing their parents or an  
arhat, or splitting the highest community.  
If they sincerely reflect on the nature of phenomena, they will be swiftly  
released from these [actions],  
But where should there be liberation for someone whose mind hates the  
dharma?<sup>1604</sup>

In brief, those who speak with strong clinging do not transcend rejecting the dharma. *The Sūtra That Is a Synopsis of the Entirety of Complete Pulverization*<sup>1605</sup> says:

Undefeatable One,<sup>1606</sup> for those who remain in the discriminating notion of sentient beings and the discriminating notion of phenomena, there are actions to actually be committed. However, for those who are nonreferential, there are none.

Mañjuśrī, if some have the discriminating notion “good” and some have the discriminating notion “bad” toward the Buddha’s speech that is proclaimed by the Thus-Gone Ones, they reject the dharma.

To say, “This is reasonable” and “This is unreasonable” means rejecting the dharma. To state, “This was declared for the sake of bodhisattvas” and “This was declared for the sake of hearers” is to reject the dharma. To say, “This is a training for bodhisattvas” and “This is not [such] a training” means rejecting the dharma.

[816] It is stated that also [the following factors] are included in rejecting the dharma: all attributions of mistakes (such as with respect to the conduct of proponents of the dharma, their words, the meaning [of these], whether these are contradictory or repetitive), all doubts, and all discriminating notions of rejecting or adopting with respect to the Buddha’s speech. [A sūtra] reports:

During [the time of] the teachings that are renowned to come from the previous Thus-Gone One “Radiating Immaculate Light,” the present Buddha Amitāyus was a fully ordained monk called “Entirely Pure Conduct.” He adopted sixty thousand sūtras of complete pulverization and one hundred million sūtra collections. Then he tamed an infinite number of individuals within the three vehicles through teaching in accordance with their aspirations. The Thus-Gone One himself<sup>1607</sup> was

a fully ordained monk called “Dharma.” He adopted one thousand sūtras of complete pulverization, attained the fourth meditative stability, and became endowed with the [twelve] qualities of training.<sup>1608</sup> Then he taught that anything other than just emptiness is not the Buddha’s speech and deprecated the previous dharma. Through this, he was born in the hells for seventy eons and forgot the mind of enlightenment for sixty eons. After that, although the Thus-Gone One “Completely Hidden Jewel Light” had caused him to generate the mind [of enlightenment], he became an animal for ninety thousand lifetimes and a poor human being for sixty thousand [lifetimes]. However, in all of these [rebirths,] he was [born] without a tongue.

It is further stated that, even if someone who rejects the dharma will become enlightened, demons will appear, degenerated times will happen, and many obstacles to the teaching will too.

*The Sūtra That Teaches the Nonorigination of All Phenomena*<sup>1609</sup> explains:

During the teaching of the previous Buddha “King Truly Noble Like the Highest Mountain,” there was the Thus-Gone One “Unshakable Fully Ordained Monk with Completely Pure Conduct” together with his retinue. He was not watching the sense faculties, consciousnesses, or observed objects; that is, he was endowed with conduct that is skillful in means. Our Teacher [Buddha Śākyamuni] himself was a fully ordained monk called “Intelligent Insight of Conduct.” He had attained the five supernatural knowledges, was endowed with ethics and skilled in the vinaya, had qualities of purification, liked seclusion, and had a retinue that was just like him. [817] He disparaged the former [Thus-Gone One by saying], “He has corrupted ethics,” and deprecated his dharma too. Thus, after his transition from this lifetime, he experienced unbearable sufferings in the lower realms and such, just like the aforementioned one.

Even Mañjuśrī reported the following [in a sūtra]:

In the Buddha-field “Great Illumination” of the former Thus-Gone One “Lion’s Roar, King of Drum Sound,” the present Buddha “Immaculate Abundant Splendor Who Outshines Sun and Moon” was an upholder of the dharma called “Utterly Joyous Senses.” He was endowed with the conduct of means of someone who does not think about something to be adopted or to be discarded. He taught those

with sharp faculties who wish for just the expression of the initial phrases [with the words], “All phenomena have the nature of desire. They have the nature of hatred and dullness. They are unobscured. Also all conduct has the same defining characteristic.” Thus, he placed them in [the state of] endurance.<sup>1610</sup>

At that time, I (Mañjuśrī) was [also] an upholder of the dharma called “Intelligent Insight of the Victors.” I had attained the meditative [stabilities of the form] and the form[less realms], was endowed with the qualities of purification, and proclaimed the flaws of worldly hustle and bustle as well as the praises of solitary seclusion. One day I enjoyed my alms in the home of a lay man who was a disciple of the above upholder of the dharma and taught the dharma to the lay man’s son who had attained endurance. When I deprecated the dharma and this person by saying, “This former upholder of the dharma taught wrongly,” the lay man’s son said, “Venerable One, how do You understand desire?” “I understand it as completely afflicted.” “Well, then, is desire inside or is it outside? Desire is neither inside nor is it outside. In this way, desire is neither inside nor outside. Thus, it is also not in any of the cardinal and directional points. If this is the case, it is unarisen: So what from among afflicted phenomena or purified phenomena could exist in what is unarisen?” Having heard this, I (this fully ordained monk) got irritated and angry, went off without even taking my alms with me, [818] and accused the above upholder of the dharma in the middle of the spiritual community. Then the above upholder of the dharma said amid the spiritual community:

It was declared that desire is nirvāṇa.  
Hatred and dullness are just like this.  
Enlightenment is their very abode.  
A Buddha’s enlightenment is inconceivable.

Those who completely impute desire  
And do so with hatred and dullness too,  
For them, a Buddha’s enlightenment is as far away  
As the sky from the earth.

The duo of enlightenment and desire do not exist as two.  
Engaging in them is the same; they are endowed with equality.  
For naïve beings who are frightened by the dharma of these,

Buddha enlightenment is far away.

Desire does not arise and does not cease.

Mind does not become afflicted.

Those whose minds are attached to observed identities

Are thrown into the lower realms through desire.

and

For those who become mad through being bloated with ethics

And who remain entirely in referential views,

There is no enlightenment nor any Buddha qualities.

and

Those who see the conditioned and the unconditioned

Will not move somewhere other than within samsaric phenomena.

Those who realize the basic element [as] equality

Will swiftly become supremely enlightened beings.

If someone never sees any

Of the Buddha's qualities nor the Buddha's speech,

That one is untainted by all phenomena,

Vanquishes the demons, and will also truly awaken into  
enlightenment.

and

The Buddhadharmas equal space . . .

This dharma of the genuine king of dharma is unmoving,

Without being, without characteristics, and in the same way

Empty of nature. Not hearing this dharma,

Naïve beings fall into the great abyss. [819]

Through such teachings, thirty-two thousand gods attained endurance of the unarisen dharma, and eighty thousand fully ordained monks attained arhathood. After I (the fully ordained monk "Intelligent Insight of the Victors") had died, I experienced limitless lower realms and even as a human being I [only] earned disgrace. For many hundred thousand eons I did not hear the name Victor; for seventy-six thousand lifetimes I fell away from ordination; and for many thousand lifetimes my faculties were weak. Nevertheless, because of having heard these verses, my actions became purified and I attained this kind of



endurance [that was taught above] wherever I was born. Thus, I became Mañjuśrī, the supreme of the bodhisattvas who propound emptiness.

After [Mañjuśrī] had reported this, the Blessed One declared, “Since entities are like that, it does not matter whether one enters the vehicle of bodhisattvas or enters the vehicle of hearers. If someone does not have such obscurations of painful toil and no such sufferings, such a being will not reject the genuine dharma, will not disparage the genuine dharma, and will not be angry toward any dharma whatsoever.”

*The Sūtra That Is a Synopsis of the Entirety of Complete Pulverization* says:

Mañjuśrī, I do not call clinging “bodhisattva conduct.” I do not call attachment to a home “completely pure livelihood.” I do not say that those who teach duality are released from being destitute of dharma. I do not say that those who teach one single nature are released from the lower realms. I do not say, “Those who delight in talking are entirely pure.” Mañjuśrī, I teach the gates of dharma which are as numerous as the grains of sand in the river Gaṅgā in a way that is non-referential.

Likewise, there are so many ways that this is taught, starting from the gates of discriminating notions that involve observed objects, emptiness, and sentient beings, followed by signlessness, nonconceptuality, and [820] wishlessness, the person and the nonexistence of the person, existence and nonexistence, the conditioned and the unconditioned, expediency and the nonexistence of expediency, secrecy and the nonexistence of secrecy, cyclic existence and nirvāṇa, the mundane and the supramundane, desire, hatred, and dullness, up to and including the gate of relinquishment. Mañjuśrī, if all of these were the way of being of the perfection of knowledge through [just] the way of being of impermanence, then you would only know a single tiny fraction of a fraction of the [perfection of knowledge] and thus deprecate the Thus-Gone One.

If people who have rejected the dharma confess this three times every twenty-four hours for seven years, they are purified. If [such persons] are close to attaining endurance, they will [attain it] in ten eons.

It is stated that you will regress [in your spiritual development] if you talk about this dharma without having trained in it first. You should

speaking about it through abiding in the four equalities: the equality of sentient beings, the equality of phenomena, [the equality of] enlightenment, and [the equality of] insight. Otherwise, you will regress.

*The Ornament [of Sūtras]* states:

If [anger] is inappropriate even toward inappropriate forms,  
 There is no need to mention [the anger] toward the dharma that one doubts.  
 Therefore, it is excellent to rest in equanimity—this has no flaw.<sup>1611</sup>

In this land of Tibet, those who know a little bit of the dialectic approach and such are very haughty. It seems that they grasp at the scope of all phenomena and decide, “There are no explanations [of the dharma] except for [those in] all the sūtras and tantras.” The one who loudly proclaims such things as, “Except for Candrakīrti in India and me in Tibet, there is no one who understands the Centrist view” is set up by them as the supreme one among the learned.<sup>1612</sup> Nevertheless, such [assertions] are just points to be examined for a while, but I certainly have my doubts about taking them as my refuge.

Therefore, [*The Sūtra of the Arrival in Lanka* 821] says:

O Mahāmati, what is called “having studied a lot” means being skilled in the meaning but does not mean being skilled in the terms. Being skilled in the meaning refers to such words that are not blended with any of the words of the word-builders.<sup>1613</sup> Thus, what will never make either yourself or others fall, O Mahāmati, is to keep in mind a lot of studies that pertain to the meaning.<sup>1614</sup>

The peel of a sugar cane plant does not have any core at all,  
 [But] what is delightful dwells inside it.  
 Human beings who eat the peel  
 Are not able to find the delicious taste of sugar cane.  
 Here, what resembles the peel are the words,  
 And what resembles the taste is reflecting about the meaning.<sup>1615</sup>

Thus, it is taught that words and letters are very insignificant.

However, if [it really were the case that] the teaching of the Blessed One Śākyamuni had liberated only one single human being in India and one single human being in Tibet, then what kind of enlightened activity of the Blessed One [for the welfare of all sentient beings] is this supposed to be?

In this way, it is difficult to aspire to and have trust in this topic of the inconceivable great vehicle. Hence, it is explained in every sūtra of the great vehicle, such as the perfection of knowledge, that [even] mere conviction and rejoicing in the dharma of the great vehicle is of greater benefit than generosity and making offerings:

Merely not rejecting this sūtra and having confidence in it is of greater benefit than providing all the necessary supplies for numerous Buddhas for many eons.

Therefore, *The Sublime Continuum* says:

Those with intelligent insight who are filled with devotion for this object  
of the Victors  
Are vessels for the assembly of the Buddha qualities.  
Through truly taking delight in the assembly of inconceivable qualities,  
They outshine the merits of all sentient beings.

Some who strive for enlightenment may constantly offer golden  
[Buddha-]fields bedecked with jewels  
That are equal in number to the particles of [all] Buddha-fields to the  
dharma kings every day.  
Others [822] may hear just one word of this [dharma] and, upon hearing  
it, their hearts will overflow with devotion.  
These persons will obtain merits far greater than the virtues that spring  
from such generosity.

Some with intelligent insight who wish for unsurpassable enlightenment  
May observe immaculate ethics with body, speech, and mind through  
great effort for many eons.  
Others may just hear one word of this and, upon hearing it, their hearts  
will overflow with devotion.  
These persons will obtain merits far greater than the virtues that spring  
from such ethics.

Some may complete right here the meditative stabilities that extinguish  
the blaze of all afflictions within the three realms of existence—  
The meditative states of the gods and Brahmā—and thus cultivate them  
as the means for perfect immutable enlightenment.  
Others may hear just one word of this and, upon hearing it, their hearts  
will overflow with devotion.

These persons will obtain merits far greater than the virtues that spring from such meditative stabilities.<sup>1616</sup>

To say nothing of other virtues, [this is even true for] all virtues such as the following: Some people with the inspiration of the special engaging mind [of enlightenment] may perform generosity toward as many Buddhas as there are grains of sand in the river Gaṅgā every day for eons, such as offering them special things like golden Buddha-fields bedecked with jewels whose number equals the particles of Buddha-fields. Others may observe pure ethics for the sake of unsurpassable enlightenment for many eons. Some may cultivate meditation up to the fourth meditative stability as well as the aspiring and engaging mind of enlightenment for a long time. However, if you hear just a few words that are dressed in any one of the seven vajra points, then this virtue outshines all these former virtues. This is the case because the sūtras state that for each and every one of these [virtues above] you will obtain far greater merits [through the vajra points] than through them.

This is also established through reasoning because of the following: Through generosity, one obtains nothing but mere wealth. Through ethics, nothing but a body in the higher states [is gained]. [823] Through meditation, one achieves nothing but the relinquishment of the afflictive obscurations, but this does not function as the direct remedy for all obscurations. On the other hand, the knowledge that sees true reality relinquishes the two obscurations together with the latent tendencies at their root. The sole cause for the arising of such knowledge is hearing such profound specifications of the dharma [of knowledge].

You wonder why? Generosity accomplishes wealth,  
Ethics higher states, and meditation relinquishes afflictions.  
Knowledge relinquishes all afflictive and cognitive [obscurations].  
Therefore, it is the most sublime and its cause is hearing this.<sup>1617</sup>

This is the way in which the Blessed One Maitreya has established the [great vehicle] through both scripture and reasoning.

Thus, it is difficult to aspire to this dharma of the great vehicle with inferior intelligent insight. If one has rejected it, one has to experience grave [results of] complete maturation for a while. However, precisely the mere hearing [of the dharma of the great vehicle] is what puts an end to the [cyclic] existence of such a sentient being later. Hence, the benefit of hearing it is immeasurable. *The Sūtra That Teaches Bodhisattva Conduct*<sup>1618</sup> states:

Three years after the boy [called] Precious Gift had been born, he attained endurance at the time when our Teacher first developed the mind of enlightenment in the past. After three hundred thousand eons

had passed, [Precious Gift] taught that all phenomena are nothing to be adopted or rejected. At that point, Mañjuśrī asked him, “If your dharma teaching is of this kind, which words do you use to teach it to beginner bodhisattvas?”

He said, “[I start with] such [statements] as, ‘Do not reject desire, do not dispel hatred, do not eliminate dullness, do not ascend above a real personality.’ Then I say, ‘Do not engage mentally in the Buddha, do not think about the dharma, do not make offerings to the spiritual community, do not take up the trainings, do not strive for utter peace of existence, do not cross the river.’ With these kinds of instructions, beginner bodhisattvas [824] should be counseled and taught. You might wonder why [I say this]. The reason is that the nature of all phenomena is just abiding. Naïve beings specify them as arising and ceasing phenomena. [However,] this expanse of dharmas is characterized by nonconceptuality. Such realization of the nature of these phenomena is enlightenment. You should understand this by thinking, ‘If someone is instructed in the aforesaid manner and is not afraid, is not frightened and will not be frightened, e ma, this is a bodhisattva who does not revert. This [bodhisattva] has the karmic disposition for the ground of irreversibility.’ Thus, through these instructions, one should develop delight again and again.”

At that point, eight fully ordained monks [whose minds] were referential did not feel devotion for such [teachings] and went away from the retinue. They died upon vomiting fresh blood and were reborn in the howling hell. Mañjuśrī said, “Alas, now look at all this harm that your dharma specification has inflicted on these fully ordained monks!”

The Blessed One pronounced, “Mañjuśrī, do not talk like this. If they had not heard this dharma, they would not even be reborn in any pleasant realms for one million eons, let alone become enlightened. It is precisely through hearing this dharma with their qualms that they become liberated from hell this very day and are reborn as gods in Tuṣita. They will please ten billion Buddhas for sixty-eight eons and live as miraculously born wheel-rulers<sup>1619</sup> throughout this time. Thereafter, they will become Buddhas who are [all] called Immaculate Light.” During this prophecy, the sons of the gods arrived and said, “Blessed One, we rejoice in this specification of the dharma.” They became nonreturners in this very moment.

*The Sūtra of the Abiding of Mañjuśrī*<sup>1620</sup> says:

It is without analysis, [825] without discursiveness, utter peace. There is no claim of any statements such as “It exists,” “It does not exist,” “It both exists and does not exist,” or “It does neither exist nor not exist.” Once these are not claimed, this is nonreferentiality. Since this is freedom from all discursiveness, there is no mind and [there is] freedom from mind. It is called “abiding in the dharma of practicing positivity in the manner of nonabiding.”

Through this teaching, four hundred fully ordained monks became arhats. Another one hundred [fully ordained monks] were deeply disturbed and stayed behind. They fell into the howling hell.

[This sūtra] gives the following prophecy:

If they had not heard this dharma, they definitely would have fallen into this hell [realm anyway], but through hearing this dharma, they come into contact with the sufferings of this hell only for a single moment and are instantly reborn as gods in Tuṣita. [Later,] they will attain arhathood as the first followers of [the coming Buddha] Maitreya.

Also *The Dharmamudrā Sūtra*<sup>1621</sup> states:

[The Buddha] spoke, “Neither going beyond the phenomena of ordinary beings nor attaining uncontaminated phenomena—this is the ordination in the excellently spoken dharma of the vinaya and the supramundane completion of the vows. With this [kind of ordination and vows] it is appropriate to partake of [offerings] that are given out of confidence, whereas everything else is perverted ordination.” Then Śāriputra and Subhūti ascertained the meaning of this, through which seven hundred fully ordained monks became arhats. One hundred got up [and left] because of not feeling devotion for this [teaching]. Five rejected it and stayed behind. Through [having heard] it, they fell into the hells but were instantly liberated [from them].

There are also many other [quotations] like these.

Thus, I can only pray: You self-appointed learned ones, please do not delimit the scope of the dharma, and do not reject some dharmas just because they may not be in accordance with some fraction of your own texts or just because they

may not be in accordance with some fraction of the phraseology of naïve masters or their textbooks.

In this way, the establishment [of the great vehicle] through scripture [826] has been explained extensively by including supplementary remarks.

#### 2.2.2.2. The Proof through Reasoning

The root of the teaching is full monkhood,  
And this full monkhood is ill established.  
A nirvāṇa of those whose minds are referential  
Is ill established too. [44]

This [verse] teaches that one does not attain [the state of] the ultimate fully ordained monk and nirvāṇa if one does not realize emptiness.

[826] If one does not rely on the great vehicle, one does not obtain the teaching of the Buddha completely. The reason for this is: It is certainly the case that **the root of the teaching is full monkhood, and this full monkhood is very ill established.**

You might think, “What are you talking about? [It is said,] ‘There are five [types of] fully ordained monks [that are described] in the vinaya: the fully ordained monk who just bears this name, the pretending fully ordained monk, the fully ordained monk who just seeks [alms], and the fully ordained monk who has vanquished the afflictions. [The fifth] is the one who has fully entered the order.<sup>1622</sup> [This is accomplished] through the fourfold act of requesting<sup>1623</sup> [that is performed] in this dharma [tradition]. [Here,] the intention is that he is the one who is to be called “fully ordained monk.”’ Thus, it is stated that the very one who receives the vows through the ritual of fourfold [activity], such as requesting, is the fully ordained monk. Therefore, [full monkhood] is well established.”

Such an [explanation] is nothing but an approach to temporarily take care of naïve beings. This is the case because the [actual] intention [here] is that the perfect fully ordained monk is the ultimate fully ordained monk. This is the [monk] who has vanquished the afflictions, and the only one who has completely vanquished the afflictions is the Buddha.

Hence, **a nirvāṇa of those whose minds are referential is ill established too** for the following reasons. Many sūtras—such as *The Sūtra of the White Lotus of Genuine Dharma*—explain this in an extensive way:

All the hearers did not pass into nirvāṇa.  
By engaging in enlightening conduct,  
All these hearers will become Buddhas.<sup>1624</sup>

The vehicle is just one, there are no two.  
 I taught two vehicles for the sake of [some needing to] take a rest.  
 Therefore, you fully ordained monks,  
 I do not pass into nirvāṇa today for just that much.  
 For the sake of omniscient wisdom,  
 You should generate extensive and genuine vigor.<sup>1625</sup>

Noble Śāriputra spoke [in this sūtra]:

Before, I was attached to views,  
 A wandering mendicant<sup>1626</sup> honored by the forders.  
 Then, the Protector knew my thoughts  
 And spoke about nirvāṇa in order that I be freed from views.

Having been freed from all that is a view, [827]  
 I attained the dharma of emptiness.  
 Therefore, I think, “I passed into nirvāṇa.”  
 Yet this is not what is called “nirvāṇa.”

When one has become a Buddha, the principal of sentient beings,  
 Honored by gods, humans, harmbringers, and evil ghosts,  
 And possesses the body with the thirty-two marks,  
 Then this is complete nirvāṇa.<sup>1627</sup>

The Blessed One Maitreya[‘s *Sublime Continuum*] explains:

Thus, without the attainment of Buddhahood,  
 Nirvāṇa is not attained,  
 Just as one is not able to watch the sun  
 Separated from its light and rays.<sup>1628</sup>

[The Buddha] has declared that one does not transcend being referential if one does not realize emptiness and that there is no way that someone who is referential could attain endurance.<sup>1629</sup> As he said this, how could it be possible that someone attains enlightenment who has not even attained endurance?

If liberation came from relinquishment of the afflictions,  
 It should happen immediately after this.  
 However, one sees the efficacy of actions



Even in those who lack afflictions. [45]

You might argue, “Here it has been determined  
That they do not have any craving that appropriates.”  
Why should they not also have unafflicted craving,  
Just as they have basic ignorance? [46]

Craving comes from the condition of feelings,  
And they do have feelings. [47ab]

These two and a half verses teach that even arhats are not released from karma.

You might say, “Even without the realization of emptiness, if one is **liberated** from **the afflictions**, this in itself is enlightenment.” Then it **would** follow that the [state that is attained] **immediately after this** liberation from the afflictions is perfect **relinquishment**. However, you cannot assert this, because it is explained that many results that are induced by former actions [exist] **even in those who** are asserted to be arhats of the inferior vehicle and **lack manifest afflictions**. [This can be seen from] such cases as Maudgalyāyana’s limbs being smashed by wandering ascetics, Udāyin being beheaded by a robber chief, Little Kubja [dying from] eating mud soup at the end of being ill for seven days, and Upasena being caught by poisonous snakes.

[Also the effects of] latent tendencies of afflictions are explained here, such as in the case of the arhat Kapīṭanaḥ who destroyed the reliquary of [a person called] Thursday out of his latent tendencies of hatred. There were also some [arhats] who yelled, “Ain’t they gorgeous!” at women and got all excited while guffawing with laughter. Or, we have such [reports] as the one about the two sons of Ānanda’s sister [828] who were fooling around with their miraculous powers after they had attained novitiate and arhathood at the age of seven: On their way to fetch water, they would send the pot ahead in space while they followed behind. Furthermore, there was Gavāmpati, who, due to his latent tendencies of affection, cried out, “Brother Pūrṇa!”<sup>1630</sup> Thus, **one sees** that they possess **the** latent tendencies of actions.

You might argue, “This is certainly true. However, **here, it has been determined that they do not have any craving that appropriates** further existences.” Agreed, those who are asserted to be hearer arhats surely do not have afflicted ignorance. However, since they do have unafflicted ignorance, their wisdom cannot engage in all knowable objects. Hence, they do not have this afflicted craving, but **why should they not have unafflicted craving, just as they have unafflicted basic ignorance?** [They indeed have unafflicted craving], because one sees them looking for food, taking medicine, and so on. You might think, “Well,

then, that follows for the Buddha too.” It does not: The purpose of such [beings] as the Buddha going for alms was already taught earlier.

Furthermore, [arhats of] the hearers and solitary realizers possess craving, because **craving** originates **from the condition of feelings, and they do have feelings**. You might say, “However, then it follows that coming into existence and being reborn must exist for them too, since craving leads to grasping, and [grasping] is followed by coming into existence.” They do not have any grasping or birth that are induced by manifest actions and afflictions. However, they do have [the kind of] grasping and birth that is the transformation in the form of inconceivable death and transition that is based on imprints through subtle latent tendencies. This is the ground of latent tendencies of basic unawareness.

Therefore, *The Sūtra of [the Lion’s Roar of Queen] Śrīmālā* and others declare that [arhats] do not attain the perfection of ultimate purity—the relinquishment of the ground of latent tendencies of basic unawareness—nor the [perfection] of ultimate permanence—the relinquishment of inconceivable death and transition. [829]

#### Referential minds

Become stuck here and there. [47cd]

Without emptiness, a fettered mind

Will arise again,

Just as in the case of the meditative absorption without  
discrimination. [48a–c]

These five lines teach that the stream of births will not be interrupted if one does not realize emptiness.

Of course, there are cases of **minds** that **refer** to some objects and thus **become stuck** somewhere, that is, in some meditative concentrations, for many eons. However, such is not essential at all. **Without** the realization of true **emptiness**, a **mind** that is **fettered** [in this way] at one time **will arise again** due to other conditions [at a later time], **just as in the case of the meditative absorption** of someone **without discrimination**. One’s mind stream is interrupted [in this meditative absorption] for [long periods], such as eighty-four thousand great eons, but one awakens again [from it] and is reborn in another place in cyclic existence.

#### 2.2.3. The Summary of the Function of Both of These [Types of Seeing]

Thus, you should meditate on emptiness. [48d]

For the sake of those who are burdened with suffering due to  
ignorance,  
One is released from the extremes of attachment and fear  
And will manage to remain in cyclic existence.  
This is the result of emptiness. [52]

These five lines explain the result of having meditated on emptiness.

Thus, no one at all is observable who is a meditator (a self or a person) and nothing whatsoever is visible that is to be meditated upon (any such aspect as conditioned or unconditioned, permanent or impermanent, real or delusive). Hence, no discrimination whatsoever is adopted or discarded, and nothing is observed in any way of meditating whatsoever. Even the apprehension of observation or nonobservation does not exist before immaculate knowledge. In consequence, no one abides at any point in anything whatsoever, and also this is not seen as an aspect of anything. This [nonseeing] means seeing perfect actuality and knowing that there is nobody who meditates on anything in any way whatsoever. Thus, not being stirred from just this is called “to meditate on emptiness.” A sūtra says:

Through this, once mind and observed object are perfectly and most  
directly not seen, this is seeing what is perfect.

*The Sūtra of the King of Meditative Concentration* says:

One finds that phenomena are unfindable,  
But also in [this] finding there is no finding.  
Those who know phenomena in this way  
Will realize ultimate enlightenment.

Space is explained to be ungraspable.  
You do not find anything to grasp in it.  
The nature of phenomena is precisely this—  
Ungraspable, just as space.

In this way, the dharma is taught: [830]  
There is nothing whatsoever in it to be seen.  
Inconceivable is this dharma  
Of those who do not see this dharma.

*The Sūtra of [the Meditative Concentration of] the Collection of All Merits*<sup>1631</sup> says:

If these phenomena are unobservable,

The unskilled ones who observe [them]  
Do not release themselves from suffering  
And their sufferings will increase.

You might ask, “What does it mean to see phenomena just as they are?” This is what it is: just nonseeing.

These and other [quotations] explain this extensively.

To abide in this emptiness is supreme love, the supreme of all perfections, [supreme] complete upholding of the genuine dharma, and supreme pure ethics. *The Sūtra [Requested by the King of the Kinnaras, Called] “Tree,”*<sup>632</sup> says:

“Sound of Music” [asked]:

“How come you embrace beings with love,  
When you have realized identitylessness?  
Identitylessness and love,  
How could they be the same?”

The emanated bodhisattvas who dwelled on lotus flowers on the tips of light rays answered:

Those who fully know emptiness  
Have internalized identitylessness.  
Those who know that beings are empty  
Are supreme in their love.

*The [Sūtra Requested by] Sky Treasure* applies this to all six [perfections], such as:

Not apprehending any phenomenon is supreme giving.

*The Sūtra of the King of Meditative Concentration* says:

Those who delight in peaceful emptiness  
Are those who have grasped this dharma of the Victor.  
Those who have grasped this meditative concentration  
Have taken ordination in my teaching  
And are the fully ordained monks with complete vows who perform the activities of restoration and purification.<sup>1633</sup>

This is also explained in many other places in the oceanlike collection of sūtras.

Therefore, in a manner of not meditating on anything at all, **you should meditate on** precisely just this perfect actuality that is beyond all observation.

You might ask, “What kind of result comes from meditating on this?” [831] All aspects of discrimination and observation as such and such are reversed. Thus, one knows that there is no phenomenon whatsoever to be attained through anything. This extinguishes [all] hopes for nirvāṇa. Just like knowing that a dream is a dream, one knows that suffering is not observable through its nature. Hence, there is no fear of cyclic existence. Apart from all phenomena just being mere imputations, they neither abide as any nature whatsoever nor do they abide as anything at all. Just this is what is seen as the very expanse of mind that is empty and luminous. This puts you in a position where you have complete power over everything you could possibly wish for, just as if all phenomena were resting in the palm of your hand.

Thus, by gaining power over and becoming very skilled in the dependent origination of the collections of causes for the entirety of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa, compassion for the assembly of sentient beings who do not realize this in the same way wells up unbearably. [However,] at this point, there is nothing to be observed as either oneself or sentient beings. To the same extent that great compassion increases, also this very [realization] that, primordially, nothing can be observed as sentient beings, what is not sentient beings, suffering, happiness, and so on grows and increases. This is the ultimate seeing that is like the orb of the sun. When it becomes stable and increases in such a way, great compassion—which is like the light rays of the sun—will grow even more than before. [Beings with such realization] do not behold sentient beings, but great compassion still flowers in them. They do not behold themselves either, but they still lend their support to all sentient beings. They do not behold anything to be attained whatsoever, but they still establish beings in great enlightenment. Just as there is no place whatsoever to go to beyond space, they do not behold anybody who would go somewhere beyond, but they still display [the activity of] liberating sentient beings from cyclic existence.

Thus, who would be able to realize the way of conduct of those who possess demeanors that [seem to be] contradictory to the world? Therefore, [832] what is the point of draining ourselves—who are just flies buzzing around—by [trying to] gauge the scope of these skylike bodhisattvas with our wingspan? Consequently, we should sincerely devote ourselves to being respectful [to them], rejoicing [in their actions] with nothing but respect, praising their qualities, and aspiring that we too will be like them.

Hence, just as skillful physicians exert themselves for the sake of the diseased, one makes one-pointed efforts **for the sake of those who are ignorant** since beginningless time because of various [ways of] having reference points. [Ignorant beings] only exert themselves for the causes of **suffering** and then angrily

look at the results [of this]. They **burden** themselves **with** their own sufferings by plunging into a swamp that they stirred up themselves, and then they have no clue what to do. Just as [people outside the swamp] know that this swamp in which these naïve beings are drowning is shallow and small, one fully comprehends the nature of cyclic existence through knowing true reality. Thus, **one is released from both the extremes of attachment to and fear of swamplike cyclic existence.** Through knowing that oneself moreover has the ability to pull sentient beings out [of this swamp], one **will manage to remain in cyclic existence** for the sake of others as long as space exists. **This is the direct result of having meditated on emptiness.** The Blessed One Maitreya says [in *The Sublime Continuum*]:

With supreme knowledge, they cut through craving for identity without exception.

Because they cherish sentient beings, they possess loving kindness and do not attain peace.

In this way, through relying on insight and loving kindness, the means for enlightenment,

The noble ones dwell neither in the seeming nor nirvāṇa.<sup>1634</sup>

and [in *The Ornament of Clear Realization*]:

Not abiding in existence through knowledge,  
Not abiding in peace through compassion . . .<sup>1635</sup>

**Thus, one cannot uphold any faultfinding  
In the thesis of emptiness.  
Therefore, you should meditate on emptiness  
Without entertaining any doubts. [53]**

This verse instructs one to relinquish doubts.

To wish for a harvest—the result—but to reject farming—its cause—is something that is ridiculed in the world even by cattle herders. **Thus**, in the same way, the ones who wish for enlightenment—the result—**cannot uphold any faultfinding in or any denial of the thesis of emptiness**—its cause. [833] **Therefore**, by not relying on the talk of evil friends and **without entertaining any doubts, you should meditate solely on this emptiness**, the basic nature of entities which is the nature of all phenomena.

[803] **Emptiness is the remedy for the darkness**

Of afflictive and cognitive obscurations.  
So how could those who wish for omniscience  
Not swiftly meditate on it? [54]

Granted, things that produce suffering  
Will give rise to fear.  
However, emptiness is what relieves suffering,  
So why should it provoke any fear? [55]

These [two] verses teach that it is very reasonable to meditate on [emptiness].

You might think, “What are you talking about? [In lines 52cd,] you proclaim:

And will manage to remain in cyclic existence.  
This is the result of emptiness.

If this is the case, then this is something through which one does not attain liberation from cyclic existence.”

In general, solely through one's understanding cyclic existence and *nirvāṇa* as emptiness, the chains of both existence and peace will uncoil by themselves. There is no question that precisely this is a liberation that cannot be rivaled even by one hundred thousand liberations of hearers and solitary realizers. However, one still abides in cyclic existence for the sake of others through compassion, just as a skilled physician does not abandon the assembly of the diseased. [Such abiding] is nothing other than [abiding] like a lotus that is unstained by mud. Hence, [a person who abides] in such a way is not called “someone in cyclic existence,” just as a physician is not called a “sick person.”

This much is certainly true, but, moreover, only **emptiness is the direct remedy for the thick inner darkness** that obscures true reality, that is, the collection of **afflictive and cognitive obscurations**. Because one has engaged in emptiness through devoted interest on [the paths of] accumulation and junction, emptiness—which is, like space, without any difference—is realized on the path of seeing in a manner of being omnipresent. Through the power of eliminating adventitious stains on the paths of meditation, every aspect of the qualities intrinsic to emptiness is revealed. [This is] as if one were to fathom the extents and special features of every [instance of] space exactly as they are, starting from the space of the limitless realms of sentient beings down to the [space] that is enclosed by the fibrils of the split tip of a hair. Finally, it is as if one were to simultaneously and fully comprehend in one single moment the entirety of the element of space that is included in the three times and is beyond unity and multiplicity. Likewise, in one single moment, one simultaneously and fully comprehends the entirety of the expanse of dharmas (or emptiness) exactly as it is. It is beyond unity and

multiplicity and has always been intrinsic to all Buddhas, bodhisattvas, hearers, solitary realizers, and sentient beings; to all the five aggregates; the eighteen constituents; the twelve sources; and to all the factors to be relinquished [834] or to be attained. In dependence on the worldly seeming level, [this final realization is described by] saying, “Perfect Buddhahood is attained.”

Thus, it does not matter whether this pertains to **those who wish for swift attainment of omniscience** or to bodhisattvas who adopt the subjugating conduct<sup>1636</sup> of great desire and wish to remain in cyclic existence for the sake of others for as long as space exists. Since the cause for attaining such a [goal] is solely the knowledge of emptiness, **how could they not meditate on emptiness?** Rather, it is [truly] appropriate to meditate on this very [emptiness].

You might venture, “Since we did not train in emptiness, we are afraid of it.” **Granted**, in worldly contexts, it is adequate that **things that produce suffering will give rise to fear. However**, in such worldly contexts, it is [likewise] stated as inadequate to be afraid of something that is beneficial, just as one is afraid of a disease but not of medicine and a physician. **So** if this **emptiness** is like the supreme physician, since it is **what relieves** the entire disease of reification and the **suffering** [that is connected with it], **why should it provoke any fear?** Rather, this [emptiness] is doubtlessly something to put your confidence in.

### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

As for [verse 44], Kalyāṇadeva says:

Just this one who serves as a basis that contains the root of the vows of a fully ordained monk is the fully ordained monk. However, this very [monk] is ill established, since there is dispute [about him] with the forders.<sup>1637</sup>

Thus, he puts forth the speculation that there is an equal application of the entailment by [the reason in lines 43cd:] “As are certain of their parts [disputed] between you and others.” [He continues with verses 44–47:]

As long as there is clinging to the aggregates by those who are referential, for that long the pride of clinging to an I is generated and there are actions and births. Thus, nirvāṇa is ill [established] too. You might object, “It is not ill [established], because the afflictions are relinquished by seeing reality.” Therefore, [verse 45] “If liberation came from . . .” is [taught]. . . . Someone else [835] might say, “Here, afflicted and neutral craving as well as negativities of the desire realm are used in terms of the origination of further existences. If possessing joyous



desire means possessing afflictions, why were [lines 45cd] ‘However, one sees the efficacy of actions . . .’ spoken?” The implication [of this] is as follows: It is asserted that dullness is afflicted too, since it is the great seed for afflictions. Its latent tendencies exist also in this referential mind of unafflicted ignorance that entails basic unawareness. Likewise, unafflicted latent tendencies exist also in unafflicted craving: These are feelings. . . . [Feelings themselves] are not afflicted, but if they meet with cooperative causes, they produce something afflicted. This is what is taught by the term “also” [in line 46c]. Therefore, [lines 46cd–47ab] “Why should they not . . .” are stated. You might say, “Causes are not something that definitely produces results.” Therefore, [lines 47cd] “Referential minds . . .” are given.<sup>1638</sup>

These are the passages that appear [in Kalyāṇadeva’s commentary]. However, this answer [to the question about lines 45cd] that he gives—that “dullness is an affliction”—is a basis for analysis. The reason for this is that [his answer] is affected by the [above] qualm [of the opponent] that it is not reasonable [for Śāntideva] to say, “However, one sees the efficacy of actions . . .”

Vibhūticandra comments:

The one who has extinguished the afflictions is the fully ordained monk. This is not accomplished if emptiness is not realized. [This meaning] is established by [verse 45] “If liberation came from . . .”

[Line 44b] “And this full monkhood is ill established” and the two lines [44cd] “A nirvāṇa of those whose minds are referential . . .” teach again that nirvāṇa is difficult for those who mentally engage in discursiveness.<sup>1639</sup>

He removes objections:

You might wonder, “However, if suffering does not actually exist, what is the point of remaining in cyclic existence?” The reason is that, on the seeming level, sentient beings are observed.<sup>1640</sup>

In *The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points*, the following appears:

[As for verse 44:] Among the five [kinds of] fully ordained monks, the fully ordained monk who has vanquished the afflictions is the one to be identified here [836]. If emptiness does not exist, it follows that the fully ordained monk of the nirvāṇa with remainder does not exist

[either]. Those who have vanquished the afflictions are the roots of the teaching for the following reasons: (a) The assembly of arhats collects, upholds, and protects the teaching. (b) It is explained that they remain even now in different countries, such as Kashmir, for the sake of upholding and protecting the teaching. (c) If someone asks, “How is it that having vanquished the afflictions is unjustified without emptiness?” the reason is that the [afflictions] arise again, since their seeds have not been relinquished. Or [you might say], “Having vanquished the afflictions is justified, but nirvāṇa without remainder is not justified.” [The answer is in lines 44cd] “A nirvāṇa of those whose minds are referential . . .” [You might continue,] “However, once the aggregates that were induced in the past are extinguished, this is nirvāṇa, since [there are] no [aggregates] that could be reborn.” In order to anticipate such a qualm, [verse 46 says,] “You might argue, ‘Here, it has been determined . . .’” [Arhats] do not possess any striving for such aggregates that involve clinging to an I. However, they do possess craving that strives for the aggregates [as such], because they possess striving for food. It is taught that such [craving] exists [in them], since its causes are complete. [This is found in verse 47] “Craving comes from . . .” It is explained in such [scriptures] as *The Sublime Continuum* and *The Sūtra [of the Lion’s Roar of Queen] Śrīmālā* that inconceivable death and transition exist [for these arhats].

The following phrases [indicate that the opponents] are forced to accept that these passages above do apply to the inferior vehicle’s [own] texts:

You yourself assert that those who have vanquished the afflictions are the supreme fully ordained monks, because it is the arhats who perform the actual main activities of the teaching.

Following this, there appears what seems to be a further rebuttal by using the great vehicle’s own texts as [a source of] valid cognition:

If you do not realize emptiness, you are not able to relinquish the afflictions. Hence, there is no nirvāṇa or arhathood in the inferior vehicle.

In *The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Knowledge Chapter Only*, both [versions] appear as supplementary words: Full monkhood is ill established for the reason that there is dispute about it and that it is hard to vanquish the afflictions.<sup>1641</sup>

### 3. The Way to Meditate on Emptiness

This has two parts:

- 1) Personal identitylessness
- 2) Phenomenal identitylessness

#### 3.1. Personal Identitylessness

This has five parts: [837]

- 1) Teaching that a [personal] identity in general is not established
- 2) The particular refutation of the Enumerators' assertion
- 3) The refutation of the Logicians
- 4) Teaching that karma is not contradictory to identitylessness
- 5) The ancillary refutation of the Analyzers and of the [specific kind of] person [that is asserted by] the followers of Vātsīputra in our own faction

##### 3.1.1. Teaching That a [Personal] Identity in General Is Not Established

If there were something called "I,"  
It might be afraid of things here and there.  
However, since there is no "I" at all,  
Who is it who could be afraid? [56]

This first verse teaches that there is no self that is the one who is afraid.

[839] It has been taught [in verse 55] that emptiness is not something to be afraid of:

However, emptiness is what relieves suffering,  
So why should it provoke any fear?

This is definitely the case. On the other hand, **if there were something called "I"** that is the one who is afraid, it would of course be reasonable that **it might be afraid of things here and there** that one can be afraid of. **However, since there is no "I" at all**—not even a tiny one—it is not reasonable to be afraid. So first, [840] examine the one **who could be afraid**.

I am not the teeth, hair, or nails,  
Nor bones or blood.  
I am neither nasal mucus nor phlegm,  
Nor lymph or pus. [57]

I am not marrow nor sweat,  
 Nor am I fat, entrails,  
 Or any of the other inner organs.  
 I am also not excrement or urine. [58]

I am not flesh or sinew,  
 Nor am I the body's warmth, its respiration,  
 Or its orifices.  
 I am not the six consciousnesses in any way either. [59]

[The first eleven lines of] these verses teach that the body is not the self, and the last line teaches that the mind is not the self either.

You might state, "The body is the self." There is no body other than the collection of its parts. However, the parts are not the self, nor is there any self within them. Thus, **I am not teeth, hair, or nails**, as these are [just] bones and hairs. It is not reasonable that **I am** such [things] as **bones** or body hairs. Likewise, **I am not blood** and blood is not me either. **I am neither nasal mucus nor phlegm, nor lymph or pus**. This is the case because these [substances] are filthy and it is not reasonable that the self is something filthy, nor is it reasonable that something filthy is the self.

**I am not marrow nor sweat**, as these two [substances] are nothing but the water element [in] the interior [of the body]. **I am not fat, entrails, or any of the other inner organs**, because they are nothing but flesh. **I am also not excrement or urine**, because these two [substances] are the waste products of food and drink. **I am not flesh or sinew**, nor bones, blood vessels, nerves, or tendons. The reasons are as follows: [Everybody can] see that flesh and so forth that are scattered on a charnel ground are not the self, nor are they what belong to this self at all. Furthermore, one [can] not see a difference between the [flesh and such on a charnel ground] and the flesh and so forth of this [living] body. [Thus,] these [nine lines of verse] teach that the [inner] earth element and water element are not the self.

In the same way, **I am not the body's warmth** (the fire element) or **respiration**<sup>1642</sup> (the factor of the breath that involves inhalation, exhalation, and pause). These are just like fire in a stove and the wind that kindles it, which are not the self. **Nor** am I its various other inner **orifices**, such as the ones in the nose. They are just like outer windows, which are not the self.

Now you might continue, "Granted, the body is surely not the self, but the mind is the self." **I am not** these **six consciousnesses** that engage in objects, such as the eye [consciousness], **in any way either**. The reasons are as follows: These [consciousnesses] arise in dependence on objects, such as form, [841] whereas it is not reasonable that the self depends on conditions. Also, they are referred to as

“mine” by such discriminating notions as “my eye consciousness.” If they were the self, it would be contradictory [to say] that they are mine, because this is as impossible as something being both me and my horse. There is also no mind that is other than the six collections [of consciousness], because consciousness is just one single collection of consciousness and it is just this [single collection of consciousness] that is presented as sixfold due to [its apprehension of six kinds of] objects.

Then you might try, “The ground consciousness is the self.” [However,] this is taught nowhere other than in the context of the great vehicle. [For example, *The Sūtra That Unravels the Intention* says]:

The appropriating consciousness is profound and subtle.

All seeds flow into it like a river.

It is not appropriate to conceive of it as a self.

Hence, I did not teach it to naïve beings.<sup>1643</sup>

Even when one [tries to] present the ground consciousness [as the self], this is not the self either, because it is also referred to by the discriminating notion “mine.” In general, [the Buddha] proclaimed the ground [consciousness] with an intention, which was to reverse the view of causelessness. However, the [ground consciousness] is not something that exists by its nature for the following reasons: It is not present on the Buddha ground. [The Buddha’s] main teaching is the dharma wheel in which, on the final level, the ground [consciousness] does not exist. There, he said:

Those who assert the ground [consciousness] do not assert the dharma.

If there were a self other than body and mind, it would be reasonable that it appears to oneself, because it is impossible for it to be a phenomenon that is hidden from oneself. [However,] such [a self] does not appear. Thus, whether it is on the seeming level or the ultimate level, and whether it is under analysis or [just] conventionally, a self is never possible.

### 3.1.2. The Particular Refutation of the Enumerators’ Assertion

The Enumerators state the following: The self is [mere] consciousness. [The self’s] own nature is [called] “the individual”<sup>1644</sup> which is endowed with this [mere consciousness]. Due to [the individual’s] desire, the equilibrium of the triad of “motility,” “darkness,” and “lightness”<sup>1645</sup>—that is, the permanent “nature”<sup>1646</sup>—becomes imbalanced. This is what is called universal flux<sup>1647</sup> [or “manifestation”], which involves arising and ceasing. [842] [In this process, first,] “the great one,” or “cognition,”<sup>1648</sup> [splits off] from its [original] unity with this permanent [“nature”].

From ["cognition" manifests] "identification,"<sup>1649</sup> and thence the five "essential elements,"<sup>1650</sup> such as the one of sound. These become shifted toward "cognition," which is like a two-sided mirror. Thus, they appear for and are experienced by the self like reflections [in a mirror]. Apprehending [these objects] through "cognition" is what is sensed by "the individual." Hence, the self is something that permanently has the nature of consciousness, such as [the consciousness] of sound.<sup>1651</sup>

The refutation of this is as follows:

If [the self] were the consciousness of sound,  
It would perceive sound all the time.  
Excuse me—without a knowable object, what is it aware of?  
So why do you even speak about "consciousness"? [60]

You might venture, "It is consciousness without something  
knowable."  
Then it would follow that even a piece of wood is consciousness.  
It is definite that there is no consciousness  
Without a knowable object being close by. [61]

These two verses refute permanent perception of sound.

If, according to you, [this permanent self] **were the consciousness of sound**, then it follows that sound resounds uninterruptedly, since this consciousness **would perceive sound all the time**. Therefore, the sound of conch shells and the sound of lutes **would** be uninterrupted and [would occur] independent of any effort, such as blowing these conch shells or playing the lutes. You might say, "Sometimes sound does not occur, since the object sound is not close by." **Excuse me—if there is no knowable object**, since sound is not close by, **what is this consciousness aware of** at this time? So tell us—**why do you even speak about "consciousness of sound"**?

You might venture, "It is consciousness of sound even when it is **without the knowable object sound**." Then it would follow that even a piece of wood is consciousness, because [consciousness] does not need to be conscious of an object. It is definite that there is no arising of consciousness without a **knowable object being close by**. Therefore, do not prattle about a consciousness that perceives sound even when there is no sound.

You might continue, "Exactly this is what is conscious of form."  
Then why would it not also hear at that time?  
You might say, "Because no sound is close by."  
In that case, there is also no consciousness of it. [62]

**How is it that something whose nature it is to perceive sound  
Could perceive form? [63ab]**

These one and a half verses refute that this [very consciousness of sound] perceives form.

**You might continue**, “Exactly this permanent cognition [that perceives sound] **is what is conscious of form** when an object is close by, even when it is not conscious of sound.” **Then why would it not also hear sound at that time?** [It should do so,] because it is permanent as the consciousness of sound. Furthermore, the following [consequence] will fall on you: You would have to hear the sound of a conch shell when you see a white conch shell, because a white conch shell is the support for the sound of this conch shell and [because, according to you,] this permanent consciousness sees the form of the conch shell close by, while at the same time there is no difference between the sound of this conch shell and the form of this conch shell in that the [first of these two] objects is close by and [the other] is far away. **You might say**, “There is no sound, **because no object sound is close by.**” **In that case, there is also no consciousness of this sound.** If there is no horn of a rabbit, [843] where should there be a consciousness of it? This is just the same. If you agree here [by saying], “This is how it is,” then [your] thesis of a permanent consciousness of sound has just collapsed.

So, again we have to ask you: How should this work? **How is it that** this consciousness **whose nature it is to perceive sound could perceive form?** You might say, “This is just like a single person who may be presented as a son in dependence on [his] father and as a father in dependence on [his] son.”

**One single person may be conceived as both father and son,  
But this is not how it really is. [63cd]**

**Thus, lightness, motility, and darkness  
Are neither father nor son.  
One does not see their nature  
In connection with the perception of sound. [64]**

These one and a half verses refute the example of dependence that is given [by the opponent].

**One single person may sometimes be conceived as father and sometimes as son.** These are [just] conceptions in dependence [on other persons], **but** his [being a father or a son] **is not how it really is**, since [such a person] is neither father nor son when not considered in dependence [on his child or parents respectively]. **Thus, lightness** (pleasure), **motility** (suffering), **and darkness** (dullness) that you

assert **are neither father nor son**, because they do not depend on anything whatsoever.<sup>1652</sup> You might disagree, “They depend on manifestations.” However, at the time of not being dependent [on these manifestations], nobody **sees the nature** of motility, darkness, and lightness **in connection with the perception of sound**.<sup>1653</sup>

“Just like an actor, this same entity assumes different forms.”  
 However, then it is something impermanent.  
 You might continue, “The same entity has different natures.”  
 Such a singularity is something unprecedented indeed. [65]

You might say, “Its different forms are not real.”  
 Then just describe its own form!  
 Your answer is, “It is just consciousness.”  
 In that case, it would follow that all beings are one. [66]

Also, the cognizant and the incognizant would be one,  
 Because both are equal in just being existent.  
 Now, when the particulars are mistaken,  
 What would be their common ground? [67]

These verses refute that [the self] is real as something permanent and single.

You might say now, “**Just like an actor** takes on different forms—such as Arjuna or Bhīma<sup>1654</sup>—in every moment, **this same** consciousness **assumes** different aspects in **different forms**.” However, then it is certain that **this** consciousness **is something impermanent**, because it changes moment by moment. **You might continue**, “The actor takes on various **different natures**, but the actor **is the same**. Likewise, though it assumes different aspects, this self that entails a permanent consciousness that perceives sound is just a single one. Hence, there is no mistake.” Well, we can only rebuke you: If [the self] is supposed to be both the **singularity** of a self that entails this permanent consciousness that perceives sound and at the same time changes into all kinds of things—such as perception of form and perception of smell—then **such a [self] is something unprecedented** in the world and impossible **indeed**.

Furthermore, if the self is permanent as the consciousness of the essential element sound, it has to be permanent as the consciousness of all five essential elements, such as the essential element form. [844] If that is the case, all five [essential elements], such as form, would have to be perceived permanently, even if there are no objects or sense faculties.<sup>1655</sup> And if this is so, what [kind of] job should the self of blind and deaf people or the self at the time of sleeping and fainting be doing?



You might say, “Since the permanent single self is **not real** as these **different forms**, they do not contradict its being permanent and single.” Well, **then, just describe** what the self’s **own form** is! Your answer is, “It is **just mere consciousness**.” In that case, it would follow that **all beings are one**, because they are not different in being this one self that is mere consciousness. It **would also follow** that **the cognizant individual and the incognizant primal substance**<sup>1656</sup> **are one**, because they are this one self. Then you might agree, “We accept that the nature and the individual are the same, since **both are equal in just being existent**.” Now, **when the specific particulars** that were presented by you—the individual who has a mind and the nature that does not have a mind—are **mistaken, what would be the ground** or the basis of attribution that these two distinct features—with mind and without mind—have in **common** or in which they are included as being one? There is no basis whatsoever of these two that is other than these two. They are also not one and the same, because these two are not mutually included in each other.

#### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

With respect to these verses, Kalyāṇadeva states the opponents’ theses and refutes them:

The assertions by Vātsaḥ and others that a so-called self, soul, or person exists are invalidated. The Enumerators label consciousness as the “self.” . . .<sup>1657</sup>

He refutes [objections]:

You might say, “Since sound and so on does not always remain in a certain place, it is not heard all the time.” Therefore, [lines 60cd] are given, “Excuse me—if there is no knowable object, what is it aware of? Why do you then say ‘consciousness’?”<sup>1658</sup>

He comments further:

[Verses 62–63ab:] If perception of form and perception of sound were one, [845] to label the sense faculties as five would also be meaningless.

[Verses 63cd–64:] If the nature is a permanent singularity, it is not justified that, gradually—just as a son comes from a father—the “individual” arises from the “nature,” “cognition” from the [nature], “identification” from [cognition], the “essential elements” from [iden-

tification], and so forth. . . . You might object, “Although it is a singularity, it is suitable to be labeled as many [things], just as a single being may be called both father and son.” Since [its constituents], such as lightness, are taught as something single, they are [just] labeled as mere “manifestations.” However, this “universal flux” is not something that has arisen from the [constituents]. Hence, truly, lightness and so on are neither father nor son.

[Verses 65–67:] You might say, “Just like an actor, this very consciousness of sound is what appears [now] as the consciousness of form.” If this were the case, just like the actor, this consciousness would be impermanent. You might argue, “It is this very [consciousness] that [just] has another nature.” This very same [consciousness of sound] does not exist up to this present point, because this very same [earlier consciousness of sound] is mutually contradictory to the other [consciousness of form that exists now]. Thus, it is refuted that [these two] are one. Then you might agree, “Granted, it is wrong that it is [the same consciousness] that [just] has another nature. It does not exist in this way.” If this is the case, then state how the very nature or entity of this self is. “It is just consciousness.” Then this entails the mistake that it would follow that all beings are one; that is, beings who are released or not released [from cyclic existence] would be completely identical. Furthermore, it follows that the individual who has a mind and the nature that does not have a mind are one and the same. [Here, you] Enumerators say, “We accept that the individual and the nature are the same, since they are equal and identical in being existent.” The Centrists answer with [lines 67cd], “Now, when . . .” This means that there is no particular difference between the individual and the nature in that they have mind or not and that they are both free from progressive or nonprogressive activity. Hence, if, just like the horns of a rabbit, [846] they are utterly nonexistent, then what is their condition of likeness? There is none at all. Therefore, they are also not the same. These [verses] also eliminate [the notion of] generalities, such as cause, [that are something separate from their instances] and [the notion of] sharing the same status.<sup>1659</sup>

[As for verse 56,] Vibhūticandra gives a quotation:

When one analyzes this so-called self, there is nothing but words or conceptions. At this point, who is it who has fear?

Now, a self will not come forth anymore.  
Also “mine” will now not show up again.  
Naïve beings are afraid of it.  
In the learned ones, fear is exhausted.<sup>1660</sup>

He comments further on [verses 65–67]:

The example of the actor is not justified, because it does not accord with the probandum to abandon [this actor's] first mode of being and then to seize another mode of [his] being. If you state that the actor is the very same but is still of a different nature, then such a singularity is something unprecedented indeed. Since something other is different from the very same, [this example] is extremely contradictory. You might argue, “[There] is the very consciousness and perceptions of form and such. [The latter] are [its] second modes of being. The modes of being of perceptions of form and such depend on objects like the color of a crystal. Hence, they are not real.” So what is the mode of being of their nature? “It is just consciousness.” All right, you have asserted that the two different consciousnesses that are the perception of sound and the perception of form are one. According to [this assertion], it follows that all beings are one, because they do not differ with respect to consciousness. Moreover, if you discard distinctions and take [things] to be one due to just some arbitrary [common] mode of being, then mind (the phenomenon that is the “individual”) and what is not mind (such phenomena as the “nature”) would not be different, because both are equal in being existent. [Here,] you might agree, “I accept.” [However,] at this point when particular entities are wrong, what would be their common ground? If there are many different similar entities, they are taken to be one through their similarity. However, such do not exist [here].<sup>1661</sup>

[As for line 57d,] *The Small Commentary on the Knowledge Chapter* explains:

Lymph [847] is the rotten liquid that comes from scratching when one itches. Fat is a rotten liquid that remains inside.<sup>1662</sup>

This is not the case: Lymph is the very transparent fluid that arises from flesh and blood. Fat is the condensed grease of the body. It is such things as blood that turn into pus when they rot.

[Then, this commentary] supplements some words for [line 65d], “Such a singularity is something unprecedented indeed” to the effect that it is contradictory

for the self to be both single and of another nature. Therefore, it is indeed something amazing that is unprecedented.<sup>1663</sup>

There follow some supplementary words [for verses 66–67]:

If the nature of the self were consciousness, it would follow that all beings are one, since there would be no difference [in them] as far as mere consciousness is concerned. Also, it would follow that mind and what has no mind—the “individual” and the “nature”—are the same. Why? They are equal in “just being existent,” that is, in merely having a state of being, because they are not different [in this respect]. Furthermore, if the distinctions that consist of the perception of form and such are mistakenly stated, since they are not real, then there would be no common ground [for them]. The reason is that, if there are no distinctions—as in the similarity of an ox and a gavayah<sup>1664</sup>—to be identified, then there is no [common ground of such distinctions either]. [It would moreover follow that] multicolored and pale yellow [oxen] do not possess a difference, because they are the very objects that are expressed by the term “ox.”<sup>1665</sup>

*The Great Commentary* [on lines 63cd–64ab and 67cd] is paraphrased here according to its meaning:

Someone may be presented as father and son in mutual dependence, but when he is [considered] independently, he is neither father nor son. The Enumerators themselves assert that the equilibrium of the three constituents is the permanent “primal substance” which is not fluctuating and that their disequilibrium turns into the impermanent “universal flux.” However, this is just a presentation in dependence on temporary “manifestation,” whereas ultimately it comes down to the assertion that there is no difference between earlier and later and that the “nature” is [just] a single one.<sup>1666</sup>

You might say, “The particulars of consciousness—the ‘manifestations’ of the five ‘essential elements’ (such as the perception of form)—appear in a mistaken way. Therefore, they do not exist.” What then is their common ground in terms of being mere consciousness? [There is none,] because they are not established.<sup>1667</sup> [848]

In brief, Kalyāṇadeva asserts that this phrase [in line 67b], “Because both are equal in just being existent” represents the answer of the Enumerators who say, “The nature and the individual are one, because they are equal in being exis-

tent.” The other [commentator]s assert that [this phrase] refers to our own [Cen-  
trist] statement, “It follows that ‘the individual’ and ‘the nature’ are one, because  
they are equal in being existent.”

### 3.1.3. The Refutation of the Logicians

Something incognizant is also not the self  
For the very reason that it has no mind, just like a garment  
and such.

However, if it is consciousness, because it possesses mind,  
It follows that its incognizance is invalidated. [68]

You might think, “In fact, the self is unchanged.”  
In what way then should mind have affected it?  
Thus, if it is incognizant and free from activity,  
This amounts to referring to space as the self. [69]

The first verse refutes a self without mind, and the following verse refutes the  
assertion that such a self is unchanging.

You Logicians say, “If one claims the self to be something that has mind, these  
mistakes [above] certainly do apply, but we claim that it is something without  
mind.” **Something incognizant is also not the self for the very reason that it has  
no mind**, for example, **just like a garment or cloth and such**. You might venture,  
“Granted, the self is without mind, but since it meets with a distinct quality,  
called consciousness, it becomes cognizant.” **However, if it is** the case that the self  
turns into **consciousness, because it possesses mind, it follows that** your former  
claim of **its incognizance is invalidated**. Since you asserted before that it does not  
possess mind and asserted later that it does so, this is also contradictory to your  
assertion that the self is permanent.

**You might think, “In fact, this permanent self is unchanged.”** With what  
[kind of] means for the arising of consciousness **should** this feature of con-  
sciousness or **mind have affected**—or ever affect—**the self?** [This is impossible,]  
because something permanent is incapable [of functioning] as any kind of agent  
or object whatsoever.<sup>1668</sup> **Thus, if you label something incognizant and free from**  
agent and object as the self, **this amounts to** labeling **space as the self**. Hence,  
from now on, take space as your self!

### 3.1.4. Teaching That Karma Is Not Contradictory to Identitylessness

You might say, “If there is no self,  
The connection between actions and their results is not possible.

As actions disappear, once they have been committed,  
Who would experience their results?" [70]

This verse formulates the objection.

Thus, it is taught that neither an innate nor an imaginary self exists. At this point, **you** followers of Kāṇāda<sup>1669</sup> and others **might say**, "If there is no self, it follows that **the connection between actions and their results is not possible**. As there is no self that is an agent and the **actions themselves disappear, once they have been committed** and completed, [849] **who would experience their results later?** In whom would their results mature?"

Since it is established for both of us  
That action and result have different bases  
And that a self does not have any function in this,  
Is your objection here not quite pointless? [71]

This verse teaches that the positions of both disputants are equal in that there is no self as an agent.

You asserted a permanent self that does not act, and now also we Buddhists assert that there is no self. Hence, **both our parties** accept the following: The **action**—that is, [committing] some deed (the time of the cause)—**and** its completion (the time of the **result**) **have different bases** or supports, and they entail an earlier and a later time. At both of these times, **a self does not have any function** at all. **Since** we equally [accept] this, and, in consequence, **your objection here** just works against yourself, **is it not quite pointless?**

One never sees it happen  
That the provider of a cause is the recipient of its result.  
It is just in dependence on a single continuum  
That a so-called agent and experiencer are taught. [72]

This verse teaches that it is impossible for a cause and [its] result to be simultaneous.

Based on just a single phenomenon, **one never sees it happen** in the world **that the provider of a cause is** simultaneously **the recipient of its result**. This is just like the following example: As long as a lotus seed has not perished, it is impossible that its sprout nevertheless would grow, or that its flower would open without the sprout having ceased, or that its fruit would ripen while the flower leaves do not wither.

You might argue, “Your own teacher has stated that the agent of actions experiences the result.” He **taught** the following: There is no self in a river at all, and its earlier [moments] are different from its later ones. However, it is presented as one due to being a stream. Likewise, there is no [personal] self at all. [Rather,] **it is just in dependence on a single mental continuum that** [its] earlier [moments] are called “**agent**” at the time of committing an action **and** [its] later [moments] are called] “**experiencer**” at the time of experiencing the result. Thus, there is no self that is an agent, and it has been refuted that [such a self] is this very mind that represents the agent. However, just through the mere continuum of this [mind], you will certainly experience what has completely ripened [in it] without anything becoming lost.

**3.1.5. The Ancillary Refutation of the Analyzers  
and of the [Specific Kind of] Person [That Is Asserted by]  
the Followers of Vātsīputra in Our Own Faction**

**The past and the future mind  
Are not the self, because they do not exist.  
You might say, “Well, then the just-arisen mind is the self,”  
But when it has ceased, there is no self anymore. [73]**

The first half of this verse teaches that the past and the future [mind] are not the self, while the second half [teaches] that the present [mind] is not the self [either].

At this point, you Analyzers and others say, “Just this mind stream is the self.” This is also not the case: The mind is something that entails the aspect of a stream. **The past and the future mind are not the self, because that** which is past does not exist after it has ceased (just as yesterday’s offering lamp) and because that which is in the future does **not exist** now, since it did not arise yet (just as tomorrow’s rainbow does not exist now). [850] **You might say, “Well, then the mind that has just arisen and not yet ceased is the self,” but** even this [present mind] is something that entails extremely infinitesimal fractions of the three times. If you analyze precisely, you are not able to observe what is present. Even if you consider it roughly, **when** you grasp [at the present moment of mind] as the self, what you have grasped at **has already ceased** [in the next moment]. Hence, in this way, **there is nothing** in the present [moment of mind] that is a **self**.

**For example, there is nothing  
If you take the trunk of a banana tree apart.  
Likewise, if you search for it with thorough analysis,  
The self is not really true either. [74]**

This verse teaches that the self is unfindable.

Here, the followers of Vātsīputra in our own faction say, “The self cannot be expressed as anything at all that would be the same as or other than the aggregates.” This is not the case either: **For example, you may cut up the trunk of a banana tree**, slice it into pieces, and also **take** each one of these [pieces] completely **apart**. Then you might wonder, “Now, in which of these [parts] is the trunk of the banana tree?” **If** [you look closely], you will see that apart from these parts **there is nothing** whatsoever that is a trunk that possesses the parts. You see furthermore that also each one of these parts is not the trunk. Thus, your clinging to the trunk of a banana tree has become completely reversed. **Likewise, if you search with thorough analysis** through reasoning in all the inner and outer aggregates, you will see that this very **self** that is inexpressible as the same as or something other [than these aggregates] **is not really true either**. Rather, you will not see any so-called self whatsoever.

You might object, “If there are no sentient beings,  
For whom should you have compassion?”  
It is for those who are conceived through the ignorance  
That we embrace for the sake of the result. [75]

“Without sentient beings, whose is the result?”  
This is true, but we still strive on the level of ignorance.  
For the sake of completely pacifying suffering,  
You should not spurn this ignorance in terms of the result. [76]

Self-centeredness—the cause for suffering—  
Increases through the ignorant belief in a self.  
You might say, “You cannot put an end to this,”  
But it is better to meditate on identitylessness. [77]

These three verses remove the objection that compassion is not justified if there are no sentient beings.

**You might object**, “Thus, since self, sentient being, and person are synonymous terms, if there is no self, this would lead to the claim that there are also no sentient beings. **If there are no sentient beings** either, then at that point, who **should** cultivate **compassion for whom**? This is contradictory to the explanation that compassion is the main object of meditation for you followers of the great vehicle.” In general, in the context of not analyzing with knowledge, this is merely a position that is **embraced** out of compassion for the welfare of others, that is, **for the sake of the result** that is the attainment of perfect Buddhahood.



However, when one analyzes, one understands that any kind of self, sentient being, and suffering are not even established as mere things in a dream. At this point, [851] loving-kindness for those who do not realize this will increase a hundred times. Since they [do not have] such [realization], they are completely ignorant due to this pile of stupidity that consists of views about themselves, others, and suffering.<sup>1670</sup> Sentient beings are **those who** superimpose and **are** superimposed as something real—such as self and others— **through this ignorance**.

You might continue, “**Without sentient beings** who are the objects of one’s intent, for **whose** sake is the attainment of Buddhahood, **the result** that is intended for them?” **This is true, but we still strive** to promote the welfare of these [sentient beings], starting with those **on the level of ignorance** who do not understand this in such a way.<sup>1671</sup> You might argue, “Even if you wish to attain Buddhahood for the sake of others, this is ignorance about the result.” When you consider the final ultimate level, there is no question that this is the case. However, **for the sake of completely pacifying the suffering** of all sentient beings, for the time being, **you should not spurn this ignorance about the result**, even though you know that it is ignorance. This is comparable to physicians who definitely rely on certain types of poison as remedies for [certain] diseases. “Anyway, you might deliberately not relinquish this ignorance about the result, but what then?” Just as [its] fragrance [dissipates] when a flower fades away, at the time of awakening from the sleep of basic unawareness, [also this ignorance] will naturally become pure.

You might argue, “However, just as you do not reverse the ignorance about the result as a temporary support on the path, it is equally fine to rely on the clinging to a self.” [All kinds of water] are equal in that they are water, but [only water] that possesses the eight qualities<sup>1672</sup> is used [for drinking], whereas poisonous water or water from rocks is not used in this way. Likewise, though they are equal in that they are ignorance, one does not rely on the clinging to a self in the same way as one does on the ignorance about the result, because **self-centeredness**<sup>1673</sup>—the entity that is **the cause for all suffering—increases** due to this **ignorant belief in a self**. Thus, **you should put an end to this** clinging to a self by all means. **You might say**, “So what should we do?” You should **meditate on** only this **identitylessness** of all phenomena and the utter peace of discursiveness. This is the **best** and most excellent activity.

### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

Kalyāṇadeva [describes a further objection]: [852]

You might say, “We assert that the assembly of body, mind, and mental events is the self.”<sup>1674</sup>

He refutes this with the example of the banana tree and briefly quotes [Nāgārjuna's] *Precious Garland*.<sup>1675</sup>

With respect to [lines 72cd] “It is just in dependence on a single continuum . . .,” Vibhūticandra says:

You wonder why? The very continuum  
In which the latent tendencies of actions are placed  
Is that in which the result matures,  
Just as red [color] in cotton wool.

One may repeatedly apply some [red] dye to a seed of cotton wool. Then, whatever grows out of this [seed]—from the sprout up through the fruit—will be red only. Likewise, [action and result] are different, but the mind stream that has performed an action is exactly the one in which the result matures. Therefore, qualms do not occur here.<sup>1676</sup>

He teaches the example of the trunk of a banana tree in his “summarized explanation [of this section].”<sup>1677</sup>

As for [lines 76cd] “For the sake of completely pacifying suffering, . . .” he says:

Ignorance is [both] the cause for engaging in existence and the cause for putting an end to existence.<sup>1678</sup>

This teaches that the causes for putting an end [to cyclic existence], such as compassion, are not negated, while the cause for engaging [in cyclic existence]—clinging to an identity—is negated. Someone might say, “There is no certainty that cyclic existence is put to an end through [realizing] identitylessness.” There is [such certainty]:

Since the seeds of views about an identity have been relinquished,  
This is an irreversible state.

[Kalyāṇadeva] gives a quote from *The Sūtra of the Secrets of the Thus-Gone Ones*.<sup>1679</sup>

Śāntimati, it is like this: Through cutting the root of a tree, all the branches and leaves will become dry. Likewise, through the views about a real personality being completely at peace, all afflictions will be at peace.<sup>1680</sup>

### 3.2. Phenomenal Identitylessness

One meditates on phenomenal identitylessness through the four applications of mindfulness.

This has two parts:

- 1) The general topic
- 2) The meaning of the text

#### 3.2.1. The General Topic

I will explain the application of mindfulness.

Its object of observation is fourfold: body, feelings, mind, and phenomena.

Its nature is the knowledge that understands these.

Its aids are the accompanying factors mindfulness and alertness.

The way to meditate is to meditate that the body is impure,  
That feelings are suffering, that the mind is impermanent, [853]  
And that all phenomena are identityless.

The results: Reversing the clinging to the body's purity  
Is nonattachment, the understanding of the reality of suffering.  
Comprehending all feelings as pain  
Reverses craving and relinquishes the origin [of suffering].

Through seeing that the mind is momentary,  
One understands that there is no person and meditates on the path.  
Through seeing that all phenomena are identityless,  
One is free from dullness and attains cessation.

In order to attain one's own release,  
By focusing on the body and so on that are contained in one's own continuum,  
One meditates and apprehends them thus.  
These are the applications of mindfulness of the limited vehicle.

Since one wishes for enlightenment for the welfare of others,  
One meditates by focusing on the bodies and so forth  
Of [all beings in] the three times whose [number] equals space.  
At the same time, one does not observe these as impurity,

Suffering, impermanence, or even mere identitylessness.  
 This is the great path of the Victors' children.  
 Hence, through fourteen aspects,  
 The applications of mindfulness of the great vehicle are most eminent.

The higher abhidharma says:

The applications of mindfulness should be understood in terms of (1) observed object, (2) nature, (3) aids, (4) meditation, and (5) result of meditation.<sup>1681</sup>

1) Beings in cyclic existence cling to the body as the support for the self, to feelings as that which is experienced by the self, to the mind as that which is grasped as the self, and to phenomena as the causes for bondage or release of the self. Since cyclic existence is produced through the intense clinging to these four, this set of four—body, feelings, mind, and phenomena—constitute the objects to focus on.

2) The nature [of the applications of mindfulness] is the knowledge that understands the nature of body, feelings, mind, and phenomena. To understand that the body is impure is the nature of the application of mindfulness of the body, because this is the knowledge that understands how its nature in dependence on the seeming level is. [The same applies for] the remaining [three]. *The Treasury [of Abhidharma]* says:

Application of mindfulness [854] is knowledge: . . .<sup>1682</sup>

3) As for the aids, this knowledge is embraced by mindfulness and alertness. Through this, it is not forgotten and is associated with its congruent factors, which are the five omnipresent mental events that arise simultaneously with it, because the application [of mindfulness] is not accomplished if these [factors] are not present. What one is “mindful” of is precisely this knowledge. “Intense” means not distant, that is, not interrupted by something else. “Application” means that the mind is fused with this mindfulness; it remains within the stream of mindfulness through alertness. Therefore, this is called “intense application of mindfulness.”

4) The way to meditate

a) One's own body and those of others are collections of impure phenomena. Through the intense mindfulness of the body, one understands that this is actually the case. In particular, from among the twenty notions [to come], here one

meditates on the [first] ten: the notions of (1) a dead person, (2) a repulsive corpse, (3) a putrid blue corpse, (4) a putrid black corpse, (5) a swollen corpse, (6) a maggot-ridden corpse, (7) a mangled corpse, (8) a putrid red corpse, (9) a scattered corpse, and (10) dry bones.

b) The intense mindfulness of feelings is the remedy for attachment to pleasant feelings, aversion to suffering, and dullness toward neutral ones. In the sūtras, it is repeatedly said:

Everything contaminated is suffering.

and

Thus, whatever you might feel, this is suffering.

Accordingly, one meditates by understanding [feelings] in such a way. Here, the suffering of suffering refers to everything that is evident as manifest suffering. The suffering of change is the entirety of those feelings to which one clings as being pleasant. The suffering of conditioned existence refers to any situation that this mere body that one has taken on and [its] mere mind or consciousness experience from [one's birth] onward. This suffering of conditioned existence is like living with a feeling of indifference when one's [latent] disease of stomach cancer has not yet matured. The suffering of change is like the delicious flavor when one eats boiled rice mixed with poison. The suffering of suffering [855] is like the experience of feeling ill when the poison [in the rice] has become active or like the arising of an ulcer on top of [this] stomach cancer. In brief, [here] one should meditate on the following six notions: (11) the notion that impermanent phenomena are suffering, (12) the notion that food is an adverse factor, (13) the notion of disliking the whole world, (14) the notion of [its] defects, (15) the notion of relinquishing [it], and (16) the notion of being free from desire [for it].

c) The intense mindfulness of mind is the remedy for clinging to mind as something permanent and single. [The Buddha] said:

Everything conditioned is impermanent.

Accordingly, forms—clouds, steam, smoke, flames, and so on—do not remain as such and such [forms] even for a moment. Also [phenomena] such as water streams and the movements of the wind do not remain for even one moment beyond the specific [moment of] time [when they occur]. Their previous [moments] are not the following ones, and these again do not remain as their following ones. When one examines mind with examples such as these, the mind—

this mere stream of consciousness that experiences—does not remain for even a moment. Its previous [moment] is not the following one, and there is nothing in between the previous and the following moment. Hence, it does not last even for just a moment and cannot be labeled as something single or multiple. [The intense mindfulness of mind] is what makes one understand this. Thus, [here] one should cultivate (17) the notion that everything conditioned is impermanent.

d) The intense mindfulness of phenomena is the remedy for clinging to the phenomena constituent<sup>1683</sup> or the phenomena source<sup>1684</sup>—which is superimposed as the object of the sixth consciousness (the mental [consciousness])—as being such and such [phenomena]. One contemplates dependent origination in progressive order and reverse order. Additionally, in the great vehicle, one analyzes these [phenomena] with reasons and arguments, such as the freedom from unity and multiplicity, and the refutation of arising from the four possibilities. Through this, one understands that bondage and release are not observable in any phenomenon whatsoever. Thus, [here] one meditates on (18) the notion of cessation and on (19) the notion of discriminatingly examining emptiness.

#### 5) The result

[The result is] (20) the understanding that the fourfold mistakenness of clinging to these four—the body and so on—as something pure, pleasant, permanent, and an identity functions as the cause for acquiring bad places of birth. Hence, one is not attached to a body and does not wish for a body. [856] This is the understanding of [the reality of] suffering. Through understanding feelings as suffering, one is free from craving. This means to relinquish the origin [of suffering]. Through seeing that the basis to which one clings—the mind—is impermanent, the clinging to “me” is reversed. Thus, one is free from the fear of nirvāṇa, from the concern that the self becomes extinct. Hence, one gradually manifests cessation. Through being aware that all phenomena are not different, that is, spacelike emptiness and illusionlike dependent origination, one is free from ignorance. This means to engage in the reality of the path.

By going beyond these four—contaminated body, feelings, mind, and phenomena—one attains mastery over uncontaminated body, feelings, mind, and phenomena. [*The Distinction between the Middle and Extremes* says:

Because of impregnations of negativity, because of craving’s cause,  
Because of the basis, and because of nonignorance,  
One engages in the four realities.  
Through this, one cultivates the applications of mindfulness.<sup>1685</sup>

The applications of mindfulness of the inferior vehicle are as follows: With a mind that strives for peace for one's own sake, one meditates by focusing on just the five aggregates that are seized by oneself and on just those other beings who dwell in places that are suitable to appear [to oneself]. These [objects] are then apprehended as impure and so on.

The applications of mindfulness of the great vehicle are as follows: Through being embraced by the mind of enlightenment, one meditates by focusing on the entire spectrum of the aggregates and so on in the three times that pervade space. This [leads to] the reversal of apprehending them as pure, pleasant, permanent, and an identity. At the same time, one [mentally] engages in emptiness, that is, that they are not observable as impure and such either. *The Ornament [of Sūtras]* states:

The applications of mindfulness of those with insight  
Are without comparison  
Through fourteen aspects of meditation.  
Hence, these render them more eminent than others.<sup>1686</sup>

Accordingly, they are more eminent through the following fourteen [aspects]:

- 1) The support, which is the knowledge that arises from the profound and vast dharmas of the great vehicle
- 2) The remedy, which is the knowledge that eliminates the extremes of both superimposition and denial
- 3) Engagement of oneself and others in the four realities of the great vehicle
- 4) Focusing on inconceivable dharmas [857]
- 5) Mental engagement that everything is like space
- 6) Attainment of nonabiding in existence or peace
- 7) Concordance with the perfections
- 8) Ensuing engagement according to the inclinations of those to be trained
- 9) Complete understanding that the body is like an illusion, that feelings are like dreams, that mind is like space, and that phenomena occur adventitiously like clouds
- 10) Attainment of births as one pleases, in which one is without afflictions despite assuming supreme bodies, like those of Śakra or a wheel-ruler, and experiencing the supreme among feelings
- 11) Outshining the great meditations of others even through one's minor meditations, since one has sharp faculties and is skilled in means
- 12) [Everything] being one taste as the supremacy of genuine enlightenment
- 13) Endowment with inexhaustible meditations even after the attainment of nirvāṇa

14) Accomplishment of the ten grounds and the result of buddhahood

[As *The Ornament of Sūtras* says]:

They are other due to support, remedy,  
Likewise ensuing engagement,  
Focus, mental engagement,  
More eminent meditation through attainment,

Concordance, ensuing engagement,  
Complete understanding, birth,  
Greatness, supremacy,  
Meditation, and perfect accomplishment.<sup>1687</sup>

### 3.2.2. The Meaning of the Text

This section has four parts, which are the four applications of mindfulness:

#### 3.2.2.1. The Application of Mindfulness of the Body

This has two parts:

- 1) The individual body parts are not the body.
- 2) The refutation of something that possesses the body parts.

##### 3.2.2.1.1. The Individual Body Parts Are Not the Body

The body is neither feet nor shanks,  
Nor is it the thighs or the waist.  
The abdomen and the back are not the body,  
And neither are the chest or arms. [78]

Hands and sides are not the body,  
Nor are armpits or inner organs.  
Also head and neck are not the body.  
So if it is none of these, what is this body? [79]

The [first] seven<sup>1688</sup> lines [teach] that none of the various distinct parts is the body, and the last [line] teaches that the body [858] is a superimposition.

If you call this assembly of various body parts “body” and cling to it as such [a body], it is reasonable to examine this for a while: [859] What is it that you name



“body”? The body is neither feet nor shanks, nor is it the thighs or the waist. The abdomen and the back are not the body, and neither are the chest or arms. Hands and sides are not the body, nor are armpits or inner organs. In the same way, also head and neck, and all individual parts other than these, are not the body. So if it appears that you have gained certainty that it is none of these [parts], what is this so-called body? It is nothing but a mere name, just a superimposition.

### 3.2.2.1.2. The Refutation of Something That Possesses the Body Parts

If this body were present  
In all of them as their exact match,  
Then the parts would of course dwell in the parts,  
But where would itself stay? [80]

If the entire body  
Were present in the hands and such,  
There would be as many bodies  
As there are hands and so forth. [81]

If the body does not exist inside nor outside,  
How could the body be in the hands and such?  
It also does not exist separate from the hands and so forth,  
So how could it possibly be found? [82]

These three verses refute that the body abides in [any of] all [its] parts.

Here, the Differentiators and others say, “These are [just] the parts of the body, but the actual body that possesses these parts abides in such a way that it encompasses all [its] parts.” Also, some later Tibetans say, “The six [kinds of] parts (such as nectar, pus, and blood) abide within that which possesses these parts (a bowl full of that which is wet and moistening).”<sup>1689</sup>

Our objection<sup>1690</sup> to this is: **If this very body were present in all its parts as their exact match, then the individual parts**—like the eyes—**would dwell in** just these individual parts.<sup>1691</sup> If you state such a superimposition, it is **of course** nothing but an imputation, **but** then we ask: **Where would the body itself stay** among these parts?

If you assert that this body—that is, **the entire body** with all its parts—**were to dwell in each of the hands and so on, there would be as many bodies** in number **as there are hands and so forth**, such as the body that dwells in the hands and the body that dwells in the feet. Hence, there would be many bodies. [Moreover,] there would be the following consequences: The body that dwells in the hands [would entail] two bodies, one in the right and one in the left [hand].

Each of these [two bodies] in turn would have three [more] bodies that are related to its major joints, five bodies in the fingers, and fifteen bodies in the knuckles and so on, until finally there would be as many bodies as there are infinitesimal particles [in the body]. Thus, you are not able to assert [such a position] for the following reasons: If it were like this, [860] it would follow that each and every [body] part is the body. Therefore, your claim of an encompassing body that possesses its parts collapses. Furthermore, it is a most amazing feat indeed that a single individual should have a number of bodies [that equals the number] of infinitesimal particles [in the body].

Therefore, if you see that, when analyzed, **not** even an atom of **the** so-called **body exists** anywhere **outside**, as an appearance of matter, **nor inside**, as an appearance of consciousness, **how could** you say, “**The body is in the hands and such**”? Even if you were to grind the hands and the like to dust, you would not find a body in them. You might assert then that there is a body that is not these [body] parts. [However,] in this case, the body would not be harmed even if you dissect it all the way down to its life force, because the body is something other than these [body parts]. Hence, each part—**the hands and so forth**—is not the body, and **the body also does not exist separate from** these parts, **so how could** the body **possibly be found**? In this way, [the body] is understood to be a mere name.

Thus, the body does not exist, but one perceives a body  
In the hands and so on due to ignorance,  
Just as one may perceive a human being in some pile  
Because of its specific configuration. [83]

As long as the conditions are assembled,  
This figure<sup>1692</sup> looks like a person.  
Likewise, as long as such is the case for the hands and so forth,  
One will see a body there. [84]

These two verses teach that [the perception of] a body is comparable to apprehending a pile of stones as a human being.

Thus, no matter whether it is something that possesses its parts or something else, **the** so-called **body does not exist** at all, **but one perceives a body in** the assembly of **hands and so on**. This happens **due to** a dull mind’s **ignorance**. It is **just like** the following [example]: When one looks at a human being and some pile of stones from afar, they look similar in that they are just some dark shape [in the distance. Thus, it is merely] **because of its specific configuration** that **perceiving some pile** leads to the thought, “**A human being** appears.”

You might say, “[Your example] is nothing but mistaking a pile of stones for

a human being for just a moment, whereas the perception of hands and the like as a body occurs over a long time. Thus, they are dissimilar.” **As long as the causes and conditions for it are assembled, it may happen that this figure looks like a person. Likewise, as long as such [an assembly of] causes and conditions is the case for the hands and so forth, this will give rise to a cognition that sees a body there.** Hence, there is no difference.

In the same way, what would a foot be,  
Since it is just a collection of toes?  
As these are collections of knuckles,  
The knuckles can likewise be divided into their parts. [85]

Consequently, the parts too can be broken down into particles,  
And the particles may be divided into their directional parts.  
Since these directional divisions lack any parts,  
They are like space. Therefore, not even particles exist. [86]

These two verses teach that, when analyzed, the body parts and their subparts also are not established.

Not only is the apprehension of the body as a unit reversed in this way, but also its parts are not established under analysis. **In the same way, what would a foot be, since it is just a collection of toes? As these [toes] are collections of knuckles, the knuckles [861] can likewise be divided into their parts. Consequently, the parts too can be broken down into particles, and the particles may be divided into their directional parts. Since these directional divisions lack any parts, they are like space. Therefore, not even particles exist** as something that can be observed.

So which person who analyzes  
Would take delight in dreamlike forms?  
Once thus the body does not exist,  
What is a man and what is a woman? [87]

This verse teaches that, consequently, forms are dreamlike.

**So which person who analyzes would take delight in dreamlike forms? Once thus the body does not exist, what is a man and what is a woman?** The meaning of this is as follows: Men and women are nothing but [labels] that are set up due to differences in the sexual organs, and [such labels] come from the clinging that the sexual organs are [parts of] the body. When one understands that the body itself is not observable, where should its distinct features remain as a residue?

**[Synopsis of Other Commentaries]**

Here, Kalyāṇadeva explains the following and other speculations:

[The variant of line 84b] “the body looks like a person” in some editions should be explained in another way: As long as the collection of conditions of mental dullness exists, the body looks like a person, although a person has never existed in it. Likewise, as long as the collection of conditions for the hands and so on exists, the ignorance that they are the body arises.<sup>1693</sup>

*The Small Commentary*<sup>1694</sup> mentions the same speculation by extending it further:

Just as some pile is mistaken for a person, [our range of mistakenness] starts with mistaking the hands and so on for the body and extends to [such cases as] mistakenly [apprehending] grass due to [a collection of] particles.

Then there appears the following:

This śloka [84] “As long as the conditions are assembled . . .” was inserted later.

**3.2.2.2. The Application of Mindfulness of Feelings**

This has four parts:

- 1) Feelings as such are not established.
- 2) There is no cause for feelings.
- 3) There is no object that is felt.
- 4) There is no apprehender of feelings.

**3.2.2.2.1. Feelings as Such Are Not Established**

If suffering actually exists,  
 Why does it not oppress those who are cheerful?  
 If delicacies and such are pleasure,  
 Why do those troubled with sorrow and the like not delight  
 in them? [88]

This verse teaches that suffering does not ultimately exist.

[863] Feelings are of six [types], such as feelings due to the condition of eye contact [with form]. When summarized, they are included in the triad of pleasure, suffering, and neutral [feelings].<sup>1695</sup> Thus, if it is certain that the temporary feeling of **suffering** is real as and **actually exists** as suffering, **why does it not oppress the feelings of cheerfulness** and pleasure? [In fact, it should do so,] because this very suffering exists even at the time of a feeling of pleasure, since it is real as the feeling of suffering as such. **If pleasure** exists ultimately, **why does** relishing delicious tastes **and such not delight** and please even those who are in the state of being **troubled with sorrow**, suffering, **and the like**? [It should delight them,] because pleasure is ultimately real and their minds are involved with this [pleasure, when they relish food and so on].

You might say, “It is not experienced,  
Because it is overridden by something stronger.”  
How could something be a feeling  
That does not have the nature of an experience? [89]

This verse refutes the assertion that [suffering] is overridden by pleasure.

You might say, “There is no question that the feeling of suffering exists. However, suffering is **not experienced** in a situation in which pleasure is experienced, **because it is overridden by pleasure that is stronger.**” Such suffering **that has the nature of being overridden by an experience** of pleasure [864] is **not** suffering anyway: If suffering designates something that is felt and experienced, **how could something be a feeling** that is not experienced by anybody?

You might say, “Isn’t it that suffering exists in a subtle form,  
Once its gross form is removed?”  
If the [feeling] other than that is mere joy,  
Any subtlety must still pertain to this. [90]<sup>1696</sup>

If suffering does not arise  
Due to the arising of its adverse condition,  
This can only mean  
That feelings are just imaginations of our conceptions. [91]

These two verses refute the existence of subtle suffering.

You might say, “Suffering exists in a subtle form. Therefore, its continuum is not interrupted.” However, **isn’t it that** this experience and existence of subtle suffering **removes** even the **gross form** of pleasure [that exists] at this same

time? [In fact, it should,] because it is not possible that subtle suffering and gross pleasure are experienced simultaneously by a single consciousness.

You might argue, “Since **this** subtle suffering arises at **some** time that is **other than the** [time of] gross pleasure, there is no mistake.” **Any subtlety of suffering must still pertain to this** gross pleasure in that it is **its adverse condition**. **Due to this**, it is impossible that pleasure **arises** while suffering exists. Rather, it would follow that it is never possible for pleasure to arise, since suffering ultimately exists. You might say, “**Suffering does not arise** as something permanent by nature; it merely originates from an assembly of causes and conditions.” If this is the case, **this can only mean that this** [suffering] appears in different situations merely due to an assembly of delusive causes and conditions. Thus, **our conceptions** of pleasurable, painful, and neutral **feelings** and our apprehension of them as actualities **are** nothing but **just** mistaken **imaginations**.<sup>1697</sup>

For this reason, you should cultivate  
This analysis as the remedy for such.  
Meditative stability that springs from the field of examination  
Is the food of yogins. [92]

This verse teaches that feelings are without nature.

For this reason, you should cultivate this analysis of feelings’ own nature as the remedy for such clinging that [takes] feelings, such as pleasure, to be real. This is the sprout of meditative stability that grows from the fertile field of proper examination. It is weighed down with the fruits of knowledge and is freed from the husks of discursiveness. It is the most genuine food to sustain the well-being of yogins who engage in authentic knowledge.

### 3.2.2.2.2. There Is No Cause for Feelings

If there is a distance between the senses and their objects,  
Where would they meet?  
If there is no distance between them, they are a single unit.  
So what would meet what? [93]

Infinitesimal particles do not interpenetrate infinitesimal particles,  
As they lack free space and are uniform.  
Without interpenetration, there is no intermingling,  
And without intermingling, there is no contact. [94]

So how could you possibly say  
That partless entities come into contact?  
Should you ever bump into a meeting of partless entities,  
Please be so kind as to introduce us to it. [95]

These three verses refute that sense faculties and their referents come into contact.

In this context, the Followers of the Great Exposition school of our own [Buddhist] faction say, “When the senses meet with their objects, this is contact. From this, feelings arise ultimately.” [865] We ask: How is it, do [these feelings] arise in such a way that there is something in between the senses and their objects, or do they arise without something in between? If they arise so that **there is a distance between the sense consciousnesses and their objects** in the sense that [these two] are separated by an aspect or anything else, **where would the senses and their objects meet?** [They would not meet at all,] because they are separated by something else in between. If, however, you assert that **there is no distance between the senses and their objects**, then upon meeting, **the two would be mingled as a single unit**, because they are not separated by anything else in between. Hence, in terms of senses and their objects, **what would meet what?** When analyzed, [the notion of] meeting collapses.

You might argue, “It is not the coarse entities that meet. Rather, the infinitesimal particles meet.” **Infinitesimal particles do not interpenetrate** these very **infinitesimal particles**, because it is you hearers who assert the nature of these infinitesimal particles as follows: **They lack any free space or volume and they are uniform**, that is, partless units. Hence, just like water in water, **without one [particle] interpenetrating** into the other, **there is no intermingling, and without intermingling, there is no contact** in the sense of touching [each other] everywhere.<sup>1698</sup>

**So how could you possibly say that entities that are partless in time and space come into contact?** Therefore, **should you ever bump into** such a common locus of entities that are **partless** in terms of time and space [on the one hand] and [entities] that [can] **meet** [on the other hand], **please be so kind as to introduce us to it** and bless us with your amazing discovery.

It is absolutely illogical  
To have any contact with nonphysical consciousness.  
The same goes for a collection, since it is a nonentity,  
Which was already analyzed earlier. [96]

This verse teaches that it is not justified to come into contact with consciousness.

In a general way, [conventionally speaking,] physical phenomena do surely come into contact, but **it is absolutely illogical** [for a physical thing] **to mutually have any contact with nonphysical consciousness**. You might venture, “[Our] presentation that they come into contact with consciousness is based on the collection [of senses, objects, and consciousnesses].” **The same goes for a collection, since, when analyzed, it is a nonentity, which was already analyzed earlier** with the examples of a rosary, an army, and such.<sup>1699</sup>

If thus there is no contact,  
Where would feelings come from?  
So what is the purpose of tiring yourself out?  
And who would be afflicted by what? [97]

When there is nobody who feels  
And no feeling either,  
Then, seeing this situation,  
Why, O craving, do you not burst asunder? [98]

These two verses teach that consequently there is no contact, and thus feelings do not come into being.

If **thus there is no mutual contact** between the senses and their objects, **where would feelings** that [depend] on this [contact] **come from?** This is like smoke without fire. You might go on, “[Their] cause may not be seen, but there still are mere feelings.” [866] **So what is the purpose of tiring yourself out** in such a way by asserting that there is a result even if there is no cause? What are your tiring efforts good for?<sup>1700</sup>

Thus, **when there is nobody who feels and no feeling either, then, seeing this situation, why, O craving, do you not burst asunder?** [You should do so,] because craving comes from feelings and [usually] the result subsides, once the cause has ceased.

### 3.2.2.2.3. There Is No Object That Is Felt

Even what you see and touch  
Is by its nature dreamlike or illusionlike. [99ab]

Furthermore, if there were any objects to be felt, feelings would of course depend on them. However, **even** these objects that appear as **what you see and what you touch**<sup>1701</sup> manifest [just] by their **nature** of being **like** something that is



seen and touched in a **dream** or something that is seen and touched in an **illusion**, because they do not in the slightest exist as something else.

3.2.2.2.4. There Is No Apprehender of Feelings

A feeling is not seen by the mind,  
Since it arises simultaneously with it. [99cd]

Something earlier may be remembered  
By what arises later, but not experienced. [100ab]

These four lines refute an apprehender of feelings in the three times.

Furthermore, feelings do not actually exist, because the mind does not experience them for the following reasons: When a moment of feeling **arises simultaneously with** a moment of mind, the mind is not seen by the feeling, and the **feeling is not seen by the mind**. This means that [any interaction between] an agent and an object is contradictory to [their] simultaneity.<sup>1702</sup> As for **some earlier** feeling, it **may be remembered** by a mind **that arises later, but it is not experienced** by this following [moment of] mind, because it has already ceased. For example, this is like mentally engaging today in yesterday's cold sensation. If the mind were [to arise] earlier and the feeling later, the same mistake would apply.

It does not experience itself,  
Nor is it experienced by something other. [100cd]

There is no experiencer of feelings at all.  
Therefore, in true reality, there are no feelings. [101ab]

These four lines teach that there is no experiencer of feelings.

A feeling **does not experience itself**, because this is comparable to the eye not seeing itself.<sup>1703</sup> **Nor is this feeling experienced by something other** than the feeling itself, just as form does not experience sound. Once one has analyzed in this way, from the perspective of stainless knowledge, **there is** nothing that is felt, **no experiencer** who feels, and no way in which feelings are felt **at all**. **Therefore, feelings** are [just] appearances through superimposition from the perspective of mistakenness without analysis. When analyzed, however, they **are not true reality**.

So what in this collection without any identity  
Could be harmed by them? [101cd]

These two lines summarize the meaning of the topic in a general way.

So what benefit or harm could these superimposed feelings do in this mental and physical collection without any phenomenal or personal identity that is a mere illusion? [867] This is just like illusory space not being harmed by illusory fire or water.

This is the perfect meditation of the application of mindfulness of feelings. [As *The Sūtra Requested by Crown Jewel*] says:

Mañjuśrī, those who do not observe these very feelings are the ones who intensely apply their mindfulness to feelings by inspecting feelings.

### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

Kalyāṇadeva says:

[As for verse 92,] conceptual meditative stability [that analyzes true reality] is the food without contamination. It has the defining characteristic of realizing true reality. The one in whom it exists is a yogin, because studying gives rise to reflection, [reflection] to meditation, and [meditation] to the wisdom of true reality. Just as the killing of an illusory elephant by an illusory lion is not [happening] in actuality, the analysis of true reality vanquishes wrong conceptions while, actually, [both] do not exist.<sup>1704</sup>

These [lines 98d–99b that start] “Why, O craving, do you not burst asunder?” refute also the followers of Kaṇāda<sup>1705</sup> and others. They say, “There are two types of substance, what is seen and what is touched. The consciousnesses that originate from the meeting of the senses and their referents are perceptions.” Through this way of analyzing, [one sees that] there is neither substance nor meeting. In other words, one may see or touch such entities as a vase that look like substance (such as form), but none [of them] exists. The term “even” [in line 99a] refers to the acceptance of [such entities] on the seeming level. Ultimately, however, there is nothing to be seen or touched whatsoever.<sup>1706</sup>

Vibhūticandra comments:

Feelings are just imaginations. . . . The very pleasure of one [being] is the suffering of another. Something that one has heard before might have given rise to suffering, [but] if one sees it at some other time, it

may give rise to pleasure. Therefore, feelings and their causes are nothing but imputations. [There is] also the following explanation:

Snakes make the peacock feel happy.  
Poison is pleasure for those familiar with extracting the essence.<sup>1707</sup>  
Thorns that hurt you [868]  
Are a special treat in the mouth of a camel.<sup>1708</sup>

*The Small Commentary* presents [lines 90a–c] as the statement of others:

You might argue, “Since [suffering] exists [here] in a subtle way, it exists as the very feeling [of suffering]. [However,] since [its] gross [aspect] may be dispelled [by gross pleasure], it is also not contradictory to [say] that [suffering] does not remove pleasure. Furthermore, it does not follow that this [subtle suffering] goes beyond the definition of feeling, because it is experienced. In this way, it is merely something other than that [gross pleasure]. The subtle suffering [at the time of gross pleasure] is something other than great pleasure; it has the character of subtle pleasure that is empty of supreme pleasure.” [Thus, lines 90a–c would read as follows:]

You might say, “Isn’t it that suffering exists in a subtle form,  
Once its gross form is removed?  
It is merely something other.”

[This commentary says that lines 90d–91d] “Any subtlety must still pertain to this . . . “ teach the refutation [of this statement].

### 3.2.2.3. The Application of Mindfulness of Mind

This has two parts:

- 1) Mind is not established.
- 2) Objects are not established.

#### 3.2.2.3.1. Mind Is Not Established

Mind does not dwell in the senses  
Nor in form and such, nor in between.  
The mind is also not found inside nor outside,  
Nor anywhere else. [102]

What exists neither in the body nor elsewhere,  
 Neither intermingled nor separate,  
 That is just nothing.  
 Therefore, sentient beings are by nature completely liberated. [103]

The first six lines teach that mind does not withstand analysis, and the last two lines teach that it is pure from the very start.

You might think, “Feelings exist, because the experiencer of feelings—the mind—exists.” Cognizance or **mind does not dwell in the senses**, [869] **nor in** objects, **such as form, nor** does it dwell **in between** these two. Hence, what does not dwell anywhere at all is not something that exists by its very nature. So who [or what] is the mind? If you examine this question, **the mind is also not found inside** (as a sense faculty), **nor** is the mind an **outside** object, **nor** is it **anywhere else** than inside or outside as a mind that is something different [from sense faculties and objects].

Thus, if nobody sees the one who is the mind, what is it now that is labeled “mind”? You might think, “If mental cognition itself is a sense faculty, how could it be that it does not dwell in the sense faculties?” In general, it is of course the case that such [terms] as “mental sense faculty”<sup>1709</sup> and “mental conception”<sup>1710</sup> [are used] with reference to “mental cognition” as their basis of attribution. During [mental cognition]’s [initial] phase of [manifesting as] nonconceptual perception, it is presented as “the [mental] sense faculty,” while its ensuing operation [as] apprehending conceptions is presented as “mental conception.” However, even in such cases it is not adequate to say, “The basis of attribution (mental cognition) dwells in the attribute (the mental sense faculty).” This is just as inadequate as saying, “The body dwells in the hand.” If you assert that mental cognition itself is the mental sense faculty, how could it be adequate that something dwells in itself? That something dwells in something [can only] refer to phenomena that are different, but how could you present [such a notion of] dwelling with respect to [phenomena] that are not different?

Thus, **that** mental cognition **which exists neither in the body nor anywhere** other than the body, **neither intermingled** with the body **nor** in a way that it could be seen **separately** from the body, **is not** seen as **anything** at all that has a nature of its own. **Therefore**, right from the start, the minds of **sentient beings** **are by nature completely liberated** and unaffected by discursiveness.

### 3.2.2.3.2. Objects Are Not Established

If consciousness came before the knowable object,  
 Based on what would it arise?

If it were together with the knowable object,  
Based on what would it arise? [104]

If it came after the knowable object,  
From what would consciousness arise then? [105ab]

Here, the mistakes of [consciousness existing] earlier than, simultaneously with, or later than its knowable object are each taught by two lines.

You might think, “Consciousness actually exists, because [its] objects—knowable objects—exist by their nature.” However, then we should ask: What comes first, consciousness or knowable object? You might say, “Consciousness is first.” If it were the case that **consciousness came before the knowable object, based on what would this consciousness arise?** [In fact, it does not arise,] because it cannot have any other object than its [specific] knowable object, and this knowable object has not arisen yet. If you were to say, “It occurs [870] **together with the knowable object** at the same time,” **based on what would this consciousness arise?** [It does not arise,] because it cannot evaluate [any object], since simultaneity contradicts any [interaction between] agent and object.<sup>1711</sup> **If it came after the knowable object, from what would consciousness arise then?**

Thus, arising, abiding, and ceasing of all phenomena as well as subject, object, and so forth are nothing but imputations through clinging to the stream of mistakenness that is our habituation to latent tendencies. However, these [phenomena] do not exist from the perspective of correct consciousness.

#### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

In general, as for [lines 102cd] “The mind is also not found inside . . .,” most commentaries supplement the following words: “It also does not dwell on the inside . . .” [However,] if this were [the meaning of these lines], they would [just] repeat [lines 102ab]—that [the mind] does not dwell in the senses [and so on]—and the effect of the term “also” in [the phrase] “also not found inside” would fall away.<sup>1712</sup> Hence, one should not comment [on these lines] in such a way.

According [to these verses above], mind is pure from the very start. To see this is the application of mindfulness of mind. *The Sūtra [Requested by] Crown Jewel* says:

When you search for the mind everywhere, you do not really see the mind on the inside, nor on the outside, nor on both [sides], nor in the aggregates, the sources, or the constituents either.

and

Mañjuśrī, if someone understands the mind as a mere name, this is someone who intensely applies the mindfulness in which mind inspects mind.

[As for lines 104–105ab,] Kalyāṇadeva says:

Since knowable objects, such as form, are momentary, they do not have parts [that could be apprehended by a later moment of mind], because they perish and are gone instantaneously. Even if they had parts, an earlier moment of mind [that could perceive them now] does not exist, because [an earlier moment] is a nonentity [now]. Consciousness and knowable object do exist simultaneously, just like the beams of a scale, but none is the cause for the other. Therefore, actually, both of them do not exist.<sup>1713</sup>

[As for line 105b,] *The Small Commentary on the Knowledge Chapter* says:

From what would consciousness arise anyway, since it is unborn in the first place?<sup>1714</sup>

### 3.2.2.4. The Application of Mindfulness of Phenomena

This has three parts:

- 1) Teaching that all phenomena are without arising
- 2) Dispelling consequences of extreme absurdity
- 3) Dispelling the consequence of infinite regress [871]

#### 3.2.2.4.1. Teaching That All Phenomena Are without Arising

**Thus, you cannot come to the conclusion  
That any phenomenon arises. [105cd]**

Once you have ended your clinging to body, feelings, and mind in this way, there is no other phenomenon than these left. Therefore, you fully grasp that all phenomena are without nature. **Thus, you understand that you cannot come to the conclusion that any phenomenon arises.** Hence, you turn away from apprehending any arising [of phenomena altogether] and, consequently, do not observe [their] abiding or ceasing either. Through this, you fully grasp that they are primordially free from discursiveness.

3.2.2.4.2. Dispelling Consequences of Extreme Absurdity

“In this case, the seeming does not exist,  
So where would this leave the two realities?  
If it came through another seeming,  
Where would there be liberated beings?” [106]

They are just conceptions in the minds of others,  
But they do not exist in terms of their own seeming.  
Later, when this has been verified, it exists.  
If it has not, the seeming does not exist at all. [107]

The first verse states the objections, and the second provides the answer.

At this point, the Proponents of Cognizance and the realists might say, “**In this case** of everything being without arising, **the seeming does not exist**. **So where would this** position that the seeming does not exist [872] **leave the two realities?** This contradicts your earlier presentation of the two realities. [Furthermore,] the seeming is not put forward from the perspective that the seeming has a nature of its own. Rather, it is posited on the basis of another reason, that is, in terms of interdependence. This is comparable to when one conceives of a mirage as water. [This concept] is not something that is brought up by the mirage [itself]. Rather, it is set up **through another seeming** [phenomenon], which is the cognition that conceives of it.” If they were to argue like this, [someone else might answer,] “However, **where would there be liberated beings?** [Beings could not pass into nirvāṇa at all] for the following reasons: If the seeming does not exist, then there are no sentient beings [either]. Or it is possible that even someone who has already become a Buddha is presented by others as someone with basic unawareness.”

[Here, in verse 106, Śāntideva] has anticipated some of his opponents’ qualms in the form of the above objection and answer and has set up this ostensible dispute. He then [continues with verse 107] in order to provide an answer to this [discussion]:

They are just conceptions in the minds of others,  
But they do not exist in terms of their own seeming.

Such presentations that someone has become a Buddha or not **are just** imputations that [come] from the **conceptions of others’ minds**. It is **not** that these presentations of having become a Buddha or not are made, because such a **seeming** [event of becoming a Buddha] is seen from the perspective of a Buddha’s **own** nature. The reason for this is: [A Buddha] sees that, right from the start, all phe-

nomena are nothing whatsoever by their very nature and has completely eliminated [all] discriminations, such as real or delusive.

In general, it is suitable that seeming dependent origination appears within emptiness, just like clouds in the sky or waves on the ocean, while one is not able to label the ocean and its waves as one or different. Once the ultimate Dharma Body has been revealed, the seeming Form Bodies spring forth without effort among what appears for others. In this way, it is not contradictory that the seeming does not exist by its very nature, while a great variety of appearances present themselves as this seeming, just as it is not contradictory that the form of the moon [which is reflected] in the water is not a real [moon] and yet appears.

**Later, when this has been verified, it exists.**

**If it has not, the seeming does not exist at all.**

Later, when you gain certainty about this way [of how things are] and realize it, you will fully grasp that ultimate nonarising does not contradict the illusionlike existence of the seeming. [873] If the ultimate were **not** nonarising, then—despite your assertion to the contrary—you would have to accept that **the seeming does not exist at all**, because [Nāgārjuna] states [in his *Fundamental Verses on Centrism*]:

For those to whom emptiness makes sense,  
Everything makes sense.  
For those to whom emptiness does not make sense,  
Nothing at all makes sense.<sup>1715</sup>

and

If all of this were not empty,  
Nothing would originate and disintegrate,  
And it would follow that, for you,  
The four realities of the noble ones do not exist.<sup>1716</sup>

### 3.2.2.4.3. Dispelling the Consequence of Infinite Regress

**“Both conceiver and what is conceived  
Are mutually dependent.”  
All analysis is expressed  
On the basis of its accord with common consensus. [108]**

The first two lines state the objection, and the second two lines give the answer.

You might say, “In dependence on a consciousness that is the **conceiver**, one



assigns a knowable object **that is conceived**. Likewise, one assigns consciousness in dependence on what is conceived. When one does so, **both** consciousness and knowable objects **are** [just] **mutually dependent** conceptions. Therefore, one will never be able to analyze [anything].”

If one analyzes [consciousness and knowable objects] in such a way, they are [indeed] mutually dependent thoughts. Therefore, they are both not established, and [just] this is their ultimate state. Temporarily, however, in this context of presenting the seeming, one does not analyze these phenomena—such as form—about which there is common consensus between both debaters. It is from such a perspective then that **all analysis is expressed on the basis of this mere accord with** [such] **common consensus**. The reason for [such analysis] is that it is necessary to put an end to the wrong ideas of others. However, also the analysis itself is not something that is real as such [an analysis] by its very nature.

If what has been analyzed  
Is analyzed through further analysis,  
There is no end to it,  
Because that analysis would be analyzed too. [109]

Once what had to be analyzed has been analyzed,  
The analysis has no basis left.  
Since there is no basis, it does not continue.  
This is expressed as *nirvāṇa*. [110]

The first two lines state the opponents’ answer [to the above] and the remaining lines eliminate their qualms.

You might argue, “However, this analysis too must be analyzed by another analysis.” In this case, it would definitely follow that **if what has been analyzed is analyzed through further analysis, there is no end to it, because that** [further] **analysis would be analyzed too**. However, it is not like this: Knowledge is the means that analyzes **what had to be analyzed**—the wrong ideas of the opponents—in a way that it [addresses] all [of these wrong ideas], however many they may be. **Once** the wrong ideas of the opponents **have been analyzed** with [this knowledge], they are put to an end. As soon as they have come to an end, the purpose of the analysis is accomplished, and therefore, also the analysis itself will subside on its own. Thus, it is nothing more than an analysis for this specific purpose. However, **the analysis** in itself **has no** particular **basis** or nature. [874] **Since there is no basis** or purpose left, **this** very analysis **does not continue** after wrong ideas have been put to an end, just as a fire goes out on its own as soon as the firewood is burned up. As *The Sūtra of [the Prophecy of the Young Lady] Excellent Moon*<sup>1717</sup> says:

“O young lady, who gave you this self-confidence of yours?” “The Elder himself imparted it [to me], because this self-confidence of mine would not have arisen if the Elder had not questioned [me].”

Once clinging in terms of superimposition and denial has come to an end in such a way, just this empty and luminous nature of phenomena in which there is nothing to be removed or added is the fundamental state of phenomena. **This is expressed as** primordial **nirvāṇa** as such. Thus, since no conditioned or unconditioned phenomena whatsoever are observed [at this point], there is no ground for apprehending them as something positive or negative either. This is the perfect application of mindfulness of phenomena. [As *The Sūtra Requested by Crown Jewel*] says:

Mañjuśrī, if someone does not observe positive or negative phenomena, then this is someone who intensely applies the mindfulness of phenomena that inspects phenomena.

#### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

As for [verse 106], Kalyāṇadeva formulates some quite speculative objections:

If one definitely examines the explanation that—on the seeming level of this—cognitions exist by nature, then they also do not exist, since self-awareness is not established. Therefore, actually, both realities do not exist. Or, if the seeming becomes the seeming through some other causes or due to something later, it is established as something separate. Therefore, sentient beings could not pass into nirvāṇa. Since the seeming is labeled as something other, where would there be a nirvāṇa for sentient beings? In some [other] editions [of Śāntideva’s text], [line 106d] reads, “Hence, there is no nirvāṇa.” To this [phrase, we say]: However, if it is established that [nirvāṇa] is another seeming, it is taken as another one. Hence, sentient beings would not pass into nirvāṇa.

[He continues with the answer:]

“Conceptions in the minds of others” [in line 107a refers to] “of others” or “others.” This refers to the seeming, which is the conception that a mind exists as the continuum of another one or as a later mode of being. When [the text] says “mind” [here], this is distinguished from the “conceiver”<sup>1718</sup> of the Grammarians. What is labeled “mind” in other theses [875] is not what is to be identified here, because this

discussion essentially concerns itself with practice [and not philosophical theories]. To say “conception” [here] indicates that this mind is mere delusion. Therefore, [line 107b] says, “not in terms of their own . . .” You might wonder, “So who are these others?” This is [indicated] by [line 107b] “they do not exist in terms of their own seeming.” That which does not exist as one’s own seeming [in the first place] is subsequently ascertained through analysis as nothing but nonexistent. Before this [analysis], there was this aspect of an unquestioned, satisfying presence [of things]. As [*The Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning*] says:

In the beginning, those who search for true reality  
Should be told that everything exists.  
Later, when they have realized actuality  
And lack attachment, they are free.<sup>1719</sup>

If [things really] existed before they were examined, one would not be able to eliminate them even through later examination.<sup>1720</sup>

Thus, it appears that, explicitly, [Kalyāṇadeva] proves that the seeming is simply nonexistent by its nature. [Actually,] however, he seems to explain the following: The mere, simple presence of the objects of clinging when they are not examined is not contradictory to their nonexistence when they are analyzed.

Vibhūticandra sets up the following objections:

“If all phenomena are unarisen and unceasing, the seeming does not exist. Thus, conventionality is not established. Since ultimate reality is then the one and only reality that is established, the two realities, merit, and such would not exist. If such a seeming that is assigned by the cognitions of the continua of others were to exist, then ultimate reality would not be the only one. However, if this seeming is assigned by the conceptual cognitions of others, where should there be a nirvāṇa for sentient beings? Since emptiness too is taken as an object by conceptions, it would then be the seeming. [Furthermore,] through the realization of the ultimate, all discursiveness is no longer observed. Therefore, which sentient beings would pass into nirvāṇa? And if they were to proceed toward nirvāṇa, it would then be through mental observation. Also, since nirvāṇa is expressed by seeming cognitions, it too would be the seeming.”

[Verse 107] “They are . . .” is the answer [to this]. Since nirvāṇa is taken as an object of the cognitions of people who explain [about it] and are

different from those who have passed into nirvāṇa, it is [just] these conceptions of theirs. Therefore, it is not reasonable that nirvāṇa is the seeming; it is just nirvāṇa. [876] Why? It does not exist based on one's own seeming, because all one's own conceptions have ceased in it. You might wonder, "How then should it [exist] due to the seeming of others?" This is stated in [lines 107cd] "Later, when this has been verified . . ." The conceptions of others appear to yogins through dependent origination: "If this exists, that originates." Since [yogins] verify the conceptions of others during the aftermath of the actual part of their main meditative concentration, for the yogins, the seeming exists. The vajralike meditative concentration is the Dharma Body of the Buddhas, which is the nonobservation of any phenomenon. From this [manifests] the Body of Complete Enjoyment, the six supernatural knowledges, and omniscience. This is the mirrorlike wisdom, because all entities appear in the mirror of wisdom insofar as it is suitable for past, future, present, distant, or close phenomena to show [in it].

You might ask, "However, since the past and the future do not exist, how could they appear?" The following is stated: Distance in time is just like distance in space, because the wheel of the six kinds [of beings] has neither beginning nor end. Since the amazing Buddhas are the sources of merit and knowledge, they see what is distant in space and by nature. Likewise, why should they not see what is distant in time, such as the past? Since the same reasoning applies in both [cases], they see the wheel of the six kinds [of beings] that is free from a beginning, an end, and something in between. Thus, it is established that beings have no beginning and that the Teacher is omniscient. This explanation does not deal with the following question: "Since the [beginning and end of] cyclic existence are not known, if it is without beginning and end, how is omniscience established?" Rather, [it says that] the wheel of the six kinds [of beings] has neither beginning nor end and is still directly seen. Therefore, [it is said]:

For the omniscient ones,  
 Beings without exception appear like the present.  
 In dependence on the view of ordinary people,  
 Threefold distance is explained.<sup>1721</sup>

As for the Body of Complete Enjoyment, due to the influence of those to be trained and [previous] aspiration prayers, it also [entails] the Emanation Body, the wisdom of equality [877], and so forth. There-

fore, there is no contradiction between the ultimate nonexistence of arising and such and their seeming existence. You might ask, “Granted, yogins know the conceptions of others through their supernatural knowledge that knows the minds of others, but how should they know imputed things?” To this we say: Since these two—conceptual cognitions and the knowable objects that are imputed by these—entail interdependence, [yogins] know the objects of conceptions too. You might argue, “However, what is the basis of analyzing the seeming then? It is not the seeming, since this has been refuted. It is not the ultimate [either], since it is impossible to analyze it.” We say: In order to make people understand, here [all worldly analysis] is expressed in dependence on entities and analyses as these are common consensus in the world.<sup>1722</sup>

Thus, he explains the meaning of the two lines [107ab] “They are . . .” as follows: At the time when latent tendencies are vanquished by the vajralike meditative concentration, the seeming does not exist from the point of view of a nature of its own. [Line 107c] “Later, when this has been verified, it exists” means that mirrorlike wisdom knows the seeming. [Then he says above:] “You might ask, ‘[Yogins] know the conceptions [of others], but how should they know the objects?’” It seems that he explains [verse 108] “Both conceiver and . . .” as the answer [to this question]. However, there appear no supplementary words for [line 107d] “If it has not, the seeming does not exist at all.”

*The Small Commentary* says:

“If you analyze in this way, even the seeming would be nonexistent. So where would this leave the two realities? This is contradictory to what you claimed [before]. However, seeming mistaken consciousness exists from the perspective of others who are mistaken. Hence, if you analyze just this, it does not exist, but this does not mean that it does not exist on the seeming level.” This qualm is anticipated by [line 106c] “If it came through another seeming . . .”

The invalidation of this is as follows: [Line 106d] “Where would there be liberated beings?” indicates the [second] thesis of the opponent, which means, “Since even Buddhas may appear as someone with basic unawareness for the thinking of others who are mistaken, on the seeming level, they would circle [in cyclic existence] just like any other sentient being.” [Then, line 107a] “They are just conceptions in the minds of others” [878] refers to the fact that Buddhas, ignorance, and so on are merely made up by the conceptions of others. [Line 107b] “But

they do not exist in terms of their own seeming” means that it does not follow that Buddhas [have] basic unawareness on the seeming level, since this is not what the Buddhas themselves experience. You might ask, “Well, then how do the ignorance and suffering of sentient beings exist on the seeming level?” [The answer lies in line 107c.] “Later, when this has been verified, it exists”: The results—ignorance and suffering—exist only if they exist subsequently to some [moments of] mind that preceded them. [Line 107d] “If it has not, the seeming does not exist at all” means: If the cause exists, [resultant ignorance and suffering] exist. However, if one’s own continuum does not experience [its own] causes and results independently of the conceptions of others, [these causes and results] are nonexistent even on the seeming level, just like the horns of a rabbit.

This comment on [verse 107] means the following: No matter how something is mentally labeled by others, if it is not experienced by oneself, then it does not exist [for oneself] even on the seeming level. On the other hand, if it is experienced by oneself, it is presented as something that exists on the seeming level.

*The Small Commentary on the Knowledge Chapter* Only comments:

[Verse 106] “In this case . . .” anticipates the qualms of others who might say, “The seeming is imputed by other seeming [phenomena]: The conception of a mirage as water is an imputation by other seeming cognitions for which [something] appears as water. Likewise, even a Buddha who has passed into nirvāṇa is observed by the consciousnesses of others, such as bodhisattvas. Hence, ultimately, even a Buddha would not have passed into nirvāṇa.”

Here, master [Śāntideva] gives [line 107a] “They are . . .” This thought, “I see the consciousness of a Buddha” is one’s very own conception for which something other appears in such and such a way. Merely because something comes to someone else’s mind, it does not become existent on the seeming level. You might continue, “Buddhas themselves experience their own consciousnesses, which are their own seeming. Therefore, these exist on the seeming level.” [879] That this is not the case [is shown in line 107b] “But they do not exist in terms of their own seeming.” If you assert [the existence of] this seeming in Buddhas, then they have seeming consciousnesses. Therefore, they would not have attained precisely this ultimate consciousness [which is the very makeup of Buddhahood].

You might wonder, “How does the seeming abide then?” [The meaning of lines 107cd] “Later, when . . .” is expressed as follows: “That which is ascertained [to be] subsequent to [its] cause is what undoubtedly originates [from it]. Then, this is its result and the other [phenomenon] is the cause.” If there is such a conventional defining characteristic of this mere conditionality, then [one can say that] the seeming exists. However, if there is no such [characteristic], the seeming does not exist. You might still wonder, “If consciousnesses and knowable objects are not exactly such [consciousnesses and knowable objects], then what about the conventional expression, ‘This is a conception and that is what is conceived?’” The [answer] is stated in [lines 108ab:] “Both conceiver and . . .” This conventional expression of “mutual dependence” is something imputed.<sup>1723</sup>

These comments appear to have the following meaning: Since Buddhas have no seeming consciousness, there is no experience of themselves by themselves. If all phenomena are without arising, the seeming does not exist. Hence, where are the two realities? One labels the seeming as existent, if it is ascertained that a subsequent result arises from a cause that preceded it. One also labels, “If there is no arising of this [result], the seeming does not exist.” Actually, consciousnesses and knowable objects do not exist. However, in dependence on conceptions and what is conceived, they are expressed in accord with common worldly consensus.

The [master] from Sabsang says:

You might say, “If all phenomena are without arising, the seeming does not exist. Hence, where are the two realities? If the seeming were an imputation by the mistaken cognitions of others, then sentient beings would by their very nature not pass into nirvāṇa.” This seeming is nothing but the conceptions of the minds of others, that is, of those in cyclic existence. Therefore, when analyzed, it does not exist. Nirvāṇa’s own nature is not this that appears as the seeming. Rather, [88o] it abides as the unchanging ultimate. When there is the certainty and understanding that results are what subsequently originate from causes, then causes and results that are real as mere appearances exist. Hence, the presentation of the two realities is justified. When the above is not the case—that is, once these mere appearances have ceased—the seeming does not exist. However, nirvāṇa—the single reality—is established. Therefore, there is no mistake [in presenting the two realities].

This certainly looks like an expression of being greatly habituated to mental states that cling to the real [existence of] the ultimate. However, his answer to this objection, “It follows that the two realities are not justified, because the seeming does not exist,” is to accept its reason on the ultimate level. At the same time, he himself claims this entailment that “it follows that the two realities are justified, because one reality is justified.” Thus, it seems to me that he provides a feast of laughter for others.

#### 4. The Refutation of Reification

This has two parts:

- 1) Teaching that there are no means to prove [real] entities
- 2) Teaching the means to invalidate this [notion of entities]

##### 4.1. Teaching That There Are No Means to Prove [Real] Entities

Those for whom these two are real  
Have a very hard time with it. [111ab]

These two lines give a brief introduction.

[881] [There are] the systems of the realists **for whom these two**, the analyzer and the object of analysis, **are real** by their very entities. However, **they have a very hard time with** this pair of a real analyzer and a real object of analysis. Hence, nobody can establish them, because the analyzer and the object of analysis mutually depend on each other, and neither exists independently.

If objects are established by virtue of consciousness,  
What support for the existence of consciousness do you have? [111cd]

“Well, consciousness is established by virtue of knowable objects.”  
So what support is there for the existence of knowable objects?  
“They exist by virtue of each other.”  
Then neither of these two exists. [112]

These six lines teach that consciousness and knowable objects are not established.

If you proponents of [outer] referents say, “Outer **objects**, such as form, **are established by virtue of consciousness**,” please tell us first **what support** or justification **for the existence of consciousness you have**. You might answer, “Well, the subject—consciousness—is **established by virtue of** the existence of its objects, that is, **knowable objects**.” So what argument is there to **support the**



**existence of its knowable objects?** You will say, “Since knowable objects are established by virtue of consciousness, and consciousness is established by virtue of knowable objects, **they exist by virtue of being dependent on each other.**” Good enough—**then neither of these two exists independently**, because knowable objects do not exist independently of consciousness, and consciousness does not exist independently of knowable objects.

If there is no father without a son,  
Where would a son come from?  
If there is no son, there is no father.  
Likewise, these two do not exist. [113]

This verse explains the example for such [dependent existence].

For example, one speaks about a son in dependence on him having been engendered by a father and about a father in dependence on having engendered a son. Therefore, **without a son** who has been engendered by him, **there is no father**. Likewise, **if there is no father, where would his son come from?** **There is no way to speak of someone as a father if there is no son** who has been engendered by him. Hence, **like** [consciousness and knowable objects], **these two—**father and son—**do not exist** when they are [regarded] independently.

“A sprout arises from a seed,  
And this points to the seed.  
So why should the existence of a knowable object not be verified  
Through the consciousness that arises from it?” [114]

The existence of the seed is verified  
Through consciousness, which is something other than the sprout.  
What should realize the existence of this consciousness  
That verifies a knowable object? [115]

These two verses teach that this is not comparable to the example of seed and sprout.

They might argue, “**A sprout arises from a seed, and this points to** [the existence of] **the seed. So why should the existence of a knowable object not also be verified through the consciousness that arises from this knowable object?**”

This is a nonconcordant example: **The existence of the seed is verified through consciousness, which is something other than** and different from the sprout. [882] The consciousness that arises from a knowable object **verifies**,

“There is a **knowable object**.” What reason **should** prompt any consciousness other than **this** [first] **consciousness** to **realize** its **existence**? [There is no such other consciousness,] because one cannot observe any consciousness other than this consciousness that has arisen from knowable objects, that is, any other consciousness that realizes [this first one].<sup>1724</sup>

### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

Kalyāṇadeva expounds these [verses above] as the detailed explanation of [lines 108ab]:

Both conceiver and what is conceived  
Are mutually dependent.<sup>1725</sup>

[Furthermore, as for lines 115cd,] the following appears [in his commentary]:

Why should the existence of consciousness itself be realized, since self-awareness does not exist?<sup>1726</sup>

Some other [commentators still] relate these [verses] to the application of mindfulness of phenomena.

## 4.2. Teaching the Means to Invalidate This [Notion of Entities]

This has two parts:

- 1) The general topic
- 2) The meaning of the text

### 4.2.1. The General Topic

In general, in the context of Centrism, [there are] five great reasons that eliminate discursiveness.

- 1) The reason of dependence, or dependent origination

[This can be formulated] in terms of a negation: “These mere appearances as the subject do not exist by their nature, because they are something dependent, just like an illusion.”

[It can] also [be stated as] an affirming argument: “These [appearances] as the subject are also not nonexistent like the horns of a rabbit, because they are something dependent.” This latter [formulation] is for the sake of presenting the seeming.

There are two types of dependence:

- a) dependence in the sense of dependent arising, such as the arising of light due to the arising of a butter lamp
- b) dependence in the sense of dependent imputation, such as short in dependence on long

*The Precious Garland* says:

Due to the existence of this, that comes to be,  
For example, just as something short when there is something long.  
Due to the arising of this, that arises,  
Just as light due to the appearance of a butter lamp.<sup>1727</sup>

In this text [*The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life*, this reasoning] is not deliberately taught, because one understands it implicitly from the teaching that all phenomena are illusionlike.

Apart from this [reasoning, there are] four other negating arguments:

- 2) The analysis of a nature: the freedom from unity and multiplicity

“A sprout as the subject is not actually [883] established, because it is not established either as a unity or as a multiplicity.” In the present [text], [this reasoning] is included in [the section on] the application of mindfulness and others.

- 3) The analysis of the way of arising—the refutation of arising from the four possibilities<sup>1728</sup>—will be implicitly understood from the refutation of arising.<sup>1729</sup>

Therefore, the [remaining] two [reasonings]—the analysis of the cause (the vajra sliver [argument]) and the analysis of the result (the argument that refutes an arising of existents and nonexistents) —will be explicitly explained here.

- 4) The vajra sliver argument<sup>1730</sup>

Just like a vajra, [this argument] is unobstructed with respect to anything whatsoever. Therefore, it is called “vajra slivers.” It is to be explained as it is found in *The Fundamental Verses on Centrism*:

Not from themselves, not from something other,  
Not from both, and not without a cause—  
At any place and any time,  
All entities lack arising.<sup>1731</sup>

Thus, the positions of the Hedonists<sup>1732</sup> who assert that there is no cause, the Enumerators who assert that [entities] arise from themselves, and the Nudes<sup>1733</sup> who assert that [entities] arise from both are refuted by all texts of Centrism and valid cognition. The assertion that [entities] arise from something other, which is the position of our [other] three [Buddhist] factions—the Mere Mentalists and the [two schools] below them—is eliminated through Centrist texts [alone].

The oral pith instructions on Centrism by my mentor, the Omniscient Victor,<sup>1734</sup> say:

“A sprout as the subject is without arising, because it is free from arising from any of the four extremes, just as a frog’s long hair.”

Here, master Bhavya states [this as] the main argument and then formulates four autonomous reasons as the means to prove the subject property. The venerable and fearless Candrakīrti presents this by labeling the mere refutation of arising from the four extremes a “position.” He teaches the invalidation of the opposite [positions] of this [refutation] through consequences that reveal contradictions and through the analogous applicability of the [opponents’] reason [to something that contradicts their position]. However, he does not formulate a main argument, nor does he assert arguments that establish the subject property through valid cognition. It is merely on the grounds of this [difference] that one refers to Autonomists and Consequentialists. However, it is not that [884] there were any differences in terms of better or worse in the views of these two. The reasons for this are: Both accept the freedom from discursiveness in which all complexes of discursiveness have been ended without exception. Not even the Omniscient Ones would see a difference in terms of better or worse between the ways in which these two put an end to discursiveness.

One might wonder, “How can this be? There is a slight remainder of discursiveness left in the view of the Autonomists.” This is not the case, because the texts of Autonomists are much clearer in their way of teaching freedom from discursiveness than the texts of venerable Candrakīrti. *The Ornament of Centrism* says:

Because [“nonarising”] concords with the ultimate,  
This is called “the ultimate.”  
In actuality, it is the release  
From all complexes of discursiveness.

Since arising and so forth do not exist,  
Nonarising and so on are impossible.  
Since their nature has been negated,  
Their verbal terms are impossible.

There is no good formulation  
To negate nonexistent objects.  
[Nonarising and such] depend on conceptions  
And thus are seeming, not actual.<sup>1735</sup>

*[The Distinction between] the Two Realities* agrees:

Since the negation of arising and so on  
Concords with actuality, we accept it.  
Since there is nothing to be negated,  
It is clear that, actually, there is no negation.

How should the negation of an imputation's  
Own nature not be an imputation?  
Hence, seemingly, this is  
The meaning of actuality, but not actuality [itself].

In actuality, both do not exist.  
This is the lack of discursiveness:  
Mañjuśrī asked about actuality  
And the son of the Victors remained silent.<sup>1736</sup>

This is extensively taught in other [texts] too. The school of Yoga Practice explains this as the wisdom that is empty of the duality of apprehender and apprehended and free from discursiveness. From the perspective of this wisdom itself, it is definitely free from discursiveness, but, in general, a [certain] remainder of discursiveness is left. Therefore, this is not all-encompassing freedom from discursiveness.

Thus, the differences between Autonomists and Consequentialists [in terms of ground, path, and fruition] are as follows: In the context of the ground, there is the difference that [Autonomists] present the seeming in accordance with proponents of philosophical systems [such as the Sūtra Followers or the Yogācāras] and that [Consequentialists] present it in accordance with common worldly consensus.<sup>1737</sup> When presenting the ultimate, [Autonomists] accept objects (that is, seeming

[phenomena]) that bear the nature of phenomena, while [Consequentialists] do not accept this. [885] [Another difference is] that [Autonomists] accept valid cognition that is undeceiving with respect to objects (that is, conventional reality), and [Consequentialists] do not accept it.

In the context of the path, [Autonomists] settle in meditative equipoise within spacelike emptiness of appearance, and [Consequentialists] settle in meditative equipoise within illusionlike emptiness of reality.

In the context of the result, they differ in that [Autonomists state that] the aspects of the seeming emerge within the self-appearances of the wisdom that knows the extent, while such is not the case [for Consequentialists]. They also have a different [opinion] as to whether discursiveness is ended gradually or all at once.

For those with sharp faculties who take the instantaneous approach, the Consequentialist [approach] is better, and for those with weaker faculties who take the gradual approach, the Autonomist [approach] is better. Some [aspects] of the seeming [reality] of yogins have to be accepted by both Autonomists and Consequentialists after analysis through reasoning, such as the four seals of the view that are a sign of the Buddha's speech and the aspect of emptiness of reality free from discursiveness. It is not that these [aspects] are presented as the seeming from the point of view of having been analyzed [and found] through reasoning. Rather, they are presented as the seeming from the point of view of [still] apprehending characteristics in what is analyzed.

[Now follows the actual explanation of the vajra sliver reasoning:

a) The refutation of the first extreme: arising from itself]

There is no arising [of an entity] from itself for the following reasons: If it is not yet present, it does not exist, which makes it unsuitable as a cause. If it is already present, it would be pointless that something that is already present arises again. Moreover, it would follow then that it arises forever without reaching an end. In his *Lucid Words*, [Candrakīrti] quotes Buddhapaṇita's commentary [on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Verses*]:

There is no arising of entities from themselves, because their arising would be pointless and because it would be completely absurd. There

is no need for entities that [already] exist as their own identity to arise again. Why is that? If they were to arise although they [already] exist, there would be no time when they do not arise.<sup>1738</sup>

[In his *Lamp of Knowledge*], master Bhāvaviveka formulates this as an autonomous reason:

It is certain that, ultimately, there is no arising of the inner sources from themselves, because they [already] exist, for example, like an existent consciousness.<sup>1739</sup>

Master Candrakīrti objects to this:

Why do you introduce this distinction “ultimately” here? [886] You might answer, “My reasons are: To accept arising on the seeming worldly level is not what is to be negated. Moreover, even if [this arising] were negated, it follows that [such a negation] would [still] be invalidated through what [the world] accepts.” This is not reasonable, because an arising from itself is not accepted even on the seeming level. . . . You might argue, “This distinction is made in dependence on the systems of others.” This is also not reasonable, because their presentations are not accepted even on the seeming level. Even worldly people do not think that [entities] arise from themselves. Worldly people [simply] do not engage in such analyses as whether [things arise] from themselves or others. All they think is that “results originate from causes.” Also master [Nāgārjuna] presented this in such a way. Therefore, it is certain that “this distinction is meaningless in all aspects.”

Furthermore, if you wanted to refute arising on the seeming level and thus set up this distinction, then the flaw of a subject that is an unestablished base or the mistake of an argument that is an unestablished base falls upon yourself, because, ultimately, you yourself do not claim the sources, such as the eyes. . . . You might say, “Because we refute that the seeming, such as the eyes, arises ultimately, to say ‘ultimately’ indicates a special case of refuting arising.” Well, if this were your concern, you should say, “Seeming [entities], such as the eyes, are ultimately without arising . . .” [However,] you did not teach such a phrase.<sup>1740</sup>

If one were to insert “ultimately” in order to refute an arising on the seeming level that is claimed by worldly people or the Enumerators, [this is pointless,

since] they do not present the two realities but merely assert that “[entities] simply arise.” This was all that the venerable master Nāgārjuna has refuted. Thus, this is not a refutation by differentiating the two realities. Since worldly people do not claim that [entities] arise from themselves, [887] there is no purpose in inserting “ultimately.” [Furthermore,] if this were done in order to refute arising on the seeming level, since master Bhāvaviveka himself does not assert that, ultimately, the sources, such as the eyes, exist, then to set up “exist” as the reason [in his autonomous reasoning above] would be a nonapplying argument. If [this insertion of “ultimately”] were made for the sake of understanding that the eyes and so on are the seeming, there is the mistake of not arriving at this meaning, since [in order to do so] one would have to say, “Seeming [entities], such as the eyes, are ultimately without arising . . .”

By refuting [Bhāvaviveka in this way, Candrakīrti] asserts that there is never any arising from the four extremes, whether it is in worldly and non-Buddhist contexts of no analysis in terms of the two realities or whether it is in the Buddhist context of presenting the two realities. However, then [there are] those later Tibetans who presume to be Consequentialist Centrists and who are in the tight grip of dense referential views. They proclaim, “When one sets up Centrist reasons, there is the flaw of denying the seeming, if one does not insert ‘ultimately,’ ‘actually,’ or ‘when analyzed.’” [There are] also those who talk about the three phases of no analysis, slight analysis, and intense analysis [in this context]. From what Candrakīrti [said above], it is very clear that [such people] are not followers of this master.

Thus, also the following explanation is nothing but [an attempt to] make some pale yellow metal look like the finest gold from the river Jambu: “Without analysis, I accept [entities] in accordance with common worldly consensus. Under slight analysis, I accept such [positions] as the following: Cyclic existence does not exist and, when distinguishing the pure essence<sup>1741</sup> [of wisdom mind] from the dross<sup>1742</sup> [of ordinary consciousness], the dross is necessarily that which does not exist.<sup>1743</sup> At the point of intense analysis, if you ask me what the ultimate is, I do not say anything at all.”

[Actually,] in the Centrist system itself, the phase of no analysis through reasoning refers to the cycle [of teachings] that first puts an end to what is not meritorious, which is the vehicle that [leads to] the higher realms. The intermediate phase of putting an end to identity means to counteract [all types of] clinging of Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems with Centrist reasonings. The phase of putting an end to all bases for views refers to the final complete elimination of [any] clinging to true reality. Hence, there is no need for anybody to reduce these [phases] or add anything to them. [888] Once one relates all these three [phases of no analysis, slight analysis, and intense analysis] solely to the intermediate phase of putting an end to identity, one develops clinging to the



nonexistence of the dross and clinging to the existence of the pure essence. [Moreover,] one considers merely not giving an answer as the ultimate actuality. For those who understand the meaning of Centrism, this [mistaken presentation] certainly provides a good chance for a laugh. However, for some ignorant people who wish for liberation, it still serves as an issue that makes them tremble with awe.

Therefore, it is explained that when Mañjuśrī asked Vimalakīrti about the perfect actuality, the genuine answer [in this case] was to not give an answer. However, when one naïve being does not give an answer to the question of another one, how could these two cases ever be comparable? Please understand the difference between a bodhisattva in his last existence who dwells under the bodhi tree and Devadatta who is sitting under a nimba tree. If you think, “These are comparable,” then just ask an ox about the ultimate and you will get the final answer that you wish for [from this ox].

b) The refutation of the second extreme [that is, arising from something other]:

[Candrakīrti's *Lucid Words* quotes Buddhapālita on this]:

Master Buddhapālita says:

Things are without arising from something other, because [otherwise] it would follow that everything arises from everything.<sup>1744</sup>

Venerable Candrakīrti himself says:

Things also do not arise from something other, because there is nothing other.<sup>1745</sup>

In *The Entrance [into Centrism]*, he states:

If something were to originate in dependence on something other than it,  
Well, then utter darkness would spring from flames  
And everything would arise from everything. Why?  
[Also] everything that does not produce [this] is the same in being  
other.<sup>1746</sup>

Furthermore, if [entities] were to arise from causes and conditions, [as *The Fundamental Verses* says, there] are only four conditions:

Conditions are fourfold: Causal,  
Observed, immediate,

And dominant.  
There is no fifth condition.<sup>1747</sup>

For example, the nature of a rice sprout does not exist in any of [its conditions:] neither in its causal condition (water and manure), nor in its observed condition (the harvest), not in its immediate condition [889] (the last moment of the seed), and also not in its dominant condition (the person who plants [the seed]):

The nature of entities  
Does not exist in conditions and such.<sup>1748</sup>

When one analyzes this with [the reasoning of] the freedom from unity and multiplicity, then if an [entity] in itself is not established, where should there be something other that depends [for its otherness] on this [first entity]?

If an entity in itself does not exist,  
An entity other [than it] does not exist either.<sup>1749</sup>

If conditions (such as water and manure) have functions (such as producing a sprout), they would have to produce sprouts all the time. If they do not have any functions, there would never be any function. However, if they do not have any functions, why are they presented as conditions?

Function is not something that entails conditions.  
[Conventionally, however,] there is no function that does not entail conditions.  
What does not entail a function is not a condition.<sup>1750</sup>

You might say, "However, since [the sprout] arises in dependence on these, they are its conditions." As long as it does not arise, they are not its conditions, and once it has arisen, its conditions are not needed [anymore]. Hence, when would they be its conditions?

This is consensus: "Since it arises in dependence on these,  
Therefore, they are its conditions."  
As long as it does not arise,  
How could these not be things that are not its conditions?

For [both] nonexistents and existents,  
Conditions are not suitable:  
If something does not exist, whose conditions would they be?

If something exists [already], what are conditions good for?<sup>1751</sup>

Hence, once one examines any existing or nonexisting phenomenon, it disintegrates and is thus not established. In this situation, how could [its] causes be established?

Once phenomena are not established  
As existent, nonexistent, or [both] existent and nonexistent,  
How could you speak of “causes that accomplish [them]”?  
Once such is the case, this is not reasonable.<sup>1752</sup>

Likewise, the observed condition is not established either:

An existent phenomenon [that is a consciousness] reveals  
Nothing but the nonexistence of [its] observed object.  
If a phenomenon [itself] is not observable,  
Where would [its] observed object exist?<sup>1753</sup>

It is surely a consensus that the previous moment that has just ceased is the immediate condition. However, since there is nothing that arises, something that has ceased is not justified. Moreover, since something that has ceased is not existent [anymore], it is also not suitable as a condition. Hence, the immediate condition is also not established:

If phenomena have not arisen,  
Cessation [890] would not be justified.  
Therefore, the immediate [condition] is not reasonable.  
If it has ceased, what would be such a condition?<sup>1754</sup>

You might argue, “The Blessed One stated, ‘Since this exists, that originates. Since this has arisen, that arises. Due to the condition of basic unawareness, [there] is formation.’ Is this not [what he said]?” *The Lucid Words* states:

These teachings of arising in the sense of dependent origination and so on are not [meant] in terms of the nature of the object of uncontaminated wisdom of those who are free from the blurred vision of basic unawareness. “Well, [in terms of] what are they [meant] then?” They are [meant] in terms of the object of consciousness of those whose eyes of intelligent insight are impaired by the blurred vision of basic unawareness. It is in terms of seeing precisely this that the Blessed One has made statements such as:

Oh fully ordained monks, this ultimate reality is single. It is as follows: Nirvāṇa has the property of being undeceiving, whereas all formations have the property of being delusive and deceiving.<sup>1755</sup>

[The text then] continues with many further quotations to prove this.

Hence, a result does not dwell in any of its diverse conditions. Thus, if it is a nonexistent [at the time of its conditions], how could this nonexistent arise [as an existent later]? If it were to arise despite its nonexistence, it would arise even from [entities] that are not its causes. [*The Fundamental Verses on Centrism* says:]

If, for whatever reason, there is no existence  
Of things that do not exist by their nature,  
It is not justified to say,  
“Since this exists, that originates.”

The result does not exist at all  
In any of its diverse conditions or their assembly.  
What does not exist in its conditions,  
How should that arise from such conditions?

However, if it does not exist  
And were still to arise from these conditions,  
Why would it not also arise  
From [entities] that are not its conditions?<sup>1756</sup>

You might say, “Because the result depends on its conditions, the result is something that has the nature of its conditions.” If even these very conditions do not exist as [something that bears] its own nature, how should they exist as the nature of the result? [On the other hand,] there is also no result that does not depend on conditions. Therefore, causes and conditions are nothing but superimpositions.

You might say, “The result is of the nature of its conditions.”  
[However,] conditions do not have a nature of their own. [891]  
What is the result of something that is not an entity in itself?  
How could it be of the nature of [such] conditions?

Therefore, it is not of the nature of [its] conditions.  
[However,] there is [also] no result with the nature of what are not its conditions.

Since results do not exist,  
How should nonconditions be conditions?<sup>1757</sup>

c–d) The [refutation of] the remaining two extremes: [arising from both or arising without a cause]

*The Lucid Words* explains:

Things also do not arise from both [themselves and others], because this would entail [all] the flaws that were stated for both of these theses and because each one of these [extremes] does not have the capacity to produce [entities].

If suffering were produced by each one of them,  
It would be produced by both.<sup>1758</sup>

This will be explained [below].

[Entities] also do not arise without a cause. This would entail the following and other mistakes that will be explained below:

If there were no causes, results  
And causes would not be justified either.<sup>1759</sup>

Other flaws would follow as well:

If these beings were empty of causes, they could not be apprehended,  
Just like the smell and the color of an utpala flower in the sky.<sup>1760</sup>

5) The analysis of the result: the argument that refutes arising of existents and nonexistents<sup>1761</sup>

[The basic reasoning] is formulated as follows: These mere appearances as the subject do not exist by their nature, because neither existents nor nonexistents arise, just like an illusion.

- a) Those who assert the arising of a result that [already] exists in the cause now are the Enumerators.
- b) The people who assert the arising of [a result] that [already] exists in the future belong to the Great Exposition School in our own [Buddhist] faction.<sup>1762</sup>
- c) Those who assert the new arising of [a result] that did not exist before are some other followers of our own faction.

a) If the sprout existed in the seed right now, it would follow that it is pointless for it to arise again. [The Enumerators] would say, “Its nature is established [already now]. However, it exists in such a way that it arises as something clearly manifest [later].” From the point of view of its nature, it would then be pointless for it to arise again, and from the point of view of its clear manifestation, it would be a nonexistent that arises.

b) Also something that [already] exists in the future does not arise for the following reason: If an entity that has not [yet] arisen [here] existed in some unknown [other] place right now, it would be reasonable that it might arise [here] in the future. However, since there is no such [entity], what is it that could arise? [*The Fundamental Verses on Centrism* says:]

If some nonarisen entity  
Existed somewhere,  
It might arise.  
However, if it does not exist, what would arise?<sup>1763</sup>

c) If something that has not existed before were to arise, [892] it would follow that even the horns of a rabbit could arise. [Moreover,] it would follow that just about anything could arise. The reason for these [consequences] is that [a nonexistent] does not depend on any cause [at all].

If something nonarisen could arise,  
Just about anything could arise in this way.<sup>1764</sup>

Thus, when we analyze with these [five] great reasonings, all our clinging to causes, the lack of causes, arising, ceasing and so on—that is, all conceptions of superimposition and denial—subside, which is [precisely] the purpose of this [approach]. *The Entrance [into Centrism]* says:

Ordinary beings are bound by conceptions.  
Nonconceptual yogins will find release.  
Hence, the learned state that the result of analysis  
Is that conceptions are at peace.<sup>1765</sup>

#### 4.2.2. The Meaning of the Text

This has two parts:

- 1) The analysis of the cause: the vajra slivers

- 2) The analysis of the result: the refutation of an arising of existents and nonexistents

#### 4.2.2.1. The Analysis of the Cause: The Vajra Slivers

This has five parts:

- 1) The refutation of arising without a cause
- 2) The four refutations of arising from something other
- 3) The three refutations of arising from itself
- 4) Teaching that the cognition that negates the existence of objects is a valid cognition
- 5) Stating the meaning that is ascertained through valid cognition

##### 4.2.2.1.1. The Refutation of Arising without a Cause

**Temporarily, worldly perception  
Sees all kinds of causes. [116ab]**

These two lines teach that causes are directly seen by the world.

Some Mundanely Minded assert that there are no causes at all. They say, “The cause of things is their very nature, because they originate through their own nature. [As our scriptures say]:

The roundness of peas, the long sharp tips of thorns,  
The colorful patterns of the feathers of a peacock's wings,  
The rising of the sun, and the downhill flow of rivers—  
All these were created by nobody. Their cause is their very nature.

To this we say: **Temporarily**, it is neither the case that there are no causes [893] nor that [entities] are [just as they are] by their very nature, because **perception sees all kinds of causes** in the **world**, such as a seed being the cause of a sprout.

**The distinct parts of a lotus, such as its stalk,  
Are produced by distinct causes. [116cd]**

These two lines teach that there are various causes for [a flower's] stalk, its petals, and so on.

There are different causes for each individual color on the multicolored feathers of a peacock's wings. Likewise, **the distinct parts of a lotus, such as its stalk**,

its leaves, its anthers, its pistils, and its various colors, **are produced by distinct individual causes.** In a single seed, these causal aspects are present in an inseparable way. They are the objects of the vision of those who are not obscured with respect to the whole range of what bears the nature of phenomena, but naïve beings do not understand this.

You might ask, “What created the variety of causes?”

It comes from the variety of preceding causes.

“Why are causes able to produce results?”

This is due to the force of the preceding causes. [117]

This verse teaches that these [causes] arise from previous causes.

You might ask, “What created this variety of causes? If there is no creator, they are established as nonexistent.” Later [causes] become gradually established **from the variety of causes** in their respective **preceding** moments. You might continue, “Why are causes able to produce results?” **This is due to the force of the preceding beginningless causes**, through dependent origination in which one [cause] sequentially leads to another one. Furthermore, it is an immediate contradiction to assert that there is no cause and at the same time to formulate an argument for this. The reason is that an argument is the cause that makes one understand [something], and if this [cause] exists, then also the existence of other causes is established.

#### 4.2.2.1.2. The Refutation of Arising from Some Other Cause

This has four parts:

- 1) Teaching that Īśvara<sup>1766</sup> is not established
- 2) Teaching that his results are impossible
- 3) Teaching that it is contradictory for him to be a creator
- 4) The refutation of infinitesimal particles

##### 4.2.2.1.2.1. Teaching That Īśvara Is Not Established

If Īśvara is the cause of the world,

Just tell us who Īśvara is.

If you say, “He is the elements,” that is surely fine,

But then why all this fuss over a mere name? [118]

Moreover, the earth and such are multiple,

Impermanent, inactive, not divine,



**Something trampled upon, and impure.  
Therefore, they are not Īśvara. [119]**

[894] These two verses teach that the four elements are not Īśvara.

You Differentiators and others say, “There is the god called Īśvara who is pure, vast, worthy of veneration, permanent, single, and an omnipresent creator. He is the one who has absolute power over everything. [As the scriptures say]:

He who is subtle, singular, the source . . .

and

It is said that Īśvara functions as the cause  
For everything else that entails conditions.  
What has no mind is not capable  
Of assembling its results by itself.”

Here we ask: [895]

**If Īśvara is the cause of the world,  
Just tell us who Īśvara is.**

If you say, “We assert that the great elements are Īśvara,” that is surely fine, but we too assert that the elements are causes, so **why** should we create **all this fuss** by debating **over mere** different **names**, such as “elements” or “Īśvara”? We will not debate [about mere terminology].

**Moreover**, [what you say] contradicts your own system for the following reasons: The elements—**earth and such**—are **multiple**, while you assert that Īśvara is singular. Earth and such are **impermanent**, but you assert that Īśvara is permanent. Earth and so on are [mentally] **inactive** and thus have no mind, while your position is that Īśvara has an [active] mind.<sup>1767</sup> Earth and so forth are **not divine and something** that your feet **trample upon**. However, you claim that Īśvara is divine and worthy of veneration. Earth and such are necessarily **impure**, but you assert that Īśvara is pure. **Therefore**, in your own system, the elements are not Īśvara.

Īśvara is not space, because it is inactive.  
He is not the self, because this has already been refuted earlier.  
If he is inconceivable, his state as a creator is inconceivable too,  
So what can you say about it? [120]

This verse teaches that space or something inconceivable is not Īśvara [either].

You might continue, “Īśvara is space.” **Īśvara is not space, because Īśvara is active, while space is inactive.** Then you might try, “The self is Īśvara.” A **self, which is never possible, is not Īśvara, because this self has already been refuted earlier.** Your last shot might be, “Īśvara is inconceivable.” **If the state of Īśvara as an inconceivable creator is inconceivable, you are not able to say something about it. So what is the point of calling him Īśvara?**

#### 4.2.2.1.2.2. Teaching That His Results Are Impossible

**And what could he want to create? [121a]**

This line teaches that there is nothing that could be created by him.

Thus, since Īśvara is not established, **what could be the phenomena other [than him] that he wants to create?**

**If it were a self, isn’t that eternal?**

**[Likewise,] the nature of earth and such, Īśvara, [121bc]**

These two lines refute the assertion that the self is Īśvara.

You might say, “Since everything is emanated by the self, the **self** is Īśvara.” If you assert that Īśvara is this singular and eternal [self], it follows either that he creates all things, **such as earth**, simultaneously and all the time, or it follows that he never creates them. **Isn’t it that you assert Īśvara’s nature as eternal?**<sup>1768</sup>

**And consciousness arising from knowable objects are all without beginning. [121d]**

**Suffering and happiness come from actions.**

**So please tell us what he has created. [122ab]**

These three lines teach that [results] are produced by actions.

Hence, **consciousness and knowable objects arise from** being dependent on each other. **Beginningless [896] suffering and happiness arise from** one’s own actions. **So please tell us what** this Īśvara who is nothing but a mere name **has created.**

4.2.2.1.2.3. Teaching That It Is Contradictory for Him to Be a Creator

If the cause does not have a beginning,  
Where should there be a beginning of its result? [122cd]

Why does he not create all the time,  
Since he does not depend on anything other?  
There is nothing that was not created by him,  
So on what should this [creation] of his depend? [123]

If it were dependent [on other factors], their coming together  
Would be the cause, but again Īśvara would not.  
Once these have come together, he could not but create,  
And without them, he could not but not create. [124]

These lines teach that collections [of various causes and conditions] are the [actual] cause [of the world].

Furthermore, **if the cause—Īśvara—does not have a point where it begins, where should there be a beginning of the result** that originates from it? If you assert such a [permanent cause], it follows that newly originated results are impossible.<sup>1769</sup>

If Īśvara is the creator of everything, **why does he not create all the time**, also doing such things as fetching water and making fire? If he did so, of course, [everything] would be created by Īśvara, but what would be the point in others, [such as] servants, taking care [of these things too]? Some [permanent] creating [that is performed] by Īśvara alone would surely **not depend on any other** causes. However, the [whole] world can directly see that these phenomena do depend on other causes: If you want fire, you need firewood, but what help is Īśvara in this? **There is nothing that was not created by Īśvara, so on what other causes and conditions should this [creation] of his**, such as clay pots and butter lamps, **depend?** Thus, it is not reasonable that [such an exclusive creating activity] could depend [on anything].

On the other hand, however, we can see that a clay pot is not created by Īśvara but by a potter, and that a [burning] butter lamp does not arise from Īśvara but originates from fat, a wick, a small bowl, and fire. Therefore, **if it [his creation] were dependent on such causes and conditions, their coming together would be the cause, but again Īśvara would not. Once causes and conditions have come together, Īśvara could not but create**, even if he wished not to create. **And without them coming together, he could not but not create**, even if he wished to create.

If Īśvara were to create without desiring to,  
 It would follow that he is under the sway of something else.  
 If he creates because he so desires, he would depend on his desire.  
 So what has become of your Īśvara then? [125]

This verse teaches that Īśvara does not have absolute power.

Again, we ask: How is it, does Īśvara create without desiring to, or does he create out of desiring to? If Īśvara were to create without himself desiring to, it would follow that he is someone under the sway of something else, because, just like a servant, he would have to create despite not wishing to. If you say, “He creates because he so desires,” he would be someone who is under the sway of his own desire, because he depends on his desire and follows it. So in both cases, what has become of your absolutely powerful Īśvara then, since [your idea] that he has absolute power is ruined?<sup>1770</sup>

#### 4.2.2.1.2.4. The Refutation of Infinitesimal Particles

Those who propound permanent infinitesimal particles  
 Have already been disproved earlier. [126ab]

Thus, the Differentiators [897] and others [who claim the existence of Īśvara] have been refuted. Now, there is also no justification [for the claim of] those other people, such as the Analyzers, who propound that the entire animate and inanimate world arises from permanently existing infinitesimal particles that have no parts. Infinitesimal partless particles are not established, because [Vasubandhu’s] *Twenty Verses* says that partlessness is not established:

If six [particles] join it simultaneously,  
 This infinitesimal particle would have six parts.  
 If all six together are partless,  
 Then also their aggregation would be just an infinitesimal particle.<sup>1771</sup>

[Furthermore,] infinitesimal particles are not established for the following reason: If you take some [particles] that are golden, then a mountain that consists of them must also be golden. Likewise, if they are permanent, it would follow that the things that consist of them—such as Mount Meru or houses—are permanent too. Hence, also those systems have already been disproved earlier by such [lines as 86cd]:

Since these directional divisions lack any parts,  
 They are like space. Therefore, not even particles exist.

### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

Here, Kalyāṇadeva explains:

[Earth and such are not Īśvara] for the following reason: You assert that he is single, permanent, endowed with excellent intelligence, and divine. Therefore, even such things as a liṅgam are pure and not to be stepped upon. You might assert that Īśvara is space. However, this is also not Īśvara, since it is free from activity and deliberate engagement. Also a self that has the character of venerating sun or moon and such is not Īśvara, because it has been refuted by [verses 57–59]:

I am not teeth, hair, or nails . . .

You might end up saying, “Īśvara is inconceivable.” Since his creating activity also is inconceivable, what can you say? How could something inconceivable be an object of expression? And even if we assume this, what things could he wish to bring forth or produce? If he wishes to bring forth a so-called self, this [self] is not like [inconceivable] Īśvara, since you say that it is permanent and stable.<sup>1772</sup>

Vibhūticandra states the thesis of the opponents [about Īśvara] as follows:

The Logicians and others say, “There is this Blessed One, who is skilled in creating various beings. His power never declines. He is the beginning, eternal, omniscient, [898] and almighty. He is the cause of the world and creates bodies, realms, mountains, oceans, and such. He is the cause of abiding and ceasing, the Great Almighty.”<sup>1773</sup>

#### 4.2.2.1.3. The Refutation of Arising from Itself

This has three parts:

- 1) The refutation of the primal substance of the Enumerators
- 2) Dispelling the assertion that pleasure and such are permanent
- 3) The refutation of the assertion that the result abides in the cause

##### 4.2.2.1.3.1. The Refutation of the Primal Substance of the Enumerators

The Enumerators assert that the primal substance

Is the permanent cause of the world. [126cd]

The equilibrium of the constituents  
 “Lightness,” “motility,” and “darkness”  
 Is called “primal substance.”

Universal flux is explained through their disequilibrium. [127]

These one and a half verses state the thesis of the opponent.

[899] The non-Buddhist Enumerators assert that the primal substance is the permanent cause of the animate and inanimate world. The equilibrium of the three constituents “lightness,” “motility,” and “darkness” is called “primal substance.” They assert that it has five attributes: It is permanent, material, not appearing, and single, and it is the nature [of everything] but not [any of that nature’s] manifestations. They further claim that it is only a cause but not a result. The so-called universal flux is explained through the three constituents being in the phase of their disequilibrium. The [other] twenty-four [factors of their system are the following]:<sup>1774</sup>

2) the self [or individual], which has five attributes: it is aware, permanent, single, and contained in the continuum of individuals, and it is the experiencer but not an agent or a creator

The [remaining] twenty-three [factors of universal flux] gradually originate from the primal substance:

3) the “great one” or “cognition,” which is like a crystal mirror with two sides<sup>1775</sup>

4) from this comes “identification,” which evolves into—the eleven faculties:

5–9) the five [sense faculties], such as the eye sense faculty and the ear sense faculty

10–14) the five operative faculties, such as speech

15) the faculty that is both operative and mental, that is, mental cognition [900], and

—the five essential elements:

16–20) the essential elements, such as sound, which in turn evolve into

21–25) the five [coarser] elements, such as space

[The Enumerators] assert that, from among these, the eleven faculties and the five elements are only causes. They say, “Since the manifestations of both the self and [outer] objects appear simultaneously within [the two-sided mirror of] cognition, the individual experiences objects. When the individual realizes that these are created by the primal substance, the primal substance becomes ashamed and does not create these manifestations [anymore]. Thus, the self becomes separated from the primal substance and is released.” The objections to this are as follows:

Since three natures in a single entity  
Are not possible, it does not exist.  
Likewise, the constituents do not exist,  
Because each of them has three aspects too. [128]

This verse refutes the constituents.

That **three natures** exist in a **single** primal substance is **not possible**, because it then follows that the primal substance is not single but triple. You might argue, “It exists as a triad, but this is not contradictory to being one.” However, then it follows that it is also not contradictory for a vase and a cloth to exist as two but still to be one. **Since** [this is impossible,] a primal substance that is their equilibrium **does not exist**. **Likewise**, the three **constituents** themselves—motility, darkness, and lightness—**do not exist**, because if they existed, they should be suitable to appear, but they cannot be observed anywhere. [Furthermore,] there follows an infinite regress, **because** you yourselves assert that **each of them too has three aspects**, such as the motility of motility and so forth.

If these constituents do not exist,  
The existence of sound and such becomes extremely far-fetched. [129ab]

These two lines refute sound and such that are produced by the [constituents].

If thus **these very constituents do not exist**, the **existence** of the essential elements, **such** as **sound**, and the [coarser] elements—which are [all] produced by the primal substance that entails these [three constituents]—**becomes extremely far-fetched**. This is just like the case of the son of a barren woman: If he does not exist, then his youth or old age do not exist either.

Moreover, pleasure and such are impossible  
In something without mind, such as cloth. [129cd]

You might think, “Entities have the nature of their causes.”  
 However, did we not analyze entities already?  
 Anyway, your cause is pleasure and such,  
 But cloth and the like do not come from this. [130]

If it were that pleasure and such come from cloth and so forth,  
 Once these do not exist, pleasure and the like do not exist either.  
 [131ab]

These eight lines fling the extremely absurd consequence [at the opponent] that earth and so on have pleasure and such.

Moreover, it is not reasonable that all twenty-three factors of universal flux possess the three constituents, **such as pleasure**, because an experience of these feelings—pleasure (lightness), suffering (motility), and dullness (darkness)—**is impossible in something without mind, such as earth.**<sup>1776</sup> ([Here,] the word “moreover” implies the following: “It is not only the case that the three constituents themselves do not exist, [but it is moreover impossible that there is pleasure and such in something without mind.]”)

You might think, “Entities have the nature of their causes, which are [the three constituents,] pleasure and so on. Hence, pleasure and such [can in turn] arise from earth and the like.” However, did we not refute these very entities **already** before by analyzing them from their infinitesimal particles all the way up to collections? We surely did. [901] Anyway, you Enumerators with **your** system may well assert that the **cause is pleasure and such**, but [the truth is that] **cloth and so on do not come from this** [kind of cause], because nobody has [ever] seen that cloth arises from pleasure.

If your philosophical system were to say **that pleasure and such arise from cloth and so forth**, [conventionally speaking,] this would be appropriate. The reason for this is that **once these** garments made of cloth and such **do not exist**, the **pleasure of warmth and the like** [that would come from them] **do not exist either.**<sup>1777</sup> [However,] in this case, none of these [things], such as cloth and pleasure, would ever be established, because the cause for such things as pleasure is cloth and so forth, and the cause for such things as cloth is pleasure and so on.<sup>1778</sup>

#### 4.2.2.1.3.2. Dispelling the Assertion That Pleasure and Such Are Permanent

Also, pleasure and so forth are never seen  
 To have any permanence. [131cd]



If there is clearly manifest pleasure and such,  
Why would such an experience not be perceived? [I32ab]

These four lines teach that pleasure and such do not permanently exist, because they are not experienced [all the time].

Furthermore, the primal substance and its constituents cannot be permanent, because their results—**pleasure and so forth**—are also **never seen to have any permanence**. You might say, “Pleasure and such do exist permanently. All we are saying is that they are just not [permanently] experienced.”<sup>1779</sup> **If there is some clearly manifest particular or distinct pleasure and such, why would such an experience not be perceived?** [It must be perceived] for the following reason: If consciousness is that which experiences and yet does not experience [such pleasure], this would contradict [its role] as that which experiences.

“That same [experience] becomes subtle.”  
How could the same be gross and subtle? [I32cd]

These two lines teach that it is not reasonable [to distinguish between] gross and subtle with regard to something permanent.

You might continue, “Since **that same experience becomes subtle**, it is not perceived.” **How could it be possible to present the same single [and permanent phenomenon]—that is, pleasure and such—as both gross and subtle?**

If it becomes subtle only upon ceasing to be gross,  
Being gross or subtle means nothing but impermanence.  
So why do you not likewise accept  
The impermanence of all phenomena? [I33]

If the grossness of pleasure is not something other than it,  
It is clearly evident that pleasure is impermanent. [I34ab]

These six lines teach that pleasure and such are impermanent.

If pleasure and such **become subtle only upon ceasing to be gross** from one moment to the next, it is definite that the various [states of] **being gross or subtle mean nothing but impermanence**. In this case, [the notion of] permanent constituents collapses. So if you see that pleasure and such are impermanent, **why do you not likewise accept the impermanence of all phenomena?** It is certain that they are impermanent. If you assert that **the grossness and subtlety of pleasure** and such are **not something other than it**, you will directly understand by yourself **that**

pleasure and suffering are **impermanent**, because they arise from conditions, [appear] in an intermittent way, and serve as mutually exclusive conditions.<sup>1780</sup>

#### 4.2.2.1.3.3. The Refutation of the Assertion

##### That the Result Abides in the Cause

You assert, “Something that does not exist  
Cannot arise because of its nonexistence.” [134cd]<sup>1781</sup>

You may not wish for a nonexistent to arise as something  
manifest,  
But this is exactly what it comes down to. [135ab]

These four lines teach that the [Enumerators] implicitly claim that [entities] arise from themselves.

You assert, “When one analyzes in this way, granted, it is true that the primal substance is not a cause. However, [all entities] are their own causes. There is no question that entities arise from themselves, **because something that does not exist cannot arise** and also [because] **of the nonexistence** of any other cause [for their arising].” [902] You do not [really] see that [entities] arise from themselves, but you just speculate and say, “One needs to accept that they arise from themselves.” According to this [position], **you may not wish for** [entities] **to arise** even when the collection of [their] causes does **not exist as something manifest**, **but what it comes down to is** that you have to accept **exactly this**.<sup>1782</sup>

If the result were present in the cause,  
To eat food would amount to eating excrement. [135cd]

And for the price that you pay for cotton cloth  
You should rather buy cotton seeds and wear them. [136ab]

These four lines state extremely absurd consequences [that follow] if cause and result are simultaneous.

This [above conclusion] is definitely what you get, but **if** you still **were** to assert that **the result is present in the cause**, then **to eat food**, such as cooked rice, **would amount to eating excrement**, or feces, because the result—feces—is present in its cause, the food. **And for the price that you pay for cotton cloth you should rather buy** pealike cotton seeds and wear them as your garments, because the results—cotton wool and cotton cloth—are present in the cause—these very cotton seeds.

You might argue, “Worldly people do not see this because of ignorance.”  
However, this is the very position of the knowers of this reality.  
[136cd]

Anyway, even worldly people have knowledge about this,  
So why should they not see it?  
“Worldly people do not have valid cognition.”  
Then their perceptions of manifest things would not be true  
either. [137]

These six lines refute the answers to [the above consequences].

**You might argue**, “The result definitely does exist in the cause, but **worldly people do not see this because of ignorance.**” However, then [at least] you yourselves who presume to be **the knowers of this reality** should buy cotton seeds for the amount of money that you pay for cotton and wear just these seeds as your garments, thus substantiating your **very position** of before. This is the way in which [you should be consequent]. **Anyway**, [even] if you [claim] to be those who know that the result (cotton cloth) exists in its cause (cotton seeds), **even worldly people have some knowledge about this**, that is, that the result (cotton cloth) is accomplished based on its cause (cotton wool). **So why would** worldly people **not also see that** cotton cloth exists in cotton seeds? [In fact,] they would have to see this [too].<sup>1783</sup> You might think, “That worldly people do not see this is not a mistake [in our position], as **worldly people do not have valid cognition.**” However, **then [all] their perceptions of manifest things**, such as arising, **would not be true either**. [Unfortunately, however, such perceptions accord with your own. Consequently], just like such worldly [mistaken perceptions], [your] imputations—such as a self or the primal substance—are also not true.

#### 4.2.2.1.4. Teaching That the Cognition That Negates the Existence of Objects Is a Valid Cognition

“If valid cognition is not valid cognition,  
Isn’t what is validated by it delusive?  
In true reality, the emptiness of entities  
Is therefore unjustified.” [138]<sup>1784</sup>

[903] This verse states the objection.

The opponents might say, “If you assert in your Centrist system that even all **valid cognition**—which is the means of evaluation—is **not valid cognition, isn’t** a phenomenon **that is validated by it delusive** too? If one analyzes in accord with

**true** Centrist analysis, emptiness is not established, and, in consequence, meditation on emptiness is **unjustified** as well.”

Without referring to an imputed entity,  
One cannot apprehend the lack of this entity.  
Therefore, the lack of a delusive entity  
Is clearly delusive [too]. [139]

This verse teaches that [everything] is mere delusion.

**Without referring to**—that is, without relying on—a mere **imputed entity**, **one** is also **not** able to **apprehend** or present **the lack of this entity**, which is emptiness. The reason is that if one does not rely on the conventional term [or notion of] space, one is not able to present space as [referring to] the lack of any entities.<sup>1785</sup> **Therefore**, since sentient beings cling to the reality of **delusive entities** that are mere appearances, they plunge into cyclic existence. If one understands that these very [appearances] are unreal and illusionlike, this [understanding] surely serves as the remedy for the [clinging to reality]. However, emptiness—which is this imputation in the sense of **the lack of** such **delusive** [appearances] that appear as **entities**—is **clearly delusive** too. In the same way as an illusory lion kills an illusory elephant, this is [nothing more than] engaging in the [particular] reification of understanding emptiness as the remedy for the reification that conceives of real [entities].

Thus, when one's son dies in a dream,  
The conception “He does not exist”  
Removes the thought that he does exist,  
But it is also delusive. [140]

This verse teaches that the [cultivation of emptiness] is the remedy for reification.

**Thus**, if one experiences **in a dream** that **one's son** has been born and then **dies**, inasmuch as this is a dream, there is definitely no difference between the [son]'s birth and his death. Still, due to one's seeing [in the dream] that he has been born, there arises the mental state that conceives, “My son exists.” When there is the appearance that he has died, there emerges **the conception** “My son has died and now **he does not exist**,” [904] which **removes the thought** that fancies, “My son **does exist**.” However, since both—the existence and the nonexistence of this son **too**—are equal in being a dream, they are alike in being **delusive**.

4.2.2.1.5. Stating the Meaning That is Ascertained  
through Valid Cognition

Hence, through having been analyzed in this way,  
Nothing exists without a cause,  
Nor is anything contained  
In its individual or combined conditions. [141]

Neither does anything come from something other,  
Nor does it abide, nor does it go. [142ab]

These six lines teach that causes are not established when one analyzes them.

Thus, through having been analyzed in this way, no phenomenon exists in a way that it arises without a cause. Nor is any result contained in its individual causes or in a combination of many of them. Neither does anything come from some other causes, nor do results abide in their causes, nor do causes cease or go after they have produced their results.

So what is the difference between illusions  
And what is taken to be real by ignorant people? [142cd]

These two lines teach that everything is illusionlike.

What is the difference between illusions and all that is taken to be real and apprehended as [real] by ignorant people? In fact, one has to understand it as being like an illusion. Therefore, the *Mother* [Sūtras] teach that [everything] from form up to nirvāṇa [is illusionlike] and that any hypothetical phenomenon superior to it would be illusionlike too.

[Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

As for these [verses], in the section that refutes the Enumerators, Kalyāṇadeva [first] states their assertion:

“Pleasure and such are the nature or entity of the cause. Since things, such as garments, have the nature of this cause, they are this cause. Since its results are garments and so on, pleasure and such exist in these. If they did not exist [in them], pleasure and such would not arise from them.”<sup>1786</sup>

He teaches that this is refuted by [line 130b] “However, did we not analyze enti-

ties already?" Then he states the consequence that pleasure and such would have to exist all the time if they were permanent. [He continues:]

Again, you might say, "When this permanent [pleasure] is clearly manifest, it appears as pleasure. However, when its full potential is not clearly manifest, it does not appear." This is refuted by [lines 132ab] "If there is clearly manifest pleasure and such . . ." . . . You might argue, "The phases of being gross and subtle are different, but since there is no difference in the basis of these phases—pleasure and such—there is no mistake." The objection to this is [found in lines 133ab] "If it becomes subtle only upon ceasing to be gross . . ." You might think, "The basis of these phases is permanent." This is refuted by lines [134ab] "If the grossness of pleasure is not something other than it . . ." <sup>1787</sup>

As for [line 137d] "Then their perceptions of manifest things would not be true either," he says:

This demonstrates that the existence of sound and such is perceived as something manifest. [Here,] the term "either" teaches that what exists in inferences and scriptures would not be true either. <sup>1788</sup>

He explains that [verse 143] "What is created by illusion . . ." also belongs to this section. [905]

*The Small Commentary on the Knowledge Chapter* says:

When stating these [lines 132ab] "If there is clearly manifest pleasure and such, . . ." master [Śāntideva] had in mind that it is the position of the Enumerators to express the assembly of the result with the term "clear manifestation." <sup>1789</sup>

[In *The Small Commentary* the objection in verse 138] that emptiness is unjustified receives the following answer:

We do not say, "Emptiness is the negation of both entity and nonentity." The reason for this is that, ultimately, the negation of these is not capable of making concrete phenomena in the three times into [phenomena that have] the nature of a negation. You might ask, "So what is [emptiness] then?" It is that which is superimposed as the nature [of all phenomena], because a purpose entails something that serves this purpose. <sup>1790</sup>

[*The Small Commentary's*] concluding summary [of this section] explains that “without a cause,” “individual,” “combined,” and “coming from something other” [in verses 141–142] are, in due order, a synopsis of the refutations of the following [opponents]: those who say that there are no causes, the followers of Īśvara, other opponents, and those who say that [entities] shift in time.<sup>1791</sup> Then it adduces the passages in [verses 143–144] “What is created by illusions . . .” as the proof for this [statement].<sup>1792</sup>

#### 4.2.2.2. The Analysis of the Result: The Refutation of an Arising of Existents and Nonexistents

This has two parts:

- 1) The nature of the reason
- 2) The meaning that is ascertained through valid cognition

##### 4.2.2.2.1. The Nature of the Reason

What is created by illusion  
And what is created by causes—  
Examine where each has come from  
And also where they go. [143]

[906] This verse teaches that, just like an illusion, [things] are without coming, going, and abiding.

There is not the slightest difference between the appearance of an illusion **that is created by** mantras and such that [produce] an **illusion and** this mere appearance as things **that is created by causes** and conditions that are presumed to be fully qualified causes. **Examine** both of them [to see] **where each has come from, where they go, and also** how they abide right now, and you will find neither of these two.

How could there be any reality  
In artificial entities that are equal to reflections  
And only seen in conjunction with something other  
But not in its absence? [144]

This verse teaches that, just like reflections, [things] are not real.

Thus, just as in the case of a reflection [that appears] in conjunction with a mirror and a form, [things] are **seen in conjunction with some other** causes and conditions, **but not in the absence** of such conjunction with causes and conditions.

**Artificially** created **entities**, like an elephant [played] by an actor, and what is **equal to reflections** in a mirror do not withstand analysis. When not examined, they are just a plain, satisfying presence. **How could there be any reality in them?**<sup>1793</sup>

What use is a cause  
For a thing that already exists?  
And what use is a cause,  
If it does not exist? [145]

Even billions of causes  
Cannot alter the lack of an entity. [146ab]

These one and a half verses teach that there are no existents or nonexistents whatsoever that need causes.<sup>1794</sup>

How could such a state turn into an entity?  
And what else could turn into this entity? [146cd]

If an entity is impossible during the lack of this entity,  
When should this turn into an entity?  
For while an entity does not arise,  
The lack of this entity will not disappear. [147]

Without the lack of this entity having disappeared,  
The opportunity for an entity does not arise.  
Also, an entity does not turn into the lack of this entity,  
Because it would follow that it has a dual nature. [148]

These two and a half verses refute that the lack of an entity turns into an entity and that an entity turns into the lack of an entity.

You might say, “The state of the lack of an entity [907] turns into an entity later.” **How could it be** that **such a state** of the lack of an entity turns into **an entity** later? In just the same way, a lotus in the sky does not turn into an utpala [flower] in the water later. You might try, “It is not this [lack of an entity itself] that turns [into an entity], but some other state that turns into an entity.” **And what else could** be a state that turns **into an entity**? [There is no] such [state], because [a state of being] neither an entity nor the lack of this entity is impossible.

Hence, whether it is an entity or the lack of this entity, some state of [both of]



these, or something other than these, none of them turns into an entity. **If an entity is impossible during the lack of this entity, when should any entity arise** from this prior [state of the lack of this entity]? If the mere horns of a rabbit are impossible, where in the world should there arise the horns of a white rabbit that are as clear as crystal? In relation to a single basis, as long as **an entity does not arise, the lack of this entity will not disappear. Without the lack of this entity having disappeared, the opportunity for an entity does not arise** within this [lack of this entity]. Hence, **also** any former existent entity **does not turn into the lack of this entity** later. [Here,] the term “also” [implies that] a former non-existent also does not turn into a later existent, **because it would follow** [in both cases] **that a single entity has the dual nature** of being both existent and non-existent at the same time.

#### 4.2.2.2.2. The Meaning That Is Ascertained through Valid Cognition

Thus, never is there any cessation  
Nor are there any entities either.  
Therefore, this whole universe  
Is unborn and without cessation. [149]

This verse teaches that all phenomena are without arising and ceasing.

Thus, since there is no arising, **there is never any cessation** or abiding either. Since there is no arising and no cessation, **there are no** conditioned entities **either**. The term “either” [implies that] their counterparts—unconditioned phenomena, or nonentities—do not exist and that something other than these does not exist either. **Therefore, this whole universe is unborn and without cessation.**

Rather, the migrations of beings are dreamlike.  
On analysis, they are just like banana trees.  
In substance, there is no difference  
Between those who are released and those who are not. [150]

This verse teaches that cyclic existence and nirvāṇa cannot be observed.

Hence, just **like** water and a dry place in a **dream**, cyclic existence and **being released** [from it] too are nothing but imputations, that is, mere remedial conceptions. All phenomena are always just beyond cognition, ineffable, inconceivable, inexpressible, [908], and completely pure by their very nature right from the start.

[Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

In Kalyāṇadeva's [commentary], the following phrase [on line 150b] appears:

Just as one does not find a core, if one examines a banana tree by dissecting it and breaking it into parts, . . .<sup>1795</sup>

However, [this line] is an explanation that a banana tree has no core, since it is [found to be] hollow inside when dissected. On the other hand, the mere [fact of] not finding a core by breaking something into its parts is the same for other trees as well. Thus, it is said:

That "a banana tree has no core"  
Is taken as an example in the world, but . . .

This eliminates the need for identifying a banana tree [as a special example of a tree that has no core].

*The Small Commentary on the Knowledge Chapter* explains:

Having refuted arising in this way, [verse 149] "Thus, . . ." refutes perishing.<sup>1796</sup>

## 5. The Result of Meditating on Emptiness

This has three parts:

The twofold qualities that are one's own welfare

- 1) Transcending existence through not being carried away by afflictions
- 2) Not falling into [the state of one-sided] peace through the arising of compassion for those who lack realization

The qualities that are the welfare of others

- 3) Protecting all sentient beings

### 5.1. Transcending Existence through Not Being Carried Away by Afflictions

When phenomena are empty in this way,  
What is there to gain and what to lose?  
Who can be honored  
Or despised by whom? [151]

**Where do happiness and suffering come from?  
What is there to like, and what is there to dislike? [152ab]**

These one and a half verses teach that one is not swayed by the eight dharmas of desire.

[910] Through having familiarized oneself with the sproutlike seeming mind of enlightenment, the ultimate mind of enlightenment—which is like a [cereal plant's] ear—will arise. The remedy that removes all diseases of reification at their root is the profound heart of the dharma of all Buddhas, which is the perfection of knowledge, the ultimate mind of enlightenment, the complete peace of all discursiveness, true reality. When one has become familiar with it **in this way**, just this nature of all phenomena that is completely pure right from the start and not an object of speech, reflection, knowledge, or expression will be seen in such a way. At that point, all these phenomena that are mere sights and sounds are fully realized as naturally **empty phenomena** that are just like appearances in a dream. Hence, with respect to these phenomena that are just reflections, [all] mental states of wishing or not wishing for them, hope and fear, and adopting and rejecting will naturally perish:

**What is there to gain and what to lose?  
Who can be honored  
Or despised by whom?**

**Where do happiness and suffering come from?  
What is there to like, and what is there to dislike?**

Thus, attachment and aversion in terms of the eight [worldly] dharmas will perish as a matter of course. [911] There is no question that the learned ones do not give any considerations to the objects that naïve beings cling to, but these [objects] as such do not represent some [intrinsic positive] qualities for these [beings themselves] either. The reason for this is: It seems that, even [among] those beings who are equal in that they are engrossed in all the bondage in the world, grown-ups do not give any importance at all to those things that small children cling to, such as castles made of sand or horses and elephants made of clay.

**What is craving and for what is this craving,  
When investigated in its nature? [152cd]**

**If you analyze, what is this world of living beings  
And who is it who will die in it? [153ab]**

These four lines teach that [emptiness] is the direct antidote to the cause of cyclic existence, which is the craving for the three realms.

If **you investigate** what is to be evaluated through knowledge that examines in a discriminating way and rest with personally experienced wisdom in meditative equipoise in the actual **nature**, which craver **is craving for what object and** for what reason? You will see all phenomena in exactly the same way as when deer in a dream crave for a mirage in this dream. If **you analyze** properly in this manner, at the time of not having realized this before, the entirety of these worldly appearances appeared as if they were so real and **alive**, but from the perspective of this stainless knowledge, **what is it, and who is it who will seemingly die** or has died in it? This utterly hollow delusion will collapse instantaneously. It does not perform any function whatsoever.

What will come to be, and what has been?  
Also, what are relatives, and who is whose friend? [153cd]

May persons like myself fully grasp  
That everything is just like space. [154ab]

These four lines teach that everything is seen as spacelike.

At this point, **what** is the future that **will come to be, and what** are these past phenomena that are apprehended as what **has been? Also, what** or who **are** beloved **relatives and friends?** The term “also” [here implies] enemies, or those whom we label as not our loved ones. **Every** phenomenon **is** by its very nature right from the start **just like space**. It has no being, it is inconceivable, and its extension or size cannot be observed. It is not visible at any time, nor is it not visible at any [point]. The [next two lines] contain the advice that [Śāntideva] gave here: “**May I**—the bodhisattva—and also those intelligent **persons** whose karmic dispositions are **like my own fully grasp**, perfectly comprehend, completely assimilate, and take seriously **that** this is the way it is.”

## 5.2. Not Falling into [the State of One-Sided] Peace through the Arising of Compassion for Those Who Lack Realization

Beings become enraged and elated  
Through the causes for quarrels and celebrations. [154cd]

They grieve and toil, they despair,  
And they mutilate and slay each other.

**Through all this and further evil deeds, they lead miserable lives,  
Always longing for their own happiness. [155]**

These one and a half verses teach compassion and loving-kindness for those who commit negative deeds.

You might say, “However, since the cause of cyclic existence is craving, and craving is reversed through meditating on emptiness, one becomes an arhat of the hearers or solitary realizers [through such meditation]. In that case, this contradicts the explanation that [becoming] a hearer or solitary realizer represents an abys for the followers of the great vehicle.” [912]

Since cyclic existence together with its fundamental basis is fully comprehended [through meditation on emptiness] in this way, there is no question that nirvāṇa has arrived in the palm of your hand. However, this is not in the slightest considered as anything such as an infinitesimal particle. You see it as nothing but the nirvāṇa of all phenomena right from the start, as enlightenment by its very nature. Hence, you are just like a person who, when arriving at the foot of the seven golden mountains, does not treasure a piece of brass as if it were gold. This is definitely the way it is. Still, for those sentient beings who do not realize this, what wells up [in you] in an unbearable way is solely great compassion. However, even at this point, nothing in the slightest is observed as sentient beings or suffering. It is just this that leads to the increase of nothing but unrestrained great compassion. It is hard for us naïve beings even to hear about this, let alone to have trust in and be convinced of such a great mode of being of bodhisattvas. This is their outstanding and amazing miraculous display, such as fire blazing from the upper part [of the body] while water gushes from [its] lower part,<sup>1797</sup> which cannot be matched by billions of [other] outstanding miraculous displays.

There is no question that this is the way it is. Still, when we look at the situation of these [beings] who, like crazy old women, are tainted by their flaws no matter what they do, compassion for each other may appear in an unbearable manner even in us childlike beings. If [this can dawn in us even now], why should it not [be possible to continue in this way]? [This means that] we [can] become familiar with love and compassion for limitless eons and relinquish every aspect of considering our own happiness. We assume the entirety of enlightened body, speech, mind, qualities, and activities solely for the sake of sentient beings. The countless streaming rivers of our great compassion flow naturally in an effortless and nonconceptual way. [Their flux] is uninterrupted, shows no fluctuations, and has left behind the banks of permanence and extinction. They sparkle in a translucent way due to their gems of infinite uncontaminated qualities and represent the sole support for all beings. So why should their waves not surge high [for these beings]?

Since these assemblies of our [former and present] parents **long for their own happiness**, there is not a single one [among them] who does not commit **evil deeds**. Since they wish to be unrivaled, they kill others. **Through this cause**, [913] they are born in the reviving hells for many lifetimes. Thus, they experience killing **each other** tens of thousands of times each day. And even when they become liberated from these [states], wherever they are reborn, their lives will be short, they will have many diseases, and they will experience themselves now being **slain** by others. Since they continue to engage in actions that accord with their causes, they [still] take delight in [killing] and are inclined to kill. Hence, it is difficult to turn away from this. Through the completely ripened results of these [actions], they circle again in the hells and so on, just like a continuously moving waterwheel. Thus, there is no time when they would become liberated from suffering.

Wanting to be wealthy, they rob and steal the possessions of others and thus take what was not given to them. This determines the completely ripened result of being tormented by the sufferings in innumerable states of hell beings and hungry ghosts. Furthermore, wherever they are reborn after this, they will again be poor and destitute. All that will happen [to them] is that their [few] things will be of no benefit to them and go to waste in useless ways, such as falling prey to robbers and thieves, or be ruined by fire or water. Under the sway of their latent tendencies, wherever they are reborn, they will still be inclined to take what was not given, and it will be hard to turn away from this. Then, they will [again] experience the completely ripened results of this and so forth. Thus, they will uninterruptedly circle [in cyclic existence].

You should understand that the same applies to all seven [negative actions of body and speech] that are to be relinquished. [Imagine that] you were to sell the entirety of your food, clothes, and possessions of this life from today onward, buy [for them] a charmed potion that is poisonous to touch, and apply it to your own body. In just the same way, [to commit these negative actions] means only to sell the entirety of your happiness in hundreds of thousands, millions, and billions of countless future lifetimes just for the sake of a few tiny scraps of seeming happiness in this life.

Likewise, [such people] do not worry about all their parents in each one of these lives who experience excruciating sufferings in limitless ways for a long time. However, in this single lifetime [right now], they take as their kinfolk [some of these beings], who are just [like] guests gathered in a hotel for one day. When a single one of them dies, **they** roll back and forth on the ground in **grief**. They do not exert themselves in generosity—the cause for wealth—but rather engage in meaningless business and so forth. Through this, they **toil** only to tire themselves out completely. **They** strive merely for the sake of food and clothing and **lead miserable lives**. Therefore, [Śāntideva says:]

Beings become enraged and elated  
Through the causes for quarrels and celebrations.  
They grieve and toil, they despair,  
And they mutilate and slay each other.  
Through all this and further evil deeds, they lead miserable  
lives,  
Always longing for their own happiness.

So who would not feel compassion and loving-kindness for them?

Upon dying, they fall into the long and unbearable sufferings  
Of dreadful existences again and again.  
Then, they surface in pleasant migrations  
And indulge in their pleasures again and again.<sup>1798</sup> [156]

This verse teaches compassion and loving-kindness for those in higher states of existence.

It is stated that through making a single prostration to a reliquary that contains relic pills, one obtains a thousand times as many [rebirths as] a wheel-ruler as there are sand grains in the area that one has covered with one's body [while prostrating] all the way down to the golden ground.<sup>1799</sup> Accordingly, each tiny little positive action bears the capacity that [beings] obtain many hundreds of thousands of divine and human bodies. If these positive actions are not wasted, [beings] obtain a corresponding number of divine and human bodies. In these [bodies] **they** are able to **indulge in** infinite great riches, such as kingdoms, and to live for many hundreds of thousands of human years and so forth. This certainly happens to them, but if they do not produce some further special positive actions, the positive actions that previously had propelled [them into such states] just become exhausted. Thereafter, **they** will circle in **dreadful existences** and experience **unbearable sufferings** again:

Upon dying, they fall into the long and unbearable sufferings  
Of dreadful existences again and again.  
Then, they surface in pleasant migrations  
And indulge in their pleasures again and again.

Many are the abysses in existence,  
And all you find there is true reality's lack.  
Existence entails mutual opposition,

And what you do not find in it is true reality. [157]

It contains oceans of suffering

That are horrible, unending, and beyond compare. [158ab]

These one and a half verses teach that the entirety of cyclic existence is suffering.

Hence, this cyclic existence is nothing but a place on which you cannot rely at all, [a place] that is frightening from top to bottom, dreadful, and terrifying. **Many** are these kinds of **abysses in existence**, and in any state that you are born in, you just fall down and become separated [from true reality]. So **all you find there is the lack** of a core, that is, **true reality**. No matter where you are born, it **entails** that you are under the control of only these **mutually contradictory** mental states of attachment to happiness and aversion to suffering. Therefore, out of your wish for happiness, you will only strive to accomplish suffering. However, even in mere dreams, **what you do not find in this existence** is any engagement in **true reality** by which you understand that the nature of happiness and suffering is not real.

Hence, in a dream, there is no happiness, suffering, or experiencer whatsoever. However, as long as you do not realize this, from the perspective of mistakenness, it seems as if all kinds of things are experienced. Likewise, wherever you are born, it seems that you experience **oceans of suffering in it that are horrible, unending, and beyond compare**. [915] This is just like the suffering of being separated from a friend who is an illusion.

Thus, there is little strength here,  
And life is short too. [158cd]

Also, with activities for staying alive and healthy,  
In hunger, fatigue, and exhaustion,  
In sleep, misfortunes,  
And the fruitless company of fools, [159]

Life passes quickly and in vain,  
With hardly any chance for investigation. [160ab]

These eight lines teach that such analysis [as described above] is hard to find even when one is born as a human being.

Even for those in the higher states of pleasant migrations, **there is little strength** in their remedies [for suffering], **and their lives are short**. As long as they



are alive **here**, they are tormented by diseases. Even if they are in good **health**, they become exhausted through various worries and deprivations. **In the company of fools**, they drag along, helplessly forced by others. Since they suffer in all these various ways, **life** becomes exhausted **in vain**, with **hardly** ever **any chance** for such an **investigation** of the genuine dharma:

Thus, there is little strength here,  
And life is short too.  
Also, with activities for staying alive and healthy,  
In hunger, fatigue, and exhaustion,  
In sleep, misfortunes,  
And the fruitless company of fools,  
Life passes quickly and in vain,  
With hardly any chance for investigation.

Where could beings find a way here  
To turn away from their habitual distraction? [160cd]

Here, demons combine all their efforts  
To cast them into the dreadful lower realms.  
As wrong paths are plentiful here,  
It is hard to overcome doubts. [161]

These one and a half verses teach that even when [such analysis] has been found, it is hard to put an end to the actions of demons.

Even though it is possible for [beings] to find the entrance to the dharma at some point, they are habituated to nothing but distraction since limitless lifetimes. Therefore, it is difficult for them **to turn their minds away from distraction**. Moreover, they are under the sway of the demon of the aggregates (attachment to the aggregates) and the demon of the afflictions (the afflicted mind). Hence, they are propelled **into the dreadful lower realms**. Also, the demon of the divine son—which appears from dependent origination due to basic unawareness—assumes the guise of spiritual friends and displays a great variety of different guises, such as the guise of the dharma, the great vehicle, Centrism, and the secret mantra. This creates obstacles for higher states and liberation. Since fake **paths** are more than **plentiful here**, the places on the path to go astray are plentiful [too], and **it is hard** for beings **to** believe in perfect actuality. Since those who are inclined to [take] paths that go astray are plentiful as well, those who accomplish the path are very few:

Where could beings find a way here  
 To turn away from their habitual distraction?  
 Here, demons combine all their efforts  
 To cast them into the dreadful lower realms.  
 As wrong paths are plentiful here,  
 It is hard to overcome doubts.

It is not easy to obtain this chance again.  
 The presence of Buddhas is very hard to find,  
 And it is difficult to ward off the flood of afflictions.  
 Alas, suffering is an endless stream! [162]

Oh dear, it is more than appropriate to feel deep concern  
 For those who are thus immersed in the torrents of suffering  
 And do not see their wretched state  
 Even though they are in such great misery. [163]

Just as some [fool] would take a [cool] bath again and again  
 And thereafter go to a fire every time,  
 They think of their distressing situation  
 As being sheer happiness. [164]

Those who lead their lives like this  
 As if aging and dying were not meant for them  
 Just approach their being put to death  
 As the first of many horrific tortures to come. [165]

These four verses teach that such sentient beings are the objects of our deep-felt compassion.

Since the time has come now at which you have **obtained** a human body and met with the dharma, [916] this is like finding a jewel in the middle of sweepings. If you do not make any effort in this [situation], it is **not easy** to accomplish it [again] later, which means that you will then have to roam around in cyclic existence without end:

It is not easy to obtain this chance again.  
 The presence of Buddhas is very hard to find  
 And it is difficult to ward off the flood of afflictions.  
 Alas, suffering is an endless stream!

Thus, [beings] are tormented by nothing but **distressing situations** since beginningless time without any interruption for even one moment. Still, on top of not becoming weary [of this], they are [even] concerned about not obtaining [more] suffering. Being just like moths who kill themselves in a fire, **they nevertheless think of [this situation] as being sheer happiness.** They are even proud [of this] and cling to [the idea] that it is just fine to remain in this lifetime forever without **dying**. However, **first**, their wealth is destroyed by dwindling away. [Then,] their youth is destroyed by **aging**; their health is destroyed by sickness; their companionship is destroyed by separation; and their life is destroyed by death. After having gradually **been put to death** through these [circumstances], they will have to experience further **horrific tortures**. Not being able to bear [all this, Śāntideva] considers them: “If I can just [help them], any means is fine!” Thus, he speaks these words of utmost compassion:

Oh dear, it is more than appropriate to feel deep concern  
For those who are thus immersed in the torrents of suffering  
And do not see their wretched state  
Even though they are in such great misery.

Just as some [fool] would take a [cool] bath again and again  
And thereafter would go to a fire every time,  
They think of their distressing situation  
As being sheer happiness.

Those who lead their lives like this  
As if aging and dying were not meant for them  
Just approach their being put to death  
As the first of many horrific tortures to come.

### 5.3. Protecting All Sentient Beings

When will the time come that I pacify  
The torments of suffering's scorching fires  
With my offerings of happiness<sup>1800</sup>  
That stream forth from the clouds of merit? [166]

This verse teaches that one will [eventually] become the support for the benefit and welfare of sentient beings.

The elephant [named] “Son of the Protector of the Earth”<sup>1801</sup> enters a lake without hesitation, since he has an overview of its size. Likewise, stainless knowl-

edge has penetrated the flaws of cyclic existence. Hence, one has no fear and has complete control over all phenomena. However, [one's mind] is still governed by compassion, so that one is able to vanquish sentient beings' basic unawareness and such through knowing that these are adventitious and not their actual mode of being. Since the basic element of sentient beings is pure right from the start, they abide in the very nature of enlightenment. This makes one [917] see that they are all destined to become enlightened and that there is no difficulty in eliminating this adventitious basic unawareness. Through [seeing] this, one generates the unlimited mind [of enlightenment] and dons its inconceivable armor for the welfare of [all sentient beings], who are like people who suffer because of not knowing that a [magical] illusion is an illusion. [To generate the mind of enlightenment and don its armor in this way] is the very nature of phenomena. Therefore, [Śāntideva] says:

When will the time come that I pacify  
 The torments of suffering's scorching fires  
 With my offerings of happiness  
 That stream forth from the clouds of merit?

[Thus,] through the whole range of provisions that please and benefit all sentient beings, one eliminates their suffering and satisfies them in every temporary and ultimate aspect.

As a result of [my] careful gathering of the accumulation of merit  
 By means of the seeming and in a nonreferential manner,  
 When will I teach emptiness  
 To those who have referential views?<sup>1802</sup> [167]

This verse teaches that one establishes all beings in [the state of] enlightenment through turning the wheel of dharma.

Without moving away from stainless knowledge—that is, **the accumulation** of wisdom—one fully accomplishes the means, which are the five perfections. Through this, one manifests unsurpassable enlightenment. Then, one turns the wheel of dharma of profound **emptiness**, which is the perfection of knowledge that eradicates referentiality and [all] views about characteristics at the root. [One teaches it] **to these** sentient beings **who** suffer solely because they are clinging, [apprehend] characteristics, and are **referential**. They are just like people who sink into a swamp through their own movements or silkworms who tie themselves up with their own saliva. Through [turning the wheel of dharma], one puts them into the state of revealing the Dharma Body in their own continua.

[Thus, Śāntideva] generates the aspiring mind [of enlightenment] by saying, “May the time come **when I will** be like this.”

In this way, through knowledge, one does not remain in existence, and, through compassion, one does not remain in [one's own] peace. This is the complete perfection and full completion of the great vehicle. [Thus, the last verse] teaches, all in one, what is to be meditated upon (emptiness and compassion), the benefit of having meditated, and the function of this.

### [Synopsis of Other Commentaries]

If [line 166c] is read as “with my offerings of happiness,” it refers to “being just like when all one's necessities stream forth from the clouds during [the eon of] perfection,<sup>1803</sup> since ‘offerings’ has the meaning of all necessary provisions.” [Alternatively,] many editions [of Śāntideva's text] say, [918] “with the rains of my own happiness.” Accordingly, this should be explained as being “like rains that stream forth from the clouds.”<sup>1804</sup>

As for the [preceding verses], Kalyāṇadeva says:

In order to teach that the eight worldly dharmas, such as gain, and everything such as craving are delusive, we have [verses 151–152ab:] “When phenomena are empty . . .” . . . Since these worldly dharmas originate from craving, [lines 152cd] “What is craving . . .” are given.<sup>1805</sup>

He supplements some words in the sense that living and dying are not established when analyzed:

You might say, “We need craving so that we do not die and so on.” This is answered in [lines 153ab] “If you analyze . . .”<sup>1806</sup>

His further comments are just some supplementary words:

Someone might say, “One craves for bodies that will come to be.” This is referred to in [line 153bc] “and who is it . . .” Someone might say, “There is craving in the wish to meet with relatives and friends.” This is addressed in [line 153d] “Also, what are relatives, . . .” . . . Actually, all of these are unborn. Therefore, they are nonentities, just like space. Since [Śāntideva] composed this text for those who are of equal status with himself, he says in [lines 154ab], “May persons like myself fully grasp . . .”

You might say, “There is a mind that is happy and suffers.” [Lines

154cd–157ab] “Beings become enraged . . .” address this. . . . Thus, these [experiences] are taught to be illusionlike. . . . There are also mutual oppositions in this [cyclic existence]: One lives with such [sensations] as heat and cold and also with mutual disharmony between different sentient beings.

“Not craving” [refers to lines 157cd]: As long as craving is not gone, this [cyclic existence] which is not true reality will not disappear [either].

“The clouds of merit” [in line 166d] are the collection of merit. . . . “Gathering” [in line 167a means] brought together.<sup>1807</sup>

Vibhūticandra says:

[As for verses 151–152:] If one clings to what is delusive through not knowing true reality, it is oneself who creates one’s own suffering. Through the path that was explained in this way, [one understands the following:] In terms of all this which is without a nature, from where should anything be obtained and to whom should whose [things] be lost?

[Verse 153:] If you analyze, what is this living world, since it does not exist? Who is it who will die here? What has happened, and what will come to be, since the past and so on entail [mutual] dependence?

[Lines 154ab:] That everything is like space is what appears for the yogi’s wisdom that originated from the final special familiarity with actual reality. In the same way, also other persons like myself should seize true reality without doubt.

[Lines 154cd–155ab:] Naïve beings are deeply upset through the causes for quarrels and become elated through the causes for delight. [919]

[Verse 157:] In this existence, such [things] as form and so on—which are not true reality—confuse [beings]. They then happen to be in mutual opposition for the sake of these [things], because they do not realize true reality free from the four extremes.

[Lines 161cd:] Since wrong paths—such as those of the Mundanely Minded and Analyzers—are plentiful, it is hard to overcome doubts.<sup>1808</sup>

As for “being put to death” [in line 165c], he quotes *The Sūtra of the Instructions for the King*,<sup>1809</sup> [which says] that one is reduced to dust from the four [main] directions through the four mountains of sickness, aging, death, and decline. He [further] explains that the first of the last two verses relates to higher states [within cyclic existence] and that the latter relates to definite excellence.<sup>1810</sup>

*The Small Commentary* says:

[Verses 151–154ab] “When phenomena are empty . . .” teach that there is no difference between qualities and flaws. Then, [verses 154cd–157ab] “Beings become enraged . . .” teach the ignorant behavior of naïve beings who are blinded by basic unawareness.

You might say, “However, why do you not assert perfect consciousness itself as the cause through which the suffering of cyclic existence arises?” [The answer is given in lines 157cd] “Existence entails . . .” To be hurt by extremely unbearable feelings is the great hardship of mutual opposition within cyclic existence. Where such [great hardship] exists, it is absolutely certain that this kind of perfect consciousness is not justified as the cause for existence. [These two lines] “Existence entails . . .” make it clear that [such a consciousness] simply does not exist in this very [cyclic existence].

[As for verse 159:] This is [spoken] because of such activities as hoping to be alive, hoping to be healthy, relying on others, and so forth.

“Wrong paths” [in line 161c refers to] falling into wrong views.

[Verse 165] “Those who lead their lives . . .” teaches that there is no point in saying more [about this], as all of these [activities] are expressions of basic unawareness.

[This commentary] explains that [verse 167] has a twofold meaning:

Having accomplished the accumulation of merit through not referring to the three spheres [of agent, object, and action], when will I teach others? Or, having accomplished the two accumulations through not referring to the three [spheres], when will I teach emptiness to those who are referential?

Some Tibetans [say] that the activity for attaining knowledge is [twofold]: the way of meditating on emptiness by oneself and the way of meditating on com-

passion for others. They explain that the first [pertains to verses 151–154ab] “When phenomena are empty . . .” and that the second [is contained in verses 154cd–167] “Beings become enraged . . .” [However, this explanation] seems to [provide] an outline that is not so nice, [920] because compassion too must be meditated upon by oneself. Therefore, it is better if this is explained as “meditating on the basic nature, which is emptiness, and meditating on compassion for those who do not realize this.”

**This was the elucidation of the ninth chapter on the Perfection of Knowledge from *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life*.**



1424 ACIP TD386o@r88A.

1425 XVII.6, 21.

1426 ACIP TD3842@236B.

1427 ACIP TD3862@279A.

1428 Ibid., @26oA.

1429 VII.29, 33.

1430 *Rebuttal of Objections*, verse 70.

1431 *Fundamental Verses* XXIV.20.

1432 Reprint in *rje'i gsung lta ba'i skor* (Dharamsala: 1975, vol. I, p. 83).

1433 All Tibetan schools, including the Gelugpas, regard Chaba Chökyi Senge as an Autonomist Centrist.

1434 For details, see his essay in Dreyfus and McClintock 2003, especially pp. 235–37.

1435 In no way do I mean to insinuate that Tsongkhapa and his followers did not strive for such liberation.

1436 1989, p. 143.

1437 1981, p. 158.

1438 Newland remarks: “In such situations, the individual’s sense of identity hinges upon magnifying and preserving very subtle differences. Thus, . . . disputes on Mādhyamika between scholars . . . often turn on differences so thin that one hesitates to call them ‘philosophical.’ Nevertheless, debating and analyzing such differences plays an enormous role in the textbooks and the lives of those who use them.” (1992, p. 24)

1439 Tib. zhen pa bzhi bral.

1440 *Majjhima Nikāya* 63, I. 429 (quotation abbreviated).

1441 *Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (London: 1930), pp. 162—63.

1442 *Aṅguttara Nikāya* III.65.

1443 This account is based on Tāranātha 1980 as well as Dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba 1986 and n.d.

1444 Skt. Sūtrasamucchaya, Tib. mdo kun las btus pa (text now lost).

1445 Maybe he recited the homage once again, since it was added to the text later.

1446 Tib. nyams len byin rlabs kyi brgyud pa.

1447 Tib. lta spyod zung ’jug gi brgyud pa.

1448 I am well aware that, in a general sense, “intellect” can also mean one’s basic power or faculty of knowing, which would fit the meaning of *buddhi* quite nicely. However, these days, the word “intellect” usually connotes mere conceptual engagement in abstract ideas that are far removed from “real life” and one’s experience, and in this sense, it has a pejorative flavor for many people. Hence, I think that using the word “intellect” rather distorts the issue at hand. Also, in terms of the verse’s content, it is rather trivial that ultimate reality as it is cannot be grasped by mere intellect in this sense. So it would be surprising if this were all that Śāntideva had in mind here.

1449 IX.3ab.

1450 Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba, n.d., p. 645; see also the corresponding quote from Prajñākaramati's commentary in the translation part.

1451 Skt. Ghandavyūhasūtra, Tib. rgyan stug po bkod pa'i mdo.

1452 Verse 14.

1453 IX.23.

1454 Skt. Dvayasatyāvatārasūtra, Tib. bden pa gnyis la 'jug pa'i mdo.

1455 ACIP TD@193B.

1456 The equivalence of "cognition" and "consciousness" as well as the definition of "knowable object" is, for example, stated in texts such as *The Classifications of Mind* (Tib. blo rig) and *The Collected Topics* (Tib. bsdus grva).

1457 These are texts such as those mentioned in the previous note.

1458 ACIP KD0106@04B-05A.

1459 IX.25.

1460 The Chinese Buddhist canon does not contain any commentaries on Śāntideva's text.

1461 This text is not a distinct commentary, but just the eighth chapter of P5274. In the Tohoku catalogue (T3877), it is called *A Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Knowledge Chapter and on the Dedication* (Skt. Bodhisattvacaryāvatāraprajñāparicchedapariṇamapañjikā, Tib. byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i shes rab le'u dang bsngo ba'i dka' 'grel).

1462 This is not the earlier Yogācāra teacher by the same name (530–561), but the later master from Suvarṇadvīpa (Sumatra) who is also often referred to as Dharmakīrti from Suvarṇadvīpa. He was one of the teachers of Atiśa and wrote P5280 and P5281 at the latter's request.

1463 The Padmakara Translation Group (Śāntideva 1997) lists two more texts as Indian commentaries on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*:

Dhārmikasubhūtiḥoṣa. *Bodhisattvacaryā[samgraha]pradīparatnamālā* (Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa bsdus pa'i sgron ma rin po che'i phreng ba). T3936.

Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiśa). *Bodhisattvacaryāvatārasūtrikṛitāvāda* (Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i mdo tsam gdams ngag tu byas pa). P5348.

However, these two texts are not commentaries on Śāntideva's text but short outlines of bodhisattva conduct in general.

Hopkins (1983) lists Atiśa's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatārabhāṣya* (Byang chub sems dpa'i sypod pa la 'jug pa'i bshad pa) P5872. This text too is not an actual commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* but just links the names of its ten chapters to the stages of the path of bodhisattvas as these are outlined in the Prajñāpāramitā literature.

1464 For short descriptions of these Indian commentaries, see Williams (1998a) and Dietz (1999).

1465 Reportedly, there were earlier Tibetan commentaries that are now lost, for example, by Ngog Lotsāwa, his disciple Shang Tsebondwa Chökyi Lama (Tib. zhang tshe spong ba chos kyi bla ma), and Chaba Chökyi Senge.

1466 Tib. dngul chu thogs med.

1467 Tib. 'ju mi pham rgya mtsho.

1468 Tib. kun bzang dpal ldan.

1469 Tib. rdza dpal sprul o rgyan 'jigs med chos kyi dbang po.

1470 The text regularly and extensively quotes P5273, P5275, P5278, and P5282. It also refers to P5274, P5280, and P5281.

1471 Tib. sa bzang ma ti pan chen 'jam dbyangs blo gros. He was a disciple of Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltzen and one of the teachers of Rendawa.

1472 Tib. mtsho sna pa chen po shes rab bzang po.

1473 Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba, n.d., p. 831.

1474 Ibid., p. 874.

1475 This is commentary P5282 (ACIP TD3880@256A). In general, many passages from other commentaries that are quoted in this text are not verbatim but more or less paraphrased versions of the originals that are available now. It may also be that Pawo Rinpoche used different editions from the present ones. Often, however, the variants in this text are just scribal errors, misspellings, or omissions. Therefore, I do not always indicate these in the notes, but my translation follows the available originals.

1476 This is commentary P5275 (ACIP TD3874@65B).

1477 This refers to Prajñākaramati's commentary (P5273, ACIP TD3872@185B).

1478 This is commentary P5278 (ACIP TD3876@159A). In Pawo Rinpoche's commentary, it is just called *shes rab le'u kho na'i dka' 'grel chung ngu*.

1479 I.e., a circular argument.

1480 Numbers in brackets refer to the page numbers of the Tibetan text.

1481 Skt. nirvedhabhāgiyamārga, Tib. nges 'byed cha mthun gyi lam. This is another name for the path of junction.

1482 Generally, wherever there are variants in the Tibetan editions of Śāntideva's text or when the Tibetan differs from the Sanskrit, I have followed the Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin 1902–14) without specifying the different readings in each case, as these can be found in Wallace and Wallace 1997. Among Tibetan commentators, it seems that only Bu ston, Pawo Rinpoche, and Mipham Rinpoche explicitly address such differences.

1483 This is an epithet for the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras.

1484 I could not locate this quote in *The Precious Garland* by Nāgārjuna. However, there is a nearly identical verse in Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* (VIII.5).

1485 An utpala is a type of blue lotus flower.

1486 IX.23.

1487 Verse 19 (quoted in ACIP TD3872@197A).

1488 Verse 33.

1489 It is to be remembered that both Śāntideva's text and its commentaries were originally addressed to purely male monastic audiences. In general, of course, statements such as the above about the bodies of women equally pertain to males too.

1490 Skt. sadbhāva, Tib. dngos yod.

1491 This refers to the creation of magical displays through certain incantations and rituals, which was quite common in ancient India.

1492 From page 656 in the Tibetan original onward, all the root verses under each heading are presented as one set and followed by a section that gives an outline of the topics discussed in the individual verses. After that, the commentary on the whole set is given. In the translation, I have continued to follow the format that was used up to this point, in which the individual root verses are immediately followed by their respective outlines and commentaries.

1493 In other words, the Mere Mentalists say themselves that external objects and—even more so—illusions do not really exist. Therefore, one can equally fling their objection (“Once there is no subject, what would observe the object?”) back at them: “Once there is no object, what would be observed?”

1494 This is one of the two subschools of the Mere Mentalists, the other being the False Aspetarians.

1495 As quoted in Candrakīrti’s *Lucid Words* (ACIP TD386o@o21A).

1496 X.335 (gātha 568). The same appears in prose right after the above sentence in *The Sūtra Requested by Crown Jewel*.

1497 VII. 9.

1498 Ibid., VII.12.

1499 I.e., a circular argument in the sense that both counterparts would mutually depend on each other. Thus, none of them can be established inherently by itself alone.

1500 There is no commentary for verse 22. The corresponding passage of Künzang Pelden’s commentary says:

Is that which knows that consciousness is illuminated by itself this consciousness itself, or is it a consciousness other than this one? The first case is not justified: This does not apply here, since it is the given object of analysis. If it needed to be known through a consciousness other than this [illuminating] consciousness itself, then there would be an infinite regress of that which knows it, and it could not possibly be known. If these [two consciousnesses] were not simultaneous, then objects of the past that have ceased or future ones that have not yet arisen could not be known. Since there is no mutual dependence in something simultaneous in the present, it could not possibly be known then either. Therefore, **once** other-dependent consciousness is not seen either by itself or by something other than itself, and **not seen by anything** else either, an analysis of [its] distinctive features, such as “**illuminating**” and “**not illuminating**,” is meaningless. A presentation of distinctive attributes with respect to a basis of attribution that was never seen is **like** saying, “**The looks** and the physical condition of a **barren woman’s daughter** are such and such.” **Even if described, they are meaningless.** (Kun bzang dpal ldan 1994, pp. 641–62)

1501 In his commentary on *The Entrance into Centrism*, Karmapa Mikyö Dorje says the following on this issue of self-awareness and recollection:

Self-awareness is not even conventionally established through recollection. For, if there were certainty about a causal connection between self-awareness and recollection as there is between fire and smoke, [self-awareness] would be established [through recollection] in this way. However, such a causal connection is not established [for them]. If self-awareness is not only not established as the cause for recollection but not even [established] in itself, recollection as the [assumed] result for which this [unestablished self-awareness] functions as a cause is not established either. Thus, conventionally, though

there is no self-awareness, mere recollection occurs, since it arises as such from the conditions from which recollection arises, . . . just as water [in a river] comes from rain and fire from rubbing [two] sticks. (Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, p. 400).

1502 In different commentaries, the example of the rat's poison is explained in various ways (for the most common version, see Vibhūticandra's commentary in the section below entitled "The Synopsis of Other Commentaries" as well as Pelden and Sönam 1993, p. 159).

1503 ACIP TD3874@071A.

1504 This seems to have been a rather commonly used technique in ancient India to heighten one's visual capacity. Here, Minyak Künzang Sönam points out that the example of the eye lotion not only does not prove self-awareness but it actually invalidates the existence of self-awareness: Since the eye lotion is an example of something that is very close but not seen, it exactly illustrates that one's own mind does not see itself, and not the opposite (Pelden and Sönam 1993, p. 159).

1505 Most other commentaries say that line 25a indicates three cognitions: "How something is known" refers to conceptual consciousness as opposed to perception ("seen") and information from others ("heard").

1506 Here this term is used as a synonym for False Aspectarians.

1507 These are P5280 (ACIP TD3878@192B) and P5281 (ACIP TD3879@191A).

1508 ACIP TD3872@190B–191A.

1509 Ibid., @191A.

1510 Verse 23.

1511 III.282. This quote is also found in a number of other texts, such as Āryadeva's *Compendium of the Essence of Wisdom* (verse 28; ACIP TD3851@27B). Pawo Rinpoche's text quotes only the first line.

1512 ACIP TD3872@191B.

1513 XXIV.8c.

1514 ACIP TD3872@192A–192B.

1515 Ibid., @192B.

1516 This text has "dharma" (chos) instead of "meaning" (don).

1517 ACIP TD3872@193A–193B.

1518 The quote in this text ends at "mind."

1519 ACIP TD3872@193B–194A.

1520 This version of the rat example corresponds to the detailed explanation in Pelden and Sönam 1993 (p. 159).

1521 Verse 45.

1522 ACIP TD3872@207B.

1523 ACIP TD3880@258A.

1524 Ibid., @258B.

1525 Ibid., @260A.

1526 Ibid., @262B.

1527 Ibid., @263A.

1528 Ibid., @263B.

1529 Ibid., @264A.

1530 Tib. dka' 'grel chung ngu. In the *Tengyur*, there are five pañjikās (Tib. dka' 'grel) on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*:

Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (P5273, 281 fols.)

an anonymous *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravivṛttipañjikā* (P5274, 72 fols.)

Vairocanarakṣita's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatārapañjikā* (P5277, 75 fols.)

an anonymous *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāraprajñāparicchedapañjikā* (P5278, 25 fols.)

Vibhūticandra's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāratātparyapañjikāviśeṣadyotanī* (P5282, 115 fols.).

Pawo Rinpoche's text calls P5273 *The Great Commentary*; P5282 is always referred to as "Vibhūti"; and P5278 is explicitly called *The Small Commentary on the Knowledge Chapter Only*. Moreover, all the quotes from these texts can be clearly located. This leaves P5274 and P5277 as the possible sources for quotes from what Pawo Rinpoche calls *The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points*. The first short quote from this text (p. 127 in Pawo Rinpoche's commentary) accords pretty much with a corresponding passage in P5274. However, none of the other quotes can be found in either of these two commentaries, nor in any of the remaining ones in the *Tengyur*. Unanimously, all further available sources, such as Butön's *History of Buddhism* (Lokesh Chandra ed., vol 24, p. 949) and his commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, as well as all Western authors list only the ten commentaries as found in the Bibliography.

None of the Tibetan or Western scholars whom I consulted could resolve this issue either. There is some possibility that Pawo Rinpoche still had access to one of the numerous lost Indian commentaries. (It seems to be ruled out that he was just quoting from a very different edition or translation of P5274 and P5277, since most of the passages quoted in his text are much longer than and quite different in content from what these two commentaries say on the corresponding verses.) There is also an anonymous, fragmentary commentary in Sanskrit that was found in the Durbar Library in Kathmandu, Nepal, by Cecil Bendall. L. de La Vallée Poussin used this as yet unpublished and unanalyzed manuscript for his edition of Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, referring to it as *Bodhicaryāvatāraṭippānī*. In any case, style and context of the passages from the *Small Commentary* in question suggest a translated Indian commentary, thus ruling out the possibility that Pawo Rinpoche refers to the now lost commentary by Ngog Lotsāwa (A khu shes rab rgya mtsho's list, no. 11077).

1531 The former are the Enumerators. Akṣapāda (Tib. rkang mig pa, lit. "Eye-Feet") is better known under the name Gautama and was the founder of the Nyāya school (he wrote the *Nyāyasūtra*). He was a follower of the god Śiva (Tib. dbang phyug) and received his name in the following way: Śiva appointed him as attendant for his consort, the goddess Uma, who became very attracted to this handsome man and displayed all kinds of seductive physical expressions in front of him. Since she was the consort of his god, he considered it completely inappropriate to respond to her flirtations. Thus, he kept directing his gaze to his feet and meditated in that way. This pleased Śiva so much that he gave him the name Eye-Feet.

1532 ACIP TD3876@163B.

1533 Tib. legs bshad sdud pa. This is a commentary on *The Entrance to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life* by the fourteenth-century Kadampa master Tsönabpa Chenbo Sherab Sangbo (Tib. mtsho sna pa chen po shes rab bzang po).

1534 Verses 46, 51.

1535 In other words, it is not necessarily the case that everything whose nature is not established is not an object of meditation.

1536 Verse 23.

1537 The large general section on Buddhahood in this commentary (pp. 677–792) is not translated here.

1538 Sanskrit has not only a singular and a plural but also a “dual,” which specifically indicates two in number.

1539 Skt. *niḥśreyasa*, Tib. *nges legs*. This is another term for liberation from cyclic existence.

1540 *Prajñākaramati*’s commentary refers here to a wooden pillar consecrated with mantras.

1541 Skt. *Puṣpakūṭadhāraṇi*, Tib. *me tog brtsegs pa’i gzungs*.

1542 Skt. *Bodhisattvapiṭakānāmasūtra*, Tib. *byang chub sems dpa’i sde snod ces bya ba’i mdo*. This is a part of the vast *sūtra* collection known as *The Jewel Mound Sūtra* (Skt. *Ratnakūṭasūtra*, Tib. *dkon mchog brtsegs pa’i mdo*).

1543 Tib. *’dul ba lung sman gyi gzhi*. This is one of the four texts of the Hinayāna’s Vinaya that were taught by Buddha Śākyamuni.

1544 Lines 391cd.

1545 V.20.

1546 ACIP TD3874@072A–073A.

1547 ACIP TD3880@264B–265B.

1548 IV.83.

1549 ACIP TD3876@165B.

1550 Sabsang is the native area of the Tibetan Centrist master Sabsang Mati Panchen Jamyang Lodrö. For his commentary, see *Sa bzang ma ti pan chen ’jam dbyangs blo gros* 1975.

1551 I could not locate these notes in Atiśa’s texts.

1552 The four aspects of the reality of suffering are: impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and identitylessness.

The four aspects of the reality of the origin of suffering are: cause, origin, intense arising, and condition.

The four aspects of the reality of cessation are: cessation, peace, excellence, and definite emergence.

The four aspects of the reality of the path are: path, adequacy, accomplishment, and definite deliverance.

1553 This is an epithet for the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras*.

1554 Skt. *Samatāpravṛttisūtra*, Tib. *mnyam pa nyid la ’jug pa’i mdo*.

1555 These are cultivated during the four applications of mindfulness (for details, see section 3.2.1. The General Topic below).

1556 *Sūtra*, *Abhidharma*, and *Vinaya*.

1557 This refers to the actual qualities of realization and relinquishment in the mind streams of true practitioners on the path.

1558 Skt. Mahāmeghasūtra, Tib. sprin chen po'i mdo.

1559 This refers to the Centrist view that in Tibet was called “the center free from extremes” (Tib. mtha' bral dbu ma), another name for the view of “the earlier Centrists.” As mentioned in the introduction on the lineages of Centrism, this view was proclaimed by Patsab Lotsāwa Nyima Tra and his four main disciples (specifically Shang Tangsagba); the Sakya masters Rendawa, Gorampa Sōnam Senge, and Dagtsang Lotsāwa; the Eighth Karmapa; Pawo Rinpoche, and others. This view uses Madhyamaka analysis that results in an unqualified negation of all four positions of the typical Centrist tetralemma without asserting anything instead in order to completely overcome all conceptualizations. In this way, it is certainly an accurate characterization of the Indian Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka approach.

This is also what is understood by “the view of neither existence nor nonexistence” when this expression is used by its advocates as solely pertaining to ultimate reality, i.e., that “the center” in the sense of ultimate reality is “neither the existence of a nature nor the nonexistence of a nature.” Starting with Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), the tradition of “the later Centrists”—the Gelugpa school—criticized this view by saying that “nonexistence of a nature” is the correct Centrist view and thus not to be negated (for details, see Chapter 6). In addition, in order to discredit the above understanding of Centrism, its critics linked “the view of neither existence nor nonexistence” with the notorious stereotype of Hvashang Mahāyāna, through which this understanding, in their eyes, assumed a pejorative meaning.

Mipham Rinpoche's *Lamp of Certainty* says that this term is also used as a pejorative for the system of the Great Perfection. See Pettit 1999, p. 297.

1560 An expression for the practice of the Great Seal, as exemplified in the Ninth Karmapa's *Ocean of Definitive Meaning* (Tib. nges don rgya mtsho). The Eighth Karmapa calls the Madhyamaka lineage of Maitripa “the center without mental engagement” (see the Introduction).

1561 This also refers to the teachings of the Great Seal, as it says in the Kagyü tradition's *Short Prayer to Vajradhara*: “The essence of thoughts is dharmakāya.”

1562 This expression can be found in the teachings of the Great Seal, the Great Perfection, the tantras, and even many sūtras, such as the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras.

1563 I.e., they mistakenly considered themselves to be the brilliant suns among scholars who dispel the darkness of others' wrong views.

1564 The Tibetan is not clear here: It could either be *rdo rta* (stone horse) or *rngo rta* (mangy horse). From the context, it is certain that the sense of the word is pejorative. The Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche said that this is some local jargon of the area where Pawo Rinpoche came from.

1565 There are disputes as to the proper order of verses 42–51 and whether verses 49–51 are the authentic words of Śāntideva or were inserted later by others. The translation follows the order of the root verses as they are presented in this commentary (with verses 49–51 inserted between lines 42b and 42c according to the context of establishing the great vehicle). See also below after the commentary to verse 51.

1566 The Tibetan here is *gal ste ma brtags gcig gis ni* (Skt. ekenāgamyamānena sakalaṃ yadi doṣavat). Most other Tibetan editions read *gal ste ma gtogs gcig gis ni* (If by a single one that is not included . . .). Also *gal ste ma rtogs gcig gis ni* (If by a single one that is not realized . . .) can be found.

1567 In the first sentence (the objection), all three modes of a correct reason are not established. However, the second proof sentence neither attempts to attack the first mode nor tries to give the “right” answer (with a correct second mode). Rather, in good Consequentialist style, it is



an absurd consequence that only shows that the opponents' way of formulating the reason can equally be used to prove exactly the opposite, i.e., what they are trying to negate.

The basic problem with this objection of the hearers is that they pick just one of their own criteria for belonging to the sūtras of the hearers (which for them are equivalent to Buddha's speech) and claim that the lack of this single criterion invalidates all the sūtras of the great vehicle as Buddha's speech. (To claim the lack of this criterion in the scriptures of the great vehicle—teaching impermanence—is wrong in itself, since in fact these scriptures also teach impermanence. However, this is not the point that is attacked here.) What is pointed out here is: If the lack of just a single criterion were enough to exclude all sūtras of the great vehicle from what constitutes the Buddha's speech, then it absurdly follows that finding a single criterion of the hearers' sūtras in the sūtras of the great vehicle is also enough to include the latter in what is Buddha's speech.

1568 In Pawo Rinpoche's text, there appears a fifth line of this verse (*de ni theg dman la yang mtshungs*: "this would apply in the same way to the inferior vehicle too"). This line is neither found in any of the other editions of Śāntideva's text nor the commentaries available to me. See also in the following synopsis of other commentaries the discussion as to whether the whole verse is part of Śāntideva's original work.

1569 Skt. abhiprāya, Tib. dgongs pa.

1570 Skt. abhisamḍhi, Tib. ldem dgongs.

1571 Mahākāśyapa was one of the foremost disciples of the Buddha. He inherited the leadership of the saṅgha after the Buddha had passed into nirvāṇa. Śāriputra was praised by the Buddha as foremost among the wise (with respect to the teachings of the hearers).

1572 See *The Sūtra of the Prophecy of the Young Lady Excellent Moon* (Skt. Candrottārā-dārikāvyākaraṇasūtra, Tib. bu mo zla mchog lung bstan pa'i mdo).

1573 Skt. Bahuśrutiya, Tib. mang thos pa. This is one of the eighteen Vaibhāṣika subschools.

1574 The teachings of this Buddhist school are thus compared to a story in ancient India that illustrates that there is often a lot of ado about nothing: In the dusty roads of a town, a man produced some fake footprints that looked like those of a wolf and then proclaimed everywhere that there was a dangerous wolf in town, thus terrifying everybody.

1575 Skt. Mūlasarvāstivādin, Tib. gzhi thams cad yod par smra ba. This is another of the eighteen Vaibhāṣika subschools.

1576 Skt. Saṃṃitiya, Tib. mang bkur ba, also one of the sects of the Vaibhāṣikas. For various charts of all eighteen schools, see Hopkins 1983, p. 340. For an illuminating discussion of this topic, see Dalai Lama 1988, pp. 45–49.

1577 Skt. pañjikopādhyāya, Tib. 'grel chen mkhan po. This is an epithet of Prajñākaramati, one of the main Indian commentators on this text.

1578 ACIP TD3872@224A and ACIP TD3880@267A.

1579 I could not find any such statement in Kalyāṇadeva's commentary. Dānaśrī was one of the Indian paṇḍitas who were involved in the early period of translation in Tibet. The *Tengyur* contains two texts by him, but neither of them deals directly with the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*.

1580 The Sanskrit word *śloka* indicates a unit of 32 syllables, which can be either in prose or in verse. Here, it refers to verse 51.

1581 As explained earlier, this line is only found in Pawo Rinpoche's commentary.

1582 ACIP TD3874@073B.

1583 ACIP TD3876@166A.

1584 All following quotations from *The Ornament of Sūtras* are found in its second chapter, “Establishing the Great Vehicle.”

1585 Ibid., II.12.

1586 Skt. māra, Tib. bdud.

1587 *The Ornament of Sūtras*, II.1.

1588 He is the third of 1,002 Buddhas who appear during this “excellent eon” in which we live (Buddha Śākyamuni is the fourth).

1589 Skt. Kṛkin. This king—a sponsor of the former Buddha Kāśyapa—had ten visions in a dream. The ninth among these visions was explained by the Buddha as follows: “O great monarch, in thy dream thou hast seen how 18 men were pulling at a piece of cloth. This means that the Teaching of the Buddha Śākyamuni will be split into 18 sects. But the cloth, that is (the Doctrine of) Salvation, will not be torn asunder.” This is found in the *Svapnanir-deśanāmasūtra* (Tib. rmi lam nges bstan pa zhes bya ba’i mdo), quoted in Bu ston rin chen grub’s *History of Buddhism* (1931, II.98).

1590 *The Ornament of Sūtras*, II.2.

1591 This refers to the Buddha’s first teaching on this earth to his first five human disciples in the Deer Park in Sarnath.

1592 Tib. dga’ ldan. This is one of the six heavens of the desire realm in which the enjoyment of the dharma is also present. It is the place where the Buddhas of this eon dwell before they appear on earth.

1593 Skt. Buddhāvataṃsakasūtra, Tib. sangs rgyas phal po che’i mdo; also called *The Flower Ornament Sūtra*.

1594 *The Ornament of Sūtras*, II.6.

1595 Tib. rdzogs smin sbyang. This refers to the perfection of aspiration prayers, the ripening of sentient beings, and the purification of Buddha-fields.

The full extent of the perfection of aspiration prayers is the complete perfection of the power of the positive roots that are the causes for the ability to effortlessly and spontaneously promote the welfare of others while one-pointedly resting in meditative equipoise within the nature of phenomena.

The full extent of the ripening of sentient beings is the complete perfection of the power of the positive roots that are the causes for the ability to display millions of physical manifestations in millions of Buddha-fields and to establish the retinue in front of each such manifestation—countless sentient beings—on the path of the noble ones due to teaching them just a single verse of dharma.

The full extent of the purification of Buddha-fields is the complete perfection of the power of the positive roots that are the causes for accomplishing the particular Buddha-field in which one will become enlightened, just as the full extent of the ripening of fruits is their being ready to be enjoyed.

1596 *The Ornament of Sūtras*, II.3.

1597 Ibid., II.4.

1598 Ibid., II.5.

1599 Ibid., II.7.

1600 Ibid., II.9.

1601 Ibid., II.10a–c.

1602 V.22. Here, the term “arhat” refers to fully enlightened Buddhas and not to those who attained the fruition of the vehicles of the hearers and solitary realizers.

1603 Skt. pañcānantarya, Tib. mtshams med lnga. Often translated as the “five immeasurably negative actions”: killing one’s father, one’s mother, or an arhat; creating a schism in the saṅgha; and intentionally causing blood to flow from the body of a Buddha. They are called “without interval” because their result is rebirth in a hell realm immediately after death, without the interval of an intermediate state (bardo) before the next rebirth.

1604 V.24.

1605 Skt. Sarvavaidalyasaṃgrahasūtra, Tib. rnam par ’thag pa thams cad bsduṣ pa’i mdo. In general, the term “collection of complete pulverization” is another name for the “very vast scriptural collection” (Skt. vaipulyam, Tib. shin tu rgyas pa’i sde) in the twelvefold classification of the sūtras of the Buddha (Skt. dvadaśadharmaprayaścāra, Tib. gsung rab yan lag bcu gnyis). This collection is the scriptural collection of bodhisattvas and teaches the great vehicle only. It bears the name “complete pulverization” because it completely pulverizes all obscurations. (Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas 1982, vol. I, p. 349).

1606 An epithet of Maitreya.

1607 This refers to Buddha Śākyamuni in one of his previous lifetimes.

1608 Skt. dvadaśadhūtaguṇa, Tib. sbyangs pa’i yon tan bcu gnyis: (1) wearing the dress of a dung sweeper (i.e., only clothes that other people have thrown away), (2) owning only three robes, (3) only wearing clothes made out of one kind of material, such as wool, (4) begging for alms, (5) eating only while sitting at one’s eating place (i.e., not getting up and returning to eat), (6) not eating food after noon, (7) living in isolated places, (8) living under trees, (9) living in places without a roof, (10) living in charnel grounds, (11) sleeping in a sitting position, and (12) being content to stay anywhere (i.e., without manipulating the ground in any way to make it more comfortable).

1609 Skt. Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśasūtra, Tib. chos thams cad ’byung ba med par bstan pa’i mdo.

1610 In a general sense, this refers to being mentally ready for the dharma of nonarising, i.e., emptiness (Skt. anutpattidharmakṣānti, Tib. mi skye ba’i chos la bzod pa). Thus, here “endurance” does not mean passively enduring or bearing something but rather indicates an active openness and receptiveness to integrate the experience of emptiness into one’s mind stream. In a more specific sense, “endurance” stands for reaching the level of endurance among the four levels—heat, peak, endurance, and supreme dharma—of the path of junction. Here, the practitioner newly attains some degree of endurance—or readiness in the sense of lack of fear—with respect to profound emptiness. Strictly speaking, the complete form of this kind of endurance is only attained from the path of seeing onward when one directly sees the nature of phenomena and then familiarizes oneself with this realization.

1611 *The Ornament of Sūtras*, II.15b–d.

1612 This obviously refers to a proclamation by Tsongkhapa. In addition, *The Blue Annals* reports a very similar statement by Tsang Nagpa Dsöndrū Senge, another earlier Consequentialist in thirteenth-century Tibet: “A man similar to me, able through study to ascertain the

meaning of texts according to the method of Śrī Candrakīrti, will not appear henceforth.” (‘Go lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal 1996, p. 334).

1613 Skt. tīrthakara, Tib. mu stegs byed pa.

1614 ACIP KLo107@214B.

1615 I could not locate this verse in the ACIP version of the sūtra (which, however, contains incomplete sections).

1616 V.2–5.

1617 Ibid., V.6.

1618 Skt. Bodhisattvacaryopadeśasūtra, Tib. byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa bstan pa’i mdo.

1619 Skt. cakravartin, Tib. ’khor los bsgyur ba’i rgyal po. Universal monarchs who travel wherever they want on huge wheels that are made out of gold, silver, copper, or iron. They rule on up to all four continents of the world-system containing Mount Meru and the four continents as presented in ancient Indian cosmology.

1620 Skt. Mañjuśrīsthānasūtra, Tib. ’jam dpal gnas pa’i mdo.

1621 Tib. chos kyi phyag rgya’i mdo.

1622 Skt. upasampadā, Tib. bsnyen par rdzogs pa (lit. “approaching, entering”).

1623 This refers to the formal ritual of being fully ordained as a monk, which starts with the candidate’s own request for ordination, followed by three formalized repetitions of this request by his preceptor (Skt. upadhyāya, Tib. mkhan po)—one of the elder fully ordained monks who conduct the ceremony—to these other monks. The ritual is concluded by means of questions to rule out impediments to ordination (such as being sick or not yet twenty years old).

1624 ACIP KDo113@78B (Pawo Rinpoche’s commentary quotes only the first line.)

1625 Ibid., @117B (The second line as quoted here reads, “I taught three vehicles for the sake of guidance.”)

1626 Skt. Parivrājaka, Tib. kun tu rgyu ba. This is the general name for wandering mendicants of Brahmanic origin, following orthodox Vedic teachings or heterodox paths (the name for mendicants from other castes on heterodox paths was Śramaṇa). Some of these mendicants were mere sophists, some Ājīvikas (see Appendix II), but most of them experimented with a wide range of gurus and spiritual methods.

1627 Ibid., @40A-B.

1628 I.93.

1629 Here “endurance” refers to the third part of the path of junction.

1630 All these examples refer to stories in the Vinaya scriptures about such arhats. For example, Maudgalyāyana—who was renowned for his miraculous powers—went to the hell realms and met a hell-being who was suffering in a very particular way and told him that such suffering had befallen him because—during his human lifetime as a non-Buddhist spiritual teacher—he had propagated certain wrong views. The hell-being requested Maudgalyāyana to tell his students that their teacher urged them to renounce their wrong views because of such karmic results. When Maudgalyāyana returned to the surface of the earth and told the teacher’s students what he had seen and heard, they did not believe him but took his words as an insult to their deceased guru and beat him to death.

Uḍāyin still had some attachment and preferred to teach dharma in the neighborhood brothel. The local robber chief caught him alone with his own favorite prostitute and chopped his head off.

The arhat Little Kubja had the problem that everything that was given to him as alms did not stay in his begging bowl but fell out immediately. So he finally tried some broth made of mud, which stayed in his bowl but led to his passing away.

Nanda used to stare at the women in the audience when giving a dharma talk.

There are other stories (quoted in Crosby and Skilton 1995): High-caste Mahākāśyapa could not rid himself of habitual snobbery and—despite his renown for ascetism—could not help jiggling to a tune because of his former lives spent as a monkey. Likewise, Gavāmpati—because of his many lifetimes as an ox—habitually regurgitated his food to chew the cud. Madhuvasiṣṭha—another ex-monkey—could not resist climbing walls and trees. Reportedly, even a pratyekabuddha—who had been a courtesan in past lives—still dressed “like a coquette.”

Pūrṇa(maitrāyaṇīputra) was noted for his abilities in expounding the dharma and his skill in training novice monks.

1631 Skt. Sarvapūṇyasamuccayasamādhisūtra, Tib. bsod nams thams cad bsodus pa'i ting nge 'dzin gyi mdo.

1632 Skt. Drumakinnararājaparipṛcchāsūtra, Tib. mi'am ci'i rgyal po ljon pas zhus pa'i mdo.

1633 Skt. poṣaḍa, Tib. gso sbyong. This is a regular ceremony required for all ordained persons to restore and purify their vows.

1634 I.39.

1635 Lines I.IIab.

1636 Skt. vrata, Tib. brtul zhugs.

1637 ACIP TD3874@073B.

1638 Ibid., @073B–074A.

1639 ACIP TD3880@266B.

1640 Ibid., @267A–267B.

1641 ACIP TD3876@166A.

1642 Skt. vāyu, Tib. rlung; lit. “wind.”

1643 ACIP KDOI06@21B.

1644 Skt. puruṣa, Tib. skyes bu. For more details on this system, see Appendix II.

1645 Skt. rajas, tamas, sattva; Tib. rdul, mun pa, snying stobs.

1646 Skt. prakṛti, Tib. rang bzhin (also called “primal substance,” Skt. pradhāna, Tib. gtso bo).

1647 Skt. jagat, Tib. 'gro ba. This is a synonym for the whole universe, indicating its dynamic character.

1648 Skt. mahat/buddhi, Tib. chen po/blo.

1649 Skt. ahaṃkāra, Tib. nga rgyal.

1650 Skt. pañcatanmātra, Tib. de tsam lnga.

1651 The main point that is refuted here is that the permanent self—the individual—is consciousness. See also section 4.2.2.1.3.1. The Refutation of the Primal Substance of the Enumerators below.

1652 The example of labeling one person as both father and son comes from the Enumerators. What they try to illustrate with this is as follows: Whatever is perceived—sound, form, and so on—is basically nothing other than the permanent and single “nature,” which becomes perceptible as various “manifestations” (Skt. *vikāra*, Tib. *rnam ’gyur*) due to the desire of the individual. This nature actually is the equilibrium of the three “constituents” lightness, motility, and darkness. Here the Centrists’ refutation starts: Unlike a person who is labeled in different ways in dependence on other persons, something permanent is something that by definition does not depend on anything, otherwise it would be conditioned and thus impermanent. Hence, the three constituents cannot be something that is qualified in dependence on something else. This entails moreover that they cannot be a cause for anything, since they are permanent, i.e., unchanging and unceasing.

1653 In the way that Pawo Rinpoche comments on lines 64cd, the term “nature” (Skt. *svabhāva*, Tib. *rang bzhin*) can be understood on two levels. First, the Enumerators’ assertion is that the three constituents of darkness, lightness, and motility are what manifest as “cognition” (Skt. *buddhi*, Tib. *blo*) and enable actual perception by the self or the “individual,” which is the only factor in their system that is considered sentient or conscious. However, even if this assertion is accepted, the three constituents do not per se have a nature that would allow them to perceive sound (since they are unconscious matter).

On a more specific level, the phrase “at the time of not being dependent” refers to the equilibrium of the three constituents. This state is just what makes up the primordial “nature” (Skt. *prakṛti*, Tib. *rang bzhin*), which in itself is not a permanent perception of sound but just undifferentiated primal matter. Moreover, it is said to be imperceptible at all times, whereas the perception of sound is definitely something that is experienced. Thus, these two—the primordial nature and the perception of sound—cannot be the same.

1654 These are two of the five Pandava sons, the heroes in the ancient Indian epic *Mahābhārata*.

1655 Mipham Rinpoche’s *Ketaka Jewel* says here: “If you think that there is an apprehension of sound even when form is apprehended, all manifestations would be apprehended [simultaneously] whenever any one [of them occurs], or sound would not be apprehended even when [there is] sound. Since all manifestations are of [this] single nature, it is impossible that certain [manifestations] are [only] apprehended at certain times and not apprehended at the times when others [of them occur]. . . . If what is seen as something distinct [perception of sound and perception of form] is nevertheless one, then it follows that everything is one.” (’Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1979, pp. 91–92)

1656 Skt. *pradhāna*, Tib. *gtso bo* (another name for *prakṛti*).

1657 ACIP TD3874@075A.

1658 Ibid., @075B.

1659 Ibid., @075B–076B.

1660 ACIP TD3880@267B. I could not locate the quote in this passage.

1661 Ibid., @268B–269A.

1662 ACIP TD3876@167B.

1663 Ibid., @168B.

1664 Tib. ba men. An Indian species of deer that has features similar to an ox.

1665 ACIP TD3876@168B.

1666 ACIP TD3872@230A.

1667 Ibid., @231A.

1668 The *Ketaka Jewel* adds that this is as impossible as it is to paint space ('Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1979, p. 96).

1669 Tib. gzegs zan pa ("Husk-Eater"). Kāṇāda was the founder of the non-Buddhist school of the Differentiators and received his name because he was able to meditate for a long time while sustaining himself by eating only grain husks. He was also called Owl (Skt. Ulūka, Tib. 'ug pa) because, upon his accomplishment of Īśvara, the deity alighted on a stone liṅgam in his meditation cave in the form of an owl, who was then asked by Kāṇāda for confirmation of his attainment.

1670 The *Ketaka Jewel* says: "Bodhisattvas see that there is no self, but the objects of their compassion—all sentient beings—do not realize this. Hence, they continuously and unnecessarily experience the appearances of suffering as if they had a self. Since there are such [beings], [bodhisattvas] develop compassion when they observe them, for the following reason: [Bodhisattvas] are not attached to a personal self and see that others suffer [through their clinging to] such a self despite the fact that they do not have one. Thus, mental states of cherishing others more than oneself blossom naturally, and they also see that it is possible to dispel the suffering of others just like deep sleep." ('Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1979, p. 101)

1671 The *Ketaka Jewel* gives the following example: "This is just like people who are afflicted by evil spirits. These persons live in the same surroundings as other people. However, from their perspective, deluded appearances, such as the forms of demons, exist. Thus, [for them,] also the suffering caused by these [appearances] and the relief of being free from such suffering exist." (Ibid., p. 102)

1672 Traditionally, these eight qualities define how good drinking water should be: cool, sweet, light, soft, clear, pleasant, wholesome, and soothing.

1673 Skt. māna, Tib. nga rgyal. Usually, this is the word for "pride," but it can—as in this case—also refer to the clinging to a personal self or "me" which leads to desire for what seems pleasant and aversion to what seems unpleasant. The actions that are motivated by such afflictions then cause the various sufferings of cyclic existence.

1674 ACIP TD3874@077B.

1675 Verse 101 of this text says:

When a banana tree together with  
The entirety of its parts has been dissected,  
There is nothing [left] whatsoever.

Similarly, also persons with their constituents, when dissected, are like this.

1676 ACIP TD3880@269B.

1677 Ibid., @270A.

1678 Ibid., @270B.

1679 Skt. Tathāgataguhyasūtra, Tib. de bzhin gshegs pa'i gsang ba'i mdo.

1680 ACIP TD3872@241B–242A.

1681 “Higher abhidharma” refers to Asaṅga’s *Compendium of Abhidharma* (P 5550, fols. 114b.3–4). In the great vehicle, the presentations in Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Abhidharma* are considered the “lower abhidharma.”

1682 ACIP TD4089@21A.

1683 Skt. dharmadhātu, Tib. chos kyi kham.

1684 Skt. dharmāyatana, Tib. chos kyi skye mched.

1685 IV.1.

1686 XVIII.42.

1687 XVIII.43–44.

1688 The Tibetan says “eight,” because the Tibetan translation of verse 79 has five lines.

1689 This statement refers to the view of Tsongkhapa and his followers that there is a common basis for the various perceived objects of different sentient beings. For example, what is wet and moistening is seen as water by humans, as nectar by gods, as pus and blood by hungry ghosts, and so forth. In his *Chariot of the Tagbo Siddhas*, the Eighth Karmapa too refutes this position.

1690 What is refuted in verses 80 and 81 are the two possibilities of how a body could theoretically exist in its parts: It must be the case either that one body with all its parts pervades the entirety of our body parts by being an exact one-to-one match or that an entire body with all its parts is present in each and every one of its parts (thus implying a multiplicity of bodies).

1691 Of course, either this is just redundant or else the consequence would be that there are two versions of each body part: the actual and the one that belongs to this extra body.

1692 Here, some Sanskrit versions say *kāya* (body, figure) and others *kāsthama* (wooden pile, trunk). Pawo Rinpoche and Padma Karpo read *tho yor* (pile of stones). Most other Tibetan versions of this line read *lus ni skye bu ltar snang ba* (the body appears like a person). The commentaries of Ngülchu Togme and Minyak Künzang Sönam simply ignore this and comment in the same way as Pawo Rinpoche does. Most Indian and Tibetan commentaries available to me explain here that the body appears as a person as long as the conditions for such an appearance are present; i.e., it does not appear as a person when it is an embryo in its earliest stages or when it is cremated and only ashes remain. Kalyāṇadeva and Mipham Rinpoche refer to both Sanskrit versions and, accordingly, give two different explanations (see the following synopsis of other commentaries).

1693 ACIP TD3874@078B.

1694 This must refer to the unidentified *Small Commentary on the Difficult Points*. Mostly, Pawo Rinpoche also calls Prajñākaramati’s *Great Commentary on the Difficult Points* just *Great Commentary*. Moreover, just as in the case of *The Small Commentary on the Difficult Points*, none of the quotes of this text here can be located in any of the commentaries on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* in the *Tengyur* either, and it seems quite unlikely that there is yet another unidentified *Small Commentary*.

1695 In Buddhism, the term “feeling” has a much more limited meaning than in Western thinking generally. It only refers to direct, nonconceptual experiences—physical sensations or mental feelings—on their most basic level; these can be pleasurable, unpleasurable, or neutral. All the elaborated “feelings” and “emotions” of our Western internal landscape are simply considered the subsequent conceptualization of our direct experiences.



1696 Pawo Rinpoche's version of lines 90bc has *'di yis* instead of *'di yi* and *gzhan 'ga' tsam* instead of *gzhan dga' tsam*. Thus, his commentary refers to the following reading:

You might say, "Suffering exists in a subtle form."

Isn't it that this removes the gross form [of pleasure]?

If it is merely something other,

Any subtlety must still pertain to this.

1697 As can be seen, the text of verses 90 and 91 is somewhat rearranged in the commentary, which is partly due to the variants in lines 90bc.

Padma Karpo's commentary shows the same variants but gives a different explanation: "**You might say**, 'At the time of pleasure, **suffering exists in a subtle form**. However, **isn't it that** this gross pleasure **removes the gross form** [of suffering]? Then, **it is merely something other**; i.e., its gross form has subsided and its subtle form becomes manifest.' **Any subtlety must still pertain to** its respective type. Since it cannot go beyond [its type], it is still suffering or pleasure [respectively]." (p. 157)

Almost all other commentators explain this verse by taking the first three lines as the statement of the opponent. Ngülchu Togme's commentary may exemplify this: "**You might say**, 'Since the experience of **suffering in a subtle form exists**, it is definitely a feeling. However, **isn't it that its gross form is removed** by powerful pleasure? It surely is. The nature of **this subtle** [suffering] **is a joy different from that** gross pleasure, i.e., a mere slight pleasure.' **Any** experience of [such] **subtlety** would not be suffering, since it **must still pertain to this** type of pleasure." (p. 344)

See also Künzang Pelden's commentary (Kun bzang dpal ldan 1990, pp. 90–91), which—as so often—corresponds almost exactly to Mipham Rinpoche's *Ketaka Jewel*.

1698 When the text says here "coming into contact," this refers to all-inclusive mutual contact in all dimensions. If infinitesimal particles (or anything else, for that matter) were to touch like two folded hands, they would come into contact on just the palm sides, but not on the back sides, for example. Consequently, they would not be partless. Moreover, one could not say that the two particles—or hands—have contact, since only one of their respective sides—the palm side—has contact. Thus, in order to have full mutual contact on all sides, the particles would have to completely interpenetrate each other. This is not possible either, since they are all equal in having no spatial extension whatsoever that could accommodate something else inside. For this reason, they cannot intermingle; i.e., they could at most exist side by side without overlapping. Strictly speaking, their very quality of being partless and dimensionless excludes any contact at all (let alone 100 percent mutual contact), since they do not have the slightest surface that could have contact.

1699 This refers to verse VIII.101ab:

What is called "continuum" and "collection"

Is not real, just like a rosary, an army, and such.

Some commentators identify the preceding verses about examining the body and its parts (particularly verses IX.85–86) as that "which was already analyzed earlier."

1700 There appears no commentary for line 97d. The corresponding passage of Künzang Pelden's commentary reads: "There is no pleasure to be strived for or to be accomplished. **And which person would be afflicted by what** suffering? They are mere illusory appearances of a mistaken mind." (Kun bzang dpal ldan 1990, p. 696)

1701 Here, only the first and the last among the objects of the five senses are explicitly mentioned, but this implicitly includes also the remaining three, i.e., sounds, smells, and tastes.

1702 In other words, if object and experiencer did not have a relationship of being cause and result respectively, the experiencer would be something without a cause. On the other hand,

causal connection requires that the cause precedes the result. Thus, simultaneity of two things that are substantially separate and distinct entities that are not related at all—like a mountain in the east and a mountain in the west—excludes a causal connection (as well as the second possible type of connection, i.e., a connection of identity). So how could the one experience the other?

1703 This is analogous to the refutation of self-awareness (verses 17ff.).

1704 ACIP TD3874@079B.

1705 I.e., the non-Buddhist school of the Differentiators.

1706 ACIP TD3874@080B.

1707 Skt. *rasāyana*, Tib. *bcud len*. This refers to various practices for extracting the essence of minerals and so on, which sustains the body without other food.

1708 ACIP TD3880@272A.

1709 Skt. *mana indriya*, Tib. *yid dbang*.

1710 Skt. *manokalpanā*, Tib. *yid rtog*.

1711 See lines 99cd.

1712 All commentators agree here that “inside” refers to the sense faculties. However, in the case of the comment that is criticized here, lines 102ab and lines 102cd would come to mean exactly the same thing, i.e., that mind dwells neither in the sense faculties (inside), nor in form (outside), nor in between (anywhere else). However, Pawo Rinpoche’s point here seems to be that mind does not only *not dwell somewhere in* the sense faculties, in outer objects, or in between, but that lines 102cd say in addition that mind *is also not identical with* these faculties, objects, or anything other than these.

1713 ACIP TD3874@081A–081B.

1714 ACIP TD3876@172B.

1715 XXIV.14 (the text quotes only the last two lines).

1716 XXIV.20.

1717 Skt. *Candrottarādārikāvyaḥaraṇasūtra*, Tib. *bu mo zla mchog lung bstan pa’i mdo*.

1718 Skt. *kalpaka*, Tib. *rtog pa pa*.

1719 Verse 30.

1720 ACIP TD3874@081B–082A.

1721 I could not locate this quote.

1722 ACIP TD3880@274A–274B.

1723 ACIP TD3876@172B–173A.

1724 The gist of this is as follows: In the example, the existence of the seed is not revealed merely by the material sprout (it neither perceives nor infers its own cause). Rather, our mind has to first perceive the sprout (the result) and then infer the existence of the seed (its cause) based on this perception (which, moreover, requires a proper understanding of causality in general and in this specific case; for example, mere observation of a sprout by a baby without such an understanding would not reveal the existence of the seed to this baby). Thus, this is a process that is more complex than the example suggests.

On the other hand, the implication when the opponent's example is applied to consciousness and knowable object is that—just as the perception of a sprout may lead to an inference about the seed—consciousness itself (the result) should be perceived (a) and thus lead to an inference (b) about the real existence of objects (its cause). However, such two extra consciousnesses (a) and (b) are not observed and moreover are superfluous. Conventionally speaking, unlike a sprout, consciousness in itself is what reveals its perceived object (though not its real existence). Thus, there is no need for this mere perception of an object to lead to a further perception of itself plus to some inference about the existence of an object that it already perceived. Even if one assumes such further consciousnesses, what would they look like? It was already refuted in the section on self-awareness that a given consciousness itself can perceive its own existence (verses 17ff.). If it were another consciousness that perceives the existence of the first one, this would result in the fallacy of infinite regress. Thus, a (really existing) perception of this first consciousness is impossible, not to mention an ensuing inference that is based on such a perception. Consequently, the (real) existence of objects cannot be inferred by reason of a consciousness that perceives them. If the perception of objects were proof of their real existence, this would moreover lead to the absurd consequence that the objects that are perceived in a dream are really existent outside referents, because they are perceived.

1725 ACIP TD3874@o82A–o82B.

1726 Ibid., @o82B.

1727 Verse 48.

1728 These four possibilities are (1) a single result arising from a single cause, (2) a single result arising from multiple causes, (3) multiple results arising from a single cause, and (4) multiple results arising from multiple causes. Thus, “the refutation of arising from the four possibilities” is not to be confused with “the refutation of arising from the four extremes,” which is another name for the vajra sliver reasoning.

1729 This refers to the explanation of the vajra sliver reasoning below.

1730 This reasoning is taught in detail in verses 116–142.

1731 I.i.

1732 Skt. Cārvāka, Tib. tshu rol mdzes pa pa.

1733 Skt. Nirgrantha, Tib. gcer bu pa. This is another name of one of the two subjects of Jainism, i.e., the Digambaras (“Sky-Clad Ones”).

1734 This refers to Pawo Rinpoche's guru, the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorje.

1735 Verses 70–72 (the present text does not quote lines 71cd and 72cd).

1736 Verses 9–11. The last two lines refer to Vimalakīrti's famous silence in his dialogue with Mañjuśrī about ultimate reality in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra*.

1737 *The Treasury of Knowledge* adds: “The Autonomists do not present the seeming by just following worldly conventions, since they see possibilities for mistakenness in such an approach. For, worldly people simply use conventions without any analysis through reasoning whatsoever. Thus, they prefer to present seeming reality in accordance with either the Sūtra Followers or the Yogācāras who know how to apply reasonings. The Consequentialists do not follow other proponents of philosophical systems but just the conventions used by worldly people. For Consequentialists, the noble ones are the sole authorities on the valid cognition of ultimate reality, while worldly people are the sole authorities on what is conven-

tionally considered the valid cognition of seeming reality.” (Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas 1982, vol. II, pp. 519–20)

1738 Quoted in ACIP TD3860@05B (the passage in Buddhapālita’s text is ACIP TD3842@161B).

1739 Ibid., @08B (the passage in Bhāvaviveka’s text is ACIP TD3854@49A).

1740 Ibid., @08B–09A.

1741 Tib. dvangs ma.

1742 Tib. snyigs ma.

1743 As for the pure essence and the dross, Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Taye’s commentary on *The Profound Inner Reality* explains: “In each one of all phenomena of the aggregates, sources, and constituents, there is the pure essence (the aspect of wisdom) and the dross (the aspect of [mistaken] consciousness). By taking the collection of both the pure essence and the dross as the basis for purification and the dross as that which is to be purified, the means for purification—maturation and liberation—accord with the gradations of the basis for purification, and thus the result of purification—the three enlightened bodies—is revealed.” (Sikkim, India: Rumtek, 1970, fol. 25b)

As Pawo Rinpoche states below, when misinterpreting this, one may cling to the nonexistence of ordinary, mistaken consciousness and the real existence of wisdom.

1744 ACIP TD3860@012A.

1745 Ibid., @011B.

1746 VI.14.

1747 I.2.

1748 Ibid., I.3ab.

1749 Ibid., I.3cd.

1750 Ibid., I.4a–c.

1751 Ibid., I.5–6.

1752 Ibid., I.7.

1753 Ibid., I.8.

1754 Ibid., I.9.

1755 ACIP TD3860@013A.

1756 I.10–12.

1757 Ibid., I.13–14.

1758 *Fundamental Verses* XII.9ab.

1759 Ibid., VIII.4ab.

1760 ACIP TD3860@012A–012B. The last two lines are taken from Candrakīrti’s own *Entrance into Centrism* (VI.100ab).

1761 This reasoning is taught in verses 143–150.

1762 As mentioned before, the followers of this school assert that all things in the three times exist as substantial entities right now. Thus, the things that exist in the future right now come into the present in the next moment and appear as what we call “results,” while the things that exist in the present right now (the causes of these results) pass into the past, remaining existent there.

1763 VII.17.

1764 Ibid., VII.19cd.

1765 VI.117.

1766 Tib. dbang phyug. This refers to the supreme godhead in Hinduism since the time of the Vedas, who is mostly identified as the personal god who creates the universe. Later, this supreme godhead often became synonymous with the god Śiva. Several philosophical systems claim the existence of Īśvara, such as the Differentiators and some subschools of the Enumerators. (In Śaṅkara’s *Advaitavedānta*, Īśvara is understood as the impersonal, primordial nature of the universe, thus being identical with the Brahman.)

1767 It is said that Īśvara creates the world through his mental activity.

1768 Here, all other commentaries that I consulted say: The opponents claim that Īśvara creates the self and the particles of earth and such. However, since they also claim that all these are permanent, there cannot be a relationship of cause and result between them. How could a permanent Īśvara ever create something, i.e., change his state by creating various things? And how could a self or particles ever be created, since their state of eternity does not allow them to be created or influenced by anything in the first place?

1769 The point here is that if there were a permanent cause that created everything since the infinite past and lasts into the infinite future, there would be no results at all, because their cause has not ceased and will never cease. Or, alternatively, the results—just like their cause—should exist infinitely too. Both consequences are disproved by the fact that we see newly arisen results as well as their cessation everywhere around us. Thus, there cannot be a permanent cause like Īśvara.

1770 Verses 123–125 show that any activity of creation by a creator god, such as Īśvara, is impossible, whether it is considered to be independent of other factors or dependent on them. If such activity were independent of anything, nobody else would have to exert any effort at anything, such as producing food by farming, since there could be nothing that was not created by Īśvara. Thus, even if one made one’s own effort, it would be completely in vain and superfluous. Strictly speaking, any actions and even any thinking by sentient beings would be impossible, since these would not come from Īśvara. Thus, the whole idea of karma or any ethics would collapse too.

If it is said that Īśvara is the creator of everything and yet depends on other causes and conditions for this, then it follows that, once the causes and conditions for a result are complete, he could not but “create” this result—whether he wants to or not—because it becomes manifest at this point and thus must have been created by him. On the other hand, it follows that, as long as these causes and conditions are not complete, he obviously does not have the power of creation, because the result is not manifest, even if he wants it to be.

Thus, in both cases, Īśvara is fully under the control of other factors. This not only contradicts the claim of his absolute power to create or not create but moreover makes him completely superfluous in the process of producing results altogether: Once the other causes are complete, they are fully sufficient to manifest the result. Therefore, an additional creator is not needed, nor could he prevent the arising of the result even if he wished to. As long as other

causes are incomplete, such a creator is of no use either, since he cannot produce the result without them. Thus, in any case, he cannot influence the result in the slightest.

1771 Verse 12.

1772 ACIP TD3874@o83A-o83B.

1773 ACIP TD3880@276A.

1774 The primal substance is the first of the twenty-five factors of the Enumerators that comprise all phenomena. For Sanskrit terms and more details, see Appendix I.

1775 It is to be noted that this cognition itself is not sentient, since it derives from primal matter. Rather—just like a mirror in which one sees one’s face—it serves as a support for the sentient self to experience objects. Thus, perception comes about only through the combination of the self and cognition.

1776 The following arguments relate to the Enumerators’ position that all manifestation or universal flux comes from or has the nature of the three constituents. At the same time, these constituents are equated with pleasure, suffering, and dullness respectively. Thus, it follows that all manifestations must possess these three feelings.

1777 Here, most other commentaries explain: If you say that pleasure arises from cloth, since things like cloth do not actually exist, the pleasure that arises from them does not exist either.

1778 Moreover, this means that pleasure is both the cause for cloth and its result, which is like saying, “This one person is both my mother and my daughter.” If the Enumerators were to say that this refers to two different pleasures—one being the cause and the other being the result—they would contradict their own basic claim that the constituents, such as lightness/pleasure, are something single.

1779 This refers back to the Enumerators’ thesis that, for example, subtle suffering exists at the time of intense pleasure but is not experienced (verses 88–91).

1780 On the other hand, if the grossness of pleasure were something different from pleasure (and thus totally disconnected), it would follow that pleasure has to be experienced in just the same way all the time, even when its grossness has changed into subtlety.

1781 These two lines could also be read as follows: “You might assert, ‘A nonexistent cannot arise from total nothingness.’” However, among the Indian commentaries, only Kalyāṇadeva’s commentary supports this reading, while all others seem to understand the Sanskrit ablative (*kiṃcīdasattvād*) as indicating a reason. The Tibetan commentaries all follow this, since the translations of this verse agree in saying “because” (*phyir*).

1782 To recall, the Enumerators basically say that if the result does not exist at the time of the cause, it cannot arise later, since it is impossible for something to arise from nothing. They use the example of sesame oil, which is already present within sesame seeds and just becomes manifest when one grinds them. On the other hand, if one grinds sand, no oil is produced. Moreover, there are no other causes that could make a result that does not exist in the first place into an existent result later. Thus, they say, the result must exist at the time of the cause. However, if entities arise from themselves alone, it implicitly follows that they need no other factors for their arising, such as farming or grinding the sesame seeds. Also, if the result already exists at the time of the cause, there is no need for it to arise or become manifest again, or it would arise endlessly.

Most other commentaries explain lines 135ab in the following way: The Enumerators do not explicitly assert that the clearly manifest result as such does not exist at the time of the cause, but that is what follows from their claim that it becomes clearly manifest only later. So they

deny that the result is entirely nonexistent at the time of the cause and arises completely newly. However, implicitly, this is exactly what their position comes down to, because, by claiming that the result exists as a potential, they just obscure the distinction between the nonexistence of the result at the time of the cause and its existence later. Saying that it is not manifest at the time of the cause amounts to saying that it does not exist. Otherwise, it would have to be perceptible in some way at this time, which it clearly is not.

1783 Some commentaries give the following reason: The knowledge that the result exists in the cause is a particular result within the consciousnesses of the Enumerators. Therefore, such resultant knowledge must also exist in worldly beings, because they also have consciousness, i.e., its cause.

1784 In all Tibetan translations of this verse, the last two lines read as follows:

<i>de nyid du ni stong pa nyid</i>	In true reality, meditation on emptiness
<i>sgom pa de phyir mi 'thad 'gyur</i>	Is therefore unjustified.

In Sanskrit, this would be *tattvataḥ śūnyatā tasmād bhāvanā nopapadyate*. However, what these lines actually say is *tattvataḥ śūnyatā tasmād bhāvanāṃ nopapadyate*, which is confirmed by all Indian commentaries and their Tibetan translations. Thus, the Tibetan should read: *de nyid du ni dngos rnams kyī/ stong nyid de phyir mi 'thad 'gyur*. Pawo Rinpoche seems to comment on both possibilities, with an unusual gloss of *de nyid du ni*. Except for Bu ston, who explicitly refers to both versions, all other Tibetan commentators comment on the first version only, which seems to result from a certain emphasis on the practical application of one's understanding of emptiness in meditation.

1785 The usual reading of lines 139ab refers to the fact that a negation of something has to depend on a preceding notion of this thing; for example, one cannot talk or think about the nonexistence of a vase without having the notion of a vase in the first place. Pawo Rinpoche seems to focus on the necessity of using and communicating with conventional notions or terms—which are always imputations—in order to demonstrate what they refer to.

1786 ACIP TD3874@084B.

1787 Ibid., @084B–085A. In the last sentence, Pawo Rinpoche's commentary quotes line 133b: "Being gross or subtle means nothing but impermanence." However, Kalyāṇadeva's commentary clearly refers to lines 134ab.

1788 Ibid., @085A.

1789 ACIP TD3876@175A.

1790 Ibid., @176A. There are some textual variants after "It is that which is superimposed as the nature [of all phenomena], . . . (Tib. ngo bo nyid du sgro brags pa ste)." In the present text, this quote continues with: *dogs pa dang bcas pa 'gog pa yin no zhes* (which does not make much sense; I assume *dogs pa* is just a misspelling of *dgos pa*). P5278 says: *dgag par bzung bar mi nus pa'i phyir ro*. ACIP and D3876 both read: *dgos par bya ba la dgos par byed pa yin no*. (Here, the passage in P5278 above follows after a few more sentences, which suggests that these are missing in P5278.) Thus, my translation follows ACIP and Derge.

1791 Some Indian non-Buddhist schools say that results come about through time as their ripening cause.

1792 ACIP TD3876@176A–176B.

1793 Most other commentaries relate verses 143–144 to the reasoning of dependent origination.

1794 It seems that Pawo Rinpoche deemed verses 145–146ab to be self-explanatory, since he gives no further comment. The corresponding part of Künzang Pelden’s commentary says: “If the result is analyzed, is what is to be produced an existent or a nonexistent? **What use is a cause for a result that is an entity**, i.e., something **that exists already** by its nature? These two are not suitable as cause and result for each other. You might say, ‘The result is something nonexistent that is produced by the cause.’ **What use is a cause, if the result’s own entity is a mere nonexistent?** [There is no need for a cause], since, in general, a nonexistent does not have a cause and such a [nonexistent] remains within its nature of being a nonexistent. You might think, ‘A mere nonexistent is not something that is produced by a cause. However, it is the cause that makes this nonexistent result into an existing entity.’ No [cause] is capable [of this]: **Even the combined efforts of billions of causes cannot alter the lack of an entity** (i.e., [the lack of] a phenomenon)—or the nonexistence of a nature of its own—into an entity. This is just as the horns of a rabbit cannot be transformed into an existent, no matter how many causes are combined. A nonexistent will never turn into something that has to depend on something [else]. Another reason the lack of an entity cannot be transformed into an entity is: It is not justified either that [this lack of an entity] turns into [an entity] without discarding its nature (i.e., being the lack of an entity) or that it turns into [an entity] by discarding [this nature].” (Kun bzang dpal ldan 1990, pp. 724–25)

1795 ACIP TD3874@o87A.

1796 ACIP TD3876@176B.

1797 This refers to Buddha Śākyamuni’s miracle at Śrāvastī, where he displayed such feats.

1798 Unlike the Sanskrit, the Tibetan translation of this verse switches the first two and the last two lines. Thus, the Tibetan commentaries also give the reverse order of rebirth in pleasant and unpleasant states. The Indian commentaries confirm the order that is given here.

1799 This refers to the golden ground at the very bottom of a four-continent world with Mount Meru.

1800 The Sanskrit for this line is *sukhopakareṇaiḥ svakaiḥ*. The Tibetan says *rang gi bde ba’i tshogs char kyis* (“with the rains of my own happiness”) instead of *rang gi bde ba’i tshogs chas kyis*. This is the common variant of this line in most Tibetan translations. Pawo Rinpoche addresses the difference in his synopsis of other commentaries below.

1801 Skt. Bhūmipālaputra, Tib. sa srung gi bu. This is the elephant on whom the god Indra rides.

1802 The Sanskrit of this verse reads:

*kadopalambhadṛṣṭibhyo deśayisyāmi śūnyatām*  
*saṃvṛtyānupalambhena puṇyasaṃbhāramādarāt*

The Tibetan says:

<i>nam zhiḡ dmigs pa med tsul du</i>	Having carefully gathered the accumulation of merit
<i>gus pas bsod nams tsogs bsags te</i>	In a nonreferential manner,
<i>dmigs pas phung bar gyur rnam la</i>	When will I teach emptiness
<i>stong pa nyid ni ston par ’gyur</i>	To those who are ruined by being referential?

The English translation primarily follows Prajñākaramati’s commentary. He explains that the accumulation of merit is not gathered in a random way, but by very carefully employing the expedient conventions of seeming reality, without which ultimate emptiness cannot be taught. The accumulation of merit consists of the perfections, such as generosity, which are all practiced in a nonreferential manner, that is, by not conceptualizing the triad of giver, recipient, and the act of generosity. Those who have referential views are the realists, that is, those who cling to really existing entities. (ACIP TD 3872@287A–B).



1803 Skt. *kṛtayuga*, Tib. *rdzogs ldan dus*. According to ancient Indian cosmology, this is the first of four phases in an eon—the “golden age”—in which human beings have an extremely long life span. At this time, wealth, wishes, happiness, and dharma are spontaneously provided in vast abundance.

1804 The second version seems to be a freer translation of “offerings” (Skt. *upakareṇa*, lit. “help, service, instrument”), which fits the context of this metaphor nicely. Originally, it might well have been just a scribal error, since, in Tibetan, the difference between these two versions is just a single letter (*char* instead of *chas*). All Indian commentaries refer to the first version (as does Mipham Rinpoche), whereas most Tibetan commentaries explain the latter.

1805 ACIP TD3874@087A.

1806 Ibid., @087A.

1807 Ibid., @087A–088A.

1808 ACIP TD3880@280A–281B.

1809 Skt. *Rājadeśasūtra*, Tib. *rgyal po la gdams pa'i mdo*. In the *Kangyur*, there are three sūtras by this name, which are taught for different kings. It is usually the sūtra taught for King Prasenajit of Kosala that is referred to.

1810 ACIP TD3880@281B–282A.

1811 Sources: Mi nyag dgon po 1999 (pp. 237–42), Ko zhul grags pa 'byung gnas dang rgyal ba blo bzang mkhas grub 1992 (pp. 995–96), Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 1986 (pp. 1528–31), and Chos kyi 'byung gnas 1972 (vol. II, pp. 55–63).

1812 Tib. *dbu ru snye thang*, an area in central Tibet near Lhasa.

1813 Tib. *gnyags dznyā na ku mā ra*.

1814 Tib. *bla ma dar*.

1815 Tib. *lam rnyed sgrol ma*.

1816 Tib. *chos dbang lhun grub*.

1817 Tib. *dge bsyen cha lung*.

1818 Tib. *lho brag gro bo lung gi dgon pa*. Trowo Lung is a region in Lhotrag in southern Tibet.

1819 Tib. *dge 'dun rgya mtsho*.

1820 Tib. *mi pham chos kyi rgyal po*.

1821 Tib. *paṇḍita ngag dbang grags pa*.

1822 Tib. *dvags po paṇḍita chos rgyal bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan*.

1823 Tib. *dbus smyon he ru ka kun dga' bzang po*. He is not to be confused with the well-known Tsang Nyön Heruka, who lived from 1452–1507.

1824 Tib. *legs bshad gling*.

1825 Tib. *bka' chen bzhi*.

1826 Tib. *zhva lu lo chen chos skyong dpal bzang po*.

1827 Tib. *kong po*, a region in southern Tibet.

1828 Tib. zing po 'bum pa sgang.

1829 This means "Glorious Garland of Holy Scriptures." Literally, the Tibetan word *gtsug lag* means "[to touch one's] crown of head [with one's] hands." Thus, it is a reverential word for scriptures, especially for the teachings of the Buddha.

1830 Tib. tsa ri'i gnas nang rong chung. Tsari is a region in southern Tibet, and Naynang is the area where the main seat of the line of Pawo tulku is situated.

1831 Tib. gzhu gru bzhi'i mkha' 'gro gsang phug.

1832 Tib. mkha' ro'i gsang phug.

1833 Tib. mtsho dkar khyung rdzong.

1834 Tib. rgyal tshab grags pa don grub, another one of the four regents of the Karmapas.

1835 Tib. grags pa dpal 'byor.

1836 Tib. phag mo rnam bshad chen mo.

1837 Tib. rtsis kyi bstan bcos rin chen gter mdzod.

1838 Tib. gso ba rig pa'i rgyud bzhi rnam bshad.

1839 Tib. sman dpyad zin bris snying po bsdu pa.

1840 For more details, see, for example, Frauwallner 1956 and Hirianna 1973.

1841 Skt. varṇa.

1842 Skt. bhedābheda.

1843 Skt. pramāṇa, Tib. tshad ma.

1844 Skt. pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, śabda, upamāṇa; Tib. mngon sum, rjes dpag, sgra, dpe nyer 'jal.

1845 Skt. prameya, Tib. gzhal bya.

1846 The claim that the legendary sage Kapila (Tib. ser skya pa, "The Blond One") is the founder of this system is historically unfounded. That this name is mentioned in the Vedas (*Sagāthakam* 784) more probably refers to Kaphila who wrote verses 547–556 of the verse collection *Theragāthā*.

1847 Tib. rang bzhin.

1848 Tib. skyes bu.

1849 Skt. guṇa, Tib. yon tan.

1850 Skt. rajas, tamas, sattva. Tib. rdul, mun pa, snying stobs.

1851 Skt. jagat, Tib. 'gro ba.

1852 Skt. vikāra, Tib. rnam 'gyur.

1853 Skt. buddhi or mahat, Tib. blo or chen po. Cognition is also called "the great one" because all further manifestations evolve from it and because it is the only factor that is capable of bringing about a liberating realization.

1854 Skt. ahaṃkāra, Tib. nga rgyal.

1855 Skt. pañcatanmātra, Tib. de tsam lnga.