SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT IN LIBYA

A LEXICON OF HATE SPEECH TERMS
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About the Partner Organizations: Development Transformations (DT) has been supporting communities transitioning from conflict to sustainable peace since 2008. Our research approach is designed to prioritize community voices, challenge outsider assumptions, and ensure sensitivity to local dynamics. This enables us to better understand local challenges and resiliencies from a community’s perspective, providing the context required for rigorous analysis and community-inspired collaborative program design.

Elbiro is a non-governmental organization launched in October 2017 which focuses on human rights and humanitarian issues in Libya through investigations and journalistic visual stories. Elbiro aims to develop journalistic content according to international professional ethics and to improve the role of mass media to promote human rights while expanding discourse and modern concepts in Libya.
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Introduction

This report is one of a series of lexicons produced by PeaceTech Lab that are focused on social media and hate speech in a particular country context. Since 2014, PeaceTech Lab has worked with local partners in countries throughout Africa and the Middle East to develop lexicons of hateful language and to better understand the dynamics of online hate speech and its potential correlations with offline violence. This research is part of the Lab’s broader goal of addressing online hate speech and its impact on communities in conflict zones. Libya has been identified as a priority country for this work given the unstable security situation and the extensive fragmentation in the country in the years since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, all of which has been shown to play out in a burgeoning online environment. As of December 2017, 54.1 percent of Libya’s population were Facebook users1 while the mobile phone penetration rate is over 100 percent, with many people having more than one mobile subscription².

PeaceTech Lab’s work on hate speech aims to identify and contextualize the particular types of language that are likely to cause violence. This project identifies relevant terms through on-the-ground information gathering and examines their origins, background context, and use in a particular country environment. To successfully monitor and counter hateful speech, we must first identify specific terms and the social and political context that makes them offensive, inflammatory, or even potentially dangerous. The research also seeks to identify alternative terms that would mitigate or replace this language and thereby contribute to building peace. Finally, this report is intended as a resource for individuals and organizations involved in monitoring and combatting hateful speech so that their work can be more effective. The Lab has a large network of local organizations that have used these lexicons to inform and improve their efforts to address hateful content and prevent potential violence. Dozens of projects and initiatives have been launched by local partners to counter hate speech in their local contexts. These reports also enhance the overall body of knowledge on hateful online speech to inform and improve other efforts around the globe. The Annex at the end of the report includes a description of the project’s research methodology, challenges, and risks.
The Lexicon

Country Context: Conflict in Libya

Introduction
Much of Libya’s current insecurity and violence is rooted in the 2011 opposition uprising and overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year rule. The 2011 revolution began with Arab Spring-linked anti-government protests in February that progressed quickly into civil war. This resulted in the proliferation of armed militias, the number of which ballooned to more than 1,600³ over the next three years, and encompassed goals across the political and ideological spectrums. In 2014, elections were held for the newly created House of Representatives (HoR) but the results were rejected by Justice and Construction Party (JCP) members of the General National Congress (GNC), who had done poorly in the 2012 elections. This resulted in the formation of rival governments—the internationally recognized HoR based in Tobruk and the GNC in Tripoli (with the National Salvation Government established as their executive arm)—and contributed
to an escalation of conflict between rival armed groups. The armed forces backing the HoR were led by General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in what Haftar named “Operation Dignity” aimed at eliminating Islamist militias. The GNC was backed by several militias (mainly Islamist), dominated for a time by the “Libya Dawn” coalition. This coalition did not last, but many of these militias remain active in one form or another, along with global extremist organizations and rival armed groups.

In December 2015, to resolve the political stalemate between two competing governments, the United Nations brokered a new agreement to form a Government of National Accord (GNA), intended to serve as the executive branch of a unified national government—and to become the only officially recognized government of Libya. Despite the formation of the Tripoli-based GNA, conflict in Libya has persisted. The authority of the GNA is disputed by several parties—most notably Haftar and his LNA—who launched an offensive in and around Tripoli in an attempt to take control of the capital in April 2019. Haftar announced that the offensive was launched to bring security and stability to Tripoli, later introducing the narrative that they would eliminate the “terrorist militias” in the capital.4 The LNA-aligned HoR withdrew their initial support for the GNA in August 2016, choosing to continue support for a rival government in the east.5 Thus, for the past several years, Libya has contended with two rival administrations with competing security structures based in the east and west of the country.6

**Legacy of Gaddafi’s Rule**

The social and political divisions in Libya that have been exacerbated by the recent conflict have foundations in the decades of authoritarian rule by Muammar Gaddafi. The years under Gaddafi’s rule were marked by extensive political repression, intentional weakening of government institutions and the country's security apparatus, and preferential treatment afforded to certain tribes and ethnic groups while others suffered from blatant discrimination and marginalization. These relationships were by no means static during Gaddafi’s regime, as tribal and geographic alliances shifted periodically. However, some groups, such as the Tebu (also spelled Tabu, Toubou, or Tubu) and Imazighen/Amazigh, were marginalized consistently throughout this period. These and other ethnic groups continue to face discrimination today. This discrimination is often predicated on their non-Arab identities which are underscored, in the case of the Tebu, by the use of slanders that characterize them as African rather than Libyan.7

Resources and positions within the government and security forces during Gaddafi’s rule were unevenly distributed not only by tribe or ethnic group, but also by regional origins. This resulted in the neglect of specific towns and geographic areas. This was partially due to the alignment of tribal divisions along geographic lines, but was also a result of political maneuvering related to the concentration of oil resources and historical relations and tensions. The split between east and west is the most significant division, related to assertions by eastern citizens that they have received a disproportionately smaller share of the country’s resources compared to the amount of oil their region produces.8 The city of Benghazi in particular faced significant underdevelopment and repression under Gaddafi in comparison to Tripoli, an issue that points to the opposition’s entrenchment in Benghazi and other eastern areas.9

Geographic rivalries have played out in other forms during the course of the conflict as well. For example, militias from Zintan and Misrata engaged in intense fighting in Tripoli in 2014, despite both sides having been among the strongest early forces involved in the overthrow of Gaddafi. The Misratan forces were part of the “Libya Dawn” coalition which moved to push the Zintani fighters out of the capital due to accusations that the Zintanis were aligned with Haftar and
planned to help him take over Tripoli, as well as accusations that they were working with ex-Gaddafi fighters. Additionally, there was a pro- and anti-Islamist factor to the conflict, with some Zintani elements reportedly opposed to increased Islamist power while the Misratans were seen as linked to Islamist political groups. These rival militias later reconciled and aligned in early 2018, but the split and conflict are illustrative of the overlapping and complex regional, political, religious, ethnic, and tribal loyalties that play a role in Libya.

Another issue that impacted the general security environment leading into 2011 and that persisted in the political challenges from 2014 to today is the overall weakness of formal political and security structures. Gaddafi’s system of nepotism and the deliberate weakening of many government institutions, partially out of fears of a coup, resulted in the collapse of these institutions during the 2011 uprising. This led to a post-Gaddafi security and governance vacuum that was an opportune environment for the rise of hundreds of armed groups overlapping with groups jockeying for political power. The high number of militias that grew within this context is also closely related to the patchwork of tribal and geographic loyalties outlined above. Competing allegiances without distinct, shared political goals outside of the elimination of Gaddafi created an environment that encouraged factionalization.

The Gaddafi regime also marginalized and banned Islamist elements to further protect its power. As a result, during the uprising, many of the anti-Gaddafi militias contained Islamist elements and Islamism took root in various forms in the political and security gaps post-Gaddafi. These political and militant elements ranged from moderates focused on democratic development to violent extremists, including an Islamic State (ISIL) branch that took hold of Sirte and several other areas in 2015. The group had been expelled from Sirte and most other strongholds by the end of 2016, but it continues to carry out sporadic attacks on government and security force assets and personnel in the country. Other Islamist militias—some extremist and some moderate—established footprints in other parts of the country, including al-Qaeda affiliate Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi (dissolved in 2017) and factions that broke off from the Libya Dawn coalition in Tripoli and surrounding areas. Some Islamist militias were main players in the escalation of clashes between rival groups that occurred in Tripoli in August and September 2018.

The largest Islamist political party to arise in the post-Gaddafi context was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which had been banned and whose elements existed only in exile or underground during Gaddafi’s rule. As a result of this, the MB in Libya did not benefit from the broad societal support that MB bodies in other countries in the region did. The group did form a political party, the JCP, which won 34 seats in the 2012 elections for the GNC, behind the largely secular National Forces Alliance (NFA) which won 64 seats. The JCP and MB gained some wins within the GNC, such as the passage of the Political Isolation Law, banning anyone from the Gaddafi administration from political participation for 10 years. The MB has since suffered diminishing popularity and influence, experiencing poor results in the 2014 HoR elections, which many MB supporters boycotted. This led to the continuation of the GNC as a rival government by Islamist elements—including a strong MB faction. These actions contributed to criticisms of the MB regarding their role as spoilers in reconstruction and stabilization efforts as well as accusations of connections to extremist militant groups. Eventually, representatives from the GNC and HoR signed the Libyan Political Agreement in late 2015, leading to the creation of the GNA, though the GNC continued to fight for power until early 2017. The MB is now represented in some of the GNA’s governing bodies, though their continued political role and influence remains uncertain.
Ethnic and Racial Discrimination

As mentioned above, tribal and ethnic discrimination was commonplace under Gaddafi’s administration, with the Imazighen and Tebu minority groups experiencing abuses such as revocation of citizenship, denial of public services, forced displacement, repression of cultural practices, and banning of native languages. The minority Tuaregs, despite being considered part of the wider Imazighen ethnic group, were actually given relatively preferential treatment by Gaddafi, but only under certain conditions. They were allowed to speak their dialect and some groups of Tuareg from neighboring countries were even welcomed into Libya. However, this preferential treatment disproportionately benefited the men in this population as Gaddafi aimed to incorporate male Tuareg into the army, offering them citizenship as an incentive. Segments of the Tuareg population were certainly aligned with Gaddafi as the rebellion broke out and some were members of the state-aligned security forces, but many other Tuareg were opposed to him and his overall treatment of minorities. Unfortunately, after Gaddafi’s fall there was backlash against the wider Tuareg community by some parts of Libyan society who viewed them as Gaddafi loyalists. Each of these groups have been making efforts in the post-Gaddafi landscape to increase recognition and protection of their cultures and inclusion in governance.

Along with local minority groups, the group that bears the brunt of discriminatory and racist targeting is the large population of migrants, the majority of which come from sub-Saharan African countries. Estimates put the number of migrants in Libya at somewhere between 700,000 to two million people, depending on the source and time period. Some of these migrants have entered Libya for work while others use Libya as a transit point to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. During the fighting against the Gaddafi regime in 2011, many migrants, primarily from sub-Saharan Africa, were arrested or targeted by violence due to widespread, exaggerated rumors that the forces supporting Gaddafi had brought in scores of mercenaries from these countries who were then committing atrocities against Libyans. These rumors were compounded by existing xenophobia, prior exploitation of migrants under Gaddafi, and the training of foreign rebel fighters by the Gaddafi regime, notably insurgents from Chad, Niger, and Mali in the 1970s. Some foreign fighters had been incorporated into the Libyan military, but the accusations against foreigners during the rebellion were found to be widely overblown and proven false in many cases. These accusations, and the arrests and violence against black members of the population, ignored the existence of dark-skinned Libyan nationals and vilified population groups based solely on the color of their skin.

Recent Events and Outlook

As mentioned in the introduction, General Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive aimed at taking control of Tripoli in early April 2019. This activity represents a significant escalation of conflict in the country and fighting is ongoing at the time of this writing. The military actions have been widely condemned by the international community, the UN, and, of course, the Tripoli-based GNA. Prior to the recent military developments, the GNA had been engaged in UN-led negotiations with Haftar aimed at forming a transitional government. Earlier in the year, the LNA successfully led operations to take the al-Sharara and al-Feel oil fields in Libya’s southwest, giving the group control over the vast majority of the country’s oil production. This also gave the LNA better strategic footing to move on Tripoli. Opponents to Haftar voice concerns that the general’s success in gaining control of the country would be a return to the type of authoritarian rule experienced under Gaddafi.
Primary Words and Phrases That Are Offensive and Inflammatory

The following list is organized from most inflammatory and prevalent to least inflammatory and prevalent as indicated by participants in the survey and focus groups. Although this ranking is based on the consensus formed from this input, it is subjective and should not be taken as a definitive hierarchy.

1. دواعش / Daeshi

Other spellings and related references: دواعش/ Daeshi; انتحاري / aintiharun (English translation: suicidal); براهما / brahma (English translation: bird / chicken) / chicken legs (reference to short pants that show ankles, worn as men's religious attire); المدخلي / Madkhal; والهابي / Wahhabi; قاتل / qatal (English translation: killer); متطرف / takfiri; معانصرين / mutatarif (English translation: terrorist / extremist); أفغانستان جماعة / jumaat Afghanistan (English meaning: refers to the Libyan fighters who came from Afghanistan when they joined al Qaeda); جماعة اللهب / jumaat illahy (English translation: group with beards—referring to the practice of growing a beard for religious purpose); خوارج / khawarij

Terms Targeting Religiously Conservative Women (tangentially linked to, but not synonymous with ‘Daeshi’): خيمة / khima (English translation: tent); خمار / batman (reference to attire covering everything except for the eyes)

Sample Posts:

English translation: “How to be a non-Libyan, these Khawarij, Daeshi, bandit is a bandit. The good Trabelsi did not ally with these killers, they must be cut off”
English translation: “You know, the dirty Daeshi is an agent of Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and you know very well that the national army is the elite of the Libyan people, and they have no agenda and their cause is the homeland. And God willing, the national army will destroy the Daeshi Haftar and his militias soon.”

Definition: This word means “a member of ISIL,” for which the Arabic acronym is Daesh. The context in which it is used is key to understanding how this term is applied as inflammatory speech. Used dispassionately, it can simply describe someone who is actually a member of the extremist group; however, in sensitive contexts in Libya, it is often used to describe anyone who is seen as politically or religiously radical or extremist in comparison to the speaker’s own views. As one respondent in Benghazi stated, “Any person that fights freedom in general is called a Daeshi.” It is an accusation that is not necessarily based on the accused person’s actions or role in an extremist organization; rather, it may be based on the accused person’s appearance (e.g., dressing conservatively) or political opinion. It is used as both an insult and provocation that may lead to violence. Widespread use of “Daeshi” in Libya began sometime between 2013 and 2015, when the Islamic State began carrying out operations in the country. In its current usage, it is often employed against anyone who opposes General Haftar and the LNA, falsely conflating any opponents with Islamist extremists.

Why it’s offensive and inflammatory: “Daeshi” is inflammatory because it is used in certain contexts to accuse individuals of belonging to ISIL or to associate them with the related extremist ideology and its extreme actions, thus justifying violence against the accused. According to a focus group participant in Kufra, “This term creates incitement. It is used to criminalize anyone who is intellectually or politically different. Like, if you have a different view on something, people can label you this term even when of course you do not support them [ISIL].” It is reportedly used frequently in political disagreements, around elections and in everyday disputes, associating political opponents with terrorist actors. In relation to the term’s connection with violence, one focus group participant in Benghazi said, in what appeared to be a joking manner, “If I heard that the person next to me is an ISIS member, it may lead me to kill him!”

This term was extensively politicized after the civil war in 2014 and, as mentioned above, it is often used to describe political opponents. For example, if someone lives in the east and is vocal against the LNA, people might describe them as “Daeshi,” stigmatizing them and putting them under the potential threat of being killed or imprisoned. Even if a person is not a member of any Islamist groups, if they are not explicit in their rejection of Islamists, others may label them as
“Daeshi.” This puts those targeted potentially under threat from the security forces and from family members of people killed by Islamists who may be seeking revenge.

Non-offensive alternative terms: اصولین (English translation: fanatic); جماعت اصولیه / jamaat usuli (English translation: fundamentalist / reformist group)

2. خوارج / Khawarij

Other spellings and related references: خارجي / khariji (singular); كلااب النار / kalaab ainaar (English translation: fire / hell dogs); إرهابي / iirhabiayn (English translation: terrorist); كلاب الضالة / kalaab dalih (English translation: stray dogs); مرتد / murtad (English translation: apostate)

Sample Posts:

English translation: “to Hell. What an evil destination, O Khawarij”

Definition: This term has its origins in the first century of Islam as the name of an early fundamentalist sect that revolted against the caliph in power at the time and parted ways from the dominant Islamic practice. The term experienced a resurgence during the 2011 revolution in Libya and the other Arab Spring uprisings and continues to be used in the present-day Libyan context. It has evolved to describe someone who misuses Islam by participating in an extremist or radical group. Some respondents described this term as equivalent to the term “terrorist” and essentially interchangeable with this word and the term “Daeshi.” A narrower explanation from the focus groups defines “khawarij” as any armed group or member of an armed group that doesn’t obey the state leader or person in power. Some respondents reported that it is used more broadly to disparage anyone who is viewed as incorrectly following Islam; several noted that it is often used in this way by Madkhali-Salafi adherents, a conservative Sunni (Salafi) Muslim group that has been gaining influence throughout Libya in recent years. Several focus group participants noted that the term has been used to justify violent actions against opponents. For example, one participant in the Tripoli focus group stated that the term “was used in the war in the east of Libya; groups were labeled as that [khawarij] regardless, whether they are or not, and many groups were executed by the LNA.”

Why it’s offensive and inflammatory: The term “khawarij” is used to imply or indicate that someone has deviated from the Islamic path by acting against the state or by disobeying a leader. As a result, those identified as “khawarij” are no longer considered a part of Muslim
society because they have acted against the whole. The use of this term is particularly dangerous because, according to some doctrine in Islam, it is justifiable to kill an apostate (someone who has renounced a religious belief or principle). The word is used in an inflammatory manner when it is used to call for violent action against those accused of being “khawarij.” The term may be used to signal that the person labeled as such is an extremist and therefore an acceptable target for violence. Particularly in LNA-controlled areas, calling someone a “khariji” (singular form of “khawarij”) could potentially threaten that person’s safety.

The term was used extensively in the civil war in Benghazi in 2014 when Haftar launched “Operation Dignity.” It was used not only to describe Islamists, but also people who were sympathizers, relatives, or members of the MB or Ansar al Sharia. For this reason, many people who left Benghazi due to fears of “Operation Dignity” are now referred to as “khawarij” in the east of Libya; there is graffiti of the term on the walls of some of the abandoned houses.

Figure A: This illustrates the daily volume of tweets containing the word “khawarij” from February 1 - May 17, 2019. There is a clear uptick in the use of the term online in early April, corresponding with the date that the LNA launched an offensive in and around Tripoli. Several other hate speech terms also saw a significant increase during this time period.

Non-offensive alternative terms: مصلحين / muslihin (English translation: reformers / reformists); الجماعات الأصولية / jamaat usuli (English translation: fundamentalist / reformist group); الثوار / althuwwar (English translation: revolutionaries); المعارضين / almuearidin (English translation: opponents / objectors); حركة التغيير وتحديث / جماعة اصلاح وتغير (English translation: reform and change group)
3. **الإخوان / Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood)**

**Other spellings and related references:**
- الإخوان المسلمون / al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (full, official name of Muslim Brotherhood);
- الآخوان / ikhwan (adjective of ikhwan);
- سارق / sariq (English translation: thief);
- ماسمو (English meaning: poisonous / a malicious person with no principles);
- أتركك / kalab al-bana (English translation: dogs of al-Banna [founder of the Muslim Brotherhood]);
- كلاب المرشد / kalab almurshid (English translation: dogs of the guide/leader of the Muslim Brotherhood)

**Sample Posts:**

- **English translation:** “Always, God willing, and all subject to the entire Libyan soil and purify the impure of the Muslim Brotherhood and the state of treason and Satan of Istanbul. Long live Libya. Long live the chosen Haftar”

- **English translation:** “It’s a result, because they stand against Khawari Al Ghariani, he’s the first who described them. It is the curse of God to the Day of Judgment. And my Lord has power over the corrupt Muslim brotherhood. In order to show them the meaning of Creed and principle in the war and what is the meaning of the Martyrdom, Son of Ghariani”
**Definition:** The word “ikhwan” translates literally to “brothers,” but in the Libya context and many others throughout the Middle East, it is predominantly used to refer to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as it is shorthand for the full title: al-ikhwan al-Muslimeen. As discussed in the context of the conflict, the MB is a Sunni Islamist organization with an associated political party, the JCP, in Libya. Similar to how the term “Daeshi” has come to be used to apply to more than actual members of ISIL, “ikhwan” has largely moved away from a merely descriptive definition referring to a member of the MB and is often used to imply various negative characteristics. According to focus group discussions, it indicates that the target of the term is connected to a foreign agenda, that they are self-interested, and that they act against the police and military forces in Libya. Focus group discussants stated that the term was often used against people viewed as having more closed-minded political beliefs or, according to respondents in Kufra, anyone who is opposed to the LNA or “Operation Dignity.” One participant said that, “Anyone who is bearded, backwards in religion, opinionated is Muslim Brotherhood.” Another participant stated that this term had been used against her due to her more conservative style of dress. There appeared to be an assumption across the focus group conversations that the MB—and the term “ikhwan”—is widely viewed negatively throughout the country. One participant stated, “Everyone has the right to believe in whatever he wants as long as it’s not harming other people, but this group [the MB] - in order to get what they want – they have a history of hurting people. Everyone knows they only work for their own benefit.”

**Why it’s offensive and inflammatory:** From the discussions held in the focus groups, there is a strong bias from many groups in Libya against the MB and the term “ikhwan” has come to be used as an accusation and insult, particularly in the eastern region of the country. Even while discussing the use of the term as hate speech, many of the participants indicated their own bias towards the MB with some stating that they are “very dangerous,” that “they are literally worse than devils,” and that “all of Libya’s problems are because of Muslim Brotherhood.” While some of the conversations recognized that “ikhwan” is used as hate speech against MB members or individuals perceived as having related political goals and beliefs, some of the statements made in the focus groups would themselves qualify as hate speech. For example, one participant said that, “they should be killed!” Furthermore, use of the term goes beyond bias and hatred against actual members of the MB, as many respondents indicated that the term may also be employed against people who call for reforms of the military or government or who otherwise express opposing political views (particularly those opposed to the LNA).

As indicated by several of the participant comments, many Libyans now attribute many of the country’s problems to the MB and accuse them of trying to take power and control people. The use of “ikhwan” has been seen to lead to the social seclusion of those labeled as such. Often, “ikhwan,” “Daeshi,” and “khawarij” are used interchangeably, with many people not differentiating between the political MB and the radical groups Ansar al Sharia or ISIL. Therefore, the term can be just as inflammatory as “Daeshi” and “khawarij.” The use of “ikhwan” as hate speech may increase given the decision of the HoR on May 14, 2019, to classify the MB as a terrorist organization.

**Non-offensive alternative terms:** 
الداعون للإسلام تحت حكم يتبع شريعة الإسلاميه (English translation: those calling for Islam under the rule of Sharia law)
Other spellings and related references: shomfak (racial slur based on facial features); kahla (English translation: black); zol / tlees (references to physically strong slaves); أزرق / azraq (English translation: blue); أحرق / ahraq (English translation: burnt); فحم / fahm (English translation: charcoal); ذنجي / zenji (English translation: n-word); خادم / khadem (English translation: servant)

Sample Posts:

English translation: “Slaves of UAE and slaves of Egypt and traitors of the state and you sold it to France, you lost, O bastard, o Qarmatians and your way to your master prisoner Haftar, say to Haftar we have men in Libya”

English translation: “You are happy with this despicable accomplishment O slave of the Sultans... We in Libya adore freedom and see that slaves like you are not our equals... But history has witnessed where slaves dared to liberate... But in the end they only made a mob state...”

Definition: This term—"abd" (عبد) being singular and “abed” (عبيد) being plural—is a racial slur used against people perceived to be of sub-Saharan African descent. The use of this word is closely tied to historical and social contexts in Libya: the influx of sub-Saharan African migrants into the country, the association of some sub-Saharan nationalities with Gaddafi’s military forces, and the historical discrimination against certain Libyan ethnic groups with typically darker skin, such as the Tebu. Focus group participants in Tripoli indicated that use of the term is likely to be triggered by discussions of the issue of illegal immigration, the needs of unemployed black workers, and interracial marriage. It is also used in reference to someone who is viewed as being beholden to a certain group or leader (e.g., “slave of Haftar”).
Why it’s offensive and inflammatory: The term “abd” is offensive because it dehumanizes the target and, in the Libyan context, it is also associated with characteristics such as stupidity, hard-headedness, and being part of a lower class. It can be compared with the use of the n-word in the United States context. Respondents in several locations indicated that they had observed the use of this term offline in many different contexts and it often led to physical altercations. There is a widespread lack of awareness or acknowledgement of the presence of racism by the wider population in Libya, which may explain, to some extent, the continued use of this term. The word is considered particularly offensive when used against women, as traditional Libyan culture has typically not considered dark skin to be beautiful. This can have a significant psychological impact on women and girls who are labeled “abed.”

A recent event that contributed to the sensitivity around this term was the forced displacement of the town of Tawergha in 2011. Tawergha had a black-majority population and was the only city in Libya to be entirely forcibly displaced during the fighting. This increased tensions and grievances among black Libyans (particularly Tawerghans).

Note: There was some disagreement over the level of offensiveness of this term on the part of younger focus group participants. According to some youths, the term is used in certain situations as slang among friends (typically only male friends). For example, one participant in Tripoli noted, “A lot of people these days use it as a sign of respect, such as young generations, when they call him ‘abd’ that is ‘my n****a.’ It’s a sign of respect. A lot of young people now see it as non-offensive.” This usage, however, is very dependent on specific social contexts and overall the word is still considered very offensive in most situations. If it is used in reference to a political situation (e.g., Tawergha) or with someone the user does not know personally, it will be viewed as offensive.

Non-offensive alternative terms: أسمر / asmar (English translation: dark complexion);
من أصول افريقيه (English translation: of African origin)

5. ارهابيين / Iirhabiayn (Terrorists)

Other spellings and related references: إرهابي / terrorist (singular); خوارج / khawarij; انتحاري / aintihariun (English translation: suicidal); الفارق / al Qaeda; أبو سليمه الكتيبة / Abu Salim Brigade—in Derna; أنصار الشريعة / Ansar al Sharia

Sample Posts:

English translation: “#Tripoli. Some of the terrorist Misrata militias who are fighting against Libyan Armed Forces They are randomly hitting people’s houses”
**Definition:** The word “iirhabiayn” translates literally to “terrorists,” though, similarly to the word “Daeshi,” it is used to defame or insult a user’s political or religious opponent in some contexts. In other words, it is sometimes used to insult or accuse people who do not necessarily fall within the broadly used definition of a terrorist as someone who uses unlawful violence and intimidation (especially against civilians) in the pursuit of political aims. People may be labeled as “iirhabiayn” based on their actions, religious or political beliefs, or appearance—particularly more conservative appearances associated with strict adherents of Islam. It is worth noting that the word is not always used as a hate speech term and may be employed as a label for an extremist militant.

**Why it’s offensive and inflammatory:** This term is offensive and inflammatory in situations when it is used to denigrate, defame, or accuse another person based on differing beliefs or opposing political actions. In Libya, it has also been frequently employed to justify the use of force against so-called “terrorists,” who are often political or military opponents rather than members of actual terrorist groups such as ISIL or al Qaeda. Haftar has used this term frequently in the context of defeating or eliminating the “terrorists” from Libya in order to explain and justify his military actions, most recently in launching the offensive on Tripoli. Haftar and his supporters have labeled the Tripoli-based militias backing the internationally-recognized GNA as “terrorist militias” in response to accusations that the offensive is a power grab. Although some of these groups do have documented ties to al Qaeda, Haftar has broadly generalized their goals to justify military action and vilify any militias opposing him. Respondents from the focus groups indicated that supporters of Haftar and the LNA use this term often against anyone who is not a supporter or who is critical of their actions. In particular, in the context of the current military action by the LNA, those who oppose this action are frequently labeled “iirhabiayn.” As one respondent stated, “If you are pro-peace and anti-war, but reside in the west of the country [where opposition to Haftar has typically been strongest], you are considered as a militia supporter or an ISIS member. Terrorist has become a term which is used to discredit people.”

**Non-offensive alternative terms:** المعارضين / almuearidin (English translation: opponents / objectors)
6. **Kalab / كلاب (Dog)**

Other spellings and related references: **Kalab Muammar** (English translation: *dogs of Muammar*); **Kalab Haftar** (English translation: *dogs of Haftar*); **Gawad** (English translation: *pimp*); **Zimzak** (English translation: *suckup*); **Sabi** (English translation: *servant / boy*); **Abed Muammar** (English translation: *slaves of Muammar*).

**Note:** The word “abd” or “slave” can also be used in a similar manner (e.g., “slaves of Muammar”) to indicate that the target of the phrase is owned by someone else and follows them blindly.

**Sample Posts:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>English translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>📸</td>
<td>“What will the dogs of the Muslim Brotherhood say, and those who are like them, after the arrest of al-Ashmawi and the one who is with him from the Egyptian terrorists, who was fighting the Libyan army now, you lost, cowards, agents of Qatar and Turkey. Yes, now we are more determined in Tripoli. Yes, with the army led by Marshal Khalifa Haftar.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>📸</td>
<td>“Now your heart is very soft on Houn City, let them bomb them, Haftar dogs.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Definition:** The Arabic word for dog, “kalab,” is used in several derogatory phrases such as “dogs of Muammar,” referring to loyalists to Gaddafi, and “dogs of Haftar,” referring to loyalists of General Haftar. The use of the word “dog” in these contexts refers to someone who is blindly loyal to one of these leaders. Another related term is “kalab dalih,” or “stray dogs,” but
discussants indicated that this phrase was primarily used during Gaddafi’s regime to refer to the opposition and Islamist militants, and was reportedly associated with directing violence towards those labeled as such. “Stray dogs” has since become less common, though it is still used in certain circumstances, particularly when the person employing the phrase supports Gaddafi’s way of using force and imprisonment in dealing with Islamists (militants or non-militants).

Why it’s offensive and inflammatory: The comparison to an animal is dehumanizing and these phrases are reportedly employed with the aim of defeating, removing, killing, prosecuting, or isolating the person being targeted by the language. Referring to someone as a “kalab,” or “dog,” is inflammatory because it implies that the person is owned by someone else and does not have power over their own decisions. The phrase “dogs of Haftar” is particularly inflammatory at the moment, given the ongoing fighting involving Haftar’s forces in and around Tripoli. As one respondent in Sabha stated, “The term strongly implies hatred. I mean, when you really think about these terms, what are we saying? We are saying when anyone calls you, you answer like a dog to his master...When the master calls, the dog comes running. And he is happy to abide by his master. Just look at what is happening in Tripoli right now. I mean, if I saw a ‘Haftar dog’ of course I would hate him. There is so much violence right now. Haftar calls and then they abide by the master.” The use of this phrase is extremely inflammatory in any conversations between opponents and supporters of Haftar.

Non-offensive alternative terms: موالي لحفتر (English translation: loyal[ist] to Haftar); مشجع لحفتر (English translation: supporters of Haftar)

7. **شرقاً / Shargawe (Eastern)**

Other spellings and related references: شرنغش / shrengish; فاصوليا / fasoolya (beans, i.e., a common dish in the east); المصرّبين / almisriiyn (English translation: Egyptians)—due to eastern border with Egypt; شلاتيا / shlaftiya (English translation: low class); شرقاً / sharqa (English translation: east)

Sample Posts:

![image]

English translation: [sarcastically, with picture of injured men] “This is Shrengish, they said, they have army!”

Definition: This term literally translates to “eastern,” but it has become politicized and is used to stereotype and denigrate people from the eastern part of Libya. In its use as a hateful term, it is associated with characteristics such as backwardness, savagery, stupidity, and
closed-mindedness. According to discussants in Benghazi, the term is associated with having
darker skin and being lower class, which introduces a racial element as well. As one participant
stated, “It is said to demean and connotes a lower level of sophistication, as if somehow the
western parts of Libya hold all [of] the culture and traditions.”

Why it’s offensive and inflammatory: This phrase discriminates based on regional origins
and may be used by people from the western regions to insult and demean people from the
east while emphasizing regional division and discord within Libya. The connotation of the term
is that people in the east are not authentic Libyans and they are “second class citizens.” This
term is inflammatory because it is perceived as weakening the Libyan identity by adding
another layer of fragmentation on top of tribalism and communalism.

The offensiveness of this term is closely related to the historical context of regional relations and
development. Benghazi and other parts of the eastern region of Libya faced underdevelopment
and neglect under Gaddafi and it is likely that this contributed to the negative stereotypes
assigned to people from the east through the use of the term “shargawe.” Some participants in
the Tripoli focus group noted that “regional racism” increased under Gaddafi due to his
exclusionary practices. The origins of this regionalism go back much further, however, likely
dating back to when Libya was separated into the three administrative regions of Tripolitania in
the northwest, Fezzan in the southwest, and Cyrenaica in the east during the Ottoman Empire.
There are several other hateful regionalist terms, including the related references listed above
and the following term for “western,” that are illustrative of the overall problem of regional-
based stereotyping and discrimination in Libya.

Non-offensive alternative terms: ليبى / Libyan

8. غرباوي / Gharbawi (Western)

Other spellings and related references: بروش / baryoosh (English translation: croissant, i.e.,
soft because of what they eat); عسل / asleen (English translation: honey, i.e., softie); Tunisian;
مكنسة / sahnun (English translation: too soft / pushover); مركزية / markazi (English translation:
centralized); غرباء / gharba; غرب / gharb; غرباني / gharenbish (English translation: from the
west); غرباء / gharaba (English translation: westerners)

Sample Posts:

English translation: “Suliman Alkawafi, you are Gharbawi and not from Barqa. Your
destiny is expelled from barqah or live as slave Owned. Observe for yourself”
SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT IN LIBYA: A LEXICON OF HATE SPEECH TERMS

Definition: As with the term “shargawe” above, “gharbawi” is the Arabic word for a cardinal direction, “western” in this case, though it is now associated with certain negative, stereotypical characteristics and is used as a hateful term for people from the western part of the country. In this context, the negative characteristics that the phrase implies include weakness, cowardice, and a lack of honor. Notably, two of the focus groups, in Sabha and Kufra, chose to discuss these terms together in the same conversation as they were classified as being opposite while still being linked by their discriminatory nature.

Why it’s offensive and inflammatory: As with “shargawe,” this term discriminates based on regional origins and may be used by people from the east to insult and demean people from the west while underscoring regional division and discord within Libya. Several respondents also indicated that it can reinforce tribal and racial discrimination and divisions given that regional splits often overlap with these other categories. In its relation to violence, one participant stated that it may be used when someone is specifically “looking for a fight.” Another respondent said that “gharbawi” and other regionalist terms have not previously been particularly linked to conflict, but, “…with the civil war in Libya, it’s growing to be something that incites armed conflict, east versus west.” Additional feedback pointed out that this term is used to demean western Libyans, particularly during times of conflict. This is a significant term and societal cleavage to monitor given the current fighting between Haftar’s eastern-based forces and the western Tripoli forces and government.

Note: About half of the participants in the Benghazi focus group (located in the east) did not agree that “gharbawi” was hate speech. This appears to indicate that this word may be used by some people from the east who are unaware that the term can be insulting or inflammatory to individuals from the west. The other half of the participants in Benghazi said that it was “definitely hate speech.”

Non-offensive alternative terms: Libyan / Person from Tripoli

9. كرامة / Karama (Dignity)

Other spellings and related references: حفتي / Haftoori (English translation: of Haftar); حفتي / Haftoori (English translation: of Haftar); حفتي / tuhalib (English translation: algae); حفتي / azlam (English meaning: Gaddafi follower); حفتي / karamista; حفتي / dogs of Haftar; حفتي / slaves of Haftar; انقلابي / (English translation: [military] coup); حفتي / slaves of Haftar; حفتي / slaves of Haftar; حفتي / (English translation: Dignity Operation group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off-topic</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate Speech</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Libya Hate Speech: Karama (dignity) — Opinion Analysis from 1/1/19 to 5/17/19

Figure B: The percentage of Twitter posts containing the word “karama” from January 1-May 17, 2019 that have been classified as hate speech, neutral, and off-topic. The large volume of tweets that use the word neutrally highlights the challenge of identifying sample hate speech posts for this term. The use of “karama” as a hate speech term is particularly dependent on whether the
term is used to refer broadly to the military operation with this name or to denigrate those who support the operation and the LNA.

**Definition:** The literal meaning of this word is “Dignity,” which was the name given to the military operation carried out by General Haftar. As such, “karama” came to describe anyone who supports Haftar and the LNA. Some respondents indicated that the term is used to label people based not only on their political views but also based on their place of birth, employing it to refer to people in the east where Haftar has been based and maintains the most support. When used to generalize people from the east, it implies that all easterners are supporters of Haftar. The term was introduced in 2014 with the launch of “Operation Dignity.”

**Why it’s offensive and inflammatory:** In the focus group discussions, particularly in Benghazi, there was some disagreement over whether “karama” is currently used as hateful speech. However, all participants from that group agreed that the use of the term provokes a negative reaction in the western part of the country and may lead to violence. There is some uncertainty as to the level of offensiveness of this term due to a lack of consensus, but overall it appears to be considered more inflammatory when used to target someone in western Libya where opposition to Haftar is generally stronger. The term could lead to the detention or abuse of those labeled as such given the tensions between Haftar in the east and the other factions in the west. As of May 2019, with the fighting around Tripoli due to Haftar’s operation to take the city and the public backlash against this action, it is possible that the frequency of use and level of offensiveness of “karama” could shift in the near term.

**Non-offensive alternative terms:** “Supporter of the army [LNA]”, الجيش / aljish (English translation: the army)

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10. **Eamil (Agent/Spy)**

**Other spellings and related references:** جماعة المجتمع المدني / jamaat almojtama almadani (English translation: civil society group); عملاء / eumala (alternative spelling of eamil)

**Sample Posts:**

English translation: “You know meaning how to be polite? I wish I was barbaric, this is my honor, you little traitors, you agents who sold Arabs and lost all the Arabs”
"You are lying, agents of Qatar"

**Definition:** An inflammatory term provided in some of the online surveys and highlighted by participants in the Kufra focus group was “eamil,” which means “foreign agent” or “spy.” Survey respondents stated that this term is used to accuse people of being spies or agents for foreign entities or governments and is often directed towards individuals who work for international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) or foreign embassies. The term is associated with the context around the phrase “jamaat almojtama almadani,” discussed below.

**Why it’s offensive and inflammatory:** This term was noted as being particularly inflammatory in the Libyan context due to the widespread mistrust within the country with regards to suspicion of foreign organizations and their potential interference in domestic affairs. Labeling someone as “eamil” implies that they are acting in the interest of outside actors, rather than in the interest of Libya and the Libyan people. It has been employed online frequently in reference to Haftar and his supporters, claiming that he is an agent of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE. The use of this hate speech term increased significantly in volume in early April 2019 when the LNA launched its offensive to try to take Tripoli.

**Non-offensive alternative terms:** None provided

**Berber**

**Other spellings and related references:** بربري / berbery (English translation: barbaric); امازيغي / amazigh, جاهل / jahil (English translation: ignorant)

**Sample Posts:**

"Amazighi BRBERI klub Hbqir"

**English translation:** “Berber Amazigh dog despicable”
Definition: The term “Berber,” despite being used somewhat widely in English and on several mainstream websites, was identified as an offensive term referring to several of Libya’s ethnic minorities, namely the Imazighen/Amazigh, Tebu, and Tuareg peoples. Participants indicated that the word came into use following the start of Gaddafi’s rule in 1969, highlighting the extensive discrimination against minorities under his administration. The word itself has its origins in the Greek word for “foreigner” and is closely linked to the English word “barbarian.” In the Libyan context it implies that someone is uncivilized or primitive and is often used to describe a person or group of people who allegedly don’t speak Arabic or cannot speak it well. Some respondents also said that it is often used in situations where the person being targeted is viewed as being low class and aggressive in their behavior.

Why it’s offensive and inflammatory: This term is dehumanizing and defines those labeled as “Berber” as being inferior to other ethnic or racial groups. As one respondent in Sabha stated, “...when this term is used, what happens is that it places Arabs above them [ethnic minorities], as if Arabic culture is the predominant culture and Arabs in general have greater value than non-Arabs.” Another participant said that the use of the term may result in physical altercations between people of Arab origins and those of Amazigh origins. The term creates a division between Arab and non-Arab communities in Libya by degrading members of these minority groups and claiming that they are not equally Libyan, even if they have lived in the country for generations. This division was illustrated through some of the statements of focus group participants, as several individuals expressed opinions that members of the Amazigh ethnic group are racist and act superior to Libyan Arabs, claiming that they reject interethnic marriage. These comments appeared to be attempts to justify the use of divisive language related to discussions of ethnicity. There was, however, some disagreement over how inflammatory the term is, with some participants indicating that sometimes the term is used in ignorance and is not intended to offend or dehumanize anyone. Additionally, participants in Kufra stated that the term was not employed in their region of the country, perhaps due to the presence of Tebu communities throughout the area, against whom the term “abd” is more often used as derogatory speech.

Non-offensive alternative terms: Imazighen/Amazigh; Tuareg; Tebu (depending on ethnic identity group); Libyan
12. **علماني / Elmani (Secular)**

**Other spellings and related references:** كافر / kafir (English translation: infidel); مرتاد / murtad (English translation: apostate); منحرف / monharel (English translation: deviant / person with bad habits); سافره / safera (English meaning: a woman with bad habits who is non-religious / a woman who does not wear a hijab / a loose woman); عاهرة / eahir (English translation: prostitute)

**Sample Posts:**

![Image](image_url)

**English translation:** “Secular and dirty. The money of the Salafists and your masters keep you in your drunkenness and misguidance”

![Image](image_url)

**English translation:** “Oh cantaloupe you are a liar you smell in the corner of your moldy mouth you elmani you cuckold”

**Definition:** The literal definition of “elmani” is “secular” and in Libya, it is used in a religious context to describe someone who does not “adhere to the teachings of [Islam]” or, in the political context, someone who is overly liberal to a level that’s inappropriate. The use of the term in political conversations also associates the target with negative foreign, and especially Western, characteristics such as inappropriate mixing of genders in public spaces and workplaces. As illustrated by the related references above, when used to refer to women, the term is also associated with promiscuity and culturally shameful behavior. The word itself is old but, according to the focus group participants, it generally began to be used as hateful speech after the 2011 revolution. The word began to spread particularly during the debate over whether to implement Sharia law or not between the MB and Mahmud Jebril, the head of the NFA party. The term began to be used to attack liberal opponents of the MB who were advocating for democracy, free civil society, and a constitution.

**Why it’s offensive and inflammatory:** This term is offensive within the Libyan context because it accuses the target of not following Islamic values properly or of adopting Western political beliefs or lifestyle that are perceived negatively. Respondents in Kufra stated that it is...
often used by Madkhali-Salafis to discredit their opponents. It is reportedly used to disparage and discredit political candidates, particularly around election periods. Focus group participants gave several examples of verbal or physical abuse of individuals accused of being too secular in their beliefs and opinions. For example, one respondent described a university student being assaulted after discussing evolution in a class and being labeled as “elmani.”

**Non-offensive alternative terms:** progressive (English translation: *those believing in democracy*); غير متعصب للدين (English translation: *not rigid in their thinking*); مومن بالانسانيه (English translation: *humanist*); منفتح العقلية / munfatih aleqlia (English translation: *open minded*) (Note: some argue that this last term can actually also be used in an inflammatory manner)

### جرذان / Jardhan (Rats)

**Other spellings and related references:** مبطن / mkhatit (English translation: *lined, i.e., the new Libyan flag with different colored rows*); الميليشيات / almilishiat (English translation: *militias*); خونة / khawna (English translation: *traitors*); بيعو الوطن / baato alwatan (English translation: *sell the country*)

**Sample Posts:**

```
#February_Revolution is a Revolution of rats, like it or not.
```

```
I said nothing but the truth of what is in the picture you rats of NATO damn you. clean your belly from the benefits you take from UAE then come talk about other things.
```
**Definition:** As with phrases that include the word "dog," "jardhan," or "rats," is also a dehumanizing term. Rats are particularly worthy of scorn in many cultural contexts given their reputation as harmful and dirty pests. The word in the Libyan context is widely noted as first appearing as a hateful term in a speech given by Gaddafi right after the launch of the uprising in February 2011 when he referred to supporters of the revolution as "rats" who needed to be caught. The present-day meaning has also come to be associated with the assignment of blame for Libya’s current instability and problems. Given the association of this term with the Gaddafi regime, it is not used as frequently as it was during the 2011 conflict. However, it appears that it continues to be relevant as it was one of the most frequently cited terms by respondents to the online survey on hate speech in Libya.

**Why it’s offensive and inflammatory:** Focus group participants argued that the use of the term resulted in more violence against protesters and supporters of the rebellion. Several respondents indicated that the term has become less common in the years since the overthrow of Gaddafi, but some—primarily from the Kufra region—stated that it is still used online and offline against supporters of the 2011 revolution by their opponents, and that it is likely to prompt violence given the origins of the term and the association with Gaddafi. It is used to imply that people who supported the 17 February Revolution against Gaddafi are traitors. Respondents from Sabha also noted that the use of the term often resulted in physical violence, which several of them had personally witnessed.

“Jardhan” is overall less inflammatory in the east compared to the south and west given the alignment between many former Gaddafi supporters and the eastern-based LNA; many of these supporters now live in Benghazi. Therefore, use of this term in the west and south is more likely to lead to violence.

**Non-offensive alternative terms:** الثوار / altuwwar (English translation: revolutionaries); المعارضين / almuearidin (English translation: opponents / objectors)
**طحالب / Tahalib (Algae)**

**Other spellings and related references:** أخضر / okhdar (English translation: green); ازلام / azlam (English meaning: Gaddafi follower); الطابور الخامس / taboor khamis (English translation: fifth column, i.e., Gaddafi supporters in the form of sleeper cells); متساق / motasalik (English translation: climber); ghooz (English meaning: tribe associated with Gaddafi); Haftoori; قطط السمان (English translation: fat cats—referring to corrupt Gaddafi officials)

**Sample Posts:**

**English translation:** “You algae are the most severe of the danger to Libya from ISIS. You laugh in the death of the Libyan army who help you back to country. You don’t deserve it.”

**English translation:** “Algae does not have a religion”

**Definition:** “Tuhalib,” or “algae,” is a term that has been used to refer to supporters of Gaddafi. The reference to algae comes from the green color of the Gaddafi regime’s flag. This term was one of the top two most frequently identified phrases in the online surveys on hate speech, though many focus group participants indicated that it has gone out of use since 2014. Many participants noted, however, that the term becomes more frequently used towards the beginning of every year when the anniversary of Gaddafi’s overthrow occurs.

**Why it’s offensive and inflammatory:** Focus group discussants explained that the dehumanizing nature of the word algae as an organism that is “parasitic” and referred to as “scum” is the reason that this word was particularly offensive. Another respondent mentioned that the term’s association with Gaddafi signaled that the people targeted with this term were
loyal to a person rather than to Libya, and this made the term particularly offensive. Conversely, several participants mentioned that they were not offended by the term and some have tried to reclaim it as they were proud of their support for the Gaddafi regime. This viewpoint may be somewhat due to conflict fatigue, which has led many people to support Haftar (seen as some to be a return to the stability and order they remember under Gaddafi). Overall, the term is no longer common and several participants indicated that even when it is employed, it is sometimes used sarcastically and is not especially inflammatory.

That being said, the use of the term may be considered more offensive when it is used to refer to specific tribes that are perceived as supporting Gaddafi, rather than as an insult directed at an individual. In this context, there are concerns that this phrase and the issues associated with it could prolong tribal conflicts in the south where some groups remain Gaddafi loyalists.

**Non-offensive alternative terms:** *Septembreyen* (English meaning: supporters of the September 1969 Gaddafi Revolution); "Supporters of the former/previous regime"; *jamaat Muammar* (English translation: Gaddafi group)

### Civil society group

**Other spellings and related references:** علماني / *elmani* (English translation: secular); الوهمية / *wahni* (English translation: delusional); منحل / *monhal* (English translation: too open minded); مميز و ضان / *maeiz wi dhan* (accepting mixing of genders); عملٍ / *eaml* (English translation: agent); قاسقين / *fasekeen* (English translation: person with bad habits / non-believer); المناافقين / *monafikin* (English translation: hypocrites); مناع بنات / *matae bnat* (English translation: womanizers); مناع ولاد / *matae wlad* (gays); بوقة / *boofta* (English meaning: homosexual [slur] / faggot); عاهرة / *eahira* (English translation: prostitute); ديوث / *dayoot* (English meaning: not manly / a man who is unable to control the women in his life); درجيات; سكر / *sakir* (English translation: alcoholic); عاهرات المجتمع المدني / *eahira almojtama almadani* (English translation: civil society b***h/whore)

**Sample Posts:**

**English translation:** "Civil society group... is a decay and emancipation from morality"

**Definition:** This phrase, translated as "civil society group," has negative connotations in the Libyan context and associates people who work for civil society organizations (CSOs) and INGOs with secularism, Western habits, the pursuit of money, and overly liberal behavior. The contextual implications of this phrase are linked to two main related issues: 1) negative secular
behaviors, and 2) a focus on foreign interests and potential spying for foreign actors. It can also apply to men and women in different ways. When referring to women, the phrase implies that they are disrespectful and promiscuous. When referring to men, it may be used to imply that they are weak. The negative connotation of this phrase relies heavily on who is using it and their perception of CSOs and INGOs.

Within the Libya context, many people have trouble accepting the fact that CSOs are mixed gender as this has traditionally been viewed with suspicion in Libyan society. Many Libyans have also developed an aversion towards Western organizations as a result of 40 years of Gaddafi propaganda against the international community, so the interaction of activists with the international community has typically been treated suspiciously.

Why it’s offensive and inflammatory: The phrase “jamaat almojtama almadani” is considered offensive and inflammatory because it is used to imply that members of this type of group are promoting and even importing foreign and perceivably un-Islamic values to the communities in which they work. For example, as illustrated by the related references above, the term is often linked with the use of drugs and alcohol and promiscuous behavior, unacceptable traits and activities among many communities in Libya. Its use demeans the efforts of civil society activists and places a negative stigma on them. The focus groups did not provide any examples of this phrase being linked to violence, though its definition indicates that associating someone in Libya with these types of behaviors could be inflammatory depending on the target’s community and beliefs.

The CSO and INGO communities in Libya have dealt with several discriminatory policies and actions connected to the use of this phrase, which has been used to justify repression of the CSO space. In 2017, the LNA’s chief of staff banned women under the age of 60 from traveling abroad without a male chaperone, impacting the population in the east of Libya. This mainly impacted female civil society workers as these were the segment of women most likely to be undertaking solo travel. The ban was later expanded to all individuals between the ages of 18 and 45; anyone traveling abroad was required to obtain permission by answering various security questions regarding travel purpose and itinerary. Civil society activists in Libya at the time stated that this allowed the LNA to block the travel of any CSO workers they disagreed with or had bias against. Furthermore, during the civil war in 2014, several civil society activists were assassinated (notably: Tawfik Ben Saud and Salawa Boguigis, a lawyer and activist).

Note: Respondents at the Sabha focus group indicated that this phrase is not considered hate speech in their region.

Non-offensive alternative terms: نشطاء المجتمع المدني / nushata almojtama almadani (English translation: civil society activists)

Note: According to focus group participants, the alternative phrase for “jamaat almojtama almadani” de-emphasizes the group and assigns a more personal meaning, separating the person working for a CSO or INGO and their motivations from the group overall, which may have other motives. However, one Libyan consultant indicated that this phrase can also be used in an offensive manner.
16. **Azlam**

Other spellings and related references: الطابور الخامس / taboor khamis (English translation: fifth column, i.e., Gaddafi supporters in the form of sleeper cells); طحالب / tuhalib

Sample Posts:

"Kantat Tädhib for the revolutionaries to fight Haftar and his people from the Azlam that wanted to go back to the era of the masses. But accused them of terrorism and killed innocent people and destroyed your city. May God rest the martyrs of February in the eastern region. The response to this will be very harsh on the borders of Tripoli and February’s people and the rebel people will be released."

"Do you imagine that we are not understanding? We knew that Haftar and those with him from Azlam are coming to occupy Tripoli."

Definition: The term “azlam” means followers of Gaddafi. This term is linked in its meaning with “tuhalib,” or “algae,” though, according to focus group participants in Benghazi, it is considered less offensive as it applies mainly to close associates of Gaddafi and those who directly benefited from his regime rather than anyone who broadly supported him. It originated during the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi.

Why it’s offensive and inflammatory: Similar to “tuhalib,” this term is used less in the present day than it was during the 2011 uprising, though the use of this term also increases around the
anniversary of the revolution. In terms of how offensive it is, a respondent in Kufra stated that, “At the beginning of the 2011 revolution, the term was considered inflammatory. But now it is [merely] discriminatory . . .” A participant in Benghazi said that the use of this word against someone will still result in violence, though from the broader conversations it appears that it is used less often and is not as severe a term as many of the others discussed in this lexicon. Though it is likely that this was more so the case in the past, one discussant stated that, “A lot of people get physically attacked, kidnapped, killed and have their properties taken because they are accused of being ‘azlam.’ That is, the money they have is not theirs and they benefited from the previous regime.” (This is linked to a law related to housing created by Gaddafi in the 1970s and ’80s. He purportedly aimed to disperse the wealth of the rich to the rest of society, but this resulted in wealth mostly going to his supporters, which was therefore viewed as not belonging to them.) Negative perceptions of Gaddafi’s former supporters led to the political isolation law that was passed in 2013 barring any former senior member of Gaddafi’s regime from serving in the new government.

Similar to many other terms, “azlam” is considered more offensive in some regions as opposed to others. For instance, in LNA-controlled areas, the general perception has reportedly shifted from associating “azlam” with corruption to associating it with general loyalty to Gaddafi. But in other areas, such as Misrata, those targeted by the phrase may risk having their safety, freedom, or properties taken away.

**Non-offensive alternative terms:** Supporters/men of the former regime
### Secondary List of Terms that Are Offensive and Inflammatory (listed in alphabetical order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atrak / اترك</td>
<td>This term, which translates to “Turks” or “Turkish,” is used derogatorily in reference to Misrata inhabitants to insult them by implying that they are “not Arabs” because they are allegedly of Turkish descent. There is a historical grievance by some Libyans towards Turkey because some believe that the Ottoman Empire left the Libyans to face the Italians alone. This term was used increasingly after Turkey supported Misrata during the civil war in 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydoun / عائدون</td>
<td>This is a term that is used derogatorily towards Libyans who lived abroad for a long period of time and have now returned to the country. Respondents translated the term as “returnees” or “outsiders.” It was specifically mentioned by discussants at the Sabha FGD. Respondents indicated that it is used to discriminate against and disapprove people based on their place of birth (when referring to the children of returnees who may have been born abroad) or political views and cultural traditions that are viewed as imported from foreign countries. The implication of the term is that the individual labeled as such left the country during a difficult time economically or politically and only returned when things improved; the presumption is that they abandoned their own country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kafir / كافر</td>
<td>This term is related to the term “elmani,” meaning secular, but “kafir” is translated as “non-believer” or “infidel.” It was identified as being inflammatory by several survey respondents and focus group participants due to it being used to insult and label someone viewed as non-religious or not religious enough. Some respondents indicated that it is often used by radical Islamists to denigrate moderate Muslims who do not adhere to their ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qahba / قحبة</td>
<td>This term, which translates to “b***h” or “whore,” was provided as a hate speech term by some of the survey respondents, but the focus group facilitators determined that this term was too offensive to discuss in a group setting in the Libyan cultural context. Feedback from the surveys, however, indicated that this term is often used to denigrate women who are more liberal or secular or who do not wear a hijab. As mentioned in the section on the phrase “civil society group,” the term is also used specifically in reference to women who work for CSOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakshaka / شكشاكه</td>
<td>This is another term that was not considered acceptable for discussion in a group setting in the Libyan cultural context. It is used as a slur against gay men or any man considered to be acting in a feminine manner. The word “shakshak” was originally used to describe the sound made when two metal surfaces impact; in the Libyan context it was used to refer to women’s jewelry making a similar sound as well as an instrument called “shokshaka.” Because Libyan society is largely conservative with significant homophobic elements, calling someone “shakshaka” could threaten the target’s safety. Related derogatory terms include &quot;بوفا / boufta&quot; and &quot;بغل / baghal.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaghouda / يوغدا</td>
<td>“Yaghouda” is used as a slur for “white person” (can also mean “red skin person”) that is used mainly in the southern region of Libya. It originated in the Tebu community to categorize or label white visitors or inhabitants in their area. Recently, the term has been used in a racist manner, particularly online, to label those who are not originally from Tebu tribes. This term was added to the list of terms viewed as inflammatory in the Kufra focus group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex A: Methodology and Considerations

Scope and Design

The first phase of the project was a web-based survey translated and adapted for the Libyan context from the survey used in previous lexicon projects. The survey was disseminated by two local partner organizations, Development Transformations (DT) and the Elbiro Foundation, and more than 250 completed surveys were collected. DT staff then went on to host workshops in late March and early April 2019 in the four quadrants of Libya—one in Tripoli, one in Benghazi, one in Kufra, and one in Sabha—to validate the findings of the surveys. It was essential to gather information from as broad a geographic area as possible, as this allowed the project team to develop a contextual and nuanced understanding of the terms used as hate speech. As one project participant noted, “It is worth mentioning that Libya is…vast in size. There might be terms which are considered as ‘labeling and hate speech’ in one city in the east, but do not have the same meaning or context in the north and south of the country. And vice versa.” From the results of these geographically diverse workshops, PeaceTech Lab drafted a refined lexicon which was then passed to a panel of Libya experts for review and feedback.

Surveys

The online surveys were translated into Arabic from the English version of the survey previously used for the lexicon development process in Cameroon. The translation was done by a PeaceTech Lab consultant, with adjustments made by the local partners collecting the data. These adjustments were necessary given differences in Arabic dialects and regional and country-specific contexts that could affect understanding of the concepts and questions presented.

PeaceTech Lab partnered with two organizations, DT and Elbiro, working locally in Libya for the distribution of the online surveys and the translation and organization of the data. Both organizations presented the surveys through Google Forms and disseminated the links to the surveys through Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms, as well as to their wider networks. The partner organizations each collected between 100 and 150 completed surveys during the initial data collection period. Given the amount of information collected, it took both organizations several weeks to sort, translate, and submit their results to the Lab. From this data, PeaceTech Lab staff were able to create an initial list of the most prevalent hate speech terms with some basic contextual background.

Validation Workshops

The activities on the ground for the second phase of the lexicon development were led by DT. Through local consultants and facilitators, DT organized and hosted validation workshops in four locations spread geographically throughout Libya—Benghazi, Tripoli, Kufra, and Sabha—broadly covering the northeast, northwest, southeast, and southwest, respectively. The location and number of workshops brought out diverse viewpoints and provided an abundance of valuable insights.
Follow-Up Surveys

After the validation workshops, there were a few follow-up questions of interest to PeaceTech Lab. Most of these questions were related to previously unidentified terms that were brought up during some of the workshops. Follow-up surveys were sent to pre-identified participants by DT staff to solicit further clarification of these terms and phrases and to gather any additional feedback these individuals might have. Five surveys were returned with additional clarification.

The original plan for this phase of the project—to hold one-on-one key informant interviews (KIIs) after the focus groups—had to be scrapped due to the outbreak of active fighting in the Tripoli area and the security impact on local partners.

Expert Advisors

Finally, the project team tasked six Libya experts from diverse backgrounds with reviewing and providing feedback on the lexicon draft developed out of the information gathered from the validation workshops. This panel of experts included Libyan civil society activists and academic professionals. Efforts were also taken to ensure that the panel was diverse in terms of gender, community of origin, and professional background. These experts contributed additional analysis and insights regarding local social and political context in Libya.

Annex B: Issues and Risks

Length and Complexity of Online Surveys

Some of the respondents to the online survey indicated that they felt the survey was too lengthy and/or complicated. This appeared to have some impact on the number of people who completed the survey, as several commented that they began the survey, but gave up after determining that it was too complicated or time intensive. In future lexicon development projects, it would likely be beneficial to further refine the format and language of the survey, particularly when launching the survey in languages not previously utilized.

Concerns Regarding Motives of Project

Some of the responses to the survey posted on social media raised questions regarding the motives of the project and the organizations (PeaceTech Lab and its local partners) implementing it. Some of the commenters were skeptical that the local partners actually represented local interests and others expressed concerns that the project was pushing a foreign agenda. This was an issue when PeaceTech Lab, a US-based organization, was prominently named as a partner with those groups distributing the surveys. Most local partners chose not to explicitly name PeaceTech Lab when distributing the surveys, but in the case when this issue arises, it is important for project staff to be able to fully explain the purpose of the project and the many measures in place to avoid bias—such as the inclusion of a diverse representation of local participants and the public availability of PeaceTech Lab’s methodology and findings.

In addition, a small number of individuals responding to the online surveys expressed the opinion that hate speech was not a problem in Libya or that there were more pressing issues and this project should therefore not be a priority. While there are certainly many issues related
to the conflict in Libya that should be addressed, PeaceTech Lab believes that online hate speech is a priority issue given the rapid growth of social media networks and information and communications technology (ICT), and given the potential for these tools to be used to incite violence. ICT and mobile technology are increasingly accessible to populations globally, expanding the reach of both negative and positive messaging. It is imperative to leverage the impacts of positive messaging through projects such as this one.

Internet Reliability

Our local partners in Libya experienced intermittent problems with internet connectivity that caused some delays in communication and the transmittal of survey data. This lengthened the timeline of the data collection somewhat as they were unable to submit the data immediately upon completion of the sorting and translation. Poor internet connection in Tripoli was exacerbated by daily shelling by Haftar’s forces in and around Tripoli, where many of PeaceTech Lab’s local partners live and work.

Language and Translation Challenges

Another challenge that impacted the timeline of the project, as well as the ease with which the PeaceTech Lab team was able to analyze the collected data, was a lack of Arabic language knowledge on staff. The local partners provided valuable translation support but having a fluent Arabic speaker as a dedicated consultant on the project would enable faster and more direct translation, data sorting, and analysis for future lexicons in Arabic-speaking regions.

This issue, particularly in Arabic-speaking countries and regions, also has implications for monitoring of hateful language. It is key that the individuals and organizations using this lexicon to monitor and combat hateful speech possess Arabic language skills, preferably specific to the Libyan dialect, and knowledge of the Libyan context. Many of these terms and phrases may appear unbiased to the outside observer, but the implications become clear through an understanding of the Libyan context and the subtle differences in meanings due to spelling or pronunciation changes and other nuances.

Cultural Sensitivity around Profanity

A specific issue that arose during the project was cultural sensitivity around profanity and personal slurs. The initial list of prevalent offensive terms that we developed included two terms that had to be left out of the validation workshop discussions based on the recommendation of local consultants. PeaceTech Lab was advised that workshop participants would not be comfortable discussing these terms in a group setting due to their classification as slurs and the relatively conservative nature of certain parts of Libya’s society. The excluded terms were slurs against women and homosexual men. The decision was made to omit these terms to ensure that workshop participants were able to share their views comfortably without upsetting social norms. This was not ideal for the project as these terms are still used online, and further data collection through online methods or in a more permissive environment would likely be useful in further understanding the use of these terms in Libya and how inflammatory they are.
Endnotes

17. Cameron Glenn, “Libya’s Islamists: Who They Are - And What They Want.”


30  "الحاكم العسكري لشرق ليبيا يشترط موافقة أمنية لسفر الجنسين", The New Arab, February 2017 ,24, accessed May 2019 ,15, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/society/24/2/2017/%D%8A%7D%84%9D%8A%7D%83%9D-85%9D%8A%7D%84%9D%8B%9D%88%9A-%D%84%9D%8B%4D%8B%1D-82%9D%84%9D%89%A%D%88%9A%D%8A-%7D%89%A%D%8B%4D%8A%1D%8B%7D%85%8D%88%9D%8A%7D%81%9D%82%9D%84%9D%8B%9D%88%9A-%D%84%9D%8B%4D%8B%9A%9D%89%A%9D%84%9D%8B%4D%8A%7D%84%9D%8B%AC%8D%86%9D%8B%3D%89%A%086%9.
ABOUT PEACE TECH LAB

PeaceTech Lab works for individuals and communities affected by conflict, using technology, media, and data to accelerate local peacebuilding efforts. An independent non-profit organization, the Lab’s mission is to amplify the power of peacetech to save lives through earlier warnings and smarter responses to violence. The Lab’s programs emphasize a data-driven, cross-sector approach, engaging everyone from student engineers and citizen journalists to Fortune 500 companies in scaling the impact of peacetech.