

Party Blobs and Partisan Visions: Making Sense of Our Hollow Parties

Daniel Schlozman
Johns Hopkins University
daniel.schlozman@jhu.edu

Sam Rosenfeld
Colgate University
srosenfeld1@colgate.edu

This paper will appear as a chapter in *State of the Parties*, 8th ed., ed. John C. Green, Daniel Coffey, and David Cohen (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming).

Contemporary American parties are hollow parties. This paper steps back from the events of 2016 to offer a conceptual framework that attends to party dynamics across multiple, interacting fields of action. American parties, we argue, should not be understood as either classically “strong” or “weak” (cf. Azari 2016). Instead, they are hollow—top-heavy as organizations, underlegitimized as shapers of political conflict. By historical standards, centralized party leadership in Congress is alive and well. At the mass level, party identification steers public opinion and voting. In the spaces in between, however, parties are neither organizationally robust beyond their task to raise money—and increasingly losing out even there to candidates and paraparty groups drawing plutocrats’ dollars—nor meaningfully felt as a real, tangible presence in the lives of voters or in the work of engaged activists. Parties cannot inspire positive loyalties, mobilize would-be supporters, effectively coordinate their influencers, or police their boundaries.

This hollowness has had dire consequences. The parties have failed to meet the challenges that the combination of polarization and fracture have thrown up. As Thomas Edsall summarizes, “Over the past 50 years, overarching and underlying conflicts about morality, family, autonomy, religious conviction, fairness and even patriotism have been forced into two relatively weak vessels, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party” (Edsall 2017). The parties’ divergent visions for state and society define American politics, yet the parties themselves stand as bystanders to fights waged in their own name.

This chapter first identifies general traits in a system defined by hollowness—its formless blob, its negativity, its distance from Americans’ lived experience. Because such hollowness serves to obscure party purposes, we then turn to a genealogy of contemporary partisan visions. We construct portraits of six ideal-types of partisan actors, rendering explicit the views about

party they typically express either in fragments or sub rosa. We examine insiders and outside insurgents in both major parties, and also, from the center, “New Realists” who look back fondly on dealmaking parties of yore, and anti-party centrists lusting after a solutions-oriented technocracy. The through-line across these partisan visions is the inability of anybody, whether the formal parties themselves or anyone in the circles around them, to bring elites and the mass public together in common purpose, to mobilize loyalties in a purposeful direction. And though hollowness has manifested itself in ways particular to American conditions, the themes here link with broader maladies across the West (Mair 2013; Katz and Mair 2018).

Our approach is historical and institutional: historical in emphasizing the deep roots of contemporary party hollowness, and institutional in emphasizing formal parties as distinct from various para-party groups. We treat parties as autonomous and thick collective actors. Parties emerge from complex, iterative interactions among diverse actors and exist in dense fields. Ideas, institutions, and rules all matter—and they do not emerge simply from congealed preferences. Parties should not be understood solely as the solution to the coordination problems of other, prior players on the political stage.

The most prominent explanations in contemporary scholarship, by contrast, posit parties as the vehicles respectively of ambitious politicians or of groups eager to extract benefits from the state (Aldrich 2011; Bawn et al. 2012). Make analytical sense of the underlying forces and the incentives they face at any given period in American history, and the resultant parties fall into place. Parties, one might say, are the things that emerge from prior actors’ coordination. Party positioning comes as the groups that collectively comprise a “party” banner jostle against one another. When the environment shifts, whether because the same actors face new pressures

or change their preferences or because new actors enter the scene, the parties change in turn (Karol 2009; Noel 2013; Baylor 2017).

Yet in these approaches, the road from politicians' or groups' desires for power to parties' wielding of it remains underdetermined. When the whole game is explaining coordination, preferences are exogenous by design. We reverse figure and ground. Rather than asking what parties do for their claimants and then seeing what conclusions follow for parties, we put parties first. We seek to understand both parties' internal workings as they seek to win elections and their external goals to wield state power and remake the polity.

That parties want to win elections and wield power is an essential truth separating them from all other actors in the political game—but only a paper-thin one. As a matter of definition, we follow E.E. Schattschneider (1942, ix): “a political party is an organized attempt to get control of the government.” Nevertheless, what else partisan actors have wanted has varied across American history, and varies still today. Some want spoils; others want policy; still others want reform. Some empower the loyal partisan or else the grassroots activist while others happily let the boss rule. Still others look to a transformative leader. Answers along one facet, reflecting pressures faced, bargains struck, or norms followed, feed back to and impinge on others. They change the incentives facing group claimants, who have their own internal structures and dynamics. A synthetic view of parties sees these as a series of nested problems—and parties as more than the sum of their roles or tasks.

Such a view also emphasizes how parties conceive of themselves when they exercise power. Parties have held very different ideas about whom to reward and about how to entrench themselves across the sprawling American state (Shefter 1994), and those ideas have not served as mere dress or superstructure. Doctrine matters, both on the place of party in American

political life and on the party's vision for the republic (Cooper 2017; Rosenblum 2008). Even in an era of hollow parties, those visions have consequences.

Making Sense of Hollowness

In parties, as in American life more generally, ours is an “Age of Fracture” (Rodgers 2011). The hollow parties tell their own version of the story, bearing the imprints of and tensions among distinct partisan lineages spanning two centuries (Schlozman and Rosenfeld 2018). We still live with the legacies of the locally oriented, federated parties of the nineteenth century, and of the Progressive reforms, and suspicion of parties' machinations, that dented but did not destroy them. The reworking of party in the era of the Democrats' McGovern-Fraser Commission took up the Progressive suspicion of backroom deals more than it affirmed a positive vision. As the re-entry of the South into two-party politics finally sorted Democrats and Republicans, the parties could not contain the conflictual politics that ensued. The fruits of these intersecting developments are evident in the amorphous, mercenary, money-driven, candidate-led, nationalized game of contemporary party politics.

The party-as-organization has held on in the money chase (Herrnson 2009; Dwyre and Kolodny 2014), but without distinguishing itself as much of an innovator or even an ongoing day-to-day presence felt by the politically engaged, at a time when increased loyalty to the party team might have made it so. Local parties soldier on, however tenuously linked to the para-organizations and movements that have roiled American politics, even as federated membership groups wither (Roscoe and Jenkins 2016; Skocpol 2003). State parties have sustained their organizations and even bolstered their technological capacities while losing relative influence (Bibby 2002; Hatch 2016; La Raja and Rauch 2016). Recent work-around schemes have

emasculated state parties, rendering them as mere conduits in directing large-dollar donations to presidential candidates' coffers (Kolodny and Dulio 2003; Greenblatt 2015; Brazile 2017). The national committees, while comparatively robust, have found themselves eclipsed by para-organizations that reflect the influence of the ascendant super-rich. Vast spending on campaigns goes mostly to television, despite its dubious effectiveness. And even the modern revival of person-to-person canvassing comes from the top down. Staffers parachuted in from outside coordinate lists concocted by uncertain and unseen algorithms. Para-organizations and campaigns alike close their storefronts the morning after Election Day, not to reopen again until the next cycle (Schlozman 2016).

The unfolding story of Trump-era “resistance” highlights the long-term costs to know-how and capacity in a top-heavy, hollowed-out system. Citizens across the country seek to fill voids in Democratic organizations. Yet, despite some bright spots, formal party actors at the national and, in many instances, state and local levels have typically offered little help, and have little help to offer (Putnam and Skocpol 2018).

The parties still organize the quadrennial conventions. At the same time, the primaries and caucuses that select the delegates provide months-long fodder for candidates and their supporters who feel aggrieved by the process. To state the obvious reality from 2016, Republican Party leaders, with no single favored alternative, failed to unite to stop a nominee whom few of them would have chosen. The process of nominating a president, the preeminent though far from singular task of American political parties, serves not as a celebration of party but as an extended opportunity to bash it, without the parties themselves, or anybody on their behalf, offering principled responses. The rules for delegate selection seem opaque and the process confusing.

Regardless of whether “the party decides” the nominee (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2016), it wins few friends in the deciding.

To repeat a central premise, our theme is not weakness but hollowness. Polarization is the preeminent fact of contemporary politics, but it is a form of polarization with particular and corrosive dynamics. At the top, with the parties evenly matched and the stakes high, minorities in Congress have incentives to fight rather than to compromise (Lee 2016). Repeatedly, presidents promise to cut through the gridlock and bring Americans together, yet the reach of the rhetorical presidency exceeds the grasp of an ever-more-partisan administrative presidency (Tulis 1987; Skinner 2006; Milkis and York 2017; Rudalevige 2016). To these dynamics add negative partisanship in the mass public (Abramowitz and Webster 2016), whose suspicion of disloyalty and distaste for process looks nothing like the older, positive partisanship of the torchlight parade. Nor does it resemble the issue- and rules-oriented partisan citizenship that liberal reformers long hoped to inculcate.

Inhabiting the space where parties once dwelled is a disorderly assortment of actors that we term, collectively, the Blob. Today’s parties are distinctive for the presence of so many figures entwined with and buzzing around but not organizationally part of parties themselves. The list goes on and on: issue groups, many of them with paper members or no members at all; media from talk-show hosts to Twitter personalities, guided by profit and celebrity at least as much as by ideological or electoral goals; policy experts in think tanks generating party programs by proxy; engaged activists giving time or a few dollars to prominent and often extreme candidates; ideological warriors at CPAC and Netroots Nation; the mass affluent munching on canapés at fundraisers; high rollers with real access and, often, very specific agendas of their own; PACs; nominally uncoordinated “Super PACs”; leadership PACs from

politicians looking to build their own brands and get chits out to colleagues; consultancies and staffers hoping for a share of all the money sloshing through the system.

See this Blob as a whole, grasp, if you will, its shapeless shape, its formless form, its headless body, and the picture starts to fall into place. Its constituent pieces—“members” is too strong a term—all have internal incentives of their own, many of which militate for them to work against rather than with other parts. The drivers of the behavior—the principals—and the underlying goals being pursued are difficult to identify. The figures in the Blob cannot be reduced to a single analytic category without losing the internal variation that is precisely its defining feature. This jumble of principals and incentives is precisely how the Blob contributes to hollowness. A disorganized multiplicity of actors with doubtful loyalty to the long-term interest of their allied party ultimately weakens it.

The Blob is porous, amorphous, and frequently directionless. Its actors include but are not limited to “policy demanders” who want goodies from the state (Bawn et al. 2012). Nor are they just candidates, their supporters, or members of the candidate-money-consultant nexus. Nor are they just “groups,” with the internal structure that that label implies. Parts of the Blob tend to polarize the system, others to bring it toward the center (Karol 2015). Activity in the Blob is variously motivated by material incentives (typically not the patronage of yore but rather the rewards of, say, a tax break or a share of the lobbying dollars), solidary incentives (even the solitary solidary incentives of online activism); and purposive incentives (though, again, not always in a straight or clear line) (Wilson [1974] 1995).

The Blob looks different in the Democratic and Republican Parties. Whether or not, as Matthew Grossmann and David Hopkins (2016) argue, “ideology” is the distinctive characteristic, still less the glue, of the Republican Party, the GOP has adopted a take-no-

prisoners, don't-sweat-the-details zeal on both procedure and substance with no parallel on the other side, as our discussion of left-populism, with its heavy dose of Progressive reformism, well shows.

Proof of the Blobs' asymmetries is found in the exercise of electoral and political power. The signal political victory in our 50-50 era of party competition has been Republicans' success in the states. Via gerrymanders in Congressional districts and aggressive state lawsuits against the Obama administration, they have imprinted that victory on national politics. Rather than stemming from strong state parties, their state-level success has emerged from linked actors outside, but entwined with, formal parties. The critical non-party actors, including the Koch network and the American Legislative Exchange Council, seized the opportunities that the midterm gains of 2010 offered, consolidated power, and changed the playing field by starving out their opponents, foremost in public-sector unions. The structural power of business, the alliance between conservatism and right populism, and, critically, a set of powerful actors that knew what it wanted, all came together (Mayer 2016; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016). (Such achievements, to be sure, do not characterize the entire Republican story, as the shambles of the 2016 nomination contest and first year of unified national GOP control indicate.)

They have no equivalent on the other side. Liberal efforts to engage in states have repeatedly failed. The Democracy Alliance, a collection of liberal interest groups and rich donors established explicitly to resist short-termism and fragmentation, quickly replicated those very maladies, and made no discernable impact on the structure of American politics (Sclar et al. 2016). Rather than building institutions that would push a clear partisan or ideological vision, the Democracy Alliance straddled the Democrats' internecine battles and spread its cash thinly and widely, in the end accomplishing little more than to pump money into the Blob.

The same underlying reality that we characterize as the Blob other scholars have termed the networked party (Koger, Masket, and Noel 2016). Such an approach has both great virtues and significant limits. In specifically political networks, the internal structures and motivations of participants are as important as their external patterns of cooperation and non-cooperation. We emphasize less the particular points of cooperation and coordination than the overall structure (or non-structure) of the party network, and the weaknesses of the connections that might bring its pieces together. The limits of coordination in contemporary parties go beyond signaling games, in nomination or elsewhere. The vast failure to build the collective goods through which parties helpfully channel citizens' passions and organize political conflict is the central non-event in the hollow parties. The Blob is more than just its nodes and ties, even though the looseness of contemporary parties makes network analysis a particularly appealing strategy. We see the Blob filling a void, and merely focusing on how it tries to fill the void risks missing the point.

Visions of Party in an Age of Hollowness

Because we understand parties as autonomous and complex institutions, we take seriously partisan actors' normative, programmatic, and instrumental goals. Table 1 offers an account of the visions of party that animate six important collective actors in contemporary American politics. These six actors are ideal types, useful in making sense of a complicated landscape. They reflect our distillation of the politically savvy and sophisticated in each category. Precisely because contemporary American politics has both undermined parties' legitimacy and rendered their work opaque, we have had to serve, as best we can, as interpolators of actors' oft-inchoate sentiments rather than as stenographers of their coherent and comprehensive views.

We consider, moving row by row, the Democratic and Republican parties and then the center, with the more pro-party actors in the left-hand column of the table and the anti-party actors on the right. The Democratic Institutionalists and Republican Establishment make up the world of the Blob—and as our discussion should show, calling these congeries “pro-party” is, in absolute terms, a stretch. One would be hard-pressed to find nowadays a politician who consistently upholds in word, still less in deed, the nineteenth-century maxim to put party before self. Compared not with their temporal predecessors but with their internal antagonists, however, each defends its respective world in which politicians and the interests around them set the terms for the party, and nominations do not mimetically reflect the popular will. Left and right populists in the American context should by no means be equated, but they each reject those propositions, instead seeking, somehow, parties that speak authentically for the people.

Finally, we consider two kinds of centrists aiming to combat polarization and return American politics to the sensible middle, respective heirs to the venerable traditions of machine and reform. New realists look back fondly to transactional small parties of yore and want to strengthen actors more interested in holding office than in remaking state or society. Technocratic centrists, who take after elite strands in Progressivism, instead seek to banish parties and partisanship in the name of public-spirited efficiency. The centrists’ policy prescriptions may not differ much, but their views of party diverge radically.

The six facets of party delineated in the table cover critical dimensions of the complex American political system, with its comparatively decentralized but also highly regulated parties (Epstein 1986). Parties, both rhetorically and practically, privilege certain actors, making them the repositories for the party’s *raison d’être*. In parties, beset with principal-agent problems, exactly who takes orders (or even cues) from whom depends on both doctrine and circumstance.

Who, in the views of our actors, speaks for “the party”? We then ask about views on the core task of nomination, and particularly presidential nomination. These views reflect beliefs not only about who should nominate, but about who should rule and in whose interest. Next, we ask about orientation to compromise. Should parties seek agreement across their divides, or stand apart on principle? What kinds of compromises should parties accept? And by what principle?

These first three facets of party cover much of the traditional remit of party scholarship, but they do not exhaust our inquiry. Because parties organize conflict and mark out the organizable alternatives in national politics (Schlozman 2015), we want to know how they seek to reshape society. Those are the real stakes in party politics (Hacker and Pierson 2014). Some parties may content themselves with the rewards of office or with presiding over an efficient government, while others seek to remake America. A direct line connects privileged partisan actors and their goals in wielding power. Parties’ search for funding, and donors’ concomitant motivations to give, condition their goals, and so we ask both about who funds each prophet of party, and how those funders relate to other facets of party. Finally, we apply Tocqueville’s venerable distinction between great parties “more attached to principles than to consequences” and “to ideas rather than to causes” (1966, 175), and small parties, for whom private interests and pragmatic power-seeking define and delimit their vision. If the labels of “great” or “small” party seem, to the contemporary eye, fusty or else overly subjective, they usefully fuse what parties *are* and what parties *do*, and so capture the possibilities for the political regime to accommodate partisan actors’ visions of democracy.

<insert Table 1 around here>

Democratic Institutionalists

The Democrats at their party's core suffer from the ailments of a hollow age, constantly engaging in the art of the deal within their own party. Even more than their counterparts in the Republican establishment, Democratic institutionalists lack recourse to a shared, affirmative language of *party* tradition and lineage beyond celebrations of particular politicians' leadership and denunciations of intransigent opponents. McGovern-Fraser's children have grown up to become the party establishment (Miroff 2007), but, squeezed between the regular and reform traditions, they have not found the role of Democratic Institutionalist an easy one. On the one side comes accommodation to the party's many stakeholders, itself a reflection not only of the party's coalitional diversity but of the less reformist strands in its heritage. On the other lies the commitment to continual reform in search of a common good.

In program and organization alike, Democrats stand out in the modern era by their association with the politics of straddling. The *groupedness* of the Democratic coalition of interests is more visible and pronounced than in the GOP case—comparatively speaking, the seams show (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016). The party's twentieth-century transformation on civil rights has hardly solved for the party of “out-groups” the thorny electoral and coalitional politics of race and what detractors term “identity politics” in the twenty-first. So, too, the Democrats remain cross-cut and compromised programmatically on questions of political economy. Their historic New Deal commitments, reinforced as sorting removes the moderates and conservatives who long frustrated liberals' ambitions (e.g. Abramowitz 2010), stand often in tension with increased support from the upper-middle class (Geismer 2014; Gross 2000). The rising costs of campaigns and the long decline of organized labor have helped to ensure that the Party of the People relies for financial support on business and super-rich donors (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Ferguson, Jorgensen, and Chen 2013).

Some Democratic institutionalists, at their most candid, echo the new political realists (their scholarly champions) in emphasizing the unromantic exigencies of elections and the political inevitability of mammon. Hillary Clinton, in her own moments of frankness during her nomination battles with Barack Obama in 2008 and Bernie Sanders in 2016, sounded just such notes—to her political detriment (Klein 2016). Far more often, with the language of participation the coin of the realm, the institutionalists dare to voice old defenses of party regularity and pluralism only sotto voce.

If pragmatic Democratic Institutionalists shy away from open statements of party principle, so, too, do exponents of a somewhat different strand in this tradition, one that seeks good government and looks to the common good. Though these Democrats aim to reap the rewards of good policy, they feel no need to make the connections to the grubby world of party politics (Galvin and Thurston 2017). Favoring gentle deliberation over open conflict, they see their moderate-liberal views as the fruits of “simply being reasonable and rational” (Muirhead 2014, 14)—unlike the intransigent and maybe even crazy folks on the other side. Jon Stewart is the patron saint of this view. More consequentially, though Barack Obama also played the Democratic Institutionalist straddle, he never lost “his conviction that reconciling differences contributes more to contemporary democratic culture than exacerbating conflicts” (Kloppenber 2014, 284).

Whether hard-nosed or high-minded, Democratic Institutionalists prove unable to make positive claims of party legitimacy. In February 2016, Democratic National Committee chair Debbie Wasserman-Schultz spoke up for those beleaguered embodiments of institutional party authority, the unpledged “superdelegates” to the national convention. But she did not offer the straightforward defense that leading, loyal Democrats should have a voice in picking their

party's nominee. Instead, she risibly argued that their purpose was to allow grassroots activists a chance to attend the convention without having to run against elected officials to earn a slot (Borchers 2016). Little so perfectly captures the disappearance of a public rationale for party than the Democrats' chair cloaking her own party's hard-fought procedures in a bogus, people-versus-the-establishment cover story. Many of the sincerest partisan soldiers in American politics, are, ironically, also the most cowed and surreptitious in their defense of party itself.

Left Populists

The left dissidents in and around the contemporary Democratic Party chafe against the blatantly transactional politics of a decidedly small party. (The term “populists,” which we use out of deference to an ongoing discussion, fits better in a specifically American lineage [Harris 1973; Kazin 1998] than in the contemporary global context.) Such politics, in their view, explain the Democrats' present electoral woes (e.g. Action for a Progressive Future 2017). Bernie Sanders in 2016 came close to winning the nomination of a party that, despite loyal parliamentary support across a quarter-century in Congress, he steadfastly refuses to join. His candidacy coalesced a broader critique than his candidacy, one that raised but did not answer central questions of party.

Today's left populists embrace radical democracy, but—reflecting the influence of intellectuals like Chantal Mouffe (e.g. 2005)—have less sense of what form the political party ought to take as a means to realize that vision. Cause and justice come before party. Thus the disconnects between the scale of organizing and the critique of party, and between substance and procedure. Sanders, an ardent admirer of Eugene Debs, ran to recreate and then to transcend the limits of the New Deal order. His internal critics look also to feminism and the black freedom

struggle. Yet Sanders's call for a "political revolution" hardly embraced the radical possibilities in mass politics that such a lineage might suggest, instead leaning hard on the tradition of procedural reform.

Like the framers of McGovern-Fraser, and before them the Progressives, left populists elevate openness, decry grubby deals, and show impatience with any special role, in nominations or elsewhere, for long-serving party functionaries or elected officials. Yet where reformers in the 1970s put procedure on a pedestal, left populists, impatient with manipulable rules and anxious for substantive change, show little patience with it. "Superdelegates" come in for special opprobrium, as part of an abiding, perhaps even conspiratorial interest in the activities of the Democratic National Committee, imputed with powers far beyond its actual remit. Nor do the left dissidents embrace party democracy even as aspiration. Their justifications, instead, are instrumental. Calls for openness in opposition to closed primaries soon become defenses of engaged participation in support of delegate-selection caucuses. And after Sanders, in a concession not uncommon from winning candidates, extracted a 2016 platform much to his liking, the erstwhile opponents of overweening parties became positive apostles of party responsibility, urging candidates from Hillary Clinton on down to fall in line behind the stated positions of the Democratic Party. Through all the caterwauling and factional struggle, a left vision of party remained tantalizingly just out of reach.

Establishment Republicans

Mainstream conservative Republicans in the twenty-first century, doctrinaire heirs to the tradition of Ronald Reagan, embody some of the very deepest paradoxes of party hollowness, joining tenacity with weakness, militancy with lassitude. Another juxtaposition helps to set the

puzzle of modern Republicanism in relief. In the drama of Donald Trump’s capture of the party’s presidential nomination, coverage and commentary often depicted a team of sober-minded “grown-ups” scrambling belatedly but earnestly to resist a political force they associated with reckless extremism—and, more to the point, electoral weakness. In the years leading up to 2016, however, that very same staid establishment, had become the subject of increasingly alarmed diagnoses depicting the modern GOP as an extremist “insurgent outlier” in American politics (Mann and Ornstein 2016, xxiv) driving forth “a slow-moving constitutional crisis” (Hacker and Pierson 2015, 60). To distinguish Trumpist populism from the GOP mainstream is correct—Trump’s takeover truly was a hostile one. But the longstanding interpenetration of ethnonationalist elements speaks to the distinct incapacities of the party to claim internal authority and police boundaries.

Establishment Republicans, more so than their Democratic counterparts, do have a shared story they tell themselves and their cadres to cement loyalties to a party lineage: that of the modern conservative movement. The postwar remnant, the Goldwater insurgency, and the apotheosis of Saint Reagan all provide the narrative backdrop for a party catechism—a language of common purpose and commitment—recited by virtually every leading GOP figure (Edwards 1999; cf. Phillips-Fein 2011; Tanenhaus 2017). Behind that lingua franca, however, is a decidedly more pragmatic coalitional and electoral bargain. GOP electoral success over the last half century has ridden the realignment of the South and the potency of racial resentments and cultural grievances felt by white voters, North and South. Appeals that speak to identity and culture have won the party majorities—which in turn have facilitated a policy agenda advancing regressive economic and fiscal policies far dearer to the party’s donors than its voters (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Francia et al. 2005; McElwee, Schaffner, and Rhodes 2016).

Trump instinctively identified and exploited that gap in his nomination campaign, doubling down on the virulent politics of in-group identity while jettisoning rhetorical or substantive fealty to the economic side of the conservative catechism. Remarkably, Republican elites' "what-would-Reagan-say" charges of ideological apostasy fell largely on deaf ears, undercutting establishment Republicans' key claim to party stewardship. Once Trump's unlikely candidacy led to Trump's unlikely election, however, the GOP establishment proved characteristically disciplined in coalescing support for their new president and sustaining—however unsteadily—the basic GOP bargain in governance. The tests that Trump's presidency poses for the American political system are thus *fundamentally party tests for the Republican Party*. Animated by cycles of insurgency and the language of ideological purity, the GOP has shown itself to be disinclined to police boundaries and set lines (the "cordon sanitaire") that cannot be crossed. Here the historical experiences of conservative parties that proved weakly resistant to radical infiltration—that lacked, in Daniel Ziblatt's words, "the capacity to stimulate but subordinate outside groups" so as to balance party activism and temperate forbearance (2017, 49)—become illuminating, and worrisome. Facing a substantively disaffected rank and file, an array of conservative institutions structured to stoke permanent outrage at GOP capitulation, and a decreasingly resonant rallying cry for the party itself, establishment Republicans proceed full tilt down a political highway devoid of guardrails.

Right Populists

With the election of Donald Trump, who conjured up a nightmare scenario of a nation plunged into chaos and decline and pledged that "I alone can fix it," the United States found its own version of a revanchist right populism that has manifested itself, in various guises, across

the globe. “People who work hard but no longer have a voice,” he told the Republican convention in language that uncannily matched scholars’ definitions of transnational populism, “I am your voice!” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013; Müller 2016; Finchelstein 2017).

Right populism is, in a curious sense, the tendency in contemporary American party politics least riddled with inconsistencies: it is fundamentally anti-party. And it has a dispositive resolution to any tensions inside its worldview: the leader knows best. The privileged partisan actor under right populism is unquestionably the leader. That leader’s legitimacy is rooted in an essential connection with supporters among the people, whom the leader conjures up and for whom the leader alone may speak.

Right populism ceaselessly exploits divisions between the people and the forces out to thwart them, while denying political parties their place as mediating institutions and their role in restraining the baser passions. While parties themselves would not wither away, what Schattschneider long ago described as “The zone between the sovereign people and the government, which is the domain of the parties” (1942, 15) empties out. The usual meso-level players inside parties, group or politician, Blob or otherwise, may serve an instrumental but not a legitimizing function. Ironically for an ideology that celebrates the traditional ties of church, family, neighborhood, and, at times and more ominously, blood, the political party, maybe *the* defining intermediary institution in civil society, has no meaningful role to play (cf. Mitchell 2017; Mus [Anton] 2016).

New Realists

Cutting deliberately against the grain of pan-ideological sentiments concerning the benefits of transparency and appeal to political principle, scholars and journalists loosely

grouped under the moniker “new political realism” offer hardnosed counsel tinged with nostalgia (Cain 2014; Pildes 2014; La Raja and Schaffner 2015; Rauch 2015; Persily 2015). Their prescriptions aim to channel power and resources away ideologues and toward formal parties. Because parties are the only institutions in the system tasked chiefly winning elections, they have incentives toward moderation and bargaining. Stronger formal parties, the new realists suggest, can save us from polarization.

The new realists’ comprehensive critique of the “romantic” reform tradition indicts its misbegotten efforts to keep money out of campaigns, bring the grassroots into party decision-making, and let the sunshine of transparency disinfect political and legislative relations. All of these, they contend, have rendered the political system prisoner to extremists and purists who prevent the “everyday give-and-take of dickering and compromise” that American political institutions require to function (Rauch 2015, 2).

The nostalgia that suffuses their provocations is for the pragmatic transactionalism that distinguished American parties from their 19th century heyday into the later 20th century, celebrated in a lineage that runs from George Washington Plunkitt (Riordan 1963) to James Q. Wilson’s *The Amateur Democrat* (1962). The new realists notably echo the institutional arguments offered by the anti-McGovern-Fraser Democrats who organized the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in the early 1970s (Kemble and Muravchik 1972). Though dutiful in acknowledging the infeasibility and undesirability of replicating old-style machine politics under modern conditions, the new realists emphatically embrace mercenary motivations over ideological zeal. Nathaniel Persily, a leading new realist, has defined his view as a “‘pro-party’ ‘bad-government’ approach” to analysis and reform (2015, 126). The realists envision parties

controlled by professionals, funded by pragmatic goodie-seekers, skilled in the art of the bargain, and in the Tocquevillian sense, proudly—productively!—small.

Technocratic Centrists

If the new political realists and their anti-reform reform agenda occupy a cohesive public niche, a far more diffuse but broadly disseminated reform disposition shares with them a common enemy—the politics of ideological extremism—while challenging it from the opposite procedural direction. What we term the technocratic centrist analysis sees political parties not as the solution to purism but as its handmaiden. For these centrists, policy emerges not from conflicts over values and power but from the rational pursuit of “solutions.” The soundness of real solutions arrived at through deliberation and compromise—like the objective “public interest” such solutions serve—is self-evident (Berman 2017).

The assumption of an underlying and unitary common good, distorted by the mischiefs of faction, traces a line from republican thought in the Founding period through the Mugwumps who despaired at parties in the Gilded Age to the technocratic strain in Progressivism, though the particular offenses of the parties condemned have changed from the pocket-lining corruption of a century ago to the extremist straitjackets and litmus tests of our polarized era. Whether calling for bipartisanship, a third party, or, as the Centrist Project advocates, “America’s first Unparty,” the centrists seek end-runs around the barriers to solutionism. This tendency, manifested in the output of elite commentators (Friedman 2010; Fournier 2013; VandeHei 2016) as well as splashy efforts like Unity ’08, Americans Elect, and No Labels, serves as a perennial punching bag for political scientists. The centrists’ blitheness to the collective logic of party formation is one reason, as is their cluelessness that the substantive commitments they assume an antiparty reform

project would advance—business-friendly deficit hawkery and social liberalism—are staunchly unpopular with the actual American electorate. By contrast, their outlook on democracy and conflict resonates with enduring popular assumptions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).

The language of personal courage and honesty suffuses the centrists' admonishments to public officials. Fittingly for an outlook that tends toward savior scenarios during presidential election years, their institutional prescriptions betray a presidentialist streak—fast-track legislative authority, line-item veto power, quick up-or-down votes on appointments (e.g. No Labels 2011)—running alongside measures to induce deliberation and compromise in Congress (e.g. No Labels 2012). Though technocratic centrists hardly seem to realize the paradox, meanwhile, a discourse of markets, innovation, and disruption sits uneasily with classic Progressive reliance on independent expertise and nonpartisan regulation through multimember commissions (Gehl and Porter 2017). Underlying both tendencies is the desired evasion of organized, enduring conflict in politics—and thus the escape from party.

Conclusion: Filling the Void

The hollow parties have proven incapable of bringing order to a politically divided society. For all the important and distinctive understandings of party that cleave left, right, and center, none of them squarely confronts the problem of hollowness. We have deliberately focused on parties, and not on partisans, on cue-givers and not cue-takers. We take as a starting point voters' lack of sophistication around issues (Achen and Bartels 2016), which leaves the parties' role in shaping the polity all the more important. Party politics, in this view, reflects a clash of interests, with the prize being control over state power and the ability to articulate and enact the party's partial democratic vision. The promise and peril of parties lie in whether they

turn group conflict into principled disagreement or tribal hatred (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, 305-323).

If the diagnosis is hollowness, strengthening parties offers a solution in a polity divided but also disordered. Parties, at their best, offer clear and compelling choices. We have no real idea how to heal the partisan divide nor, as a normative matter, do we want to. Instead, we seek robust parties with complementary commitments to mobilize voters, define priorities, and organize conflict. We enlist ourselves in the venerable cause of party renewal, and embed party renewal in a civic renewal to make parties positive lived presences in citizens' lives. Like the New Realists, we seek to strengthen party, but we emphasize parties not as brakes on polarizing groups and candidates but solvers of collective problems. Like the reform Democrats of midcentury who challenged machine hacks and southern Bourbons alike, we celebrate parties offering clear and compelling choices rooted in principle (Wilson 1962; Rosenfeld 2018). We seek parties that do active things—starting, critically, with the local parties that do the work on the ground. And given the evolution of norms about intraparty democracy, we call on parties to face the legitimacy problem foursquare. That means party actors will have to go beyond *sub rosa* workaround solutions, and openly and clearly make the case for strong parties. As a scholarly Committee on Party Renewal affirmed four decades ago, “Without parties, there can be no organized and coherent politics. When politics lacks coherence, there can be no accountable democracy” (1977, 494).

Works Cited

- Abramowitz, Alan I. 2010. *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Abramowitz, Alan I., and Steven W. Webster. 2016. "The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of American Elections in the 21st Century." *Electoral Studies* 41: 12-22.
- Achen, Christopher, and Larry Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Action for a Progressive Future. 2017. "Autopsy: The Democratic Party in Crisis." Action for a Progressive Future, October 30, 2017. <https://democraticautopsy.org/wp-content/uploads/Autopsy-The-Democratic-Party-In-Crisis.pdf>.
- Aldrich, John H. 2011. *Why Parties? A Second Look*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Azari, Julia. 2016. "Weak parties and strong partisanship are a bad combination." *Vox*, November 3, 2016. <https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/11/3/13512362/weak-parties-strong-partisanship-bad-combination>.
- Bawn, Kathleen, Marty Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2012. "A Theory of Parties: Groups, Policy Demands, and Nominations in American Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10: 571-597.
- Baylor, Christopher. 2017. *First to the Party: The Group Origins of Political Transformation*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: The Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Berman, Sheri, 2017. "Populism Is a Problem. Elitist Technocrats Aren't the Solution." *Foreign Policy*, December 20, 2017. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/20/populism-is-a-problem-elitist-technocrats-arent-the-solution/>
- Bibby, John F. 2002. "State Party Organizations: Coping and Adapting to Candidate-Centered Politics and Nationalization." In *The Parties Respond: Changes in American Parties and Campaigns* 4th ed., edited by L. Sandy Maisel (Boulder: Westview Press), 19-46
- Borchers, Callum. 2016. "We need more questions like this one from Jake Tapper to Debbie Wasserman Schultz [video]." *Washington Post* online, February 12, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/12/we-need-more-questions-like-this-one-from-jake-tapper-to-debbie-wasserman-schultz-video/>.
- Brazile, Donna. 2017. "Inside Hillary's Secret Takeover of the DNC." *Politico*, November 2, 2017. <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/02/clinton-brazile-hacks-2016-215774>.

Cain, Bruce E. 2014. *Democracy, More or Less: America's Political Reform Quandary*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2016. "Party versus Faction in the Reformed Presidential Nominating System." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 49: 701-708.

Committee on Party Renewal. 1977. "Professional Notes," *PS* 10 (1977): 494-495.

Cooper, Joseph. 2017. "The Balance of Power Between the Congress and the President: Issues and Dilemmas." In *Congress Reconsidered*, 11th ed., edited by Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 357-398. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: CQ Press.

Dwyre, Diana, and Robin Kolodny. 2014. "Political Party Activity in the 2012 Elections: Sophisticated Orchestration or Diminished Influence?" In *The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties*, 7th ed., edited by John C. Green, Daniel J. Coffey, and David B. Cohen, 207-230. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Edsall, Thomas B. 2017. "President Trump Is the Enemy of Their Enemies." *New York Times*, May 4, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/opinion/president-trump-is-the-enemy-of-their-enemies.html>.

Edsall, Thomas B., with Mary D. Edsall. 1991. *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics*. New York: Norton.

Edwards, Lee. 1999. *The Conservative Revolution: The Movement That Remade America*. New York: Free Press.

Epstein, Leon D. 1986. *Political Parties in the American Mold*. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press.

Ferguson, Thomas, Paul Jorgensen, and Jie Chen. 2013. "Party Competition and Industrial Structure in the 2012 Elections: Who's Really Driving the Taxi to the Dark Side?" *International Journal of Political Economy* 42: 3-41.

Finchelstein, Federico. 2017. *From Fascism to Populism in History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Fournier, Ron. 2013. "Talkin' About Revolution: 6 Reasons Why the Two-Party System May Become Obsolete." *The Atlantic*, January 14, 2013. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/01/talkin-about-revolution-6-reasons-why-the-two-party-system-may-become-obsolete/461667/>.

- Francia, Peter L., John C. Green, Paul S. Herrnson, Lynda W. Powell, and Clyde Wilcox. 2005. "Limousine Liberals and Corporate Conservatives: The Financial Constituencies of the Democratic and Republican Parties." *Social Science Quarterly* 86: 761-778.
- Friedman, Thomas L. 2010. "Third Party Rising." *New York Times*, October 3, 2010.
- Galvin, Daniel J., and Chloe N. Thurston. 2017. "The Democrats' Misplaced Faith in Policy Feedback." *The Forum* 15: 333-43.
- Gehl, Katherine M., and Michael E. Porter. 2017. "Why Competition in the Politics Industry is Failing: A Strategy for Reinvigorating Our Democracy." Harvard Business School, September 2017.
- Geismer, Lily. 2014. *Don't Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the Democratic Party*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Greenblatt, Alan. 2015. "The Waning Power of State Political Parties." *Governing*, December 2015.
- Gross, Daniel. 2000. *Bull Run: Wall Street, the Democrats, and the New Politics of Personal Finance*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Grossmann, Matthew, and David A. Hopkins. 2016. *Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group-Interest Democrats*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2010. *Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned its Back On the Middle Class*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2014. "After the Master Theory: Downs, Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy Focused Analysis." *Perspectives on Politics* 12: 643-662.
- Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2015. "Confronting Asymmetric Polarization." In *Solutions to Political Polarization in America*, edited by Nathaniel Persily, 59-70. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Harris, Fred R. 1973. *The New Populism*. New York: Saturday Review Press.
- Hatch, Rebecca S. 2016. "Party Organizational Strength and Technological Capacity: The Adaptation of the State-Level Party Organizations in the United States to Voter Outreach and Data Analytics in the Internet Age." *Party Politics* 22: 191-202.
- Herrnson, Paul S. "The Roles of Party Organizations, Party-Connected Committees, and Party Allies in Elections." 2009. *Journal of Politics* 71: 1207-1224.
- Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs About How Government Should Work*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Karol, David. 2009. *Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Karol, David. 2015. "Party Activists, Interest Groups, and Polarization in American Politics." In *American Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization*, edited by James A. Thurber and Antoine Yoshinaka, 68-85. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 2018. *Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kazin, Michael. 1998. *The Populist Persuasion: An American History*, 2nd ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kemble, Penn, and Josh Muravchik. 1972. "The New Politics & the Democrats." *Commentary*, December 1972, 78-84.
- Klein, Ezra. 2016. "Hillary Clinton and the Audacity of Political Realism." *Vox*, January 28, 2016, <https://www.vox.com/2016/1/28/10858464/hillary-clinton-bernie-sanders-political-realism>.
- Kloppenber, James T. 2014. "Barack Obama and Progressive Democracy." In *Making the American Century: Essays on the Political Culture of Twentieth Century America*, edited by Bruce Schulman. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Koger, Gregory, Seth Masket, and Hans Noel. 2016. "No Disciplined Army: American Political Parties as Networks." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks*, edited by Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Alexander H. Montgomery, and Mark Lubell. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kolodny, Robin, and David A. Dulio. 2003. "Political Party Adaptation in U.S. Congressional Campaigns: Why Political Parties Use Coordinated Expenditures to Hire Political Consultants." *Party Politics* 9: 729-746.
- La Raja, Raymond J., and Jonathan Rauch. 2016. "The state of state parties—and how strengthening them can improve our politics." Brookings Institution, March 2016. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/states.pdf>.
- La Raja, Raymond J., and Bryan F. Schaffner. 2015. *Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lee, Frances. 2016. *Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mair, Peter. 2013. *Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy*. London: Verso.

Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. 2016. *It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the Politics of Extremism*, rev. ed. New York: Basic Books.

Mayer, Jane. 2016. *Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right*. New York: Doubleday.

McElwee, Sean, Brian Schaffner, and Jesse Rhodes. 2016. "Whose Voice, Whose Choice?: The Distorting Influence of the Political Donor Class in Our Big-Money Elections." *Demos*, December 8, 2016.

http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Whose%20Voice%20Whose%20Choice_2.pdf.

Milkis, Sidney M., and John Warren York. 2017. "Barack Obama, Organizing for Action, and Executive-Centered Partisanship." *Studies in American Political Development* 31: 1-23.

Miroff, Bruce. 2007. *The Liberals' Moment: The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the Democratic Party*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Mitchell, Joshua. 2017. "A Renewed Republican Party." *American Affairs*. Spring: 7-30.

Mouffe, Chantal. 2005. *On the Political*. London: Routledge.

Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013. "Populism." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, edited by Michael Freeden and Marc Stears. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Muirhead, Russell. 2014. *The Promise of Party in a Polarized Age*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. *What Is Populism?* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Mus, Publius Decius (Michael Anton). 2016. "The Flight 93 Election." *Claremont Review of Books*, September 5, 2016. <http://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/the-flight-93-election/>.

No Labels. 2011. *Make Congress Work! A No Labels Action Plan to Fix What's Broken*. No Labels, December 2011. https://2o16qp9prbv3jfk0qb3yon1a-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/MCW_Pages.pdf

No Labels. 2012. *Make the Presidency Work!* No Labels, October 2012. https://www.nolabels.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/MPW_Pages.pdf.

Noel, Hans. 2013. *Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Persily, Nathaniel. 2015. "Stronger Parties as a Solution to Polarization." In *Solutions to Political Polarization in America*, edited by Nathaniel Persily, 123-135. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Phillips-Fein, Kim. 2011. "Conservatism: A State of the Field." *Journal of American History* 98: 723-43.
- Pildes, Richard H. 2014. "Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of Government." *Yale Law Journal* 124: 804-52.
- Putnam, Lara, and Theda Skocpol. 2018. "Middle America Reboots Democracy." *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, February 20, 2018.
- Rauch, Jonathan. 2015. *Political Realism: How Hacks, Machines, Big Money, and Back Room Deals Can Strengthen American Democracy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Riordan, William L. 1963. *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics*. New York: E.P. Dutton.
- Rodgers, Daniel T. 2011. *Age of Fracture*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Roscoe, Douglas D., and Shannon Jenkins. 2016. *Local Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Rosenblum, Nancy L. 2008. *On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rosenfeld, Sam. 2018. *The Polarizers: Postwar Architects of Our Partisan Era*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rudalevige, Andrew. 2016. "The Obama Administrative Presidency: Some Late-Term Patterns." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 46: 868–890.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. *Party Government*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- Schlozman, Daniel. 2015. *When Movements Anchor Parties: Electoral Alignments in American History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schlozman, Daniel. 2016. "The Lists Told Us Otherwise." *n+1*, December 24, 2016. <https://nplusonemag.com/online-only/online-only/the-lists-told-us-otherwise/>.
- Schlozman, Daniel, and Sam Rosenfeld. 2018. "Prophets of Party in American Political History." *The Forum*, forthcoming.

Sclar, Jason, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Theda Skocpol, and Vanessa Williamson. 2016. "Donor Consortia on the Left and Right: Comparing the Membership, Activities, and Impact of the Democracy Alliance and the Koch Seminars." Working paper.

Shefter, Martin. 1994. *Political Parties and the State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Skinner, Richard M. 2006. "The Partisan Presidency." In *The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties*, 5th ed., edited by John C. Green and Daniel J. Coffey, 331-342. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Skocpol, Theda. 2003. *Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Skocpol, Theda, and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez. 2016. "The Koch Network and Republican Party Extremism." *Perspectives on Politics* 14: 681-699.

Tanenhaus, Sam. 2017. "The Tribunes of Discontent." *New York Review of Books*, November 23, 2017.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1966. *Democracy in America*, edited by J.P. Mayer. New York: Harper & Row.

Tulis, Jeffrey K. 1987. *The Rhetorical Presidency*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

VandeHei, Jim. 2016. "Bring On a Third Party Candidate." *Wall Street Journal*, April 26, 2016.

Wilson, James Q. 1962. *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wilson, James Q. (1974) 1995. *Political Organizations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 2017. *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Daniel Schlozman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of *When Movements Anchor Parties: Electoral Alignments in American History* (Princeton: 2015).

Sam Rosenfeld is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colgate University. He is the author of *The Polarizers: Postwar Architects of Our Partisan Era* (Chicago: 2018).