On April 30, 2012, Dutch parliamentarian and head of the right-wing Party for Freedom, Geert Wilders, gave a speech in the Four Seasons Hotel in New York that was entitled *Stifling Free Speech in Europe*. By invitation of the conservative U.S. think tank, the Gatestone Institute, and against the background of a large Dutch flag, Wilders presented his four strategies on how “we” ought to “defeat Islam” (Wilders, 2012). Although this language signals both Wilders’ and Gatestone’s shared vision on freedom of speech in the context of criticizing Islam, it also seems to imply a broader alliance of countries:

We must reassert our national identities. The nation-state enables self-government and self-determination. This insight led the Zionists to establish Israel as the homeland of the Jews. Zionism teaches us one of the most important lessons which the modern world needs today. Theodor Herzl argued that a Jewish state would facilitate “a new blossoming of the Jewish spirit.” Today, we need our own respective nation-states to preside over a new blossoming of our own Western spirit. Our nations are the homes in which freedom and democracy prospers [sic]. This is true for the Netherlands. This is true for America. This is true for Israel.

Wilders, however, was not in New York as an official or formal representative of the Dutch government. In fact, only nine days earlier his Party for Freedom (Partijvoor de Vrijheid; PVV) had officially withdrawn its support of the minority government, a cabinet that had existed only by virtue of the Party for Freedom’s assured endorsement. Rather, Wilders’ speech coincided with the U.S. release of his autobiography, *Marked for Death: Islam’s War against the West and Me*. This book does not reflect any official Dutch stance on foreign
policy or internal affairs, but documents the innate juncture between Wilders’ private and political life as his views on Islam have led to death threats and Wilders living under permanent protection. Indeed, when Wilders was interviewed on *Fox News* by Sean Hannity about his book the following day, he was introduced there as “a marked man.”

Wilders’ visit to the U.S. was made in a personal capacity and by private invitation. Yet, his parliamentary affiliation and governmental position suggest that his U.S.-targeted book, New York speech, and *Fox* interview inexorably have ramifications for perceptions of “The Netherlands” or, more specifically, of the Dutch government’s position in the field of international politics and affairs as it is publicly known.

Additional international speaking engagements featuring Wilders further illustrate the role of media platforms and international alliances in the dissemination of his political vision for the Netherlands that are at odds with official Dutch policy, particularly in the areas of foreign affairs and immigration. As examples, in 2009, Wilders gave a speech to the Danish Free Press Society, where he outlined his version of a two-state solution for the Middle East conflict, namely, “one Jewish state called Israel including Judea and Samaria and one Palestinian state called Jordan” (Wilders, 2009), and where he called for a boycott of the U.N. Human Rights Council. Also in 2010, after having been denied entry to the United Kingdom the year before, Wilders controversially addressed the House of Lords in London, by invitation of Lord Malcolm Pearson, who is a peer from the U.K. Independence Party. Wilders asserted there that, “[…] we will have to end and get rid of cultural relativism” (Wilders, 2010a, emphasis added). When Wilders was in Berlin in 2010 by invitation of *die Freiheit* [the Freedom], the German counterpart to the PVV, he stated, “I am here because Germany matters to the Netherlands and the rest of the world” (Wilders, 2010b, emphasis added). And on Sept. 11, 2010, at a much anticipated speech at the 9/11 Remembrance Rally, Wilders argued,

[...] *we*, *we* will not betray those who died on 9/11. For their sakes we cannot tolerate a mosque on or near Ground Zero. For their sakes loud and clear *we* say: No mosque here! [...] So that New York, rooted in Dutch tolerance, will never become New Mecca (Wilders, 2010c, emphasis added).

Wilders’ performances on these international stages are typically controversial. They, consequently, attract extensive national and international media coverage. Wilders can thereby capitalize on the strategic public relations potential of these platforms, on which he is consistently seen to explicitly contend with government voices and stances on foreign policy, immigration
politics and international affairs. Although Wilders’ actions may be primarily
rhetoric and polemic in intent, they explicitly claim a diplomatic entitlement
and may thus have very real diplomatic consequences.

Importantly, Geert Wilders’ case is not idiosyncratic, but emblematic of
an emerging kind of actor that ought to be considered for its diplomatic ramifications. These typically populist agents are not to be mistaken for in-
cumbent populist leaders and governments that deploy anti-elitist tactics in
their approaches to foreign policy and management of international relations
(McPherson, 2007). Instead, the actors focused on here are self-positioned
as political outsiders who, because of explicit ties with state institutions, have
demonstrated (potential) access to political power; are explicitly opposed
to federalism, centralism, and to political institutions and symbols associat-
ed with it; advocate nationalist and anti-immigration politics; and operate
in international networks that are influential in both domestic electoral be-

tavior and diplomatic relationships between nation states. Most interesting,
however, is that they do and convey almost all of the above through strategi-
cally benefiting from the workings and economy of mainstream media in con-
junction with the affordances of online and social media. Key contemporary
examples of this growing phenomenon, which this chapter terms the ‘con-
testing public diplomat,’ are Nigel Farage, leader of the increasingly popular
anti-Europe and anti-immigrant UKIP party in Britain; Marine Le Pen, party
leader for the French National Front; Sarah Palin, former senator and one
of the symbolic leaders of the Tea Party movement in the United States, but
also Silvio Berlusconi, who is currently out of political office but continues
to disseminate his vision for Italy through domestic and international main-
stream media.

The “contesting public diplomat” described is increasingly visible in the
arena of international politics and public diplomacy. This shift is certainly
related to the surge of neo-populism in Europe and North America but also
shaped by the increasingly widespread use of both mass and personal media as
a space (Castells, 1997) for performing politics and mobilizing support. The
aim of this chapter is therefore to provide a starting point for understanding
the diplomatic impact of populist practices in other international contexts.
By drawing on Geert Wilders and particular instances of mediated controver-
sy surrounding him, this chapter explores the broader strategic significance
and diplomatic consequences of neo-populists positioning themselves as con-
tending non-state actors or as contesting public diplomats. The chapter con-
cludes its empirical exploration with a reflection on the broad repercussions
of contesting public diplomats for our thinking about the relationship be-
tween the realms of strategic public relations and public diplomacy (Signitzer

& Coombs, 1992; Gilboa, 2008), particularly in the governmental pursuit of an integrated public diplomacy (Golan, 2013). This reflection specifically considers how strategic communication in all three layers of an integrated approach to public diplomacy may actively anticipate and aptly respond to populist public relations.

**Populists as Contending Non-State Actors**

Put somewhat briefly, in 2004 Wilders clashed with the leaders of his own Dutch Liberal Party (VVD), which led to him leaving that party in order establish his own political movement, the Party for Freedom (PVV). This impasse needs to be considered in the context of what Prins (2002) termed “new realism” as hegemonic discourse that candidly considers non-Western and Muslim migrants for their economic and cultural-ideological risks to traditional Dutch national culture, identity, and society. The essence of Wilders’ conflict with the VVD—his explicit objection to the party’s support for Turkey’s proposed ascension to full membership in the European Union—highlights a perception of (global) society as individuals, institutions, and nation states classified and evaluated along an us / them-axis.

Moreover, the Wilders controversy signals how in neo-populist movements, ranging from the PVV in the Netherlands to the Tea Party in the United States, xenophobia is inextricably entwined with foreign policy stances. Populists often challenge stances of incumbent governments or explicitly propose the contours of their own foreign policy. Both their challenge and alternative entail calls to restrict immigration and to reduce or withdraw from particular supra-national and centralist alliances, such as the European Union (EU).

The close connection between state nationalism and international politics is already acknowledged in political science scholarship (cf. McCartney, 2004), for example, through the idea of a “dialectical relationship” mediating national identity and foreign policy (Prizel, 1998). In addition, foreign policy is perceived as a key national security resource (Campbell, 1998) and, in the particular context of populism, adopting a nationalist foreign policy stance enables the practical convergence of populists’ two central adversaries: elitism and pluralism (Mudde, 2004; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Specifically, this adoption allows for subsequently attacking the political left for embracing a cultural relativism, which, according to Wilders in his 2012 New York speech, “[… ] refuse[s] to stand for liberty and prefer[s] to appease Islam.” Yet, what is left underexplored is if and how neo-populists’ explicitly anti-state and anti-elite pronouncements and performances, in relation to foreign policy, affect the field and future of public diplomacy.
Contemporary approaches to diplomacy, under the banner of “the New Public Diplomacy” (Melissen, 2005a, 2005b), have extended the kind of practices and the nature of actors that can qualify as potentially diplomatic, even if some actors do not evidently have a “working relationship” (Melissen, 2011, p. 3) with the state (Leonard 2002; Ross, 2003). Still, such work has not necessarily been able to make full sense of the public diplomatic impacts of agents that explicitly resist such affiliations.

Public diplomacy should, of course, always be considered in the realm of those practices that set out to ensure national interests by, ultimately, promoting government policies abroad, for example, through nation branding or place branding (Anholt & Hildreth, 2005; Anholt, 2006). This conceptualization, however, does not fully consider perceptions of neo-populists without formal government representation in any diplomatic capacity, even as counter-public diplomacy. After all, neo-populists too equally claim to aspire to safeguarding national interest, and they extensively do so by engaging in cultural and strategic public relations activities that are increasingly international in orientation and impact. In exploring the case of Geert Wilders, the conceptual territory of public diplomacy should thus be expanded through the notion of “double differentiation.”

**Double Differentiation and Accredited Representation**

In his empirical exploration of how alleged Dutch populists in the post-Fortuyn era relate to “ideal type” populists, Vossen asserts the complexity of assessing Geert Wilders. Vossen argues that Wilders does not “match the populist archetype of the ‘reluctant politicians’ with a strong dislike for politics and politicians” (2010, p. 34), referring to Wilders’ long-standing political ties with established governmental bodies. Yet, the populist prototype does not acknowledge that, increasingly, the “reluctant politician” (Taggart, 2000) or “anti-party party” (Mudde, 1996) can also be understood as a discursive achievement. Explorations of parliamentary ties and government alliances of the regional Lega Nord in Italy (McDonnell, 2006), the national Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark (Rydgren, 2004), or the European UKIP in the United Kingdom (Hayton, 2010) emphasize anti-establishment identities as rhetorical resources rather than actual prerequisites for populist parties.

The salience of performance in populism can therefore be situated through the concept of double differentiation (Kriesi, 2011). Double differentiation considers as characteristic for contemporary (European) populist actors the ability to distance themselves from the political establishment, while simultaneously displaying a potential to work within and exert influence
in the political order. Groshek and Engelbert (2012) extended Kriesi’s concept in a comparative study of populist movements in the United States and the Netherlands. They found leaders in both groups use self-representational and online media to “both negotiate and reconcile the potential conflict between their anti-establishment image and their (past, current, and potential) political affiliation” (Groshek & Engelbert, 2012, p. 198–199).

Here, Wilders’ distinct political style of being able to operate within the very center of power he also challenges is essentially something he intentionally constructs and keeps alive (cf. Fairlough, 2000; Ankersmit, 2003). As is typical for the rhetoric of so many neo-populist movements (Vossen, 2011), expressions of nationalism and xenophobia are pervasive in the performance of Wilders’ political style and, consequently, of issues that typically concern the realm of foreign policy (be they international trade, immigration or the sovereignty of Europe). Consequently, double differentiation is a practice that emphasizes the performative dimensions to populism and public diplomacy. As such, populists’ performances inevitably entail, and indeed, encourage a push-and-pull-struggle with formal state representatives over who is best equipped to not only protect but also direct national interests amid fluid globalization processes.

Paradoxically, Wilders takes that struggle over national preservation to media platforms that are available to or specifically targeted at international audiences. As could readily be observed in the extract of Wilders’ New York speech, he does so through laying out what is ultimately a vision for protecting (Dutch) national interest as a vision for international solidarity between nation-states that are similarly facing the “challenges” of immigration, Islam, and the consequences of centralization and globalization. Wilders consequently constructs the Netherlands as an object for international identification and tool for ideological exclusion. He thereby engages in what displays a striking resemblance with the Cold War diplomatic practice of ideological warfare (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005). In fact, Wilders’ purpose in addressing international issues and managing international relations, but, specifically, his perceived entitlement to address and manage these issues, seems to pertain to the broader practice of public diplomacy.

Characteristic of Wilders’ populist style, then, is his explicitly claimed entitlement to being the “accredited representative” (Melissen, 2005b, p. 4), who is to safeguard Dutch national interest both home and abroad. He is permitted to do so not by virtue of the state, but by popular appointment. Consequently, in Wilders’ alternative version of public diplomacy two acts converge: aligning international audiences and swaying national publics. This convergence of international orientation and nationalism is indeed
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paradoxical: it shows the ambiguous conceptual boundary (Signitzer & Coombs, 1992) or “intricate relationship” (Melissen, 2005b, p. 9) between the realms of public diplomacy and public affairs.

Altogether, contesting public diplomacy as a mode of strategic public relations management is a significant element of the performative dimension to populism. First, it ensures a focus on populist vanguards, such as immigration, Islam, and Europe. Second, it provides an apt stage for double differentiation; enabling populists to challenge the very political institutions they operate in or with which they are associated. It, finally, constitutes an excellent opportunity to simultaneously display cultural and political leadership. There is yet an additional advantage to engaging in contesting public diplomacy: it is enabled by online and social media, the economy of mass news media, and, not in the least, by populists’ sophisticated integration of these.

From Media Populism to Media Politik

In February 2012, Wilders’ opposition against EU enlargement and policy emerged in a quintessential example of double differentiation when he launched the Meldpunt Midden- en Oost-Europeanen [Central and Eastern European Register] (MOE). The MOE was an online and social media space, originally embedded within the PVV website, where individuals could register their complaints against CEE citizens living and working in the Netherlands. The site contextualizes this particular group in the light of “problems” caused by “mass labour immigration,” which involve “nuisance, pollution, repression [of the Dutch] on the labour market and integration and housing issues” (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012). The MOE thus extends the anti-Islam discourse so typically deployed by Wilders in problematizing the cultural consequences of non-Western migrants. Moreover, the MOE articulates and reinforces the familiar Wilders discourse of migration as a tidal wave or “tsunami” (De Landtsheer, Kalkhoven & Broen, 2011).

When Wilders’ party launched the MOE on Feb. 8, 2012, the PVV was still bound by the construction of providing secured support to the government of Liberal Prime Minister Mark Rutte. The MOE exposes tension and conflict within this political arrangement but also provokes and discriminates against nationals from the CEE countries. The MOE thereby meets two important criteria—sensation and scandal (Arsenault & Castells, 2008, p. 507)—that make for a controversial and thereby commercially viable news story in increasingly competitive and market-oriented media systems (cf. Curran, 2011).
The launch of the MOE is thus commercially viable for the news agency and for its clients’ news outlets because it allows for emphasizing and capitalizing the conflict potentially affected by the register (cf. Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Interestingly, a press release from the national news agency ANP already makes this potential explicit by presenting as part of the news event the responses of Dutch parliamentarians and Polish government representatives:

The PVV has established a website where people can leave complaints about CEE citizens in our country. They are Poles and people from other countries in Central and Eastern-Europe […]. Are you bothered by CEE citizens? Or have you lost your job to a Pole, Bulgarian, Romanian or other Central- or Eastern European? We like to hear from you,” the website states. The PVV intends to present all complaints to Henk Kamp, the Minister for Social Affairs. A spokesperson of the Polish embassy has expressed his sorrow in Algemeen Dagblad [a major national newspaper]: “Offensive party initiatives do not contribute to thoughtful debate.” Jolanda Sap [leader of the Green Party] was furious: “The PVV has acquired a new toy by bombarding Eastern Europeans into new enemies. Problems and nuisance should be seriously tackled, just as the exploitation of Eastern Europeans for their cheap labor should. But this register does not contribute to this. This is mere rabble-rousing” (ANP, 2012).

However, journalistic attention for the MOE signals more than a media economy that is characterized by “an intensified focus on political celebrity and political gossip and scandal” (Corner, 2007, p. 216). It again points to the significant performative dimension to successful populism that can be repurposed in the international arena by these actors in staking out public diplomatic efforts. Populism, then, is more than what is commonly referred to as “media populism” (Mazzoleni, 2002; Waisbord, 2002) and shares essential features with what Peri (2004) terms “media politik,” a social practice that is only possible because of its mediation. With the example of MOE provided here, as a platform that allows and invites citizens to put a name to issues that would have been systematically tabooed by the political elite, the PVV created a key opportunity to enact its political identity. Without the actual online media infrastructure itself, but crucially without media performances and journalistic attention, this potential would not have been actualized.

Controversy and provocation are thus equally as important to the survival and success of media institutions as they are to that of populist movements. From this perspective, the MOE is an example of how Geert Wilders attempts to create opportunities for himself and his party to double differentiate in relation to the national political establishment. Yet, the MOE also brings to the fore how Wilders’ “national media politik” and the opportunities for
local double differentiation increasingly have repercussions for international perceptions of the Netherlands abroad.

**Something Old, Something New**

When pressed by parliamentarians, ambassadors, and other officials to condemn the MOE days after it was launched, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte instead classified it as a “performance of political parties” (Rutte, 2012). This reaction signals the increasingly influential position of populist movements in, especially, Europe, either through their contribution to actual governments (for example, in the Netherlands and Denmark) or through their influence in shaping the agenda of mainstream politics (for example, in Finland and France). Accordingly, neo-populists, like Wilders, can more easily claim to be speaking on behalf of national and political majorities. The major repercussion of this consensual self-accreditation—consensual in the sense that governments are increasingly impaired to openly criticize populists’ behavior—is that something like the MOE risks being interpreted as representative of a government stance or, at least, as a voice to be reckoned or diplomatically battled with.

This confluence of trends means that Wilders’ actions—be it the MOE, his calls to pull out of and disband the European Union, his protest against Turkey’s proposed EU membership, his particular two-state solution for the Middle East Conflict, or the release of his controversial anti-Islam film *Fitna*—are not incidents that need to be anticipated and responded to through formal diplomacy (Melissen, 2008). Rather, in order to grasp the international consequences of a national media politik, the actions themselves need to be understood in a public diplomatic capacity, even if these actions appear explicitly anti-diplomatic, undermine former long-standing diplomatic efforts, or directly threaten the status quo of international relations.

At the same time, however, Wilders is actively pursuing new international alliances. In the case of the MOE—but similarly in all of Wilders’ actions aimed against the values, aspiration and symbols of a European Union—the alternative international community would reject the values and aspirations of any global, supra-national or federal body to which the nation state is to delegate sovereignty. Similarly, it would reject any development that may threaten the supremacy of national culture, such as immigration or multiculturalism. And, finally, the community could look at the Netherlands, and the PVV in particular, for cultural and political leadership in pursuing this ideological program through double differentiation, though Wilders is willing to share that leadership with countries with which he ideologically aligns.
Importantly, the “imagined community” of Wilders, or the partnership with whom he is to engage diplomatically, then, is not bound by the borders of the European Union. Rather, his community is an international one, in which a shared concern over very particular national interests constitutes the prerequisite and currency for diplomatic exchange. This is how, in his New York Speech for the Gatestone interview in April 2012, Wilders was able to ideologically align with ‘the’ United States over his own anti-Europe politics:

[...] previous Dutch governments [...] have signed away a significant part of our own sovereignty to the EU, the European Union, a supranational institution run by unelected and undemocratic bureaucrats. [...] We are now heading for elections [...] Our electoral campaign will focus on the need to restore our national sovereignty, because without our sovereignty we cannot defend our identity and fight against Islamization. My friends, we continue our efforts.[...] One of my favourite presidents Ronald Reagan once said: “The future doesn’t belong to the fainthearted.” Reagan was right. The future belongs to us (Wilders, 2012, emphasis added).

In sum, Wilders’ strategic public relations can be considered as an act of contesting public diplomacy in the sense that it condemns, problematizes and tries to break down existing allegiances, policy stances and values whilst it concurrently creates an alternative international community with its own set of ideological beliefs and aspirations. The realm of public diplomacy, then, is accessed by Wilders through strategic public relations efforts. Equally, the realm of international public diplomacy, because of the controversy that accessing it permits and the opportunity for “frame fighting” (Entman, 2004) it provides, constitutes a key resource for populist opposition “in the domestic debate about the right thing to do” (Gilboa, 2008, p. 65). The final section of this chapter considers the broader implications and relevance of this contingent relationship between populists’ strategic public relations and (integrated) public diplomacy.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to construct a framework for exploring the significance and consequences of populist actors who explicitly promote values in the field of foreign affairs, immigration politics and international relations that challenge and even compromise those of a national government. These populist actors were conceptualized as contending non-state actors and as contesting public diplomats given their claimed entitlement to represent national interest on mediated international platforms. More specifically, the performance of contesting public diplomacy was argued to constitute a mode
of strategic public relations management, which, in turn, allows populists to *double differentiate*; to distance themselves from the very political institutions and established practices they are in fact a part of, whilst simultaneously displaying political and cultural leadership.

Populists thus draw on political repertoires of foreign policy and public diplomacy and are increasingly international in orientation, whereas they are in fact attending to domestic conflict with the political establishment. Though double differentiation highlights the performative dimension to populism, its ramifications for the realm of public diplomacy and international relations may be very real. This chapter considered these consequences as inevitably shaped by particular national political configurations, such as a minority government that is directly bound by populist support or more indirectly shaped by the hegemony of populist discourse. Furthermore, diplomatic consequences should be considered in terms of existing allegiances that are compromised and new international and ideological alliances that are actively created.

A framework built around a particular case, embedded within its own nation-specific political culture, can, of course, never be readily transported into another context. Yet, the central mechanism of the framework (the ceaseless frame fight over domestic politics and national interest) and its conceptual core (populists’ strategic management of public relations provides access to the realm of public diplomacy) allow for an application to those national contexts in which the populist forces are increasingly evident, either by means of formal political representation or symbolic opposition.

For example, considering briefly the United States, the populist Tea Party emerged in early 2009 as a reaction to the financial “bailout” programs administered by the Obama administration. Since that time, the Tea Party has been instrumental in the outcome of the 2010 U.S. midterm elections, where Republicans—particularly those farther right—won back or took over previously, Democratic-held positions at the Congressional, gubernatorial, and state levels. While the differences between the non-hierarchical Tea Party and the leader-as-party PVV are clear (cf. Groshek & Engelbert, 2012), what is transcendent about populist public diplomacy is that it pushes local, state, and national issues into the international arena where opinions about a nation and its policies are formed by foreign audiences.

In this manner, the mantle of Tea Party values regarding reductions in government spending and taxes, as well as smaller government are reflected by a stance toward American exceptionalism and relatively isolationist attitudes (Mead, 2011). These outward foreign policy positions—some being outlined by Tea Party representatives such as Ron Paul who assume the inadvertent
role of the contesting public diplomat (cf. Paul, 2011)—thus exert a similar, if more diffuse effect that changes not only the national political reality, but also the perceived shift of American politics towards conservatism on issues such as global warming, gay marriage, immigration, and Christian religiousness (Campbell & Putnam, 2011).

Altogether, there is a certain similarity of Wilders’ performative practices of double differentiation being carried out in the United States by Tea Party politicians, in both instances of formal or informal endorsements (Jonsson, 2011). Though the “imagined communities” of these actors are likely far less international in intent, their impact eventually becomes writ large on the stage of public diplomacy, often through a strategic melding of mass and online media.

Given the upsurge in contesting, neo-populist public diplomats in Europe and North America, like Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, Silvio Berlusconi, Sarah Palin and Nigel Farage—who can all count on extensive coverage in international mainstream media and further dissemination through social media spaces—governments cannot but actively be seen to anticipate and respond to the alternative international solidarities, alliances and country reputations established by these contenders. Yet, while the diplomatic threat may be so intricate because it comes from within, new integrated models of and approaches to public diplomacy are more than ever equipped to deal with this challenge. That is, given their reliance on the doxa and economies of mainstream media, performativity and cultural exchange, contesting public diplomats can be repudiated in their claimed diplomatic entitlement through the very differentiated (soft power) dimensions that integrated public diplomacy offers. With mediated public diplomacy, nation branding, reputation management and relational public diplomacy at its core (Golan, 2013, p. 1252), integrated public diplomacy is particularly well resourced to ‘disintegrate’ the contesting neo-populist diplomat.

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