

CANADIAN CENTRE FOR THE

CCR2P

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

AT THE MUNK SCHOOL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS

**FROM THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: A STUDENT PANEL DISCUSSION WITH DR. MADELEINE
ALBRIGHT & DR. LLOYD AXWORTHY**

(VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT)

**APRIL 1, 2014
Seeley Hall, Trinity College
University of Toronto**

Speakers

- Introduction by Ms. Tina Park, Executive Director, CCR2P
- Moderated by the Hon. Bill Graham, Chancellor of Trinity College
- Guest: Dr. Madeleine Albright
- Guest: Dr. Lloyd Axworthy

Student panelists:

- Mr. Patrick Q-Brown **PQB**
- Ms. Rachel Gunn **RG**
- Mr. Misha Boutilier **MB**
- Ms. Hope Caldi **HC**

EVENT CO-HOSTED by the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History & the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

Transcript composed/edited by Ms. Rachel Gunn, Ms. Megan McGinnis-Dunphy, Mr. Daniel Bachmutsky and Mr. Misha Boutilier of the Canadian Centre for R2P

Please check the video recording at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIIEVUDjyjk>. We are grateful to Mr. Randy Hanbyul Lee and Mr. Van Wickiam for their assistance in video recording and editing.

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Ms. Tina J. Park, CCR2P: Good afternoon, Dr. Madeleine Albright, Dr. Lloyd Axworthy, Chancellor Bill Graham, and our distinguished guests. On behalf of the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, I am delighted to welcome you today for our student panel discussion here at Trinity College.

My name is Tina Park, and I am a co-founder and Executive Director of the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Based at the Munk School of Global Affairs, the Canadian Centre for R2P is mandated with promoting scholarly engagement and political implementation of the Responsibility to Protect principle. As a leading non-profit and non-partisan research organization for R2P in Canada, we currently have over eighty students working in our research and advocacy wings. We also have recently advised the Inter-Parliamentary Union on their resolution on the role of parliamentarians in enforcing R2P. With the International Relations program at Trinity College and the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, we have launched a campaign this spring to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and to reflect upon the past, present, and future of the R2P principle. Through our campaign, we hope to give tangible meaning to our pledge of 'never again', in our efforts to curb mass human atrocities and discuss how we can make the Responsibility to Protect a living reality in the twenty-first century. In addition to the full-day conference last Saturday, our campaign consists of a film festival, a youth and education outreach program, and a publication project with the Canadian International Council's *OpenCanada*, featuring reflections by twenty prominent Canadians on the lessons learned from the Rwandan genocide.

I should also mention that on April 10th, from 2pm to 4pm at the Campbell Conference Facility of the Munk School, the Bill Graham Centre will be hosting a discussion on the end of apartheid by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney and Stephen Lewis, chaired by Chancellor Bill Graham.

Today's panel discussion is an important part of our campaign as we engage in dialogues with two very distinguished guests, Dr. Albright and Dr. Axworthy, who have made enormous contributions in the promotion of global humanitarianism. We are honoured that they could share their insightful ideas with the students at the University of Toronto and are extremely grateful of their time and dedication.

Now, I'm delighted to introduce our Chancellor, the Honourable Bill Graham, to you, who will be chairing today's panel discussion. A graduate of Trinity College, Chancellor Graham was first selected as a Liberal MP for Toronto-Centre Rosedale in 1993 and served the Toronto-Centre until 2007. He also served as a chairman of the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

He served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2002 to 2004 and subsequently as the Minister of National Defense from 2004 to 2006. Prior to entering politics, Chancellor Graham had a very distinguished legal career. After earning his law degree at the University of Toronto as gold medalist, he pursued a doctorate in law in Paris. As a partner in Fasken and Calvin in Toronto, he practiced litigation and international commercial law, primarily in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. In the 1980s, he taught international law at the Faculty of Law here at the University of Toronto. As the Chancellor of Trinity College, Professor Graham has been an exceptional mentor to many of our students present here today, and a generous supporter of our international relations program, the Canadian Centre for R2P, as well as the newly launched Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History. Without further delay, please join me in welcoming Chancellor Graham to the podium.

Hon. Bill Graham, Chancellor of Trinity College (BG): Thank you very much Tina, and a warm welcome, ladies and gentlemen, to you. It's a great pleasure for me to be able to introduce two such remarkable people as former US Secretary of State, Dr. Madeleine Albright, and our colleague, former Foreign Minister, Dr. the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy. Dr. Albright was educated at Wellesley College, Massachusetts, and went on to pursue graduate studies at Johns Hopkins and Columbia University. She received her doctorate in 1978 from Columbia. From 1993 to 1997, Dr. Albright served as the US permanent representative to the United Nations. In December 1996, she was nominated by President Clinton to serve as Secretary of State. In a remarkable demonstration of bipartisan confidence, her nomination was unanimously confirmed by the Senate, something I'm sure, Dr. Albright, would occur today if you were to be presented again. I'm sure if only you could be presented it would restore some peace and civility to that particular institution. Upon assuming her new office, she was, at the time, the highest-ranking woman in the history of the United States government. Dr. Albright's tenure as Secretary of State was marked by strong American engagement with its allies, the NATO-led intervention to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and efforts to disarm Iraq. I might say, my son is not able to be here, but he was a journalist in Belgrade, and he said to me, Dr. Albright, he said 'well, I hope I can come tonight, because I want to tell her she bombed me when I was in Belgrade'. So, there are people around who have a distinct memory of your career. In addition, Dr. Albright advocated more robust international business, labour, and environmental standards, and championed democracy and human rights abroad. In 2012, President Obama awarded Dr. Albright the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honour in the United States. Dr. Albright currently teaches at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service and is involved with a variety of organizations related to defense and international affairs, including the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Defense Policy Board at the US Department of Defense. She's joined today by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy.

Dr. Axworthy was educated at United College, Winnipeg, and Princeton University, from which he received his doctorate in 1972. He was first elected as a member of the Manitoba legislature before leaving provincial politics to join federal politics in 1979. In Ottawa, Dr. Axworthy served in several different cabinet posts under Prime Ministers Pierre Trudeau, John Turner, and Jean Chretien, including Minister of Employment and Immigration, Minister of Human Resources Development, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. As Foreign Affairs, Dr. Axworthy pursued an activist foreign policy, centered around human security, human rights, and the strengthening of international law through institutions such as the International Court and the development of the R2P concept. His efforts in establishing the Ottawa Treaty for the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Landmines led, in 1997, to his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. I have to say, I followed Dr. Axworthy in the role of Foreign Minister, and I kind of considered myself, Lloyd, as sort of like a sweep-up guy to all these things that you'd started. When I went to the UN, you know, the first thing Kofi Annan said to me, he said, "You've got to finish the R2P. You've got to do 'this', you've got to do 'this' on the human security..." I said, "Well that was all Lloyd's stuff," and he said, "Well just get it done!" And that was my job, what I was trying to accomplishing, bringing these, many of Lloyd's extraordinary innovations to make them reality. He's a member of the Order of Canada, and his humanitarian initiatives have garnered him numerous honours, including the North-South Prize, awarded by the Council of Europe, and the Care International Humanitarian Award. Dr. Axworthy is currently the President and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Winnipeg. Since leaving public life in 2000, he's remained actively involved in international affairs through his work with institutions such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

This afternoon, Drs. Albright and Axworthy will be responding to questions from four student panelists. Mr Misha Boutilier, Ms. Hope Caldi, Ms. Rachel Gunn, and Mr. Patrick Quinton-Brown. We are going to turn it over to you, I have you—I assume you have ordered...this is not going to be like the United States Senate...some sort of more civil working procedure, and my understanding was that we can go to about four o'clock or just a few minutes after that so, I would like to turn it over to our students now to ask the questions to our honoured guests. Thank you very much. [Applause]

Patrick Quinton-Brown (PQB): Thank you very much Chancellor Graham. This is an incredible opportunity, and so I want to start us off with a tough question. Some commentators talk about the CNN effect in shaping public opinion toward foreign policy. To what extent did the horrific images broadcasted on television screens force the hand of Canada and the United States during the Bosnian and Kosovo crises?

Dr. Madeleine Albright: You're absolutely right about the CNN effect, and I was on the Security Council when Bosnia was happening, and the CNN effect was huge, because people actually did see the pictures. And places where CNN is not, nothing happens, and the bottom line is even though more people are now dying in the Congo or the Central

African Republic or Sudan, that never really got on TV, and we will be talking about Rwanda - that was never on TV at that time. So I do think that there is a very large effect, but the question is how CNN decides to deploy its capabilities, and if they're only interested in the Malaysian airline, then they are never going to understand what happens in Ukraine.

Dr. Lloyd Axworthy: Well I would like to comment as much on the way it influenced domestic policy. There was a striking, sort of, shocking effect that happened in a period when we were still acting as peacekeepers, not involved in any active role or activity. And you will remember the sight of a young lieutenant who had been manacled to a post by the Serbian militia in Bosnia-Herzegovina and was... stayed there for two weeks I think almost, just tied to a post. It appeared day after day and I think it helped mobilize an opinion, around the idea that—how was this happening? From that, led to other questions, about Srebrenica, for example, and there was a real dilemma because Canadian peacekeepers had been in Srebrenica and, just the day before the massacre took place, we were relieved by the Dutch troops, and I think it's true that today there are court cases going on in the Netherlands about the dereliction of duty or whether in fact there had been irresponsibility by the Dutch forces, but I guess here is the point, Patrick: at that point in time, the United Nations had not given a mandate to peacekeepers to protect people. At most they could protect themselves, and that was really, I think, the big shift that took place. It was that kind of imagery that made people realize... maybe there was an assumption that they were there to to keep the peace, they were they to make sure there was Chinese for foreign aid, that there was a buffering zone between opposing parties, but when it came down to the hard reality, the international community, because of the sovereignty rule, would have to stand by and let people be murdered. And I think that was a turning point which led in Secretary of State Albright's efforts, a leader on the Security Council at the same time, to try to say, how does the international community respond to this issue? It really did catalyze Canadian opinion - just that one very sobering, sad figure of the Canadian soldier manacled to a post for a period of time.

Dr. Albright: Can I add something, because images are important in other ways... It was very hard to persuade members of the Security Council that we actually had to up the mandate on it. What happened was that I got declassified some photographs that we had from satellites which showed the following thing on Srebrenica: it was first an empty field, then a field with a lot of people in it, then a field with no people and tracks taking people away. And so, images, in so many ways, make a difference. And I sat in the Security Council and I passed these photos around and there really, there was shocked silence. So having images is very important. One of the aspects of R2P, as we get into it, is... I think that one could argue, but many of us would not, but one could argue that people didn't know what the Germans were doing during WWII. As a result of information and images that had come out of Bosnia of people being hauled off to labour camps and things... the excuse of saying 'we didn't know' is gone, and now that we have information about everything, the question is what to do. And that is... Lloyd and I have

been talking about this now for twenty years in some form or another, so that's where the concept of human security and responsibility once you have images and the facts, then what? And that's what I think this whole discussion, in terms of then who carries it out, what is the mandate and where is it going... We - literally - we have talked about this in some form for twenty years. But it's having those pictures, and having testimony... because of what happened in Srebrenica, I was able to put the pictures together with the testimony of one man who had managed to escape by hiding underneath somebody's body. So, images make a huge difference.

PQ: Thank you very much, I'll hand it off to Rachel.

Rachel Gunn (RG): The 1990s saw a shift towards promoting Canadian or American trade rather than traditional foreign aid programs. How did this impact Canada and the United State's ability to respond to some of the worst humanitarian crises of the decade? Were there any conflicting visions of the role and nature of foreign aid in a post-Cold War world?

Dr. Albright: Foreign aid? Well, first of all, I'm just going to say up front what I say whether I'm in Canada or anywhere else: Canadians are the best international citizens in the world. I fully believe that, and in terms of the idea that Canadians take responsibility for other people's lives in a number of different ways. In the United States, I can tell you this is the problem: during the Cold War, our assistance was basically in pursuit of... the world was divided into the 'red' and the 'red, white, and blue', and what we were doing was trying to give aid in a number of ways in order to get countries to be on our side, and the Soviet Union was doing the same thing. So the Cold War ends, the question was then, how is this supposed to work? Why do you give aid? And it is harder to do. if you talk to an American audience, and you ask them how much of our budget goes to foreign assistance... by the way, the bottom line is, putting those two words together is like trying to sell some terrible disease - 'why to those foreigners? Why would you give them money?' So people would say twenty-five percent of our budget goes to this, and then you say 'well what do you think would be the right amount?' And they say 'well, ten percent would be okay' and then you say to them 'well, it's one percent'. So there's this image about it, that it's a black hole and nobody knows where it goes, and there's corruption, and why would you do it? And so as you argue for it, you have to give different reasons for it. And some of us talk about national security support. We say 'national security' and then everybody salutes and they think there really is some kind of a reason to do it. Really, development groups and humanitarian groups don't want to call it national security support, and so we don't give very much money. It is an argument all the time. And this is the problem - Lloyd, you were talking about domestic politics of images. In the United States, I was down in New Orleans after Katrina, and there were people living under bridges and a whole ward had been destroyed and you think, you know, the people would say 'why are we giving this money to some foreign country, why aren't you helping us?' And as much of a bleeding heart as I am, you think 'okay, we

actually could do both', but there is that problem in domestic politics, since none of our countries are perfect in terms of our helping, say 'why would you give it to some country?' And the bottom line now is people wish, as far as foreign assistance is concerned, it would be nice if somebody were grateful, and what I now am going to call the 'Karzai Effect' is going to make it harder and harder for there to be money given to anybody, if they actually never say thank you and also say 'get out of here'. So, it's a public... it's hard to sell it.

Dr. Axworthy: I'll just pick up on a couple of points that Madeleine made. First, in the larger scheme of things, I think the diminishing of foreign development assistance as part of a broader international phenom which is just we're losing our capacity to do bold, challenging, comprehensive things. We've become a world of incrementalism, and so Columbo plans, Marshall plans, we have been able to mount a very large scale industrial estate. Today's headlines - Ukraine. We know that... one of the ways in which we can provide a counterpoint to what Putin and the Russians are doing is to substantially support Ukraine's ability to reset itself democratically, economically, socially. I'm going to be going there this coming weekend as part of an initiative with Madeleine as the Chair of the National Democratic Institute as a sponsor to do some assessments. But we were talking over lunch, we can do the assessments but where's the beef? Who's got the capacity or the willingness to invest in a "big public good" and we can't mount major infrastructural programs, we can't build seaways anymore, we just don't do these things, as governments... We've kind of lost our capacity both to think and act in a way that puts it together. And that is certainly true in our foreign aid/development area, there's a... For example in our own country, I find it difficult that because of budget restrictions and restraints we've taken the delivery of our foreign aid away from a much larger contingent of NGOs and basically transferred money to governments. Nothing wrong with that, but I've been to some countries where the money is abused and corrupted or it's used for weapons or it's simply dwindled away. It doesn't have the kind of grassroots participation to it. So there is a result, I think, of cynicism about foreign aid, as there is about much of public policy these days, because I don't think we capture people's imagination, and over time I think we're paying the price for this quasi-political statement I've lived through for several years now. Going back to the Reagan-Thatcher days we just don't like government or public instruments to do significant projects or investments in things of a public nature, we just don't do it anymore. Everything is piecemeal, and to me that is one of the victims... Our goal is really that, say, in Ukraine, a very large, substantial, integrated multi-lateral effort to help restore and rebuild their country so it can really act as an example of what Russia is not.

Misha Boutilier (MB): Dr. Albright and Dr. Axworthy thank you so much for joining us today. My question concerns the issue of humanitarian intervention. By 1999, as you both know, Canada and the United States proclaimed their willingness to intervene in mass atrocities. At the same time, Western humanitarian intervention was clearly selective as Western states intervened in Kosovo but did not intervene in Rwanda. Why

did Canada and the United States intervene in such a selective fashion during the 1990s?

Dr. Axworthy: A point I made earlier, Rwanda also took place during an era where the absolutism of sovereignty was still the standard at the United Nations, that you could not have interventions into the affairs of another state under the Article 2-4 of the United Nations. And as you have the horrible sight of General Romeo Dallaire and the troops from Belgium and a small contingent of Canadians, having to stand by while people were being killed. They knew about it - they had the warnings. But when he got back to UN headquarters, they said, 'Yeah but you can't use force' and that is still the big issue. We're fighting about it today in Syria, where the Security Council, which is the only body that has the capacity to authorize an intervention, a forceful intervention, not that force is the only answer, because under the R2P principle, as you well know, sanctioning, diplomatic means are much preferred if they work, but the thing we learned in Kosovo, ultimately, when it comes down to it, when you get down and dirty, if the perpetrator of the violence and atrocity is not going to stop, then to what degree are you prepared to mount a forceful intervention? That is still unresolved. The R2P was an effort to set criteria, to set the framework around which you could justify that, but in Rwanda no such thing existed. I think that is, we're coming out of it to some extent, we've made some real progress on establishing R2P as a norm, as it happened in 2005, but when it gets down to the realpolitik on the ground, there's still a reluctance. You've got Russia, China, some of the BRIC countries basically saying, 'thou shalt not intervene'.

Dr. Albright: I think, specifically, those of us that were in office during Rwanda, keep asking the same question. President Clinton, on a regular basis even to this day, wants to know why didn't we do more? So I can explain it, this may not be right or morally right, but this is the issue, and it goes a little bit to the question you asked of 'where' and 'why'. So in the United States, there was the whole idea about when do you use force somewhere? And the American context was the following: President Clinton, when he was Governor Clinton and Candidate Clinton, had said he would do something about Bosnia. Then he gets into office, and 'it's the economy stupid', and the issue about gays in the military, and it really was a question in terms of... A President and a Secretary of State or a UN Ambassador can threaten all kinds of things, but if you don't have force you can't do anything about it. I was on the Security Council during Bosnia and I always say I saw more different diplomats than any other American. Whoever served in Canada saw more Canadians, but I saw everybody that came up and said 'why aren't we doing something?' So in Principles meetings I argued very strongly for doing something in Bosnia. I was the only woman in the Principles Committee. And there was Colin Powell who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and he would come into meetings - he had just won the Gulf War, he was the hero of the Western world... He would come into meetings with medals from here to here. And I was there as a mere mortal female civilian arguing in order to use force and we had a terrible fight. He ultimately wrote about this in his book. And after he left we had a new Chairman, General Shalikashvili, and we used force in Bosnia and we won. So he writes this book and I get a call from a journalist saying

'what do you say about what Colin Powell said about you?' I said 'what did he say?' 'Well he said he patiently had to explain to Ambassador...' so I call him up and say 'Colin, patiently?' He said 'yes, patiently. You understood nothing'. What had happened was, I finally had said to him 'what are you saving this military for? People are dying' and he said 'these are not toy soldiers'. So we... That is one of the issues about 'when' you go in... we finally did go in. So that was one thing that was happening. The other thing was Somalia, which, for America, was a stunning shock. It had begun as a humanitarian feeding mission. It ultimately became a big issue in terms of disarming rebels, people dying, and then Black Hawk being shot down and Americans being dragged through the streets. Then, on the other side of the world, Haiti, where in fact there were riots going on, Aristide had been thrown out of office, we were sending an air craft carrier to get people, the Harlan County, that had to be turned around. So part of foreign policy that is so hard - we've now both mentioned it - are the domestic politics. So why are we doing all these things? The thing that's really hard, Canadians actually... People may not believe me about this, but I know from what I know that we did not at that time have all the information about Rwanda. A lot of it has come out later, and the United Nations... What is interesting is the United Nations is blamed for Somalia and that was America's fault because there were a lot of Americans in command there, and the US was blamed for Rwanda and that was the United Nation's fault because I think there was not enough information coming through. But the mood was very difficult in terms of who does... In our country, it was 'why did we get somebody killed in Somalia?' And so the question is, and the other part I talk about in my class a lot, I happen to believe that you have to look at what US and Canadian national interest is. And it's defined differently. I believe that humanitarian issues are part of US national interest - not everybody believes that. And they know what to do if we're attacked, or if our allies are attacked, but if it's over a bunch of people dying in some place we've never heard of, it's really hard to make it happen. I do think, everything that Lloyd says, a lot of what we are doing now came out of the failures of Rwanda. And the thing that I keep trying to think about, we wouldn't even declare Rwanda a genocide, we called it acts of genocide because the genocide convention requires you to do something. And it was what I called volcanic genocide, that happened after the plane with the Hutu president got shot down; we then watched rolling genocide in Darfur. Secretary Powell declared it genocide and we still didn't do anything. So the concept of 'when' you act is something that you talk about and try to figure out how to do, but it's always the same issue. Information and the willingness to do it.

Dr. Axworthy: I'll pick up on that point. I guess I'm long enough in the tooth and been long enough away from the action that I deserve But as Canadians we like to think of ourselves as great crusaders, or there was a time that we did... and peacekeeping and peacemaking. When the Rwanda conflict was coming to an end... because the refugees, the Hutu, were escaping into the eastern Congo. You'll recall it became a major maelstrom of conflict between the genocidaires, there were the real murderers, and people in the refugee camps, and people were streaming out of the camps. I recall

receiving... I was home in Winnipeg in my constituency. Prime Minister Chretien got me at a family dinner on Sunday night and said 'I want you back in Ottawa in the morning. Myself and the defense minister have been watching this on the news, and we've got to do something'. Well, what do you do? We went to work, with the support of the United States as a background... They were not themselves doing it, but we organized a peace mission to go into the eastern Congo to rescue the refugees. There were seven countries; I think there were three Europeans, two Africans, I think. Anyway, we had enough lift capacity. We weren't moving thousands of troops. We going to intercede to provide... a cordon sanitaire, if you like, and the NGOs working in the area were absolutely outraged that this was going on, and we said 'okay, we can all put in together'. And then... And this is a difficult point to make and I don't want to offend anybody... Our own military bases came forward with maps and photographs to say 'the crisis is over. We can't find any refugees anywhere'. And I said 'we're getting reports from the field, on the ground' and they said 'well, just look at the maps. And based on that there's no one here'. We were actually landed in Kampala, in Uganda, ready to begin. At that point in time the military started to talk amongst each other as a sign that it's no longer necessary to do, and it got back to government and cabinet, and we aborted the mission. I've got something on my conscience, I can tell you. The idea that we could have been there, and seven million lives later, what could have happened as a result... And that was not big power machinations or whatever. It comes to a very fundamental point – that it's not just domestic political interests. Within the decision-making interests there are very significant oppositions. And generally, the military don't like to do humanitarian interventions. They like to fight wars; they like to be out there, on the front lines. They do not like these kind of messy civil conflicts where you're not sure exactly where you stand. That, to me, hasn't received historical treatment and I think if any academics have written an article about it – maybe they have but I haven't seen it, but that is a case example of a... almost a... what's the name of the book? A Killing Foretold... The amount of killing that went on because of a lack of an international presence, I think, is tragic.

Dr. Albright: So you've had your own Colin Powell.

Hope Caldi (HC): Dr. Axworthy, in an address in June 2000 in Washington, you said, "From ethnic cleansing in Bosnia to mass displacement in East Timor and Kosovo, to the genocide in Rwanda, sovereignty has protected the perpetrators, not the millions of victims." Can you expand on this statement?

Dr. Axworthy: Well, a lot of people in the room, including a distinguished scholar of international law, know that sovereignty has been the watchword of statecraft for 200 years – the Westphalian system. We've got all our laws around nation-states having an unalienable right to do what they want to do inside their own territory, and they have their own tradition, their own politics, their own morality. What began to take place in the period that we're talking about it is to realize that that particular principle of inalienable sovereignty doesn't work very well if your primary concern is protecting people. The

whole concept of human security is you move from protecting governments to protecting people, a major change in the nature of sovereignty. And I think that is part of the underlying debate that is going on in governments, in academic circles, certainly in international circles - it does ultimately dictate the kind of action we take. And Kofi Annan's famous statement, 'Problems without Passports' and 'Blueprints without Borders' – you've got to be able to deal with these very strong threats or risks to people that don't recognize the frontier or border line... We're not talking about world government... I think that's the trick pony in the R2P concept: it's not a challenge to sovereignty per se, but it's saying that sovereignty is earned by a government, it's earned by the degree to which it protects its citizens. And if it doesn't protect its citizens, or can't, or itself becomes the predator, then its right to that sovereign protection is problematic. And it's that kind of very important thing that we need to look into right now as we try to shift the international order and where you as young scholars and academics and foreign service – I think those are the issues that you are going to have to put to bed eventually, in the next ten, fifteen years.

Dr. Albright: I think it's one of the most complicated aspects, because the system is based on it and the United States, for instance, is very protective of our sovereignty. So, go back to Katrina – if the Chinese had shown up and said 'we're here to help you', we would not have been real happy. So I think... one needs to kind of look at that and think about it. The other part is that R2P is a moving thing. We have spent a lot of time on this. I initially did a task force with former Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen, who had actually opposed us going into Kosovo, but afterwards came to me and said 'I think you were right.' So we did a task force on genocide prevention, which then led into a task force on R2P, and Lloyd was on this task force. We spent a lot of time looking at it. My co-chair on that was a guy that ultimately turned to be an advisor to Romney. So we were trying to figure out how we did it, what was going to happen... Libya happened, which was done under R2P, but it began to raise questions about the effectiveness, did it go too far, and was killing, you know, going against Gaddafi part of R2P. What has happened now, and I want you all to think about this – Crimea and sovereignty. Although Putin has not invoked R2P, he was on his way, I think, in some ways, talking about protecting people. And who is to argue about sovereignty and territorial integrity? We are. So, I think that you will find, and I agree fully that this is going to be your issue, and the fact that you're studying it is essential because it's a very complicated aspect, and we have argued that if you see people dying and you have the capability to do something about it, do it. But when is it invasion, when is it actually protecting somebody? And I think you and I have talked about this a little bit – I don't think we've sorted the Ukraine thing out. I think it complicates things in many ways. Or, the thing that is of concern is that in eastern Ukraine, all of a sudden they're going to ask for fraternal assistance. That's what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. So all these issues about sovereignty and various aspects are very much alive, and the images are there of people dying, and you have the capability, and which ones do you choose? So, this is very much alive in many, many different ways and discussions.

Hon. Bill Graham: I think it's fair to say the Russians certainly use the language of R2P when they intervene. In Georgia... Then it goes back to, 'what are the international institutions that are going to be able to say 'you're right, and you're wrong, and we give you the sanction to do it, and others can't'?

Dr. Axworthy: I think here's the difference: R2P is the best way to create a process, and the idea that the way in which you ensured that intervention is not used simply for national power or purview, you need to have an international agreement. You have to have proportional means, you have to be able to demonstrate that there is a real crisis, a risk of insecurity taking place for people, and therefore there's number of criteria for people to use to determine when is the appropriate time for international involvement. Now I think that... the Russians can use the language, but they certainly aren't following the process.

Dr. Albright: But the other part that happens here is Kosovo. We could not get a Security Council mandate for Kosovo. I think I called you after I'd been in Moscow to say 'they've just told me they're going to veto it'. Meanwhile we see people dying. So we go to NATO. So it was multilateral. Kosovo, technically, has been declared illegal. We saved a lot of people, and I think did absolutely the right thing. But Putin now says 'well, you guys did Kosovo' – so it gets twisted and turned. And I think one of the issues with R2P is: when will you actually get a Security Council resolution for it? The Russians will veto everything. And so, you do need international agreement. And how you distinguish as to whether it's aggression or made-up or whether it's actually saving... I think it's the most fascinating international concept in terms of international law. I'm sorry we bombed your son but, the bottom line is Belgrade was killing tons of people.

Hon. Bill Graham: He was in Iraq when you bombed too... [laughter] His job as a journalist...

Dr. Axworthy: Can I just make one more comment on that? If we go back to the R2P concept and the commission that we established, they made the point that what you do when the Security Council is paralyzed or hung up on deals...and they have about 8 or 9 different alternative ways, including using a different assessment, as an alternative - that was eliminated in 2005 when it came down to the issue of putting R2P as part of the ... of the UN World Summit, in order to get R2P agreed to by Summit leaders, they had to shave off a lot of those recommendations by the commission... And that was the idea that there could be a shift in the G8... So there's still a lot of work to be done but there's no reason that can't come back - there's no reason that can't come back to start suggesting that the use of a veto doesn't have the same kind of blockage in humanitarian issues as it has in a protecting national interest issue... So there's lots of, lots of, I think, as Secretary of State Albright has said, there's so much that needs to really be discussed and examined and looked at, to really come up with what is the most...in each case.

PQB: I can't help but comment that whereas Kosovo was illegal but legitimate, Crimea is illegal and illegitimate. Question now, back to the 90s, how did your personal friendship influence the Canadian-American foreign relations during this time? Between the two of you.

Dr. Albright: I have to say the following thing. I think our personal friendship developed while we were in office. We had a few arguments, mostly over salmon...I mean it was impossible...We argued – climate change will make our salmon swim in your waters... So we began with salmon, and I cannot eat salmon today [Laughter] But we did spend more and more time together and I have to say this: I think we both alluded a little bit to kind of internal decision-making processes, and I have to say I respect Lloyd's views as much as anybody that I have ever met in the world. I think, he's one of the few people that has his head screwed on right and has his heart in the right place. And I always want him to hear. But this is what had happened with the land mine treaty. So what happened exactly was the following, and I use these things in my class: what happened was the U.S. kind of - when I first got to the UN and actually had an exploded land mine on my desk, and President Clinton came in there and gave a speech to the General Assembly, and he took the land mine with him, and "We are going to do something about these mines."

Then, because of a number of things that came up when I was in the... Disarmament Commission and how slow things were going on. Meanwhile, Lloyd picked it up, not the land mine but the idea. But he kept pushing it, and we got into a number of different issues where we were not participating in the discussions, and all of a sudden there were definitions that came up that didn't suit us, et cetera. And I kept arguing for us to be more involved and the other people in the Principles Committee would say, "Your friend Lloyd...", who is just a 60s liberal and 'my friend Lloyd' was always getting us into trouble. What I think that our personal friendship [Audience laughter], but I think that our relationship, where we were able to talk to each other about everything but not always agree - I think that makes all the difference in the world. And I do think personal friendships make a difference. And I have to tell you this, is that, Kosovo: we talked, all of us, kind of talked practically every day on what we were going to do, so what did happen as a result of that we all got to be very, very good friends. And Robin Cook who was the British Foreign Secretary, was head of the European Socialists and we were all out of office by then, and Robin calls up and says, "I just came out of a meeting in Brussels and things are perfectly terrible - do something. People are saying terrible things about the United States." Then I got a call from the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Jozias Van Aartsen, who had just talked to the French Foreign Minister saying, "Things are a mess, call Madeleine." We were all out of office, so I created a group of former Foreign Ministers. It's under the auspices of Aspen - the Aspen's Ministers' Forum. That's its official name. Its unofficial name is Madeleine and her exes. And so, [Audience laughter], we do not talk from our national positions. But I have to say flat out to all of you that I have no better friend than Lloyd Axworthy and he is always

the person that keeps us on the proper track...in terms of making us think about the humanitarian issues, in every way. And making us walk through this, and trying to figure out how you structure it in a way to get somewhere. We do spend a lot of time together. We were just at a conference on food security looking at new and different problems and I think, the value of people that can work together and can talk to each other about differences that they have, really ...and link up about things they have in common, and push each other, from a position of respect, I think that's really important. Now say something nice about me.

Dr. Axworthy: I will start this with a small story having to do with salmon. It was a Friday night on Jubilee Avenue while it was still summer...beer garden exercises, which when you're a working street politician you have to do these things—not that you mind the beer. And I get a call from one of my assistants saying 'Madeleine Albright wants to talk to you'. It was ten o'clock at night. I said 'Really? Friday night? Okay'. I find a little corner, and she said 'Lloyd, if it wasn't for our friends, the Marines would now be in Prince Rupert'. I said 'is there a reason?' and she said 'yes, it's because your fisherman just surrounded one of our cruise ships which was in John Paul something or other...' So, we, I said 'Well, I'll see what we can do about that' - not that I had any control over the fisherman from Prince Rupert. We were able, because of her good offices, to smooth over the most convoluted complex discussion about how do we come to preserve and conserve the Pacific coast salmon. If you think that it is difficult to deal with nuclear disarmament, wait until you try to deal with salmon who come around the Queen Charlotte Isles ...Oh yes and the Alaskans...Anyway the point I'll make is that it does demonstrate how friendships and personal relationships can... Not that I thought the Marines, well maybe you were serious about the Marines...well, I've found that it's been certainly active during that period when I was in office, and certainly since. I think there's one person in my opinion who has the leadership capacity to pull all these things together, whether it was an action in Kosovo, or whether it was a real attempt to reform, seriously reform some of our international ways of doing things, to start talking, for the first time, I think, about the role of women and how they have to be given a much stronger role in things like peacekeeping and...she has given leadership and still does around the world. Madeleine's Ex men group, while it sounds kind of vaudevillian... I think is now working seriously, through Madeleine's direction, to see how we might work in some new architecture, internationally. The old postwar systems are wearing down, are no longer as relevant to the realities we face. So what kind of architecture, what kind of institutional stuff... We would really work on food security, climate change, drug cartels... We're still working on a lot of the intellectual legacy of 1945-48-50, and we really haven't gone much beyond that. So to me it's been a wonderful opportunity to work with somebody who just doesn't bring the intellectual power but has the basic quality called leadership, and thank you, Madeleine, for doing that.

Can I tell one more story? We were near the end of negotiating a treaty—it was a big meeting in Oslo to draft out the issue... we had a discussion with Madeleine Albright and

Sandy Berger, who was National Security Advisor to Bill Clinton. Because at that time, it wasn't that—we weren't that far apart. There was a couple of items... I think the Korean issue, and also had something to do with what was a tank mine and a personnel mine... We had ten years to figure something out, so we thought it was pretty safe, and we were getting a very strong sense of commitment that the United States would join in. So around five o'clock I get a call, it was you or Sandy Berger, saying, "I think the President's going to agree." So I call my wife and say 'remember that twelve year old bottle of Macallan we've been saving for a special occasion?' I said 'I'm coming home – open it'. We get in the car, we're driving, and the call came in... the Joint Chiefs of Staff just talked to the president, he can't do it... So I got home and I said 'I need that Macallan more than anything'. So that's not to say that I made all my decisions based on that, but it's a story... there's always been this, too much of an academic view that somehow the United States and Canada were in a big awful war... President Clinton was the first leader to speak at the General Assembly about the need for a land mine treaty... The Americans worked very much with what they had. What they had was joint chiefs of staff who were opposed to it. We came within inches, I think. The reality is, from that point on, the United States has lived up to, I would say, 99 percent of the strictures within the treaty itself, and put more money into landmine removal than any other country in the world.

Dr. Albright: The one lesson I tell my students is, we should have been involved all along in definitional issues. Because, in fact, the definitions of the land mines and things in terms of what was a smart and a dumb mine, and various things – it's an example of how you have to be a part of negotiations. It is an important part. The other part that's now come out many times is that there are arguments that go on between the diplomats and the military people. There's no question. And so, as you look at how decision-making is done, at what stage do you bring people in? And then the role of our parliaments.

Dr. Axworthy: And with definitions you need lawyers.

Hon. Bill Graham: Lloyd was never too happy with lawyers in the room, I think he preferred the generals. I think we have time for one more question. So Rachel, go for it.

Rachel Gunn (RG): Dr. Axworthy, in 1997 you called for a review of NATO's policy of "first use" of nuclear weapons. U.S. resistance was strong and consistent. What were some of the factors behind the different positions towards the transition to a post-Cold War world? Did this have any impact on the relationship that Canada had with the U.S.?

Dr. Axworthy: You're right, we did make mention of that. I want to give proper credit where it's due, which is to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the time. This committee had just finished a cross-country review of Canada's nuclear policy, consulting very widely with Canadians, and had come back with the comment that it was

a little bit on an anachronism that the Cold War was over, the Wall was down, but the first clause in the NATO agreement was related to the Soviet Union. We can look at it as a basis for the Canadian position at the time. It was not a popular standpoint. There were a lot of the Eastern European countries who were quite concerned over the looming power – Russia as a nuclear state – and we could see why. But we did get a hearing and I think that it was at the Washington subcommittee where we had the opportunity to debate, and there was a kind of compromise worked out. One was that NATO would still continue to possess nuclear weapons, but with a different set of controls and basis for doing things. It wasn't ideal, but it was something. I've always felt, even going back to the days when nuclear weapons first arrived, that we have a special voice. We were the first country that had the capacity to build nuclear weapons but we said no. There is a famous excerpt in Dean Acheson's book about Mr. Pearson, going down to meet with President Truman, that the candles had decided to disarm themselves.

Dr. Albright: I think this was one of those issues where they said 'your friend Lloyd'. Because the United States has stuck by the 'no first use' policy. Only recently, in President Obama's nuclear posture review, was there some adjustment in terms of negative security, of saying we will not use nuclear weapons first against a non-nuclear power, so there's some adjustment. But the whole issue of 'no first use' is a very difficult one, and frankly, it is a difference between the United States and some of our allies, and some of that has to do with the responsibility of the United States, the way it is viewed. I think issues generally, in terms of weapons in Europe now, with the tactical nuclear weapons in number of discussions that are not complete that are going to be more complicated now in terms of what the Russians have done, because I've been involved in Track II discussions on what to do about some of the tactical nukes that are out there still in Europe, so everything, I think, has become more complicated.

Hon. Bill Graham: Is it fair to say, though, in the NATO discussions we've had, the nuclear powers took the position that the nuclear weapons were theirs, they were not NATO's. Their sovereign decisions were reducing nuclear weapons, and trying to get a NATO statement to say there are nuclear weapons...

Dr. Albright: Very hard, and one of the things I was asked by a groups of experts to look at the new NATO strategic concept, and this continues to be one of the issues. So, I would like to say that the most radical thing, however, I did as Secretary of State was to move Canada into the Western Hemisphere—in case you don't know it was in Europe, according to the United States State Department. [Laughter] So, I did, there were a lot of questions as to how this was possible to do and why. The truth is that it is in the Western Hemisphere. But the reason, and I think this does speak to our partnership, it was very important as we look at this hemisphere to create a solidarity of democracy, and try to have a democratic country, such as Canada, to take leadership.

Hon. Bill Graham thanked the special guests and student panel. [The end]