

# Mob Violence and Militancy: The Case of Indian Muslims

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## Abstract

When does militancy arise among marginalized minorities? Muslims are a minority in India who face substantial and wide-ranging marginalization. Yet, militant groups, who exploit such grievances, have only been able to create relatively little militancy among Indian Muslims. This is especially puzzling given that marginalized minority Muslim populations in other parts of the world do not exhibit this same reluctance towards militancy. Due to the limitations of existing explanations, I instead posit a novel theoretical framework that highlights a key factor determining the extent of militant mobilization within aggrieved minority groups: the group's perception of protection. Using this framework, I argue that minority Indian Muslims police themselves to prevent militancy within their community because they fear retaliatory indiscriminate mob violence, and this fear stems from a lack of confidence in the state to definitively protect Muslims from the mob. I then develop a formal model of the relationship between confidence in the state and militant mobilization among marginalized minorities which counterintuitively illustrates that improving perceptions of the state can lead to more militancy. I go through some applications of the insights from the model and theory by briefly examining current and historical episodes of militancy or the lack thereof among marginalized minorities.

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Militant mobilization across marginalized minority populations has not been uniform. There are cases of minority communities within which a long-lasting and substantial militancy arose such as the Catholic population in Northern Ireland, and there are also cases where little militancy emerged such as with the African Americans in the early post-Civil War South. Even if we control for the time period to be the present and look specifically at Muslims who are a minority community in India and France, then we still see differences in the rates of militant mobilization. In 2015, France incurred six attacks by homegrown Islamist militants - which included the attacks at the Charlie Hedbo magazine headquarters and the shootings at the Bataclan theatre. In India, there were a total of five militant attacks in that same year (U.S. Dept. of State, 2016, pp.238-239). Three involved an Islamist terrorist group but this particular militant organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba, is based in Pakistan and the assailants were Pakistani, not Indian.

Under what conditions do members of marginalized minorities engage in militancy? This paper addresses this question in the context of India which presents an important puzzle. Muslims are a minority in India<sup>1</sup> who experience substantial socioeconomic marginalization and discrimination. Yet, why have militant groups, who exploit such grievances, only been able to create a relatively negligible amount of militancy among Indian Muslims? I empirically illustrate this “shortfall” of Indian Muslims in militant organizations which is even more perplexing when we consider that marginalized Muslim minority populations in other regions of the world (e.g., Western Europe) do not exhibit this same reluctance towards militancy. Furthermore, even after accounting for the militancy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the puzzle of low participation among this marginalized minority remains and is actually more striking.

Existing explanations, as applied to India, cannot effectively account for this “underrepresentation” puzzle. Furthermore, focusing narrowly on either leader, individual, or institutional factors has severe limitations. Instead, this paper proposes a new and more rounded theory that takes into account these prior factors and also emphasizes the importance of a minority group-level factor in determining the extent of militancy among aggrieved minorities: a group’s perception of protection. My theoretical framework

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<sup>1</sup>Even though India currently has the second largest Muslim population in the world and, by 2050, it will have the largest such population ([http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/muslims/pf\\_15-04-02\\_projectionstables74/](http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/muslims/pf_15-04-02_projectionstables74/)).

provides the conditions that mediate the extent that these other factors can generate militant mobilization among marginalized minorities.

Using this framework, this paper proposes a novel argument to explain why minority Indian Muslims want to prevent militancy within their community: They fear retaliatory indiscriminate mob violence because they lack confidence in the government to protect them from the mob. Due to considerable grievances and appeals by militant groups (e.g., al-Qaeda), substantial militant sentiments could exist within the Indian Muslim population. However, this perceived threat of retaliatory indiscriminate mob violence incentivizes Indian Muslims to inform on individuals that are planning to engage in militant violence. Due to this high rate of informing, potential militants are deterred from following through on their actions. Therefore, under these circumstances, we would observe few Indian Muslims participating in militancy.

Indiscriminate mob violence is not the same as indiscriminate state-led violence. The latter can either backfire on the state (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007; Kocher et al., 2011; Condra and Shapiro, 2012; Benmelech et al., 2014) or damage militant support (Lyall, 2009). I reason that indiscriminate mob violence exhibits a unique deterrent threat that is distinct in both nature and effect from collective punishment enacted by the state. Using this reasoning, I argue that the credible threat of indiscriminate mob violence would almost always suppress militancy within a marginalized minority.

Improving confidence in the government has countervailing effects. Increasing perceptions of the state dissuades people from engaging in militancy due to perceived lower chances of success in any such act. Yet, simultaneously, increasing perceptions of the state would make the minority members feel more confident that they will be protected from any indiscriminate retaliation and subsequently more secure in not informing. To better explain the militancy outcomes under such conflicting dynamics, I develop a formal model to understand the relationship between perceptions of the state and militant mobilization. The theory and model depict how relatively low confidence in the state can account for why few Indian Muslims participate in militant violence even though significant militant sentiments could exist among this minority population.

Existing literature has pointed to a negative association between perceptions of the state and militancy (Enders and Sandler, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Berrebi and Lakdwalla, 2007; Lai, 2007). Counterintuitively, I use the model to show that it is the

relatively low perception of the Indian state that “dissuades” Indian Muslims from engaging in militant violence. These low perceptions mean that the government is seen as a weakened watchman that is unable to credibly commit to protect the Muslim minority from the indiscriminate mob, and this in turn makes this minority population more fearful about retribution from any acts of militancy that is associated with their community.

I briefly examine some applications of the insights from the theory and model. Using interviews of officials from prominent Indian Muslim organizations and some secondary source survey evidence from India and the United Kingdom, I demonstrate that the theory and model help us understand the different rates of militant mobilization among the marginalized Muslim communities between these two countries. I also use the insights to briefly revisit the episodes of militancy among the Catholic population in Northern Ireland and the absence of militancy among African Americans in the early post-Civil War South.

The results from the model and theory have some important policy implications. Improving confidence in the government to protect the minority population from mob violence, without attending to deeper minority grievances or the counterterrorism technology, can actually result in more militant attacks. This unfortunate trade-off, where reducing the threat of mob violence comes at the cost of increasing militant violence, can be overcome if the government follows two paths simultaneously along with improving protection: (1) It implements policies to address the legitimate grievances of the marginalized minority population and (2) it invests seriously in the counterterrorism infrastructure. The government should prioritize these two policies before modifying any other related security policies.

The paper is structured as follows. I first briefly describe the socioeconomic and political marginalization of Indian Muslims as well as the wide-ranging extent of anti-Muslim discrimination in India. In the next section, I empirically illustrate that Indian Muslims are statistically underrepresented in militant groups. I then go through the related literature and the shortcomings of existing explanations. Next, I present my novel theoretical framework and my argument regarding the suppression effect of indiscriminate mob violence on militancy. Following that, I present a formal model that analyzes the relationship between perceptions of the state and militant mobilization. Then, I briefly go through some applications of the insights from the model and theory to explain militant mobilization or the lack thereof. I finally discuss some modeling issues and other cases

before I conclude.

## The economic and political conditions of Indian Muslims

Using the 2006 Sachar Committee Report, Table 1 below presents a selection of socioeconomic data. The data show that Muslims, on average, fare worse than the Hindu upper castes and also actually have similar or considerably worse scores than Other Backward Classes (OBC) and Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC/ST).<sup>2</sup> On urban poverty in particular, Muslims do worse than both Hindu OBCs and SC/STs.

Table 1: Socio-economic conditions across groups in India

	Literacy Rate*	Graduates Prop*	Male Unemp.*	Female Unemp.*	Urban Poverty*	Rural Poverty*
Muslims	59.9	3.4	8.1	9.2	38.4	26.9
Hindu SC/STs	52.7	2.2	10.2	9.9	36.4	34.8
Hindu OBC	63.4	4.4	7.0	8.8	25.1	19.5
Hindu UC	80.5	15.3	5.1	8.0	8.3	9.0

*Data from Sachar Committee Report, 2006. All values are in percentage terms. SC/ST - Scheduled Castes/Tribes, OBC - Other Backward Classes, UC - Upper Castes. \*2004-05 data.*

In terms of political representation, given their proportion of the total population, Indian Muslims have consistently been underrepresented at both the national and state level (Ansari, 2006; Jaffrelot, 2010b).<sup>3</sup> Muslims have fared better in their representation in local government bodies (Verma, 2012), but this is not really a sign of progress. First, it is not surprising that the representation of minorities would improve when we focus on elections at lower levels of governance. Second, power is concentrated in the center and (particularly) the state governments, while the local governmental bodies have limited independent authority (Chhibber, 1999, Ch.2). The center and state-level governments, not these local bodies, have sole or joint jurisdiction over the important issues - such as law and order, and economic and social policies - that would actually affect the security and socioeconomic development of the minority Muslim community.

This pattern holds in the public sector as well. According to the Sachar Committee

<sup>2</sup>These are groups that are legally recognized to be historically disadvantaged communities. The constitution enjoins the Indian Government to rectify their situation through affirmative action programs.

<sup>3</sup>However, there is wide variation across states: Gujarat has the worst average deprivation rate (79%) and Delhi has the best average rate (11.76%) for the years 1952 to 2004 (Ansari, 2006, p.370).

Report (2006), at both the central and state government levels, Muslims are underrepresented in all levels and sectors. Even though some groups of Muslims have access to reserved government jobs (through their listing under the OBC category), the proportion of employees that are Muslim in the union and state governments is much lower than their corresponding shares in the populations.

These political and economic outcomes are unlikely to be driven by innocuous factors as anecdotal and empirical evidence both suggest that discrimination against Muslims is a real phenomenon. Muslims have spoken about living “with an inferiority complex” due to the highhanded means employed by the police against them (Sachar, 2006, p.14). A 2014 Police report in India revealed how Indian Muslims have low trust in the police due to such biases against their community Nair (2014). Communal violence has also affected the choices of Muslim families as “perceptions of public security - partly associated with increasing incidents of communal violence - prevent parents from sending daughters to schools located at a distance where they would have to use public transport” (Sachar, 2006, p.20).

Empirical studies have shown that systematic discrimination against Muslims is fairly extensive. Muslims experience discrimination in employment (Thorat and Attewell, 2007), housing (Thorat et al., 2015; Datta and Pathania, 2016), and governmental requests (Gaikwad and Nellis, 2016a). Muslims also appear to perceive these forms of discrimination as well (Gaikwad and Nellis, 2016b).<sup>4</sup> Moreover, even among the Hindu population living in slums, substantial discriminatory sentiments appear to exist towards Muslims (Tusicisny, 2016)<sup>5</sup>.

Finally, even though some Muslims might be included in reservations through their OBC status, the discrimination against Dalit<sup>6</sup> Muslims is essentially “written” into the Indian constitution. The marginalization of SCs by the Hindu community has led many to convert to other religions such as Buddhism, Sikhism, or Islam (in the past and up until today). The Indian constitution directs the government to employ affirmative action programs and other measures to improve the socioeconomic conditions of SCs, and if a

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<sup>4</sup>See the supplementary Index’s Table A10, A11, and A13 in Gaikwad and Nellis (2016b).

<sup>5</sup>Tusicisny (2016) is focusing more on understanding what impacts discrimination against Muslims as opposed to measuring the actual levels of discrimination. Yet, the data still show a considerable proportion of individuals would not accept a Muslim neighbor or intermarriage.

<sup>6</sup>Dalit and SC are synonymous terms.

Dalit has converted to Sikhism or Buddhism, then they are still permitted to receive these governmental benefits. However, Dalit Muslims, by law, are not entitled to these benefits as they are no longer deemed to be part of the SC category upon their conversion to Islam.<sup>7</sup>

We would expect these vast economic and political grievances to produce feelings of “relative deprivation” (Gurr, 1970) - a sentiment that can be instrumentally exploited to push people towards violence. Yet, grievances alone are insufficient to lead to militant actions.<sup>8</sup> Porta (2015) identified three additional features that are important for the onset of clandestine militant groups: unjust policing, escalation among competing groups, and the activation of close social networks. With regards to the first feature, Indian Muslims already have conflictual relations with the police. Yet, as discussed in the next section, the second and third features have not materialized. There have been many groups promoting the interests of Indian Muslims but escalation was rare and when it did happen, it was fairly short-lived. Social networks among Indian Muslims would be fairly tight given the “ghettoization” of Muslims across many Indian cities (Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2012). However, these tight social networks have been unable to productively generate militancy.

## **Indian Muslims and (the lack of) militancy**

In light of the marginalization and the size of the Indian Muslim community, it is surprising that there is no information recorded on Indian Muslim members of Islamist militant groups in the John Jay and Artis Database (JJA). Tables 2, 3, and 4 below illustrate this underrepresentation of Indian Muslims in such groups.

Given that it is the best systematic individual-level data for militant groups to this author’s knowledge, the JJA data are presented in this paper but there is a limitation with this source. On the JJA website, it states that “the sampling mechanism prevents these data from being representative of the radical Islamist population as a whole”<sup>9</sup> as they often have to rely on newspaper reports, court documents, and arrest documents to compile the data. This warning is warranted as two homegrown Indian Islamist groups (which will be

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<sup>7</sup>This also applies to Dalit Christians.

<sup>8</sup>The social movement literature has pointed out other necessary factors (e.g. see McCarthy and Zald 1977 and McAdam 1982).

<sup>9</sup>See <http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/attributes.php>

discussed below) are missing from the dataset. However, there is no reason to think that missingness across countries would lead to a unique downward bias for Indian Muslims. The country has a relatively free and vibrant press implying that reports on potential militants would be more easily available.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, court and arrest documents of suspected and arrested militants are freely available on the website of India’s national counterterrorism agency (the National Investigation Agency). Additionally, I examine the data in several ways and demonstrate that the underrepresentation of Indian Muslims remains consistent.

Table 2: Underrepresentation of Indian Muslims by individual’s place of birth

Region	Muslim Pop (M) <sup>1</sup>	Muslim % of Total <sup>2</sup>	No. of People in Islamist Terrorist groups <sup>3</sup>	Expected Amount <sup>4</sup>
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
India	176	17.6	0	313
Middle East & North Africa	390	39.0	1066	694
Europe	18	1.8	85	32
North America	4	0.4	9	7
Rest of Asia	411	41.1	620	732
<b>Total</b>	<b>999</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1780</b>	

Table 3: Underrepresentation of Indian Muslims by individual’s country of joining

Region	Muslim Pop (M) <sup>1</sup>	Muslim % of Total <sup>2</sup>	No. of People in Islamist Terrorist groups <sup>3</sup>	Expected Amount <sup>4</sup>
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
India	176	18.1	0	81
Middle East & North Africa	342	35.1	91	157
Europe	17	1.7	112	8
North America	4	0.4	18	2
Rest of Asia	435	44.6	228	200
<b>Total</b>	<b>974</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>449</b>	

*Data are only for countries that show up in the John Jay and Artis Database (see appendix for full list). <sup>1</sup>Pew Research: Religion and Public Life Project, <sup>2</sup>value obtained by dividing the value in Column 2 by the Total in Column 2, <sup>3</sup>John Jay and Artis Database, <sup>4</sup>value obtained by multiplying the value in Column 3 by the Total in Column 4.*

Table 2 presents the data for individuals by their place of birth, while Table 3 presents data by the region where they joined the militant group. Assuming a binomial distribution

<sup>10</sup>It is harder for journalists to report in Jammu and Kashmir, but, as I describe later, this would not affect the statistical illustration of the underrepresentation.

for individuals who join these groups, Indian Muslims are the most underrepresented in both cases (i.e. the expected amount of Indian Muslims for these groups exceeds the actual number). Muslims are a minority population in Europe too but, from this region, Muslims appear to be overrepresented in these militant groups.

The theory I present in this paper is more relevant to domestic militancy, but in the JJA data, we cannot readily distinguish between those who traveled abroad to join transnational groups and those who joined groups in their own country. As a second best option to examine domestic militancy, I also look at only those individuals who join groups in the countries in which they were born. Table 4 below presents these data. As before, a similar pattern holds where Indian Muslims are underrepresented in Islamist militant groups while European Muslims are overrepresented in such groups.

Table 4: Underrepresentation of Indian Muslims: Domestic militancy

Region (1)	Muslim Pop (M) <sup>1</sup> (2)	Muslim % of Total <sup>2</sup> (3)	No. of People in Islamist Terrorist groups <sup>3</sup> (4)	Expected Amount <sup>4</sup> (5)
India	176	20.6	0	49
Middle East & North Africa	266	31.1	75	75
Europe	13	1.5	44	4
Rest of Asia	400	46.7	121	112
<b>Total</b>	<b>855</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>240</b>	

*Data are only for countries that show up in the John Jay and Artis Database (see appendix for full list). <sup>1</sup>Pew Research: Religion and Public Life Project, <sup>2</sup>value obtained by dividing the value in Column 2 by the Total in Column 2, <sup>3</sup>John Jay and Artis Database, <sup>4</sup>value obtained by multiplying the value in Column 3 by the Total in Column 4.*

Even if we directly consider specific “homegrown” groups, there is still relatively little domestic militancy among Indian Muslims. The ongoing militancy in J&K is a conflict that tends to involve Muslim insurgents but, as Fair (2014) has shown, the militants in this region tend to be predominantly from Pakistan (particularly the Punjab province) or Kashmir (both Indian-administered and Pakistan-administered). It is thus empirically incorrect that substantial numbers of aggrieved Muslims from the rest of India are joining up with groups fighting in Kashmir.

Furthermore, it would be short-sighted to focus solely on J&K as this one state is not representative of the broader Indian Muslim experience. As the sole Muslim-majority

Indian state, it holds a unique place in the Indian polity in terms of governance (Article 370), history (in its contentious accession to India as a former princely state), and culture (e.g. *Kashmiriyat*). The state also has 8.5 million Muslims which is only a fraction of the 176 million Muslims living throughout India. To focus solely on J&K is ignoring the Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, Gujarat, and so forth, who have endured their own set of grievances stemming from economic and political marginalization. Thus, as the findings of the 2006 Sachar Committee Report suggest, the situation in J&K is unlikely to be the main source of grievances for the broad Indian Muslim community.

Domestic militancy among Indian Muslims in the rest of India has been relatively limited. The South Asian branch of al-Qaeda has yet to make a significant mark in India but, even though the JJA database does not have information on them, there have been two other notable homegrown Islamist militant groups - the Student's Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Indian Mujahideen (IM). SIMI is a banned student organization that most analysts consider to be linked to the more militant IM (Fair, 2010, p.105). In 1977, SIMI was established as the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH). Although the position of JIH moderated over time, SIMI became more radical and were eventually banned in 2001. However, rather than pushing the group further into extremism, the ban led to an internal split with one side choosing to pursue a radical path and the other side choosing a more moderate one. Those members on this latter path have tried to restore the credibility of their organization by adopting anti-jihad positions (Fair, 2010, p.114), while the more militant faction has not really lasted after the removal of the initial leaders.

IM has committed deadly attacks but the number and intensity of these attacks have been falling and, presently, IM attacks do not appear to be a serious threat.<sup>11</sup> After some notable bombings in 2008, police crackdowns led to arrests and leaders fleeing India, and the IM have only publicly claimed responsibility for five bombings since 2008 - three in 2010, one (questionable) in 2011, and one in 2013 (Subrahmanian et al., 2013). The last blast resulted in no deaths, and there have been no publicly claimed attacks since 2013 even after the Hindutva-linked party, the BJP, came to power in 2014. In fact, in 2009, then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said the Naxalites, not any Islamist militant groups, were the most serious internal threat to India's national security and this statement was made after the four IM-related bombings in India in 2008. Thus, both SIMI and IM have

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<sup>11</sup>In fact, given the level of external support, it is often difficult to determine from an attack whether IM or another militant group based outside of India (for example, in Pakistan) was the chief perpetrator.

struggled to maintain a presence and this seems to be due to a lack of membership.

The interrogation of IM leaders reveal that one of their chief constraints was a shortage of manpower (Nanjappa, 2010, 2015), and these two groups heavily relied on help from Bangladeshi and Pakistani sources such as respectively Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami and LeT (Swami, 2008; Gupta, 2011). Furthermore, even prior to the emergence of IM or the ban on SIMI, Islamist terrorist attacks within India were mostly committed by Pakistani and Bangladeshi militants (Swami, 2013; First Post, 2013).<sup>12</sup>

Given the overall low level of domestic militancy, it is not surprising that even after acknowledging the potential threat of SIMI and IM in her report, Fair (2010, p.119) still concludes by asking “[given] the pervasive problems confronting India’s vast and variegated Muslim communities, why is terrorism not more pervasive among them?”

Before proceeding, it is important to make clear that I am not assuming Indian Muslims constitute an isolated homogenous block who are all inclined towards militancy due to their collective marginalization. There is a rich literature depicting the historic and modern voices and movements within Indian Islam advocating pluralism, democracy, and secularism (Hasan, 1997, 2008; Sikand, 2004; Ahmad, 2009; Sajjad, 2014). After all, religion is but one identity that informs political choices. In most countries, the vast majority of Muslims (even where they are the minority) do not view militancy as a legitimate course of action. Only a small proportion of this population would engage in such violence. My argument speaks to the puzzle of this violent sub-minority within an otherwise peaceful minority - the fact that this former group has emerged in other places where minority Muslims have been marginalized, but not so much in India.

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<sup>12</sup>Two notable exceptions are the 1993 Bombay bombings and 1998 Coimbatore bombings. The 1993 Bombay bombings occurred in the wake of the Babri Masjid demolition and the resulting riots. Yet, these attacks were orchestrated by the underground criminal organization D-Company - a group that already had the infrastructure and established criminal network who, with help from Pakistani sources, turned its focus to committing the bombings. This was not the act of a militant group that emerged from within the Muslim community. On the other hand, the 1998 Coimbatore bombings were conducted by a homegrown militant group, al-Umma. After these attacks, arrests were made and there was some mob violence directed against Muslims. Since 1998, however, Al-Umma has not conducted any such attacks.

## Related literature and existing explanations

This paper builds on the literature addressing the causes of ethnic conflict. This literature has shown that the structure of institutions can create opportunities for conflict,<sup>13</sup> leaders can exploit institutional features and instrumentally use ethnicity to create cleavages and foster conflict in pursuit of broader goals,<sup>14</sup> and individual and local-level circumstances can determine how and when inter-ethnic violence arises.<sup>15</sup> I am focusing on a specific type of ethnic conflict which is the militant mobilization of aggrieved minorities, but this prior literature specifies three levels of explanations - institutional, individual, and leaders.

Even though the current constitution might prevent religion from being a formally institutionalized cleavage, it still remains a prominent social cleavage within India. The question then is how well can existing explanations that link institutional features to militancy account for the relatively negligible amount of militancy among the minority Muslim population. One such existing explanation focuses on the type of political system. Specifically, as a relatively robust democracy, the Indian political system might allow for minority grievances to be channeled in non-violent ways which helps to prevent the rise of extremism. Aksoy and Carter (2014) find that within-system militant groups (but not anti-system groups) are less likely to emerge in democracies with proportional representation and higher levels of district magnitude. Yet, this finding does not apply to India which has a first-past-the-post system with single-member districts (at both the national and state-level for the important legislature houses), and Islamist militant groups would be considered anti-system groups (according to Aksoy and Carter's (2014) typology).

Another institutional-based explanation is that consociational mechanisms could lessen the grievances of marginalized minorities (Lijphart, 1977). Even though Lijphart (1996) and Wilkinson (2000) take different views with regards to India's experience with consociationalism, they do both state that post-Nehru conditions would promote discord and hostility. Yet, we still do not see a corresponding substantial increase in the

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<sup>13</sup>Lijphart (1977); Laitin (1986); Posen (1993); Snyder (2000); Rabushka and Shepsle (2002); Bertrand (2004); Posner (2005); Chandra (2005); Straus (2006); Walter (2006); Lieberman and Singh (2012); Chandra (2001)

<sup>14</sup>Brass (2003); Bates (1974); Hardin (1995); Jaffrelot (1996); Brass (1997); Chandra (2004); Posner (2004); Wilkinson (2012); Adida (2014)

<sup>15</sup>Weiner (1978); Karapin (2002); Varshney (2003); Brass (2003); Wilkinson (2004); Dancygier (2010); Hopkins (2010); Jha and Wilkinson (2012); Sambanis and Shayo (2013)

participation of Indian Muslims in militant violence. Thus, the presence or absence of consociationalism cannot explain this participation puzzle.

Individual level studies tend to regularly find that, counterintuitively, human capital is positively correlated with participation in militancy (Krueger and Malečková, 2003; Krueger, 2007; Bueno De Mesquita, 2005; Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007; Benmelech et al., 2012; Gambetta and Hertog, 2016).<sup>16</sup> The relative absence of militancy among Indian Muslims is consistent with this empirical evidence given the poor socioeconomic conditions of this minority. Thus, if not poverty, then what explains participation in militant violence? This literature points to limited political and civil liberties<sup>17</sup>, poor integration<sup>18</sup>, and minority economic and political discrimination.<sup>19</sup> As explained before, the minority Indian Muslim community are highly discriminated against, are economically and politically marginalized, and are forced to the peripheries of cities and society. Thus, conditional on these other factors, Indian Muslims are still an outlier with regards to militancy.

Reconciling intuition with the counterintuitive empirical findings regarding poverty and militancy, Lee (2011) argues that even though one has to surpass a certain socioeconomic threshold to be politically active, it is the poorest of this politically active group that choose militancy. The upper and lower echelons of the politically active Indian Muslims have pursued divergent paths, but this division has been grounded in issues rather than tactics (Sajjad, 2014, Ch. 6). Militancy has not been in the repertoire of either level.

Other individual-level focused literature has highlighted more factors that move people to support and participate in political violence. These drivers include intense emotions,<sup>20</sup> economic and symbolic appeals,<sup>21</sup> being integrated in certain social networks,<sup>22</sup> taking pleasure in agency through militant assertions,<sup>23</sup> and other psychological motivations.<sup>24</sup> Yet, these explanations assume the existence of a recruiting militant group, which raises the logically prior question about the leaders that actually create such organizations.

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<sup>16</sup>One exception is Krueger and Laitin (2008) who look at international terrorism and find little explanatory power in economic conditions explaining who participates in terrorism.

<sup>17</sup>Krueger and Malečková (2003); Krueger (2007); Krueger and Laitin (2008); Piazza (2006)

<sup>18</sup>James et al. (2015)

<sup>19</sup>Cederman et al. (2010, 2011); Piazza (2011)

<sup>20</sup>Horowitz (2001); Petersen (2002)

<sup>21</sup>Weinstein (2007)

<sup>22</sup>Porta (2015); Scacco (2017)

<sup>23</sup>Wood (2003)

<sup>24</sup>Horowitz (1985)

Leaders matter for creating effective organizations to facilitate (non-violent and violent) collective action (Chong, 1991; Jha and Wilkinson, 2012). The majority of the Muslim elite of British India moved to Pakistan during Partition which might raise the question of whether there are any leaders left to create opportunities for militancy. However, potential “leaders” have existed but have either failed to arouse support for militancy to sustain their organizations or opted to choose non-violent paths.

Groups like SIMI and IM have tried to take the lead in inciting militancy but, as explained above, this has been unsuccessful. Aside from these two groups, there have been other militant organizations (e.g. Al Umma, Gujarat Muslim Revenge Force, etc.) that have emerged (Subrahmanian et al., 2013), but they do not seem to last after crackdowns, suggesting that they emerge but do not endure once the initial leaders are eliminated.

Furthermore, the Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia in particular) have patronized various Ahl-i-Hadith<sup>25</sup> institutions in India since the 1960s, such as the Jamia Salafiya in Varanasi. Gulf patronage to religious organizations has been linked to ultraconservative and militant beliefs. Yet, in India, this has not been the case as Jamia Salafiya officials have instead been known to talk about loyalty to the constitution and the Indian state (Haykel, 2017).

A final existing explanation for the lack of militancy among Indian Muslims is specific to the Indian context. Some might argue that Islam in India, due to historical and cultural reasons, is fundamentally different in a way that makes Muslims significantly less inclined towards violence. Yet, this argument is incorrect for both factual and normative reasons.

First, even in Pakistan, religiosity and religious experience do not appear to be the main determinants (or even a determinant) of support for and participation in militancy.<sup>26</sup> Second, the main Islamic schools of thought/jurisprudence in India (Barelvi and Deobandi) are also prevalent in neighboring Pakistan - a country which has had experience with Islamist militancy and sectarian violence involving these two schools of thought. Third, the prevalence of Sufism<sup>27</sup> in India is another highly unlikely explanation given its prevalence in Pakistan as well. Furthermore, Sufi orders are most prominent in Sub-Saharan African countries like Nigeria<sup>28</sup> which has experienced homegrown Islamist terrorist groups. Finally, and

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<sup>25</sup>The Indian variety of Salafism.

<sup>26</sup>Fair (2008); Shapiro and Fair (2010); Fair et al. (2010); Kaltenthaler et al. (2015)

<sup>27</sup>There exists a popular conception that Sufism is a moderating influence.

<sup>28</sup>In Nigeria, 7% of the Muslim population stating that they belong to a Sufi order (Pew, 2012).

problematically (in a normative sense), the argument about Islam being different in India also suggests that, inherently, Islam is a chief reason for why Muslims resort to militancy in other countries. Instead, religion is used instrumentally to mobilize disaffected people which has been the case at different points in time for all religions.

There are also Islamic organizations and preachers in India who would be considered strict and not relatively moderate. Tablighi-Jamaat, a relatively puritanical organization has maintained a low profile even though its influence appeared to have “grown steadily after independence” (Hasan, 1997, p.199). Jamaat-e-Islami Hind might have eventually adopted secular and democratic messaging, but their post-independence stance was similar to the vision of their founder’s, Abul A’la Maududi, regarding the establishment of an Islamic state (Hasan, 1997, p.206). Furthermore, Zakir Naik, who is currently an Islamic preacher in India, has adopted some extreme positions regarding apostasy and Islamic supremacy but still maintains a fairly popular following. These groups and individuals are not openly advocating for militancy, but this evidence suggests that influential and relatively “extreme”<sup>29</sup> organizations and individuals have existed and do exist in India.<sup>30</sup>

Within Indian Islam, as in other places, there is also conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims (especially in cities like Lucknow). Additionally, like in Pakistan, the Ahmadi Muslims are discriminated against by other Muslim sects and groups in India (although to a lesser extent as the full state apparatus does not fully support and back such discrimination).

Finally, and as mentioned above, Indian Muslim militant groups have emerged but they collapse after initial crackdowns. Thus, the inclination towards creating these groups exists but it is the lack of members and participation that leads to their demise.

## **Theory: Perceived protection and indiscriminate mob violence**

The preceding literature on explaining ethnic conflict has tended to focus on factors at three different levels: the leader, the individual, and institutions. Leader-focused explanations have looked at how privileged or resource-endowed individuals (material or symbolic) work within their institutional structure to instrumentally create divisions and foment feelings of antipathy. Yet, although such an elite is important, focusing solely on this “upper” level ignores the dynamics occurring at the “subordinate” level. These

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<sup>29</sup>In defining “extreme,” I am using the definition in Ahmad (2009, p.7) which applies to a group that “[sharpens] the boundary between Islam and the ‘other’, and [recenters] the Islamic state on its agenda.”

<sup>30</sup>Indian Muslims are also not immune to religious mobilization (Chhibber and Sekhon, 2016).

elite-focused theories give little agency to the decision making happening at the lower level.

The individual-level theories fill this gap by pointing out how emotions, grievances, selective incentives, and social networks can push and pull people towards violence. As Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) have shown, all these factors are likely to be important in explaining individual participation. Yet, these factors are still not sufficient explanations. For example, militancy does not always arise in those places where grievances exist.


Institutions matter but are interacting with the other two levels of analysis. Thus, conditional on militant leaders and individual sentiments, which institution is paramount in determining whether a significant militancy arises among an aggrieved minority?

Given the significant shortcomings in restricting the focus solely to any one level, I instead posit a more rounded theoretical framework that accounts for these prior factors but also underlines the importance of ethnic group-level factors. To better explain the onset and presence of militancy among marginalized minority communities, I elaborate on a specific institutional feature with respect to the minority group: a group's perception of "protection." As explained below, the state is often the body that provides such protection, and these perceptions of the minority group would thus be derived from their beliefs about the state's capacity and willingness to protect. It is the position of the minority group vis-à-vis the state with regards to these perceptions that determines the decision-making outcomes of individuals and the success of appeals from militant leaders.

Militant violence can provoke not just counter-violence but indiscriminate counter-violence where a community associated with the militants are made targets. Indiscriminate retaliation can come from the state but often, and especially in the context of India, the threat of indiscriminate retaliation comes from non-state sources. When this indiscriminate retaliation emerges from the majority community as opposed to the state, it often takes the form of mobs. A minority group often needs to rely on the state for protection from such indiscriminate mobs. The state, as the monopoly provider of the legitimate use of violence, is viewed as the body that can prevent any indiscriminate vigilante violence. Thus, if there is low confidence in the state to protect a group and if consequently the group is vulnerable to such a retaliatory mob, then group members will be particularly concerned about indiscriminate violence that could occur in response to militancy associated with their community. As a result, they are then more likely to take preventative actions, such as informing, to halt militancy within their group.

On the other hand, if there is high confidence in the state to protect a group, then group members will be less concerned about indiscriminate counter-attacks. Consequently, there would be a lower inclination to take preventative actions. The flow chart in Figure 1 illustrates how a minority group’s perception of protection influences militancy.

Figure 1: *Mob violence and militancy*



To be sure, leader and individual-level factors are necessary conditions for mobilization but it is the minority group’s feeling of protection that mediates the extent that these factors generate militancy:

Leader/individual factors  $\Rightarrow$  High confidence in state for protection  $\Rightarrow$  Militancy likely

Leader/individual factors  $\Rightarrow$  Low confidence in state for protection  $\Rightarrow$  Militancy unlikely

This framework can account for the militancy puzzle concerning Indian Muslims. A rich and still expanding literature has looked into understanding the causes and political effects of Hindu-Muslim riots.<sup>31</sup> My theory takes the approach of using the threat of the Hindu mob as the explanatory variable, but my dependent variable is different in that I look at explaining the negligible amount of militancy among Indian Muslims.

Hindu mob attacks have been extensively covered in the media and have taken place regularly enough to be in the minds of the minority. Furthermore, Indian Muslims have very low trust in the police due to corruption and alleged biases (Nair, 2014). All these factors lower confidence, in the eyes of the minority, that the state forces are able and willing to effectively protect the minority from any mob attacks. The credible threat of indiscriminate violence from a Hindu mob makes aggrieved minority Muslims less likely to support militancy and more likely to inform on any would-be militants. This high likelihood of being denounced, in turn, deters anyone from participating in militancy.

This threat of indiscriminate retaliation is real as, for example, a Hindutva-linked organization committed the 2008 Malegon blast in response to IM terrorism (Jaffrelot, 2010a). Additionally, the infamous 2002 Gujarat riots were triggered by the Godhra train burning where some members of the Muslim community allegedly set fire to train carriages carrying Hindu pilgrims back from Ayodhya. Given this credible threat, I argue that there would thus be higher rates of informing among this population.

Although not specifically characterized, I take confidence in the state to be an increasing function of perceptions of state willingness and perceptions of state capacity. This paper remains agnostic about the relative importance of perceptions of state willingness versus perceptions of state capacity. For the theory, confidence can be a function of these two items with weights being applied as required.

Although Wilkinson (2004) has argued that state willingness is more important than state capacity in explaining whether a riot materializes, I argue that, in India, both *perceptions* of state capacity and *perceptions* of state willingness matter in determining the threat of the indiscriminate mob for the minority. It seems highly likely that the memory and occurrence of riots (even if they are in other parts of India) have large effects on the

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<sup>31</sup>Engineer (1984); Brass (2003); Varshney (2003); Wilkinson (2004); Copland (2010); Berenschot (2011); Dhattiwala and Biggs (2012); Wilkinson (2012); Jha (2013, 2014); Mitra and Ray (2014); Klačnja and Novta (2016); Iyer and Shrivastava (2015); Nellis et al. (2016)

beliefs of Indian Muslim regarding the state. In other words, all riots affect perceived state capacity and perceived state willingness and there is evidence to suggest this is the case.

A 2014 Director General of Police (DGP) report depicted a Muslim “trust deficit” with police due to perceived communalism, bias, and corruption (Nair, 2014), and one of the authors was the DGP of Tamil Nadu - a state that Wilkinson (2004, pp.189-196) cited as an example of where the state government that has an incentive to protect this minority. Further survey data indicate that overall and even within states where willingness should exist, Indian Muslims have limited trust in the police.<sup>32</sup> Overall, 53% of Indian Muslims have not much to no trust in the police, and in Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Kerala, respectively 50%, 47.2%, 50%, and 60% of this minority group have not much to no trust in police.<sup>33</sup> These findings indicate that Indian Muslims would still question whether the state could and would protect them.

Furthermore, low state capacity still puts some limitations on effectiveness which in turn influences perceptions of the state. For example, even in states where the will exists, communal violence might still take some time to control with damage occurring to people’s businesses and houses (Wilkinson, 2004, p.196). This destruction might be relatively less than that inflicted in other regions where the will does not exist, but the response time of the police can still be slow enough for considerable amounts of damage to occur. Even Chief Ministers, who have jurisdiction over law and order within their State, recognize their own impotence in certain situations. For example, Sharad Parwar - Chief Minister of Maharashtra during the 1993 Bombay bombings - deliberately made false statements about the location of the bombs to prevent communal clashes (Anandan, 2015). If it was only about willingness, then there would be no need to resort to deceit to prevent mob violence.

Finally, state capacity is also a contested term where the exact boundaries of the concept are not particularly clear. For example, Wilkinson (2004, pp.94-95) states that the police have the ability to restrain the mob but sometimes choose to not do so due to direct orders from their political superiors or because of retribution from acting without approval. Even if we acknowledged this was true, is this fear (and the supposed immunity of the political superiors from any consequences) not a sign of a highly limited rule of law, which in turn is a sign of limited state capacity to implement the law of the land effectively? This

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<sup>32</sup>These figures are highly likely to be a lower bound due to social desirability biases.

<sup>33</sup>Obtained from the State of Democracy in South Asia data set, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, India.

“immunity” is also enjoyed sometimes by police officers and riot participants. The former have shown their anti-Muslim bias in riots but do not always incur sanctions, and the judiciary has failed to act decisively and effectively against the latter (Jaffrelot, 1998, pp.90-92). The boundary between willingness and capacity can thus sometimes be blurred. Therefore, it makes sense to give paramount importance to the perceptions of individuals.

If, as described above, many Indian Muslims have very low trust in the police then why would Indian Muslims inform to a body in which they have little confidence? First, as in many developing countries (e.g., see Adida 2014), certain groups (Muslims in the case of India) have to rely on a community leader to interact with the police. Therefore, they do not directly interact with the police. Second, a considerable part of this distrust is due to the fact that the police have failed to protect them from the mob during some notable riots and are often accused of participating in the mob violence themselves (Brass, 2003, pp.329-330). As the police have this reputation for failing to protect, the minority would even be more incentivized to report any known militant plots.

In sum, the theoretical framework suggests that the threat of the indiscriminate mob suppresses political violence among Indian Muslims. There could be a significant proportion of Indian Muslims that do want to engage in militancy. However, other Muslims, who are concerned with the threat of indiscriminate retaliatory mob violence, are more inclined to inform on individuals who are potentially planning militant acts. Due to the high likelihood of informing, those potential militants decide to not engage in such violence. Therefore, we would observe few people participating in militancy under these circumstances. In maintaining a peaceful environment, minority members are engaging in a form of “in-group policing” (Fearon and Laitin, 1996) through informing, where the tight social networks that exist among Muslim communities in India actually facilitate the prevention, rather than the viability, of militancy.<sup>34</sup> Human intelligence is a vital resource in the fight against militant groups.<sup>35</sup> Intelligence building, as shown in other insurgencies in India, often starts with someone informing (Fair, 2009).

Previous literature has positively linked limited confidence in the state and militancy.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>This is in contrast to Larson and Lewis (2017) who find that low fragmentation is conducive to viability.

<sup>35</sup>For example, see Kalyvas (2006).

<sup>36</sup>Enders and Sandler (2002); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Berrebi and Lakdwalla (2007); Lai (2007)

However, counter-intuitively, I am arguing that it is low confidence in the Indian state that results in the negligible amount of militancy among Indian Muslims. Deterrence, as defined in the international relations literature, is using a threat to coerce others to refrain from taking certain actions.<sup>37</sup> Deterrence operates on two levels in my theory. First, the threat of the indiscriminate mob encourages minority members to inform than stay silent. Second, the high likelihood of informing deters individuals from engaging in militancy.

Although it might seem related to “preference falsification” (Kuran, 1997), this theory differs in that it is not obstacles to open communication which prevents change from happening. In my framework, each person in the aggrieved minority group can communicate and be fully aware of the preferences of all the members. Yet, even under these circumstances, a violent action might not occur due to the fear of retaliation from the majority group. Thus, the obstacle to mobilization does not lie in preference falsification, but in the threat of indiscriminate mob violence that makes individuals from the minority group (even aggrieved ones) choose to inform on others.

Kalyvas (2004, 2006) argues that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive as selective violence is what incentivizes non-combatant cooperation. However, this paper is making the opposite argument: It is the indiscriminate mob violence that is more “productive” in reducing the incidence of militancy as the threat of being attacked - regardless of whether you participated or not - encourages individuals to inform on potential militants. Selective violence, on the other hand, would not have this same deterrent effect as it would not incentivize individuals to inform as much.

This paper furthermore argues that indiscriminate mob violence is different in both nature and effect from indiscriminate punishments enacted by the state. The usual models of violence and insurgency involve three actors - the government, the militant group, and the potentially collaborative civilians - where the government and militant group have the choice of using indiscriminate or selective violence in their campaigns.<sup>38</sup> In my framework, the actors are the government, the militant group, the potentially collaborative civilians (minority), and the mob (part of the majority group). The government provides selective

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<sup>37</sup>Some examples include Schelling (1966); Powell (1990); and Huth (1999).

<sup>38</sup>This conventional framework also applies in Greitens (2016) who, though is not explicitly looking at militancy, illustrates when and why indiscriminate violence will be used by an autocrat’s internal security forces with respect to eliminating a dictator’s threats.

violence, but the production of indiscriminate violence is “outsourced” to the mob.

Some governments (including India’s government for the most part) are more constrained than a mob - due to domestic and international norms, legislation, and procedures - and so we would expect indiscriminate mob violence to be relatively cheaper to produce than government-generated indiscriminate violence. Thus, indiscriminate mob violence would likely be more frenetic where participants would be more inclined to commit atrocities (Horowitz, 2001, pp.102-123), with this especially being the case if the government is incapable and unwilling to obstruct the mob. Moreover, mob violence can be triggered on the smallest of rumors (Horowitz, 2001, pp.74-88). A rumor that precipitates mob violence is not always going to lead to state violence. In other words, the threshold to trigger indiscriminate mob violence is much lower than the threshold to trigger collective state punishments. This would make minorities increasingly more wary about mob violence, as even small events (which can be false) can lead to indiscriminate retaliation.

However, even if we acknowledge the difference in the nature of the indiscriminate violence that can be generated between the mob and the government, why would we expect the effects of indiscriminate violence between these two sources to be different? The empirical evidence on the efficacy of state-directed collective punishment has been somewhat mixed.<sup>39</sup> Kocher et al. (2011, p.204) argue that these mixed findings could be attributed to local conditions: if the local community, who incur the cost of indiscriminate state violence, can influence and pressure the militant group to change course then we could see indiscriminate state violence leading to less militant violence. In the absence of this influence, the relative cost of remaining a noncombatant increases as it is the rebel groups that have the resources to ensure survival against the indiscriminate state, which encourages more citizens to participate in the militancy (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007).

Yet, with mob violence, the effect is less likely to vary with local influence as the government can provide some degree of “selective” punishments that would eliminate militants. Therefore, even if one did not have local influence over the militant groups, they still have some ability to prevent indiscriminate mob violence by informing to the government. Conversely, if one had the ability to influence tactics, we would expect individuals who fear the mob to dissuade militancy. If this dissuasion proved unsuccessful, then informing could take place. Thus, the threat of indiscriminate mob violence leads to

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<sup>39</sup>Kalyvas and Kocher (2007); Kocher et al. (2011); Condra and Shapiro (2012); Benmelech et al. (2014) show that such indiscriminate violence can backfire on the state while Lyall (2009) shows its beneficial effects.

lower levels of militancy regardless of the level of local influence. In sum, indiscriminate mob violence differs from indiscriminate state violence in both nature and effect.

This theory has emphasized the importance of a single variable - confidence in the state. Yet, increasing this confidence has offsetting effects. First, increasing perceptions of the state's infrastructure means the militancy is facing a "stronger" enemy. Lowering the perceived chances of success would thus discourage individuals on the margin from resorting to militancy. At the same time, increasing confidence would make the minority feel safer from the threat of indiscriminate mob retaliation and thus more secure in not informing. Lower participation rates and lower informing rates mean it is not immediately clear how changes in confidence in the state affect militancy outcomes. The formal model in the next section will incorporate both effects to understand how the potential equilibrium outcomes for militancy changes as confidence in the state changes.


## Model

The story behind this model is as follows. There is a minority group where the members, who each have different grievance levels, interact with each other and each member learns the level of grievances of another one (but not all members). Given that the "ghettoization" (e.g., Muslims in India) and the territorial concentration of minority communities are common features, it is reasonable to assume that minority members are likely to interact and learn about their own brethren. If a minority member sees that another intends to commit militant violence, then the former can stay silent or inform on the latter to prevent the violence. If the militant violence materializes, then the majority group mob will attempt to take indiscriminate retaliatory action against all minority members. The group-level perceptions of the government will thus influence the individual-level decision-making.

### Players and actions

There is a minority group with  $M_i$  members where  $M_i$  is an even number. Each member will have a level of grievances where grievances are drawn independently from a known CDF,  $F(\cdot)$ . Thus, each minority member is indexed by their grievance level. Each minority member is then paired randomly with another member of the minority group, and each member sees only their partner's level of grievances. They then participate in the following game:

Figure 2: *Game Tree*



First, both members ( $P1$  and  $P2$ ) in the pair choose simultaneously whether to engage in violence ( $E$ ) or to not engage in violence ( $\neg E$ ). After this, if one person has chosen to engage and another has chosen to not engage, then the latter can choose whether to stay silent ( $S$ ) or to inform ( $I$ ) on their partner. If both choose to engage or not engage then there is no option for someone to choose to stay silent or to inform.

### Payoffs

Mob violence is indiscriminate so payoffs for each individual minority member is a function of actions chosen within their pair and actions occurring in the other pairs. Each minority member is indexed by a level of grievances ( $\alpha$ ) which are drawn independently from a known CDF  $F(\cdot)$  with support  $[\underline{\alpha}, \bar{\alpha}]$ , where  $\underline{\alpha} < 0$  and  $\bar{\alpha} > 0$ . The payoffs  $U_i(A_i; A_j)$  for a member  $i$ , who is matched with member  $j$  whose respective actions are  $A_i$  and  $A_j$ , are the following:

1.  $U_i(E; E) = p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \bar{\kappa} + [1 - p(c)] \cdot (-\Delta) + p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \underline{\kappa} + N \cdot [p \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \underline{\kappa}]$
2.  $U_i(E; \neg E, S) = p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \bar{\kappa} + [1 - p(c)] \cdot (-\Delta) + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \underline{\kappa}]$
3.  $U_i(E; \neg E, I) = (-\Delta) + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \underline{\kappa}]$
4.  $U_i(\neg E; \neg E) = z + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \underline{\kappa} + p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]$
5.  $U_i(\neg E, I; E) = z + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \underline{\kappa} + p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]$
6.  $U_i(\neg E, S; E) = z + p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \underline{\kappa} + p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D) + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \underline{\kappa} + p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]$

$p(c)$  is a differentiable function and represents the perceived probability that militant violence will be successful, and it is decreasing in the confidence the community has in the government ( $c$ ). The higher the perceptions of the state, the less likely that one expects

militancy to be successful. Let us define the “counterterrorism infrastructure” as  $1 - p(c)$ . I assume  $p(0) = 1$ , and  $p(c) \rightarrow 0$  as  $c \rightarrow \infty$ . The perceived probability that the mob is successful in attacking is defined by the differentiable function  $\pi(c)$  which is decreasing in confidence in the state. The more confident one is in the state, the more they feel the state will protect them and the less they fear the threat of the indiscriminate mob. Let us define the “protection infrastructure” as  $1 - \pi(c)$ . I assume  $\pi(0) = 1$ , and  $\pi(c) \rightarrow 0$  as  $c \rightarrow \infty$ .

I am assuming that changes in confidence in the state are correlated with both the counterterrorism infrastructure and the protection infrastructure (although I can and do allow for the effects to be different for each of these dimensions in discussing the comparative statics). However, it might seem more reasonable to separate these two different dimensions as improvements on one dimension might be mutually exclusive to the other. For example, improving the budget and technology of India’s national counterterrorism agency, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), would have hardly any impact on the protection infrastructure and, similarly, strengthening the legal code with regards to mob violence would likely have little to no impact on the counterterrorism infrastructure. Yet, as I explain later, splitting the dimensions in such a way would not affect the overall dynamics described in the propositions below.

$\bar{\kappa}$  is the baseline benefit from successfully attacking which is magnified or contracted depending on the level of grievances of a member ( $\alpha$ ). Grievances can be negative which allows for some to obtain disutility from militancy. If the militant violence is unsuccessful, then the member incurs the failure disutility of  $-\Delta$  (e.g., jail).  $\underline{\kappa}$  is the baseline benefit from a successful attack if a minority member is not directly engaging in the violence but allows for its production by staying silent. I assume that  $\underline{\kappa} < \bar{\kappa}$  which captures the “pleasure in agency” (Wood, 2003) (i.e. the extra utility) that is obtained if one is more able to assert themselves. Additionally, other literature has shown that violent groups can provide material and psychological incentives to those who directly engage (Weinstein, 2007; Goldman et al., 2014; Littman and Paluck, 2015).

$N$  represents the expected number of militant attempts occurring outside of one’s pair. Each person in the minority is being paired with someone else and, within each pair, either both are going to engage, one is going to engage, or no one is going to engage. Thus:

$$N = \left[ \frac{M_i - 2}{2} \right] [Pr(\text{Both Engage}) \cdot 2 + Pr(\text{One Engages}) \cdot 1]$$

If one chooses to not engage in violence, they they keep their income  $z$ . Thus, one sacrifices their income if they choose to engage in militancy. If one chooses to not engage, and militant violence materializes either within one's pair or outside one's pair, then they also risk facing the indiscriminate mob who inflict damage  $-D$ . I will assume that  $D > z$  in the sense that the damage is considerably large which is not unreasonable given the historical record of mob violence.

Finally, if one chooses to engage in militancy then they do not face the threat of mob violence. This assumption is based on the empirical fact that non-participation, rather than participation, can often be the more costly choice in conflict (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). This non-participation cost is depicted in the model where one is not exposed to the indiscriminate retaliation by joining the militancy. However, even if I assumed that this was not the case and that those who commit militancy are also exposed to the indiscriminate mob violence, the main results from the model would not change.

Now that we have characterized each of the components, we can now move on to describing each of the payoffs above. The first payoff applies when both members engage. Thus, for member  $i$ , they obtain their expected payoff from their act of violence ( $p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \bar{\kappa} + [1 - p(c)] \cdot (-\Delta)$ ), the expected payoff from their partner's act of violence ( $p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \underline{\kappa}$ ), and the expected payoff from violence occurring in the other pairs ( $N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \underline{\kappa}]$ ). The second payoff applies when  $i$  is the only one engaging, and their partner chooses to not engage and stay silent. The only difference between the first payoff and this one is that the latter does not include the expected payoff from their partner's act of violence. The third payoff applies when  $i$  chooses to engage but their partner chooses to not engage and inform. Member  $i$  is prevented from committing violence and instead incurs the failure disutility ( $-\Delta$ ) as their partner's act of informing definitively prevents the militancy. Member  $i$ , however, still obtains some utility if militancy occurs outside of their pairing. The fourth payoff applies in all situations in which both members in a pair choose to not engage. Here, member  $i$  keeps their income ( $z$ ) and obtains the expected utility of militant violence occurring outside their pairing. However, if such militant violence does materialize,  $i$  also risks facing the threat of the indiscriminate mob ( $p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)$ ). A similar logic holds in the characterization of the fifth payoff where  $i$  chooses to not engage and inform on their partner who is engaging. By informing, they are only able to stop militancy in their pairing. The final and sixth payoff applies where  $i$  chooses to not engage and stay silent, while their partner engages in militant violence. Member  $i$  keeps their

income and obtains the expected utility of their partner's militancy occurring as well as the expected disutility from the indiscriminate mob if such militancy materializes. They also incur the same expected utility and disutility if militancy occurs outside their pairing.

### **Key mechanisms**

The group-level factor of a minority group's confidence in the government impacts individual decision-making through three mechanisms:

1. Success effect: the chances of militant success.
2. Protection effect: the chances of being protected from the indiscriminate mob.
3. Non-participation effect: the cost of non-participation in militancy.

The logic behind the first two mechanisms is clear. Increasing confidence make militant attacks less likely to succeed. Increasing confidence also means that one is more likely to be protected against the mob, and thus one feels safer staying silent if they knew their partner was engaging in militancy. For the third mechanism, the logic is not as straightforward. Improving confidence in the government such that attacks are less likely to succeed means that less people would be willing to engage. Lower levels of engagement means a lower chance of militancy arising and subsequently a lower chance that indiscriminate retaliation will occur. Thus, minority members will feel less incentivized to join the militancy to escape being exposed to the mob (the cost of non-participation). Similarly, improving perceptions of protection would also mean that an individual is less threatened by the mob and would consequently feel less inclined to join the militant group. However, from another perspective, improving the perceptions of protection will mean that more people will feel safer staying silent. Subsequently, more potential militants would be able to follow through on their actions. Thus, minority members would also be incentivized to avoid the corresponding indiscriminate retaliation and join the militancy. In sum, increasing confidence in the government does not have straight forward effects on militancy outcomes.

### **Sequence**

In sum, the game takes place within finite periods and has the following sequence:

1. Each minority member draws their grievances independently from a known CDF  $F(\cdot)$ .
2. Each member of the minority group is paired randomly with another member of the minority group. In this stage, within each pair:

- (a) Members choose simultaneously whether to engage or not engage in militancy.
  - (b) If one member chooses to engage and the other chooses to not engage, then the latter can choose whether to inform or stay silent.
3. Payoffs are realized.

**Solution concept: Symmetric equilibrium**

As this is a finite-period model, the solution concept will be a sub-game perfect equilibrium and the game will be solved using backwards induction. We will be solving for a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies ( $S$ ) which maps one's grievances and their partner's grievances onto the strategy space. For a member  $i$  paired with a member  $j$ :

$$S_i(\alpha_i, \alpha_j) \mapsto \{(E, S); (E, I); (\neg E, S); (\neg E, I)\}$$

## Analysis

Now that we have covered the framework of the model, we can proceed to the equilibrium analysis. First, we state a reasonable assumption that will hold throughout the analysis.

**Assumption I - Failure disutility**

*For all confidence levels,  $-\Delta < z + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]$*

This assumption implies that the disutility from an attack failing (e.g., jail) is sufficiently high such that if one knew that their partner was going to inform, then they would not attempt to engage in violence as failure is certain. This assumption is reasonable for two reasons. First, if it did not hold, then anyone with a positive grievance level, regardless of who they are paired up with, would definitely engage in militancy which is uninteresting and unrealistic. Second, if it did not hold, then people would deliberately choose to fail and go to jail because they would rather go to jail with certainty and be safe from the indiscriminate mob violence. The idea of jail being a place of refuge is a highly unrealistic situation.

## Cut-points

We are solving for a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. The first proposition below characterizes the structure of any such equilibrium.

### Proposition I - Equilibrium in cut-point strategies

If a non-trivial pure strategy equilibrium exists, it will involve cut-points in the grievance space.

This proof behind this proposition is in the appendix. The intuition behind the proof is that if one fixes their partner's strategy, then one's optimal choice depends on one's level of grievances. Thus, if a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, it must be based on cut-points. Using the payoffs described above, we can derive the important cut-points. For a given pair of members  $i$  and  $j$ , if we fix  $j$ 's strategy, the four important cut-points for  $i$  is as follows:

1. If  $j$  chooses to not engage and stay silent, then it is better to engage than not iff:

$$\alpha_i > \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}}$$

2. If  $j$  chooses to engage, then it is better to engage than stay silent iff:

$$\alpha_i > \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + [N + 1] \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}}$$

3. If  $j$  chooses to engage, then it is better to engage than inform iff:

$$\alpha_i > \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot [\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}]}$$

4. If  $j$  chooses to engage, then it is better to stay silent than inform iff:

$$\alpha_i > \frac{\pi(c) \cdot D}{\underline{\kappa}}$$

Let us call these four cut-points respectively  $\tilde{\alpha}^1$ ,  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$ ,  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$ , and  $\tilde{\alpha}^4$ . Thus, to summarize:

1.  $\tilde{\alpha}^1 = \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}}$
2.  $\tilde{\alpha}^2 = \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + [N + 1] \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}}$
3.  $\tilde{\alpha}^3 = \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot [\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}]}$
4.  $\tilde{\alpha}^4 = \frac{\pi(c) \cdot D}{\underline{\kappa}}$

The interpretation behind some components of the cut-points is intuitive. If the perceived chance of success in militancy ( $p(c)$ ) decreases, if income ( $z$ ) is higher, if the failure disutility ( $\Delta$ ) is higher, or if the baseline benefits from militancy are smaller ( $\bar{\kappa}$  and  $\underline{\kappa}$ ) then engaging in militancy is obviously less attractive so the first three cut-points increase. For the fourth cut-point, as the threat of mob violence ( $\pi(c) \cdot D$ ) increases, then informing becomes more appealing. Thus, unsurprisingly, the fourth-cut point increases.

Yet, the interpretation for other components requires a bit more explanation. It appears that militancy becomes a more attractive option as the chances and intensity of mob violence increase. If the chances of a mob attack ( $\pi(c)$ ) increases, if the expected number of militant attacks outside of one's pairing ( $N$ ) increases, or if the mob violence disutility ( $D$ ) increases then the first three cut-points actually decrease and engaging in militancy becomes more appealing. This dynamic occurs because of the non-participation mechanism described above where joining the militancy becomes a more appealing option as the cost of non-participation, the threat of indiscriminate mob violence, becomes magnified.

$N$ , on the right hand side of the first three cut-points above, is the expected number of attacks outside of one's pairing.  $N$  could then be a function of  $\tilde{\alpha}^1$ ,  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$ ,  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$ , and  $\tilde{\alpha}^4$ , which implies that the first three cut-points could be implicitly defined. The following assumption about the least aggrieved ( $\underline{\alpha}$ ) and the most aggrieved ( $\bar{\alpha}$ ) minority members will be important in establishing the existence of all the cut-points.

### **Assumption 2 - Grievances**

*For all confidence levels, the following two conditions hold.*

1. *The most aggrieved person always want to engage in violence if their partner choose to stay silent or engage. This implies:  $\bar{\alpha} > \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}}$*
2. *Engaging is always a dominated strategy for the least aggrieved person regardless of their partner's actions. This implies:  $\underline{\alpha} < \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + (Mi - 2) \cdot (-D)}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}}$*


This assumption implies that the most aggrieved person would always prefer to engage as long as their partner was not informing, and that the least aggrieved person would never want to engage in militancy regardless of what their partner chose as a strategy. The following proposition holds under this reasonable assumption. The proof is left in the appendix, and uses the intermediate value theorem to show that all the cut-points exist.

**Proposition II - Existence of cut-points**

*If Assumption 2 holds, then all four cut-points exist.*

Assumption 2 assures the existence of the cut-points but does not imply that each cut-point has a unique value. Let us take the case of  $\tilde{\alpha}^1$ , as the cases of  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$  and  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$  are analogous. Recall the cut-point characterized above, and let us define the right hand side of the equation by the function  $G(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$ . By Assumption 2, we know that  $G(\underline{\alpha}) > \underline{\alpha}$  and  $G(\bar{\alpha}) < \bar{\alpha}$ . Figure 3 shows how Assumption 2 can be satisfied in ways where there are unique or multiple values for this cut-point. A cut-point exists when the function  $G(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$  intersects with the 45° line.

Figure 3: *Uniqueness of Values for Cut-points*



As there can be multiple values for each cut-point, we are going to focus on the *sets* of the cut-points throughout the analysis and order them by the following definition which is used in the literature (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2006).

**Definition 1 - Ordering of Sets**

*Take two sets of elements  $S1$  and  $S2$ . We will say that  $S1$  is greater than  $S2$  if two conditions hold with at least one strictly holding:*

1. *The greatest element of  $S1 \geq$  the greatest element of  $S2$ .*
2. *The smallest element of  $S1 \geq$  the smallest element of  $S2$ .*

From now, the set associated with a cutpoint  $k$ , will be denoted as  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^k)$ . By focusing on sets and using the following ordering, we will see that we can then examine how the maximum and minimum levels of the expected amount of militant violence evolves as other parameters change.

## Equilibrium strategies and outcomes

Now that we have established the cut-points and the conditions for their existence, we will focus on looking for equilibrium strategies. First, let us look at the different states of the world in terms of how the cut-points could possibly be ranked.

### Proposition III - The worlds

*There are four worlds:*

*World A:  $\tilde{\alpha}^2 < \tilde{\alpha}^1 < \tilde{\alpha}^3 < \tilde{\alpha}^4$*

*World B:  $\tilde{\alpha}^2 < \tilde{\alpha}^3 \leq \tilde{\alpha}^1 < \tilde{\alpha}^4$*

*World C:  $\tilde{\alpha}^2 < \tilde{\alpha}^3 < \tilde{\alpha}^4 \leq \tilde{\alpha}^1$*

*World D:  $\tilde{\alpha}^4 \leq \tilde{\alpha}^3 \leq \tilde{\alpha}^2 < \tilde{\alpha}^1$*

The proof is in the appendix. Within each of these four worlds, each minority member will observe their grievances and their partner's grievances and make a choice within their pairing. The next proposition describes these equilibrium strategies.

### Proposition IV - Equilibrium strategies

*The equilibrium strategies for member  $i$  when paired with member  $j$  is the following:*

- *In Worlds A, B, and C:*
  1. *If  $\alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^3$  then do not engage and inform.*
  2. *If  $\alpha_i \geq \tilde{\alpha}^3$  and  $\alpha_j < \tilde{\alpha}^3$  then do not engage (i.e. choose either  $(\neg E, S)$  or  $(\neg E, I)$ ).*
  3. *If  $\alpha_i \geq \tilde{\alpha}^3$  and  $\alpha_j \geq \tilde{\alpha}^3$  then always engage.*
- *In World D:*
  1. *If  $\alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^4$  then do not engage and inform.*
  2. *If  $\tilde{\alpha}^4 \leq \alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^2$  then do not engage and stay silent.*
  3. *If  $\alpha_i \geq \tilde{\alpha}^2$  and  $\alpha_j < \tilde{\alpha}^2$  then do not engage and stay silent.*
  4. *If  $\alpha_i \geq \tilde{\alpha}^2$  and  $\alpha_j \geq \tilde{\alpha}^2$  then always engage.*
  5. *If  $\alpha_i \geq \tilde{\alpha}^1$  and  $\alpha_j < \tilde{\alpha}^4$  then do not engage and stay silent.*
  6. *If  $\alpha_i \geq \tilde{\alpha}^1$  and  $\alpha_j \geq \tilde{\alpha}^4$  then always engage.*

The proof is left in the appendix, and the intuition is as follows. When confidence is extremely low, we are in World A or World B. In these two Worlds, the threshold for choosing whether to stay silent or inform on one's partner (i.e.  $\tilde{\alpha}^4$ ) is the largest. This means that even for those who want to stay silent, engaging is still a more preferred option (as those who have grievances larger than  $\tilde{\alpha}^4$ , also have grievances larger than  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$  and  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$ ). Therefore, staying silent is not an equilibrium strategy in these two Worlds, and this stems from the fact that low confidence in the state means that there is considerable fear of the indiscriminate mob from staying silent. In other words, militancy cannot arise in these two Worlds with someone staying silent in equilibrium. In World C, although  $\tilde{\alpha}^4$  has fallen in the ranking such that it is below  $\tilde{\alpha}^1$ , it is still larger than  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$  and  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$ . Confidence in the state is still low enough such that if someone had grievances greater than  $\tilde{\alpha}^4$ , they would still prefer to engage than stay silent. Due to a similar logic as before about the fear of staying silent, militancy will not emerge with someone staying silent in equilibrium.

In World D, there is relatively higher confidence in the government. Now people are more likely to feel safe staying silent such that the threshold  $\tilde{\alpha}^4$  is now the lowest. As long as someone has a grievance level greater than  $\tilde{\alpha}^4$ , then they are willing to stay silent rather than inform if they knew someone was engaging. Therefore, now staying silent could be an equilibrium strategy which results in militancy as there is higher confidence in the government to protect the minority from any indiscriminate retaliatory mob.

Given Proposition IV, we can now characterize the equilibrium outcomes.

### **Corollary I - Equilibrium Outcome**

*Militancy will be attempted within a pair in the following ways:*

1. *In Worlds A, B, and C: If both members have grievances greater than  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$ , and both choose to engage.*
2. *In World D:*
  - (a) *If both members have grievances greater than  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$ , and both choose to engage.*
  - (b) *If one member has grievances greater than  $\tilde{\alpha}^1$ , and the other has grievances between  $\tilde{\alpha}^4$  and  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$  with the former engaging and the latter staying silent.*


Due to the logic described above, militancy can only emerge in World's A, B, and C among those who have grievances greater than  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$ . Low confidence in the state means militancy cannot arise in equilibrium with someone staying silent. If militancy does arise then it will involve both members in a pair choosing to engage.

However, in World D, militancy can arise in equilibrium where someone willing to stay silent is matched with someone with relatively large grievances (i.e. greater than the largest cut-point  $\tilde{\alpha}^1$ ). Furthermore, a pair where both have grievances greater than  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$  will result in both engaging in militancy. Confidence in the state is at a higher level in World D than the other Worlds. Thus, the difference is that in the former World, militancy can emerge where one person chooses to engage and the other chooses to stay silent.

This corollary characterizes  $N$ , the expected number of militancy attempts in other pairs. In Worlds A, B, and C where confidence in the state is low,  $N_{low} = \frac{Mi-2}{2} \cdot [1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^3)]^2 \cdot 2$ . In World D where confidence in the state is higher,  $N_{high} = \frac{Mi-2}{2} \cdot \left[ [1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^2)]^2 \cdot 2 + 2 \cdot [1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^1)][F(\tilde{\alpha}^2) - F(\tilde{\alpha}^4)] \right]$ .

Figure 4 illustrates the constellation of grievances that are necessary for militancy to arise. In Worlds A, B, and C the dark gray area represents the coordinate space where both individuals within a pair choose to resort to militancy. Outside of this space, no one chooses to engage. In World D, the dark gray area exists along with a light gray area which represents the coordinate space where one individual chooses to engage and the other chooses to not engage but stay silent. Outside of these two areas, no one chooses to engage.

Figure 4: *Constellation of grievances*



## Comparative statics: cut-points

Given that we have solved for the equilibrium strategies and outcomes in each of the Worlds, we will now look at how the sets of cut-points change as confidence in the state increases. The first proposition describes this dynamic in Worlds A, B, and C.

### Proposition V - Comparative statics in Worlds A, B, and C

*There exists a  $\hat{c}$  confidence level, such that when  $0 \leq c < \hat{c}$ :*

- 1.  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$ ,  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^2)$ , and  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^3)$  are increasing in confidence.*
- 2.  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^4)$  is decreasing in confidence.*
- 3. When  $c = 0$  either World A or World B materializes. If the former holds, then as  $c$  increases, World A will move into World B and then into World C. If the latter holds, then as  $c$  increases, World B will move into World C.*

The proof behind this proposition is in the appendix, and  $\hat{c}$  represents the confidence level where  $\tilde{\alpha}^2 = \tilde{\alpha}^3 = \tilde{\alpha}^4$  and thus World D emerges. The first part of the proposition states that the sets for the first three cut-points are increasing in confidence. If one has a grievance level less than the third cut-point then this implies that one would prefer to inform than to engage if their partner was engaging. Increasing confidence decreases the chance of success in militancy and also reduces the threat of the mob if militancy arises outside of one's pair. This causes the least and largest values for the third cut-point to increase as informing becomes more preferable to engaging. If one has grievances less than the first and second cut-points then one would prefer, in comparison to engaging, to respectively not engage (if their partner stays silent), and to stay silent (if their partner engages).  $N_{low}$  is a function that is decreasing in the value of the third cut-point. As confidence improves, the least and largest values of the third cut-point rises which would mean that the corresponding  $N_{low}$  would be falling. Thus as confidence improves, the sets of the first and second cut-points would also increase. This occurs because engaging becomes less appealing due to the decreasing chances of success and the lower chance of facing the indiscriminate mob violence (the cost of non-participation). Consequently, even if improvements only exclusively affected the protection or counterterrorism infrastructure, the same result described here would hold.

At the same time, as confidence improves, people become more secure in staying silent over informing as the threat of the indiscriminate mob falls. Therefore, as described in the second part of the proposition, the set of the fourth cut-point would fall.

The third part of this proposition describes the evolution of the Worlds as confidence improves. With the set of the fourth cut-point dropping, and the other three sets increasing, the World moves from A to B to C, or from B to C until World D emerges. The next proposition describes how the sets of the cut-points change in World D.

**Proposition VI - Comparative statics in World D**

*There exists a  $\hat{c}$  confidence level, such that when  $c \geq \hat{c}$ :*

1.  *$S(\tilde{\alpha}^4)$  is decreasing in confidence.*
2. *If the counterterrorism infrastructure is more responsive, then  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$ ,  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^2)$ , and  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^3)$  are increasing in confidence and we remain in World D.*
3. *If the protection infrastructure is more responsive, and...*
  - (a) *The probability of militancy involving one silent member increases by little then  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$ ,  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^2)$ , and  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^3)$  are increasing in confidence and we remain in World D.*
  - (b) *The probability of militancy involving one silent member moderately increases then  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$ ,  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^2)$ , and  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^3)$  decrease in confidence, but the World remains in D.*
  - (c) *The probability of militancy involving one silent member increases by a sufficiently large amount then  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$ ,  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^2)$ , and  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^3)$  could decrease in confidence, and the World switches back to A, B, or C.*
4. *Eventually, as confidence becomes high enough, then  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$ ,  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^2)$ , and  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^3)$  are increasing in confidence as it grows.*

The proof behind this proposition is in the appendix. The first part of the proposition is, as explained above, fairly intuitive. The set corresponding to the fourth cut point is falling as confidence improves because people become more secure in staying silent over informing as the threat of the indiscriminate mob is reduced.

If the counterterrorism infrastructure is sufficiently more responsive to changes in confidence than the protection infrastructure then engaging in militancy becomes less attractive compared to the other options. Thus, the sets of the first three cut-points would increase in confidence as described in the second part of this proposition. This same result would arise if there was an exclusive improvement in the counterterrorism infrastructure.

On the other hand, if the protection infrastructure is more responsive to changes in confidence (or if there were only improvements to the protection infrastructure), then the answer is more complicated due to the offsetting dynamics around the cost of non-participation. An improvement in the protection infrastructure makes the chances of

an indiscriminate mob attack less likely which dissuades people from needing to participate in militancy to avoid the mob. However, an improved protection infrastructure makes people feel safer staying silent which increases the chances of militancy being attempted. The increased chance of facing the corresponding indiscriminate cost of non-participation encourages individuals to resort to militancy for protection. The key component then determining which of these two opposing dynamics dominates is the magnitude of the change in the probability of militancy occurring in a pair involving one silent member. If the change is sufficiently small then the first effect dominates which is why, as Proposition VI 3(a) states, the set of the first three cut-points would increase.

If the change in this probability is fairly moderate, then, as described in Proposition VI 3(b), the second effect dominates which results in the sets of all the cut-points falling but the world remains in World D. Yet, if the change in this probability is sufficiently large then the drop in the cut-points can be big enough such that the world switches back to World A, B, or C. This is described in Proposition VI 3(c).

Once confidence in the state reaches a sufficiently high enough level, then the perceived chance of success is sufficiently low. This low chance of success outweighs any increases in the number of people willing to stay silent. Thus, engaging just becomes less and less appealing as confidence increases beyond this point which is why the sets of the first three cut-points would increase. This is described in Proposition VI 4.

The region of grievances within a pair which produces militancy will change as confidence increases. This change is represented below in Figures 5 and 6 which looks at the how the largest and smallest values of each cut-point evolve (as they evolve in the same direction). When  $c = 0$ , we are potentially in World A or World B. As confidence increases the set of cut points for  $\tilde{\alpha}^1$ ,  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$ , and  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$  go up and the set of cut points for  $\tilde{\alpha}^4$  falls. The dark gray area represents the set of grievances required for both members in a pair to resort to militancy. Figure 5 illustrates how, as confidence initially increases from  $c = 0$ , this dark gray area becomes smaller and smaller up until  $c = \hat{c}$ .

Yet, at  $c = \hat{c}$ , Proposition VI applies and Figure 6 depicts how multiple paths can occur. There is now this new light gray area which represents the type of militancy where one individual chooses to engage and the other chooses to not engage but stay silent. The dynamic described in Proposition VI 2, 3(a), and 4 is represented in the *First Path* where the sets for the first three cut-points increase, while the set for the fourth cut-point falls.

Under Proposition VI 3(b), the sets for all the cut points fall but we still remain in World D, which is represented in the *Second Path*. Finally, for the *Third Path*, the set of the three cut points fall to such an extent that we revert back to World A, B, or C (in Figure 6, I assume it is World C but this does not have to be the case).

Figure 5: *Evolving configuration of grievances*





Figure 6: *Evolving configuration of grievances in World D*



Once in World D, different paths can emerge at different confidence levels. The course is determined by the factors described above. However, we know that eventually when confidence in the government becomes sufficiently high, then the sets of the first three cut-points would always be increasing such that the first path would be the sole trajectory.

## Comparative statics: Amount of militancy

Now that we have established how the cut-points move, we are now going to examine how the expected amount of militancy changes with confidence. The prior proposition looks at the ordering of sets, and we can thus say something about how the maximum and minimum levels of expected militancy would change. For the rest of the analysis, we will state that if the maximum and minimum levels of the expected amount of militancy fall (rise) then the *overall* expected amount of militancy falls (rises). As shown above, the largest and smallest values of each cut-point move in the same direction so the maximum and minimum levels of the expected amount of militancy would also move in the same direction.

To determine the expected amount of militancy, we would need to know the actual probability of a militancy attempt being successful.  $p(c)$  just represents the *perceived* chances of success in the eyes of the minority community. We can reasonably assume that the actual chances of success is positively correlated with the perceived chances of success and negatively correlated with confidence in the state. Therefore, to minimize confusion by creating new variables and descriptions, I am just going to assume  $p(c)$  also represents the actual probability of success. Introducing a new variable would not change the results but would possibly make it more difficult for the reader to follow the analysis.

If both people within a pair decide to engage then the expected amount of militancy arising from the pairing is  $[p(c)]^2 \cdot 2 + p(c) \cdot [1 - p(c)] \cdot 1 + [1 - p(c)] \cdot p(c) \cdot 1 = 2 \cdot p(c)$ . If only one person from within a pair decides to engage in militancy, then the expected amount of militancy is just  $p(c)$ . In Worlds A, B, and C, and in World D, the expected amount of militancy would respectively be the following:

$$Exp(M)_{A,B,C} = \frac{Mi}{2} \cdot [[1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^3)]^2 \cdot 2 \cdot p(c)] \quad (1)$$

$$Exp(M)_D = \frac{Mi}{2} \cdot [[1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^2)]^2 \cdot 2 \cdot p(c) + 2[1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^1)][F(\tilde{\alpha}^2) - F(\tilde{\alpha}^4)] \cdot p(c)] \quad (2)$$

Using the above equations, the next proposition establishes how the *overall* expected amount of militancy would vary with confidence in the state.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>It is important to note that  $\frac{dExp(M)}{dc}$  is not necessarily defined at  $c = \hat{c}$ . This is because the expected amount of militancy switches to a different function at this point as  $N_{low}$  switches to  $N_{high}$ .

## Proposition VII - Comparative statics for militancy

*As confidence in the state increases...*

1. *For  $0 \leq c < \hat{c}$ , the overall expected amount of militancy is decreasing.*
2. *For  $c \geq \hat{c}$ , if the counterterrorism infrastructure is more responsive to changes in confidence than the protection infrastructure, then the overall expected amount of militancy will decrease.*
3. *For  $c \geq \hat{c}$ , if the protection infrastructure is more responsive to changes in confidence than the counterterrorism infrastructure and...*
  - (a) *there is only a small increase in the number of people willing to stay silent, then the overall expected amount of militancy would decrease.*
  - (b) *there is a moderate increase in the number of people willing to stay silent, then the overall expected amount of militancy would increase.*
  - (c) *there is a large increase in the number of people willing to stay silent, then there would be a discontinuous increase in the overall expected amount of militancy.*
4. *If confidence becomes sufficiently high, then the overall expected amount of militancy would decrease as confidence grows beyond this high level.*

The proof is in the appendix and the intuition behind this proposition is as follows. When  $0 \leq c < \hat{c}$ , then we are in World A, B, or C. As shown in Figure 5, if confidence increases in this environment then people are dissuaded on the margins from engaging in militancy and this in turn reduces the area of the grievance space where militancy could arise within a pair. Increasing confidence thus lowers attempt rates and chances of success which explains the logic behind the first part of the proposition.

Once  $c \geq \hat{c}$ , then the relative responsiveness of the protection and counterterrorism infrastructure determines the changes in the overall expected amount of militancy. If the counterterrorism infrastructure is more responsive then, as confidence in the state improves, there is a far greater reduction in the chance of a successful attack than any increase in the number of minority individuals willing to stay silent. Therefore, as stated in the second part of the proposition, the overall expected amount of militancy falls. Similarly, if only the confidence infrastructure exclusively improved, then there is a reduction in the chances of militant success without any changes to the protection infrastructure. This would also cause a decrease in the expected amount of militancy.

The third part of the proposition is related to when the protection infrastructure is more responsive. Even then, if there is only a small increase in the number of people

willing to stay silent then the overall expected amount of militancy could still decrease in confidence in the state. Individuals are dissuaded from engaging due to the reduced threat of the indiscriminate mob and the lower chance of success, and these dynamics outweigh the effects of an increased silent population. Conversely, if there is a substantial increase in the number of people willing to stay silent then the overall expected amount of militancy could increase. More minority members feel secure in staying silent, while the chances of a successful attack do not diminish greatly. The higher likelihood of militancy being attempted also increases the cost of non-participation and makes engaging a more attractive option. A moderate rise in the silent population will cause the overall expected amount of militancy to increase, while a sufficiently large expansion in this population will cause a discontinuous increase. Similarly, if only the protection infrastructure exclusively improved then the overall balance between the increased silent population (which not only increases the chances of militancy being attempted but also increases the cost of non-participation) and the increased protection (which decreases the cost of non-participation) will determine whether the expected amount of militancy rises or falls.


Once confidence is sufficiently high, then the chances of success are small enough such that further increases in the silent population are inconsequential. Thus, as confidence rises above this threshold, the overall expected amount of militancy would always be decreasing.

The dynamics described above could occur at any confidence value in  $c > \hat{c}$ . Thus, there are many paths that the overall expected amount of militancy could take after  $\hat{c}$ . For illustrative purposes, I am going to depict the three possible dynamics at  $c = \hat{c}$  in Figure 7.

Up until  $\hat{c}$ , the overall expected amount of militancy is always declining. However, after  $\hat{c}$ , the overall expected amount of militancy can decline, rise, or have a discontinuous jump. If the last dynamic occurs, then this is because the world has reverted back to World A, B or C (as described in Proposition VI). Subsequently, the overall expected amount of militancy starts to initially decline in confidence in the state until a different  $\hat{c}^* > \hat{c}$ , where World D emerges. Furthermore, once confidence in the state reaches a high enough level where militancy is highly unlikely to be successful, then the overall expected amount of militancy would always decrease as confidence in the state grows further beyond this level.

Therefore, Proposition VII explains how an unfortunate trade-off can emerge where reducing the threat of mob violence (through improving perceptions of the protection infrastructure) can increase the overall expected amount of militancy. A government should

Figure 7: *Evolving expected militancy*



protect civilians (minority or not) from vigilantism, but this trade-off raises a problem in pursuit of that policy. In order to overcome this trade-off, the government needs to take steps to reduce the grievances of the minority population (such that less people would be willing to engage or stay silent), and to adequately invest in the counterterrorism infrastructure (to dissuade potential militants and prevent militancy from actually materializing).

## Applications

First, I want to show the relevance of the model by applying the insights to the empirical puzzle regarding Indian Muslims. India might currently experience comparatively little militant violence from Indian Muslims because this minority group has relatively low confidence in the state that is around the  $\hat{c}$  level. The state is thus not perceived to be weak enough from one perspective (i.e. there is not a high chance of success in militancy) or strong enough from another perspective (i.e. there is an inadequate protection infrastructure). The threat of indiscriminate mob violence thus deters people from staying silent which in turn deters people from engaging in militancy. As described before, survey evidence and police reports indicate that Indian Muslims hold negative perceptions of the police. Moreover, given the ghettoization of Indian Muslims, it would be difficult to avoid being seen such that militancy would be difficult to generate unless sufficiently highly aggrieved people become completely isolated from the broader minority community.

Recent events suggest that any increases in confidence in the Indian state would have improved perceptions of the counterterrorism infrastructure over the protection infrastructure. In 2008, the Indian Government established a new counterterrorism agency, the National Investigation Agency, which likely enhanced their counterterrorism abilities. In contrast, the increased presence of cow-vigilantes and the recent Uttar Pradesh election which resulted in a new controversial Chief Minister would likely make Indian Muslims less trusting of the protection infrastructure.<sup>41</sup>

Interviews with two officials from prominent Indian Muslim organizations provide support for the logic behind the theory and model of mob violence.<sup>42</sup> They stated that the role of the police is suspect in relation to communal tension and that there is a large trust deficit between the police and the Muslim community in India. However, one official stated that the “Police have people everywhere” within the Muslim community. Thus, there appears to be substantial amounts of Muslim informants. Furthermore, it appears that fear is a key driver of this behavior, as “[Muslims] will definitely report extremist issues to the police...[as they] want to maintain peace and not invite violence against themselves.”

Therefore, this paper argues that the relatively low level of militancy among this

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<sup>41</sup>The newly elected Chief Minister, Yogi Adityanath, was renowned for making anti-Muslim statements in the past.

<sup>42</sup>Interview with author, April 11, 2017. Interview with Author, August 22, 2017. Organizations were selected based on their political activism for the Muslim community.

community should not be taken to mean that India is unique in that a minority can be marginalized by elements within the state and society without any militant sentiments arising. The model illustrates that increasing confidence in the state from its current levels can actually have detrimental effects in terms of militant violence if sufficient attention is not paid to both minority grievances and the counterterrorism infrastructure. Thus, the Indian government should focus on addressing the grievances of this minority,<sup>43</sup> and investing in its counterterrorism infrastructure. By always prioritizing these two policies, the Indian government would then be able to improve the protection infrastructure for Indian Muslims without potentially incurring increases in the amount of militancy.

The theory is predominantly about domestic militancy as transnational militancy, where someone goes abroad to commit violence, is less likely to invite indiscriminate retaliation at home. Thus, we would not expect the same informing dynamic to hold if someone were to travel away from India to engage in militancy. Yet, there still could be spillovers to the transnational arena. If one noticed that someone was becoming radicalized, there is unlikely to be a clear signal about whether the latter person is going to engage in transnational or domestic militancy. Thus, given the threat of indiscriminate retaliation, informing could still likely occur as a precaution. Table 5 uses the data reported in Benmelech and Klor (2016) to show the Muslim population-based rankings of ISIS foreign fighters from some selected countries. India ranks last out of 65 countries with 0.1 fighters per million Indian Muslims, which is far below the rates for a lot of notable Western European countries.

Table 5: ISIS Foreign Fighters

Rank (1)	Country (2)	Fighters/Million Muslims (3)
1	Finland	1590.9
11	France	342.4
16	UK	256.2
22	Germany	187.9
65	India	0.1

*Data from Benmelech and Kor (2016)*

To be sure, there are other variables that could be driving this result with regards to ISIS foreign fighters. For example, it is plausibly much easier for a Muslim from Western

<sup>43</sup>For example, by including Dalit Muslims under the SC category.

Europe to travel to Syria and Iraq than it is for a Muslim in India. However, the informing dynamic could still play a role. For instance, a group of Muslims from Kerala left India in mid-2016 to join ISIS but, before their departure, they gave others around them more benign reasons for their travel. However, once they were outside of India, they declared their true motives and sent back an audio recording stating: “There is no point in complaining to police...We have no plans to return from the abode of Allah” (Safi, 2016). Thus, the informing dynamic could still influence transnational militancy.

The insights from the model and theory also help us understand the “overrepresentation” of Muslims from Western Europe in militant groups. Muslims in this part of the world are also a heavily marginalized minority. Yet, compared to India, there has been relatively higher militancy participation among Muslims from Western Europe. This difference is consistent with the model, as the minority Muslim community in Western Europe has substantially more confidence in their governments to protect them. Thus, witnesses of potential militants would feel safer staying silent as there is no threat of an indiscriminate mob which means there could be more attempts at militancy.

Some suggestive survey evidence from Britain supports this as a plausible explanation. Two separate surveys reveal that a half to two-thirds of British Muslim respondents would not inform the police if they thought someone close to them was getting involved with people who support terrorism in Syria (ICM, 2015, 2016).<sup>44</sup> At the same time, there appears to be positive impressions of the police and court system with around 70% of Muslim respondents expecting to be treated the same or better by these two institutions compared to people from other religions (ICM, 2015).

However, if the high level of confidence in the state translates into enhanced perceptions of the counterterrorism (protection) infrastructure, then the model suggests that the expected number of militant attacks occurring would be small (relatively larger). The case of Britain exemplifies both mechanisms. In 2015, Britain, which has a national counter-terrorism agency (MI5), foiled 7 high-scale attacks - a case of lot of attempts but with no successes (Wilkinson, 1994). On the other hand, France, which had no national counterterrorism center, experienced three high profile attacks between 2015 and 2016.<sup>45</sup>

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
<sup>44</sup>This does not mean that they would not take any action at all. Instead, many reported that they would opt for other means to deal with the issue (talking to them directly, involving family members, etc.).

<sup>45</sup>In fact, right before the 2016 Nice attack, a French Parliamentary Commission called for the creation of such a national counter-terrorism agency (Riedel, 2016).

Some might counter that there were notable militant attacks that occurred in the UK in early 2017. However, many place the blame for these attacks on the Conservative government who cut police numbers and the budgets of the Home Office (Chu, 2017; Williams, 2017). Thus, it appears that a drop in spending on critical dimensions of the counterterrorism infrastructure could have led to the increased number of attacks.

The insights from the model and theory can also be applied to explain militant mobilization in the case of Catholics in Northern Ireland in the mid to late 20th century. The Troubles commenced after the *Battle of the Bogside* and other riots in 1969. Although loyalist groups did target Catholic communities, it never reached the scale of mob violence. Furthermore, the charts in Figure 8 below illustrate that the threat of retaliatory attacks by the loyalist groups was relatively low and unresponsive.

Figure 8: *Deaths in Northern Ireland during the Troubles*



Source: CAIN: Michael McKeown Post-Mortem dataset, Census of Ireland: 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001. Death rates are calculated as number of deaths per 1,000 of the respective populations (e.g. The non-combatant Catholic civilian death rate is number of deaths per 1,000 of the Catholic population)

Even though the Catholic civilian death rate (per 1,000 non-combatant Catholic civilians) was relatively high in the early-to-mid 1970s, by the late 1970s and early 1980s it had dropped down considerably. The non-Catholic death rate (per 1,000 non-Catholic citizens) and the Protestant death rate (per 1,000 non-Catholic citizens) remained at higher levels during the 1980s. From 1977 to 1998 (the year of the Good Friday Agreement), the correlation between the non-Catholic death rate and the non-combatant Catholic civilian death rate is 0.04. The corresponding correlation between the Protestant death rate and the non-combatant Catholic civilian death rate is 0.1. Therefore, there does not appear to be a strong association between the death rate of the majority group and the

death rate of Catholic civilians during a large stretch of the Troubles which indicates a relatively reduced threat of retaliatory violence by the loyalist groups.

The theoretical framework can also be applied to the case of African Americans in the South during the late 19th to early 20th century. Aside from economic and political marginalization, this minority faced the threat of mob violence. Yet, similar to Indian Muslims, a substantial militancy did not arise from this group.

Mob violence often occurred under the most minor pretenses, and there was little to no confidence in the police forces to prevent such mob attacks. Thus, one would be worried of militancy as it could invite retaliation. Under such conditions, the theory and model predict that militancy would be less likely to arise due to community self-policing.

There is evidence to suggest that this dynamic existed. Even if one felt victimized, violence was not a feasible reaction for African Americans living in the South. The prior experience of racial violence had ingrained the notion “that if black people resisted white supremacy, then whites could use violence with probable immunity from prosecution” (Williams, 2012, pp.2-3). Thus, there was no incentive for promoting militancy among African Americans due to this potential retaliation.

Given this threat of mob violence and the fact that it could arise for minor transgressions, African Americans would likely self-police themselves and modify their behavior in order to not invite this retaliation. Tolnay et al. (1996, p.811) find some evidence to support this deterrence effect with respect to lynchings where African Americans likely reacted to such violence by becoming “more circumspect in their interactions with whites so as not to provoke violent responses.”

In sum, African Americans were highly marginalized in the early post-Civil War era. They perceived a credible threat of mob violence due to their lack of confidence in the state such that they were wary of promoting the means of militancy. According to the model, the only way for militancy to arise in such circumstances would be for there to be a fairly high belief that such acts would be successful which is unlikely to be the case at that time given their limited resources. Instead, and as my theory suggests, there would be little militancy and African Americans would self-police their behavior. It is unsurprising then that during this time period, when resistance did occur, it mainly manifested itself in the form of testimonies and other non-violent methods (Williams, 2012).

## Discussion

One might argue that I am not accounting for the “mob dilemma”, akin to the counterterror dilemma described in Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007). In this analogous dynamic, the mob violence would lead to a new distribution of minority grievances that stochastically dominates the prior distribution. If such events occurred then the dynamics described in the propositions above would still hold but the expected amount of militancy would somewhat change. Let us start with an initial distribution of grievances which is defined by a level of  $\hat{c}$  where World D emerges. Now, let us look at a different world where mob violence has occurred and grievances increase for every minority member. Assuming that there is now a smaller proportion of grievances at lower levels, this would mean that the sets of the first three cut-points increase at a slower rate in Worlds A, B, and C. This is because there is a higher probability that militancy will occur outside of one’s pairing which increases the incentive to engage. This would also result in a new  $\hat{c}$  being larger than previous  $\hat{c}$ . Thus, the expected amount of militancy would increase for  $c \leq \hat{c}$  but it is unclear how the expected amount of militancy would change after as  $c \geq \hat{c} > \hat{c}$  because, as explained above, the dynamics are more complicated once World D emerges.

However, if we expect a mob dilemma to aggravate minority grievances then, similarly, we would expect militant attacks to aggravate the majority and enhance their mobilization towards indiscriminate mob violence (i.e.  $D$  would increase). Now, let us look at a different world where mob violence has occurred which has led to a militant attack. Grievances increase for every minority individual and the level of damage from mob violence ( $D$ ) also increases. In such circumstances, the dynamics behind the propositions would still hold but the changes in the expected amount of militancy would not necessarily be monotonic in any World. Increasing  $D$  would make the threat component of one’s utility more pronounced. Thus, as confidence in the state increases, the improved protection infrastructure would be more important for the minority members. This would cause the sets of the first three cut-points to increase and the set of the fourth cut-point to decrease at faster rates in Worlds A, B, and C which has the opposite effect from the mob dilemma dynamic. It is therefore unclear how the expected amount of militancy would change, compared to the prior scenario, as confidence in the state increases.

In the model, we assumed a discrete number of minority members. Thus, an obvious

extension is to examine what happens when there is a continuum of minority members. In this scenario, only the first cut-point matters. A minority member would only engage in militancy (assuming their partner was not informing) if it is better than not engaging. The intuition behind this result is that when there are a continuum of minority members, the probability given to any other minority member is zero. Therefore, one is indifferent between being silent or informing (if their partner was engaging) as one obtains the same probability of facing mob violence regardless of their action within their pair.

The insights from the theory and model could also be applied to other cases of minority militant mobilization in India - including the Red Corridor (with regards to the Adivasis), Punjab, J&K, and the North East. In the appendix, I briefly illustrate how the insights can be applied to understanding these episodes of militancy. In the appendix, I also give reasons for why a substantial militancy has not emerged among SCs and OBCs - two other marginalized communities in India - and why these reasons do not apply to Indian Muslims.

## Conclusion

This paper was broadly motivated by the wide variation in the extent of militancy across marginalized minorities and specifically motivated by the case of limited militancy among Indian Muslims. Although militant groups have been able to exploit grievances and appeal to marginalized minority Muslim populations in other parts of the world, Indian Muslims have largely refrained from such appeals to engage in militancy. I have argued that alternative explanations and theories that focus solely at either the individual, leader, or institutional-level are limited in their ability to address this puzzle. Instead, I posited a novel, more rounded theoretical framework that incorporates these factors and emphasizes the importance of a group-level factor: the minority group's perception of protection. This perception mediates the extent that the other features can generate militant mobilization.

Within this framework, I argue how the threat of retaliatory indiscriminate mob violence - a threat that differs from state-led collective punishments in both nature and effect - explains the negligible amount of militancy among Indian Muslims. Indian Muslims fear the indiscriminate retaliation of the mob because of their low confidence in the government for protection. They would thus want to prevent militancy within their

community by informing on any potential militants. This high denouncing rate subsequently discourages anyone from choosing to engage in militancy.

In this framework, rising perceptions of the state can have simultaneously dissuading and encouraging effects on militancy. I thus developed a formal model to understand the relationship between perceptions of the state and militant mobilization. I illustrate that, counterintuitively, the relatively low perceptions of a state can explain the limited militant mobilization within a marginalized minority group. Moreover, increasing confidence in the state can lead to an unfortunate trade-off where decreasing the threat of indiscriminate retaliatory violence results in increased militant violence. The implication is thus that a government, while improving any protection infrastructure, needs to prioritize both reducing the grievances of the minority and enhancing the counterterrorism infrastructure.

Using these insights, I briefly examine episodes of militant mobilization or the lack thereof among Indian Muslims currently, Western European Muslims currently, Catholics in Northern Ireland during the mid to late 20th century, and African-Americans in the early post-Civil War period. The insights can also be applied to other areas where a similar societal structure exists. The scope conditions for the theory is simply the existence of a marginalized minority and, for those groups who do have low perceptions of protection, a belief that self-policing will actually prevent the emergence of the indiscriminate mob.

Although many are constrained, some states employ indiscriminate violence in such an unreserved way that it is similar to indiscriminate mob violence. Under such circumstances, indiscriminate state violence would have similar effects to that of indiscriminate mob violence. For example, the results here could also explain the lack of militant violence among the marginalized Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. A Rohingya insurgency came to existence during the Partition of British India but it considerably weakened after General Ne Win became leader and has remained fairly weak. In late 2016, insurgents attacked Myanmar border officers, and the Military's response has been so severe that a UNHRC Chief recently declared that the Government was pursuing the "ethnic cleansing" and engaging in the "collective punishment the of Rohingya minority" BBC (2016). Given the extent of this retaliation, the theory predicts that the Rohingya militancy is likely to remain limited. Even in light of the recent news on the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) insurgency, commentators have still stated that this militant group remains weak, poorly armed, and unable to mount any real resistance (Al-Jazeera, 2017; Judah, 2017).

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## Appendix

### Countries used in Tables

#### *For Table 2*

Europe: Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom

Middle East & North Africa: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

North America: Canada, United States

Rest of Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand

#### *For Table 3*

Europe: Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom

Middle East & North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen

North America: Canada, United States

Rest of Asia: Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore

#### *For Table 4*

Europe: France, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom

Middle East & North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Yemen

Rest of Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore

### Proof of Proposition I

Without loss of generality, let us take  $j$ 's strategy as fixed, and let us look at  $i$ 's optimal strategy:

$j$  chooses to  $(\neg E, S)$

It is best for  $i$  to Engage iff  $U_i(E; \neg E, S) > U_i(\neg E, S; \neg E, S) = U_i(\neg E, I; \neg E, S)$ . This holds if

$$\alpha_i > \frac{z + [1 - p(c)](\Delta) + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}}$$

$j$  chooses to Engage (i.e.  $(E, S)$  or  $(E, I)$ )

It is best for  $i$  to Engage too iff  $U_i(E; E) > U_i(\neg E, S; E)$  and  $U_i(E; E) > U_i(\neg E, I, E)$ . This holds if respectively

$$\alpha_i > \frac{z + [1 - p(c)](\Delta) + [N + 1] \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}}$$

$$\alpha_i > \frac{z + [1 - p(c)](\Delta) + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot [\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}]}$$

It is best for  $i$  to stay silent iff  $U_i(\neg E, S; E) > U_i(\neg E, I; E)$  and  $U_i(\neg E, S; E) > U_i(E, E)$ .

This holds if respectively

$$\alpha_i > \frac{\pi(c) \cdot D}{\underline{\kappa}}$$

$$\alpha_i < \frac{z + [1 - p(c)](\Delta) + [N + 1] \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}}$$

It is best for  $i$  to inform iff  $U_i(\neg E, I; E) > U_i(\neg E, S; E)$  and  $U_i(\neg E, I; E) > U_i(E, E)$ . This holds if respectively

$$\alpha_i < \frac{\pi(c) \cdot D}{\underline{\kappa}}$$

$$\alpha_i < \frac{z + [1 - p(c)](\Delta) + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot [\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}]}$$

$j$  chooses to  $(\neg E, I)$

Then for all levels of  $\alpha_i$ , by Assumption 1, it is best for  $i$  to not engage.

Holding one's partner's strategies fixed, then the optimal action is determined by cut-points in the grievance space. Therefore, this implies that if a pure strategy equilibrium exists, then it will be determined by cut-points in the grievance space as well.

### Proof of Proposition II

$\tilde{\alpha}^4$  always exists in the way it is specified. We will prove that if Assumption 2 holds, then  $\tilde{\alpha}^1$  exists. An analogous argument holds for  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$  and  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$ . If  $N$  is not a function of  $\tilde{\alpha}^1$ , then the cut-point exists. Let  $G(\alpha)$  be represented by  $\frac{z + [1 - p(c)](\Delta) + N \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}}$ . Given the continuity of  $p(c)$ ,  $F(\cdot)$ ,  $\pi(c)$ , and  $N$ , this means that  $G(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$  is a continuous function

By Assumption 2, we know that  $\bar{\alpha} > G(\bar{\alpha})$  and  $\underline{\alpha} < G(\underline{\alpha})$ . By the intermediate value theorem then, we know that there exists an  $\alpha = \tilde{\alpha}^1$ , such that  $\tilde{\alpha}^1 = G(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$ .

### Proof of Proposition III

The following inequalities are important in determining the world:

$$p(c) \cdot \pi(c) > \frac{(z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta) \cdot \underline{\kappa}}{N \cdot D \cdot \underline{\kappa}} \quad (3)$$

$$p(c) \cdot \pi(c) > \frac{(z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta) \cdot \underline{\kappa}}{D \cdot \bar{\kappa} + N \cdot D \cdot \underline{\kappa}} \quad (4)$$

$$p(c) \cdot \pi(c) > \frac{(z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta) \cdot \underline{\kappa}}{D \cdot \bar{\kappa} + [N + 1] \cdot D \cdot \underline{\kappa}} \quad (5)$$

If all three inequalities hold then by comparing the cut-points, it can be shown that World A materializes.

If inequality 3 does not hold, but inequality 4 and inequality 5 hold, then World B materializes.

If inequality 3 and inequality 4 do not hold, but inequality 5 hold, then World C materializes.

If all three inequalities do not hold, then World D materializes.

### Proof of Proposition IV

Let us assume there are two members in a pair -  $i$  and  $j$ . We will first prove the proposition with regards to Worlds A, B, and C. Let us assume  $\alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^3$ . As  $\tilde{\alpha}^3 < \tilde{\alpha}^4$ , this means that  $\alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^4$ . This implies that if  $j$  was engaging, member  $i$  would prefer to inform than stay silent, and would prefer to inform than engage. Thus, member  $i$  always chooses to not engage and inform if  $\alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^3$ . Knowing this,  $j$  would never choose to engage if they knew that  $\alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^3$ , and vice versa.

If  $\alpha_i > \tilde{\alpha}^3$ , then we know that  $\alpha_i > \tilde{\alpha}^2$ . This means that if  $j$  was choosing to engage, member  $i$  would also prefer to engage than any of the other options. Thus, if both  $\alpha_i$  and  $\alpha_j$  are larger than  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$ , then both members choose to engage is an equilibrium.

This establishes the Proposition with regards to Worlds A, B, and C.

Let us now focus on World D. Let us assume  $\alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^4$ . As  $\tilde{\alpha}^4 < \tilde{\alpha}^3$ , this means that  $\alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^3$  too. Thus member  $i$  prefers to inform than to engage or stay silent if their partner  $j$  was choosing to engage. Knowing this  $j$  would never choose to engage if they knew that  $\alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^4$ , and vice versa.

If  $\tilde{\alpha}^4 \leq \alpha_i < \tilde{\alpha}^2$ , then member  $i$  prefers to stay silent than to inform or engage if their partner chose to engage. If  $\alpha_j < \tilde{\alpha}^1$ , then  $j$  is not willing to engage in violence if their partner is only willing to stay silent. However, if  $\alpha_j > \tilde{\alpha}^1$ , then  $j$  would be willing to engage if their partner was willing to stay silent (i.e. if  $\alpha_i > \tilde{\alpha}^4$ ). This establishes the equilibrium where one person chooses to engage and the other chooses to not engage but stay silent.

If  $\alpha_i \geq \tilde{\alpha}^2$ , then  $\alpha_i > \tilde{\alpha}^3$  as  $\alpha_2 > \tilde{\alpha}^3$ . Thus, member  $i$  prefers to engage over any other choice if  $j$  is also choosing to engage. Therefore, if both  $\alpha_i$  and  $\alpha_j$  are larger than  $\tilde{\alpha}^2$ , then both members choosing to engage is an equilibrium.

This establishes the Proposition with regards to World D.

### Proof of Proposition V

As are focusing on the sets, we need to focus on only the greatest and lowest cut-points in each set. In World A or World B, we would want to know how the cut-points move given that we know now that  $N_{low} = \frac{Mi-2}{2}[1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^3)]^2 \cdot 2$ . We will take note that  $\partial N_{low} / \partial \tilde{\alpha}^3 \leq 0$ . Using the cut-points, we can create the following functions:

1.  $G^1 = -\tilde{\alpha}^1 + \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + N_{low} \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}} = 0$
2.  $G^2 = -\tilde{\alpha}^2 + \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + [N_{low} + 1] \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}} = 0$
3.  $G^3 = -\tilde{\alpha}^3 + \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + N_{low} \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot [\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}]} = 0$
4.  $G^4 = -\tilde{\alpha}^4 + \frac{\pi(c) \cdot D}{\underline{\kappa}} = 0$

Furthermore, we will use the following lemma.

### Lemma I

*In Worlds A, B, and C: For the greatest and smallest values in  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^3)$ , it is the case that  $\frac{dG^3}{d\alpha^3} < 0$*

This can be seen in Figure 3 where the greatest and smallest value have a slope that is smaller than the 45° line.

We can use the implicit function theorem by solving the following matrix problem:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} & \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} & \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} & \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \\ \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} & \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} & \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} & \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \\ \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} & \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} & \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} & \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \\ \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} & \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} & \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} & \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4}{\partial c} \end{bmatrix} = - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial c} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} -1 & 0 & \frac{\partial N_{low}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}} & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & \frac{\partial N_{low}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 + \frac{\partial N_{low}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4}{\partial c} \end{bmatrix} = - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial c} \end{bmatrix}$$

Using Lemma I, it can be shown that the 4x4 Jacobian matrix is non-singular. Solving this matrix problem results in:

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} = - \left[ \frac{z \cdot p'(c) + N_{low} \cdot \pi'(c) \cdot [p(c)]^2 \cdot (D) + \Delta \cdot p'(c)}{[p(c)]^2 \bar{\kappa}} \right] + \left[ \frac{\frac{\partial N_{low}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}}}{-1 + \frac{\partial N_{low}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}}} \right] \left[ \frac{z \cdot p'(c) + N_{low} \cdot \pi'(c) \cdot [p(c)]^2 \cdot (D) + \Delta \cdot p'(c)}{[p(c)]^2 \bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}} \right]$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} &= - \left[ \frac{z \cdot p'(c) + N_{low} \cdot \pi'(c) \cdot p(c) \cdot (D) + \Delta \cdot p'(c) + \pi'(c) \cdot [p(c)]^2 \cdot (D)}{[p(c)]^2 \bar{\kappa}} \right] \\ &\quad + \left[ \frac{\frac{\partial N_{low}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}}}{-1 + \frac{\partial N_{low}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \kappa}} \right] \left[ \frac{z \cdot p'(c) + N_{low} \cdot \pi'(c) \cdot [p(c)]^2 \cdot (D) + \Delta \cdot p'(c)}{[p(c)]^2 \bar{\kappa} + \kappa} \right] \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} &= \left[ \frac{1}{-1 + \frac{\partial N_{low}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \kappa}} \right] \left[ \frac{z \cdot p'(c) + N_{low} \cdot \pi'(c) \cdot [p(c)]^2 \cdot (D) + \Delta \cdot p'(c)}{[p(c)]^2 \bar{\kappa} + \kappa} \right] \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4}{\partial c} &= \frac{\pi'(c) \cdot (D)}{\kappa} \end{aligned}$$

Using Lemma I, we know that  $-1 + \frac{\partial N_{low}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \kappa} < 0$  for the smallest and largest values of the third cut-point. Thus, we can see that  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} > 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4}{\partial c} < 0$ . This applies to both the greatest and smallest members in all the corresponding sets. This, thus establishes the first and second part of the Proposition V.

From the above inequalities in the proof of proposition III, then we can see that the right hand sides of the inequalities would be ordered in the following way for a given confidence level: (3) > (4) > (5). When  $c = 0$ , then we can see that  $1 > (4) > (5)$ . Yet, we do not know immediately if  $1 > (3)$  or if  $1 < (3)$ . if the former holds then we are in World A initially when  $c = 0$ , otherwise World B holds.

$N_{low}$  is decreasing in confidence as  $\tilde{\alpha}^3$  is increasing in confidence. This implies that for each of the inequalities (3), (4), and (5) above, as confidence in the state increases the left hand side decreases and the right hand side increases. This implies that from  $c = 0$ , as confidence increases World A will move into World B and eventually would move into World C (or World B initially materializes when  $c = 0$ , then it would move into World C). As  $c$  increases, there will eventually exist a  $\hat{c}$  where inequality 5 holds with equality, where World C no longer holds and World D emerges. This establishes the third part of Proposition V.

## Proof of Proposition VI

Again, we will focus on only the greatest and lowest cut-points in each set. In World D, we would want to know how the cut-points move given that we know now that  $N_{high} = \frac{Mi-2}{2} \cdot [2 \cdot [1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^2)]^2 + 2 \cdot [1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^1)][F(\tilde{\alpha}^2) - F(\tilde{\alpha}^4)]]$ . We will take note that  $\partial N_{high} / \partial \tilde{\alpha}^1 \leq 0$ ,  $\partial N_{high} / \partial \tilde{\alpha}^2 \leq 0$ , and  $\partial N_{high} / \partial \tilde{\alpha}^4 \leq 0$ . Also, note that at  $\hat{c}$ ,  $N_{high} = N_{low}$ . Using the cut-points, we can create the following functions:

1.  $G^1 = -\tilde{\alpha}^1 + \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + N_{high} \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}} = 0$
2.  $G^2 = -\tilde{\alpha}^2 + \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + [N_{high} + 1] \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot \bar{\kappa}} = 0$
3.  $G^3 = -\tilde{\alpha}^3 + \frac{z + [1 - p(c)] \cdot \Delta + N_{high} \cdot [p(c) \cdot \pi(c) \cdot (-D)]}{p(c) \cdot [\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}]} = 0$
4.  $G^4 = -\tilde{\alpha}^4 + \frac{\pi(c) \cdot D}{\underline{\kappa}} = 0$

We will use the following lemma:

### Lemma II

*In World D: For the greatest and smallest values in  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^1)$  and  $S(\tilde{\alpha}^2)$ , it is the case that  $\frac{dG^1}{d\alpha^1} < 0$  and  $\frac{dG^2}{d\alpha^2} < 0$*

This can be seen in Figure 3 where the greatest and smallest value have a slope that is smaller than the 45° line.

We can use the implicit function theorem by solving the following matrix problem:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} & \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} & \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} & \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \\ \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} & \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} & \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} & \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \\ \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} & \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} & \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} & \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \\ \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} & \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} & \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3} & \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4}{\partial c} \end{bmatrix} = - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial c} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} -1 + \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}} & \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}} & 0 & \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}} \\ \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}} & -1 + \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}} & 0 & \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}} \\ \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}} & \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}} & -1 & \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4}{\partial c} \end{bmatrix} = - \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial G^1}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^2}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^3}{\partial c} \\ \frac{\partial G^4}{\partial c} \end{bmatrix}$$

Using Lemma II, it can be shown that the 4x4 Jacobian matrix is non-singular. For ease of representation, let us use the following symbols:

- $a = \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}}$
- $b = \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}}$

- $c = \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa}}$
- $d = \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}}$
- $e = \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}}$
- $f = \frac{\partial N_{high}}{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4} \cdot \frac{\pi(c) \cdot (-D)}{\bar{\kappa} + \underline{\kappa}}$

Clearly, all these symbols are positive. Solving this matrix problem results in:

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} = \left[ \frac{-1}{1-a-b} \right] \left[ \frac{z \cdot p'(c) + N_{high} \cdot \pi'(c) \cdot [p(c)]^2 \cdot (D) + \Delta \cdot p'(c)}{[p(c)]^2 \bar{\kappa}} \right] + \left[ \frac{-b}{1-a-b} \right] \left[ \frac{\pi'(c) \cdot (D)}{\bar{\kappa}} \right] + \left[ \frac{-c}{1-a-b} \right] \left[ \frac{\pi'(c) \cdot (-D)}{\underline{\kappa}} \right]$$

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} = \left[ \frac{-1}{1-a-b} \right] \left[ \frac{z \cdot p'(c) + N_{high} \cdot \pi'(c) \cdot [p(c)]^2 \cdot (D) + \Delta \cdot p'(c)}{[p(c)]^2 \bar{\kappa}} \right] + \left[ \frac{-1+a}{1-a-b} \right] \left[ \frac{\pi'(c) \cdot (D)}{\bar{\kappa}} \right] + \left[ \frac{-c}{1-a-b} \right] \left[ \frac{\pi'(c) \cdot (-D)}{\underline{\kappa}} \right]$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} &= \left[ \frac{-\bar{\kappa}}{1-a-b} \right] \left[ \frac{z \cdot p'(c) + N_{high} \cdot \pi'(c) \cdot [p(c)]^2 \cdot (D) + \Delta \cdot p'(c)}{[p(c)]^2 \bar{\kappa}} \right] + \left[ \frac{e \cdot (-1+a) - db}{1-a-b} \right] \left[ \frac{\pi'(c) \cdot (D)}{\bar{\kappa}} \right] \\ &\quad + \left[ \frac{f \cdot (-1+b+a) - ce - dc}{1-a-b} \right] \left[ \frac{\pi'(c) \cdot (-D)}{\underline{\kappa}} \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4}{\partial c} = \frac{\pi'(c) \cdot (D)}{\underline{\kappa}}$$

Using Lemma II, we know that  $1 - a - b > 0$  for the smallest and largest values of the cut-points. We can see that  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4}{\partial c} < 0$ . This establishes the first part of Proposition VI.

However, the direction of the other comparative statics is not that straightforward. There are three components to each of the three comparative statics above. The first two components are positive as it involves the multiplication of two negative numbers, while the last component is negative.

If the counterterrorism infrastructure is more responsive to changes in confidence than the protection infrastructure, then the first component outweighs the other two components which would result in  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} > 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} > 0$ . This establishes the second part of the proposition.

If the protection infrastructure is relatively more responsive, and the probability of militancy arising by there being more people willing to stay silent is fairly small (i.e.  $c$  and  $f$  are fairly small), then the first two positive components would still outweigh the third

negative component which would result in  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} > 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} > 0$ . This establishes 3a. of the proposition.

If the protection infrastructure is relatively more responsive, and the probability of militancy arising by there being more people willing to stay silent is moderate, then the first two positive components can be outweighed by the third negative component which would result in  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} < 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} < 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} < 0$  (or  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} > 0$ ). However, these changes do not alter the overall ordering with  $\tilde{\alpha}^4 < \tilde{\alpha}^3 < \tilde{\alpha}^2 < \tilde{\alpha}^1$  still prevailing, meaning World D still prevails. This establishes 3b. of the proposition.

If the protection infrastructure is relatively more responsive, and the probability of militancy arising by there being more people willing to stay silent is sufficiently large, then the first two positive components will be significantly outweighed by the third negative component which would result in  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} < 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} < 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} < 0$ . These changes are sufficiently large that the World reverts back to World A, B, or C. This establishes 3c. of the proposition.

If confidence becomes high enough then  $p(c)$  becomes sufficiently low such that this would blow up the positive first component and would outweigh the other effects. Thus, eventually,  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} > 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} > 0$  which establishes the fourth part of the proposition.

### **Proof of Proposition VII**

When  $0 \leq c < \hat{c}$ , we are in Worlds A, B, and C. Thus, we know from Proposition V that the greatest and least value for the third cut-point,  $\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3 / \partial c > 0$ . Therefore:

$$\frac{dExp(M)_{A,B,C}}{dc} = \frac{Mi}{2} \cdot \left[ -2 \cdot [1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^3)] \cdot f(\tilde{\alpha}^3) \cdot \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^3}{\partial c} \cdot 2 \cdot p(c) + [1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^3)]^2 \cdot 2p'(c) \right] < 0$$

This establishes the first part of Proposition VII.

When  $c \geq \hat{c}$ , then we are in World D. We know that

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{dExp(M)_D}{dc} &= \frac{Mi}{2} \cdot \left[ 2 \cdot p'(c) \cdot [1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^1) \cdot [F(\tilde{\alpha}^2) - F(\tilde{\alpha}^4)]] \right. \\
&\quad - 2 \cdot p(c) \cdot \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} \cdot f(\tilde{\alpha}^1) \cdot [F(\tilde{\alpha}^2) - F(\tilde{\alpha}^4)] \\
&\quad - 2 \cdot p(c) \cdot \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} \cdot f(\tilde{\alpha}^2) \cdot [1 + F(\tilde{\alpha}^1) - 2 \cdot F(\tilde{\alpha}^2)] \\
&\quad \left. - 2 \cdot p(c) \cdot \frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^4}{\partial c} \cdot f(\tilde{\alpha}^4) \cdot [1 - F(\tilde{\alpha}^1)] \right]
\end{aligned}$$

There are four components here. The first component is negative, and the fourth component is positive. The signs of the second and third component depend on the other parameters. If  $p(c)$  is highly responsive to changes in confidence relative to  $\pi(c)$ , then  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} > 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} > 0$ , while the first component is relatively larger compared to the fourth component in terms of magnitude. This results in  $\frac{dExp(M)_D}{dc} < 0$ , and establishes the second part of the proposition.

If  $\pi(c)$  is highly responsive to changes in confidence relative to  $p(c)$ , but there is only a negligible increase in the amount of people willing to stay silent then (as Proposition VI states)  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} > 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} > 0$ , which means that the second and third component are negative and this outweighs the fact that  $\pi(c)$  is more responsive to changes in confidence than  $p(c)$ . This establishes 3a of the proposition which states that  $\frac{dExp(M)_D}{dc} < 0$  under such circumstances.

If  $\pi(c)$  is highly responsive to changes in confidence relative to  $p(c)$ , but there is a moderate increase in the amount of people willing to stay silent then (as Proposition VI states)  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^1}{\partial c} < 0$ , and  $\frac{\partial \tilde{\alpha}^2}{\partial c} < 0$ , which means that the second and third component are positive which results in  $\frac{dExp(M)_D}{dc} > 0$ . This establishes 3b of the proposition. If there is a large increase in the amount of people willing to stay silent, then the world actually reverts back to World A, B, or C (as Proposition VI states) which would cause a discontinuous jump in the expected amount of militancy. This establishes 3c of the proposition.

Finally, when  $p(c)$  becomes sufficiently small then the first component outweighs the effects of the other three components which results in  $\frac{dExp(M)_D}{dc} > 0$ . This proves the fourth part of the proposition.

### **Other episodes of militancy - Adivasis, Punjab, J&K, and the North-East**

I cannot thoroughly go through each case, but I briefly illustrate how the logic behind the theory applies to all these episodes of militancy among marginalized minority populations within India.

The Adivasis are tribal people living across central India. Even within the states that were carved out to reflect tribal groups in central India - Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh - Adivasis are still rendered the minority populations. Furthermore, they fare worse than SCs on a wide variety of socioeconomic indicators (Maharatna, 2005), and fare even worse than Muslims on some political dimensions (Guha, 2007, pp.3308-3309). Unlike with Muslims, the Government is constitutionally directed to take actions to promote the welfare of and to prevent the exploitation of Adivasis. Yet, this constitutional guarantee has not translated to action or results, as the Government has not provided decent health care or education to this tribal population, and has consistently displaced the Adivasi population from their land due to reasons of conservation and/or economic and industrial development (Guha, 2007). The Naxalites, a Maoist insurgency, were able to take advantage of the situation by exploiting these grievances to gain the support and participation of the Adivasis in the Maoist movement.

The Naxalite leadership are comprised of non-Adivasis from upper caste backgrounds. Yet, they have still been able to frame their messaging and goals in a way that appeals to the tribal populations in central India. Ethnographic studies point to the success of this framing in helping to make this insurgency a sustainable and feasible enterprise (Harriss, 2011). The Maoist struggle is portrayed as a continuation of previous historical tribal insurgencies (Kennedy and King, 2013). Furthermore, the Naxalites chase away forest guards, secure higher prices for crops, secure higher wages, and protect the tribal population from predatory contractors and moneylenders (Kennedy and Purushotham, 2012; Guha, 2007; Kennedy and King, 2013). In this battle of hearts and minds, the Adivasis seem to view the state as the “exploiter and enemy” and the Naxalites as

protectors “helping them to get their rights, [protecting] them from exploitation and [redressing] their grievances” (Ministry of Tribal Affairs, 2006, p.15).

In sum, this literature points to the following step-by-step recipe for the growth of such a militant movement. Adivasis had grievances, then the Naxalites instrumentally exploited these grievances, which in turn enabled the Naxalites to gain a considerable amount of supporters and participants from this tribal community such that their movement was seen as the most “serious internal threat” to India’s national security (as stated in 2009 by then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh). The question that then arises is why have the marginalized minority Adivasi population been able to mobilize, but the marginalized minority Muslim population have not able to mobilize when the latter population have also had homegrown and transnational groups attempting to appeal to their grievances? The theory presented in this paper suggests that if the threat of retaliation from a mob is fairly low then aggrieved minority members are more likely to follow through on their violent acts, and supporters are more likely to stay quiet and not inform to the police. It appears that the growth of the Naxalite movement could plausibly be credited to the fact that the threat of “mob” retaliation against Adivasis has been fairly low.

The Adivasis live in hills and valleys, where they outnumber the non-tribals (Guha, 2007, p.3308). Furthermore, the geography of the location of their villages is also one of the main reasons for the presence of the Naxalites. The terrain of central India - with its hills and forests - is conducive to sustaining guerilla warfare (Guha, 2007; Kennedy and Purushotham, 2012). In such an environment, the Adivasis would feel protected from any retaliation stemming from Maoist actions, and thus would feel secure in not informing or helping the state. It is only when the Chhattisgarh government-backed militia, Salwa Judum, started to commit brutal indiscriminate attacks against the Adivasis in the mid 2000s (including rape, burning whole villages, looting, and killing) did divisions appear with a substantial amount of tribal villagers choosing to join, or at the least acquiesce to, the Salwa Judum due to fear (Guha et al., 2006). Thus, the threat of brutal violence (akin to mob violence) against the minority Adivasis was needed in order to counter the threat of the Maoists. The Salwa Judum were eventually banned in 2011 by the Supreme Court of India, and, with this threat removed, the Maoists were thought to have gained a boon in their recruitment and operational ability.

Therefore, the one necessary factor that needs to be present in order for a militant

group to be unsuccessful in exploiting the feelings of resentment of a marginalized minority is the credible threat of retaliatory mob violence. Aside from the case of conflict in the Red Corridor that was discussed above, we could also apply the insights of the model to the full-fledged insurgencies that have materialized in post-independent India - specifically in Punjab, J&K, and the North East. In all three cases, we can see that various community grievances formed the mobilizing foundations, with militant groups emerging to offer a vehicle for the violent expression of those feelings. In the Kashmir valley, the combination of limited economic prospects, a politically knowledgeable youth, and the inability to express dissent through legitimate political channels led Kashmiris to turn to violence (Ganguly, 1997). Militant groups like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen were then able to provide outlets for these feelings. In Punjab, the grievances appeared to be manifold spanning issues such as unpopular agricultural policies to the 1984 Operation Bluestar and its aftermath (Pettigrew, 1995). The Babbar Khalsa, which had already shown its predilection to militancy prior to 1984, as well as other groups, capitalized on these grievances to sustain an insurgency which lasted until the early 1990s. Finally, in the North-East, grievances vary from state to state but include identity concerns, Bengali migration, and Government neglect (Misra, 2014). These grievances, combined with the lack of rule of law, have created a conducive environment for militant groups to emerge in almost all of the seven sister states (Lacina, 2007).

How did these insurgencies materialize when not even a sustainable terrorist outfit has been able to emerge within the broader Indian Muslim community? The answer, I argue, is due to the absence of a necessary condition. In all these prior insurgencies, the aggrieved group were majorities within their own locality, even if they were not the majority within India. In Punjab and J&K, respectively Sikhs and Muslims make up the majority of the state population. In the North East, the insurgencies initially represented “local” majorities.<sup>46</sup> For example, Nagaland was the site of the first insurgency and the Naga people were a majority within their specific region in Assam. Thus, being majorities within their respective geographies exposed all these groups’ sympathizers to a considerably lower risk of being victims of retaliatory mob violence from the national Hindu majority. The incidence of anti-Sikh riots in the wake of Indira Gandhi’s assassinations were concentrated in Delhi (where Sikhs form a minority), not in Punjab. In Kashmir, anti-Muslim mobs

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<sup>46</sup>I emphasize *initially* as currently the insurgent groups have fractured into smaller factions and resemble criminal groups as opposed to political insurgencies (Lacina, 2007, 2009).

have not emerged as they have in other parts of the country at various points in time. Instead, there has actually been mob violence directed against the Kashmir Hindu pandits with no subsequent retaliation by the Hindu mob (as the Hindus are the minority group in the Kashmir Valley), resulting in the exodus of this community out of the Valley. Similarly, in the North East, the population represented by the insurgent groups have not incurred the costs of retaliatory mob violence but minority “foreign” migrants have endured such assaults (e.g. 1983 Nellie Massacre).

One further interesting feature of the insurgency in Kashmir is the timing of the conflict. Although the accession of the former princely state to India was highly contentious and there were frequent events that could have triggered an insurgency in Kashmir after 1947<sup>47</sup>, the insurgent violence only really started in the late 1980s. Could the roots of this delayed response also be at work with regards to the broader Indian Muslim militancy?

According to Ganguly (1997), the delay is due to the limited political awareness of Kashmiris immediately after 1947, which inhibited any potentially aggressive responses to prior events that stoked grievances. The trigger that impelled the relatively more aware youth to eventually take up violence was the flawed 1987 J&K elections. Yet, it would be incorrect to assume that feelings of resentment were not simmering prior to the late 1980s. Unrest and agitation was present in the Kashmiri population after the dismissal and arrest of the popular leader Sheikh Abdullah in the 1950s. The Hazratbal relic disappearance in late 1963<sup>48</sup> was an eventual trigger as it prompted some violence and protests in the Valley. In fact, the decision to release Sheikh Abdullah from prison was based on the fact that it would help mollify the unrest and prevent further agitation (Ganguly 1997, p.50, Central Intelligence Agency 1964, pp.4-5). Thus, the region might not have exploded into chaos at this earlier time due to the Indian Government’s decision to release the popular Sheikh Abdullah. Furthermore, even though the violence in the region has decreased substantially since 2003, this does not mean that grievances have died down (Staniland, 2013). One could look at the violent protests that emerged in the summer of 2016 to see that a “spark”

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<sup>47</sup>For example: the multiple arrests of popular leader Sheikh Abdullah, the Hazratbal relic disappearance, and Operation Gibraltar.

<sup>48</sup>In Srinagar, the Hazratbal Mosque contains a holy relic which is considered the hair of the Prophet Mohammed (*moh-e-moqaddas*). On December 26 1963, the relic was stolen and this precipitated unrest in the Kashmir Valley. The relic was eventually recovered on January 3, 1964.

could potentially lead the region to revert back to the violence of the past.<sup>49</sup>

As described extensively before, Muslims living in other parts of India have had political and economic grievances. Moreover, there have been plenty of potential trigger points such as the Babri Masjid demolition and the 2002 Gujarat riots with militant groups emerging and instrumentally attempting to use these events to garner support. As noted as early as a few decades after independence by Brass (1974, pp.273-274), Indian Muslims and their grievances were not effectively represented in the political system. This inadequate political representation has not substantially changed implying limitations continue to exist in the use of political avenues to channel frustrations. Yet, overall, even with the grievances, the emotive trigger events, and the lack of political representation, Indian Muslims living outside of J&K have still not been drawn to act out on their extremist appeals.

### **Lack of militancy among OBCs and SCs**

Some might question why a substantial militancy has not emerged among SCs and OBCs - neither of which, alone, make up a majority in India<sup>50</sup> - and whether these reasons could also apply to Indian Muslims. These two groups have been historically disadvantaged and thus fare badly on the socioeconomic spectrum in comparison to the Hindu upper castes.<sup>51</sup> There are five possible factors which could explain why members of these two groups have not resorted to violence, and the first four factors would not really apply to the Indian Muslim community.

First, the constitution enjoins the government to improve the situation of SCs and OBCs through various affirmative action policies in education and government employment. These positive discrimination measures were instituted for SCs during British Rule and were continued and expanded post-independence.<sup>52</sup> For OBCs, some states incorporated reservations at different points in time after 1947, but the implementation of

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<sup>49</sup>In this particular episode, Burhan Wani, a popular commander of militant group Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was killed in July 2016 by Indian security forces. His death led to violent protests in Kashmir Valley which culminated with the region being put under curfew.

<sup>50</sup>Although the population of these two groups combined do constitute a majority.

<sup>51</sup>It is important to acknowledge here that there has historically been wide sub-national variation between North and South India in the political power of lower castes due to demographic features. See Jaffrelot (2003) for more discussion on this topic.

<sup>52</sup>Although the quotas were initially not fulfilled, the representation of SCs and even OBCs in government jobs has improved (Jaffrelot, 2003).

the Mandal Commission recommendations by the central government in 1990 was particularly important in improving the opportunities available to the OBCs. Even though some Muslim groups are included under the OBC category, Muslims as a whole do not enjoy these same constitutional “privileges.” In fact, as described before, a Dalit is no longer considered an SC if they convert to Islam.

Second, SCs and OBCs have been increasingly incorporated into the political landscape. Pre-independence, SCs had seats reserved within the Hindu electorate.<sup>53</sup> Post-independence, SC leaders were first co-opted into the Congress Party, but eventually political movements emerged to mobilize the SCs and OBCs as political communities (Weiner, 2001; Jaffrelot, 2003).<sup>54</sup> There are successful parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP) that have respectively targeted SCs and OBCs. The two main national parties (the BJP and Congress Party) have also used increasing amounts of lower caste party officials and candidates in elections (Jaffrelot, 2003; Chandra, 2004, 2016). Even during the 2014 general election, Narendra Modi emphasized his OBC status (Jaffrelot, 2015b). At the state level, there has been variation in the representation of Muslims<sup>55</sup>, but generally, as described before, Muslims have been underrepresented in state legislatures. At the national level, Muslims have had even less success. Overall, out of all subaltern groups, “Muslims in particular remain consistently underrepresented in positions of power” (Chandra, 2016, p.152).

Third, the caste cleavage might have become less pronounced over time. In a bid to create a united Hindu front,<sup>56</sup> the BJP has at different points in time chosen a strategy of ethno-religious mobilization to transcend caste barriers, which is likely to have had some significant effect on reducing the salience of the caste identity (Hassan 1998, pp.104-106, Parikh 1998, p.45; Jaffrelot 1998, pp.75-77; Jaffrelot 1996, p.431).<sup>57</sup> One’s caste might be

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<sup>53</sup>The Poona Pact of 1932 allowed for scheduled castes to have seats reserved within the Hindu electorate.

<sup>54</sup>In recent history the relative representation of these two groups across parties appears to have had a significant effect on the way these different ethnic groups vote (Chandra, 2004).

<sup>55</sup>The All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul Muslimeen is a potential vehicle for increasing Muslim political representation but they have not made a significant impact on the political landscape. On the other hand, the BSP in Uttar Pradesh have made appeals to Indian Muslims, as described in Chandra (2004, pp.216-217), but the main target group of this party are still SCs.

<sup>56</sup>The infamous 1981 Meenakshipuran conversion and the Mandal Commission recommendations had threatened to create disunity within the Hindu community.

<sup>57</sup>Yet, this ethno-religious mobilization strategy is unlikely to have been a successful long-term strategy given the moderation and diversification of the BJP agenda in the mid 1990’s onwards. See Jaffrelot (1996) for a full description of the Hindu Nationalists’ changing strategy.

declining as an electoral identity for other secular reasons as well. In the 1998 elections, caste appeared to be a less reliable predictor than class in determining voting intentions (Oldenburg, 1999). This trend seems to have somewhat carried on to the present where, in 2014, the BJP obtained the largest share of the SC and OBC vote in the national election which perhaps reflects economic concerns or dissatisfaction with the then incumbent Congress Party (Verma, 2014; Jaffrelot, 2015a). Furthermore, the recent 2017 Uttar Pradesh assembly elections suggest that a considerable proportion of SC voters switched over to the BJP (Varmal, 2017). The SC and OBC vote has been willing to shift to other parties (including to parties that have not historically had cordial relations with these communities), but the Muslim vote has not witnessed the same shifts. In comparison to the preceding elections, the Muslim vote in the 2014 national election, and even in the 2017 Uttar Pradesh elections, has remained consistently with the same parties, and not shifted towards the BJP (Jaffrelot, 2015a; Varmal, 2017).<sup>58</sup>

Fourth, The SC and OBC groups are composed of a multitude of smaller subgroups which implies a possible collective action problem could exist. The fragmentation could make it difficult for either broad category to be a cohesive coalition. The treatment of the sub groups within the SCs and OBCs by the political parties has also not been uniform. The BSP is primarily associated with the Jatavs, while the SP and the Rahstriya Janata Dal have focused their attention on the Yadav caste (Chandra 2004, p.189-190 Jaffrelot 2003, Ch. 10 and 11). This division is somewhat reflected in the differences in voting behavior between the Jatavs and the broad Dalit category in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections (Jaffrelot, 2015a). On the other hand, Jaffrelot (2015a, pp.32-33) provides some evidence that the same voting divisions do not appear to exist for Muslims in the 2014 elections as “neither class nor caste make a big difference in the case of this community.”

Fifth, there has been violence directed at the lower castes (e.g. the 1996 Bathani Tola massacre) in India. Extension of reservations to lower castes, at both the state level and national level, has led to riots and violence featuring mobs. If the fear of this threat exists due to the limited confidence in the state, then the theory developed in this paper might point to another reason for why militancy is restrained among SCs and OBCs.

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<sup>58</sup>This does not necessarily imply that there is a block Muslim vote-bank.