

VITA

JAMES FRANCIS WOODWARD

ADDRESS:

Department of History and Philosophy of Science
1017 Cathedral of Learning
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

EDUCATION

Carleton College. B.A. Mathematics, 1968
University of Texas at Austin Ph. D., 1977

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Distinguished Professor, History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2010-

Professor of Philosophy, California Institute of Technology, 1992- 2010

J. O. and Juliette Koepfli Professor of the Humanities, California Institute of Technology, 2001-2010

HONORS AND AWARDS

Mellon Post-Doctoral Instructorship, California Institute of Technology, 1983

Lakatos Award for *Making Things Happen*, 2005

President, Philosophy of Science Association, 2010-2012.

PUBLICATIONS

BOOK

Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press, 2003.
Paperback edition, September, 2005.

ARTICLES

1. "Scientific Explanation," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, (March 1979), 41-67.
2. "On Sklar's Space, Time and Space-Time," *Philosophy of Science*, (June 1979), 287-294. Co-authored with Paul Wolfson.
3. "Developmental Explanation," *Synthese*, (July 1980), 443-466.
4. "Why the Numbers Count," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, (Winter 1981), 531-540.
5. "Paternalism and Justification." In *New Essays in Ethics and Public Policy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy*. Supplemental Volume VIII, (1982), 67-89. Reprinted in *Contemporary Moral Issues*, ed. Wesley Cragg, (New York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited), Second Edition.
6. "Glymour on Theory Confirmation," *Philosophical Studies*, (1983), 147-152.
7. "Explanatory Asymmetries" *Philosophy of Science*, (September 1984) 421-442.
8. "A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation," *Erkenntnis*, (November 1984) 231-262. Reprinted in D. Ruben (ed.), *Explanation* (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, pp. 246-274. Oxford University Press, 1993).
9. "Folk Psychology is Here to Stay." *The Philosophical Review*, (April 1985), 197-226. Co-authored with Terry Horgan. Reprinted in *Mind and Cognition: A Reader*, ed. William Lycan (Basil Blackwell Limited, 1990). Also reprinted in John Greenwood, ed., *The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science* (Cambridge University Press, 1991). Also reprinted in Scott Christensen and Dale Turner, *Folk Psychology*, (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1992).
10. "Critical Review: Horwich on the Ravens, Projectability and Induction," *Philosophical Studies*, (1985), 409-428.
11. "Are Singular Causal Explanations Implicit Covering-Law Explanations?," *The Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, (June 1986), 253-279.
12. "The Non-Identity Problem," *Ethics*, (July 1986), 804-831.
13. "Explanation in Social Theory: Comments on Alan Nelson," *Ethics*, (October 1986), 187-195.
14. "On an Information Theoretic Model of Explanation," *Philosophy of Science*, (March 1987), 21-44.

15. "Reply to Parfit," *Ethics*, (July 1987), 800-816.
16. "Saving the Phenomena," *The Philosophical Review*, (July 1988), 303-352. Co-authored with James Bogen.
17. "Understanding Regression," *PSA, 1988*, volume 1, 255-269.
18. "Data and Phenomena," *Synthese*, (June 1989), 393-472.
19. "The Causal/Mechanical Model of Explanation," *Scientific Explanation*. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, volume 13 (1989), eds. Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon, 357-383.
20. "Laws and Causes," (Review Article of Michael Tooley's *Causation: A Realist Approach* and James Fetzer (ed.) *Probability and Causality*). *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 41 (December 1990), 553-573.
21. "Supervenience and Singular Causal Claims." In *Explanation and Its Limits*. (Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference), ed. Dudley Knowles. Cambridge University Press. (1990), 211-246.
22. "Liberalism and Migration." In *Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and Money*, eds. Brian Barry and Robert Goodin. Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1992.
23. "Realism About Laws," *Erkenntnis*, 36 (1992), 181-218. Reprinted in Michael Tooley, ed. *Analytical Metaphysics*.
24. "Observations, Theories and the Evolution of the Human Spirit" (with James Bogen), *Philosophy of Science*, 59 (December 1992), 590-611.
25. "Capacities and Invariance." In J. Earman, A. Janis, G. Massey, and N. Rescher, *Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds: Essays Concerning the Philosophy of Adolph Grünbaum*. University of Pittsburgh Press. (1993), 283-328.
26. "Essay Review of Paul Humphreys" *The Chances of Explanation*. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 45 (1994), 353-374.
27. "Causality and Explanation in Econometrics." In *On the Reliability of Economic Models: Essays in the Philosophy of Economics*, ed. Daniel Little, Kluwer. (1995), 9-61.

28. "Conduct, Misconduct and the Structure of Science." (co-authored with David Goodstein). *American Scientist*, September-October, (1996), 479-490. Reprinted in *Exploring Animal Behavior*, eds. Paul Sherman and John Alcock, Sinauer Associates, 1998.
29. "Explanation, Invariance and Intervention." *PSA 1996*, S26- 41.
30. "Causal Modeling, Probabilities and Invariance." in V. McKim and S. Turner *Causality in Crisis? Statistical Methods and the Search for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences*, University of Notre Dame Press. (1997), 265 - 317.
31. "Explanation and Invariance" (Abstract) *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 71, (1997) 108-109.
32. "Causal Independence and Faithfulness." *Multivariate Behavioral Research* 33, (1998) 129 - 148.
33. "Statistics." *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Routledge., 1998
34. "Inside Science" (co-authored with David Goodstein). *The American Scholar*, Autumn, 1999, 83-90.
35. "Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition" (co-authored with Dan Hausman). *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 50. (1999) 521- 583.
36. "Causal Interpretation in Systems of Equations". *Synthese* 121 (1999), 199-257.
37. "Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences." *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. 2000, 197-254.
38. "Data, Phenomena, and Reliability" *PSA 1998*, S163- S179.
39. "Law and Explanation in Biology: Invariance is the Kind of Stability that Matters" *Philosophy of Science* (March, 2001), 1-20.
40. "Causation and Manipulability" (2001, updated, 2008) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu>
41. "Probabilistic Causality, Direct Causes, and Counterfactual Dependence" (2001) in M. Galavotti, P. Suppes, and D. Costantini (eds.) *Stochastic Causality*. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 39- 63
42. "Explanation" (2001) *Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science*. Eds, Machamer and

Silberstein, Oxford: Blackwell, pp 37-54.

43. "What is a Mechanism: A Counterfactual Account." *PSA 2000, Vol II, Philosophy of Science* 69 (2002), S366-77.
44. "There is No Such Thing as a Ceteris Paribus Law" *Erkenntnis* 57 (2003). (Special Issue on Ceteris Paribus Laws, Earman, Glymour, and Mitchell, eds.), 303-28.
45. "Experimentation, Causal Inference, and Instrumental Realism". (2003) *The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation*. ed Hans Radder. University of Pittsburgh Press. 87-118.
46. "Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account" (with Christopher Hitchcock). *Nous* 37 (2003), 1-24..
47. "Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth" (with Christopher Hitchcock) *Nous*. 37 (2003), 181-99.
48. "Scientific Explanation".(2003, updated, 2008) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu>
49. Review Essay of Judea Pearl, *Causality*. (2003) *Economics and Philosophy* 19, pp. 321-340..
50. "Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?" (with Fiona Cowie) (2004) in C. Hitchcock, Ed., *Great Debates in Philosophy: Philosophy of Science*, New York and Oxford: Blackwell, pp 312- 334.
51. "Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement" (with Dan Hausman) 2004. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. 55, 147-161.
52. "Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation" (2004) *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 18., 41-72.
53. "Evading the IRS" (with James Bogen) in *Correcting the Model: Idealization and Abstraction in Science*, eds. Martin Jones and Nancy Carwright. Poznan Studies. Rodopi Publishers, Holland, 2005., 233-267.
54. "Manipulation and the Casual Markov Condition" (with Dan Hausman) 2005. *PSA 2002*, vol. 2.pp. 846-856.

55. "Prospects For a Manipulability Account of Causation" in *Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Twentieth International Congress*, ed. P. Hajek, L. Valdes- Villanueva, D. Westerstahl, London: King's College Publications, pp. 333- 348.

56. "Causation with a Human Face", in Price, H. and Corry, R. (eds) *Causation and the Constitution of Reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

57. "Interventionist Theories of Causation in Psychological Perspective", (2007) In A. Gopnik and L. Schulz (eds.) *Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 19-36.

58. "Causal Models in the Social Sciences" in Turner and Risjord, eds. *Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 8 (Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology)* Elsevier, 157-210.

59. "Responses to Humphreys, and Sober" (As part of a symposium on *Making Things Happen*). *Metascience* 15 (March, 2006).

60. "Invariance, Modularity, and All That" In Hartmann, Hofer, and Bovens (eds.) *Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science*. Routledge, 2008.

61. "Agency and Interventionist Theories of Causation". In Beebe, Hitchcock, Menzies, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Causation*. Oxford University Press., 2009.

62. "Sensitive and Insensitive Causation". *The Philosophical Review*. 115. (January, 2006), 1-50.

63. "Some Varieties of Robustness". *The Journal of Economic Methodology*. 13 (2006), 219-240. (As part of a symposium on John Aldrich, "When are Inferences Too Fragile to be Believed?")

64. "Explanation" in Psillos and Curd, eds *The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science*. Routledge, 2008, pp. 171-181.

65. "Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms " in Hohwy and Kallestrup, eds. *Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation*. Oxford University Press, 2008, pp 218-262.

66. "Cause and Explanation in Psychiatry: An Interventionist Perspective" in Kendler and Parnas, (eds.) *Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology and Nosology*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, pp. 132- 184.

67. “Comments on John Campbell’s Causation in Psychiatry in Kendler and Parnas, (eds.) *Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology and Nosology* Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, pp 216- 235.
68. “Experimental Investigations of Social Preferences” *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*. Oxford University Press, pp. 189-222.
69. “Reply to Strevens” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 77 (2008): 193-212.
70. “Moral Intuition: Its Neural Substrates and Normative Significance” (co-authored with John Allman *Journal of Physiology- Paris* 101 (2007), pp. 179–202
71. “Social Preferences in Experimental Economics” *PSA 06*, vol. 2, *Philosophy of Science* 75, 646 - 657.
72. “ What are Moral Intuitions and Why Should We Care About Them? A Neurobiological Perspective ” (Co-authored with John Allman) *Philosophical Issues* 18 (2008) (Special Issue on Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy: Ethics), ed W. Sinnott-Armstrong, 164-185.
73. “Why Do People Cooperate as Much as They Do” In Mantzavinos (ed) *Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice*. Oxford University Press, 2009, pp 219- 265.
74. “Psychological Studies of Causal and Counterfactual Reasoning”, in *Understanding Counterfactuals/Understanding Causation*. Oxford University Press. ed Hoerl, McCormack, Beck. 2011, pp 16-53.
- 75 . “Causal Perception and Causal Understanding” in *Causation, Perception, and Objectivity: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology*, Oxford University Press, ed. Johannes Roessler. 2011, pp 229-263.
- 76 “Data and Phenomena: A Restatement and a Defense” *Synthese* 182 (2011) 165-179
77. “A Philosopher Looks at Tool Use and Causal Understanding” In McCormack, Hoerl, and Butterfill., eds. *Tool use and causal cognition*. Oxford University Press, 2011, pp 18-50.
78. “Data, Phenomena, Signal, and Noise” 2010 *Philosophy of Science* 77, No. 5: 792-803
79. “Just do it? Just do it? Investigating the Gap between Prediction and Action in Toddlers’ Causal Inferences” (Co-authored with L. Bonawitz et al.). 2010. *Cognition* 115: 104-117.
80. “Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation”.

2010. *Biology and Philosophy* 25: 287-318.

81. “The Structure and Dynamics of Scientific Theories: A Hierarchical Bayesian Perspective” (Co-authored with L. Henderson et al.) 2010. *Philosophy of Science* 77: 172-200.

82. “Reciprocity: Empirical Evidence and Normative Implications” Forthcoming in Kincaid, ed. *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science*. Oxford University Press.

83. “Counterfactuals All the Way Down?” (Symposium on Marc Lange: *Laws and lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature*) *Metascience* (2011) 20:27–33.

84. “Causes, Conditions, and the Pragmatics of Causal Explanation”. In *Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein*, G. Morgan (ed.) Oxford University Press. 2011, pp 247-257.

85. “Mechanisms Revisited” *Synthese* 83 (2011) 409-427.

86. “Causation, Interactions Between Philosophical Theories and Psychological Research” (2012) *Philosophy of Science* 79 :961-972

87. “Laws, Causes, and Invariance” in *Metaphysics and Science* Stephen Mumford and Mathew Tugby, (eds.) Oxford University Press.

88. “Intervening in the Exclusion Argument” to appear in a festschrift for Peter Menzies, Huw Price (ed) .

89. “Interventionism and the Missing Metaphysics: A Dialog” To appear in *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science* (ed. Mathew Slater and Zanja Yudell)

90.. “Emotion versus Cognition in Moral Decision-Making: A Dubious Dichotomy” to appear in a volume on the Moral Brain, ed. Mathew Liao.

91. “Mechanisms and Causation in Biology” To appear in a volume of *Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science on Causation and Biology*, Waters and Woodward (eds.)

92 “ Empirical Investigations of Human Causal Judgment” *To appear in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy*

93. “Explanation in Neurobiology: An Interventionist Perspective” To appear in a volume entitled *Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: Prospects and Problems*. (ed. David Kaplan)

94. “Mechanistic Explanation: Its Scope and Limits” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* lxxxvii, 2013, pp 39-65.
95. “A Functional Account of Causation” (Philosophy of Science Association Presidential Address). Forthcoming in *Philosophy of Science*.
96. “Simplicity in the Best Systems Account of Laws of Nature “ *British Journal for Philosophy of Science* 65 (2014) 91- 123.
97. “Scientific Explanation” in L. Sklar ed. *Physical Theory: Method and Interpretation*. Oxford University Press.
98. “From Handles to Interventions: Commentary on R.G. Collingwood, “The So-Called Idea of Causation” Forthcoming in *The International Journal of Epidemiology*.
99. Interventionism and Causal Exclusion” Forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
100. “Methodology, Ontology, and Interventionism” Forthcoming in *Synthese*
101. “Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology in Understanding Causal Reasoning: The Role of Interventions and Invariance” To appear in a volume edited by W. Gonzalez, tentative title *Philosophy of Psychology: The Conception of James Woodward*
102. “Causal Cognition: Physical Connections, Proportionality, and the Role of Normative Theory” To appear in a volume edited by W. Gonzalez, tentative title *Philosophy of Psychology: The Conception of James Woodward*

REVIEWS

- Paul Horwich, Probability and Evidence. *Erkenntnis*, (1985), 213-219.
- Peter Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation. *Ethics*, (1985), 359-360.
- D.M. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? *Ethics*, (1985), 949-951.
- Henry Kyburg, Epistemology and Inference. *Ethics*, (1985), 391.
- Rolf Sartorius, ed. Paternalism. *Ethics*, (1985), 353-354.
- Robert Ackerman, Data, Instruments and Theory. *Philosophy of Science*, (1986), 455-458.

W. Essler, H. Putnam and W. Stegmüller, eds. Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. *Ethics*, (1988), 621.

William Lowrance, Modern Science and Human Values. *Ethics*, (1988), 630-631.

Wesley Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. *Nous*, (1988), 322-324.

Paul Humphreys' The Chances of Explanation. *Philosophy of Science*, 60, no. 4 (1993), 671-673.

David Ruben's Explaining Explanation. Forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

Ronald Giere, Science Without Laws. *Philosophy of Science*.69 (2002) 379-84

Jean Changeux, The Physiology of Truth. (Review co-authored with Ralph Adolphs) *Science* 306 (2004): 1684.

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution *The Journal of Economic History* / Volume 72 / Issue 02 / May 2012, pp 564 – 566.

WORK IN PROGRESS:

Causation with a Human Face (Book)

“Justice and the Structure of Reciprocity I: How Empirical Results Can Inform Normative Theory”

“Justice and the Structure of Reciprocity II: Reciprocity as a Basis for Distributive Justice”

“The Problem of Variable Choice” under submission to *Synthese* (Special Issue on the Philosophy of Clark Glymour)

Extensive Revision of entry on “Scientific Explanation” for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Paper to appear in *The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher* (ed. Pfeifer and Couch) Oxford university Press.

SELECTED TALKS

“Causal Attribution, causal modelling and disease interventions” Workshop sponsored by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation as part of Global Burden of Disease Project. Geneva, Switzerland, June, 2014.

“Methodology, Ontology, and Interventionism” New directions in pragmatic metaphysics for philosophy of science, Simon Fraser University, April, 2014.

“Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology in Understanding Causal Reasoning: The Role of Interventions and Invariance” Conference at the University of A Coruna, Spain on *Philosophy of Psychology: The Conception of James Woodward* March, 2014

“Causal Cognition: Physical Connections, Proportionality, and the Role of Normative Theory” Conference at the University of A Coruna, Spain on *Philosophy of Psychology: The Conception of James Woodward* March, 2014.

“Interventionism Defended: Methodology, Circularity and Truth Conditions” Workshop on Causation: New Prospects, College de France, December, 2013.

“Causal Cognition: Physical Connections, Proportionality, and the Role of Normative Theory” To appear in a volume edited by W. Gonzalez, tentative title *Philosophy of Psychology: The Conception of James Woodward*

“Causation: Interactions Between Philosophical Theories and Psychological Research” Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, January, 2014.

“Mechanistic Explanation in Biology: Its Scope and Limits” Missouri Philosophy of Science (MOPS) Workshop, U of Missouri, October, 2013.

“Mechanism and Explanation in Biology: Its Scope and Limits” Congress on Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Ghent, September, 2013.

“Interactions between Normative (Philosophical/ Computational) Theories of Causation and Empirical Research on Causal Cognition” Workshop on Causality: Perspectives from Different Disciplines, Therme Vals, Switzerland, August, 2013.

“Mechanistic Explanation: Its Scope and Limits” Joint Meeting of Aristotelian Society/Mind Association Exeter, UK, July, 2013

“The problem of Variable Choice” Workshop on Methodology and Ontology, Virginia Tech, May, 2013.

“Causation: Interactions between Philosophical Theories and Psychological Research” Ohio State University, April, 2012.

“Causation: Interactions between Philosophical Theories and Psychological Research” University of Wisconsin Madison, February, 2012.

“A Functional Account of Causation” PSA 2012 meetings, November, 2012, San Diego

“An Interventionist Account of Causation, HKUST, May, 2012

“Causation: Interactions Between Philosophical Theories and Psychological Research” Lingnan University May, 2012

“Mechanisms Reconsidered” Lingnan University, May, 2012

“Mechanisms in Biology” Center for Philosophy of Science Workshop, University of Minnesota, May, 2012

“Emotion versus Cognition in Moral Decision-Making: A Dubious Dichotomy” NYU workshop on the moral brain, March, 2012

“Causation: Interactions Between Philosophical Theories and Psychological Research” University of North Carolina colloquium in philosophy, November, 2011.

“Looking Times and Infant Causal Understanding” McDonnell Conference on Causal Learning, Montreal, April, 2011.

“Mechanisms Reconsidered” Conference on Counterfactuals and Mechanisms Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, March 2011

“Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and Proportionality” Alberto Coffa Memorial Lecture. Indiana University. November 2010

“Causation: Interactions between Philosophical Theories and Psychological Research” Philosophy of Science Association Meeting, Montreal, November, 2010

“Causation in biology: Stability, Specificity and the Choice of Levels of Explanation” Keynote address. British Society for Philosophy of Science. July 2010.

“Causal Learning and Judgment: Covariation and Contact Mechanics” Opening Celebration Conference. Center for Formal Epistemology. Carnegie Mellon University, June, 2010.

“Cooperation and Reciprocity : Empirical Evidence and Normative Implications” Conference

for Oxford Handbook of Social Science, Birmingham, Alabama, April 2010

“Comments on Jonathan Waskan’s “In Search of a Non-Counterfactual Foundation for Mechanistic Explanation” American Philosophical Association Meetings, Pacific Division. San Francisco. April, 2010.

“Causation in biology: Stability, Specificity and the Choice of Levels of Explanation” Rice University, Houston, March 2010

“Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation” Keynote at Virginia Tech Graduate Student Conference, November, 2009.

“Learning about causal relationships: action and observation, covariation and contact mechanics” Cognitive Development Society, San Antonio, October, 2009.

“Laws, Counterfactuals, and Invariance”, Metaphysics of Science conference, Nottingham, September, 2009

“Causation in Genetics (and elsewhere in Biology): Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation” Behavioral Genetics Association, Minneapolis, June 2009

“Causation in Biology: Stability, Proportionality, and Specificity” Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice, Minneapolis, June 2009

“Why Do People Cooperate? Empirical Evidence and Normative Implications” Pacific APA, Vancouver, April, 2009.

“Why Do People Cooperate? Empirical Evidence and Normative Implications” Evolution, Game Theory and the Social Contract Conference, UC-Irvine, March, 2009

“Causal Perception and Causal Cognition” American Philosophical Association, Philadelphia, December, 2008.

“Data, Phenomena, Signal, and Noise” Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, Pittsburgh, November, 2008.

“Data and Phenomena: A Restatement and a Defense” Heidelberg, September, 2008.

“A Philosopher Looks at Tool Use”, University of Warwick, July, 2008.

“Moral Intuition: Neural Substrates and Moral Significance”, University of Arizona, April, 2008.

“Causal Perception and Causal Cognition” Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, April, 2008.

“Some Problems of Variable Choice in Causal Representation”, UC-Berkeley, April, 2008.

“Moral Intuition: Neural Substrates and Moral Significance” American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, March, 2008.

“Causation, Physics, and the Special Sciences” University of Pittsburgh workshop on causation, January, 2008.

“Causation and Counterfactuals” University of Warwick, December, 2007.

“Moral Intuition: Its Neural Substrates and Normative Significance” Joint Caltech- Tamagawa University Workshop on Social Cognitive Neuroscience, December, 2007.

“Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation”, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, October, 2007.

“Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation”, University of Maryland conference. April, 2007.

“Social Preferences in Experimental Economics” Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, Vancouver, November, 2006.

“Cause and Mechanism in Biology” Boston Studies Colloquium on Causation in Biology and Physics, October, 2006.

“Some Issues in the Empirical Psychology of Causal Judgment”. Society for Philosophy and Psychology (St. Louis). June, 2006.

“Mental Causation” University of Copenhagen. (Conference on Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry), May, 2006.

“Experimental Investigations of Social Preferences” University of Alabama, Birmingham. (Conference on Philosophy of Economics), May, 2006

“Some Issues in the Empirical Psychology of Causal Judgment”. London School of Economics. May, 2006.

“Sensitive and Insensitive Causation” University of Cincinnati (Taft Lecture, as part of a conference on explanation). May, 2006.

“Sensitive and Insensitive Causation” London School of Economics, (Lakatos Award Lecture) May, 2006.

“Sensitive and Insensitive Causation” University of Calgary, March, 2006

“Sensitive and Insensitive Causation” Ohio University, March, 2006

“Sensitive and Insensitive Causation” Presentation at a workshop on Contingency and Causal Explanation, UNAM, Mexico City, October, 2005.

“Interventionist Theories of Causation in Psychological Perspective”. Plenary lecture at European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Lund, Sweden, August, 2005.

“Causation in Biology” Presentation at International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology, Guelph, Ontario, July, 2006.

“Experimental Economics and Social Preferences” Economic Science Association, June, 2005.

“Causation in Physics and the Special Sciences” Talk at Conference on Reduction, Arrhus, Denmark. May, 2005.

“Interventionist Theories of Causation in Psychological Perspective”. Presentation at workshop at University of Warwick, April, 2005.

“Causation with a Human Face” Talk at UC, Irvine. March, 2005.

“An Interventionist Interpretation of Causation”. Causal Republicanism Workshop. Venice. May, 2004.

“Response to Paul Humphreys and Elliott Sober” Author Meets Critics Session for *Making Things Happen*. American Philosophical Association. Central Division, April, 2004

“An Interventionist Interpretation of Causation in Psychological Perspective” Workshop at Institute for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, November, 2003

“Sensitive and Insensitive Causation” International Conference for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Oviedo. August, 2003.

“Prospects for a Manipulability Theory of Causation” International Conference for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Oviedo. August, 2003

"Sensitive and Insensitive Causation" Stanford, May, 2003.

"Invariance, Modularity, and All That: Comments on Cartwright" Conference on Nancy Cartwright's philosophy of science. Konstanz, Germany, December, 2002.

"Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation" PSA 2002 workshop. Milwaukee, November, 2002

"Manipulation and the Casual Markov Condition" (with Dan Hausman) PSA 2002. Milwaukee, November, 2002

"A Plea for Invariance", Conference on Explanation in the Natural and Social Sciences, Ghent, May, 2002.

"What is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account", Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, Vancouver, November, 2000

"Experimentation, Causal Inference, and Instrumental Realism" Conference on Experimentation. Amsterdam, June, 2000.

"Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences", University of Pittsburgh, April, 2000

"Law and Explanation in Biology", MIT, November, 1999.

"Data, Phenomena and Reliability" Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, Kansas City, October, 1998.

"Causality and Invariance" World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, August, 1998.

"Causality and Invariance" UCLA, May, 1998.

"Causal Interpretation in Systems of Equations", Stanford University, April, 1998.

"Explanation and Invariance" UCSD, March, 1998.

"Explanation and Invariance " American Philosophical Association, Philadelphia, December, 1997

"Causality and Invariance" Conference at University of London, October, 1997.

"Explanation, Invariance, and Intervention." Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, Cleveland, November 1996.

"Intervention, Invariance and Explanation." Conference on Quantities in Science. University of California, Irvine, April 1996.

"Explanation." Marschak Colloquium, UCLA, April 1996.

"Intervention, Invariance and Explanation." Pacific Division APA, March 1996.

"Causality and Invariance." Cambridge University, June 1994.

"Causality in Econometrics." London School of Economics, June 1994.

"Causality and Invariance." London School of Economics, May 1994.

"Causal Modeling, Probabilities and Invariance." At a conference on "Causality in Crisis? The New Debate About Causal Structures in the Social Sciences" at Notre Dame, October 1993.

"Capacities and Invariance." Wayne State, March 1993.

Comments on Ruth Anna Putnam's "Expressivism as Moral Psychology." Carnap and Reichenbach Symposium, UCLA, October 1991.

"Supervenience and Singular Causal Claims." University of Southern California, May 1991.

"Reasoning from Data to Phenomena." Conference on Reasoning About Phenomena, University of Western Ontario, November 1990.

"Supervenience and Singular Causal Claims." Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference on Explanation and Its Limits. Glasgow, September 1989.

"Liberalism and Migration." Ethikon Institute Conference on the Transnational Migration of People and Money. Mont Saint Michel, September 1989.

"Understanding Regression." Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, October 1988.
Contributed Paper.

Comments on John Robertson's "Parfit's Non-Identity Problem." American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meetings, May 1987.

"Realism, Relativism, Phenomena, and Experiment." American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meetings, March 1987. Invited Symposium.

Workshop on "Saving the Phenomena." Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, Pittsburgh,

October 1986. Invited paper.

"Causality and Regression." American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meetings,
March 1986. Invited session.

"Data and Phenomena." Indiana University, February 1986.

"Parfit and Population Problems." University of Colorado, February 1986.

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