Opening Remarks

Ms. Tina Park*:* Good morning everyone, and welcome to our conference today, entitled "From the Rwandan Genocide to the Responsibility to Protect: A Journey of Lessons Learned." My name is Tina Park and this is Victor MacDiarmid, and we are the co-founders of the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. On behalf of our co-hosting organizations, the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History and the International Relations Program at Trinity College, University of Toronto, we would like to take a moment to thank you all for joining us today to reflect upon the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and the normative journey of the R2P principle.

Over the course of merely 100 days in the spring of 1994, over 800,000 Rwandan civilians were slaughtered while the international community watched in silence. Throughout this period, this genocide was conveniently categorized as an African tribal problem by the rest of the world. The genocide in Rwanda took place at a speed three times faster than that of the Holocaust, making it one of the most efficient mass killings in the 20th century. Far from being an ancient tribal war, or even a civil war, a deliberate killing of one of the ethnic groups, the Tutsis, took place in Rwanda 20 years ago. Because of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, calling the Rwandan case a genocide would have placed an obligation under international law for the international community to take an action. Yet the rest of the world, especially the Western countries and the United Nations, failed to live up to our collective responsibility in the face of mass genocide in Rwanda. Canadian general Romeo Dallaire, who was on the ground with the helpless UN mandate for peacekeeping, called it a failure of humanity, as we failed to overcome the yardstick of national self-interest.

Since then, our thinking on international humanitarian intervention has evolved a great deal. Under the leadership of the Canadian government, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) gave birth to the concept of Responsibility to Protect in 2001. In doing so, the architects of the R2P principle hoped to shift the language from "right to intervene" to "sovereignty as a responsibility." This was a historic turning point in our Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty, and the ICISS report urged that where a state was unable or unwilling to protect its people, especially in the cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, the responsibility would shift to the international community, and the principle of non-intervention yield to the international Responsibility to Protect. From the very beginning, the R2P principle set out the use of military force as the absolute last resort after exhausting all other options. Yet the R2P soon lost the attention from the Western world with the outbreak of 9/11 and the War on Terror. While the 2005 World Summit outcome and the unanimous endorsement of the R2P paragraphs in the outcome document by 150 world leaders marked a growing consensus on this new concept, the normative journey of the R2P principle has been marked with many challenges. With the Libyan intervention, and the controversy surrounding regime change, a complementary concept of Responsibility while Protecting came to force. While technological advances in the last two decades have opened up vast opportunities for innovation and information sharing, it has also enabled killing of human lives on a horrifying scale. Around the world, sectarian warfare and ethnic conflicts continue to claim thousands of lives.

Mr. Victor MacDiarmid*:* Today, as we look around the world at the ongoing crisis in Syria and the warning signs of a genocide breaking out in the Central African Republic, our pledge of "never again" remains more relevant than ever. The causal indifference would ignore the lessons that we have learned from the Holocaust, the killing fields of Cambodia, and the Rwandan genocide. And our indifference would lead to another failure of humanity, again and again, in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia. We need to remember the consequences that would arise from our indifference. The impacts that they have on the lives of real people, men and women just like us, have to enter our imaginations. We have gathered here today because of our shared belief in human dignity, the rule of law, and social justice.

We do not believe that R2P is a solution to all the great violations of human rights that we are seeing in different parts of the world. Rather, we are confident that the R2P principle provides us with the tools for tackling these big challenges so we can give tangible means to our pledge of "never again."

We also believe that R2P remains as an important Canadian legacy in global humanitarianism. It is with such conviction that the integrity of human life and hope for the future of humanity that the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect has brought this conference together with the help of Bill Graham Centre and the International Relations program. Founded in 2010, the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is mandated with promoting scholarly engagement and political implementation of the R2P principle. As a leading nonprofit and nonpartisan research organization for the Responsibility to Protect, the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect has advised an interparliamentary union on their recent resolution on R2P and currently has over 80 analysts in our research and advocacy wings.

Today's conference marks the beginning of our Rwanda 20 campaign. On April 1st, we will be hosting a student panel discussion with the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy and Dr. Madeleine Albright. On April 5th, youth delegates from 10 secondary schools in the Greater Toronto Area will be participating in our R2P workshop, and then, from April 15th to the 17th, we will be hosting a film festival called "Eyes on Genocide" at the Media Commons of Robarts Library. Throughout April, with our partners at the Canadian International Council (Open Canada), prominent Canadians will be publishing their reflections on the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and the future of the R2P principle. Our campaign efforts, which began last fall, have been entirely organized by students, and various departments and programs within the U of T have come together for this campaign, specifically the Political Science Department and the History Department. And we are especially thankful to our Conference Co-Chairs, Misha and Anneliese.

Through these efforts, we hope not only to educate and enlighten our youth and the public on the importance of global humanitarianism, but also to make a pledge that we will step up and share in the burden of our collective pledge of "never again." We are delighted that you are here today with us, and hope that you can join us for other parts of the campaign as well. Today's conference brings together prominent practitioners and academics with an unparalleled experience and knowledge of the R2P principle. Many of our speakers are at the forefront of global efforts to halt mass atrocities, like Naomi, who is currently in the Central African

Republic, and they offer unique insights learned from years of promoting the principle. They have helped build toward R2P's successes, and have also learned from the disappointments of the international community to stop mass atrocities. In addition to a keynote address by Dr. Jennifer Welsh, the UN Special Advisor on Responsibility to Protect, this conference is divided into three panels. Our first panel, "Canadian Voices on Responsibility to Protect," discusses Canada's lessons learned from the international response during the Rwandan genocide. Our second panel looks at R2P from a global perspective and assesses the future prospects of the R2P principle following continuing atrocities in Syria. After a networking luncheon, our third panel discusses the normative evolution of the R2P principle.

Twenty years ago, the cries of outrage that nothing was done by the international community to stop the Rwandan genocide sowed the seeds of what would eventually become the R2P principle. What began as Francis Deng's bold idea of sovereignty as responsibility has developed into an internationally accepted principle. However, R2P is still a principle, not yet a codified international norm. To remain relevant and useful, R2P needs our continued commitment and our conviction that we will never let another Rwanda happen again. In the face of so many crises around the world, we must be ready to hold firm to our principles and nurture our belief with courage and resolve. Together, we must work with optimism and determination to make the Responsibility to Protect a living reality for the peoples of the world. Thank you for joining the conversation as we take a pause to reflect on the lessons learned from the Rwandan genocide. We look forward to continuing the dialogue with you throughout the conference, and with that, I will call on our speakers for our first panel.

Panel #1: "Canadian Voices on Responsibility to Protect"

Ms. Naomi Kikoler: Thank you so much Victor, I'd like to thank you for inviting me to participate in this conference. As it has already been mentioned perhaps it is fitting but I am joining you today from the Central African Republic. 20 years ago the world stood by as genocide unfolded in Rwanda. Canada's at the time engagement was very small. With the exception of Senator Dallaire, we had almost no response to the mass atrocities that were unfolding in Rwanda. At the time it was regarded that the country was small, poor, of little interest to most Canadians, remote and many had no idea what was happening in the country as the atrocities were unfolding. Today in the Central African Republic we can't say the same thing. When you land in Bangui you land in the midst of an internally displaced persons camp, you land with fifty thousand people living in makeshift shelters alongside the landing strip. It is a shocking environment to be in. This morning close to the hotel grenade attacks were taking place and people were being hunted down in PK12 and PK5. Today there are nineteen thousand people that are living in such vulnerable and besieged areas. They are being targeted on the basis of their ethnicity and religion, but it is important to underscore just as was the case in the Rwandan genocide that religion and ethnicity is being manipulated by those who seek political and economic power. It is far too simple to say that this is a crisis around religion or a crisis around ethnicity and it is important to underscore that from an R2P perspective because when we talk about the responses needed it it's far too simple to say that the answer is solely the use of force and a peacekeeping mission. We are talking today as we did in Rwanda about a country in which there is a rampant culture of impunity in which out of thirty eight prisons all but three have been destroyed, in which the minister of justice and judges live in fear for their lives, and in which those who go out to kill everyday know that they can do so with total and absolute impunity.

Twenty years ago in case of Rwanda we said that we did not know. We dismissed the atrocities that were unfolding and the international community instead responded to the mass flows of refugees in then-Zaire. I remember during the Rwandan genocide, the Toronto Star had the image of a young boy, he was wearing a sweater and on the sweater was the large Canadian flag and the word Canada below. I thought isn't that remarkable we are unable to do anything to help these actual people and here was this young man with the Canadian flag and I thought you know isn't that kind of helping these people, isn't that what Canada is all about. My own family had come to Canada as refugees and it made me think what does never again mean, does never again mean only never again for our own or does never again mean for everyone.

Ten years ago the Canadian government played a critical role in ensuring that that notion of never again meant never again for every single human being irrespective of whether or not they lived in Toronto, in Bangui, or in Bossangoa here in the Central African Republic. Through remarkable and unprecedented leadership by the Canadian government we were able to secure through the personal championing of key individuals like Lloyd Axworthy, like Paul Martin, like

Allan Rock the securing of a commitment to the Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.

Today in the Central African Republic we sadly see of those very same crimes unfolding. I think it's worth taking note unlike twenty years ago when most Canadians were unaware of what was happening, where our own government dismissed the existence of hate speech, where we down played and ignored the fact that some of the very genocidaires and the leaders of the Rwandan genocide were trained in our universities. We as Canadians and as an international community are focusing on the Central African Republic and in large part that is directly responsible to the leadership that Canada played in 2005 in securing support for the Responsibility to Protect.

Now I'm going to highlight just a couple of quick developments in the last ten years that are worth celebrating and would not have happened had Canada not played that important role. Today we have within the UN system a Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, a Special Representative on the Responsibility to Protect Jennifer Welsh, we also have increasing discussions of human rights within the UN General Assembly, crucially within the Security Council. We see the language of the Responsibility to Protect being put into the Security Council mandates, even the current mandate that's being discussed around the Central African Republic right now has language that refers to the Responsibility to Protect as an explanation of what states responsibility should be, what authorities here should be doing but also for the international community. We've also seen timely preventive action taken in situations to help prevent either a recurrence of violent atrocities or stop atrocities that are unfolding. With some of the most recent cases being the March 2013 election in Kenya where we saw an unprecedented level of local, regional and international involvement to try to avert recurrence of mass atrocities in Kenya. We also saw a very timely and decisive response to the mass atrocities in Libya. These are positive developments that we should all celebrate and then again I firmly believe that had Canada not played the championing role that it did in 2005 we would not be having the current discussions we are having today and we would not see mass atrocities crimes being discussed and being at the fore of discussions of response needed in the Central African Republic.

Yet at the same time I think there is a reason to pause when we get to celebratory about how R2P is being received today and to the role of Canada twenty years after the Rwandan genocide. Some of the lessons of the Rwandan genocide have not been truly internalised in terms of our own government response. One of the outcomes, lessons of the Rwandan genocide was the need to ensure that our government officials are looking at evolving situations on the ground from a mass atrocities prevention lens. The need to appoint senior-level government officials who are responsible for essentially mainstreaming such a perspective and mainstreaming R2P within the government. Well thirty-eight other countries form around the world and their governments like Ghana, the United States have appointed R2P focal points. Canada is entirely absent from that discussion and we have not yet appointed a focal point. Whereas other governments are bringing

together a coherent and consistent way various agencies and departments to discuss how to better align with their defence assistance, their preventative diplomacy efforts to ensure that they are trying to advance the Responsibility to Protect to prevent mass atrocities. Our response according to our own diplomats who I have spoken with remained inconsistent and ad hoc. Perhaps one of the most damning indictments today of Canada's failure to learn lessons from the Rwandan genocide is our reluctance to use the language of the Responsibility to Protect and the actual banning of one point of such language within then defaced.

It is critical that we have champions like Canada using the language accurately, defending the language when it's misused, addressing the misperceptions and misunderstanding of the R2P as solely the use of force. We need countries like Canada to build coalitions from countries from both north and south to develop innovative strategies to address crises like the Central African Republic. To bring our own skills and unique attributes that we have learnt through our work in Afghanistan but also through our own unique society in which we have remarkable tolerance and remarkable social cohesion. We need to bring out bi-jural system, our bilingual system to conversations about what need to happen in places like the Central African Republic. We have logisticians, engineers, special forces who could also contribute to peacekeeping missions. The lessons of the Rwandan genocide was that we need to keep our eyes open, we need to look for threats of mass atrocity crimes, we need to tailor responses to avert atrocities and to calibrate them as the situation unfolds on the ground. We need to find the political will to make difficult decisions including to at times put our own men and women's lives on the line to protect others and to uphold the Responsibility to Protect.

As I mentioned on the onset, when you land in Bangui you see fifty thousand internally displaced persons, there are currently over seven hundred thousand people displaced in the Central African Republic. When I look at the faces of the displaced I see that young boy twenty years ago in his Canada sweater, I see my own grandparents and I see the grandparents and family members of far too many Canadians who call Canada home today because they themselves sought refuge in the aftermath of mass atrocity crimes. Canada was a remarkable leader ten years ago in moving forward support for Responsibility to Protect. In the last few years unfortunately our support has decreased and what is tragic is in the absence of us playing the championing role no other government had stepped into our shoes. There are very nascent effort by a small group of countries to try to advance efforts like the Responsibility to Protect, focal points but there is no one country that is championing this norm. A norm that goes to the heart of the UN system, that goes to the heart of what the international community in the wake of Rwanda, in the wake of the holocaust had promised to do and that is to promise never again. So I want to thank you all for taking the time out to come together today and talk about the lessons of Rwanda twenty years later and to talk about how we as Canadians can encourage our government to continue in the future to play that leadership and championing role that is so desperately needed and in the last few years we have been wanting. Thank you.

Ms. Stephanie Power: I'm going to talk briefly from my own experience working for the Canadian government on the R2P, I'm going to share some of my own reflections on lessons learned and coming out of that experience and then also coming out of the experiences I had afterwards working with UNICEF and also with PAGER which is a very interesting Canadian humanitarian network of NGOs and governments working together. And I think inevitably the experiences you have afterwards bring additional perspective to share. I'm really looking forward to chatting with you on the breaks and lunchtime today it is one of my favourite things to do so please come approach me and we can have a sandwich together and I'd love to hear about the academic and activist work that you are doing.

I worked on the R2P file for the Canadian Government as a civil servant from the fall of 2002 until the spring of 2004. Otherwise, as Misha who has organized this conference sort of refers to as the silent period between the launch of the Isis report and the World Summit in 2005 and the adoption of the R2P as a global norm and so I want to give you some insight into the type of work we did at the time, some of the things that we learned and observed and the way that some of the work that we might have done at the time may have lead up to a critical turning point in 2005.

Speaking personally, I had worked on the mine action team at Foreign Affairs before that and also done some communications work on the human security agenda and had gone home to Newfoundland were because my father was dying, quite tragically, at the time. So I was in Newfoundland considering which job I would take in Ottawa. It was sort of a fork in the road between a special project that Canada was working on decommissioning different kinds of nuclear chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union, or I would come back and work on R2P and these were the two things I was pursuing. And I was offered both, quite luckily, and I chose R2P because of the people, the people I knew I would be working with on the file. Quite honestly, I knew the people I would be working with. My father passed away and I returned to Ottawa and immediately began working on the Responsibility to Protect. I threw myself into my work if you knew anything about human nature you probably know why and we just worked like mad basically for the next couple of years.

Things that we did that would give you insight into Canadian leadership at the time: definitely there was a concerted effort at the UN in New York to get a discussion on the Responsibility to Protect going. It was a difficult period because not only the attacks on September 11 but significantly because of that. We had a couple of round table luncheons that I went to New York for where we gathered different representatives from permanent missions to the UN and from countries around the world. Some of the support for R2P and opposition became apparent in the world summit discussions became evident at that time as well. Some countries were supportive of the concept, and some were extremely suspicious and had very hardened opposition. I want to give credit to the Canadian diplomats who were in New York at the time who were very skilled and very persistent about having these hard, hard discussions at a time where it didn't seem like the norm was going to get a lot of traction and their knowledge and their willingness to engage in that discussion needs to be applauded. One of the diplomats who we worked with was a gentleman named Glyn Berry, who, if you are a student in Canadian history and the war in

Afghanistan, would know that he left his post in his New York and went to Kandahar was killed in the line of duty, so that was a big loss for all of us.

Other work that we did at the time: Canadian Embassies around the world undertook demarches and the discussions in the capitals where they were located with the governments with talking points they would go in with and engage in discussion with their counterparts and see how the governments were feeling about the R2P, what their interest was and what their points of opposition were. This was extremely important since a lot of feedback came back to the Canadian government on that so we knew where countries stood and what the lay of the land was and all of this ultimately led into extremely intensive diplomatic efforts that led to the adoption of the R2P as a part of the World Summit document in 2005. By 2005, I was gone and I left in the spring of 2004 to go to Geneva to do communications on the 5th review conference of the landmine ban, so I take extremely little credit for that triumph in 2005.

But if you, or the organizations you are a part of get to have a wonderful Canadian diplomat named Heidi Hulan come and speak to you, I think a tremendous amount of credit for the World Summit document goes to this individual. I know usually civil servants are unnamed behind the scenes and we don't talk in Canada about the officials behind the scenes but I think if you ever get a chance to chat with Heidi Hulan about that you'll learn quite a bit.

I wanted to talk a little bit about the work that we do with civil society between 2000–2004. We had a lot of discussions with the World Federalist Movement, who I understand now hosts the International Coalition on R2P. Jane Stoylls, who is now with the Canadian Centre of International Justice, who is wonderful and extremely intelligent. We hosted, well we didn't host, we gave support to a group of parliamentarians in an action conference in Ottawa. Interestingly, we held a number of regional conferences around the world and provided support for them in conjunction with Canadian Civil Society partners and their International Civil Society Partners. It is very, very interesting, I think you are working on these types of issues to be able to take advantage of partnerships that have developed on other issues. For example, we worked with Project Ploughshares. Ernie Regehr and Greg Puley, were fabulous and established relationships with East African civil society partners who had done good work on small arms and weapons, so they had a fabulous relationship with them and held a regional conference in Nairobi on the R2P in 2004. There were also conferences in West Africa and Bamako. There was one in Helsinki that I went to which later led to quite a high level conference in Sweden which was hosted by the Swedish Prime Minister on genocide prevention. Gareth Evans spoke at that event, so did Samantha Power, Bernard Koushner which, if you are in this line of work, it's sort of a big deal. You're a young diplomat and you get to drive across town in a Swedish government car with Gareth Evans and then you meet Samantha Power and it's kind of a big deal. Anyway, that's beside the point I guess. Irwin Cotler, who was the Minister of Justice for Canada at the time, remains an outspoken human rights advocate, flew to Sweden and gave a keynote address at this event so that was another element of Canadian leadership.

Very interestingly, towards the end of my time on file, ten years ago it was the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, so we had a big discussion on how can we use this particular

opportunity to advance R2P and how can we use this as a hook or an angle for progress. So, we co-organized an event at the UN where we very much tried to commemorate the event, but we also tried to insert the R2P in that language as much as possible and the Secretary-General at the time took part in the event. There was a journalism conference at Carleton that was put together by Alan Thompson, an excellent Canadian journalist and journalism professor who had done a lot of work with Romeo Dallaire. I met Romeo Dallaire for the first time, and shook his hand and that was another personal milestone for me.

Interestingly, we did some work with the Stimson Centre in Washington DC on military doctrine around the R2P, which is an extremely, extremely important area to look at and also there was some behind the scenes work in the Security Council report which came much later, but the seeds of that had just been planted at the time. I never imagined working in my office at Foreign Affairs, and if you'd been there, I think they still give tours, you should absolutely go take one. My office, one of my friends described it as a chicken coop where there is no natural light but there is always this one light on and it's a box and the chicken keeps producing, well that was what my R2P office and most of the Foreign Affairs offices were like. When I was working there, I threw myself directly into my work and I was quite young and I didn't have a lot of foresight and I hadn't really imagined that ten years later there would be a Canadian Centre for the R2P and a Global Centre for the R2P and that it would be discussed the way that it is now. Young people and old people now would want to discuss it and I've run into old friends at a bar and they would say "I just did a paper on R2P" so I would say that is excellent and I would have never expected that.

I want to talk a little about my work on the Sudan Task Force in 2005 when I came back from Geneva from working on the land mine conference. I was a communications advisor to the Canadian government's interdepartmental Sudan Task Force which was responding to the situation in Darfur but also the situation in East Sudan and in the south of Sudan. I got to see up close and personal some of the complexities of implementing the R2P which is not a political framework but an idea, but incredibly complex and challenging to implement. One of my key lessons learned from that that I will share along with several others is that I think it would be extremely helpful for Canadians to understand what the capacities of their government actually are when it comes to the R2P and by that I mean the entire important spectrum of the R2P which is the responsibility to prevent, to protect, and respond. Naomi speaks extremely eloquently about the toolkit that is available to international actors to prevent mass atrocities. There is a whole range of actions from the implementation of economic sanctions, peacemaking, behind the scenes, military force, but that's the very last resort since there are a lot of diplomatic tools that come before that. What I found when I worked on the R2P, but especially when I worked on the Sudan Task Force was the Canadian media coverage and the Canadian public discussion about what is actually involved in intervention to prevent mass atrocities is extremely superficial and as scholars and activists who are working on this issue and who have a passion and an interest for this issue, a piece of advice from my chair to you is the importance of bringing your scholarly research out into the public domain and crossing over into public discussion, into the media particularly, and bring more substance to the maturity and the knowledge of Canada as a nation about what's actually required to prevent those kinds of situations and the toolkit Canada actually brings. There have been a number of excellent examples in recent history and less recent

history about Canadian civil society action around the world and a lot of Canadian diplomats are extremely skilled and make excellent contributions but there is an awful lot of room for Canada to be a much more capable actor. I think if Canadians knew what it took to really make a difference in the Central African Republic and really understood what its government and its civil society was and was not doing, we would be demanding more and I really want to hear more about your research while we are here today if we get a chance to chat, but I really encourage to take that out into the public domain because I really felt like the conversations that were happening in the media were very fragmented and very clichéd and often relying on international wires. It was the same story given again and again and not an awful lot of depth about what Canada was actually doing like who was involved in the peace negotiations and who was actually making a difference on the ground.

A couple of other quick lessons learned, I may offer. Those of you who are doing outreach around advancing the norm of the R2P, one question I've asked myself in recent days as I was preparing for this presentation was were we strategic enough in the outreach opportunities that we chose? We tried to have global coverage and have events around the world and have different sectors involved including parliamentarians, civil society, civil servants, but really what was the outcome of that outreach and how far were we from having an impact on the situation in advancing choices to this norm? Because this is an urgent agenda for so many people, for example those tens and thousands in the Central African Republic right now who need that situation to change and who need assistance. It is very comfortable here, but it's not a comfortable agenda, it's an urgent agenda. Are we making the best choices we could? I don't think we did, I don't think I did. I think we could have been much more strategic than we were.

The importance of high level champions and opportunities: the difference between having the leader of your organization or your department or your government on side and not on side and the difference between having a high level opportunity like the World Summit and not having that opportunity is like night and day. Keep your eyes open for those big opportunities and I encourage you to very proactively court high-level champions for your agenda.

Another big lesson I learned was from watching speeches of Naomi Kikoler on YouTube in preparation for this conference is this is a long term agenda for which there will be incremental progress and so that's certainly a lesson for me coming from this ten years later looking on the file and seeing the progress that there's been. I now am looking ahead to see what kind of progress will there be in the next ten years. I know it will be incremental, and I know this is a long term agenda, but I think if we bring the passion and the knowledge and the strategic choices and the intensity, quite honestly, that my colleagues and I brought to the file back ten years ago, then those increments can be bigger and more substantial. It's wonderful for me to be here with and I'm part with my Canadian humanitarian community. I would've loved to have all of you with me ten years ago, but it's great to see you here now and I'm really excited about what Canada can do to advance this norm as robustly and quickly as possible and as practically as possible in the years to come because it really does matter.

Very Reverend Lois Wilson: One of the advantages of speaking last is that almost everything has been said. The other thing that you should know is that Lloyd Axworthy was in my Sunday school. I was his Minister. So I claim credit for everything good he's done and disavow everything else. It was through Lloyd of course that I first heard about Responsibility to Protect, and I'm delighted to be invited to try and say something here about lessons learned.

I think we should rejoice in that R2P represented a fundamental conceptual shift from responsibility to attack to Responsibility to Protect, so from non-interference to interference. Sovereignty meant now responsibility. So it's been applied here and there, sometimes more-or-less. It's stumbled in Libya, when we applied R2P there or tried to. China and Russia objected because regime change was asked for, and that wasn't in the deal according to them, and I wonder about what's going to happen now that the atrocities taking place in North Korea have been revealed, whether China will use its veto, or what will happen there.

One of the scandalous things is that in most situations it was known long beforehand what was going to happen and the international community did not respond. No one acted. With Rwanda, the UNHCR had the file, the International Committee of Inquiry into Human Rights in Rwanda had the file that documented massacres orchestrated by the government of Rwanda and plans for it, an informant in 1994 warned Dallaire of plans for mass murder, but the UN disbelieved him and forbad him to destroy the arms cache that was used to massacre the people. So there was a total absence of political will in the international community to do anything, although the situation was known beforehand and the warning signs were there. So that's the first thing I want to say.

I'd like to say something too about what is there in support of it. [There is] quite a bit of support for it. It grew out of the ashes of Rwanda of course. And I think that the international community is struggling with the growing idea and it doesn't come easily. One thinks of even the development of the United Nations, which took years and years and years before that became a reality. And so we shouldn't be surprised that we're going through a growing stage. The 2005 World Summit endorsement of R2P helped, and the Security Council has reaffirmed it several times, invoking resolutions on Syria, South Sudan, and Yemen. Unfortunately, invoking resolutions is the easiest part of the job. Presidential statements have also sometimes supported it, and that's also helpful. The Human Rights Council has appointed a special advisor for the prevention of mass atrocities, and the UN has a Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, so that it's not without support, and that should be noted.

However, there are many difficulties. I think that the first one is the need to institutionalize R2P into state policy and UN agencies, and that needs development. States need encouragement to mainstream R2P in their national strategy documents, their decision-making processes, and particularly their budgets. It would help if there was a lead coordinator appointed in every country. As was suggested, Canada has not done that. We did pretty well on providing guidelines for the Land Mines Treaty, and since we've had that experience I would think that we should be able to also contribute that way. In 2009, a framework for making the agenda operational through the UN system was adopted, so we've got that in place, but the challenges remain. It was the limited mandate of the UNAMIR forces' neutrality approach that Dallaire experienced in

Rwanda where he was not allowed to do anything except be there. It was a very neutral approach, and that says to me that the mandate of the UN better be looked at, and a review of that for future situations.

There are three pillars to the R2P, and states support the first two but not the third. The first is the imperative that the state protect its own people. The second is that the international community provide states with the capacity to protect their people. But the third pillar, which they object to, is the obligation to respond when mass atrocities occur, and that's the stumbling block. And then there's the capacity, and I mentioned the lack of political will, but there's also the capacity of the international community to forestall political atrocities. And this means that we should explore the arms and the military training, who trains the killers, who provides the arms. Because that's really blossoming. Some Rwandan officers were trained in military schools of the USA. Zaire, France and South Africa supplied arms despite an arms embargo, China supplied 581,000 machetes, and Albania also assisted with arms. So every country is involved in the arms race, but that's not an insignificant part of what we should be looking at. So if you want to look at R2P, maybe some of you are working on the arms race as well.

Okay, so that's institutionalizing the concept into our systems. The second one is political, and I mentioned there's been so little political will, and there are inevitable clashes between countries who want to protect their own interests. I worked in Sudan as special envoy for Canada for four years, to not much effect, we couldn't get a peace treaty, and again it was really about who gets the oil, it was about power, because in central Sudan the oil fields are very lucrative, and Canada, when I was first appointed, through Talisman oil was very much in the Sudan. And I was the object of I don't know how many NGOs telling me "get Canada out of Sudan," as if I could just say "Canada get out," which was beyond my ability, but anyway. So it was a struggle, and it still is, around oil and the resources of the country. That's exacerbated of course by ethnicity and religion, so that you have the Muslim Arabs in the north and you have the Christian Africans in the south. That's not the numb of it, although it exacerbates it very much. So Sudan is very much in need of R2P, but I don't think that there's a hope in the world that it would fly there because China has now got control of the oil fields, and China has a veto at the Security Council. So politically we don't know what to do there.

Russia, they seem to think that the Security Council has enough power and they also have veto, as you know. The USA in Rwanda refused to relinquish control of its own forces to the UN, which was a problem. So, politically, you've got the self-interest of all the countries come into play when you try to get some agreement on action. Of all the countries, the consistent supporters have been Australia, Belgium, France, [and] the UK, and Canada has been but we've fallen silent recently, in the last ten years. So that's politically, which is tough.

The next one is conceptually, and I think that the countries that do support R2P should strongly support the concept conceptually, and sustain the course, and sustain the political attention of the international community if they can. There's a long way to go, we have to develop norms, and norms will be contested because the existing norms confirm the status quo, and states like people hate to change but that's got to be done. There's got to be wide consensus not only about the

concept of the Responsibility to Protect, but as well a feasible implementation strategy. So conceptually there's still a lot of work to be done.

For instance, the early warning signs in Rwanda did not trigger action. I mentioned this before that the early warning signs are around. I was in the Central African Republic in the early nineties with the World Council of Churches, and they were going to send me off by plane to some little Presbyterian church in the northeast part of the country that needed support, and then they cancelled it because they said the country was in such turmoil that I might never get back. So they didn't send me which was a good thing. The forces there, the tension, and the turmoil was going on the early nineties, the signs were there, so it's not a new thing. The same in Rwanda. The bombing of the presidential plane in Rwanda was a clear signal for those in the know to start the genocide immediately, that was the signal and it was known. Why did it not signal the same for the international community? One factor certainly was that Dallaire's request for jamming the radio equipment was denied by lawyers who said "no, no, we need freedom of speech." So while the radio stations were spewing out hate, not in English but in ethnic language which the English-speaking people didn't understand, this was ignored, so that media was a very important factor there. It was also important in the Sudan conflict. Sudan never broadcast the content of the Sudan comprehensive peace agreement, which held for few years, so that any attempt to insert UN troops to enforce peace in Sudan would be met with massive resistance from the Sudanese people, because all they'd heard was the propaganda coming in their own language. So that those countries that listened to English-only broadcasts missed the gathering storm, and that might be one of the lessons we learned about both Rwanda and Sudan.

The role of the churches was not exemplary, it was shameful. Any of you who are interested, there's a book in the Toronto Reference Library called *The Angels Have Left Us*, by Hugh McCullum, and he wrote the book about the complicity of the Christian churches in the massacre, who simply lined up with the Tutsi and Hutu on both sides. In fact, churches instead of being sanctuaries became killing fields. So that the religious makeup of the country is also a factor that needs to be looked at, what is their relationship to the powers that be, are they going to support the governments or are they going to carry out their other function.

So, we have this R2P, which has risen right out of the situation of Rwanda, based on the needs of the citizens for physical safety, and it has the well-established just war guidelines it works by, last resort, use R2P as a last resort, the principle of proportionality, reasonable prospects in the use of military force. What the concept needs to give priority to is institutional embodiment and its political implementations. So there's three things I'd like to say that need to be done specifically. The first is to institutionalize the concept in state structures. The second is to deal with and be aware of the political realities, which are tough. And the third one is stay the course conceptually for the long term. It's very easy to critique the United Nations and say it never does anything and why does it fail all the time. Friends, it's all we've got, we have created it, and now we have to make it work. So instead of saying that, why don't you look at what are the results of not acting, what are the political consequences, regional instability, criminal consequences of genocide, the moral consequences of avoiding responsibility, and the human consequences of suffering and death. So my word is don't give up, you're another generation, keep at it, Canada

initiated it, and I think if we stick to the course, eventually, eventually we may figure out how it can work.

Panel #2: "A Global Perspective on R2P: Syria & Future Prospects"

Dr. Jon Western: It's a real pleasure to be here, I want to thank Misha and the organizers for inviting me and for organizing the events today. Thank you, Dr. Groom, for the introduction and for the historical overview, I think that's helpful. Just for some additional historical background, 25 years ago, I was an intelligence analyst at the US state department in Washington. I was an East European specialist for Poland/Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia broke out, I became a principal analyst for the department on Bosnia and the Bosnian conflict. Two and a half years into the conflict, I resigned in protest because the US was not responding with an aggressive response to the mass atrocity violence. Also because the way in which they were framing the conflict was very much rooted in age-old ethnic hatreds and that defied our kind of analytical judgements that this was a much more strategic instrumental elite-driven operation. And I think that was born out at Dayton when, three leaders sign a piece of paper in Dayton, Ohio, and all the inter-ethnic violence stopped on the dime so I thought that was kind of informative about what was actually causing the violence. It wasn't spontaneous, mass person-on-person violence that was just rooted in deep-seated ancient ethnic hatreds. If that were the case it wouldn't be able to be turned off so quickly. Anyway, I'm now an academic. When I left the State Department my colleague said "Oh you're giving up a really great career" well I'm very happy to say I'm an academic and I'm in a great career, so it was worth it.

Today I want to talk about Syria. In part, I want to talk about why was the international response so slow and why did R2P have such a difficult time in the context of Syria. If you think about it, with relatively successful interventions that ended violence in Bosnia and later in Kosovo, East Timor, even more recently in Ivory Coast, and with the enthusiasm with which R2P emerged in 2005, and the fact that we got the World Summit outcome with the consensus, how did we go from that initial momentum and even in Kenya, how did we go from that momentum to the real struggle in Syria? I'll elaborate on the tension of sovereignty and human rights.

Let me just start with an overview of the conflict and I would just like to put out some data here. This is the trajectory of violence in Syria. As you take a look at that, the overview of the violence is essentially that the conflict erupted amid the broader Arab Spring movements and the international anxiety about what those movements meant. If you remember back to 2011, there was a lot of anxiety about the demonstrations in Tahrir Square. In Cairo, the US government was very anxious about what this was going to lead to. Yes, Mubarak was a dictator, yes he had been an authoritarian, but there was a certain amount of stability. So, the mass demonstrations on one hand were generated in part by civil society movements, asking for liberalization and democratization, on the other hand there was great concern about what would come next. So the conflict in Syria really starts in the context of understanding the Arab Spring. Also, the challenge in Syria is that the violence erupts in March 2011, right in the middle of that,

when there are certain amounts of anxiety about it. It's also sure that the conflict of Syria erupts simultaneous with Libya, and that's going to be a very important part of the story. The other thing that's interesting to note about Syria is that the conflict itself is relatively low intensity in conflict. It's actually not a civil war and it's not a mass atrocity event. There were crimes against humanity, but it was a relatively low intensity conflict for the first several months. I think all those contribute to the challenges.

So I just want to walk through that. This is part of the research project I'm currently working on with a team of 5 research assistants. We're trying to identify what effect did the international policy initiatives have with respect to changing the strategic landscape of violence in Syria over the course of the war. Today I just want to focus on the first three phases of the conflict. We've broken the conflict into six separate phases, but the first 18 months is what I really want to focus on, because I think that's where R2P lost its ability to respond.

So the context of the Syrian revolution, I don't want to go too much into the history, but the violence that starts out in March of 2011, much like the demonstrations and revolution in Egypt, have a lot of deep precursors. There's a decade of economic turmoil, there's a decade or more of questioning of the political legitimacy of leadership. Rising budget deficits, water shortages, declining oil productions, stagnant wages, growing income inequality, all of these are things that are contributing to the underlying social tensions inside of the Syrian society. So when the moment opens up for protest, and the real triggering moment is the event in Deraa, where 15 young students who sprayed graffiti on the walls are arrested, they're detained, they're tortured, and in a very brutal fashion. The cousin of Assad is the head of the security services in Deraa, he's the one who arrested the 15 young kids, these are 12 to 14 year olds. When the parents come to check on their children and to get them out from spraying graffiti on the walls, so just petty vandalism, the security officer says "your children aren't here, you have no children" and tells a very brutal story that eventually triggers a demonstration in Deraa and then later, as the children are released, and it's clear that they have been tortured, those events trigger demonstrations not just in Deraa, but within two days around the country. And again, I think that's a reflection of the deep-seated social tensions. But this is a triggering event, so you have 200 protesters in Damascus the first day, then 2000, and then we get throughout the country massive demonstrations, so we have by then end of the first week tens of thousands of people marching in dozens of cities across Syria as a result of the triggering event. Assad's first response to this was to do two things: one was to crack down brutally. He deploys the security services, and those security services target directly the protest movements. Again, this is in the context of the Arab Spring. He's watching what's happened, not just in Libya with Gadhafi, but more probably salient for him is the Mubarak situation in Egypt, where the demonstrations have a cumulative effect and eventually take on a life of their own. Assad's initial response is to try to disrupt the street civil non-violent protest movements, and so we see the first use of snipers and direct attacks on civilians as a mechanism to disperse the crowds. The other part of this was that

Assad launched a series of reforms a week and a half after the initial demonstrations started to erupt. He does introduce a series of modest reforms. And this is consistent with the narrative that the West will immediately pick up on in the very first weeks of the conflict which is that Assad is a liberalizing autocrat. So you've got the two kinds of leaders in the Arab world. You've got the royal families, the monarchies, and you've got these presidents that have inherited from their fathers, and these are the liberalizing autocrats. The way they've dealt with pressure points from below in the past was to introduce a series of reforms. And so there was general sense in Washington and Brussels that Assad was in fact a reformer who could be dealt with. So R2P is an interesting case here. You've got in this very first outbreak of the violence, it's not high-intensity. It's brutal, it's ugly, but it's not high-intensity. And you've got this narrative that Assad is a liberalizing autocrat. He's a reformer, he's trained in the West in London, he's got a very cosmopolitan family. And so there's a sense that this is a guy that they could work with. So there's this kind of tension between the kind of brutality of the crackdown but then the fact that he's a reformer.

So there's a number of things that happen, there are four major things that happen in this early first phase which we go from March of 2011, the outbreak of the demonstrations, to when the opposition becomes a militarized response in September. The first phase is March through September of 2011. The first challenges for the international community is first of all the timing with Libya. There's no real Benghazi moment here. What triggered 1970 and then what triggered UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was the imminent threat to Benghazi. That's really what mobilized the international community. Now remember, China and Russia don't support 1973, they just abstain. So we've got this kind of ambivalence about it, but we're going to defer. Maybe Benghazi's going to be a replication of Rwanda. There's a certain amount of coalition of perfect storm elements here. You've got Benghazi as the epicentre of the rebellion. The rebels are indistinguishable from civilians, the city had grown to a population of roughly 750 000 by March of 2011. You've got Gadhafi giving the radio address, saying he's going to go door to door, and he's using the dehumanizing language about the rebels. And he's also employed more mercenaries and all of the regular army forces are moving towards Benghazi, all of which gives the impetus for 1973. There's no similar moment in Syria. There's no sense that there is an imminent mass atrocity event that is likely.

The second part about the proximity to Libya that's important is 1973 immediately goes from ambivalence from the Russians and Chinese to how do you operationalize 1973. NATO states start the bombing campaign and they immediately pronounce that not only is it a bombing campaign but the strategic objective of the campaign is regime change. I think this is where you see the Russians and Chinese saying "wait a minute, nobody signed up for that." And that's going to become very important as we see the three UN Security Council resolutions on Syria. And also Libya took longer. The initial sense was that Libya was going to be quick, decisive,

we're going to protect Benghazi, and then that's going to be it, but the military campaign was prosecuted over the course of four months.

The second thing that I think happens in this initial phase is there's a real lack of international consensus on what the degree and magnitude of the violence is and where it's heading. There's some ambivalence, there's all kinds of government crackdowns on protest movements around the world at various points in time. And that discussion about what the kind of analytical judgement about what types of violence are happening in Syria is contested. In the West and Washington, it's government security services using sniper fire to hit civilians, but that's not necessarily shared in the early stages of the conflict with a wider sense of the international community. Again, thinking about the reasons why R2P is not invoked as a global response to Syria, that's a part of it. Violence is happening but again it's low intensity, Assad is also seen as this different kind of leader. In fact that's the term that Secretary of State at the time Hillary Clinton used, he's a different kind of leader. John Kerry, the current Secretary of State but then Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman in the United States Senate, made the case that he met Assad several times and was a guy he could work with, so they just weren't see the escalation possibility quite as intensively. And the other part of it is that there was simply a deadlock on the Security Council. The permanent five and Russia's position was initially in phase one was to say, "Look, Assad's crackdown has the potential to escalate." And what is interesting in the first phase is you've got Russia, regional partners Hezbollah, Iran, all saying to Assad, "chill out, this is going to get out of control, slow it down, take it down a notch." And you've got international pressure coming from multiple angles, that doesn't change. This moment, you have some kind of consensus that there's got to be some pressure put on Assad, but not necessarily through R2P.

What happens in late August and early September is phase two of the conflict. The first phase of the violence is really quite low. The second phase is August and September and this is when the Obama administration makes the decision that Assad is no longer a reformer. The types of atrocities that are happening now start to escalate. Again it's mostly sniper fire against civilian targets and Obama comes out in late August in conjunction with a number of international partners to say that Assad has to go. That's where we see the rhetorical shift out of Washington, that's also where we see the rhetorical shift out of Moscow. Washington, Paris, Brussels are now starting to say that Assad has got to go, he needs to move towards a democratic transition and legitimize the non-violent civil uprising. Russia at that point steps in and says, "Wait a minute, what next? Assad's got to go, what's the transition strategy?" And so the debate in the UN Security Council really starts to intensify over whether or not you should move forward on a normative principle versus the Russian response, which is also motivated by their strategic interest. This is a historic ally, they also have a naval base in Syria. They're also concerned about a rising Sunni extremism in the Caucasus. So all of these things are part of Russian interests and then what happens in the absence of Assad. What kind of a state do you have? And what happens

to Russian interests but also what happens within. This is when we start to see the intensification of the tensions within the permanent five in the Security Council. This also corresponds with the rebels actually arming and militarizing. They go into Turkey to get arms and training and they start to come back. It's no longer a non-violent response to the regime, but an now organized military response. We also get the formation of the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Council in phase two. At that point we start to see the emergence of an effort by the international community to control the situation, we go to the first Security Council resolution to impose sanctions, condemn the violence, and at that point we see the Chinese and Russians saying no and they veto the first Security Council resolution. That also parallels an Arab League initiative, which throughout the fall of 2011, tries to get the Syrian government to suspend violence against civilians, to withdraw military forces from urban areas and to issue a cease-fire, which they failed to accomplish. The Human Rights Council launches its commission of inquiry and in late November issues a statement that crimes against humanity have been occurring. This mobilizes the West, but we've already got the entrenched Security Council deadlock, and I think that's really the struggle here. The French initiate a proposal for humanitarian corridors, the Americans actually deploy an aircraft carrier off the coast, kind of anticipating the idea that perhaps we might seek a no-fly zone, and Russians deploy air defense systems to Syria in late November, early December, and we're starting to see that international proxy competition happening.

The third phase of the conflict starts really in February with the collapse of the Arab League plan, the intensification of the conflict, and the second and ultimately later the third Security Council Resolution. What's happening is that the US and the French bring a resolution condemning the violence and this is the opportunity for R2P to be triggered, and the Russians and Chinese veto, and at that moment we see an escalation of the violence. One of the things we're looking at in our research is we knew that the veto was going to happen. Should the West have pursued a veto. At that moment, the reason we have a spike in violence is because Assad's strategic calculations changes, there's going to be no intervention. We have a slight downturn in May and June in 2012 as the Annan Plan is introduced, but then we have the third Security Council Resolution, again condemning the violence and offering a potential for intervention, and that resolution is vetoed in June, and that's when we see the dramatic spike, that's when it becomes a civil war. What happens in our reading of the story is that those resolutions and the debates on the resolutions, which were destined to fail because Russia and China had already announced their indications to veto, essentially triggered a spike in the violence. It took intervention off the table; it took R2P out of the equation and it gave Assad a free hand to escalate from what had up until that point been a relatively low-intensity conflict to the massive conflict it is today.

A couple of lessons to be learned from all of this: why was it so tough for R2P? First of all, I think the trajectory of violence; second the geo-strategic context over Libya mattered. Third, the complexity of the response embedded in all of this out of Washington was Syria had a

fairly large army, it had a fairly sophisticated air defense system, how are you going to do this, and how can you intervene militarily on the context of the principle of just war theory and do no harm? The other part of it was even if you did something, what would it accomplish and there was a lack of strategy for political transition. So the broad picture on what all this means for R2P going forward it seems to me first of all, we're struggling with R2P in the context of regime change, and the legitimacy and the tension between protecting civilians and maintaining sovereignty. If we don't disentangle regime change from R2P, I don't think R2P has much of a future, quite frankly. On the other hand, if you commit yourself to regimes that are committing mass atrocity crimes, how do you protect civilians? There's a real tension there and I think the earlier point on the first panel about conceptualizing this is important. I think the ICC is also a useful instrument. The other problem for R2P is what happens when you're dealing with states with large capabilities. Syria had large capabilities relative to Libya, and we don't talk about an R2P situation in North Korea because North Korea has capabilities. We don't talk about an R2P situation in China and Tibet because China is a great power. We don't talk about R2P in Crimea because we won't respond to it because you have states with large capabilities, so you've got a bifurcated system. We also need to think about triggering actions. The red line in Syria was chemical weapons. When Assad crossed that there was a massive international mobilization to respond to that but we didn't have a similar triggering action with respect to gradual escalation of violence, so what happens in that context? And then finally, how do you deal with R2P in the context of a P-5 division? The biggest challenge to R2P moving forward is whether or not the Security Council remains relatively stable. From 1949 to 1989, there were very few resolutions moving forward on peacekeeping, on anything in which the US and Soviets disagreed. If we were to move to some kind of new co-board, that would create and enormous problem and you'd have to figure out how R2P can be moved from the legitimation by the Security Council to either regional organizations or something else, but that will create a number of tensions.

Anyway, thank you very much and I really appreciate being invited to this conference.

Dr. Malte Brosig: As I'm based in South Africa, I thought it would make sense to bring in a little bit of perspective from the African continent and from South Africa. First of all, I think that we need to understand that when it comes to questions of peace and security, African countries are predominantly focusing on Africa. Obviously African countries are the least capable of influencing global politics outside their own continent but even within the African continent, it's quite a struggle. The main focus will be on Africa. I would like to connect different cases. First of all, I will try to give you a little bit of background on how to understand the South African position by giving a little bit of background on foreign policy, and then go into Libya and Syria. I think we can't understand the reaction to Syria without speaking about Libya and other interventions, so they are very much connected. And then my last point is to look a bit at new African interventionism. While there's in mainstream media a lot of talk about Western interventions, but what gets overlooked is really African states intervening in their direct neighbourhoods so in Africa itself, proper African countries want to see a lot of interventionism here.

Starting with background on South Africa, I think from the outside you might think that apartheid is over and it's now 20 years, but there's still a hugely important discourse within the country. Liberation struggle, it's important domestically and it's important for elections as well. These citations here are from the 2011 White Paper on foreign policy. You can see that South African foreign policy is pretty much Afro-centric foreign policy and rooted in national liberation. So human rights, questions of R2P, of humanitarian interventions are still seen from the perspective of national liberation, so it's extending the liberation struggle beyond the borders of the country. The foreign policy paper is called the Diplomacy of Ubuntu, which is a kind of African humanitarian concept. You don't find this that often that a country deliberately put a humanitarian concept so prominently up on a foreign policy, but South Africa decided to do this. So what does Ubuntu mean? We could talk for hours without getting very far. I think one can summarize it as we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others. The negation of the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism is quite important to South Africa. It takes a straightforward position, the opposition to structural inequality and abuse of power in the system. The foreign policy paper already starts with the assumption of that the global system as such is abusive and that's how South Africa should approach it, which is an interesting position in such a prominent paper. The negation or opposition to colonialism, how would you achieve that, obviously concepts of non-interference and sovereignty are the first choice here. Non-interference into domestic affairs plays very prominently here, which is not so unusual for African countries. I think on average they have a much higher sensitivity to sovereignty rights. However there's one section moving more towards R2P saying that sovereignty and non-interference are coming under legal scrutiny. The foreign policy paper recognizes that there are changes but obviously the question is what does it mean in practice? It's very easy to agree that

civilians shouldn't be killed arbitrarily but what to do in practice is a completely different question and different foreign policy logics apply. In summary here, what we have to understand regarding to South African foreign policy is that human rights issues are pretty much understood under the label of the freedom fight and that seems to better resonate with anti-pluralist and non-interventionist rhetoric than pillar three action. When it comes to intervention, it's only pillar three in R2P and we often forget the prevention and the second pillar as well. The contested-ness comes then in the question of military intervention.

      I don't want to talk too much about Libya. The question is what issues did South Africa bring up with Libya? The Libyan case very much influenced their position on Syria as well so you cannot take them in isolation especially as they have been so closely associated by the Arab Spring. South Africa was on the Security Council as a non-permanent member at that time and it adopted the famous resolution 1973 with all other African members, which were Gabon and Nigeria during that time. However, very quickly the consensus on this resolution was falling apart. Jacob Zuma for instance was making a famous statement on the Human Rights Day in South Africa, which is commemorating the Sharpeville massacre in Soweto. He was making this statement in 2011: "We are reaffirming Africa's strong commitment to the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Libya and underscoring Africa's rejection of any foreign military intervention whatever its form." That's pretty tough. "As South Africa, we say no to the killing of civilians, no to the regime change doctrine and no to the foreign occupation of Libya or any other sovereign state." And that basically summarizes the South African position in Libya. So what are the problems here? Certainly the future of R2P is very much connected to the question of how do we deal with regime change. South Africa's position is very much anti-regime change and that is really the knock out criterion there. Obviously the question is how can you stop killings, but don't do regime change. This is not so easy, maybe impossible in Libya as well as Syria. But you have to understand the colonial history and the apartheid regime. Looking at the competences between the UN and NATO and complete ignorance towards the African Union mediation efforts, I think the global system of governance is still very much fragmented. If one organization issues a mandate, the other one executes it. On a different continent, this will relate to political questions and problems. On the other hand, African actors simply do not have the military capabilities to intervene and stop killing. If you don't have the capabilities, political dynamics move to other actors. Overstretch of mandate relates to the regime change question and ignorance towards the AU mediation efforts. But it's not so easy. Yes, the AU tried to negotiate peace under the leadership of Zuma for Libya, but that mission wasn't completely unproblematic. First of all, Africa is very often not united. It is often fragmented and lots of sub-regional institutions and they also don't always coordinate. In this case, it was the League of Arab States, which was taking the initiatives, not the African Union; they were always politically

behind in terms of the timing, so they also have to ask themselves "have we done everything to get involved as early as possible?" The answer is maybe not so charming.

Zuma's speech in the General Assembly the following year repeated positions that he was saying before. The main problem was the problem of accountability of NATO, there was lacking of oversight. That ties in with the Brazilian position of Responsibility While Protecting. The Libyan case was seen as an abuse of global powers and concepts of R2P. I should mention that in Africa, most countries including South Africa are not using that term [R2P] at all because it is seen as too political. We are more often speaking of protection of civilians.

It is also of critical importance that the UN is impartial and is not taking sides. That reflects the fear that some powers can hijack the peace agenda. The South African position on Syria pretty much puts forward that not the Friends of Syria should be involved in peace negotiations but it must be the UN. The UN must not take sides and try to be an honest and open peace negotiator.

Let's go to Syria. The South African position basically is that while there is no space for a military solution, peace talks must be organized within the United Nations. There's no space for the so-called friends of Syria. It is pretty much rejecting military intervention with the argument that this would aggravate humanitarian suffering. Behind that is also the fear that global powers can hijack the agenda and that the main issue is not really peace and security, but who will win the war in the end. What you can see in South African statements is very often that we want to have a balanced position towards Syria. What does that mean in practice? That means it includes Assad but also all other rebel groups. South Africa was involved in the peace talks earlier this year in January and February, and the position was always that peace talks have to be all-inclusive. This is not really agreeable for many. Most Western powers say that there cannot be any future for Assad in the country. So this is a very different position from what South Africa is taking. In a presentation, the Syrian ambassador thanked South Africa for the very balanced approach to the Syrian conflict, and then there was applause in the room. The question we could ask is why would people consent with the Syrian ambassador in that regard? There could be different interpretations. On the one hand there could be agreement with the Assad side. I don't think that was the case and I don't think South Africa would favour humanitarian suffering, but the sensitivity towards great power relations, which can overrule incentives for really looking for a peace solution, would be my explanation for that reaction in the end.

Let me finish on a few points here. The South African position on average looks very anti-interventionist but this is not necessarily always the case. The problem is really if non-African powers are misusing their power and position, especially on the African continent. You can see, especially very recently, South Africa is investing in more interventionist policies and they have done it in the eastern DRC with the international intervention debate. South Africa is very much pushing the agenda on the African continent for the African capacity for immediate response to crisis, which is a kind of intervention force. It's still in the making, we don't know what it will do in the end, but they explicitly refer to protection of civilians.

Lessons learned from the South African perspective is that intervention as such may not be negative, they can be ok, but what we don't like is there's neo-colonialist undertones there and therefore we have to invest in our own capacities, and this is exactly what South Africa is doing. In a way, it's also playing this power game on the African continent.

Keynote Address

Dr. Jennifer Welsh: Thank you so much John, I'm glad that you gave me the opportunity to come after John, someone who is truly a citizen in the world but also someone who does go into the papers, as he alluded to, and has provided us with such fantastic understanding of historical events about Canadian foreign policy. It's delightful to be introduced by John and to be here with all of you. I mean he stole much of my punchline in terms of the respect I have for the students who have organized this conference. My predecessor in this role, Ed Luck has talked increasingly, particularly since he's left the role interestingly, about the individual Responsibility to Protect. Responsibility as a demanding idea that ultimately resides in individuals. I think what you are doing your work in organizing the conference but also the events in between, is exercising your individual responsibility and recognizing the role we all have to play, and so I'm very glad that you extended an invitation for me to come it's wonderful to be with you. The panels look fantastic and have no doubt lead to the kind of stimulating discussion that this subject lends itself to. I think it's why we have so many developing dissertations in this field in student work, because it is an area rich with so many difficult questions and so many moral and political and legal issues and so I thought what I would do is talk a little bit about successes and challenges with respect to the Responsibility to Protect.

I want to consciously focus on successes, because I think we too often do not do that. We focus only on the negative and I want to just tell you a little bit about my priorities in the role and also link what I'm doing a little bit to a broader effort in the United Nations called "Rights Up Front" which I will talk about. But firstly let me just begin by casting our minds back to twenty years ago and me and then some folding in Rwanda. In some ways when we all think about our lifetimes, this seems like a long time ago, but it's not that long ago and there are many people in Rwanda, indeed, many people who will be at the variety of commemoration services that will be the week of April 7th in Kigali, that will remember all too clearly the horrors that befell that society and also the very complex relationship with international actors and the systematic failure of international support. While Rwanda in some sense seems far away, because we could think about the progress the country has made but also internationally we have made, we have unfolding before our very eyes in the Central African Republic a real, profound crisis of individual protection. I have had the opportunity to see reports from what's happening in the Central African Republic. I've had the opportunity to hear profoundly disturbing accounts of the nature of the violence going on inside the country, which has become despite what some want to characterize it as, or not as, sectarian in nature, and so individuals as young as two or three months old are being targeted for killing simply because they are Muslim, and we have a lot of work to do. My fear is that despite the engagement we see, and we do see international engagement, that's part of what I will tell you about, the lag between our decisions and the action we can take on the ground is so profound and so I really fear that by the time the area has a UN peacekeeping force on the ground, which I hope there will be, the worst will happen and we have to hope that that is not the case. Perhaps we can come back to think about this particular case. I want you all to keep it in your minds' because it is very real, it sometimes falls off the headlines. But it is one of the most pressing humanitarian crises before our eyes today in March-April 2014.

So let me move on from that to talk about successes and challenges for the Responsibility to Protect and start with successes.

I think the Responsibility to Protect principle and all experienced architects who have had a hand in that, does offer us a multi-layered conceptual framework that carefully balances the needs to respect sovereignty and the non-use of unilateral force, and the need to protect people from the most serious crimes. These are crimes that have been deemed to be international crimes in a special category of crimes. I think that framework is incredibly promising, and has already had tangible effects.

There are a number of developments in the R2P evolution which lay a foundation for, I think, progressive policy developments going forward. I think, firstly, the successes we can point to is that the debate on R2P protect has shifted largely, I wouldn't say entirely, from what the principal entails to how best to implement it, and that is a sign of success.

 I think, secondly, that civil society now has Responsibility to Protect as well and it has an additional tool to hold governments accountable. There's growing support for Responsibility to Protect in civil society globally, not just in Western countries.

Thirdly, and I see this very directly the Responsibility to Protect principle has fostered a wealth of applied research on the risk factors and triggers for atrocity crimes, and on possible tools to address them. There is obviously more we can do, but it has been a huge catalyst in that regard.

Fourthly, states' responsibilities with respect to the crimes associated with R2P have been reinforced in very tangible ways over the last three to four years. Whether we think of national focal points that individual countries have appointed, or the passing of domestic legislation, which is important, or through more informal policy mechanisms.

Fifth, R2P has been linked to two very important capacity-building agendas, human rights and development, Both which are routed in a relationship of partnership between the state and the international community. I want to say a bit more about that, because I think those agendas in the way that they are understood both within the United Nations and other agencies, holds a lot of promise for the implementation of Responsibility to Protect.

Finally, I think states' public endorsement of Responsibility to Protect has had positive knock-on effects. The discourse in crisis situations both inside and outside the United Nations has increasingly focused on protection and the prevention of atrocity crimes. It is a tangible discourse. Now someone may say "does that discourse lead to action" and of course I want to address that, but what I believe, and what I said in some my writings, is that I think a discourse, the use of the language, gives rise to what I would call a duty of conduct. We must at least discuss, we must at least deal with the situations and deliberate on the best way going forward. This is where we have to think about twenty years as being a long time, because you could claim twenty twenty-five years ago that crimes of this nature occurring inside the domestic jurisdiction in another state were not a legitimate matter international concern. You cannot say that any longer and this is a very important normative advancement.

In addition to that I see the UN a variety of initiatives on member states they're led by member states not by us and the Secretariat, which have the potential to advance the support of the Responsibility to Protect principle. One is the very lively group of friends on the Responsibility to Protect. We had a luncheon in New York yesterday, and the co-chair (the co-chairs of the group of friends are Rwanda and the Netherlands) and the Dutch chair said "You know this is the most fun group of friends." He said it was the most active and the most fun. Yesterday, we had a representative at the UN who had just been back from South Sudan briefing the ambassador and it was a very rich, lively discussion, which doesn't occur in all the group of friends within the United Nations. Secondly, there's a very interesting French proposal on the table to restrict the use of the veto in atrocity situations. I have some thoughts about that, where it may be likely to lead, but French diplomacy on this is incredibly interesting at this moment.

 I said I wanted to start with the good, but of course there are challenges. Discussion on the Responsibility to Protect is too often on the activity of the Security Council, versus other bodies, and the focus on implementation is too often on coercive mechanisms, versus other alternatives. As that statement suggests, there is a continued tendency among many to associate Responsibility to Protect with the use of military force only, and in some cases with regime change. This is a long-standing problem, it's very real and some would say has become more real since the Libya conflict, which you've no doubt discussed.

Before I move on to other challenges, I would say two things about that which are somewhat paradoxical. The first is I do not think we can judge the success of this principle on the basis of whether or not we see military action. And that's for a variety of reasons, the first and most obvious of which is that the principle of Responsibility to Protect is what might think it is a complex norm or principal it has a few different prescriptions within it. It asks states to bring about a certain state of affairs, protection, but the way in which you do that could vary and indeed the summit outcome document talks about even under pillar 3 political, diplomatic, humanitarian means. Secondly, I would say somewhat paradoxically we can never lose the kernel at the heart of Responsibility to Protect, which was always that the international community has in some instances a remedial role, and if other mechanisms fail it must be prepared to assume its remedial role, and in some cases that may involve the use of military force.

Now I will say standing here and there are some members at the R2P community don't like it when I say this but I will say it to be somewhat provocative anyway. The statement I'm about to make is not a normative one. It's not about what I think should or should not happen. It's about what I assess to be our current possibilities. I do think the Libya crisis has made it unlikely that in the near term you will see the use of force authorized by the Security Council against a state without its consent, for civilian protection purposes. We need to remember how rare Libya is, in fact there are many, and I'm one of them, that believe it was the only instance we have seen UN support without the consent of the host a for civilian protection purposes. There are others cases which are close - Bosnia, Somalia - but I think you can make claims to suggest there was a formal consent, or that there was no government to give consent. Now, in fact these cases should be rare. The United Nations as an organization should not generally seek to intervene without the

consent of the host. It should be an exceptional measure, but that is not to say it should never happen. That's why I said I didn't want to make a normative statement. But given the current politics we have I think it's unlikely to happen. What we're likely to see instead, and I think this is where we should turn some of our attention, is we are likely to see authorized missions with the protection purpose that have the consent of the state, whether for stabilization or peacekeeping, that have a very robust protection mandate within them. They are Chapter 7, robust protection. Then, the question becomes how to protect. How do you really protect civilians? Which will be our question if and when a peacekeeping mission is up and running in the CAR.

Now that doesn't mean that many of you as scholars in the audience shouldn't stop thinking about the variety of ways in which force might be used and should be used, but it's just to say I think we need to be aware of our current context.

There are some other challenges with Responsibility to Protect, let me mention a few with them. There's also, I think it's related to the point I made a moment ago, the challenge that there is in the inbuilt inconsistency in the Security Council's approach to Responsibility to Protect. It's right there in the Summit Outcome Document which invites state's to act on a case by case basis, which invites state's to act through the existing collective security mechanisms in the charter, which means the political decision-making of Security Council. So that inconsistency is in a sense unavoidable. However, that doesn't mean that all actors are inconsistent and this may be be consolation to some of you, but those of us in the secretariat or in other bodies or other actors need to be as consistent as possible calling what we see what it is, recognizing that the Security Council will act inconsistently. That is the paradox we face, but it doesn't mean we can stop trying to be as consistent as we need to be and so, I don't know if this has come up in the conference yet, but I think it's very significant. I think it is a very important moment in the evolution of Responsibility to Protect, that the Commission of Inquiry on North Korea released in mid-February talks about explicitly the manifest failure of the North Korean government to protect and the remedial role of the international community. What will follow from that? Very unlikely military intervention. But it's an interesting question for all of us as to how that international role should be exercised in that incredibly difficult case. You know we've been discussing over the last few months about how difficult Syria, and it is, think about this case. I invite all to read that Commission of Inquiry, think about the systematic and decades long political oppression of a kind we have not seen in many other countries in the world, so it's a big challenge.

A second challenge, although I like to think of it as "opportunity," is that there are varying regional and sub-regional interpretations of the Responsibility to Protect and different terms and language. I think there are ways that we can work with this and should work with this because ultimately implementation should be much more local and regional.

There's a third challenge as well and that is that the strong human rights machinery we already have within the United Nations and other bodies, makes the Responsibility to Protect superfluous. What value does it really have? If we have special procedures, special rapporteurs going around the world pointing to these early indicators of serious human rights violations that

might escalate, what does R2P bring to the table? There's a real question about value-added which I grapple with every day.

There's also a very real challenge, fourthly, among humanitarian organizations and even UN agencies engaged in humanitarian work about the political and coercive dimensions of R2P. This is a very, very real issue and it becomes even more difficult when Responsibility to Protect is connected to an agenda of accountability, because you think about those who are on the ground most likely to be in a position to gather information that might be used for the potential pursuit of accountability, and how difficult a difficult a position that places humanitarian organizations in. As we saw in Darfur when they were kicked out of Darfur. This is one we could talk about for many days on end: the continued difficulty in mobilizing the UN and other organizations indeed for preventive early action. Ban Ki-Moon said last year was the year of prevention and we have talked about prevention many times, but there's a difficulty in providing solid proof for the effectiveness of prevention and we still face obstacles in terms of how we assess information and how we act upon it.

Lastly, I would say there's a challenge in that Responsibility to Protect is still too often a UN discussion. It needs to be a much broader based discussion, particularly regionally.
So what are some of my priorities in terms of responding to those challenges. Well, in a general sense a partial response is to continue to emphasize that responsibility project is a multi-dimensional agenda with a wide range of tools. This year, the report of the Secretary-General will be on the second pillar and it will try to identify much more concrete ways how the international community can assist states in their protection responsibilities. It also means that even within pillar 3, states and other actors have a range of diplomatic humanitarian and political mechanisms for filling their Responsibility to Protect and we need to give greater emphasis to these alternative tools.

Now one of those tools of humanitarian access is I think a particularly interesting one. Because if we focus on what the Security Council has not done, we forget one thing it has begun to do, although it took a long time, and that was to press for humanitarian access in Syria and there is a very real sense that furthering humanitarian access is part of the responsibility of the Council and other agencies and there's a very interesting opening in the Geneva Conventions on the arbitrary withholding of consent for relief operations. We haven't thought much about what that means or what that entitles actors to do when consent for relief is arbitrarily withheld, I would submit to you that this is part of what we should be thinking about under the Responsibility to Protect. How do we implement the principal of humanitarian access and what are the different roles of different actors in doing that? The Security Council has a role, but others have a role, indeed the Secretary-General has a role which he's tried to play in this respect.

A second priority, and this is difficult, but important, is to continue to stress the distinction between atrocity prevention and conflict prevention and the need for particular attention to the risk factors for atrocity crimes. They overlap in many instances, but we know that at least a third of the cases of atrocities against individual populations have occurred outside the context of a formal armed conflict and if you add to this point and you look at some other work that John Western and others have been doing meaning, you will see that there are trends telling us that

there's a decline in form but there is still widespread political violence. R2P is a broad agenda that encompasses both peacetime and conflict and indeed again North Korea is an example: Crimes against humanity can be committed outside the context of an armed conflict.

A third priority for me is to continue to stress the collective nature of the Responsibility to Protect, the range of actors who bear it. It is not just owned by the Security Council, and indeed if it was we should all be pretty despondent where we sit right now.
I think as well, finally, there are some more specific priorities that I am seeking to pursue within the United Nations, and that is to make Responsibility to Protect, like other agendas that have developed over time, make those agendas incorporate an atrocity prevention and response perspective. So that means actively working with those in human rights machinery at the UN, the development machinery at the UN, and in the conflict prevention machinery at the UN, to bring our particular perspective to bear. That brings me to the Rights Up Front Initiative, which I don't know how many of you know about. The start of my tenure actually, in my present role, coincided with the release of an action plan within the United Nations that responded to the Petrie report which criticized the UN for its "systematic failure" during the final phases of the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2009. I would say as a sidebar, and you might say she would say this, that the UN has done their soul searching. When are other individual states going to do there soul searching? The UN has done that, doesn't mean it solves every problem, but for a year it has looked at what it did. I think it is time for others to do the same.

But within the UN this has led to a new initiative called Rights Up Front, which is meant to act upon the founding documents of the UN which place human rights centrally to the purposes the organization and to put rights up front in the operation of the institution both at the field and at headquarters. Now some of you might ask: wasn't it already doing that? No, it was not, and you can see the many ways in which it was not. I think it is interesting that although the Rights Up Front Initiative doesn't speak a great deal about R2P, although it is part of it, in many ways R2P is at the heart of it. If you think about it, the three times the UN has engaged in soul-searching about failure: Rwanda in 1994, after Srebrenica, and now Sri Lanka, these are not instances in which the UN is looking internally to ask why it didn't prevent these conflicts, although that is part of the story. Instead, it's a reflection on why in the midst of conflicts, which we know occur, why did acts which have no place in armed conflict -genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes - take place. Even if we cannot prevent all conflicts, we must seek to prevent those acts we deem to be crimes. It reminds me of the discourse around Rwanda: "This is a civil conflict, this stuff goes on in civil conflict" – no, that does not happen in a legitimate conflict. So, I think through this initiative we have an opportunity to think about how R2P will be placed more up front in the work of the United Nations. What that means, I think, for the Office, and I'll end with the very local - with the Office where I work, alongside the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide – firstly, it involves being at the center of the information gathering and analysis, which we will be, interestingly. It involves developing criteria for how we assess situations of risk, what factors we look at, how we assess the likelihood of atrocities, and how action is then mobilized within the system. The Office will be playing a very important role there, and we have a new framework of analysis for atrocity crimes, which if it's not already up on the website will be very soon, which I invite you all to look at.

Secondly, there is going to be a massive retraining of UN staff at every level on Rights Up Front, and also thinking about how these key positions within the UN - the field level positions, resident coordinators, special representatives of the Secretary-General, heads of peacekeeping missions - how they could incorporate atrocity prevention into what they do.

Lastly, more in terms of decision-making, what the Rights Up Front initiative talks about in terms of the Article 99 Culture: The idea that senior officials at the United Nations need to tell member states what they need to hear, not what they always want to hear. Even though we have no operational capacity, there is a responsibility to speak. There is in the Charter, that role for the Secretary-General, and so thinking about that from an atrocity perspective, how and when Article 99 can be exercised, it's interesting this just how slow and rigid the system can be. Even after the horrors of Rwanda, it took the Security Council an extremely long time to even put the issue of Darfur on its agenda, never mind to agree or not agree on action, to even discuss it took months: very difficult to insert an issue on the Security Council agenda. The Central African Republic it was discussed not on the formal agenda the Security Council, it was discussed through an Arria-formula meeting, a sort of innovative meeting, a bit like peacekeeping, an innovative adaptation of the rules to allow for states to bring forward issues of concern. It was the French who organized an Arria for me in which our office was invited to brief the Security Council on the situation. See it is still very difficult and this shows us the challenge we face, and to bring issues to the attention of decision-makers because of concerns that all states continue to have about transparency.

So I began on successes, but I have to end on challenges because there is a great deal to do and I want to encourage particularly students in the audience to continue your research on Responsibility to Protect. There are many questions we still need to answer. Share your ideas, advocate where you can, but also to be very sensitive to the complexities and why individuals and states are skeptical in the way that they are. One of the things I've tried to bring to my position is a respect for those who have expressed concern about Responsibility to Protect, and not concern solely on self-interested grounds or concern that, as Gareth Evans likes to say, is due to misunderstanding. He's right there some misunderstandings, but instead concern that is principled, concern that reflects normative commitments which happened to be slightly different to those underpinning Responsibility to Protect. We live in a world where there are many norms that coincide and bump up against each other in very complex ways, and those of us who are committed to the principle have to be very acutely sensitive to that.

Panel #3 "From Rwandan Genocide to R2P: A Journey of Lessons Learned?"

Dr. Ramesh Thakur

Good afternoon, everyone. I represent R2P's past. Jennifer represents R2P's future. Logically, I should have spoken earlier. The organizers, in fact, had this session earlier but as you will know, this conference coincides with the meeting of the International Studies Association. I had already committed to two panels of the ISA today. I had one in the morning, then I've come back here. I will have to leave, I suspect, before this whole session finishes overall. My apologizes for that. But my thanks to the organizers of this wonderful event for accommodating my commitments of the ISA. This means that the logic is a bit back-to-front.

Listening to Jennifer reminded me that I think we should, in fact, never forget that the R2P is part of the very long, good story, in that it is part of the broader historical narrative. Very well captured in Steven Pinker's *A Better Angels* where conflict, atrocities, have declined overtime quite remarkably. Based, he argues, on three factors: empathy; reasoning; and moral sensibility. Think about these two, three objective now in R2P and you can see immediately how closely aligned they are. I said I represent R2P past. If you go back in time to the 1990s, the angry and bitter debate on humanitarian intervention in the last century highlighted a triple-policy dilemma with which we grappled— of complicity, paralysis, or illegality.

One, if we have the means to stop mass-killings but choose to look the other way, we are part-complicit in the atrocities through our deliberate act of omission. Rwanda genocide in 1994 fits this description. Two, if we insist that any effective international action to protect populations at-risk of mass atrocities must be formally authorized by the Security Council, the practical effect is to surrender the agenda to the *obstructness* of any one of the P5 as has been the case in Syria, or indeed to the empathy and indifference of the Council as a whole, as was the case in Rwanda in '94. Three- but if we accept, therefore, that effective intervention by one power or a collation of states is justified, as with NATO in Kosovo in '99, we are endorsing action that under existing UN Charter Law is illegal.

The tragedy of the Rwanda genocide in '94, and the cruel paradox of the Serbian massacre of Bosnian civilians, sheltering under UN protected safe-areas in Sarajevo in '95, was powerful stimuli to the normative-shift from neutral combat-averse and passive peace-keeping to the mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat. However, the use of force by the benevolent, enlightened, and impartial- in-intent has empirical consequences. It shapes the struggle for power, and helps to determine the outcome of that political contest. This is why it is inherently controversial, contested, and contentious. Libya was the first road-test of the coercive pillars of R2P. Its evocation was almost a textbook illustration of R2P principles, but implementation proved controversial and contested. However, I think it is premature to conclude that R2P has morphed into RIP.

For three hundred and fifty years after the Treaty of Westphalia, sovereignty shielded tyrants from external accountability for acts of domestic brutality. In 2001, with Canada's help, independent international commissions formulated the innovative principles of the Responsibility to Protect, which spoke eloquently to the need to change the UN's normative framework to align with threats and victims. R2P is the normative instrument of choice for converting a shocked international conscience into decisive, collective action—for channeling individual, moral-indignation into collective policy remedies to prevent and stop atrocities. In the vacuum of responsibility for the safety of the marginalized, stigmatised, and dehumanized out-group subject to mass atrocities, R2P provides an entry-point for the international community to step-in and take up both the moral and the military slake. It is the acceptance of a duty of care by all of us who live in zones of safety, but all who are trapped in zones of danger. It strikes a balance between unilateral interference rooted in the arrogance of power and institutionalized indifference that dislocates the other from the self.

Our 2001 Report argued that the essential nature of sovereignty had changed from state-privileges and immunities to the responsibility to protect people from atrocity crimes. Where the state defaulted on its responsibility or into complicity or lack of will or capacity, the responsibly trips upwards to the international community acting through the UN. Its unanimous endorsement by world leaders in 2005 added clarity, rigour, and specificity. None of us commissioners thought it was R2P— limiting the triggering events to war crimes, genocides, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. And so, re-aligning the emerging global political norm to existing categories of international legal crimes. That was the most consequential import of the 2005 reformulation.

Secretary-General special reports, and we have one written by Jennifer later this year, have helped to consolidate international consensus on R2P. Civil-society organizations, including the CCR2P here, have promoted vigorous process of R2P norm socialization and crystallization. The annual debates of the General Assembly have helped to forge shared understanding of R2P to distinguish it from humanitarian intervention and align it with building capacities to help states exercise their sovereignty more effectively, but also more responsibly.

There was only one example of a successful road-testing of the non-military side of R2P before 2011. When post-election violence broke out in Kenya, in December 2007, January 2008, Kofi Annan successfully mediated a power-sharing deal by approaching his task, explicitly in his mind, through the R2P prevention lens.

Of all, the mobilization power potential and the limitations of R2P were demonstrated, I think, in Libya in 2011. R2P was the discourse of choice in debating how best to respond to the crisis, and the Security Counsel for the first time invoked R2P Pillar Three, under the course of Section VII of the Charter, in its military dimension. Remember in the Balkans, it took NATO

almost the full decade to intervene with air-power in Kosovo in 1999. Libya, it took just one month, to mobilize the broad coalition, secure a UN mandate to protect civilians, establish and then enforce no-fly zones, stop Gaddafi's advancing army and prevent a massacre of the innocent Benghazi, which I have no doubt would have taken place had we not intervened. Carefully crafted, both to authorize and delimit the scope of intervention, Resolution 1973 authorized the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. But, it proscribed intervention in the civil war, regime-change and foreign occupation of Libya. NATO ignored the restrictions to target Gaddafi in pursuit of regime-change, and intervened in the internal civil war on the side of the rebels. All the countries reflecting majority-developing country-opinion objected strongly to the shift from the politically-neutral posture of civilian protection to the partial goal of assisting the rebels and pursuing regime-change.

We talked about Syria in the last session. It seems to me that the failure to protect civilians in Syria stems from five separate sets of factors, and it is important that we recognize that. First, civil war. Assad launched a fierce crackdown on the initially-peaceful pro-democracy protests and the country swiftly descended into full-fledged civil war that sucked-in various foreign jihadists and rival outside backers causing three challenges that are inherent to arm-civil war contexts. And these are a better explanation for the difficulties we have experienced in Sri Lanka, than a facile division of the world into us good guys in the West- who pursue normative issues and principles- and those Bad guys, like Russia and China and their backers and supporters, who would pursue realpolitik. If you believe the United States and France and the U.K., do not pursue realpolitik in Security Council, as the saying goes, 'There is a tower in Paris, I'd like to sell you.'

The three charges are: One, is the recognized-state prohibited from employing force to fend-off armed challengers to its authority? Two, with the ensuing spread and escalation of humanitarian crises, how can the moral hazard of encouraging other opposition and secessionist groups to take-up arms against governments elsewhere be avoided, with the resulting spread and intensification of managing crises? Three – and this came up in some of the comments in Jennifer's answers – what is the appropriate boundary and demarcation between R2P on the one hand, and international humanitarian human-rights laws in regulating the conduct of conflict-parties in civil wars [on the other]?

So there are problems, confused facts in culpability – and again Jennifer leads you to that. In any war, it seems to me, critical question marks must be substituted for excitable exclamation marks regarding facts and responses. Too often, slogans pass for policy. Something must be done. This is something. Therefore, *this* must be done. Causality figures are deliberately manipulated and misused through casual allusion. Leading American politicians routinely condemn the Assad regime for having massacred more than a hundred-thousand people. The best available estimate as of mid-September last-year broke down the total following as follows,

round numbers: civilians 40,000; rebels, 22,000; government soldiers; 28,000, pro-regime militants; 1800, other unaccounted; 3000 for a total of 300, 11. So, that the total was more than 100,000 did not mean that the regime was responsible for massacring more than 100,000.

Similarly with regards to chemical-use, a qualitative escalation that does cause the atrocity threshold, the West did not help its credibility problem by jumping from the fact that they were used, to the conclusion that they were used by the regime. Seymour Hersh argues that, like Bush and Iraq in 2003, Obama cherry-picked facts and intelligence, presenting assumptions as facts, implying a sequence that reversed reality and omitting important intelligence pointing to the jihadists' capabilities to make and mark a chemical-weapon attack.

Three, limited-response options. How could the world respond without influencing a volatile situation? The fluid and confused internal situation. Question marks over the identity, intent, and methods of the rebels. The risk of atrocities against minority groups if the regime collapses. Relations with Iran, China, and Russia and the deepening Sunni-Shiite divide all over the Islamic crescent made it impossible to assess the balance of consequences of outside-intervention. A war-weary U.S. public doubts the West has any dog in the fight in the Syrian civil war, where a rebel commander filmed himself eating the heart of a government soldier, and where almost half the rebel fighters are jihadists. There is the added risk of blow-back as radicalized Western Muslims take up arms to fight in Syria and return with an extremist ideology and battle experience. Or, four, Libya fatigue. The NATO operation in 2011 exposed a critical gap between the proclamation of a no-fly zone, the prohibition of regime-change, and effective provision of civilian protection. You cannot do all three together. The Post-Ghadafi's turmoil on volatility in Libya further complicated international responses to the ongoing crises in Syria by raising doubts about the long-term results of R2P-type military action.

Five, disunity in the Security Council. Remember, no foreign countries have been attacked by Syria. Other than self-defence against armed-attack, only UN authorization provides legal cover for military strikes. China and Russia were resolutely and adamantly opposed to any authorization of action or any resolution that could set in motion a sequence of events leading to [UN Security Council Resolution] 1973-type military operations in Syria. Without UN authorization, military strikes would be neither lawful nor legitimate, just another instance of vigilante justice by a trigger-happy and seemingly out-of-control West. The non-West rest saw a determination about the NATO P3 to enforce humanitarian norms inside other countries' sovereignty restrictions by flouting higher-order global norms on restrictions on the threat and use of force internationally. And the latter are more critical to most countries' national security and to international stability.

After the allegations of chemical-warfare on 21 August, President Obama and Secretary Kerry clamoured for Syria to submit to US authority and surrender to American might. What Russia

did instead was to subject Syria to international law and to UN authority to get rid of its chemical weapons at the price of no regime change. Putin's op-ed in the New York Times laid out a narrative of the United States as an international rogue-state. Addicted to bullying weaklings in the global-backyard who refuse to cow-down to its dictates. A morally-dubious provenance of the author could not take away the sharp sting of his analysis.

To conclude, Syria has thrown-up challenges, but has not thrown out R2P. There is interest in clarifying the norm further – Jennifer's day job – and tightening operation safeguards to prevent misuses: for example, through the Brazilian conception of Responsibility While Protecting, or a Chinese version of responsible protection. But there is no demand to rescind the norm per se. Protecting civilians is indeed a wicked problem with no solutions, only better or worse outcomes. Warfare is inherently brutal. There is nothing humanitarian about the means. This is why external military intervention must only and always be the option of last resort. But, to be meaningful, R2P spectrum of action must include military force as the option of last resort.

Thank-you.

Mr. Moses Gashirabake: Good afternoon everyone. Thank you very much Tina for that wonderful introduction. I am indeed very humbled to be here today to share with you on this wonderful panel with Dr. Ramesh and Furio. It is indeed a very multi-cultural panel and I of course, appreciate the values that Canada upholds: multiculturalism and freedom of speech and other democratic ideals. Before I begin I would also like to recognize the presence of my colleague, Ms. Gloria Kim. I am working with her closely, alongside other students at the Faculty of Law at McGill in setting up the CCR2P center on our campus.

So about 5 years ago when I first came to Canada, it was actually very interesting because most people on campus [would be] doing events and [they] would ask me where I am from. And every time someone asked me where I was from and I told them—and I must say, proudly—that I was from Rwanda, almost 100% of the time, the fast follow-up question would be along the lines of: "Are you Hutu or Tutsi?" To their bewilderment, I always responded to the question as well, [and] I would basically ask, "Why do you ask?" In most cases, there would be an awkward moment of silence and the conversation about my origin would end and ceremoniously, we swiftly moved to a more interesting topic such as why the Canadian winter is so long and brutally cold.

Interestingly, I begin with this anecdote because for 13 years [that] I lived in Kenya, there was sort of a lost moment in my life. We arrived in Kenya; I was a very young person so my parents were mostly focusing on healing and fending for the family and all of that. For close to 15 years, we never talked about the genocide. Then I came to Canada and of course, I was also a bit sensitive about the issue. I came to Canada and Canadians are talking about my country—[about] the most devastating issue that has happened in my country—more than I did when I was growing up. That basically struck a chord in me and despite the fact that I begun as a Biochemistry Major, I ended up switching into political science to understand more my history and also I ended up going to the Faculty of Law.

So today, is indeed, a very good day, because I have always dreamt of meeting in person Dr. Jennifer Welsh, as well as Dr. John English; I have read extensively about their work and it's amazing, so thank you CCR2P for making my dream come true.

Basically, in the past, I grew up with the rhetoric that we the youth are the leaders of tomorrow, [and] what I witnessed here today, in terms of how well organized this conference is, is a true testimony that we the youth are indeed the leaders of today. As Stephanie Power mentioned this morning—and this is to the youth—let us aim for public service for the betterment of our communities. This also made me remember the comment that Dr. English alluded to in terms of education. Education is indeed, most endurable with human interaction. I recently read an article in the Globe of Mail that education, just like love, cannot be simply moved online—even though online education can be useful, it cannot really move that way.

So the relevance of the conference today strikes the chord because we are remembering the 20th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda and beginning this week, there [are] a series of events, across the globe, which were inspired [by] Rwanda. These events adopt a global "umuganda," and "umaganda" is a word that means coming together for a common purpose. Today we are also coming together to learn from each other's experiences, scholarships, activism against mass atrocities, as was mentioned, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.

My brief presentation today will draw closely on my personal experiences as a Rwandan Genocide survivor at a very young age—I was only about 6 years old when that event occurred – and basically lessons growing up as an undocumented refugee in Kenya, and as a new Canadian who is a student of politics and law, as well as a humanitarian passionate about rights and diplomacy.

I will begin with a little bit about myself: I was born about 26 years ago in Rwanda and in 1994, I was fortunate to survive a genocide that took away the lives of about 1 million fellow Rwandans. After passing through the Democratic Republic of Congo [and] Uganda, we arrived in Kenya at the beginning of 1995. Like most refugees at that time, I briefly lived in a refugee camp in the Democratic Republic of Congo. I must say I was lucky because my father operated businesses across East Africa, so Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. He owned property in Kenya, so he basically had some resources to continue business unlike many refugees who, up to today, stay in refugee camps in the Congo. Dr. Welsh talked about how 20 years could seem like a very long time, but for people who still suffer from the consequences of 1994 it has been a huge issue.

When we got to Kenya, interestingly, my father did not bother with trying to secure a refugee status in Kenya mainly because—and not to criticize Furio who works for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—the process was painstakingly difficult. It was difficult because there were many refugees coming [from] all across and at that time in Kenya, the United Nations office was understaffed. I came to also find out that the process was also very political in terms of trying to seek a refugee status, because basically Kenya was worried about its own internal security due to a huge influx of refugees from not only from Rwanda, but also Sudan, Burundi and Somalia. If you have been following news from way back, Somalia has been a huge threat to Kenya in terms of terrorism so it was basically a legitimate claim.

So between 1995 and 2000, about 9 out of 10 cases of refugee claims were rejected by the UNHCR office in Nairobi. The success rate to be recognized as a refugee was only 10% and there were also a very long line [in order] to be granted an initial appointment. My father took a pragmatic decision which I think was the most liable one. He concentrated on immediate family needs, doing business to fend for us, his family; I have 9 sisters and 2 brothers. We have a big family and I sincerely sit here up to today, [and] I look back and wonder how he was able to do

that. He was also spearheading our family healing process from the psychological trauma of surviving the horrible genocide and losing many friends and loved ones, especially for my mother's side.

2 years prior to my father's passing away in 2012, I asked him how he managed to do all that. The answer he gave me was very simple and it connected to what Jennifer Welsh talked about: empathy, friendship, networking with other human beings. My father happened to be a man of the people so he was able to move around and God bless his soul for doing that. I would say that through my father's hard-work and encouragement, I worked hard in school and was able to be accepted to a high school that not many other stateless refugees had ever been able to be accepted [to].

I must say it was not an easy thing because one did not require for example, a national identity card to attend elementary and high school in Kenya, so I was lucky that way. When I look back, my being here today on this panel is based on that opportunity that I had to attend a high school, of which Kenya's former President Mwai Kibaki is an alumnus. So, the grounding that I got— and for me, every day I wake up, [and] it pains me to have so many young people in Kenya, most of them teenagers, who do not have these opportunities for various reasons, like being refugees in a different country or lack of access to financial resources.

After high school, however, I did not become legally recognized as a Kenyan, even though my father had hoped to secure Kenya citizenship, but that never happened. That meant despite the fact that I had qualified for full government funding to study law at the University of Nairobi, I was blocked from accessing a university education in Kenya. But that was a blessing in disguise, because I applied to schools, universities in [the] United States of America and Canada, and interestingly, Canada accepted me, not only with a scholarship, but [also] with a legal status. So that is how I moved to Canada in 2008 and became a permanent resident in 2009.

I have lived and attended post-secondary education in Montreal since 2009 and coming to Canada, particularly, the city of Montreal was a major turning point in my life. In addition to feeling at home in a diverse and multicultural city, I had the rare opportunity of connecting with my past through the academic study of genocide and the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, something that I never thought would happen. Today, I consider it a privilege to have graduated from Concordia University and am currently working towards a law degree at McGill University.

Lessons from Canadian values from the last 5 years have not only restored my faith in humanity but also encouraged me to share my own story for the betterment of humanity and also to be an advocate for the principle for the Responsibility to Protect so that it can eventually be recognized as a norm in international law. As we commemorate the despicable and preventable genocide that took away 1 million fellow Rwandans, mostly ethnic Tutsis, in a span of 100 days, it is not only essential to remember, but to also be proactive in sharing hope. And hope can be shared

through stories of survivor resilience, scholarship, prevention of mass atrocities, and as we are doing here, organizing conferences like this one, and simply taking responsibility as we all did here today.

As the theme of my presentation goes, being here today to tell my own story is attributable to the education of opportunities that I was exposed to, especially in Canada. Despite some challenges here and there—of course, Canada is not a perfect country—you Canadians should be proud of the country that you built, which we all continue to build.

I'm going to switch to my legal and political side and talk a little bit [about] the influence that my post-secondary training had on the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. As Dr. Jon Western alluded to the peace treaty of Westphalia of 1648 which ended 30 years of war in the Holy Roman Empire and 80 years of war between Spain and the Dutch Republic, with Spain formally recognizing the independence of the Dutch Republic, you find that issues of conflict have existed for a long time in Europe and they were related to state formation. Interestingly, if you go back into the African continent—this is mostly where I focus—in the late 1800s when the African continent was being divided prior to colonialism, they never took into consideration the diversity of the African continent. You will find one country that has many ethnicities in one state and, of course, that generated conflict. With the concept of statehood being a new concept, being introduced from the external into the African ground, it became very difficult to reconcile the diversity of the African continent with the idea of a state.

Since independence, up to today, there have been tremendous changes. I am a strong believer in democracy and the ability to shape understanding. As we think about the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, especially in places like Kenya, we basically spend less time thinking about why these conflicts happen and how we could address them from the grass-roots. So basically, being able to not only be able to work on the R2P which is an amazing concept, but to also in the long term, look at ways to induce practical knowledge in addressing the issues of mass atrocities by having a long-term strategy with a goal to reconcile the issue of statehood with diverse interests based on the diversity of the African continent.

We can draw from countries such as Canada where people from very many places come together and we all work together based on specific principles. But that is not something that just happens overnight. It can happen, I think, by working on a few recommendations. We can work on, for example, intercultural and interfaith dialogue. [We can] work on issues such as the African stand-by force. So basically, bridging the international and the regional, because there is mostly a disconnect in terms of what is happening on the ground. For example, if you look at the situation today in the Central African Republic, there is a huge disconnect in terms of we being able to go on the ground and listen to the people and what they want.

One of the other things would be capacity building at the local level: giving knowledge, education—not necessarily formal education—but being able to inspire future generations to think about these issues in terms of a long-term strategy that is going to enable young people to see themselves as nations among one nation [and] not as people who are fighting against each other.

One of the last points is being able to be involved in public service and activism as we are doing today. I am very optimistic about the future even though I realize that the world is a very complex place. But with more activism and talking and creating awareness, we can be able to reduce mass atrocities in the world. Thank you very much.

Mr. Furio de Angelis: Thank you very much Tina. Thank you very much to the organizers of this conference. This is really a privilege for UNHCR to be invited to this important and very interesting debate. As you have heard from Moses, we are a field organization. UNHCR is a field organization working as a humanitarian organization for refugee protection and so necessarily, my comments will approach the issue from a field perspective.

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished professors, I will start with [a] few words with respect to UNHCR. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established at the end of 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. The agency is mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and [to] resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and the well-being of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and to find safe refuge in another state with then the options of what we call "durable solution": to return home, or to stay in the country of refuge, or to go to another country if certain conditions apply. Today, we have a staff of 7600 people working in over 125 countries helping tens of millions of people meet their basic needs.

Ladies and gentlemen, [a] few words on my personal experience with respect to the event that we are commemorating this year: the genocide in Rwanda shocked the conscience of the world. This was a 100 day killing frenzy in which some eight hundred thousand—conventional figure— nobody really knows how many persons were slaughtered by their neighbours on [an] ethnic and political basis. I arrived in Burundi a few days after the crash of the presidential plane which started the whole event and some time afterwards, I was at the border between Rwanda and Burundi in the Kirundo Province—those remote areas—as there were rumours and scattered information mainly brought in by missionaries, that something bad was going on inside the country. I remember it was sunset when a line of people appeared from the Rwandan side heading towards the border. They were the very first refugees coming out of the country after days of marching and hiding in bushes. They just crossed the borderline and sat on the ground where we were, exhausted. In a few minutes, they soon numbered in the thousands. This was an experience I will probably never forget.

I returned to the region in January 97, this time, directly in Rwanda. The mourning marked the return of refugees. I visited the villages, the dwellings, the churches where hundreds of slaughtered of people were still inside and turned into memorials. I didn't stay long that time, because after a couple of months, I was evacuated from the field, following the murderous attacks on five field staff of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, just a few kilometers away from my place of operation.

With this memory still fresh in my mind, I would like to concentrate and remark now a few thought-provoking questions. Have we learned sufficiently from the past? Are we doing enough to prevent new potential genocides? Are we doing enough to make sure at least that those

escaping from the most serious violations of human rights find safety and protection? You may find these questions rhetorical; indeed, they are. Looking at the current situation in Syria, South Sudan, Central Africa, I am afraid we are not doing enough. We have not done enough. I could actually make the list of refugee emergencies much longer.

All these crises are the result of large-scale human rights violations. As we all know genocides are characterized by the intent to destroy national, ethnic or religious groups. It is most violent and pernicious form of human right violations for which a specific international treaty was created after World War II to try to prevent it and to punish [those] responsible for this crime against humanity. Yet, in the two decades since the genocide in Rwanda, we cannot just be complacent with the fact that another terrible genocide event of that scale hasn't happened when we have been failing in preventing the current brutal forms of violence and human right abuses against groups of people, which result actually in the present refugee emergencies.

Within a few years, Syria has gone from being the world's second largest refugee hosting country to becoming the fastest refugee producing country. UNHCR has deduced so far 2.5 million Syrians as refugees in the region, another 6.5 million internally displaced in Syria, of whom some 46% are children. The brutal impact of the Syrian crisis for the new generations of the entire region is just appalling and will last for long. In response, besides enormous generosity of countries in the region that are providing asylum to refugees, sometimes at a very high cost, we have a financial intervention response that has been able so far, to fill only 14% of the resources needed in 2014 to fund humanitarian needs. The crises in South Sudan and Central African Republic have together caused one of the biggest refugee and IDP situations Africa has seen in recent years together, having forcefully displaced some 1.8 million people across the region with various parts lacking support capacities. In these cases too, we have funding levels for humanitarian intervention that are still a fraction for what is needed to meet the most basic human needs of the affected populations.

The origins of the concept of [the] Responsibility to Protect are founded very well in debate in the 90s about humanitarian intervention in the situation of conflict. At that time, the Security Council showed itself as willing, and [showed] some consensus to at least characterize the breaches of human right abuses as a threat to international peace and security, thus opening the possibility of enforcement and Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. What we are seeing since the 90s debate is an important shift in the focus from a right of humanitarian intervention to a potentially much broader Responsibility to Protect; the concept of sovereignty as responsibility developed by Mr. Deng, others as a rational for the guiding principle of internally displaced persons, also contributed to the formation of the new concept which was hard to describe with the three pillars seen as a blank in the outcome documents of 2005 UN World Summit.

It was then recognized that the Responsibility to Protect rests within and foremost with each individual state. However, where the state is unable or unwilling, the international community shares a collective responsibility to encourage and assist the state and draw through, for example, [with] humanitarian relations, monitor emissions, diplomatic pressure. Ultimately should all the above fail, as a last resort, the international community has a responsibility for collective action to protect populations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which may also include the use of force. In theory then, this can go quite some way [in] addressing root causes of displacement and this of course, is positive from UNHCR's perspective.

However, it goes without saying that the most effective means of addressing the issues of forced displacement is by means of preventing activities: anticipate and avert the conflicts. Prevention in my view, in UNHCR's view, is the most important element of the Responsibility to Protect and it should be the most resourced and developed component of international community actions in the name of the Responsibility to Protect. Indeed, the notion of preventing and removing threats to peace is to be found at the beginning of the very first article of the UN Charter. However, at times we have the impression that states tend to delay preventive measures, to then resort, when crises have erupted, to a more traditional and questionable military response.

So are we doing enough to prevent new genocides? Today we live in a radically changing world. On one hand, there is a growing trend towards globalization; the world is becoming a global neighbourhood. On the other hand, there are strong forces of fragmentation giving rise to insecurity, isolationism, and civil conflict. Today, states are less threatened by hegemonic powers from the outside, than by complaints from ethnic, religious, national and political groups taking arms to achieve their aims. Of course, one group of people leav[ing] the countries is often the very objective of the terror and violence, as we witnessed in Rwandan then, and the present crisis now in CAR and South Sudan.

In my view, there can be no true globalization if it is only economic. While respecting cultural diversity, a true politician means universal respect for human rights. But for this, we need determined political leadership. We need civic and humanitarian engagement of citizens who are prepared to look beyond the domestic horizon and can spur reluctant politicians into action. It is the lack of political will to take decisive action which is often the biggest challenge for us. Is neutrality morally and practically viable in the face of wide spread atrocities? Why was no country prepared to step into Rwanda at the height of the genocide in 1994; the answer, you know it, but the question is rather clear: it is because major powers perceived no strategic interests or because their interests just did not converge?

Humanitarian action can alleviate human suffering by providing protection and assistance to people in need. However, how long should humanitarian action continue?—including putting the

lives of humanitarian workers at risk, when there is no political solution in sight, due to lack of political will and strategic convergence [of] interests.

Let me now turn to the second question I raise: if we do not or cannot prevent massive human right abuses, are we at least offering a safe avenue to those escaping and knocking at our doors? A worrying trend is the hardening attitude of governments and the public, industrialized world who close borders, making [it] difficult for refugees to enter and to find safety. In spite of an overall increase of 28% of asylum obligations in the 44 industrialized countries, reaching a total of 612 700 persons as reported by UNHCR a few days, we have still, a tendency of closing doors [on] those seeking asylum procedures.

Refugees are seen primarily as a political, economic and environmental burden. They also represent security hazards. The restrictive policies of prosperous Western states are sometimes being copied by some developing countries which additionally have provided hospitality to a large majority of those fleeing prosecution and war. Let us remember that the fact remains that 80% of world refugees are hosted in developing countries and that refugees from the largest refugee crises of the moment being Syria, South Sudan, or CAR, and including all conflicts like Somalia and Afghanistan, are still being hosted by neighbouring countries in the region. Why do we realize that there are mixed migration movements around the globe, exploded by criminal smuggling rings, and characterized by confusing mix of economic and emergency need of international protection? We must continue to insist that each asylum seeker has his or her case newly considered and that the refugee definition is not stripped of its meaning by restrictive interpretation or that asylum systems are not newly restrictive as to not allow claims to be heard in a full and fair determination procedure. Why do we still care so much about asylum procedure? Because we believe, as in the past, [it] is the safest mechanism to ensure the protection of civilians when all other human rights protection mechanisms fail.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not believe that there is a magic formula to solve or prevent refugee crises. I am more convinced however, that some concrete steps can be taken. First, we must ensure that people in need of asylum and international protection receive it by having access to safety and to an asylum procedure. This is a foundation cornerstone of refugee law that directly originates from Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. Second thing, humanitarian action should not be an end in itself or a substitute for the political responsibility to identify solutions and to tackle the causes of refugee emergencies. Political solutions, I read by your practice, remain the only way to settle disputes and lay the basis for peaceful co-existence. Let [us] not must not miss opportunities for preventing the worst crimes. One that I think, was a missed opportunity was [when] UN troops were already in the country and could have quickly enforced and political action was missing. Third and last: More emphasis and resources must be devoted to the role of education, to promote understanding, tolerance, respect for human rights

in all societies of the world, from promoting integration of refugees in neutralized countries, to facilitating reconciliation between communities in the case of refugees returning to countries of origin.

I now wish to conclude by highlighting the crucial role of a strong civil society on the international level. Humanitarian action does not take place in a vacuum. We international actors can do a little bit but we cannot perform miracles. We must reach out to other political, social, economic developmental institutions embedded in civil society. We must increase awareness of the linkage between development, human rights protection and prevention of humanitarian emergencies. With these words I thank you again for your invitation. I thank you for this opportunity given to me today to share my thoughts. I really wish one day we see a world in which genocides and crimes against humanity will just disappear from real life, and a world in which refugees are welcome and protected until they can safely return home. Thank you.

Introduction of R2P Research Reports

Mr. Patrick Quinton-Brown*: Hello, everyone. We're going to get to the last part of our conference now. I think we've had some very fruitful discussions today, but we've also had more than six hours' worth, I think, of discussions — so I'm going to try to make this very short and sweet. The purpose of this next component, our research presentation component, is to provide an overview of some of the research activities we've been doing as a student-run research group, and to perhaps try to answer a key question: whether students can be at least somewhat useful for the genocide prevention community and its research activities. And I think by sharing some of our own work, we hope to prove that yes modestly, I think we can do something, I think we can fill certain gaps, and we're having a great time doing it.

So, we might call this, in fact, the student research gap, because today, earlier today, we were talking about how typical young people are imagined to be this sort of idealistic engine behind political movements and protests, this type of thing — and history reminds us, for example, of the young people in Vietnam, the Vietnam resistance movement, and today, even here at the University of Toronto, we can see student activism quite visibly around campus. And so, yes, student groups are typically remembered for their local advocacy efforts in support of human rights and their attempts to shape political will and this idea of the will to intervene — and yet student groups are largely untapped, in my opinion, in the realm of research. And so I think one of the things we're trying to do as the CCR2P is to try to bridge this divide, and I'd like to think by completing research at the CCR2P, we're addressing this research gap while simultaneously educating young people about the urgency of modern mass atrocity issues.

We're a rather large group. In fact, we comprise a team of over 40. This year, we've been divided into five main research divisions: Master of Global Affairs Division, Prevention Division, a division called R2PLive.org which is the evolution of last year's Media Division, a new division called Syria Watch, and finally, our Parliamentary Division.

Now let me just provide you with a very quick overview of what each of these divisions is doing.

Syria Watch is a new initiative, like I said, and it aims to promote a public discussion of the Syrian crisis. And it sort of evolved out of a realization during the summer. I was talking to a lot of my friends. In late August, of course you'll remember that there is talk of these surgical strikes on Syria that would address the use of chemical weapons. And I realized that there's a startling inclination among young people to have supported that without a sufficient understanding of the complexities of the scenario. And in fact, when we'd start having public discussions amongst friends and in classrooms, I realized that, really, we need to learn more. And how could we, as students, assist in public education, then, towards this very controversial issue? So Syria Watch attempts to do just that: to gather and disseminate research regarding the civil war's impact on the lives of innocent non-combatants. So how do we do this? We have a few different projects that we've worked on. This year, we've created a timeline on the failure of peace talks. We've done it with a graphic designer, and we've decided that we want it to be shared over Facebook and disseminated through these types of social media measures so as to increase awareness. We have a student-written op-ed on the problem of red lines in Syria to be published in *The*

Varsity newspaper. We've also decided that infographics are a really efficient way of getting across information, and it's also something people are willing to read. Last year, we did a couple of research reports, and we realized that it's much easier to get someone to read an infographic than it is a 10- or 20-page paper. And so our infographics include discussions on the Free Syrian Army — What is the Free Syrian Army? Is it more imagination than real? — What is the Syrian National Coalition, and how can we understand that versus the Syrian National Council? We are also working on English language summaries of Russian commentaries on the Syrian civil war, as I thought this would be really interesting in light of the op-ed that Putin got into *The New York Times*. And so we'll see what happens with that last one, because funnily enough, the young Russian student, Vladimir, who is working on that came up to me, and he said "Patrick, I've gathered the top 10 commentaries, but they all say the same thing." We'll see if we can have some sort of interesting debate.

And so here, for example, is one of the draft infographics we've put together, and we have a few more. I meant to — I just realized, we had one more that was sent to me this morning in draft form to show, but this is on the Syrian National Council, for example, and I think it's shaping up to look quite nice. And the plan is to release all of these reports and infographics over the summer, and we'll see when *The Varsity* publishes the op-ed on red lines.

Our Parliamentary Division aims to ask the question, how can we track Canada's decline from being a proud norm leader on R2P to really — today, we're a closeted R2P supporter. I think it's almost common knowledge now, to anyone who takes the time to look into this, that Canadian diplomats aren't even able to use the words "Responsibility to Protect" at the UN. And how can we see this reflected in the discussions that take place in the Canadian House of Commons? Do we see any correlations between parties? How can we summarize party positions regarding the principle? Notably, this analysis is done through the use of Hansard documents, which we think is — since it's official discussion, it's as close to real party statements as we can get on R2P. This has been completed from 2005 to 2012, and this summer, we're looking forward to finishing our report by catching up to the present day, doing all of 2013 and trying to do anything we can do in 2014.

I'm not going to talk too much about the Masters of Global Affairs Division because Ashley's here and she's going to go into that for five minutes or so, but the MGA Division is going to be tracing humanitarian aid to Syria, and so it's related to the Syria Watch division, in order to better understand distribution. The sample consists of the top eight donors of humanitarian aid. I'll leave it to Ashley to talk a little bit more about that.

And the same goes for prevention, because we have Jack here, who's the Research Division Manager of the Prevention Division. It's based in Ottawa at Carleton University, and I think has a member from the University of Ottawa as well. It's focused on new technology, effective mass atrocity prevention in the context of this new technology through all three R2P pillars. From what I could see from the executive summary, there are these two key points that looked very interesting: how the UN can effectively utilize its political and economic resources by investing in military technologies such as drones to make smaller-scale operations more effective, and when you think of the intervention brigade in the DRC which was making use of drones for

preventative reasons, and see where Jack is going with this, and second, technology as a means to creating a decentralized non-state network of open-source information collection. It's really intriguing.

R2PLive, finally. This is the result of hundreds of hours, and really we've been working on this for over a year. It's gone through different forms, and it's a new initiative that aims to promote — sorry about this, it should say, what this should say is R2PLive is a new initiative focused on spreading articles and disseminating these articles in various thematic organization about R2P. So there are hundreds, and in fact, over a thousand different articles in English published on R2P, and how can we organize these thematically, how can we tag them and make it easier for researchers to go through them, and so really this is a study on media, it's media analysis. How is the media talking about R2P, and what correlations can we find. For example, is R2P discussed in a positive light in Canadian media? What about Indian media? This type of thing. Like I said, it's mostly in English, but the goal is to expand it to all languages, and in fact, right now, we do have articles spanning all UN languages, but the majority of them right now are in English, and that's convenient for us, because most of our research analysts are English speakers anyways, and so they're comparing these articles to see what can be said about the media's influence on R2P implementation. It's live at r2plive.org, so check that out, feel free right now, and Misha's going to give a small demo of the site anyways.

And finally, I think before passing the mic on to my colleagues, I just want to say a few words about what I think might be the impact of this research, because at the end of the day, I'd like to think our research is not simply an academic exercise. Of course it is, in part, about giving students an opportunity to do their own hands-on research [and] contribute something new to the literature. But that's not all. I think it's also about really correlating and joining hands between student advocacy and student research. Advancing the state of knowledge through research, I think, strengthens advocacy efforts, and seeing as the CCR2P does both, I think it's one of our great strengths. It's also about educating young people about R2P and cultivating what Ms. Power was talking about this morning, this culture of humanitarianism in the country, which I think is important. It's about building citizenship on issues of human rights, and I think it's about promoting public discussion, because far too often these crises fall under the radar, and we're trying to do our best to put them back on the radar. So I think we've had a very productive year. It's been great, and now [I'm] very proud to defer to our Research Division Managers who can discuss their projects more in depth.

Ms. Ashley Lefler: Hi, I'm Ashley. I'm going to talk a little bit about the MGA Division's report, *Humanitarian Aid in Syria*, which is a work in progress to be released next month. I'm going to just give you a brief outline of the report, the methodology, the limitations, and our initial preliminary findings. As the violence escalates in Syria and the number of displaced Syrians has exploded, with recent estimates indicating that 6.5 million Syrians are internally displaced and almost 3 million are refugees, flows of this magnitude which have not been seen since the Rwandan genocide. We were concerned about the flow of humanitarian aid with numbers this high. Much of the initial exposure seemed to indicate that Syria was not an R2P case, which we know why from this morning's panel, but this has changed as the conflict has evolved. Based on the atrocities committed by both sides, as documented by the UN and NGOs,

the *Humanitarian Aid in Syria* report argues that Syria is indeed a case of R2P. The problem we found was that often the debate surrounding Syria and R2P centred around military intervention, forgetting some other very important tools provided by the R2P framework, specifically humanitarian aid. As we looked at how the international community wielded this tool, we began to question whether humanitarian aid in Syria was evenly distributed across the region, whether there was variation in institutions or regions that states were targeting for humanitarian aid, and the method and allocation of aid by top donor countries.

This report traces humanitarian aid to Syria in order to better understand distribution. Our sample consists of the top eight donor countries of humanitarian aid as determined by UNOCHA in the fall of 2013, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Germany. I should note that this list does not include refugee-hosting states in the region, with estimates indicating that Turkey has incurred double that of the highest donor, the United States. The goal of our report has been to collect information that connects the supply side of humanitarian aid, so the reported contributions, with the demand side, the distribution in and around Syria for 2013. Our report discusses Syria in an R2P context, provides a background on the evolution of the conflict, country reports for the aforementioned donors, and general conclusions. We have focused a significant amount of attention on the country reports, which comprise a mapping component and a written component. The country-specific maps will reflect the most accurate estimate of population flows and show the location of operations where the NGOs and agencies in and around Syria. The written component will explain, for each country, the map, the availability of information on humanitarian aid distribution, the country's position toward the parties and their approach to the conflict to date, and other relevant details such as whether the country diversifies their contributions and in what way. Although the country reports will differ, we have tried to ensure that they share as similar a structure as possible.

Now I'm going to talk a little bit about the methodology, and then the limitations. In our efforts, we have utilized only publicly available information. Our sources are primarily government, NGOs, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. We traced the humanitarian aid declarations from government websites to NGOs and UN databases in order to locate the regions that groups operated in or in some instances where they provided specific types of aid. We then searched coordinates and are formatting our finalized data for mapping.

Some of our limitations, however. Despite our best efforts, we do have limitations, as all research does. First, we utilized only publicly available information, so you can see that they may not entail every piece of humanitarian aid. Second, certain agencies and aid providers are fluid and do not publish information on operations for security reasons. Additionally, the population flows are merely estimates, since counting in Syria has become increasingly difficult. Some of the states in our survey size are less forthcoming about the humanitarian aid they are supplying, and to whom. We decided to proceed with these states, though, despite these difficulties, early on, because we thought that it was instructive to know, but it means that in many cases we cannot compare findings across countries as we might have liked to do.

We did not include contributions that are not considered to be humanitarian aid. Despite media reports and sometimes outright declarations of assisting opposition groups with weaponry, the state was not included. Another trouble in some instances was nailing down dates. The mapping component includes 2013 contributions for most countries, except the UK, where it was less clear whether aid had been provided in 2012 or 2013.

Some of the problems that we've encountered. Some of our preliminary findings indicate that there are vast differences in the transparency and availability of information from different states, so whereas Germany and Canada provide very detailed information on the allocation of aid, including the use of that aid, Qatar, Kuwait, and the US have been less transparent in listing the recipients of aid outside of UN agencies. In many cases, we note that more funding is being directed to refugee-hosting nations, as opposed to the much larger number of internally displaced Syrians. Once our maps are completed, we expect that our findings will increase exponentially, and thank you for listening, and I hope that you enjoy our reports.

Mr. Jack MacLennan: Well thank all of you for still being here. My name's Jack MacLennan and I lead the Conflict Prevention research group at Carleton University, and what we've been doing is working on what amounts to an agenda-setting document in many ways. Our point is to implicate technologies and means to advance the conflict prevention agenda that's associated with the Responsibility to Protect, and I think a lot of what we've ended up finding and highlighting for further analysis dovetails quite nicely with some of the points brought up by Professor Welsh, also along with what we've been talking about throughout the day. In some ways this research is a first baby step to the future, to sort of echo Professor Thakur, and leads us to some quick political debates that we will have to reflect on, that have real implications for those who unfortunately find themselves to be the focus of R2P-related operations. So some people in the room probably know the Secretary-General's 2013 report on the Responsibility to Protect, *State Responsibility in Protection*, took it upon itself to advance the Responsibility to Protect through the prevention of atrocity crimes by building resilience in legal frameworks and state structures. This report is, of course, consistent with the emerging state-centric view of the Responsibility to Protect, which argues that states must continue to apply relevant international norms and do their utmost to protect their populations. Though the state-centric perspective on conflict prevention is consistent with current appraisals of R2P's status, the 2013 report provides no guidance on how conflict prevention can be successfully operationalized by means beyond diplomatic and normative pressure

In addition to diplomatic attempts to find ways of buttressing the capacity of at-risk states, technological tools provide practical avenues through which the UN and its member states can help prevent mass atrocities. In going through these various forms of emerging technology and appraising their possibilities and their political implications, we find that several forms of advanced technology make possible novel ways for the United Nations to further assume the protection and human security agenda under the rubric of the Responsibility to Protect, specifically, technological advances should serve as a starting point for refocusing debate about the Responsibility to Protect in two important ways.

Firstly, practical differences should become a point of discussion and elaboration so that we can differentiate between two types of prevention intervention operations. We've, sort of, in a working sense, defined these as large- and small-scale operations, and I should stress that this doesn't refer to the amount of violence or the amount of civilians who are caught in the crossfires of internecine conflict, but instead to the amount of highly technological military apparatuses that are available to a UN-mandated mission. Large-scale interventions and prevention operations are carried out using advanced technology that's only really available to states, and this is, I think, most poignantly exemplified by the Libya case. These cases fall to a large extent outside the operational foundations of the UN, and relegates the UN to a diplomatic and normative position based on persuasion and posturing, which is to date been relatively effective, and should be still negotiated as such. However smaller-scale operations which elicit less material support and are perhaps not even amenable to traditional state-centric responses, and I think perhaps the Syria case *par excellence*, are real avenues by which the UN can invest in and proliferate certain kinds of technology. Adopting this typology makes it clear that the UN can more effectively utilize its political and economic resources by investing in certain forms of military technologies, we highlight drones, to make smaller-scale operations which are far more common than larger-scale operations, more effective. However, we run into, of course, the omnipresent political and ethical problems associated with drones. A recent report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on Drones and Military Technology in Countering Terrorism calls on states to undertake a detailed review of their UAV, so Unarmed Aerial Vehicle, programs and policies and this should be discussed – this should be considered when discussing UN short-term policies on UAVs. The UN has started to make small inroads with the use of UAVs, particularly in its mission in DRC.

Now, in a very important way, we don't really know the impact that drones are having on the DRC, and won't for some time, especially given our role as researchers and only able to access what's in the public record But additional implications are that they are proving an important piece of technology for monitoring what happens in the DRC and allowing the UN forces to operate more effectively But in some ways, these are more banal points, and what really seems to us to be the most important result of our research is that there is a second classification of technology that is more diffuse, less centralized, in many senses open-source, that has proven itself to be a very robust method for charting and understanding conflict and helping people in these conflict areas negotiate living through their daily lives.

Given the UN's mixed success as a hub for information gathering regarding possible and ongoing mass atrocities, emphasis should be placed on creating a decentralized, non-state network of open-source information collection. Such technology operates alongside state-centric prevention technology system cases and provides a viable alternative in others when prevention efforts are not — when it's unlikely that prevention efforts will include state-centric technologies. Some examples of this more open approach would have been referred to as virtual peacekeeping and conflict mapping. In both instances information is gathered from individuals using social media and various handheld and personal telecommunications devices to provide a clear picture of the conflict environment, its dynamics, safe areas, not safe areas — it's immediately open to both diplomats, state leaders, and people living on the ground. We've seen immense success in these networks in Kenya, during the 2007 presidential election, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and in

the United States even, following the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in 2010. As well with Japan following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami. This crowd-sourced information, however, has its pitfalls. The Syria case where open-source information sharing is allowing civilians to try to negotiate their lives, protect themselves, and give them a very robust picture of what's happening on the ground the rest of us, telecommunications proved to be a double-edged sword. In some cases, these networks make their users vulnerable to state repression and can actually provide tools for both government and anti-government forces trying to root out people seen as posing a strategic threat by sharing this information. We see that this opens up a space for debate at the UN, and for to muster what economic and political and diplomatic resources it has to try to support creating these networks, and to try to buttress their safety for those who use them. While the report, as I say, is provisional in nature and agenda-setting in its purpose, we've strongly believed that by adopting a slight change in focus, the UN can harness its political, diplomatic, and financial resources in new ways through strategic investment in certain types of technology which have been identified as useful in the creation of a new typology for R2P-related operations, it will become possible to strengthen an international capacity in terms of R2P-related operations, specifically investment in support of decentralized non-state information-gathering through the methods outlined. Four, provide a real avenue of advancement for the UN Human security agenda that moves beyond conceptual debates in a very practical and useful way. Also, the growing global technological capacity as we see in the proliferation of military technology like drones, though politically and ethically contentious, does hold some prospects for meaningful success if properly harnessed.. Though these technologies can be double-edged, they can fulfill a capacity that was identified by the ICISS report and which has proven difficult to carry out within the UN structure to date given its current conceptualization. Technology may provide us with a way to overcome and streamline UN response and more effectively prevent violent mass atrocities from taking place. Thank you.

Mr. Misha Boutilier: Hello everyone, my name is Misha Boutilier. As Patrick mentioned, I am the managing editor of the R2PLive research initiative. I'm going to be keeping my remarks brief today, as we're running a little bit behind schedule, but the purpose of my presentation is to give you a technical demonstration as to the capacities of the R2PLive research platform.

Before I begin, I'd just like to extend a thank you to Patrick, the research chairperson, for being so instrumental in leading this project and assisting me every step of the way, as well as to all my R2PLive analysts who are present today. I'd like to extend a special thank you to my senior analysts: Rachel Gunn, who is present today, as well as Brenan Sivapragasam, who unfortunately could not make it.

As Patrick mentioned, R2PLive is a global portal of media articles related to the Responsibility to Protect principle. In fact, there are over 3000 articles on the R2PLive site. R2PLive contributes to one of the CCR2P's ten core mandates, which is to provide timely and multilingual data on a real-time basis online through the r2pLive.org project. Currently, R2PLive contains primarily articles that have the English language terms "R2P" or "Responsibility to Protect." This was what analysts were working on since summer 2013, and the site was launched in January 2014. However, since January, we've been expanding our research capacities into other languages. To expand to the full six UN languages, analysts have been working on Spanish,

Portuguese, Chinese, Korean, and French, and as a result, the linguistic breadth and depth of the site has grown substantially.

Just to give you an idea of technical capabilities of the site, these are some of the infographics we have. We break down coverage by the type of article. As you can see, approximately half of the articles on our website are news coverage. We also have a fairly large number of opinion piece commentary, as well as some press releases and transcripts.

This shows coverage by country, and by country here we mean origin of the media source in question. As you can see, the largest country is the United States of America. Canada also has a large number. Coverage is centred in Europe, but there is a large number of coverage in non-European countries, and I point particularly to South Africa in this case. Again, we expect the numbers for non-European countries to expand as the linguistic breadth of our coverage is expanding.

R2PLive breaks down articles by several variables. We categorize our articles by content, country of origin, genre (meaning which facets of the Responsibility to Protect it's talking about), themes, language, and the country discussed. This adds to the analytical potential of the site, as it allows members of the public who are interested, as well as members of the R2P NGO community, to make targeted searches based on what they're interested in looking at. So, for instance, by typing in "Syria" into the site as a country subject, you would be able to get hundreds of articles relating to the Syrian conflict that have come out over the past couple years, and by going through those you could develop a very good understanding of how Syria has been covered in media throughout the world.

To show you a sample article on the site, I'm going to scroll down here. Let's look at this one: "Á frica, la responsabilidad de proteger," which is a Spanish language article. As you can see here, we include the title of the article, its text, and a couple paragraphs. For legal reasons, we are prohibited from displaying the entire article, but whenever possible we do include a link to the full article, which is accessible here, and so this allows the reader the opportunity to access the full article in depth if they are so interested.

Going back to the main site, I'd like to demonstrate some of the specific search capacities. So if we look at "sort by country," this gives a list of all the country sources, and by source we mean media outlet that produced the report. For instance, if you look at Canada here, this has a list of hundreds -- about 450 articles related to Canada, and you can access them all just by clicking on this. Similarly, you can do this for country subject, meaning the country where R2P violations are going on that's discussed in a given article. We also break matters down by theme. As you can see, we've broken down coverage of R2P into numerous themes, for instance, articles dealing with the adoption of the R2P principle, environmental crisis and natural disaster, challenges faced by minorities, challenges faced by refugees and IDPs. For instance, if you look at minorities issues here, we can see there are a large number of articles dealing with minorities, many of them in Spanish, significantly -- we've really been expanding Spanish language coverage lately. For instance, this is an article that deals with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the refugee crisis going on there from the British Broadcasting [Corporation].

In conclusion, R2PLive is a growing site. It has enormous analytical potential at the moment. We are continuing to keep it up to date, to expand its linguistic capacity -- we are publicizing it to members of the CCR2P's network of similar non-governmental organizations and research institutes, and it has a bright future ahead of it. It's been my pleasure to work with Patrick and all the members of the R2PLive team on this project over the past year, and I really look forward to where we'll go.

Introduction of R2P Scholars Network

Note: This section is missing and was not transcribed.

Concluding Remarks

Mr. Patrick Quinton-Brown: Now, it is my pleasure to introduce Mairi MacDonald who is the director of the University of Toronto's undergraduate International Relations programme She's been doing this since 2011. Her research interests include Africa in the 19th and 20th century, encompassing the era of European colonial rule and postcolonial independence. She has written extensively about the centrality of independence to the creation of Guinea's postcolonial political culture. Her current project contains the significance of the international legal framework that allows participants in the late 19th century scramble for Africa to characterise their imperial ambitions as humanitarian intervention. Dr. MacDonald is a member of the Ontario Bar, has specialised in the law of policy and telecommunications regulation for a number of years. During the mid-1990's she consulted with the World Bank on telecommunications in Francophone Africa. She completed her PhD in History at the University of Toronto in 2009 and currently teaches courses on the decolonisation of Africa, international development and legal ethics.

Dr. Mairi MacDonald: Thank you Patrick. You make me wonder how I actually manage to pull all these things together and I'm hoping that in the few minutes I have now, at the end of a very long day as we could say, that I'll show you how I bring some of these issues together.

Congratulations to Misha and Anneliese for bringing together a really terrific conference. Everyone I have spoken to joins me in complementing you on how well it was conceived and how well it was put together.

I'm going to add a few words now about history and myth, about norms and most of all about the centrally of Rwandans to the story that we have been hearing about today. As the Director of the U of T International Relations Programme, I look at the work of the CCR2P and the Scholars Network with slightly mixed feelings I must admit. On the very, very positive side, I am delighted to see such tangible evidence of the compassion and commitment of our students, including for research in this extremely important field. The idealism impacts directly from the existence of a principle such as the Responsibility to Protect the world's most vulnerable when the states they live in cannot or will not do so, to the expectation that it will be used to such just purposes as an essential ingredient in such a crucial enterprise in which, I think everybody involved in universities hopes that all our students share the work to make the world a more humane place to work towards and achieve the goal of living lives that they value. However, I think that it's equally important that we encourage everybody engaged in the student enterprise to bring to the table not just their caring hearts but also their analytical minds. We have to ask them and ask them continuously to reflect on the conditions, those of timing, context, power politics, chance, that in practice dictate when the world moves from principle to action. We must

ask them to think about the historical context in which the two big competing norms that play here arose. On the one hand, the so called Westphalian norm that sovereign states warrant the tolerance of their neighbours and can consequently conduct their affairs as they wish within their territorial boundaries. And on the other hand, the equally deeply temporally- rooted norms that arose with the spread of the European empires that justified the division of sovereignty and its breach when those with superior power consider others to be acting in an uncivilised fashion.

Knowing that the first norm isn't absolute and that the second norm has had far more influence for a far longer period of time in a far greater proportion of the world than the first, seems to me to be an essential part of the analytical background of thinking about R2P. For equally embedded in our collective toolkit are the instruments that justify selectively applying the first norm and the instruments that states use to resist the second. I'm encouraged that we're thinking about R2P as more than an trigger of military intervention, that we're thinking about it for humanitarian purposes and in particular that we're thinking about prevention. We talked a lot about conflict prevention this afternoon, but I want to broaden that a little bit to genocide prevention. For one thing, the fact that the timely prevention of horrors like genocide requires to attend to specifics of situations like Rwanda's in 1993 and 1994 and of course those of the Central African Republic today. This requires listening to the development and understanding of the people whose lives are very different from our own. For another, thinking about prevention requires us to be a little bit more creative to be a little bit more broad-minded about what we might do to defuse the situation before it spills over into violence. What we might do that doesn't immediately trigger the powers of resistance to colonial and neocolonial intervention that can be so disruptive to people living in post-colonial states.

Let me bring theses abstractions back to Rwanda. British Journalist Lindsey Hilson was in Kigali in April of 1994 when the killings began. She has written at least two, two that I know of, very moving very thoughtful pieces about these events and I think that they give us a nice way to kind of bookend what happened and also how we're thinking about Rwanda twenty years on. This is a way to bring the focus to one of the places where I think it really belongs today which is on the people who were affected and those whose lives are still shattered by remembering the events of spring 1994. The first of Hilson's articles was called 'Where is Kigali' and it reflects on how of the lack of specificity and how a lack of NGOs and the other aid agencies that were operating in Rwanda at the time the genocide began were required almost to talk about what was happening and thereby undermine the real understanding of what was coming, what had happened and what was coming in Rwanda. In that article she offers the following analysis: Genocide in a small country with little access to sophisticated technology relies on bombs, guns, sticks and knives, people to wield them, and a plan, whom to kill and when. Then there is the question of motive. Ideology supplies that. That you could argue that genocide requires three types of people: killers, strategists and ideologists. Rwanda shadow armies and political party radio broadcasts provided

all three. The CDR, the Interahamwe and Radio Mille Collines, they were all recent institutions. None could have existed without history and myth.

So, one of our questions I think is how could the international community have taken action to prevent a genocide given the presence of all three of these kinds of people. Well, of course I'm not sure and even if I did have good ideas they'd be as useful as most hindsight ideas. But a start to our analysis, I think, has to be to separate the presence of approximate causes between these three kinds of people and the tools they use so effectively to stir up the mass population from the existence of history and myth and decades long practices of manipulating both history and myth for political advantage in a country where as Hilson was also told political power is the only way to wealth. Most of the politicians here don't even have farms to go back to. If they lose power, this was an African diplomat talking to her, they'll have nothing. We need to understand the influence of history and myth but we need to avoid reifying them just as we always need to avoid reifying culture. The point is to watch for how they are being manipulated by whom and for what ends. I'm really struck whenever I think about Rwanda - and this is the telecom lawyer part of my sort of past - with the crucial role of Radio Mille Collines in stirring up the genocide. The observation, that radio is an important way to inform or misinform Africans especially rural people steeped in practices of oral cultures shouldn't have come to a surprise to anybody. I can't think of a single one of Africa's first generation of independent political leaders who did not perceive the power of that media and therefore seek to harness it for their own purposes: good, evil, useful, however you want to classify it. Moreover, it seems to me unlikely that the content of Radio Mille Collines' broadcasts were unknown beyond Rwanda's boarders. It's a small country. Radio waves don't respect territorial boundaries. Listening to African broadcasts to provide a basis for outsiders' interpretation of African politics it is a practice that dates back to independence as well. So, the final step with this or the final piece of this is that we also have a well-established international regulatory framework that governs the use of radio waves. Admittedly, it's one that doesn't tend to interfere with the content of broadcasts for fairly obvious reasons and that goes back to our friend Westphalia but of also a network that isn't unused to deal with revelations that content should be curbed because it is destabilising neighbouring countries, neighbouring governments. In other words, that that content should not be tolerated because of the impact beyond the borders. So, I'm beginning to wonder why the International Telecommunications Union wasn't engaged in prevention and whether that doesn't also constitute a lesson learned for Rwanda. In other words, that we need to spread our net a little bit wider when we think about the kinds of agencies that might get involved in dealing with particular circumstances that suggest to people in the know that a genocide may be brewing.

I want to close this afternoon by summarizing what Lindsey Hilson noticed on this very topic of speech and silence and on her last visit to Kigali, and this it seems to me relates to the responsibility to rebuild that we've heard about a little bit this afternoon. She wrote for *Granta*

again in a piece that was published last autumn. She quotes a former UNICEF aid worker Francois Kalikumutima who said now, so in 1993, in theory no one talks about the Tutsis and Hutus anymore. We're all supposed to be just Rwandans. Hilson explains that the current government still led by former general now president Paul Kagame has "decided not to engage with the debate about 'ethnie' at all but simply to aggregate the terms.' They have simplified the story of what happened to genocide of the Tutsis. The consequence of this official line, Hilson explains, and of the fear that this official line still inspires in people in Rwanda is that Rwandans can't mourn for the moderate Hutu's who were killed protecting their Tutsi neighbours and family members. Nor for the people whom the RPF killed on its campaign to take control of the country, the campaign that in the absence of any effective international intervention ended the genocide. The new government that has renamed cities and towns, trying, as Hilson puts it, to liberate geography from genocide, which is an interesting concept. It temporarily suspended and still downplays the teaching of history. And in fact people can still get into real trouble for expressing what the government calls genocide ideology. That's the notes that the government has effectively made rain on the positive side of the ledger, the life of the average Rwandan has undoubtedly improved and the government is efficient. But she ends by questioning what kind of a reconciliation all this silence is really conducive to. Perhaps it is, and I'm quoting from her, "a ritual and a reconciliation that required deeper feelings of anger and pain, proof that Rwandans, Hutu and Tutsi, perpetrator and victim, might live together for decades to come without betraying to each other what they feel inside." And I think that one of the things we need to take away from this is a degree of humility, to go with our compassion and commitment. It is typical to think about prevention just as it is to sort out the rights and wrongs of intervention and we need a lot more detailed knowledge to be able to read behind the silence on this. Thank you very much for including me in your conference.

Appreciation Remarks

Ms. Anneliese Sanghara: In December we had our first meeting with our co-hosts that we would like to acknowledge today: the Bill Graham Center for Contemporary and International History and the International Relations Program. We also appreciate the support of the International Relations Student Society and the Peace, Conflict and Justice Student Society.

Mr. Misha Boutilier: In February and March, the following sponsors provided their generous contributions: the U of T History Department, Hart House Good Ideas Fund, St. Michael's College, Political Science Department and the Munk School of Global Affairs through the personal sponsorship of Dr. Janice Stein.

Ms. Anneliese Sanghara: We extend a special thank you to our committee members: Emma, the Logistics Coordinator; Jahaan, the Communications Coordinator; and Madeleine, the Outreach Coordinator. We would also like to acknowledge all of our transcribers.

Mr. Misha Boutilier: We are also very grateful for the help provided by Randy Lee and Angel Difan Chu in videography, as well as Jae Hyun Park and Sarah Danruo Wang with photography. In addition, a special thank you to Megan McGinnis-Dunphy for assisting us with the Scholars Network and conference promotions.

Ms. Anneliese Sanghara: We offer our thanks to Catherine Lee and PQB for graphic design and for Philip Kong and Woong Park for social media promotion. In addition, we are very thankful for Christine Lee for directing media relations and assisting with conference operations.

Mr. Misha Boutilier: Patrick, we also wish to thank you for being our special advisor and emceeing the conference. And Tina and Victor, we both really appreciate your guidance, dedication, and confidence in both of us.

Ms. Anneliese Sanghara: As we embark on our personal and interconnected journeys, I invite you to attend the Scholars reception at the Bedford Academy following the conference. It will begin at 5.30 today. Thank you.

Mr. Misha Boutilier: Thank you very much.