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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Reader,

It is my distinct honor and pleasure to present the 20th Edition of the Sigma Iota Rho Journal of International Relations. Over these past twenty editions, the Journal has grown to become the preeminent undergraduate publication in this field, and the articles this year are no exception. They were drawn from an extremely competitive pool of the best submissions from around the world spanning the spectrum of topics in international relations. Given the rising tensions with Russia and possible talks of denuclearization with North Korea, the field of international relations remains of critical importance, and the Journal plays an essential role in fostering scholarly discourse on these issues. I also encourage you to visit our online platform, SIRjournal.org, which publishes opinion, research, and blog pieces on a broad array of themes and has expanded this year to include foreign language submissions and study abroad spotlights.

To mark our 20th edition, the publication features, for the first time in its history, a United States President: George W. Bush. In this moving address delivered at the Bush Institute’s “Spirit of Liberty: At Home, In The World” forum on October 19, 2017, President Bush urges a reinvigorated support for democracy, both domestically and internationally. He calls for renewed American leadership on the global scale to defend the international order and promote freedom. President Bush also provides a series of recommendations to accomplish these objectives. I urge you to read the Bush Institute’s full Call to Action Paper which elaborates on these recommendations and is available on the Institute’s website. In addition to this report and forum, the nonpartisan Bush Institute carries on the work of President Bush and First Lady Laura Bush by focusing on developing leaders; advancing policies on veterans, educational reform, and global engagement; and taking direct action on these topics.

Following the transcript of President Bush’s speech, the Journal features nine student articles which cover some of the most pressing topics in international relations. For example, Chloe Reum evaluates the effectiveness of economic sanctions, applying her findings to project the successfulness of such measures targeted at North Korea, while Elizabeth Marino examines the U.S.-Russia relationship through the lens of the space industry. Additionally, the articles cover a broad range of research methods from Felipe Herrera’s use of a game-theoretic model to study strategies of nonviolent resistance to Andrew Fallone’s content analysis of Azerbaijani social media posts to reveal democratic decay.

I would also like to recognize the contributions of several individuals whose hard work and dedication enabled us to publish another edition of the highest caliber. I wish to thank Dr. Frank Plantan, National President of SIR, Tomoharu Nishino, Journal Faculty Advisor, and Mark Castillo, SIR Senior Liaison Officer, for their guidance and support. Above all, I would like to thank Copy Editor Daniel Loud, Deputy Editor for Operations Kathryn Dura, and the rest of the staff for their countless hours and commitment to the Journal.

Sincerely,

Christopher D’Urso
Editor-in-Chief, Journal of International Relations
LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

We live in a time of long-running and intractable conflicts where hoping for a negotiated settlement in any particular case marks one as naïve or simply ignorant of the complex dynamics that created the conflict. Whether it be tribal rivalries; income and class inequalities; minority group demands for civil, political or religious rights; lack of the rule of law; ideological challenges and confrontations; or blatant, raw power grabs—ignorance of the socioeconomic and political roots of such conflicts guarantees a continuation of the suffering, death, destruction and displacement of individuals and communities at the center of these disputes. To many, it must seem that the world has never been a more hostile and unsafe place than it is today. However, if we consider these phenomena empirically, we will likely discover some counterintuitions as well as the need to reframe how we seek answers to the questions of how our world works.

There is near universal agreement among those who track such metrics that war-related deaths have steadily declined since the end of World War II. Matthew White estimates in the Worldwide Statistics of Casualties, Massacres, Disasters and Atrocities that a total of 123 million people died in all wars of the 20th century.1 This consisted of 37 million military or battlefield deaths, 27 million civilian deaths (“collateral” to military action) and some 41 million victims of “democide” or genocide. In a very detailed study that expanded the definition of war-related deaths to include conflict of all kinds, such as health-related deaths due to lack of food, water, sanitation, etc., the Cornell Peace Studies Program in 2003 raised that estimate to 231 million conflict-related deaths in the 20th century.2 And yet, Max Roser reports an astounding finding in Our World Data:3

- Number of State-Based Battle Deaths: 16,773
- Number of Non-State Battle Deaths: 1,865
- Number of One Sided Violence Deaths: 3,501
- The total sum of the above is: 22,139. This is the number of all war deaths on our planet in 2007.

So, is our planet becoming a safer place to live? Does the fact that great power wars have declined to zero today mean that there will be no great power conflicts in the future? Does the rise of non-state actors, NGOs and new trans- and multinational organizations and institutions mean that the nation-state is no longer relevant? Today, we are warned that environmental degradation, lack of water, inadequate access to credit, climate-induced natural disasters, displaced populations and changing demographics and antibiotic-resistant microbes all threaten our future and are potential sources of current and future conflict. It is enough to make one despair.

And yet, there is hope. As the post-WWII baby boomer generation begins to wane, a new generation of scholars, policymakers and activists has come of age. They were raised in a social and technological environment that recognizes no boundaries, that sees solutions in the creative application of technology, and that views themselves as part of a national and global community. They care about the social impact of their work and of the organizations with which they are affiliated. They are truly “glocal”—thinking globally and acting locally. Working in developing and transitional economies, in tech start-ups, or in the

3 Max Roser, “War and Peace” (Our World in Data, n.d.).
advancement of human rights or the environment, they look for ways to generalize from the particular to the larger social unit. This is the foundation of good social science.

And this is the work of the members of Sigma Iota Rho. Rather than despairing for the future, when I consider our students and my colleagues who teach them, I have hope for a better future. This remains the mission of Sigma Iota Rho: to advance and promote the study of international affairs and to recognize the academic achievements of our membership. But to that I would add, our mission is to make the world a better place and to secure a peaceful and prosperous future for generations to come. It sounds ambitious - even utopian. But I already see it happening today.

Best regards,

Frank Plantan
President
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Spirit of Liberty: At Home, In The World

BY GEORGE W. BUSH
43RD PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

We are gathered in the cause of liberty this is a unique moment. The great democracies face new and serious threats – yet seem to be losing confidence in their own calling and competence. Economic, political and national security challenges proliferate, and they are made worse by the tendency to turn inward. The health of the democratic spirit itself is at issue. And the renewal of that spirit is the urgent task at hand.

Since World War II, America has encouraged and benefited from the global advance of free markets, from the strength of democratic alliances, and from the advance of free societies. At one level, this has been a raw calculation of interest. The 20th century featured some of the worst horrors of history because dictators committed them. Free nations are less likely to threaten and fight each other.

And free trade helped make America into a global economic power.

For more than 70 years, the presidents of both parties believed that American security and prosperity were directly tied to the success of freedom in the world. And they knew that the success depended, in large part, on U.S. leadership. This mission came naturally, because it expressed the DNA of American idealism.

We know, deep down, that repression is not the wave of the future. We know that the desire for freedom is not confined to, or owned by, any culture; it is the inborn hope of our humanity. We know that free governments are the only way to ensure that the strong are just and the
weak are valued. And we know that when we lose sight of our ideals, it is not democracy that has failed. It is the failure of those charged with preserving and protecting democracy.

This is not to underestimate the historical obstacles to the development of democratic institutions and a democratic culture. Such problems nearly destroyed our country—and that should encourage a spirit of humility and a patience with others. Freedom is not merely a political menu option, or a foreign policy fad; it should be the defining commitment of our country, and the hope of the world.

That appeal is proved not just by the content of people’s hopes, but a noteworthy hypocrisy: No democracy pretends to be a tyranny. Most tyrannies pretend they are democracies. Democracy remains the definition of political legitimacy. That has not changed, and that will not change.

Yet for years, challenges have been gathering to the principles we hold dear. And, we must take them seriously. Some of these problems are external and obvious. Here in New York City, you know the threat of terrorism all too well. It is being fought even now on distant frontiers and in the hidden world of intelligence and surveillance. There is the frightening, evolving threat of nuclear proliferation and outlaw regimes. And there is an aggressive challenge by Russia and China to the norms and rules of the global order—proposed revisions that always seem to involve less respect for the rights of free nations and less freedom for the individual.

These matters would be difficult under any circumstances. They are further complicated by a trend in western countries away from global engagement and democratic confidence. Parts of Europe have developed an identity crisis. We have seen insolvency, economic stagnation, youth unemployment, anger about immigration, resurgent ethno-nationalism, and deep questions about the meaning and durability of the European Union.

America is not immune from these trends. In recent decades, public confidence in our institutions has declined. Our governing class has often been paralyzed in the face of obvious and pressing needs. The American dream of upward mobility seems out of reach for some who feel left behind in a changing economy. Discontent deepened and sharpened partisan conflicts. Bigotry seems emboldened. Our politics seems more vulnerable to conspiracy theories and outright fabrication.

There are some signs that the intensity of support for democracy itself has waned, especially among the young, who never experienced the galvanizing moral clarity of the Cold War, or never focused on the ruin of entire nations by socialist central planning. Some have called this “democratic deconsolidation.” Really, it seems to be a combination of weariness, frayed tempers, and forgetfulness.

We have seen our discourse degraded by casual cruelty. At times, it can seem like the forces pulling us apart are stronger than the forces binding us together. Argument turns too easily into animosity. Disagreement escalates into dehumanization. Too often, we judge other groups
by their worst examples while judging ourselves by our best intentions – forgetting the image of God we should see in each other.

We’ve seen nationalism distorted into nativism – forgotten the dynamism that immigration has always brought to America. We see a fading confidence in the value of free markets and international trade – forgetting that conflict, instability, and poverty follow in the wake of protectionism.

We have seen the return of isolationist sentiments – forgetting that American security is directly threatened by the chaos and despair of distant places, where threats such as terrorism, infectious disease, criminal gangs and drug trafficking tend to emerge.

In all these ways, we need to recall and recover our own identity. Americans have a great advantage: To renew our country, we only need to remember our values.

This is part of the reason we meet here today. How do we begin to encourage a new, 21st century American consensus on behalf of democratic freedom and free markets? That’s the question I posed to scholars at the Bush Institute. That is what Pete Wehner and Tom Melia, who are with us today, have answered with “The Spirit of Liberty: At Home, In The World,” a Call to Action paper.

The recommendations come in broad categories. Here they are: First, America must harden its own defenses. Our country must show resolve and resilience in the face of external attacks on our democracy. And that begins with confronting a new era of cyber threats.

America is experiencing the sustained attempt by a hostile power to feed and exploit our country’s divisions. According to our intelligence services, the Russian government has made a project of turning Americans against each other. This effort is broad, systematic and stealthy, it’s conducted across a range of social media platforms. Ultimately, this assault won’t succeed. But foreign aggressions – including cyber-attacks, disinformation and financial influence – should not be downplayed or tolerated. This is a clear case where the strength of our democracy begins at home. We must secure our electoral infrastructure and protect our electoral system from subversion.

The second category of recommendations concerns the projection of American leadership – maintaining America’s role in sustaining and defending an international order rooted in freedom and free markets.

Our security and prosperity are only found in wise, sustained, global engagement: In the cultivation of new markets for American goods. In the confrontation of security challenges before they fully materialize and arrive on our shores. In the fostering of global health and development as alternatives to suffering and resentment. In the attraction of talent, energy
and enterprise from all over the world. In serving as a shining hope for refugees and a voice for dissidents, human rights defenders, and the oppressed.

We should not be blind to the economic and social dislocations caused by globalization. People are hurting. They are angry. And, they are frustrated. We must hear them and help them. But we can’t wish globalization away, any more than we could wish away the agricultural revolution or the industrial revolution. One strength of free societies is their ability to adapt to economic and social disruptions.

And that should be our goal: to prepare American workers for new opportunities, to care in practical, empowering ways for those who may feel left behind. The first step should be to enact policies that encourage robust economic growth by unlocking the potential of the private sector, and for unleashing the creativity and compassion of this country.

A third focus of this document is strengthening democratic citizenship. And here we must put particular emphasis on the values and views of the young.

Our identity as a nation – unlike many other nations – is not determined by geography or ethnicity, by soil or blood. Being an American involves the embrace of high ideals and civic responsibility. We become the heirs of Thomas Jefferson by accepting the ideal of human dignity found in the Declaration of Independence. We become the heirs of James Madison by understanding the genius and values of the U.S. Constitution. We become the heirs of Martin Luther King, Jr., by recognizing one another not by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character.

This means that people of every race, religion, and ethnicity can be fully and equally American. It means that bigotry or white supremacy in any form is blasphemy against the American creed. (Applause.)

And it means that the very identity of our nation depends on the passing of civic ideals to the next generation.

We need a renewed emphasis on civic learning in schools. And our young people need positive role models. Bullying and prejudice in our public life sets a national tone, provides permission for cruelty and bigotry, and compromises the moral education of children. The only way to pass along civic values is to first live up to them.

Finally, the Call to Action calls on the major institutions of our democracy, public and private, to consciously and urgently attend to the problem of declining trust.

For example, our democracy needs a media that is transparent, accurate and fair. Our democracy needs religious institutions that demonstrate integrity and champion civil discourse.
Our democracy needs institutions of higher learning that are examples of truth and free expression.

In short, it is time for American institutions to step up and provide cultural and moral leadership for this nation.

Ten years ago, I attended a Conference on Democracy and Security in Prague. The goal was to put human rights and human freedom at the center of our relationships with repressive governments. The Prague Charter, signed by champions of liberty Vaclav Havel, Natan Sharansky, Jose Maria Aznar, called for the isolation and ostracism of regimes that suppress peaceful opponents by threats or violence.

Little did we know that, a decade later, a crisis of confidence would be developing within the core democracies, making the message of freedom more inhibited and wavering. Little did we know that repressive governments would be undertaking a major effort to encourage division in western societies and to undermine the legitimacy of elections.

Repressive rivals, along with skeptics here at home, misunderstand something important. It is the great advantage of free societies that we creatively adapt to challenges, without the direction of some central authority. Self-correction is the secret strength of freedom. We are a nation with a history of resilience and a genius for renewal.

Right now, one of our worst national problems is a deficit of confidence. But the cause of freedom justifies all our faith and effort. It still inspires men and women in the darkest corners of the world, and it will inspire a rising generation. The American spirit does not say, “We shall manage,” or “We shall make the best of it.” It says, “We shall overcome.” And that is exactly what we will do, with the help of God and one another.
The Aesthetics of Counterterrorism

BY LAUREN KAHN
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

ABSTRACT

Since 9/11, terrorism (and the corresponding War on Terror in the West) has become an undeniably pervasive facet of urban life. Counterterrorism measures have traditionally consisted of sealing off space and restricting movement, usually by use of visually and physically intrusive, ad-hoc security measures such as the Jersey Barrier, creating what some refer to as an “architecture of terror.” In moments of crisis, temporary measures are often readily accepted by the public, but as situations calm and security interventions become more permanent they often harm public spaces and can even work counter to their intended goals when not properly integrated into the streetscape. This paper analyzes the challenges posed by the increasing frequency of low-tech terrorism and “crowded spaces” as attractive target for terrorist action, and how the respondent “traditional” application of security measures impacts the “livability of American cities.” Drawing on government reports and articles on urban planning, aesthetics, and architecture, I outline the various paradoxes created by visible and invisible security measures, explain general trends in security innovation, particularly that of “designing in terrorism,” and provide examples of creative security solutions that were able to successfully balance encouraging public use of space with improving safety. The paper encourages that these aesthetic and design considerations and more collaboration between the wide arrays of stakeholders (architects, urban planners, security officials, community members) should be made priorities in order to build more resilient cities.

Since its victory during the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States briefly enjoyed a period of nearly uncontested global dominance and almost impenetrable security; The U.S. could defend its interests within its hemisphere while the Pacific Ocean became colloquially known as “the American lake” as early as 1914.1 This epoch, often referred to by scholars

as “the American Century,” came to a definitive end, however, on September 11th, 2001. As Roland Bleiker stresses in his article “Art After 9/11,” the terror attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001 constituted more than a simple breach of physical security, a “violation of national sovereignty, [or] a failure of the state’s intelligence apparatus,”—that alone would not have been enough to decisively end a century-long global reign—but “a shattering of a deep-seated sense of domestic security in the United States.” The September 2001 attack was significant because it “fundamentally questioned the prevailing sense of security and the political structures that had been established to provide it.” It is then no surprise that in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, in a mad-dash to try and regain that sense of safety and re-establish trust, the U.S. federal government underwent the largest re-organization since the Truman administration, and established the concept of Homeland Security proper. These effects manifested themselves physically as well; in the form of jersey barriers, bollards, metal detectors, fences, CCTV surveillance, increased policing, and more, creating what one journalist referred to as an “architecture of paranoia.”

Scholars have argued that, “architecture and urban design have the power to order society through environmental determinism, with such embodied experiences often serving to in/exclude particular groups from certain spaces of the city;” thus, changing the form of cities and spaces will ultimately change how people interact within it. From a security perspective, this suggests that the “built form” can shape how those who experience it internalize fear. “Architecture of paranoia” is therefore a helpful phrase in that it captures the paradox that Jon Coaffee, Paul O’Hare, and Marian Hawkesworth propose in their article “The Visibility of (In)security” that the (in)visibility and aesthetics of security measures have the ability to convey either a sense of security—that “something is being done” to ensure safety—or the exact opposite, instead drawing attention to vulnerabilities and potential threats. This is especially pertinent in an era of terrorism—a tactic that capitalizes on the fear and psychological dislocation amongst a population by enacting acts of unexpected, premeditated violence against soft targets and civilians, and more recently, crowded, public spaces such as concerts, shopping malls, and sports stadiums. It therefore becomes evident that there is an inherent aesthetic component to terrorism (and by extension, counterterrorism). As Bleiker noted, the 9/11 attacks were,


directed not just as physical targets but at representations of power. No building symbolized the neoliberal economic world order better than the twin towers of the World Trade Center, and no building symbolizes the military might of the United

2 Lindee, “Industrialized War and the American Century.”
6 Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 493.
7 Ibid.
States better than the Pentagon. The White House, the target for a failed third attack, would have been the perfect representation of political power.\footnote{Bleiker, “Art After 9/11.” 79.}

Understandably, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 aesthetic considerations were quite low on the list of priorities, but in the past decade or so there has been an acknowledgement that, as Coaffee, O’Hare and Hawkesworth put it, “security policy is more than words and ideas. Its manifestation within the built environment can transmit powerful messages, both intentionally and unintentionally, eliciting a range of subjective emotional responses.”\footnote{Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 506-07.} As a result there has been a promising, positive trend of taking into account aesthetic concerns, as well as better integrating design principles and urban planning into security plans in order to create more acceptable, less obtrusive, and more resilient counterterrorism measures.

Terrorism is a constantly evolving threat, as terrorists improvise and change tactics in order to circumvent new counterterrorism measures and efforts, resulting in a threat portfolio that has continued to expand almost exponentially since 2002.\footnote{S.K. McGuire, “The Terrorist Threat,” Class Lecture, Introduction to U.S. Homeland Security, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, September 18, 2017.} New forms of terrorism are often hard to predict and therefore even harder to address, as it is virtually impossible to prepare ahead for every variation or type of terrorist incident, especially given that the absence of attacks is not sufficient proof of effective counterterrorism measures.\footnote{McGuire, “The Terrorist Threat.”}

One of the newest developments in terrorism has been a shift to “low-tech terrorism” and a focus on crowded, public places. Before, terrorism meant preparing for plane hijackings and WMDs (weapons of mass destruction) of the CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) type on symbolic and important buildings. Now, the use of everyday objects to attack everyday places and people has become the norm—in 2017 alone there were at least a dozen vehicle-ramming terror attacks. As access to weapons or training no longer becomes necessary, any public space has become a viable and worthwhile target. Such tactics allow for almost anyone to become terrorists and for almost anyone to become a victim. As Coaffee et. al. explained, “in the past, crowded places have been targeted. Now, however, they are perceived to be primary targets.”\footnote{Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 490.} The United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy (known as CONTEST) defines “crowded places” as spaces that are easily accessible and attract large groups of people such as shopping centers, concert halls, sports stadia, bars, and clubs.\footnote{The Home Office, The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, and The National Counter-Terrorism Security Office. “Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues.” Rev. ed. (London: HM Government, 2014). 5.} Singapore-based architect Daniel Tan posits the reason why crowded places and cities have become “theatres of...terrorism today” is because they “offer a unique confluence of vulnerabilities—as nodes of capital and human flow and sites of architectural spectacle—that
work to the advantage of orchestrated and well-planned radical terrorism.”\textsuperscript{14} According to Tan, the terrorist threat has thereby become a more endogenous one.\textsuperscript{15} It is only appropriate that in response there has been a greater focus on hardening these soft targets while building more resilient and stronger cities.

The premise of architectural hardening is “that physical protection for a place or building can make it physically more difficult to create a crime or attack, theoretically deterring would-be offenders.”\textsuperscript{16} Such practices are not new nor unique, rather, designing for security is considered as “old as the history of architecture itself.”\textsuperscript{17} As early as the 18th century, English philosopher Jeremy Bentham “proposed a building meant to eradicate bad behavior.”\textsuperscript{18} The design featured a circular structure with an observation tower at its epicenter—now known infamously as the Panopticon—that would induce occupants to act “appropriately” because they would have a heightened awareness that a centralized authority surveilled them. Bentham didn’t suggest its use for prisons only, but argued that it could be used for anything and everything from schools, to hospitals, to housing.\textsuperscript{19} In the 1970s a similar idea surfaced, with Oscar Newman promoting the idea of “defensible space,” areas carefully constructed to “deter criminal activities through both real and symbolic features.” A decade later in the 1980s, stemming from the increasingly common bombing of US embassies, military planners, the Department of State, and security officials had begun put more resources into exploring concepts of building resistance and hardening as possible security solutions.\textsuperscript{20} However, such security features and hardening attempts are, more often than not, “quite obvious (possibly being obtrusive) or are even ‘advertised’ in order to convey the message that a place or building is fortified.”\textsuperscript{21} The goal of these measures is to simultaneously deter would-be perpetrators by demonstrating “that their malign intent is likely to be in vain or at least will require a significant degree of effort,” while showing the public that “a place can be used in safety.”\textsuperscript{22} There are also political incentives to “advertising” security, as they serve tangible examples that the state can point to, in order to assure the public that the threat is properly being addressed and that the government is, ultimately, in control.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{14} Tan Guan Zhong Daniel, “Urban Terrorism: St. Peter’s Square, Vatican City,” Spaces of Conflict (Autumn/Winter 2016): 149.

\textsuperscript{15} Tan, “Urban Terrorism.” 149.

\textsuperscript{16} Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 496.


\textsuperscript{19} Dickinson, “Designing for Security.”

\textsuperscript{20} Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 496; FEMA 430. 23.

\textsuperscript{21} Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 496.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23} Jon Coaffee, “Protecting Vulnerable Cities: The UK’s Resilience Response to Defending Everyday Infrastructure,” International Affairs 86, no. 4 (July 2010):945.
Ironically, this exaggerated visual-physical attempt to encourage the public to utilize a space by ensuring security can backfire and have an indiscriminate deterrent effect. Advertising security in an aggressive manner can intimidate the public and engender negative emotions such as that of isolation, being unwelcome, and even fear and anxiety by drawing attention to the threat that warranted the measures in the first place.\textsuperscript{24} A 2005 Washington Post article featured a comment made by a tourist who indicated, “I feel not as safe. I feel less at ease. You feel watched—you notice all the cameras.”\textsuperscript{25} Coaffee et. al describe this phenomenon as an issue of interpretation—that “while security regimes may attempt to ‘transmit’ feelings of safety and security though the built environment and reassure the public, the ‘reception’ of these very same messages may be ‘lost in translation’.”\textsuperscript{26} This often occurs when the type of security measures implemented rely on very visible fortress-like architecture and principles of exclusion (tactics such as barricading, surveillance, the imposition of stringent and overtly signposted rules, checkpoints are a few examples)—two things that are inherently contradictory to the innate purpose and design of public, crowded spaces.\textsuperscript{27} This has increasingly become a problem as terrorists have begun to target the very types of largely public places that “cannot be altered without radically changing citizens’ experience of [them],” such as historical sites.\textsuperscript{28} Daniel Tan emphasizes this paradox, lamenting that, “architects strive to promote mobility and interaction among people, while security experts endeavor to enclose and restrict movement to facilitate securitization.”\textsuperscript{29} Others suggest that U.S. security officials (until fairly recently) overlooked this need for more effectively subtle, better integrated, “designed in” security and counterterrorism measures that do not detract from everyday experiences, or as in the case of Bentham’s Panopticon, forget “the importance of human experience.”\textsuperscript{30} As Coaffee emphasizes, it is not enough for counterterrorist resilient design to be effective at improving security, “but must also be acceptable to the owners, inhabitants and users of particular places [and]…this acceptability encompasses complex financial, social, and aesthetic considerations.”\textsuperscript{31}

Since the terror attacks of the mid-1990s, there had been a steady proliferation of security measures and fortifications in major cities, but it was not until “the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent global war on terrorism,” that the “articulation of security and fortifications of both private space and public space in cities around the USA” was drastically and permanently altered.\textsuperscript{32} The attack was so instantaneously traumatic that the government’s immediate reaction was to implement make-shift security measures as quickly as possible, on an ad-hoc, piecemeal basis “by different federal agencies for different purposes, scattered

\textsuperscript{24} Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 496-97.
\textsuperscript{26} Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 496.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid. 496-97.
\textsuperscript{28} Coaffee, “Protecting Vulnerable Cities.” 943.
\textsuperscript{29} Tan, “Urban Terrorism.” 149.
\textsuperscript{30} Dickinson, “Designing for Security.”
\textsuperscript{31} Coaffee, “Protecting Vulnerable Cities.” 946.
\textsuperscript{32} Benton-Short, “Bollards, Bunkers, and Barriers.” 431.
throughout the city,” particularly in Washington DC and New York.\textsuperscript{33} The most often cited example of the most prolific—nearing on ubiquitous—device used in this way in the wake of 9/11 was the Jersey barrier. If not thoughtfully located or installed, the ugly, modular, inexpensive and readily available walls of concrete that “provide protection through their mass,” can do more harm than good.\textsuperscript{34} Jersey barriers regularly “degrade the quality and character of public space and severely detract from the sense of openness and accessibility that are features of an attractive and functional urban environment.”\textsuperscript{35} Jersey barrier-types of counterterrorism design solutions take a teleological, technologically deterministic approach, are often considered successful from a security standpoint, but not from an architectural, urban planning, or cultural preservation standpoint, and have been acknowledged (as early as 1999 when the GSA and the AIA convened a symposium focused on the “potential conflicts between security needs and traditional building amenities”) to be “detrimental to the function, quality and viability of the public realm.”\textsuperscript{36}

It becomes evident, as many people have pointed out, that “the urgency of the perceived need to respond, with little time to contemplate the longer-term consequences of action, characterized the initial international reaction to 9/11.” Understandably, such secondary, long-term functional or aesthetic effects were not given a moment’s thought, as “protecting critical infrastructure at this time was given the highest priority and was largely reactive, given the fear of imminent attack.”\textsuperscript{37} Such a prioritization is not uncommon or unusual—in fact, it is quite expected that in times of crises or when national security is threatened for “there to be visible forms of fortifications in the urban landscape” and that the average citizen is much more willing (at least in the short term) to forgo common freedoms and individuals rights such as privacy, in exchange for more security.\textsuperscript{38} This is best demonstrated by the widespread support and approval of the USA PATRIOT act in the months immediately succeeding 9/11, and the subsequent backlash that replaced it as the sense of imminent danger dwindled with time. Similarly, overt security measures only become problematic when the initial heightened fear of an attack has waned. However, with the way terrorism is transitioning into a low-tech, everyday occurrence, “stark forms of visible and over protection” that were once intended to be temporary security interventions only have been enmeshed and “retrofitted within the built environment” to a point where “these were so widespread at times that heightened security was, in effect, normalized;” a process which social theorist Brian Massumi argues has led to the infiltration of a constant “low level ‘ambient’ fear” in everyday life.\textsuperscript{39}

As David Dixon prophesized correctly in his article “Is Density Dangerous?”—written just a year after the twin towers fell—“a very large part of our built environment will be shaped

\textsuperscript{33} Benton-Short, “Bollards, Bunkers, and Barriers.” 432; FEMA 430. 25.

\textsuperscript{34} FEMA 430. 25

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{37} Coaffee, “Protecting Vulnerable Cities.” 944.

\textsuperscript{38} Benton-Short, “Bollards, Bunkers, and Barriers.” 430.

\textsuperscript{39} Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 491:501-02.
by concerns about terrorism.”

Because almost any building or space can be targeted, and no one can truly determine which have the desired symbolic or aesthetic value to a terrorist, no one can predict which will fall victim to attack, making the list of targets endless and the “impact of new regulations…limitless.” It is because of this, Dixon explains, that the war on terrorism,

threatens to become a war against the livability of American cities…[as] the broader, indirect impact of these regulations, with their focus on isolating people from buildings and shutting buildings off from streets, could undermine the vitality, sense of community, and civic quality of much of urban America.

“Site and Urban Design for Security: Guidance against Potential Terrorist Attacks,” a publication released by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 2006 as part of their Risk Management Series, acknowledged that this hypothesis had come to fruition, noting a drastic change in the character of public spaces, cities, and overall built environment brought about by the increasing threat of terrorism, stating that “before September 11, 2001, communities were not forced to live with security beyond normal neighborhood police protection…Now, the community must learn to live with security.” This is a unique situation, as Lisa Benton-Short explains, “despite a history of fortifications during wartime, none of these has had the potential for permanent, long-lasting changes,” but now, current security measures, while intended to be not dissimilar from these previous wartime practices, are unlikely to be undone should the war on terror ever end, with the “proposed visible and invisible forms of fortification and surveillance have geographic and political implications that resonate beyond the short term.” So far, Benton-Short’s prediction has also been correct, with the majority of the temporary, emergency interventions being made permanent in cities, which has led to widespread criticism and a new acknowledgement that if heightened security is here to stay, they must become aesthetically acceptable, too.

The overarching goal of Homeland Security policy is to safeguard the “American way of life,” which goes beyond physical security to include respecting universal values both at home and abroad. This requires security officials to consider issues such as consent, due consideration, public consultation, community context, privacy, and aesthetics when implementing new security measures. Especially in an era where security is becoming an everyday personal concern, it is all the more crucial to acknowledge the role that aesthetics play in determining the “relationship(s) between state security policy and public perceptions of—and the emotions

42 Ibid. 1.
43 FEMA 430. 98.
44 Benton-Short, “Bollards, Bunkers, and Barriers.” 430.
45 Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 502.
arising from—the ‘secure’ city.” While issues of aesthetics may not “seem as pressing in our war on terrorism,” they play a critical component in ensuring that security measures are more lasting and truly helping to build resilient cities, and in the long term have a lot to do with “national identity, national history, and how we value public space.” In 1999 Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan described architecture as an “inescapably…political art;” in 2012 Former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared “the works of our artists, architects, and preservationists provide us with another language of diplomacy;” during the debates over the Ground Zero memorial Daniel Libeskind called architecture “communication…not cladding, insulation and structure, but the substance of the individual in society in history.” As the FEMA guide notes, the “architecture and the landscaping of the site entry elements are the are the first part (and may be the only part) of the [security] project that is visible. As such, they introduce the identity of the site…and [can either] impart a sense of welcome or ‘stay away’.”

Since 9/11, many Western states have been leaning towards the latter, as made evident by the expectation of architects, designers, urban planners, engineers and the like to “consume, and through practice, to rearticulate the risk-and-threat discourse in, often literally, ‘concrete’ forms,” thereby ensuring that “political and securitization ideologies are materially inscribed in the fabric of the city, serving to codify particular spaces.” Architects and architecture critics, journalists, urban planners, scholars, and civilians alike have criticized these policies, fearing that this “architecture of terror” filled with gates, walls, barriers, and CCTV surveillance devices—“tawdry concrete necklace[s]…disfigurement[s] of public space…[and] ready-made Maginot lines”—would lead to the demise of the skyscraper, the city, or public parks and spaces, demanding that while “we might live in dangerous times…they don’t have to be ugly ones too.” Furthermore, many claim that these bulky, temporary, security measures have altered the symbolic meanings of many of the United States’ most treasurized spaces and monuments. A particularly salient example is that of the nation’s capital—the original layout for the city, as planned by Pierre L’Enfant, was “replete with international symbolism and meaning…[his] design called for the city to be the physical and symbolic embodiment of the democratic experience…it may sound abstract but visitors pick up on it.” Thus it is no surprise that residents found visual paradoxes and ironies abound, “in a city that symbolized freedom, barriers abound,” when in response to the terrorist threat, cones, fences, surveillance were installed, particularly in the highly symbolic National Mall which is a national park that is required by law to remain accessible to the public.

46 Ibid. 495.
47 Benton-Short, “Bollards, Bunkers, and Barriers.” 442.
49 FEMA 430. 130.
50 Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 494-95; Coaffee, “Protecting Vulnerable Cities.” 940-41.
51 Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 502; Benton-Short, “Bollards, Bunkers, and Barriers.” 430; 434.
53 Ibid. 424;429.
It is obvious that in an age of terrorism, where concerns about security “supersede other values” it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain American civic and democratic values. Commitment to historic preservation is threatened by measures that “alters their character and diminishes a sense of connection to our historic values and traditions,” such as the installation of surrounding barriers. Energy conservation and sustainability becomes more expensive as security measures can significantly increase energy use. Even accommodating the needs of people with disabilities might be sacrificed, as isolating buildings from parking lots or streets often force people with disabilities to walk much longer distances. Moreover, with any add-on measure or security trade off, aesthetics become much more difficult to maintain. As David Dixon aptly points out, “there are no easy ways to balance security and the livability of cities. America cannot afford to ignore the threats of terrorism, but it can even less afford to undermine its cities at a time where they already face many critical economic and social challenges.”

Fortunately, in recent years there has been a push for “resilience,” a term that has come to describe how “cities are attempting to embed security and risk management into the built environment,” and is understood to increase the “ability of social units…to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when they occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that minimize social disruption.” This is largely due to terrorism becoming accepted as both pervasive and permanent, a development that has increasingly required security interventions “to consider concerns regarding public acceptability,” as they become a constant, everyday, and normalized feature. Public acceptability in the case of counter-terrorism security measures has largely meant interventions that do not detract from a space, alter its symbolic meaning, or change the user’s experience—a set of criteria which essentially require these measures to become as invisible, or camouflaged, as possible. Architect James Timberlake illustrates this new prioritization of making security discreet, and finding more passive ways to “softly” harden a building, arguing that “in general, architects need to challenge the theory that overt visual deterrents, which are the most aggressive features in the landscape, are the answer…If it’s a K-8 school, and you’ve put a metal detector at the front door, what does that say?” This trend towards resilience and better integrated security measures has led to a greater consideration for how architects, urban planners, and the like can work along security professionals in order to better design-in counterterrorist security features to urban and crowded spaces, a trend that positions “place and people, rather than the state, as the centre of security policy.”

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Coaffee and Bosher, “Integrating Counter-Terrorist Resilience into Sustainability.” 75.
58 Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 498.
59 Ibid. 498-502.
60 Dickinson, “Designing for Security.”
61 Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 491; Coaffee and Bosher, “Integrating Counter-Terrorist Resilience into Sustainability.” 76.
Both the US and UK governments have published various homeland security documents on the benefits and best practices of “designing-in” counterterrorism. For example, “Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues,” a guide published by the UK Home Office in partnership with the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office, stated that not only is it “more cost effective to “design-in” protective security measures from the outset of a scheme… [and that] there are aesthetic and functional benefits to designing-in counterterrorism measures at the concept stage rather than later on,” but that in doing so, there is a higher likelihood that the project will be an overall success from a traditional security standpoint, an acceptability standpoint, and from an architectural and best urban planning practices standpoint.62 This careful balance, as architect Patrick Gilbert explains, can only be achieved when a building site or concept is considered in holistic terms—security cannot be treated not as an add-on or an afterthought.63

With increasingly advanced technology, the ability to implement this kind of “invisible” security is becoming substantially easier, and have been successful in rendering more undesirable, grotesque physical measures unnecessary. David Dixon provides the example of the extensive use of photographing and facial scanning at the 2002 Super Bowl in order to eliminate the “need for highly visible barriers and elaborate checkpoints that, from a design perspective, would have been far more drastic and would also have conveyed a sense of fear.”64 This is a considerably more advanced example, and not as feasible in other instances, but there are simple constructions that are more readily available that can accomplish similar levels of security without raising quite as many privacy concerns. Anything from structurally enhanced bus shelters and streetlamp columns to strategically placed water features and sculptures, if implemented properly and carefully can serve a legitimate security purpose while remaining “invisible” to the unaccustomed eye.” If done excellently, such non-obvious installations can even encourage the use of a space by enhancing the visual environment, effectively delineating pathways, and clarifying public and private space and more.65 Water is one of the most beautiful as well as “oldest forms of site security design,” as it serves as an effective stand-alone barrier (think medieval moats), but can also be configured to have a greater security impact, as the “configuration of the channel can be designed as an effective ‘tank trap’, or walls of the pool or mass of the fountain can be engineered to stop a vehicle.”66 The same role that bollards fulfill in protecting against hostile vehicle attacks can also be served by more innovative (and hardened) sculptures. Emirates Stadium in North London has been the poster child for ornamental counterterrorism features and best practices for “designing-in” security measures—the massive, “fortified concrete letters spelling out ‘Arsenal’ have been deliberately situated to prevent vehicle access, and have now become a favored location for match-day

66 FEMA 430. 157.
fans to be photographed.”

Even MOMA, the New York Museum of Modern Art, has been an active participant in the war against terrorism by designing the beautiful bronze NOGO barriers that have been installed in the Wall Street area (as well as exhibited in the museum)—“visually attractive and useful to lean on, socialize or enjoy lunch around…the barrier is part security device and part public art.” The security enhancements used for the National Mall and the Washington Monument included a “regarding of the…grounds and the construction of retaining walls that are intended to disappear into the landscape.”

This method, known as the ha-ha, originated as a more aesthetically pleasing solution to containing cattle in 17th century England, and now serves a role equivalent to that of the Jersey barrier, as well as a “happy historical reference,” as “Washington’s home at Mount Vernon used ha-ha’s for their original purpose.” A simple introduction of reinforced planters and even on some occasion, large or dense trees in an urban setting can also greatly improve security, and is an especially attractive option considering that natural views, greenery, and exposure to vegetation have been shown to significantly reduce feelings of fear, stress, anxiety, and sadness—the exact opposite psychological effect that concrete barriers and fences often have. Additionally, these types of “hidden” counterterrorism elements can help make buildings “deliberately inconspicuous…and therefore at less risk of being attacked,” and in general good counterterrorism design is also good crime prevention, as it often supports more regular security measures aimed at preventing activities such as theft or vandalism. Architecture historian Trevor Boddy likened these types of security to an “iron hand inside…[a] civic velvet glove,” soft on the outside, but hard within. Such successful examples prove that security and aesthetics are not mutually exclusive, in fact, thoughtful planning, a holistic approach, and better communication and collaboration between design, urban planning, and security professionals can solve security needs while maintaining or even enhancing existing public spaces.

However, as with anything, there are potential downsides to this type of invisible security. Some argue that by making counterterrorism measures less apparent to the everyday civilian that they will become an “uncontested element of political and public policy,” or that they will lead to a normalization and legitimization of other, more highly contested “generic foreign and domestic policies instigated as part of the overall war on terror.” Others present an

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67 Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 504.
68 FEMA 430. 173.
70 FEMA 430. 145.
73 Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 506.
74 FEMA 430. 95.
75 Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 498.
76 Coaffee, “Protecting Vulnerable Cities.” 948;953.
argument similar to that against the USA PATRIOT act—that camouflaged physical security “may in fact lead to more invasive technologies, bolstering...that security apparatus” and therefore the reach, of the state in a way that is unconstitutional and puts privacy and individual rights at risk.\footnote{Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 498.} In assessing the process for implementing new security measures in the mall, National Mall Agencies, Review Organizations, and the GAO noted that while “aesthetic and public access considerations are seen as critical elements,” there were significant challenges in collaborating across sectors to achieve these ends. In particular, they emphasized that project costs increased and planning became less cohesive, time-consuming, and sometimes redundant when consultation, review, and approval was required of multiple organizations and stakeholders that had competing interests.\footnote{Dickinson, “Designing for Security;” Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 499.} From a more visual and psychological perspective, there is also the possibility that by hiding security measures the public will feel insecure, despite them being equally as effective in deterring and mitigating against terror attacks and will make “statutory institutions charged with protecting the public...prone to allegations that threats are not being taken seriously enough;” as architect Joseph Collins points out, “there’s how safe you are and there’s how safe you feel—and both are important.”\footnote{Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 490.}

Despite the above criticisms and possible negatives, the issue of security in the face of this new era of terrorism ultimately boils down to the need to find an acceptable balance and trade-off of values. As Coaffee et. al. suggest, the various paradoxes and contradictions inherent to addressing security needs demands a dual strategy wherein “security features at some sites are expected to be obtrusive, [while] at other sites inconspicuous security is required to help such defensive measures become acceptable to the public,” and therefore must be handled on a case-by-case basis.\footnote{Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth, “The Visibility of (In)security.” 490.} The inherent issue with traditional, readymade security measures such as jersey barriers, standardized bollards, fences, and the like is that they attempt to apply a “one size fits all” solution to sites and situations that are vastly different and present unique sets of challenges and specifics that are often non-transferable. As we have seen, when ill-fitting counterterrorism elements are applied in such an ad-hoc way that fails to take into account aesthetic and community contexts, they can cause unintended and often oxymoronic consequences, such as making the public feel unsafe in public spaces (which is ultimately the end-goal of terrorist actions), which can result in a sort of national agoraphobia. Thus, while stealthy, invisible, and “designed-in” security measures pose an array of issues, they ultimately contribute to a much more integrated, flexible, and proactive approach to security. They should therefore be more aggressively pursued, as in spite of widespread praise and encouragement, the default contemporary security practice is still one “of erecting rows of crash-rated security bollards and barriers.”\footnote{Coaffee, “Protecting Vulnerable Cities.” 952-53.}
Reinforced ARSENAL sculpture outside Emirates Stadium.

MOMA’s NOGO Barriers in New York City.

**Works Cited**


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Lauren Kahn is a current junior at the University of Pennsylvania, originally from Pepper Pike, Ohio, pursuing a major in International Relations and a double minor in Economic Policy and American Public Policy/Business and Public Policy (APP/BPP). Through her studies, research, and abroad experiences, she has developed interests in economic and foreign policy, security and strategic studies, refugee and asylum-seeking populations, and how innovations in science and technology impact war.

Since her sophomore year, Lauren has been a research assistant for both Michael C. Horowitz in the Political Science department and M. Susan Lindee in the Science, Technology, and Societies department at the University of Pennsylvania. With Professor Horowitz, she spent the summer and fall of 2017 leading a team of 6 research assistants in conducting research on the proliferation of precision guided munitions and creating and managing a dataset of over 1200 entries, and assisted with other projects on drones, fighter aircraft, and C4ISR. She plans on further assisting Professor Horowitz in 2018 in mapping the first telegraph connections between countries. She spent the same summer assisting Professor Lindee to finalize the manuscript for her book on the intersection of science, technology, and war, as well as other forthcoming journal publications. Additionally, she worked on finding, assessing, and synthesizing primary-source material for her class, Science, Technology, and War, on topics ranging from scientific management in hospitals during WWI, internationalism in science and its collapse during the world wars, the militarization of science and medicine, technological distancing, and medical and scientific ethics.

Lauren is also currently a research intern for the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program led by Dr. James McGann at the University of Pennsylvania and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and serves as peer advisor for the IR major, as student president of the Penn branch of Meor, as well as an advisor on various Hillel program boards.
Fleeing from a Forgotten War: Refugees in the Context of the Conflict in Yemen

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ABSTRACT

This article explores population movements to and from Yemen since the onset of the Yemen Civil War in 2015. Though the UN considers the Yemen Civil War “the worst humanitarian disaster since 1945,” it has seen relatively limited refugee flows: less than 200,000 have fled the country, and there are currently larger numbers of people coming to Yemen from the Horn of Africa than there are leaving from Yemen. This article considers the historical context of the conflict and how it relates to refugee flows, as well as carefully comparing pre-conflict population movement trends to current data on refugees and internally-displaced persons, to explain the reasons why people are not leaving Yemen. These reasons include historical and cultural factors, the lack of well-established migration routes from Yemen, and the absence of a viable place to which to flee. I also apply a broader theoretical framework of population movement (based on Everett Lee’s 1966 model) to the Yemeni case. Considering these reasons within this framework, it is unlikely that the conflict in Yemen will ever produce large-scale refugee flows like the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

INTRODUCTION

Yemen is in crisis. Since a Saudi-led coalition invaded the country in March 2015, over 13,000 civilians have been killed in fighting and thousands more have died of disease and malnutrition, including 2,100 this year in the world’s worst cholera outbreak recent history.1 Three million people have been internally displaced, over 21 million are in need of humanitarian assistance, and severe shortages of food, water, and medical supplies have left hundreds of

thousands of children malnourished. The humanitarian situation became even more dire at the beginning of November 2017 when Saudi Arabia imposed a blockade of all of Yemen’s land, air, and sea ports, purportedly to stop the flow of weapons from Iran. Since Yemen depends on imports to meet 90% of its basic needs, this put the country at imminent risk of widespread famine. Early in 2017 Stephen O’Brien, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, went as far as to call Yemen “the largest humanitarian crisis since the creation of the United Nations.”

Despite this ghastly situation, only about 190,000 refugees have fled Yemen since the beginning of the conflict. This pales in comparison to the Syrian civil war (4.9 million refugees), civil war in South Sudan (1.8 million), and the Rwandan genocide (1.7 million), all of which the UN chief implied created a less serious humanitarian situation than in Yemen. Furthermore, refugees from the Horn of Africa are still flowing to Yemen. 260,000 Ethiopian migrants entered Yemen between April 2014 and March 2017, and during the first three months of 2017, 15,948 migrants in total arrived to Yemen from the Horn of Africa. Yet during those same three months, only 2,480 migrants left Yemen for the Horn of Africa, and UNHCR data indicate that no Yemeni migrants moved to Saudi Arabia or Oman during that time. There are, in fact, more migrants coming to Yemen than are leaving the country.

There seems to be a disconnect between the dire humanitarian situation and the refugee flows to and from war-torn Yemen. This paper will investigate why more people are coming to Yemen than fleeing. I will begin with a theoretical framework explaining a model of what causes refugee movements and briefly explain the events leading up to the present conflict in Yemen. Then I will explain historical migration patterns involving Yemen and explore how those patterns have changed as the conflict has progressed, including the development of refugee flows from Yemen. Finally, I will analyze why these patterns have changed and put forward three hypotheses to explain why refugee flows from Yemen have been relatively low. The first is that historical, cultural, and security factors make it difficult for people to move far within Yemen. The second is that there is nowhere else outside of Yemen that is both accessible to migrants and offers better conditions than Yemen itself. The third is the lack

3 “Yemen facing largest famine the world has seen for decades, warns UN aid chief.” UN News Centre. 9 Nov 2017.
of well-established migration routes out of Yemen to anywhere besides Saudi Arabia, whose border is closed. I will conclude with a discussion of what this might mean for future flows from Yemen.

Theoretical Framework

In order to analyze why the Yemen civil war has not caused large-scale refugee flows, it is helpful to consider a broader theoretical framework of what causes migration movements in the general case. Everett Lee (1966) proposes a model of negative push factors in the country of origin that compel a migrant to leave and positive pull factors at the country of destination that compel a migrant to come to that country. Between the push factors and the pull factors are “intervening obstacles” like physical barriers and political factors that make it more or less difficult for a migrant to move. In essence, migrants weigh what they know about the destination against their present situation and the difficulty of overcoming the intervening obstacles between their origin and their destination, and make a decision about whether to migrate or not.

Cassandra Conton (2010) builds on Lee’s theory to flesh out what push and pull factors are at play in the context of a refugee situation. Conton says that push factors include violence from political unrest, threats to personal safety, poverty and social insecurity, struggle for livelihood, and low levels of education. Pull factors include personal dreams of self-improvement, a booming economy and financial security, job opportunities, favorable migration laws, cultural/language similarities, and family support. She argues, however, that in the case of “war-induced violence”, migrants are influenced mostly by push factors and go wherever they are safe.

It is also useful to enumerate Lee’s “intervening obstacles” in the context of refugee movements. One way to do this is to take a piece from an entirely different model of refugee movements. Christina Boswell (2002) poses that the causes of forced displacement can be broken down into root causes like underdevelopment, state mismanagement, social fragmentation, and contested borders. Root causes create tension that boils over into proximate causes, like severe state repression and violent conflict, which are roughly equivalent to Lee’s push factors that which compel a person to move in a refugee situation. Finally, a number of critical “enabling factors” allow a migrant to undertake the journey out of his country. These enabling factors – which include resources to make the journey, travel possibilities, knowledge of how to undertake the journey, legislation and controls in receiving countries, and networks in the country of destination – affect the migrant in much the same way as Lee’s “intervening obstacles”.

are factors that influence the ease of undertaking the journey, irrespective of the strength of the push factors to leave. We must note that enabling factors are not simply a part of the calculus of migration; they are an imperative for it to happen. If they are not met, movement tends not to occur.

In the context of a refugee situation, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between enabling factors and pull factors. For instance, “legislation and controls in receiving countries” could be thought of as a pull factor. This may be the case for economic migrants, and this view certainly dominates policymaking in Europe. A prime example of this is when the EU decided to stop the Italian coastguard’s migrant rescue operation in the Mediterranean Sea in 2014 and replace it with a much more limited naval operation focused only on border security. Officials cited “the ‘unintended “pull factor” of encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing’ as the primary reason for making the change.” Then in September 2017, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán refused to accept an EU court ruling requiring it to fulfill its obligations under the EU migrant quota scheme because “it’s a pull factor.” However, Aristide Zolberg (1986) writes that:

> “People cannot leave their country if they have no place to go; and in effect, in a world of generally restrictive controls on entry, the availability of such a place is largely determined by the governmental policy of receiver.”

In other words, legislation towards migrants – especially border controls – are not simply part of the migrant’s calculation of whether the situation in the country of destination is more or less favorable than the situation in the country of origin. Instead, migrant policy and border control create (or remove) the possibility of refugees having a place to go, which is a fundamental enabling factor for refugee movement. Zolberg goes on to say that:

> “Other things being equal, the availability of a place of refuge may in some cases determine whether persecution will lead to the formation of a refugee flow or to some other outcome, such as mass murder.”

The model I will use to analyze Yemen in this paper is essentially Lee’s theoretical approach, with some specifications to make it fit the refugee situation in Yemen. Migrants weigh push factors in their country of origin against pull factors in potential countries of destination, but flows only happen in the presence of a number of “enabling factors” needed for refugee movement.

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10 “Britain’s Response to the Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean.” European Futures. 26 Dec 2015.
13 Ibid.
My hypothesis is that the situation in Yemen is producing strong push factors, but the absence of key enabling factors (namely the ability to move freely within and out of the country, a place to flee to with appropriate legislation and border controls, established migration networks, and resources to make the journey) are preventing most Yemenis from leaving the country as refugees.

**A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN**

With the lowest GDP and Human Development Index in the in the Arab world, Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East. Its history has been wrought with instability and internal division. Though the notion of Yemen dates back millennia before the dawn of Islam, Yemen did not exist within its modern borders until 1990, when the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south unified. The unification process was deeply flawed: at its core, the process was driven not by a desire for peace but by the need to create stability along the former North-South border where there were lucrative oil reserves both governments wanted to exploit. There was little historical basis for the new borders that resulted from the process, the country’s leaders failed to conceive of a coherent concept of a common Yemeni identity. The mildly-Islamist YAR and Marxist PDRY also had radically different political cultures that did not blend well. The larger and more stable north dominated the former PDRY, and eventually tensions boiled over into civil war in 1994.

After the civil war, Yemen continued to be handicapped by the north-south divide and the deeply tribal organization of Yemeni society. President Ali Abdallah Saleh relied heavily on Yemen’s traditional tribal structure to consolidate his rule. He formed alliances with rival tribes and rewarded them with patronage (especially arms and military pay) in exchange for loyalty. If any one local leader became too powerful, Saleh boosted his support for other tribes or otherwise pitted them against each other so that no group could become united enough or powerful enough to challenge his authority. Instead of going through the political process, tribes quickly learned the best way to get what they wanted was to “foment a crisis” by kidnapping a foreign tourist or exploding blowing up an oil pipeline and waiting for the government to intervene. This patronage system left little money for public services or economic development.

In light of these problems, Yemen was poised for change when the Arab Spring swept across the Arab World. Protests in Sana’a began in January of 2011, and President Saleh initially offered a number of concessions, including a promise to step down after the end of his term in 2013. However, protests only intensified after the government used force against

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demonstrators, and soon the international community and senior members of the President’s party turned against Saleh. Protests and outbursts of violence continued for nine months, until President Saleh finally agreed to step aside in November 2011 and transfer power to his longtime Vice President, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.

Hadi proved ill-equipped to manage Yemen’s dire economic situation and Saleh’s tribal patronage system. He made little effort to eliminate the corruption and patronage that drove people to the streets in 2011. The Houthis, a religious-political movement representing Yemen’s Zaydi Shia minority that was disillusioned with their chronic exclusion from the political process and Hadi’s dependence on the international community, saw an opportunity in the disarray of Hadi’s rule. They expanded from their traditional power base in the northern district of Sa’ada, and by late 2014 they had easily fought their way to the capital of Sana’a. With the Houthis in control of the capital and quickly consolidating their power over the entire country, President Hadi fled to Aden and then Saudi Arabia, where he called for an international intervention. On March 25, 2015, a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia began a bombing campaign with support from the United States to drive back the Houthi advance South. The Saudis intended for the operation to last no more than a few weeks, but the Houthis proved remarkably resilient, in part because of weapons shipments from Iran. The front lines soon became entrenched, and Yemen found itself in the midst of a protracted war.

**Migration to and from Yemen to 2015**

Yemen’s location on the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula, bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, has always made foreign trade and migration an integral part of Yemen’s society. Two main migration patterns have characterized Yemen since the 1970s. First, large numbers of Yemenis have migrated to Saudi Arabia to work. Saudi authorities estimated the number of Yemenis in Saudi Arabia to be 850,000-900,000 in 1990 (though Yemeni authorities estimated it was as high as 1.7 million). Saudi Arabia temporarily upended this system in 1990 when it expelled about 800,000 Yemenis in response to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s support for Iraq in the First Gulf War, which largely eliminated remittances as a source of income for Yemen and crippled its economy. After the Gulf War, Gulf Cooperation Council states attempted a strategic shift towards non-Arab migrant laborers, but Yemenis still returned to Saudi Arabia en masse. By 1997 there were again around 500,000 Yemenis in Saudi Arabia, and the number held steady between 800,000 and 1,000,000 from 2002 to 2013.

The second major trend has been mixed migration from the Horn of Africa (HoA) to Yemen. Demand for labor in the Gulf drew migrants into Yemen and into Saudi Arabia starting in the 1970s. The number of migrants coming into Yemen spiked in 1991 after unification, with many Ethiopians coming in search of better employment opportunities and Somali refugees fleeing violence, insecurity, and poverty at the onset of the Somali Civil War. Though there have historically been more Somalis than Ethiopians in Yemen, the relative number of Ethiopians has been increasing since the 2000s, and since 2009 Ethiopians have made up the largest proportion of migrants to Yemen. In 2012, 80% (or 84,000) migrants to Yemen were Ethiopians, while Somalis constituted the rest. Still, as of March 2017 an estimated 255,000 Somali refugees lived in Yemen. The data are less clear for Ethiopians, but roughly 260,000 entered Yemen between April 2014 and March 2017. While by 2011 Somalis and Ethiopian migrants reported essentially the same reasons for leaving (half reported they left because of a lack of economic opportunities, while about 40% cited insecurity), Somalis receive prima facie refugee status (meaning that they are automatically considered refugees when they enter Yemen) while Ethiopians must go through status determination. There remains an enduring perception among Yemenis that Somalis are refugees from a violent conflict and Ethiopians are simply migrants that take jobs.

This second trend is intricately tied to the first, because many African migrants (especially Ethiopians) move on to Saudi Arabia after arriving in Yemen in search of work. Data on this movement is sparse and unreliable because of the difficulty of monitoring the Yemeni-Saudi border and Saudi Arabia’s secretiveness about its own information – the only available estimate on Ethiopians in Saudi Arabia puts the number in a range between 150,000 and 700,000, meaning we really do not know how many of the African migrants entering Yemen are making it across the border to Saudi Arabia.

**Migration from 2011-2015**

Migration patterns initially changed little in the midst of the political turmoil that began in 2011. Then, in 2013, Saudi Arabia upended Yemen’s migration patterns by dramatically tightening the flow of migrants across the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Saudi Arabia deployed a number of military units along the border and migrant flows from Yemen to Saudi Arabia slowed to a trickle. Moreover, the Saudi government forced Yemenis already

20 Survival Migration, chapter 8, page 164.
in Saudi Arabia to leave: 655,000 Yemenis were expelled, probably more than half of those in the country. Most of them returned to the Eastern provinces of Hajjah, Hudayah, and Taizz (which later saw some of the highest numbers of refugees and IDPs when the war started in 2015). Over 165,000 Ethiopians were deported during the same time period, though it is unclear whether they went back to Yemen or returned to Ethiopia. These legal controls effectively eliminated Saudi Arabia as a destination for Yemenis, as migrants or refugees. Initially, Saudi Arabia’s policy changes seemed to have less to do with internal turmoil within Yemen and more to do with the decades-old project of the “Saudization” of the labor force seeking to reduce the Kingdom’s dependence on migrant labor and get more Saudi nationals working.

At the same time, there was also a jump in the number of migrants coming to Yemen: the figure jumped from 78,000 in 2009 to over 100,000 in 2011 and 2012. However, this also probably had less to do with internal factors in Yemen and more to do with drought in Ethiopia. By 2013, migration fell to 65,000 as the situation in the HoA stabilized. But with the influx of expelled migrants from Saudi Arabia, Yemen was still taking in a substantial number of people.

**Migration Since 2015**

Since war broke out in 2015, four major trends have characterized migration patterns involving Yemen: 1) widespread expulsion of migrants from Saudi Arabia, 2) increased migration from the HoA to Yemen, 3) large-scale internal displacement inside Yemen, and 4) a relatively small number of refugees leaving Yemen for the HoA. First, Saudi Arabia announced a second round of regularization early this year that gave all irregular migrants 90 days to leave or otherwise regularize their status, after which they would face deportation. Though there is not yet data on the number of workers who have left Saudi Arabia in 2017, it may be an even larger number than the first regularization campaign in 2013. In addition the goal of the “Saudization” of the labor force, Saudi Arabia is also concerned about preventing Houthi rebels with whom they are fighting from entering the country and launching attacks. Fortifying Saudi Arabia’s southern border with Yemen is a key part of this strategy, especially in the north-western border province of Sa’ada where the Houthis are based. But this means even more Yemenis and Ethiopians will be sent back to some of the areas of Yemen that have been most affected by the fighting.

Secondly, more migrants are making the journey from the HoA to Yemen. In 2014 when the

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conflict was intensifying, migrant flows to Yemen jumped to 90,000, and by 2016 reached 111,504 (83% Ethiopians and 17% Somalians). This is the highest number since the UN started recording in 2006, and officials suspect the number is actually much higher because monitoring activities have been interrupted by the conflict.31

However, the route by which migrants reach Yemen has changed. Since the 2000s, four southern governorates have received a vast majority of Yemen’s migrants: the more crowded governorates of Ta’izz and Lahij to the West, as well as the sparsely-populated governorates of Shabwa and Hadramout to the East. Before 2013, 60-70% of migrants set off from Djibouti across the Red Sea and arrived in Taiz and Lahij. But in 2013 more migrants began departing from Puntland across the Arabian Sea to arrive in Shabwa and Hadramout. By 2015 and 2016 the trend had flipped: only 15% of migrants landed in Taiz and Lahij, while the rest landed in the eastern governorates of Shabwa and Hadramout. Both enabling factors in the HoA and pull factors in Yemen caused this shift: Djibouti authorities have begun stricter enforcement of anti-smuggling laws by raising smuggling fees and making the route more dangerous, decreasing the opportunity for travel across the Red Sea.32 Within Yemen, the civil war is concentrated in the west; Ta’izz in particular is an active front and has seen heavy fighting since 2015. Ta’izz and Lahij are also much closer to Houthis territory, where the Saudi-led coalition is heavily policing the coasts to prevent arms smuggling. This makes it much more difficult for migrants to reach these governorates safely and undetected.

These migration patterns from the HoA to Yemen continue today for a number of reasons. In 2016, protests in the Oromia region of Ethiopia (from which over 95% of Ethiopian migrants come) have led to growing political instability and violent clashes with security forces. Ethiopia is also facing a severe drought that left 10.2 million in need of humanitarian assistance in

2016. Though the drought is beginning to subside, migrant flows may actually increase as economic growth increases and more Ethiopians are able to pull together the means to make the journey, especially if the political situation in Ethiopia remains volatile. Interviews with Ethiopians in Yemen in 2016 also indicate that 87% still intend to move to Saudi Arabia, suggesting that most Ethiopians that enter Yemen at least attempt to go to Saudi Arabia and may even be accessing the country successfully.

Thirdly, there has been movement on a massive scale inside Yemen. Since the conflict began, over 3 million people (or about 10% of the population) have been internally displaced. The beginning of the conflict caused roughly two million people to move, with the largest number coming from the southern capital of Aden. In the fall of 2015, forces loyal to Hadi established firm control of Aden and IDPs began returning to Aden, while the concentration of IDPs increased in the north. Throughout the spring of 2016, about 1 million IDPs returned to their homes, mostly in southern governorates. But that was outweighed by increased displacement in the north, especially in the governorates of Taizz, Hajjah, and Sana’a. As a result, the overall number of IDPs increased through mid-2016. The number of IDPs has remained around 2 million IDPs and 1 million who have returned throughout 2017.

Two things are significant about the patterns of IDP movements in Yemen. First, displacement is becoming increasingly protracted. A majority of IDPs were displaced in the first several months of the conflict, and fewer people are leaving their homes now. By the end of 2017, 87% of IDPs had been displaced for over a year. Secondly, 44% of IDPs are displaced within their governorate of origin. In fact, 3 of the 4 governorates from which the highest number

33 “Number of people in need of emergency aid increases to over 7.7 mln: Commission.” Fana Broadcasting Corporate, 27 April 2017, translated by Amare Asrat.
35 The Task Force on Population Movements, which has been tracking IDPs in Yemen, first reported in May 2015 that just over 1 million people had been displaced by the conflict. However, successive reports increased that number, and a report from October 14, 2015 estimated the number of IDPs to be 2.3 million. According to the report, this was not because an additional 1.3 million moved between May 2015 and October 2015, but because the TFPM’s sourcing and methodology improved and was better able to capture the full scope of IDP movement, most of which probably occurred in the weeks following the onset of the conflict.
of IDPs originate are also the governorates of destination for the highest numbers of IDPs. This suggests that most IDPs are not moving far inside Yemen. Figure 2 shows how many IDPs have been displaced from each governorate, and figure 3 shows the governorate in which IDPs are currently displaced. Clearly, there is no major pattern of movement in any particular direction, although the maps do suggest that many IDPs are fleeing from fighting in urban areas to the countryside. The fourth pattern is the small flow of about 190,000 people who have fled Yemen. 51,000 have gone to Oman, 40,000 to Saudi Arabia, 40,000 to Somalia, 37,000 to Djibouti, and 14,600 to Ethiopia. However, only 5,000 of those in Oman are Yemenis, and most flows to Somalia and Ethiopia have been national returnees. Overall, Yemenis themselves only make up about a third of those that have left. Furthermore, most of this movement occurred immediately after the conflict began in March 2015: 87% (165,377) of those who fled did so during the first seven months of the conflict, and only 6,869 have moved since the start of 2017 (a majority of them Somali returnees).

Djibouti is the country with the most Yemeni refugees save for Saudi Arabia. According to interviews with Yemeni refugees in Djibouti, most traveled by boat to Djibouti in two flows. The first group to arrive were poor Yemenis, mostly fishermen from the Bal el Mandeb area that ended up in the Markazi refugee camp. The second group was wealthier and included businessmen, teachers, and doctors from the Aden area that settled in Djibouti City. These refugees did not receive as much support since the Djibouti government only registers refugees who live in the Markazi camp, but most in this group rented their own apartments were able to sustain themselves. Though Djibouti has been generally welcoming and even permits

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
registered refugees to work legally, the small nation has its own serious economic problems and few resources to offer refugees that arrive on its shores.44

**ANALYSIS OF MIGRATION TRENDS SINCE 2015**

The comparatively small number of 178,000 refugees and large IDP population suggests that something is preventing Yemenis from moving far. Viewing Yemen through the lens of the theoretical framework considered earlier, it seems that the absence of three key enabling factors prevent Yemenis from fleeing the country en masse. First, historical factors make it incredibly difficult for would-be refugees to undertake travel inside or outside the country. Yemeni tribes still wield significant power, and sometimes prevent anyone (including IDPs) from a rival tribe from moving across their territory. Yemenis still understand there to be a division between northern Yemen and southern Yemen, and Yemenis fleeing from the south in 2015 reported increasing difficulty crossing checkpoints the further north they travelled. All of these tensions are heightened by the war itself, where the north is controlled by Houthis and the south by the Hadi government, and tribes near the fighting have complex webs of alliances that sometimes pit them against nearby tribes. As a result, IDPs report being viewed by local residents with increasing suspicion and hostility the further they travel from their home.45 Furthermore, Yemen’s infrastructure has been devastated by two and a half years of fighting, making travel within the country even more difficult.46

There are additional historical and cultural factors unique to Yemen that make people reluctant to leave. Bureaucratic dysfunction and the abundance of weapons in Yemen have made land disputes common, so people may fear that they will have been taken over by someone else

44 Ibid.
45 Neamat Sharfeldin, UNHCR Cairo, Personal Interview, 28 Oct 2017.
when they return.⁴⁷ Some observers have also noted that Yemen has been poor for generations; Yemeni people are used to coping with deprivation. This makes them better conditioned to endure conflict and food insecurity in a way that Syrians, for instance, were not prior to the civil war there.⁴⁸

Secondly, there is no viable place for Yemenis to go. Though Yemenis used to go to Saudi Arabia, the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border is now heavily fortified, especially in the governorates of Sa’ada and Al-Jawf where most migrants have historically crossed. The Saudi government is aggressively pursuing and detaining migrants that cross the border illegally as part of the labor regularization campaign, and in 2015 Saudi Arabia announced that it was erecting a fence along its 1,700 km border with Yemen.⁴⁹ Oman began building a fence along the entire 290-km border in 2013, and it closed the Oman-Yemen border in early 2016 after it let in 51,000 refugees.⁵⁰ Furthermore, Yemenis from the conflict area in the west would have to cross hundreds of kilometers of desert (much of it controlled by Al-Qaeda) to reach Oman, making the journey incredibly difficult and dangerous. However, as late as October 2016, US officials raised concerns about the flow of weapons across the Yemen-Oman border and thousands of migrants have made the much longer desert journey from the HoA to Libya, so it is unclear exactly how tightly controlled the border between Oman and Yemen is or to what extent the desert itself is an intervening obstacle.⁵¹ Beyond Oman and Saudi Arabia, the rest of the world is largely cut off from Yemen, even for the wealthy who can afford to fly. According to a UNHCR official, Yemenis are banned from traveling by air to anywhere in the world except Jordan, Egypt, New Delhi, and Malaysia. These countries all require a visa to enter the country, which is impossible to obtain because none of them have open diplomatic missions in Yemen as of the end of 2017.⁵² In other words, border controls and travel restrictions are effectively keeping Yemenis refugees out of almost every country in the world.

The only two countries that are not closed to Yemenis are Somalia and Djibouti. Both countries allow asylum seekers crossing the Red Sea to freely enter the country, and Somalia grants Yemenis prima facie refugee status.⁵³ However, other factors may effectively eliminate the HoA as a viable destination to most Yemenis. First, it costs money. The only way for migrants to make the 20 mile sea crossing is to pay a smuggler to take them there by boat, which is prohibitively expensive for some Yemenis. Secondly, Yemenis do not perceive the HoA as

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⁵⁰ “Instability in Yemen fuelling concern in Oman.” Economist Intelligence Unit, 26 Feb 2015;
⁵³ Emaid Daoud, UNHCR Yemen, Personal Interview, 4 Dec 2017.
a viable destination. In 2016, Ethiopia ranked 107 out of 113 on the worldwide rule of law index, and global risk management firm Verisk Maplecroft put Somalia’s rule of law as the worst in Africa and its human rights record second only to North Korea. Djibouti also scored worse than Ethiopia on all of these measures. Yemenis are certainly aware of these problems in the HoA, and a belief that a potential destination generally upholds the rule of law and human rights has been shown to influence a person’s decision to seek asylum there. Yemenis’ perceptions are also skewed by the fact that they see continuing flows into Yemen and interact with people who have chosen to migrate because of difficult economic conditions, insecurity, or some combination thereof in the HoA. Somalian and Ethiopian migrants to Yemen also report that Africans face “widespread racial discrimination” by Yemenis and form a sub-class in Yemeni society, which likely makes it difficult for Yemenis to imagine taking refuge in the same place from which migrants at the bottom of Yemeni society have just fled. Although there is little data available on this effect, it is difficult to imagine that deeply imbedded cultural schemas do not have some effect on people’s willingness to flee to somewhere like the HoA, even when war is raging in Yemen itself.

Thirdly, there are no well-established migration patterns from Yemen to anywhere besides Saudi Arabia. Established migration networks are strongly correlated with increased migration flows because they greatly reduce the uncertainty of migration, facilitate the flow of information about conditions at the destination and how to make the journey, and provide migrants with a support community to integrate into upon arrival. There are indeed communities in Yemen of migrants from the HoA, a factor which some migrants cite as a reason they continue to come to Yemen. These communities encourage others to join them and provide them with information about the best routes, smugglers, and where to go upon arrival, facilitating a “culture of migration” among many Ethiopians and Somalis. Though migrants are certainly aware of the ongoing war in Yemen, this has actually emboldened some migrants who believe the breakdown in security will make it easier for them to sneak into Saudi Arabia.

54 “Rule of Law Index 2016.” World Justice Project.
61 Ray Jureidini. “Somali and Ethiopian Migration to Yemen and Turkey Final Report.” Center for
Furthermore, known migration routes in one direction and diaspora communities make it less likely for African migrants to turn back after they make the journey. This suggests to family and friends back home that they must be living successfully in Yemen or have made it to Saudi Arabia, reinforcing current migration patterns. Ethiopians that are arriving in Yemen are not turning back, suggesting to family and friends back home that they must be living successfully in Yemen or have moved on to Saudi Arabia. In essence, migrants from the HoA have not lost hope in the possibility that traveling to Yemen is an opportunity to build a better future, so they continue to migrate.

But there are not similar routes to the HoA or diaspora communities of Yemenis in the HoA, save for the groups of Yemenis who recently fled to Djibouti and Somalia since 2015. These communities are new and small, and therefore have done little to facilitate more migration. They are also not reporting satisfaction with their lives to researchers or to friends and family back home, even if they are receiving support. For example, an urban refugee in Djibouti City said in an interview with the Danish Refugee Council that:

“How can we live in Djibouti? We don’t have anything. Even my children don’t have security. They have no education. We receive no food. We just sleep and stay at home.”

The situation is no better in the Markazi refugee camp, where many Yemenis in Djibouti stay. There is little clean water and the weather is harsh. In a sentiment echoed by other interviewees, one refugee living in the camp said “I live in peace, but it is not a human life.” Refugees in Somalia also expressed disillusionment with the circumstances. One living in Bossaso explained:

“I am breathing, eating and sleeping, but this is not life. I receive a monthly allowance from UNHCR but this does not give me enough. I have four children to look after and no husband and I have diabetes. The money I have is not enough to look after all of us.”

Another said “I am in debt at every shop in town. We cannot survive.” As a result, at least 1,700 Yemenis have returned from Djibouti despite the security risk, and refugees in Somalia

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Migration and Refugee Studies, American University in Cairo, May 2010, page 76.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
interviewed for the same report said that “many want to return, but money is the problem.”67 Clearly, diaspora communities of Yemenis in the HoA are spread out and are not encouraging others to follow in the way that Somalis and Ethiopians are. Up until this point, I have only discussed how a lack of enabling factors are preventing migration from Yemen. It is also important to consider how a push/pull calculation may compel Yemenis to prefer staying. When people decide they can no longer stay in their homes because of fighting, air strikes, or for fear of being compelled to join the fight, they usually flee to the nearest place that is safe. The fighting in Yemen is relatively localized and the battle lines have barely moved in months. Moreover, the closer Yemenis stay to their homes, the more access they have to existing familial and economic connections in their place of origin. Indeed, only 6% of IDPs in Yemen report needing access to income and 77% of IDPs live in a private house (over half of thee with relatives).68 As a result, many Yemenis simply fled from urban area with airstrikes and heavy fighting to stay with relatives in the surrounding countryside.69 The movement of the refugees that did leave Yemen for Somalia and Djibouti can be explained in the same way: a large number of the refugees in Djibouti are fisherman from the Taizz governorate, which borders the Red Sea just 25 km from Djibouti. For them, the closest place to move to was Djibouti.70 So unless one already lives on the coast and owns a boat, staying with family may be preferable to paying for a dangerous boat ride across the Red Sea to Somalia or Djibouti, where would-be migrants may be confined to a refugee camp and depend on aid agencies for food and shelter.

Conclusion

On December 4, 2017, Houthi rebels killed former President Saleh after he publicly offered to begin peace talks with the Hadi government, signaling that the war is likely to continue for quite some time. Yemen is still facing a severe cholera outbreak, and the risk of famine remains high. However, few refugees are leaving the country. This is unlikely to change, because the same enabling factors that are inhibiting large-scale outflows right now are unlikely to arise even if the humanitarian crisis deepens. Within Yemen, tribal factionalism, the north-south divide, poor infrastructure, and the possibility of land disputes will continue to limit movement. Yemen’s borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman will remain closed at least until the conflict is over. Even if the humanitarian situation deteriorates further and Djibouti and Somalia become more relatively attractive destinations, this will not necessarily precipitate movement. A worsening humanitarian situation would put a drain on Yemenis’ already-strained personal finances needed to pay a smuggler to make the sea crossing, and it is unlikely that Yemenis will ever consider the HoA as a viable destination. Furthermore, although the greatest humanitarian risk in Yemen continues to be food insecurity, Ethiopia, Somalia, and

67 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
Djibouti are also all expected to face acute food insecurity through at least the end of 2018. They will likely be unable to provide the humanitarian relief Yemenis actually need, even if the HoA is safer.71 Finally, the lack of an established migration route to the Horn of Africa will continue making it difficult for migrants to go there.

Since these factors will likely keep refugee flows from Yemen relatively low, it is important to remain clear-eyed about the humanitarian situation in the war-torn country. Over two million children remain malnourished, and intensified clashes at the end of 2017 forced tens of thousands of new IDPs from their homes.72 The international community must not interpret low refugee flows as a measure of the gravity of the humanitarian situation in Yemen. The combination of factors preventing the flow of refugees from Yemen is in many ways unique, and refugee flows would likely be much higher if Yemen had a different historical trajectory or were located somewhere else in the MENA region. Low numbers of refugees are not an excuse to ignore Yemen, but are rather a signal of the urgent need to provide more humanitarian support inside the country. World leaders must devote more resources to meet humanitarian needs inside Yemen and hold both sides accountable for ensuring that all areas of Yemen have unimpeded access to humanitarian aid. The international community must double down on its commitment to address the humanitarian catastrophe inside Yemen and facilitate a peaceful end to the conflict as quickly as possible.

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Discourse of Disillusionment: Analyzing Contemporary Azerbaijani Social Media Posts for Democratic Decay

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ABSTRACT

In post-communist societies, such as Azerbaijan, a disconnect exists between citizens’ expectations and what their governments provide for them. Such a divide predicates a disillusioned constituency. A voter base that believes itself to be powerless will not exercise its right to participate in government through voting. A key signifier of democratic decay is a lack of participation in government, caused by popular distrust of a nation’s democratic institutions. Evidence of such disillusionment that contributes to democratic decay by deterring voter participation is found by analyzing the discourse of citizens in Azerbaijan on contemporary (2016-2017) social media. Social media forces speakers to exercise a heightened level of choice when constructing their speech acts by limiting the space speakers have to communicate their message. Furthermore, because it is more closely integrated with speakers’ everyday environments, speech acts on social media can illustrate the ubiquity of the ideologies that motivate speech. Given that discourse is a result of its environment, if examples of discourse demonstrate disillusionment, it can be concluded that such disillusionment is prevalent in Azerbaijani society, thus contributing to larger democratic decay by eroding trust in government institutions.

INTRODUCTION

Despite having transcended communist governance, the Soviet-era government created inequitable power dynamics that have lasting impacts on the effectiveness of the post-communist administrations. These often unrecognized impacts of communist governance have concrete ramifications for successor governments, regardless of their type. In The Journal of Democracy, Ethan Kapstein posits that one of the greatest struggles of new democracies is establishing effective internal institutions.¹ Often, those who assume control are more

concerned with establishing their own power than with establishing effective democratic institutions. In a post-communist country without any previous democratic institutions to build upon, such as Azerbaijan, the improper implementation of democratic institutions can allow totalitarians to pervert democracy to serve as a means of legitimizing their dishonest rule. Furthermore, the establishment of a strong political elite under communism erodes the legitimacy of new governments supposedly ‘by and for the people,’ for, as Schlomo Avineri illustrates, marketization helps a minority of citizens while those already in power benefit exponentially more. René Cuperus elucidates in the article “The Waning of Democracy?” that precluding citizens from receiving the benefits of their new system of governance contributes directly to a disillusionment of the new government. In Azerbaijan, the legacy of communism established a political elite who maintain power outside of the democratic will of the population, resulting in a disconnect between the constituents’ expectations and their government’s democratic institutions’ capacity to deliver them.

To understand how the presence of an established political elite distorts the operation of a democracy, it is key to first understand how the political elite forms. Azerbaijan is a country that has been radically altered by the swinging pendulum of evolving political theories throughout the 20th century, and one of the key catalysts for change has been the transient political opinions of its people. First emerging from the beneath the imperial fold of Russia following World War I, Azerbaijan was controlled by a small group of political elites with the gross majority of the population participating in agrarian labor. Poor leadership throughout the transition to private land ownership resulted in rapidly rising prices and pervasive unemployment, which further maligned the already marginalized laborer underclass. The bourgeoisie’s consolidation of wealth during this period contributed to the subsequent popular embrace of Soviet governance. Centrally planned socialism offered totalizing policies that constructed a single universal national identity, allowing citizens to see themselves as a part of one larger national identity, and thus transcending socioeconomic divisions in the short run. In the long run, this too did not prove satisfactory for the Azerbaijani people. Secondary economies developed in the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic due to the gaping holes in governance left by the distance between the administrative center that dictated state policy and the local governments administering it. Through these secondary economies, political elites, known under communism as the ‘nomenklatura,’ were able to regain any economic influence that the Soviet system had aspired to eliminate. Again dissatisfied with their government, in 1993 the Azerbaijani people threw off the Soviet system in favor of what they believed would be democratic governance. Counterproductively, a member of the former nomenklatura assumed power following the political crisis: ex-KGB General and oil-fueled personality cult

leader Heydar Aliyev. Yet again, the Azerbaijani people’s needs were forced to take a back seat to the personal interests of those in power. Aliyev prioritized solidifying his own power by expanding the control of the executive office before attending to the needs. For the third time in a century, Azerbaijan’s citizenry became the victim of ineffective governance.

When a population is unfairly exploited, their dissatisfaction is not limited to the political arena – it takes shape through the discourse of the polity in bars and in coffee shops, in supermarket aisles and on street corners. This social negotiation of sentiments is integral to the process of political change, because in order for a belief to become so prevalent that it can be debated in the political arena, it must have already emerged as a dominant discourse amongst the populace. When citizens assume that a belief is agreed upon, it will then manifest itself not just in the specific words they say, but also in the ways that they construct, order, and structure their speech. Beliefs assumed to be widely-held may be omitted because the speaker assumes that the listener already comprehends and agrees with them. Furthermore, in order to convincingly voice their dissatisfaction, speakers will carefully choose the way in which they build their sentences. This is because the speech is not only intended to impart the belief held by the speaker, but also is intended to motivate the listener to subscribe to the same belief, and to even go as far as to replicate the belief promoted in the original speech by replicating it to others. In Azerbaijan, even if people feel that they do not have a figurative voice in the governance of their nation, they will use their physical voice to spread the belief that their government is ineffective. This is because while there may be recourse for political activism, citizens understand that recourse for conversations over a backyard fence is unlikely. In these conversations, every belief promoted illustrates a broader ideology held by the speaker, regardless of whether this ideology is known to the speaker or not. These ideologies can be evident both in the construction of sentences grammatically, and in the construction of the argument as a whole logically. Ideologies construct a new reality for speakers and listeners alike when they are pervasive enough that they are demonstrated to motivate speech acts. To reveal the popularly-held beliefs concerning the government in Azerbaijan, the polity’s discourse on social media within the last year is herein analyzed. By demonstrating a widespread loss of trust in the government’s democratic institutions in the dominant civil discourses, democratic decay is shown to stem from the endurance of the former communist nomenclature.

**Justification of Discourse Analysis and Dataset**

Discourse itself involves choice, and thereby we can analyze the words chosen by speakers to understand the meaning they intended to impart through their word choice. The authors of *Discourse: noun, verb, or social practice?* forward that speech is a medium oriented to action,

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and that the assembly of such speech involves linguistics and choice.8 In Azerbaijan, citizens can use their speech to express dissatisfaction with the government in response to the failure of democratic institutions. Fairclough supports the belief that choice is a key component of discourse by illuminating that while beliefs are not reducible to semiotics, they are internalized through it.9 Indeed, Teun van Dijk takes Fairclough’s idea further by saying that knowledge is a belief shared by the members of a community, and thus discourse can be chosen to assume certain knowledge of the audience, further revealing the beliefs upon which the discourse was chosen.10 If a speaker in Azerbaijan chooses to voice their distrust of government institutions or the improper operation of their government, then deeper truths about the populations’ perceptions of their government are revealed. By analyzing how Azerbaijanis construct their discourse, larger conclusions can be drawn about the beliefs that educated such discourse.

Beyond just revealing the beliefs that led a speaker to choose the words they did, discourse can also reveal further insights about the environment that the discourse was produced in. Halliday elucidates that language is a result of its environment, both physical and mental.11 When combined with Fairclough’s assertion that assumptions reveal the overarching ideologies that guide a speaker to create the discourse they do, Halliday’s theory illustrates how discourse reveals the ideologies present in the population that produces it.12 Thus, if the prevailing idea that the government is corrupt exists in Azerbaijan, then that ideology will be recognizable in the discourse that citizens produce. If this belief propagates to the point that it is widespread, then Teun van Dijk’s proposition that our conception of knowledge is dependent on an entire community subscribing to it can thus be employed to use discourse to reveal what an entire population believe to be fact.13 If all Azerbaijanis believe that their government is rampant with nepotism, then it is considered a part of the population’s ‘knowledge’ and will be displayed in their discourse. Through analysis of the discourse of Azerbaijanis, we can come to understand the world in which the Azerbaijanis think they live.

The world that modern Azerbaijanis perceive themselves to live in is best revealed by tweets and Facebook posts from 2016-2017. Opposed to other forms of public discourse, social media posts force a heightened level of choice in their creation and they offer a window into the realities that Azerbaijanis perceive as a part of their everyday lives. Due to the short character limit on tweets, the words used by Azerbaijanis must be more carefully chosen and, thus, more clearly reveal the beliefs that motivated the choice of the words used. When only allowed 140 characters to communicate an idea, each of the words used must further the larger goal of the tweet. In other forms of discourse, which do not have the same restrictions, it may

13 Dijk, “Discourse and Knowledge.”
be more difficult to understand the beliefs that motivate the choice of certain words, making Twitter the best path to understanding the motivating beliefs of Azerbaijaniis. Even Facebook posts, which do not carry the same character limit as Twitter, are often short in nature as to impart a message before losing the reader’s attention. Furthermore, as opposed to official discourse that is curated for the international audience, tweets and Facebook posts allow the reader to better understand the authors’ environments. Social media allows members of the Azerbaijani polity to promulgate their discourse in a way that is accessible to almost every level of Azerbaijani society, for there is little barrier to entry to post on social media. People are apt to post about all aspects of their lives and any different idea that might appear in their minds, for there is no cost that must be paid for making a social media post. More formal types of discourse reveal significantly less about the everyday reality of Azerbaijaniis, for those forms of discourse go through a more rigorous editing process before entering the public sphere. Due to the heightened level of choice they force, and the realities about their environment that posts reveal, contemporary (2016-2017) social media is the optimal dataset through which to understand the sentiments of the typical Azerbaijani.

Analysis of the discourse of disillusionment in Azerbaijan requires a theoretical foundation to make definitive claims off of. Speech acts themselves are exemplars of larger ideologies that are a basis for their creation, which are illustrated through the grammatical moods, mental models, logics, and the agency used to construct them. A grammatical mood, as defined by Norman Fairclough, is the mechanical structuring of a sentence to accomplish a desired outcome. This message is shaped in freely-flowing exchanges by the beliefs held by the speaker, and thus can illustrate them. These beliefs manifest themselves as what Teun van Dijk calls ‘mental models.’ These models are situated in a certain context, depending on the information available to the models’ creator. Mental models also include the presupposition of certain knowledge by the speaker. Knowledge is derived from everyday interactions, and thus discourse will reflect prevalent discourses that are encountered daily in the speaker’s society. Similar to mental models, the idea of logics transcend the structuralist view of grammar as an object of scientific study, allowing the ideological basis underpinning discourse to be further analyzed. Scholarly duo Glynos and Howarth forward that logics are the “…basic unit of explanation…” for social phenomena, explaining the relationship between speech and speech. The investigation of this relationship through logics can allow for a deeper understanding of the process of social sedimentation by characterizing the ways in which ideologies are propagated through discourse. In short, Glynos and Howarth posit that logics are based upon the ideological assumptions of a speaker and result in certain grammatical choices by the speaker, thus connecting beliefs to practice in a way that can be analyzed. Logics manifest as social, political, or fantastical, depending on the function desired by their

16 Dijk, “Discourse and Knowledge.”
Agency, as conceptualized by Laura Ahearn, is a concept employed by linguistic anthropologists to describe the way in which humans make individual choices independent of a controlling superstructure, yet still influenced by the social and linguistic contexts the choice was born out of. By recognizing what components of speech were specifically agentively chosen, the beliefs and intentions of speakers can be more precisely interpreted. The democratic disillusionment that is sought within this analysis can be conceptualized as a public malaise resulting from the belief that citizens’ voice in their own government has been robbed from them, disincentivizing any involvement in the government. Analysis of the discursive concepts of grammatical moods, mental models, logics, and agency reveal the ways in which disillusionment is signified within Azerbaijan.

BACKGROUND/CONTEXT

To fully comprehend the intentions behind speakers’ choices, and the context that guides any agentive choices they make, the history of Azerbaijan’s domination by different empires and ideologies must be understood. Originating from the Persian word for fire, azer, Azerbaijan’s identity as ‘the Land of Fire’ extends beyond its oil derricks into its political arena, serving as a crossroads of empires and battleground of conflicting political ideologies throughout its storied history. After Azerbaijan’s Iranian rulers were defeated by Russia in the 19th century, Iran began the transfer of state-held lands to private ownership in an attempt to stem the flow of funds hemorrhaging from the crown’s treasury. This resulted in higher costs for the agrarian-employed populace and widespread unemployment, further ingraining a distrust of the state in the populace. The early 20th century shift to Soviet institutionalized governmental structures eclipsed previous historical identities, supplanting them with one totalizing state-promoted national “ethnicity” in hopes of furthering the state agenda through this faux-nationalism. The center-periphery relationship that formed out of the imperial power structures imposed resulted in ineffectual local governance. The feeble local governance resulting from the distance of the absolute authority from the population in Azerbaijan also promoted traditionalism that undermined the authority that the government was supposed to provide the Azerbaijani. By the 1980s, elites in Azerbaijan gained economic and political power through the absence of successful local soviet administration by forming mafia-esque secondary economies. The homogenous nationalism invented by the soviet administration could now be employed by the educated ruling elite to legitimize and solidify their authority in a post-soviet political climate. In 1993, after significant political tumult within Azerbaijan, the ex-KGB general and member of the nomenklatura Heydar Aliyev assumed control, yet he too had little interest in the welfare of his people. As explained by Audrey Altstadt, “...
key political leaders, including Aliyev, chose power, or their own ideals, over state building.”

Once in office, Aliyev gave vast powers to his executive office, and reformatted all political institutions to stack the deck perpetually in his favor.

Some scholars have posited that one of the key factors contributing to the failure of democracy in Azerbaijan is that the nation has no historical foothold from which the foundations of democratic institutions can be laid. Farid Gulyiev forwards that the deeply rooted ties between the Azeri national identity and Islam may undermine the successes of any attempts to form an effective secular democracy in Azerbaijan. Schlomo Avineri expands on the idea that historical context can affect the success of modern democracy, advancing that democratic society relies on a market economy, the power of which, in Azerbaijan, was significantly undermined by the population’s’ reliance on secondary markets for a significant portion of the soviet period. Indeed, without any historical support for the idea that government can operate as outlined in Azerbaijan’s constitution, it is difficult to develop the democratic institutions necessary for effective popular governance. In the journal Politics & Society, Anna Gryzmal-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong argue that there needs to be a reconceptualization of the role of the state for there to be successful democratic governance. The people of Azerbaijan must begin to believe that their government can represent their democratic will if democratic government is ever to be successful in Azerbaijan. This analysis of Azerbaijan holds weight, but is just a component of a large disillusionment with a government believed to be in the palm of the former nomenklatura. Without any basis of democracy to fall back upon, after the fall of the Soviet Union the nomenklatura reified their power by perverting democratic institutions in Azerbaijan. This co-opting of political power contributes to a disillusionment that can indicate underlying democratic decay.

Another school of thought believes that Azerbaijan’s administrative tribulations can be attributed to the government’s incomplete structural transition. The political elites’ maintained power, alongside Aliyev’s self-preserving policies, would support this claim. Gulyiev highlights Azerbaijan’s failure to fully transition governments, and former Russian Ambassador Michael McFaul supports this assertion, postulating that the failure to establish sound democratic institutions can result from an improper transition. Petra Goran illustrates that many of the problems caused from an incomplete transition can result from the lack of effective policy

24 Alstadt, “Azerbaijan and Aliyev: A Long History and an Uncertain Future.”
26 Avineri, “After Communism: Travails of Democratization.”
28 Alstadt, “Azerbaijan and Aliyev: A Long History and an Uncertain Future.”
reconstruction; this can be seen in Azerbaijan by Aliyev’s consolidation of power. Instead of transitioning to an open democracy, the nomenklatura has been able to maintain power by weighting the purportedly democratic scales perpetually in their favor. The incomplete structural transition is revealed in discourse through a perceived disconnect between the democratic functions outlined in Azerbaijan’s constitution and the actual operation of the government. The divide between the intended operation of institutions and reality manifests itself in discourse as yet another factor contributing to disillusionment.

Disillusionment with government and a belief that the nomenklatura have maintained political control of the nation is contributed to by a lack of historical foundation, incomplete administrative transition, and a lack of economic mobility, and provides a gauge for modern democratic decay. In his essay concerning factors influencing democratic-success, David Andelman puts forth that for citizens to play a participatory role in their own government, they must be confident in their institutions. As elucidated by Filip Kostelka, if citizens believe that their vote will not matter, or that no matter who is victorious, their needs will be ignored, then they have no incentive to participate in it. In Azerbaijan in 2003, Heydar Aliyev’s son, Ilham Aliyev ascended to the ‘throne’ of Azerbaijan in an election widely degraded as fraudulent, and violently suppressive of subsequent popular protests. There is a history of election interference in Azerbaijan, with international election observers were barred from polling stations by Aliyev’s ruling party in 2013. That same year, the administration accidentally released partial results from the election a day before voting began. Most recently, the population has been decrying Aliyev’s appointment of his wife to the newly created position of vice-president in February of 2017, preceded by widespread arrests of opposition activists. Events such as these have a serious impact on the faith of citizens in the health of their democratic institutions, and that dissatisfaction is clearly displayed on social media. Without faith that they can have a political say, citizen participation in government collapses, collapsing the institution of democracy itself, as supported by a PEW Research Center study conducted by Marius Tatar. Thus, the discourse of citizens which exhibits a disillusionment in government institutions can best be shown to correlate with democratic decay. In this analysis, the beliefs held by the general populace surrounding the current administration

31 Andelman, “Democracy Now?.”
32 Kostelka, “The State of Political Participation in Post-Communist Democracies: Low but Surprisingly Little Biased Citizen Engagement.”
of Azerbaijan will be investigated through the discourse of the citizens on social media during 2016 and 2017. The grammatical moods of citizens in their social media reactions gives hard mechanical evidence of their beliefs about their current government. The mental models Azerbaijaniis employ to impart their message reveal what knowledge is assumed to be hegemonic. The logics of citizens can be analyzed to illustrate the normative assumptions that led them to produce the discourse they do. The social context which groomed citizens to make the agentive choices they do educates a deeper understanding of the beliefs accepted as fact by the population. When combined, grammatical moods, logics, and agentive choices elucidate the way in which discourse results from and promotes further disillusionment within the population of Azerbaijan with their democratic institutions.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

When dealing with variables that may at first appear to be abstracts, it is key to create a framework from which each can be analyzed. To devise measures for such concepts, one must first establish working definitions of each. Democratic decay in this analysis is conceptualized to be a departure of government operation from its intended function; this can extend to but is not limited to corrupt elections, ineffective judiciary, the existence of an established political elite, and much more. The disillusionment operationalized to contribute to democratic decay stems from a belief amongst the populace that the government is operating outside of its outlined function. This can include references to unreliable polling in elections and a perceived monopoly on political power by the former communist nomenclatura.

ANALYSIS

The first logic employed by citizens of Azerbaijan on social media is political logic, making agentive choices to use specific grammatical moods to convince their reader that the appointment of Ilham Aliyev’s wife Mehriban Aliyev is detrimental to Azerbaijan’s democratic health because she does not deserve the position of vice-president. By posting Mehriban Aliyev’s appointment as different from the way that government should operate, the speakers construct a discourse that is coherent with Glynos and Howarth’s explanation of political logic (which itself relies on Laclau and Mouffe’s conceptions of political logics), wherein it can only be derived from either equivalency or difference. One local commentator voices the difference she sees between effective governance and Azerbaijan’s governance on Twitter, writing that:

1. Aliyev, who succeeded his father, appointed his wife, Mehriban, as the vice

2. president!? Yes, dynastic rule is a symptom of corruption! #Azerbaijan

The first sentence of the tweet is in an interrogative voice, as illustrated by the questions mark, embellished with an exclamation mark to add extra outrage and urgency to the question being asked. By taking something that is known to be a fact and posing it as a question, the speaker is asking the audience if the event in question actually occurred. The statement relies on a mental model that assumes the reader understands that such dynastic rule is not the way a democracy is intended to operate. The assumption motivating the question is grounded in the political logic that Mehriban Aliyev is a member of the nomenklatura, thus signifying exclusive rule by the economic elites, making the speaker question the reality of her appointment. The structure of the sentence was specifically chosen to posit Mehriban’s appointment as different from the way in which the government should operate, questioning not just that her appointment occurred, but also the privileges offered to her as a member of the nomenklatura. In another tweet, a second speaker similarly questions the reality of Mehriban’s appointment, saying:

3. So this happened: president #Aliyev appointed his wife first Vice President
4. #nepotism #allstaysinthefamily #corruption #Azerbaijan

Here, the first clause of the tweet illustrates the difference that the speaker perceives between what should happen and what did happen. When saying “So this happened…,” the speaker is using the declarative grammatical mood, yet there is an interrogative mood hidden within the sentence, for the speaker is simultaneously asking the reader if the declared fact that Mehriban was appointed to the vice presidency should have transpired in a healthy democracy. This interrogative statement relies on a mental model that assumes the reader understands that power is not intended to be limited to the nomenklatura. This is an example of an instance where while utilizing one grammatical mood, the speech function differs from simply imparting information, for this statement calls the appointment into question, implying that the government should have operated in a different way. A third speaker utilizes the imperative grammatical mood to tell the listener that:

5. When changing term limits isn’t enough to hold power, set up your wife as heir
6. #corruption #oil #Azerbaijan

The speaker uses the imperative grammatical mood to command the listener how to “hold power,” giving directives to maintain control. This delegitimizes Mehriban’s appointment further by forwarding that rather than appointing her based upon her qualifications, Aliyev appointed his wife to consolidate and maintain the nomenklatura’s on power. Each of the

instances above uses its grammatical structure to construct difference between the way that the government is operating and the speakers’ mental models of how the government should operate. All of these statements compound to create, as termed by Potter, Wetherell, Gill, and Edwards, a community repertoire, in which the political logic that separates Mehriban’s appointment from the intended way the government should operate is utilized to delegitimize her appointment. Potter, Wetherell, Gill, and Edwards describe this discursive practice as “…a set of words describing a certain style of cohesive social relationships…it can be used to construct versions of uprisings which valorise [sic] participants as community members struggling against the police.” In this instance, the community repertoire is not united against the police, but united against the government to separate the way it is operating from the way that the speakers believe it should operate. Given that all of these posts are on unregulated social media, the agentic choices that led to their creation reflect the social reality perceived by the speakers that influenced them to make the choices they did. By utilizing different grammatical moods to impart the assumption that Mehriban Aliyev’s appointment is an example of power being given by one member of the nomenklatura to another, the speakers create a community repertoire that clearly illustrates that they are disillusioned with their government.

The second logic utilized to criticize the appointment of Mehriban Aliyev and express a deeper disillusionment with the Azerbaijani government is fantasmic logic. As explained by Glynos and Howarth, fantasmic logic creates definitive explanations for complex scenarios. Given the date of Mehriban’s appointment on February 21, many commentators suggested that her new position as vice president was either a late Valentine’s Day gift (on February 14) or an early International Women’s Day gift (on March 8). One Facebook user suggested that:

7. Love is… to change the constitution for her

Whether it is entirely accurate or not, the speaker is creating a new fantasmic truth by posing the idea that Mehriban was appointed because of love, as a gift from one member of the elite to another elite, rather than for any legitimate reason. As explicated by Dijk, mental models assume a certain level of knowledge of the listener. A fantasmic object of a ‘gift’ is created by the discourse, implying that the position is being given to Mehriban. Here, the speaker assumes that the listener understands that appointments are supposed to be based on qualifications, not socioeconomic status, advocating that the nomenklatura have a tight grip on power. Another two Facebook posters promote a similar message, with posts that similarly posit the vice presidency as a gift:

8. Azerbaijan’s president just made his wife Vice President. How are we (men) going

43 Jonathan Potter, “Discourse: Noun, Verb, or Social Practice?”
46 Dijk, “Discourse and Knowledge.”
9. to be able to top him on March 8\textsuperscript{47} 
10. Belated Valentine’s Day present.\textsuperscript{48}

The first statement on lines 8 and 9 is reminiscent of the previous one on line 7, forwarding the fantastic idea that Ilham Aliyev gifted the position to his wife, illustrating the populations’ belief that the nomenklatura have a monopoly on power. The second, on line 10, incorporates a new component, for the actual event in question is never mentioned. This assumes that the event is so widely known that it does not need to be included, for it is such an important event that the listener’s common sense will educate them as to the event in question.\textsuperscript{49} Here, the outcry is believed to be so widespread that it does not even need to be referred to in order to be criticized. The fantastic logic that simplifies Mehriban’s appointment to a gift is the creation of a new object through a discourse so pervasive that it reifies the object through repetition.\textsuperscript{50} This is one component of hegemonic discourse, as discussed by Gramsci, where a certain belief becomes so widespread that it is accepted as truth at face value. By promoting the belief that Aliyev gave his wife the position of vice president as a gift, the statements by speakers on social media have constructed a new object. The fantastic logic behind the statements allow speakers to illustrate their disillusionment with their governments’ operation through the nepotism present in gifting a political position to a family member.

**CONCLUSION**

The analysis herein has proven that there is disillusionment present in the discourse of the population of Azerbaijan on social media, yet this disillusionment is but one component of democratic decay. Although a lack of historical foundation for democracy, a lack of complete governmental transition out of communism, and a lack of economic mobility contribute to a broader disillusionment with government operation, each could be individually operationalized and analyzed. In order to illustrate a larger correlation between a history under communism and modern democratic decay, a holistic analysis of national context and history would also be necessitated. The analysis of this paper educates that the context of Azerbaijan can result in a distrust in the function of government institutions. This distrust, combined with a mental model of how the government should operate, results in popular disillusionment. If the discourse of a polity demonstrates that citizens are so disenchanted with the health of their democratic institutions that they will not participate in elections, then there is clear evidence of democratic decay.

\textsuperscript{49} Jonathan Potter, “Discourse: Noun, Verb, or Social Practice?”
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.


**WORKS CITED**


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The Reality of Elitism Within Ghanian Pedagogical Institutions

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on how colonialism within Ghana negatively impacts modern day populations through a pervasive legacy of elitism. Many of these underlying issues can be attributed to the British Colonization of Ghana, which greatly impacted Ghanaian pedagogical institutions. Elitism within Ghana is the preference for British culture, institutions, and systems as opposed to Ghanaian ones. Through a comprehensive analysis of policy documents, historic texts, and journal articles, the paper explores how developing countries within Africa have enacted sweeping reforms to expand access to education. Reforms are enacted in hopes of making education more accessible and less elitist. Ghana is one of the latest countries to enact such reforms. Although such reforms may expand accessibility, they do little to address underlying structural failures within Ghanaian educational institutions. This paper explores how colonial legacies contribute to modern day legacies of elitism within Ghanaian pedagogy. Educational institutions play several roles within society. One of the most important roles it plays is as a socializing force within society because educational institutions are where students learn social norms. This article highlights how elitism impacts the way in which socialization occurs within Ghanaian society due to colonization. Finally, the article outlines misconceptions concerning the dissolution of elitism within these institutions.

Education is the cornerstone of the production and advancement of knowledge. As a result, education is increasingly viewed as a human right that should be accessible to all as opposed to an institution reserved for the wealthy. In keeping with this line of thought, there has been a wave of education reform in Africa. Reforms have primarily focused on removing financial obstacles to education by making both primary and secondary education free. Ghana is the latest country to implement these policies. At the same time, Ghana is a developing democracy with an extensive history of being subjugated to colonialism. The reach of this colonial legacy is so deeply rooted within society that it persists in various facets of everyday life but is particularly evident within today’s educational institutions. This is seen through the predominance of the English language within schools, the curriculum which emphasizes...
Eurocentric values, and the geographic inequality of education (more educated urban areas and less educated rural areas). The persistence of elitism within the education system despite the reforms enacted to increase the accessibility of education negates the idea that accessibility is at fault for the ongoing culture of elitism. Therefore, expansionary economic reform to increase the accessibility of education within Ghana is not enough to dissolve the legacy of colonialism within Ghanaian pedagogical institutions; curricular reform is needed as well.

The primary function of pedagogical institutions is to educate the surrounding population. However, these institutions also play an important role in socializing students. They promote the cultural norms, worldviews, and lenses by which citizens understand and evaluate the world. Keeping this in mind, colonial remnants of elitism within the education system are harmful to Ghanaian citizens because they create an exclusive group of people familiar with a different set of norms than the general population. Examples of this legacy remnants include mandatory uniforms which students often cannot afford, early school days for students who do not possess alarms, and British Literature courses filled with cultural references that students cannot relate to. All of this is ultimately detrimental to the development of upcoming generations.

Academics and authorities on the matter agree that British colonization adversely impacted pedagogical institutions. During colonization, the rudimentary educational systems installed within Ghana functioned solely to produce assistants, clerks, soldiers, and other official positions that would be of assistance to wealthy white landowners. These early education systems were called “Castle Schools” and were almost exclusively reserved for the mulatto children of wealthy colonizers and indigenous women. Castle Schools were called such because students who attended these schools typically did so quite literally within the castle walls of wealthy colonizers. British colonizers used schooling to uplift the social status of their illegitimate children while still entirely subjugating them to a social class beneath those of Caucasian descent. The curriculum of early educational institutions neglected issues such as agricultural development and instead focused on subjects that would help students “read, write, and manage the finances of the white settlers.” This in turn lead to social stratification and inequality between British children, mulattos, and the indigenous population, as mixed children were given priority in schooling. It is from this prioritization and social stratification that the legacy of elitism within pedagogical institutions arises.

In addition to creating social divisions within Ghana, the implementation of Castle Schools created geographical divisions as well. British colonizers were much more interested in the Coast of Ghana due to its ports and mineral rich soils. Therefore, the northern territories of Ghana were often left by the wayside and were cultivated only by missionaries, if by any groups

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
at all.\textsuperscript{5} However, these missionary groups were tightly controlled by the British government and were only allowed to build a certain amount of schools in the north. This resulted in a relatively weak and vastly illiterate northern citizenry in Ghana.\textsuperscript{6}

These divisions were further compounded by the requirement that all education and school materials be exclusively in English. The requirement of English-only instruction as opposed to education in local dialects further alienated educated citizens from uneducated citizens. Colonial officials mandated English-only instruction because “it made trade and record keeping easier.”\textsuperscript{7} Furthermore, because students enrolled within educational institutions were being tracked into careers where they would function primarily as assistants for white settlers. Therefore, it made sense that they were trained in the language, customs, and culture of European colonizers.”\textsuperscript{8} As a result, the early Castle Schools closely mirrored the English school system in terms of both its structure and curriculum. Ghana has shifted away from English-only instruction during the primary schooling, but English is the required language of instruction. This meant early school days and lessons filled with teachings on classical British Literature in addition to secondary topics such as math. All these factors contribute to the legacy of elitism today and are in fact evident within today’s institutions.

Additionally, students still suffer from alienation when enrolled in institutions due to the disconnect between local life and school requirements. Several schools still require uniforms and teach a curriculum that is heavily influenced by British traditions.\textsuperscript{9} Under the current system, students can only study relevant topics such as resource depletion and African American Literature at the higher levels of schooling. Yet, the problem remains that few students make it to the upper echelons of the education system. Furthermore, the disparity in the quality and accessibility of education between the urbanized southern coast and rural north has only been exacerbated by policies such as English-only instruction, free primary education, and standardized testing. Such fixtures prominent within Ghanaian pedagogical institutions only bolster this legacy of elitism.

Scholars such as Armah and Adjei well versed in the historical evolution of Ghana’s education system acknowledge that a post-colonial legacy of elitism persists within Ghana’s pedagogical institutions. Consensus amongst academics disintegrates when it comes to finding an effective


\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.

solution for dissolving this legacy of elitism. Academic debate centers around whether the solution to dissolving the legacy of elitism lies in economic reform or social revolution. Each solution puts forth its own explanations for why elitism persists and formulates a very different hypothesis as to how it can be alleviated.

One school of thought reflects the idea that elitism can be dissolved through the expansion of educational opportunities. Scholars in this camp maintain that large scale economic reforms in relation to the education system are the key to dissolving the legacy of elitism surrounding Ghanaian pedagogical institutions. The belief behind such claims is that increasing accessibility to education is the key to making schools less restrictive or “elitist.” Therefore, this school of thought promotes an economic analysis of the situation and in turn supports solutions that reallocate government funding towards education in order to further subsidize the costs of schooling. Scholars assert that by doing so, more individuals will have access to education, and as a result the conceptualization of education as an institution reserved for the elites will abate.

However, opponents of this economic analysis criticize that the practical implications of an economic analysis do little to resolve the legacy of elitism within pedagogical institutions because they misidentify the root of the issue. Opponents of economic solutions towards dissolving the legacy of elitism within Ghana’s educational institutions assert that accessibility is not the cause of elitism. Instead, such systems exacerbate inequalities between rural and urbanized areas and foster greater division within society. This is largely due to the “limited availability of resources and seats within schools.” Free primary education systems “tend to exacerbate rather than alleviate inequalities within society,” because even though one obstacle to education has been removed, “some method of rationing must be utilized for the limited number of seats available.” While “Free Primary Education subsidizes only parts of fees/costs, the financial burden of governments that finance FPE is huge,” therefore governments utilize tools such as entrance or exit examinations in order to limit the number of students passing through the education system. Such examinations still disproportionately favor students from wealthy backgrounds (typically in the urbanized south) who have advanced preparation and private tutors for such exams. Therefore, systems of free primary education simply displace issues of education accessibility from one level to the next and are not effective in dissolving elitism within Ghanaian pedagogical institutions.

13 Ibid.
Opponents of economic solutions support the idea that the root of elitism lies within the content taught in the classrooms rather than in the access the general population has to these classrooms. In the case of Ghana, the question of elitism is not one solved by asking how many people have access to a classroom, which is the opposing academic viewpoint. One must first understand that pedagogical institutions play a dominant role in both shaping and educating students. Yet, Ghana has an education system predominantly shaped and modeled after colonialism. Therefore, the question becomes whose society, culture, and institutions are being reproduced? That question is answered by the hypothesis that Ghanaian education systems promote Eurocentric ideals while rejecting African beliefs and culture. The result of this rejection is the perpetuation of elitism. Therefore, the only solution to this issue curriculum lies not with increased accessibility, but with reform of the curriculum.

Following an analysis of the competing schools of thought aided by an abundance of statistics about the growth of Ghana’s education system over the last decade, neither theory seems appropriate. This is because data shows that educational expansion alone is not enough. However, a combination of the solutions proposed by the two competing theories would likely be most effective in combating the pervasive legacy of elitism found within the education system because it would both increase access while changing the cultural norms that are taught within schools. The dissolution of elitism requires a concentrated policy that enacts economic reforms in conjunction with reforms to school curriculums.

Relative to GDP, Ghana has outspent both the United States and the United Kingdom on its education system for over the last decade. In 2006, Ghana had only 506 secondary schools; by 2015, it had 863. Currently, Ghana spends approximately 21% of its entire budget on education. The nation has nearly “90% of all children enrolled in schools for primary education,” and it recently mandated free primary education for all students. By all accounts, such large scale economic stimulation should have eliminated or at least greatly diminished the presence of elitism within institutions. However, research and data prove that the colonial legacy of elitism is still thriving within Ghanaian pedagogical institutions.

Despite the fact that Ghana has spent a large amount of their GDP on education and currently spends 6.2% of its annual GDP on education (the 13th highest in the world), nearly

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a third of the country is illiterate.\textsuperscript{20} This apparent contradiction decreases the credibility of the claim that economic reform is the panacea of institutionalized elitism within the education system. Thus, it is evident that other factors must be at fault. The data supports the notion that regulations surrounding educational curriculum may be to blame. The Ghanaian education system emphasizes education in the arts and social sciences.\textsuperscript{21} It fosters development towards paths where students are directed towards careers as politicians, businessmen, educators, lawyers and occasionally medical professionals: “These programs encourage Eurocentric beliefs in matters of law, government, and education. Rote memorization is encouraged in classrooms, and group work or innovation is discouraged. Such practices were common during colonialism and are still firmly in place today.”\textsuperscript{22} The Ghanaian government spends a mere 2,170,871 Ghana cedis on science research and education as compared to the 8,660,744,605 cedis on humanities and social science education.\textsuperscript{23} The result is a generation that can name all of the major cities in Europe but fails to understand how to address issues that impact them directly such as resource depletion, soil erosion, and the optimal fertilizer to use based on the type and location of the crop grown in a particular region. This social disconnect is as much at fault for perpetuating notions of elitism as a lack of education is. A similar story can be found in the East African country of Kenya.

In Kenya, free primary education was first introduced into the country in 1974 and subsequently reintroduced in 2003. The policy is one of liberal economic spending which eliminates all fees for students enrolling in primary school. Since the implementation of this policy, Kenya has spent more on education than any year prior to the implementation of their free primary education policy policy. Furthermore, the effects of the policy seem negligible at best. Primary education is compulsory and begins at age 6. Primary education lasts for approximately eight years, meaning that students who complete primary education finish around age 14. Access to free primary education increased enrollment rates within Kenya from approximately 62.3\% in 1999 to 84.874\% in 2012, but statistics show that 22\% of the country still remains illiterate.\textsuperscript{24} Of the “literate” portion of the population, approximately 40\% cannot read or write proficiently.\textsuperscript{25} Additionally, following the implementation of the policy, dropout rates amongst the poorest sectors of society increased for both males and females (Kenya). These statistics prove that the system of free primary education is broken. It is a policy that can be praised in name only, because the reality of such a program contrasts starkly with the goals and initiatives outlined on paper. More students may be attending schools in Kenya, “but

\textsuperscript{21} Akwasi Asabere-Ameyaw, et al.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} “Report on Basic Statistics and Planning Parameters for Senior High Schools in Ghana 2014/2015.”
\textsuperscript{24} Central Intelligence Agency, “Ghana.”
there is a great difference between attending school and learning.”26 Rather than promote a more egalitarian society free from the constraints delimited by economic means, free primary education exacerbates these economic inequalities.

Women disproportionately bear the brunt of this inequality. During colonization, women in Ghana were viewed as second class citizens in comparison to their male counterparts. Due to societal norms during the time, the opportunity for women to attend school and was extremely limited. In fact, the decision to attend school was not one females could make. Instead that decision lied squarely in the hands of the male head of household. As such, women were often taught to ignore the idea of receiving an education, as it was largely “unnecessary” for their duties in life. Women were encouraged to get married, reproduce, and become the primary caretaker of the household. An education was not needed for any of these tasks, thus it was not common for women to attend school. The impact of this mentality persists within present day Ghana, and has resulted in a vast enrollment gap between male and female students.27 Systems of free primary education do not bridge the gap between male and female enrollment rates, and in some cases, they worsen them.

By analyzing empirical evidence from Kenya, it becomes clear that free primary education does not benefit women. A study conducted by Adrienne M. Lucas and Isaac M. Mbiti shows that

...prior to FPE in Kenya, on average 95 girls for every 100 boys graduated primary school, leading to almost 14,000 more boys than girls completing primary school each year. Additionally, the average girl’s score on the exit exam in the three years prior to FPE was a quarter of a standard deviation below the average boy’s score. Prior to FPE, the number of completers per year for both genders was on an upward trend, and the rate of growth increased in the initial years of FPE (2003 and 2004). The rate of increase for boys and girls diverged in 2004, with a widening gender gap in subsequent years, narrowing only slightly in 2007. Even though the total number of girls completing primary school increased after FPE, girls as a percentage of all completers decreased from a high of almost 49 percent in 2001 to 47 percent in 2006. For a district of average intensity, the program increased the number of male graduates by 472 and the number of female graduates by 219, increasing access for both genders, but widening the gender gap in completion. These estimates imply an additional 8,999 male and 4,171 female students completed primary school due to FPE in 2003...

Since we do not find an increase in the number of older girls taking the KCPE [the primary education exit examination required to enroll in secondary school], FPE does not appear to affect the reasons that older girls do not complete school.

26 Ibid.
However, there were no apparent FPE generated gender differences in achievement. Examining the test scores by subject, we find that FPE led to a deterioration of girls’ scores in English and math.\textsuperscript{28}

The finding of this study mirror results found in a study of Ghana where free primary education was found to not only increase the disparity in completion rates between males and females, but to particularly disadvantage females from rural areas.\textsuperscript{29} The gap between completion for females from rural areas and males from rural areas has widened, especially when compared to members of the opposite sex from urban areas. Further, repetition rates for primary school completion amongst all children from rural areas has increased to an average of 3 years.\textsuperscript{30} These findings once again dispel the notion that greater accessibility means greater equality.

Attempting economic reform regarding Ghana’s educational institutions while neglecting to reform educational curriculum or vice versa holds little promise for diminishing the legacy of colonialism evident within educational institutions. The implementation of curriculum reforms that take into consideration the Ghanaian culture without expanding accessibility by definition perpetuate exclusivity. Such reforms would only benefit the minority of the population that could afford to send their children to school. Yet, economic reform that increases accessibility but fails to alter the curriculum broadens the attainability of an education, but alienates students from their own society by exposing them to norms that align with their colonial predecessors. Furthermore, these institutions are detrimental to women within Ghanaian society because they exacerbate inequality between males and females. Therefore, an effective method to combat colonialism’s legacy in Ghana lies only at the intersection of economic reform and educational reform.

\textbf{Works Cited}


\textsuperscript{30} Akwasi Asabere-Ameyaw, et al.


**About the Author**

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Political Stability in the Persian Gulf: Old Strategies, New Contexts

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ABSTRACT

The strategies employed by the monarchies of the Persian Gulf to retain political power are sophisticated, enough so to weather several decades of social turmoil and economic development in the region. The monarchs’ domestic political security stems from the consistency of these strategies, from their careful maintenance and elaboration since the establishment of the regimes. The accrual of massive oil revenues hardly disrupted this process; rather, the revenues strengthened it. Instead of devising new political strategies to maintain power, the monarchs used the revenues to enhance pre-existing ones. This claim has immediate implications for the political economy literature of the Gulf, which overwhelmingly investigates the causative relationship of oil revenue on autocracy. By identifying trends in domestic policy before, during, and after the accrual of oil revenue, it becomes clear that oil rents did not grant Persian Gulf monarchs new strategies for power retention, but augmented old ones. This paper uses the case of Persian Gulf monarchs’ migration policies within a temporal framework, and it succeeds in exposing the link between this policy dimension before oil and after it. Monarchs in the Persian Gulf have used migration as a policy to subvert dissidence long before the accrual of oil rent, and it is from this contextual history that this policy now manifests. Oil only enhanced this old strategy of power retention. Further study with this framework is critical, because it emphasizes the importance of the historical context from which regimes emerge.

The monarchies of the Persian Gulf have done spectacularly well in maintaining their power since independence by developing diverse and sophisticated strategies to mitigate threats to their survival. While civil societies elsewhere urged the world into its “third wave of democratization,” the Gulf ruling families remained comfortable in their royal seats.¹ In addition to a slew of regional instabilities, they have outmaneuvered domestic mobilization by nationalists and capitalists as well as economic fluctuations in the global oil market. The failure of Gulf civil societies to unite against their autocrats puzzled political scientists, and some

even developed a notion of “Arab exceptionalism” in which, among other racial stereotypes, it was claimed that Arabs are simply better suited to autocracies.\(^2\)

Of course, the notion of Arab exceptionalism fails to accommodate or conceptualize the unique methods of control and manipulation that regimes in the Gulf hold over society. The rentier theory proposed by Mahdavy better approximates the conditions of monarchical rule in Gulf societies by proposing that the accumulation of windfall revenue from oil rents has created a regime wholly independent from societal pressures. Academics studying the political economy of the Gulf quickly adopted this theoretical reasoning, though it began to suggest that oil revenues led to autocracy. Scholars like Wantchekon and Ross became focused on the assertion that oil rents such as those in the Gulf necessitate autocracies, that natural resources “hinder democracy” and “cause authoritarian governments.”\(^3\) This divergence, from identifying the mechanisms of social manipulation that oil affords rentier regimes to exploring the causal link between resource wealth and autocracy, has misdirected the literature.\(^4\)

This paper attempts to explain survival of autocracies in the Gulf region through the revisionist theories of the rentier state and the “late theory of rentierism,” which refocused the literature on the impressive sophistication and scope of the political security apparatus while referencing the historical context of the regimes themselves.\(^5\) These works reorient the focus of political economy research to the causes or origins of current political control.

This research emulates the works of those scholars, like Sharon Stanton Russell, Jill Crystal, and Sean Yom, that identify historical mechanisms through which Persian Gulf regimes manipulated the state-society relationship and seek to uncover how windfall resource wealth strengthened such pre-oil legacies.\(^6\) This research begins with the argument that windfall oil rents do not inspire new methods of societal manipulation as much as they strengthen and enhance pre-existing strategies. Instead of suggesting that Persian Gulf monarchs had no mechanisms to suppress dissent prior to the discovery and export of petrochemicals, this argument situates windfall oil wealth along an historical trajectory.


Due to its immediate relevance in the Gulf states today, the research focuses on migration policy formulation. Migrants in the Gulf face discrimination, aggression, and hostility in their host countries, and the Gulf states themselves send alternating and mixed messages of deportation and hire in the private sector. The reasons for this manipulation of the migrant community relate to the larger strategy of social manipulation, not necessarily to the demands of civil society. The states in the Persian Gulf, specifically Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, use migration policy as a method for political control as they have since the pre-oil era. Answering how Gulf monarchs used migration policy before oil revenue, how oil rents strengthened or reconstituted such policy, and how such policy evolved further in the turbulence of the contemporary since 2011 will strengthen, along this particular policy dimension, the argument that oil revenues (and the lack thereof) enhance previous strategies of power retention.

Theorizing the Political Economy of the Gulf

The authoritarian regimes of the Persian Gulf have encountered a plethora of threats to their political stability throughout their history, from Western occupation and encroachment by Iran and Saudi Arabia to sweeping regional civil unrest. In response, these regimes have naturally followed the “unobjectionable adage that autocrats pursue policies to maximize their survival.” Indeed, the policies adopted by all Gulf regimes have been so dynamic and successful that they have warded off any significant political upheaval to date, much to the surprise of those who contemplated their downfall. These policies have been well studied, though they seem to infantilize the Gulf regimes, simplifying them to such a degree that hides their entangled manipulation and suppression of civil society.

The Rentier State

The early manipulations of the Gulf monarchies were understood largely through the lens of rentierism, posited first by Mahdavy and later applied to the Arab states by Beblawi and Luciani. Massive unearned revenues from hydrocarbons accrued directly to kings’ coffers, thus separating the polity from their constituency. The Gulf states became autonomous from society in that their revenue was not tied to domestic perceptions of legitimacy; because they had no need to tax their subjects, their subjects’ political aspirations and wishes carried virtually no weight in the rentier economy. This characteristic of the rentier state is “of paramount importance,” as Beblawi wrote, “cutting across the whole of the social fabric of the economy.


affecting the role of the state in society.” Oil radically transformed state-society relations in the oil-rich Gulf, as it rendered inconsequential the negotiations between state and citizen regarding taxes and the distribution of power.

The discovery of oil thus further separated the regimes from their civil societies, as they did not depend on taxes to consolidate wealth. Furthermore, windfall oil rents provided Gulf monarchs with the material largesse necessary to “strategically and tactically deal with internal discontents.” Even if social unease with authoritarianism emerged, resource-rich states could simply distribute the windfall income to a minority class of citizens, creating an elite citizenry that shared the political and economic interests of the state. Resource abundance allows the state to achieve political quiescence by effectively “buying off” their citizenry through this distribution of rents to a privileged group in society.

The distribution of rents is thus the hallmark of the rentier regime. Oil provides regimes with the income necessary to deal with society singularly, without need for any other subversive techniques. This claim is convincing in part because of its theoretical implications: Allocating revenue to society creates citizens “disinclined to act economically or politically on [their] own behalf, let alone seriously criticise the state.” It is also convincing because it is so readily observable in this region: Each GCC state grants enormous welfare packages given to citizens, in the form of housing, utilities, food stipends, land grants, public sector employment, and even government charity. These packages signify attempts by the regime to decrease citizens’ political unease; in fact, throughout all of the Gulf states, increased social spending has followed economic crises, political transitions, and especially in response to the beginnings of social mobilization. Though the theory that the oil-rich Gulf elites rely on oil rents to stabilize their regimes surely has some role in the equation of such regimes’ longevity, the establishment of these regimes before the discovery of oil suggests that oil rents are not the sole determinants of policy.


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Distribution of rent to elites in the society is well documented by polemic works in traditional rentier theory. But, even if Gulf monarchs do often share oil wealth through stipends, aid packages, or donations, most of the work of distribution is done through alternate policy dimensions. To maximize short-term survival and long-term stability, Gulf states have historically combined immediately increased rent distribution with other political or social reforms; it was never rent alone that allowed the regimes to live on despite protest. The cases of policy reform after protest events reveal how the regime expects to maintain control more effectively in the future, whether by reforming laws restrictive to women to reduce their grievances, instating legislative bodies to suggest that citizens’ concerns impact policy, or by embarking on nationalization projects to reduce workers’ unease. These policy reforms speak to the deeper, more sophisticated mechanisms of regime survival. Even if the Kuwaiti ruling family alternatingly dissolves and reinstates it, the notion of a legislative council obviously has some importance in how the al-Sabahs have constructed and still maintain political control. Though huge rents do interact with these policy reforms in a manner expected by rentier theorists, the prevalence and complexity of domestic policy reform shows the dimensions and avenues of regime control. Studying the behavior of the state under threat yields a pattern in these policy shifts. From that policy, theorists may gain an understanding about the complex strategies that the state manipulates in different ways in order to subvert civil society.

Understanding this dual process of distribution with reform, and identifying the specific mechanisms toward which the state directs new oil revenues, leads to a significant reappraisal of the rentier state literature. Traditional claims of oil-rich regime’s autonomy from civil society failed to grasp that these states are “embedded in the political economy” — so embedded, in fact, that anticipating the political sustainability of their decisions is paramount to their survival. The autocrats in the Gulf must maintain their methodical manipulation of civil society in order to remain in power, and this depends on a maze of strategies designed to produce political complacency. It is the continued maintenance of this strategic network that produces policy reform after protest shocks. Approaching the contemporary manipulation of civil society by the Gulf monarchs with this understanding in mind, it is clear that “the depth and impact of … reforms were startling, and far more responsive, considered, and forward-looking than early rentier state theory … predicted.”  

The evolution of rentier state theory clearly points to the nuance of the Gulf’s strategies to stay in power, and, in accordance with Gray, these strategies reach into the fabric of the political economy itself.

15 Davidson, After the Sheikhs.
18 Ibid.
Some researchers have already researched the political economy of the Persian Gulf in this light. Sharon Stanton Russell examines the role of migration policy from the end of World War II to the Gulf Crisis in the late 1980s, noting the changing behaviors of the state after increasing oil rents began to flow to the king’s coffers. She is careful to not imply any independent causal link between oil rents and regime stabilization; instead, she views both in the context of the old strategy of migration policy.\(^1\) Sean L. Yom, in a similar strand, researches the missing link between oil rents and regime type in Kuwait, arguing that rents do not determine the existence or behavior of the al-Sabah ruling family singularly, but rather that oil rents enhanced earlier strategies of coalition-building that still to this day stabilize the Kuwaiti regime.\(^2\) Importantly, both researchers treated windfall rents as just another feature, albeit a significant one, on a timeline of regime stability and just another tactic to ensure it. Both scholars moved beyond imagining rents as the most significant stabilizing factor, investigating instead the policy dimensions with which they interacted.

In accordance with this revisionist theory, the present research takes as a case the policy dimension of migration. Migration policy has been one avenue for the regime to stabilize itself, and today this can be seen easily when ruling elites try to quell social protest through a closed-door policy to migrants. However, the regime formulated migration policy with power retention in mind long before the present, and these legacies of control through this policy dimension reveal how oil-rich regimes still rely on old strategies to maintain political power.

**Pre-Oil Migration Policy in the Gulf**

The strategic use of migration policy surely predated the expansion of the oil markets and the Gulf states’ access to them. Of course, migration policy played a large role in securing political legitimacy and stability throughout the oil boom period, but this practice of securing such stability through migration policy developed during the pre-oil era.

Kuwait exemplifies the use of migration policy before the significant influence of oil. Throughout the 1950s, the al-Sabah ruling family used migration as a tool to increase support for the ruling family over the competing merchant family.\(^2\) By increasing the de jure “immigration” of loyalist Bedouin to the formal state of Kuwait through naturalization programs, the ruling family counteracted the influence of the merchant families in the public domain. Increasing the population of “native”, and also more conservative, Bedouin people also counterbalanced the sweeping ideology of Arab nationalism emanating from Nasser’s Egypt immediately after World War II.\(^2\) Thus, the early Kuwait monarchy circumvented two important political threats, the merchant families and Arab socialism, simply by permitting Bedouin to “immigrate” to the Kuwaiti state and become full citizens. However, the nationalist’s calls for Kuwait to integrate

\(^1\) Stanton Russell, “Politics and Ideology in Migration Policy Formulation.”
\(^3\) Ibid., 30.
within the regional political society had to be acknowledged nonetheless, and so migration policies, such as the Aliens’ Residence Law of 1959, the Nationality Law of 1959, and the Labor Law of 1964, reflected a divergent set of policies and implications that would appeal to this mix of the social strata and thereby secure political legitimacy from each.²³

Kuwait is a fine example of the pre-oil tradition of using migration policy as a political tool, but it is not the sole example. As early as the 1920s, both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were developing a migration policy that played off British and American interests and foreshadowed the influx of Indian migration in the last decades of the millennium.

The presence of immigrant communities, now a hallmark of the Gulf states, is evidenced as far back as the early 1930s, when the exploration for oil caused an influx of British, American, Indian, and Arab prospectors to the region.²⁴ The first ruling member of the al-Saud dynasty, Abdulaziz al-Saud, and the al-Sabahs in Kuwait negotiated for greater reliance on nationalized labor for the oil exploration projects, which shows some, perhaps spurious, correlation with later demands by the citizenry for nationalization. More importantly, the beginnings of the Gulf’s popularity in the scene of international migration during the 1920s and 1930s displayed the “early incorporation of the migration phenomenon into the local political economy.”²⁵ One such example is the politicization of migrants’ entry into the state. Should a local Indian merchant wish to bring another immigrant to the community, they would have to pay a Political Agent a commission fee for a “No Objection Certificate”.²⁶ This would allow them to bring additional migrants to the state to access the benefits of oil exploration. The No Objection Certificate increased migrants’ reliance on the state bureaucratic apparatus. Regulating the entry of migrants, not to mention profiting directly from it, is another example of the ways in which early Gulf regimes used migration policy to secure and maintain political power. How these strategies evolved in the oil boom era reveal how windfall rents enhanced them.

The Oil Boom and Migration, 1970s to 2008

It was concurrent with the rise in oil revenues in this era that Gulf elites changed preferences from Arab immigrant workers to Asian workers. This phenomenon erupted out of concern that the Arab nationalist migrants would foment political subversion within society, as they almost did in Kuwait twenty years prior. Therefore, migration policy evolved into increased restrictions on Arab immigrants and increasing favor for migrants from South Asia.²⁷ This preference for Asian immigrants was predicated on their decreased likeliness to call for

²³ Stanton Russell, “Politics and Ideology in Migration Policy Formulation,” 34.
²⁵ Ibid., 572.
²⁶ Ibid., 560-561.
nationalist reform, which would undercut the authority of the ruling families.\textsuperscript{28} However, the Gulf’s experience with South Asian immigrants was not new, as shown earlier by the prevalence of Indian migrants to the area during oil exploration in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the reformed and repeated policy yielded more socio-political benefit for the Gulf regimes, and it erupted from the same practices that sustained their earlier development. Furthermore, this policy of Arab exclusion and encouragement of Asian migrants foreshadowed a much deeper reconstruction of Gulf societies.

This policy decision by the Gulf states did not just have immediate and simple implications for the state-society relationship; rather, complex phenomena erupted from this migration policy. Preferring Asian immigrants over Arabs created a social class distinct from national citizens, and began a process of identity formation and social differentiation that subverted public agitation within society. The rising number of Asian migrants spurred on the “articulation of a new citizenship rhetoric,” in which migrants became a “value-laden frame of reference … posing new socio-cultural threats.”\textsuperscript{29} These threats spread the “fear of culture loss,” “thus acting as a glue factor between rulers and citizens.”\textsuperscript{30} One author wrote that foreigners fostered “a national consciousness, bolstering … national identity projects” simply because the presence of South Asian migrants provided a benchmark from which to differentiate the native population.\textsuperscript{31} Shifting migration policy in this era did not just capitalize on immigrants less likely to call for reform, but marked the beginning of a campaign of identity formation in which the national citizens were lifted above migrants. Ultimately, this preemptively quelled the agitation of natives based on their cultural deluding, and it created a social class at which to direct social grievances. Obviously, then, this shift in migration policy provided the ruling families with some additional measure of stability. Furthermore, it strengthened the belief of natives in their social contract with the state. The state, after constructing an ideology of native vs. migrant, quickly styled itself as the protector of the Gulf identity. This process worked twofold – on one edge, it lessened the political threat from migrants, and on the other, it increased the political allegiance of natives to the state.

This process of identity formation went still further in the Gulf societies, shown clearly by the extravagantly sophisticated kafala system. The kafala system allows the state to transfer the responsibility of policing migrants to their citizens, which increases their differentiation and cultural elitism. In order to obtain a work permit, migrants have to pay citizens to sponsor their entry, even if such sponsorships prove unstable, frustrating, and dangerous.\textsuperscript{32} The kafala system of managing immigration allowed citizens to receive a degree of “second order rents”

\textsuperscript{30} Fagotto, “The State-Migration Nexus,” 5.
\textsuperscript{32} Khalaf, “Politics of Migration,” 48.
as Beblawi identified them.\textsuperscript{33} Not only did this create a politically quiescent society by allowing them to access, in a small part, the market of oil rents through migrant’s pay, but also allocated “the responsibility of alien surveillance to the citizens which can be considered a kind of ‘civic duty’.”\textsuperscript{34} In several ways, the state’s engineering of the kafala system during the oil boom period, and still present today, ensured the political stability of the regime. First, kafala provided control of the migrant populations - even if it was not standardized, it promoted entry and exclusion. Second, the system encouraged further elitism among the native population by privileging the very notion of citizenship. Third, kafala quieted the national population as a result of their entry into a novel market of migrant sponsorship. Citizens’ desires to work or gather in any politicizing environment were significantly lowered. Altogether, the kafala system represents one of the most sophisticated formulations of migration policy in a political economic and security context.

Kafala is a prime example of the strategic use of migration policy by Gulf monarchs to penetrate their societies at the micro level, perpetuating “social and economic segmentation” with the overwhelming consent of citizens.\textsuperscript{35} The impact of kafala on identity, citizenship, and the social contract between state and citizens proved how the state wielded power strategically and subversively throughout the oil boom period. What is perhaps more striking, though, is that kafala was not a newly contrived set of policies. As seen from the example of local Indian merchant paying a small fee to a political agent in order to obtain a “No Objection Certificate,” the pre-existence of the system is evident. In fact, even the name remained the same: agents who bargain their citizenship for an immigrant’s entry are called kafeels.\textsuperscript{36} The use of migration policy is clearly among the set of political economic strategies designed to maintain a lofty seat of power over civil society in the Gulf. However, more to the point, the manifestations of such migration policies in the oil boom era show striking similarities to pre-existing practices. The kafeel system of the 30s and the oil boom system of kafala clearly show that the presence of oil does not determine strategies of control over the state’s civil society, but rather conditions them to a more complex and extravagant level.

**Migration Policy since the Arab Spring**

Compared to the greater Arab world, the Gulf protests in 2011 were relatively small. Despite the beginning of the economic downturn in 2008, most states still had the capacity to preemptively quell dissent through distribution. The UAE and Kuwait, for example, expended hefty resource packages to their constituents in a buy-off for peace: The UAE set aside $1.55 billion for infrastructural development, and Kuwait impressively raised social spending in food

\textsuperscript{33} Beblawi, “Rentier State in the Arab World,” 92.
\textsuperscript{36} Khalaf, “Politics of Migration,” 84.
and fuel subsidies, in addition to a $3,500 grant to every citizen in February 2011.\(^{37}\) Saudi Arabia also demonstrated that it could still obtain quiescence through handouts. In February 2011, the ruling family “pledged $130 billion to buy social peace.”\(^{38}\) If a citizen was not “bought” by this exchange, their protests were caught and stifled by the impressive coercive capabilities of the state. The UAE imprisoned five signatories of a petition concerning political reform in early 2011, and Kuwait dissolved its parliament in December 2011 in a show of political insecurity and control.\(^{39}\) Though quiescence was easy to ensure for these oil giants, states whose capacity to distribute was most affected by market downturns were significantly impacted by protests.

Bahrain suffered a huge loss of legitimacy and control in the events of 2011, largely because it lacked both the financial and military capabilities of its neighbors. If not for Saudi Arabia’s deployment of troops to repress demonstrations, the al-Khalifa ruling family may very well have lost its throne.\(^{40}\) The threat to Bahrain’s ruling family demonstrated that Gulf regimes are not insulated from revolution even if they do not tax their citizenry. Though citizens do have more collective action problems in a rentier society than in a capitalist society (due to the lack of the workplace as a viable platform for opinion sharing) citizens had in these protests overcome them through the Internet. Citizens redefined protest from public, controllable acts to virtual, instant, and largely undetected ones. As Kristian Coates Ulrichsen says:

> In the Gulf, the flipside of the potent hyper-modernising new tools of communication and mobilisation that hitherto had facilitated their global rise became apparent. In particular, their synthesis of new and social media with younger and highly-technologically savvy populations enabled the instantaneous spread of ideas and news, eroded state controls over the flow of information, and underscored the vulnerability of regimes to new methods of public accountability.\(^{41}\)

The protests of the Arab Spring radically re-envisioned the social arena of dissent, calling for an equal recalculating of all subversive measures by the state, from the simple act of redistribution to the complex strategy of migration policy. The Arab Spring made apparent the incredible delicacy of the monarchical situation in the Gulf, and it called for a reformulation of policy so to avoid such strife in the future. Migration policy, specifically, was reconstructed from 2011 on, demonstrating its constant use by the state to maintain and manage power in novel ways. Saudi Arabia, as the regional hegemon, responded to the 2011 protests with


\(^{38}\) Ibid.; al-Shammari, “Political Uprisings and the Arab Monarchies,” 103.


\(^{40}\) Matthiesen, *Sectarian Gulf*.

extreme speed, and it has exemplified the patterns of the Gulf’s new migration policies best.
Saudi Arabia’s Migration Policy since the Arab Spring

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, like many Gulf states, had pursued policies of workforce
nationalization many years prior to the events of 2011, even as early as 1995. However,
these policies did little to manage their own de facto implementation and enforcement until
the shock of the Arab Spring. Immediately, in June 2011, the al-Sauds announced their new
workforce nationalization policy, the Nitaqat scheme, which promised a greater effectiveness
of the nationalization policies. The Nitaqat was intended to increase levels of Saudization by
mandating quotas on private enterprises, thus giving young, disaffected citizens positions in
the private sector. The system works by categorizing firms based on size and economic activity,
where larger firms must employ a higher percentage of Saudi nationals. The implementation
of Nitaqat appeared to be immediately successful for Saudi Arabian citizens, with a modest
increase of Saudi men in the workforce of from 2011 to 2012 of 23 percent. However,
surprisingly, the rate of foreign workers concomitantly increased with this rise, which meant
that nationals were not necessarily replacing expatriates. Instead, more Saudis were hired to
fulfill the Nitaqat requirement and more migrants were hired to actually do the work. This
observation correlates with other scholars’ thoughts that the Nitaqat simply creates positions
for Saudi nationals in the private sector that mirror their employment in the public sector; that
is, citizens are hired in unnecessary, supervisory positions in order to meet the quota and be
paid, which only increases economic inefficiency. Even if the practice is inefficient, as least it
is shown to work in private firms. This is due to the unique enforcement mechanism it totes.

The Saudi Arabia Ministry of Labor monitors and enforces this system through issuing and
renewing visas for migrant workers based on a firm’s compliance with Saudization standards.
So, a private firm is rewarded for hiring a greater percentage of national citizens by receiving
renewed visas for its current migrant workers and new visas for more migrant workers.

The Nitaqat domestic nationalization policy has a direct relationship with Saudi Arabia’s
migration policy. As Saudi markets nationalize, migrants are denied entry. However, because
the markets still demand migrant labor, the state pursues a more open migration policy. The
mixed signals have direct implications for migrants in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, because
most Gulf states are pursuing similar nationalization strategies, albeit in less formal and
extreme ways than Saudi Arabia, this policy trend is reshaping the constitution of migrants

42 Kasim Randeree, “Workforce Nationalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council States,”
Center for International and Regional Studies Occasional Papers, no. 9 (2012); Muhammad Asad Sadi, “The
43 Jennifer Peck, “Can Hiring Quotas Work? The Effect of the Nitaqat Program on the Saudi
in the Gulf region overall. However, it is doing such in a highly inefficient manner, one that seems to beckon migrants and encourage private firms to hire them at the same time as it pushes migrants away and punishes these firms.

The Nitaqat scheme is even more complex than this. As national citizens enter the private sector, migrant workers are displaced. In addition, the Ministry of Labor will not renew migrant visas for firms that cannot or do not comply with Saudization benchmarks, again displacing migrants. An integral part of this system is thus the displacement of migrants, though there is no strategy for their exit after being forced out of their work. This presents both a legal and a political problem for the state. Migrants that continue to reside in the state without a current visa are in violation of the Ministry of Labor’s regulations, and they also have a greater potential for agitation and protest. This results in another manifestation of migration policy: forced, or selective, deportations. This mechanism for migration management has been common since 2011, with waves of massive and state-sponsored deportation of illegal migrants in 2013 and 2014 and in 2016 and 2017. In March 2017, for instance, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of the Interior announced the “Nation Without Violations” campaign, which granted amnesty for illegal migration should the violator exit the country within a 90-day period. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia deported over a million migrants in a show of strict enforcement. This is a common occurrence since 2011, with massive deportations of over a million illegal migrants, Arabs and non-Arabs alike. Deportations are a necessary mechanism for population management in Saudi Arabia, a country that is attempting to decrease reliability on migrant workers and nationalize its private sector. However, there are deeper implications for this policy if it is viewed as a sophisticated and subversive mechanism of state control.

Migration policy in the Gulf is a subversive measure of the state that engenders social depoliticization, and in this case such a relationship is clear. Saudi Arabia, as a representative model for many other Gulf regimes, is responding to the frustrations that led to the massive protests of 2011 by placating its citizenry. The ruling family purports to be “preparing and training those unable to find employment so they can smoothly join the workforce whenever possible,” though their positions once employed are unnecessary and inefficient. Private sector employment, just like the public sector, is simply a platform for the construction and maintenance of clientele, patronage networks in which the state shares its dwindling oil rents through the private enterprise. In actuality, the cheapness and political quiescence of migrant labor has not been devalued since the oil era, and the state would not sacrifice migrant labor’s

benefit to economic development simply because its citizens demonstrated support for such an action. Instead, Saudi Arabia engages in selective and systematic deportations as shows, or “border spectacles” as one author called them, addressed to the same Saudi nationals that protested. These deportations allow the state to consolidate “ailing social contracts, wherein regimes would appear as the sole defenders of Gulf citizens’ interests again insecurity as well as unemployment and poverty,” thereby deterring another “spillover” of the old Arab uprisings’ frustration.

In effect, the Nitaqat scheme as a whole is one such “border spectacle”. As Hassan and Dyer said so eloquently:

Rather than unlocking opportunities for the region’s youth through complicated but sustainable reforms, governments have sought to increase public funding, including strengthening subsidies, raising public sector wages and increasing public sector hiring. While such efforts have had a short-term impact of reducing the economic burdens faced by youth and regional populations as a whole, they double down on the terms of the social contract that already proved itself unable to sustain the economic needs of the region’s large youth population…

Clearly, the Nitaqat system in Saudi Arabia, and nationalization programs throughout the Gulf states, are attempting just to provide spectacle to disaffected citizens. Surely, the state will continue to provide financial security for some societal elites through placement programs and private sector employment, though many will remain unemployed. This system’s deficiencies show a calculated and strategic use of complex, varying, and seemingly disparate migration policies that altogether secure, insulate, and protect the regime from workforce mobilization of its citizenry, profit loss from increased wages of nationals should they enter in the workforce in large numbers, and the unraveling of the social contract should they begin to earn their own incomes.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

Carefully reviewing the historical and contemporary phenomenon surrounding migration policy formulation in the Gulf states shows that this complex and sophisticated strategy has significant potential to manipulate the state-society social contract. Even when windfall rents decrease, migration policy remains an avenue for Gulf monarchs to exploit their citizenry and insulate themselves from popular protest. This finding is significant in and of itself, because it suggests that oil rents and migration policy are separable entities, that rents do not determine migration policy as much as they interact with it to produce enhancements.

The historical trajectory proposed in this research aims to revitalize the current literature on

the rentier theory by (re)imagining the strategies for power retention as being on an historical trajectory, wherein the pre-oil practices of ruling families survived through oil and until the present day. It is not oil rent that determines the behavior of regimes, nor is it oil rents that determines their actions and strategies for manipulation. The seat of monarchs in the Persian Gulf is more complicated than that. Instead, rent accumulation strengthened and enhanced pre-existing strategies of control. In the context of migration policy, these strategies of control included the integration of migrant communities, seen in the 1930s and 1950s as part of the pre-oil era, and later enhanced drastically in the identity formation undertaken by the state in the oil boom period. The kafala system also has clear, admittedly surprising, correlations with pre-oil strategies of migrant control. Finally, the current most popular strategy of migration policy is to target migrant workers in a “border spectacle” to citizens. This practice hails from a long history of misinforming, exploiting, and playing off civil society so to bar it from any activity that could foment unrest. Clearly, migration policy is not determined by rent incomes; rather, it determines the allocation of rents.

This paper successfully aligns with researchers like Stanton Russell and Yom, who imagined political manipulation strategies as emerging from pre-existing legacies and traditions. Though the historical and qualitative lens of each of these papers is useful as an exercise in conceptualizing power retention strategies as on a historical trajectory, this literature must be supplemented with quantitative and statistical works to test the theories and hypotheses that emerge from it. Recent research, such as Adrian Shin’s and Halvor Mehm and Gry Østenstad’s, are beginning to statistically test the implications that arise from the premise that oil rent conditions the extravagance of other policy measures. If this alternative literature to understanding the Gulf regimes survival is to take hold, such work must proliferate.

**Works Cited**


**About the Author**

Daniel Cooper is a third year undergraduate student in the University of Kentucky’s Economics and International Studies program, focusing on Comparative Politics and Societies in the Middle East and North Africa. He is interested in analyzing the lingering effects of colonialism on political economies in the region, in addition to its impact on international relations in the broader Arab world.
Violent and Non-Violent Strategies of Resistance: A Game-Theoretic Model of Civil Conflict

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Abstract

Nonviolent movements are historically more than twice as successful as their violent counterparts. Of 323 resistance movements between 1900 and 2006 analyzed by Stephan and Chenoweth, nonviolent movements were successful 53% of the time, whereas violent movements were successful only 26% of the time. Given these statistics, why do insurgent groups choose to use violence to achieve their political aims? I propose a game-theoretic model of civil conflict which factors information problems, bargaining, and costly signaling to predict insurgent group behavior at the macro-level to answer the question: at what point in a strategic interaction would an insurgent group choose to turn to violent strategies? Building on the findings of Chenoweth and Stephan and grounded in Fearon’s rationalist explanations for war, these models improve upon the existing literature on insurgent group violence by demonstrating the strategic interaction, rooted in fundamentally rationalist logic, that results in rational decisions to use violence or nonviolence. A continuous action-space model and an extensive form game offer key insights into the strategic interaction between a state and rebel group, and my research applies these models to three cases – Catalonia, Syria, and Egypt – to test their applicability and attempt to understand insurgent group actions through the lens of game theory and rationalist theory.

Introduction

Nonviolent movements are historically more than twice as successful as their violent counterparts.1 Of three hundred and twenty-three resistance movements between 1900 and

1 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why civil resistance works: the strategic logic of nonviolent conflict
2006 analyzed by Stephan and Chenoweth, nonviolent movements were successful 53% of the time, whereas violent movements were successful only 26% of the time.² Given these statistics, why do insurgent groups choose to use violence to achieve their political aims? Stephan and Chenoweth posit that the relative success of nonviolent movements is due in large part to the fact that nonviolent resistance presents “fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement and commitment,” essentially a mobilization argument that contends nonviolence simply makes recruitment easier for an insurgent group.³ Additionally, they argue that nonviolent resistance is more likely to create meaningful “shifts in loyalty among [the state’s] supporters, including members of the military establishment,” allowing meaningful shifts in insurgent endowments, with state and military defection providing a significant advantage for rebel groups.⁴ Stephan and Chenoweth conclude that successful nonviolent resistance is more likely to create a “durable and internally peaceful [democracy], which [is] less likely to regress into civil war,” arguing that violence is recursive, and nonviolent movements can be successful for longer periods of time.⁵

Beyond the micro-level factors analyzed by Stephan and Chenoweth regarding insurgent nonviolence, I propose a game-theoretic model of civil conflict which takes into account information problems, bargaining, and costly signaling to predict insurgent group behavior at the macro-level to answer the following question: at what point in a strategic interaction would an insurgent group choose to turn to violent strategies? Building on the findings of Chenoweth and Stephan and based on Fearon’s rationalist explanations for war, these models improve upon the existing literature on insurgent group violence by demonstrating the strategic interaction, rooted in fundamentally rationalist logic, that results in rational decisions to use violence or nonviolence.

Existing Explanations

A primary school of thought concerning rebel use of violence versus nonviolence contends that insurgent violence is a mobilizational tool that encourages support. Kalyvas introduces rationality into the literature on large-scale violence against civilians, which he claims is “typically framed and understood as irrational.”⁶ Ultimately, he concludes that we should not assume violence is irrational — there is a clear and strategic logic underlying a rebel group’s decision to use violence, which he argues is primarily to “maximize civilian support under a particular set of constraints.”

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² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
Wood argues that insurgents intentionally and strategically manipulate violence to this end, claiming that weak rebel groups especially use more violence than strong rebel groups because they do not have the resources to provide incentives for mobilization. Additionally, indiscriminate regime violence reduces the need for incentives to recruit support, thus reducing rebel reliance on violence as a mobilization tool, but only if the insurgents can credibly provide security. Therefore, stronger groups will use less violence against civilians as regime violence escalates, while weaker insurgents escalate violence in response to indiscriminate regimes.

Cohen advances this school of thought by examining sexual violence as a mobilization tool that functions as a means for recruitment, additionally arguing that the social aspect of wartime rape is a method employed to improve unit cohesion within insurgent groups. Contrary to Wood’s point that a rebel group that is stronger relative to the state will use less violence as a tool for mobilization and recruitment, Cohen argues the opposite regarding sexual violence—state weakness, relative to the insurgent group, is positively associated with increased wartime rape. However, the main issue with this argument is that it is too one-dimensional, and claims that the strategic decisions to use violence are influenced primarily by rebel capacity relative to the state, effectively ignoring the relationship between a rebel group’s objective capacity and its subjective demands in relation to the state’s. While Kalyvas introduced the concept of rationality into these larger conversations on rebel use of violence, he stops short of advancing the role of bargaining theory in the calculations of rebel groups and thus presents a one-dimensional thesis that leaves room for advancement.

Another major school of thought regarding rebel strategies of violence and nonviolence concerns rebel endowments prior to the full formation of an insurgency or the onset of conflict. This school of thought can be further delineated by literature focusing on the “resource curse” and research focusing on social-institutional theory to explain the effects of preexisting social networks on the outcomes of conflict. Billon argues that “resource sectors influence the likelihood and course of armed conflicts,” and specific resources make wars “more likely, nasty, and lengthy.” Combining this literature with Collier and Hoeftler’s notions of greed and grievance, whereby rebellion may be explained by “atypically severe grievances… or atypical opportunities,” Dreher and Kreibbaum conclude that the extraction of natural resources exerts externalities which lead to grievances, while simultaneously providing economic incentives through revenues from these resources. Notably, they claim that, “the
consequent risk of both terrorism and rebellion depends on the group’s characteristics as well as the state’s reaction to its actions.”

Focusing on social-institutional theory, Staniland argues that the literature on the “resource curse” cannot adequately explain why insurgent groups with similar resource wealth result in such widely different outcomes. He proposes that “the social networks on which insurgent groups are built create different types of organizations with differing abilities to control resource flows.”

The limitations of this school of thought which focuses on economic and social rebel endowments, is in its inability to adequately provide a framework from which we can conceptualize the dynamic interaction between the state and a rebel group. Dreher and Kreibaum hint at this notion in their conclusion when they mention the extent of the effect of a group’s capacity coupled with the state’s reactions on the risk of terrorism and rebellion, but merely scratch the surface without delving deeper.

An emerging school of thought shifts the focus towards the effects of the strategies used by rebels on peace processes and negotiation. Pospieszna and DeRouen argue that rebels use “violence to demonstrate their ability to exact costs on the government, thus forcing the latter to negotiate.”

To this end, they briefly touch on rebel uses of violence conceptualized through bargaining theory as tools used to demonstrate rebel capacity and create credible commitments. However, this is only a surface-level analysis and Pospieszna and DeRouen shift their focus towards different conclusions unrelated to bargaining theory.

Further research contends that the degree to which an insurgent will use violence depends on the extent of its territorial control. Kalyvas claims that “the lower the level of an actor’s control…the more likely that [a group’s] violence, if any, will be indiscriminate.” Kalyvas goes on to claim that indiscriminate violence occurs in “specific situations for explicable reasons to achieve understandable goals.”

This line of research, however, fails to consider that the opposite holds true statistically more often — rebel groups employ nonviolent strategies with much higher rates of success than violent strategies — and thus stops short of attempting to model the factors influencing rebel groups to turn away from nonviolence. Specifically, there is no consideration given to how state demands influence rebel decision-making.

**RATIONALIST THEORY**

At its core, the fundamental logic behind rationalist explanations for the causes of war — and by extension, the strategic use of violence in my models — is that the expected utility outweighs
the costs.\textsuperscript{18} Fearon defines a number of these explanations that influence the expected utility equation: private information and “incentives to misrepresent such information,” commitment problems, and issue indivisibility.\textsuperscript{19} Most importantly, however, he notes that these factors cause bargaining problems that lead to conflict. Game theory assumes rationality in all participating actors and contends that all actors are value-maximizing in any strategic interaction – thus, in a system with complete and perfect information, wars would not break out because a bargain can be reached at the exact point of each actor’s relative capability.

Actors often have a range of options within a strategic interaction, representing different values across different dimensions. Policy options may be continuous including points within an interval or range (one-dimensional) or across time and space (multidimensional). To this end, a continuous action space model is useful in order to represent the infinite choices available to actors and capture the interaction in a linear sense as well as across time and space. On a basic continuous action space model, the point where a bargain between two actors will be reached when a game is repeated \textit{ad infinitum} within a closed system with complete and perfect information would be point $w$ where $w$ is the probable outcome of war, and the potential costs of war would be denoted as point $c$, with the difference in each actor’s $w - c = El$ formula (probable outcome minus costs of war equals expected utility) representing the bargaining space available. In this sense, we should understand that information problems and the incentive for actors to misrepresent their capabilities contribute to this fog of war. This leads to a breakdown of bargaining when actors are unsure where the other actor lies on the continuous action space and thus make irreconcilable simultaneous demands that lead to violence. Where the research is lacking but where this framework is potentially useful, however, is in its ability to be translated to capture the interaction that produces nonviolent or violent insurgent behavior. In line with rationalist theory, I argue that the decision by an insurgent group to use violent strategies will depend largely on rebel capabilities relative to the state and the extent of state/rebel demands in a strategic interaction.

\textbf{Methodology}

When designing the models, I found that a continuous action space model was able to capture how the extent of the simultaneous demands of the state and the rebel group and the relative costs of war influenced decision-making. Additionally, an extensive-form game, formatted as a symmetrical decision tree with actors making one-off choices in a simple interaction, allowed me to model individual conflicts on a case-by-case basis. To this end, and in order to test the validity of my models, I will apply them to the specific cases of: Catalonia, where violence has not yet broken out but the state has engaged in repression against the opposition; Syria, where insurgent groups used violent strategies against a repressive state; Egypt, where the state granted broad concessions to a nonviolent resistance movement; Venezuela, where an insurgent group has not necessarily formed yet but the state is engaged in mass repression.


\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
Taken together, both models complement each other such that they produce an effective means to model insurgent behavior and predict future insurgent behavior.

I developed a few predictions for what the models would be able to convey. On a continuous action space model, when $w - \epsilon \geq 0.53$, where $w$ and $\epsilon$ are decimals between 0 and 1, $w$ is the probable outcome of war, and $\epsilon$ is the relative cost of war, I predict an insurgent group will use nonviolent strategies 100% of the time. The logic here is that if the probable outcome of war minus the likely costs of war (or the costs inflicted upon the insurgent group by the state’s use of violent repression) is greater than 0.53 on the model, we should expect the insurgent group to maximize the utility of their strategies by employing nonviolence. When $w - \epsilon \leq 0.26$, I predict an insurgent group will use violent strategies 100% of the time. The logic here is that, following the aforementioned equation, if the result is less than 0.26 on the model, we should expect the insurgent group to use violent strategies because they are below the threshold for nonviolence to be effective. Finally, when $0.53 \geq w - \epsilon \geq 0.26$, I predict an insurgent group will use nonviolent strategies with probability $[[w - \epsilon - 0.53]$ and violent strategies with probability $[[w - \epsilon - 0.26]. The logic here is that the relative distance of the insurgent group’s expected utility from the points of violent success (0.26) and nonviolent success (0.53) can determine the probability by which an insurgent group will use one strategy over the other.

I modeled this interaction in various ways. First, I used an extensive-form game with incomplete information to highlight the effect of information problems on bargaining and how both actors will engage in signaling. Second, a continuous action space model will allow me to define how the probable outcome of a chosen strategy and the costs incurred influence the calculus of an insurgent group’s chosen strategies. Finally, a simple 2x2 game allows me to demonstrate certain limitations of my preferred models and account for differences we may note in outcomes on a broader level.

As per my predictions based on the statistical findings of Chenoweth and Stephan, I model the continuous action space of insurgent strategies as follows:

![Diagram showing the action space of rebels and state, with ideal points $i_s$ and $i_r$. The diagram illustrates the transition between violence, mixed strategies, and non-violence with thresholds at $0.26$ and $0.53$.](image)

The variables $i_s$ and $i_r$ represent the ideal points for each actor, which is 100% of the action space. Without factoring in the costs of violence or the probable outcome of violence, this model serves as a framework for understanding at which points it can be predicted that violence will be used by the insurgent group ($EU \leq 0.26$, or expected utility is less than or equal to 0.26). Furthermore, studying actual rebel actions and the manner in which events unfold, we can place rebels and states in a civil conflict at their respective points on this continuous
action space and make claims regarding actual capabilities and demands. Additionally, the precise points where we place the rebels and the state will factor in when the state is making considerations regarding its beliefs of rebel capacity, which influence their decisions on whether or not to repress or concede.

These considerations can thus be captured on the extensive-form game with imperfect information, which is modeled as follows:

![Extensive-Form Game Diagram]

**Actors:**
- Insurgent Group
- State

**Possible Outcomes:**
- V-R
- V-C
- NV-R
- NV-C

**Actions:**
- Insurgent Group: \{Violence, nonviolence\}
- State: \{Repress, Concede\}
Variable \( N \) for Nature serves as the value determining the strength of the insurgent group, and \( \rho \) is the probability that the group is strong while \( 1 - \rho \) is the probability that the group is weak. The factor of imperfect information is captured by the dotted horizontal line at the second decision node where the state makes its first decision. At this point, the state still has imperfect information regarding the capabilities of the insurgent group and thus does not know where it is operating on the decision tree, but it must still make a decision based on its beliefs. Furthermore, the variables in the model are organized as follows:

\[
i_x \geq w_x \geq \epsilon \geq 0 \geq s
\]

The logic behind these variables is that \( i_x \) is the ideal point for both actors and represents the entire action-space in question. The variable \( w_x \) represents the probable outcome of a successful war, i.e. the demands of the player are met after violence has occurred. The variable \( \epsilon \) represents the likely costs of the war, and as such cannot exceed the total demands of a player nor the area of the value of the action-space, although it is possible for the state to concede and suffer from the violent strategies of the insurgent group, thus receiving a payoff of \(-\epsilon\). At any rate, each of these variables is set as greater than or equal to the others in consecutive order because we can understand a situation wherein two players issue simultaneous demands for the entire action space (thus, \( i_x = w_x \)) and the costs of war create such destruction as to eliminate the utility of the action-space altogether (\( i_x = w_x = \epsilon \)). This would be an extreme case, and would likely involve nuclear war or the large-scale use of weapons of mass destruction, but is still a logical event and justifiable in terms of the model. Finally, regarding the variable \( s \), we understand that there is a sort of “social cost” for a state that engages in violent repression against its citizens. Whether this involves members of the state apparatus being tried for war crimes or the involvement of international actors depends largely on the extent of the social cost, but this cost will always be a negative value and diminish the expected utility for a state.

**Findings and Analysis**

The Nash equilibrium is the stable state of a strategic interaction where no individual actor will unilaterally deviate, holding constant the choices of any other actors involved. Each player under Nash equilibrium is behaving rationally (choosing optimally) based on how other player(s) are anticipated to act, and understanding how a player will make a choice based on their beliefs regarding the other player provides key insights as the models are applied to specific cases. Examining the extensive-form game and solving for the Nash equilibria through backwards induction, we find two main takeaways:
iff $p \geq 0.74$

- Insurgent Group at start: NV
- State at (NV): C
- Payoffs associated are $(i, 0)$

iff $p \leq 0.74$

- Insurgent Group at start: NV, V
- State at (NV): R
- Payoffs associated are $(-c, i)$ and $(-c, w - c)$

First, when an insurgent group is strong, the Nash equilibrium of the strategic interaction lies at (NV, C). Nonviolence when a rebel group is strong relative to the state incurs fewer costs than violence for the rebel group, and concessions by the state eliminate both the social costs of repression and the costs of engaging violent conflict against a stronger rebel group, so the logic here is intuitive. On the other hand, however, we see that the insurgent group is indifferent between violence and nonviolence when it is weak and the state is expected to be repressive.

What accounts for outcomes beyond the Nash equilibrium of this model? We must factor in the discrepancy between the state’s beliefs regarding rebel capacity and the rebel group’s actual capacity. As the model indicates, while the insurgent group is sure regarding its capacity, the state is unsure of where, conceptually, it is making its decisions (i.e. whether it is operating on left side of the extensive-form game versus the right side of the model). What we might infer from the model therefore is the manner in which an insurgent group uses this logic to their advantage through signaling. As it is understood that the Nash equilibrium where the rebel group is strong is at (NV, C) and the Nash equilibrium where the rebel group is weak is at (V,
R) and (NV, R) because of the group’s indifference to the outcome (as it remains the same regardless of the group’s strategy), a rebel group may use nonviolence initially to attempt to signal its strength to the state. Since we expect to see rebel groups use violence only when \( p \leq 0.26 \), we assume the inverse also holds true: nonviolent strategies signal that \( p \geq 0.74 \), and the state, acting with uncertainty at this point, must interpret this signal and decide whether it assumes the rebel group is actually strong or not, as this choice will impact the payoffs for the state. To this end, the model provides an interesting insight into the statistical findings of Chenoweth and Stephan, and perhaps serves as an intervening variable that explains why we see a higher prevalence of nonviolent resistance movements succeeding.

**Case Studies**

As a note, I have adapted these situations using the original model as a rubric for each conflict. The Nash equilibria are still highlighted in yellow; decision paths that are not in line with the Nash equilibrium are highlighted in orange, and decision paths that lead to Nash equilibrium are highlighted in green.

*Catalonia, where violence has not yet broken out but the state has engaged in repression against the opposition:*

Although there was a period when the Spanish government offered to abort their mandated suspension of self-rule in exchange for concessions from the Catalonian president, specifically a call for regional elections, Puigdemont’s response was unclear.\(^\text{20}\) The Catalonian parliament

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declared independence, and the Spanish government initiated the implementation of article 155 of the Spanish constitution to establish direct rule, removed Puigdemont, ordered the dissolution of the Catalonian parliament, and scheduled new elections on December 21, 2017. The state did not initially issue indivisible demands, evidenced by their flexibility in negotiating with the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party to study the possibility of reforms and their offer to allow self-rule in exchange for regional elections, but the Catalonian parliament did by fully declaring independence, thus changing the strategy profile of the Spanish government, leading it to impose direct rule.²¹

Tying the outcomes of the extensive-form game to the continuous-action space model, we can assume that Catalonia is categorically weaker than the Spanish government \((p \geq 0.74)\). Further, without complete information on Catalonia’s capacity, we can still assume that a weaker Catalonia relative to the Spanish government is more likely because the decision path of a weak Catalonia leads us to the Nash equilibrium. To this end, the model demonstrates that Catalonia’s indifference to violent or nonviolent strategies when it is weaker and allows us to predict that there is a greater probability of violence breaking out.

*Syria, where insurgent groups used violent strategies against a repressive state:*

The case of Syria is noteworthy in the context of these models because the Syrian opposition initially protested nonviolently, but they were met with brutal repression by the state. Bashar Al-Assad engaged in a very specific strategy profile, known as the grim trigger, whereby the Syrian opposition’s choice to enter the game and resist the state catalyzed a strategy of unrelenting repression, as he had calculated that “zero tolerance would head off an escalation.” In all subsequent iterations of the model, Al-Assad has committed the state to violent repression against the opposition, and thus the opposition has used violent strategies in response to Al-Assad’s grim trigger strategy profile. Al-Assad’s demands were indivisible: full control of Syria. These demands shifted rebel strategies towards violence. However, since the rebels initially used nonviolent strategies, we must assume the probability that they are stronger than the state is $0.26 \leq 0.53$ and decreasing over time as violence is used to a much greater extent than nonviolence.

This case clearly shows the logic behind the factor of indifference that the model captures. Since we assume the rebels are weaker than the state given the outcomes on the extended-form game, it is no surprise that they easily shifted between nonviolence and violence, as the payoffs were the same in either outcome. Thus, the game remains in Nash equilibrium for the duration of the interaction, until the rebels lose to the state.


23 ibid.
Egypt, where the state granted broad concessions to a nonviolent resistance movement:

What separates the Egyptian case from the other two? Why did Mubarak concede totally and almost immediately (within 18 days of the start of protests)? The discrepancy lies either in the totality of the protesters’ demands and significantly lower demands issued by the state, or in a high probability of a strong opposition force. Through firsthand accounts from officers, it is understood that the number of protesters overwhelmed the police force, forcing them to retreat and lose control over the country.\(^2\) Analyzing the case through the models, we assume that the likelihood that the opposition was strong relative to the state is \(p \geq 0.74\). The fact that the same game played itself out under Morsi supports the conclusion that a high probability of a strong opposition force relative to the state had a greater effect in influencing the Egyptian case. This logic is effectively captured by the model. The outcome of this interaction is (NV, C), which is the Nash equilibrium for a strong opposition force. We can assume from the model that the opposition’s choice to use nonviolence successfully signaled to the state the capacity of the group, and this signaling on the part of the protesters forced Mubarak to resign.

LIMITATIONS, INTERVENING VARIABLES, AND FURTHER RESEARCH

In the case of Venezuela, the models cannot adequately capture scenarios that do not have at least a cohesive resistance movement opposing the state. The Venezuelan opposition is best described as a loose network of coalitions that tap into popular support against the state but do not necessarily wield that support for their own ends. While there are near-daily protests and occasional mass mobilizations in the streets of Caracas, these protests are organized more individually and on a more local level by a range of organizations, including but not limited to: Popular Will, Justice First, A New Era, Democratic Action, Copei, Movimiento Estudiantil, etc. Due to the fractures within the greater movement at the macro level, and since there is not a sole, clearly defined insurgent group that can bear the costs of repression and violence and make calculations on this basis, the models cannot capture the interaction between Venezuela’s protesters and Maduro’s government. A separate model would be useful in this case to demonstrate how the state’s influence in creating localized food shortages serves as entry-deterrent to deter insurgent groups from organizing a fully-fledged resistance.

Regarding insurgent use of nonviolence as a signal to the state of its capabilities, given our understanding of the Nash equilibrium and as the Egyptian case illustrated, the argument can be made that this fact serves as an intervening variable that explains why we see a higher prevalence of nonviolent resistance movements succeeding. It may not be actual rebel capabilities, per se, or even the extent of rebel demands that are influencing state decision-making but rather the state’s beliefs, influenced by the rebel group’s signals.

A limitation of the extensive-form game is that it represents a one-off game where each player makes one decision and thus only captures the interaction at this very broad level, effectively ignoring key differences across time and space within any civil conflict. However, we can conceptualize how the game plays itself out and repeats ad infinitum, with the N variable (Nature, which represents the endowments of the rebel group at the onset of the interaction) constantly changing as the insurgent group’s capabilities change. However, even this variable N presents a challenge, as the model itself is not able to capture what influences it. Rather, as discussed in the literature review, there is a separate school of thought that seeks to explain the factors behind these rebel group endowments. These models, based on game theory and rationalist theory, are unable to explain this dynamic.

These models, additionally, assume absolute rationality in all actors involved. Game theory assumes that an actor will seek to maximize their payoffs in any and all interactions. A common issue to this end lies in defining, limiting, isolating or accounting for every possible variable that would influence a player’s strategy and the game’s outcome. In order to create a model,

certain variables will inherently be cut out of the calculations. As such, there are only specific research questions that can be answered by game theory. However, in attempting to explain the rationality underscoring insurgent use of violence and nonviolence, game theoretic models provide key insights not offered by other methodologies.

Further study of the rational decisions to choose violent or nonviolent strategies should develop an infinitely repeated game with a discount factor which would be able to model how the interaction develops over time (though not necessarily across space) especially as the trend seems to be that civil conflicts are becoming more protracted. The discount factor in this model accounts for the relative changes in the payoff structure over time, as conflict becomes costlier and costlier to maintain, or as the insurgent group’s power relative to the state itself changes. This model would be represented as $G(\infty, \delta)$, where $G$ specifies the structure of each round (actors, actions, preferences), $\infty$ represents the time-limit of the game (infinite in this case, but any finite time period can be substituted), and $\delta$ represents the discount factor (how payoffs change over time).

**Conclusions**

Calculating the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of these models, one can conclude the specific decisions we expect insurgents and states to make. Rebel capabilities relative to the state and the extent of state/rebel demands in a strategic interaction provide key insights into the rational decisions to use violence or nonviolence in a civil conflict, and these insights are effectively captured in my models. It should be noted that these models are prescriptive and only model behavior that states and rebels should engage in. The utility of the models lies in their ability to provide rationalist explanations for the outcomes of each scenario. The validity of the model’s predictive and prescriptive capabilities will be tested over time as situations develop and conflicts play themselves out, but so far the intuition behind the current case studies and predictions is sound.

Additionally, these models are not static, and can be updated in real time as new information arises. Over the course of this research, as events have unfolded in Catalonia, a number of changes were made to the model to reflect new information. Overall, with the exception of Venezuela for previously stated reasons, the models were able to accurately capture the interaction in each case examined (i.e. the actual course of events matched the Nash equilibria), and provided useful insights to better understand the reasons behind the actions rebels and states take. Having a better understanding of the dynamics at play and being able to make recommendations on strategy profiles to optimize outcomes can prove beneficial in mitigating the potential for violence or making effective predictions for future conflicts.
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**About the Author**

Felipe Herrera is a third-year student in the School of International Service where he is studying peace, global security, and conflict resolution with a regional focus on Latin America. His research has primarily focused on US foreign policy towards Cuba, the social/political reintegration of reformed gang members in Guatemala, and international security through the lens of game theory. Felipe is a member of Delta Phi Epsilon Professional Foreign Service Fraternity, serving as Professional Chair of the fraternity, and he also serves his peers as President of the School of International Service Undergraduate Council and Associate Vice President of the American University Student Government.
The Relationship Between Sanction Effectiveness and Target Domestic Political Structure

By Chloe Reum
University of Pennsylvania

Abstract

The question of whether sanctions are effective as a U.S. foreign policy tool remains a contentious issue in academia and has received renewed attention in the realm of U.S. foreign policy discourse since the 1990s, particularly with the introduction of so-called “smart” sanctions. Scholars continue to debate and ultimately deny the utility of sanctions as an effective tool of foreign policy, leading to the conclusion that sanctions have a poor track record and are generally ineffective in prompting significant policy change in the target countries. Yet, in practice, U.S. leaders have not removed sanctions from the menu of coercive foreign policy tools and frequently use sanctions as an instrument to respond to objectionable conduct and policies of foreign governments as an alternative or complement to diplomacy or military force. Consequently, this essay seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions by examining the relationship between the type of sanctions (i.e. unilateral vs. multilateral, comprehensive vs. targeted) and the targeted country’s regime type or political structure. The case studies of U.S. sanctions against South Africa in 1986 and Russia in 2014 show that sanctions are more likely to effectuate policy or institutional change if the sanctioned country is a government accountable to its electorate (such as a democracy or a republic), while sanctions imposed on rigidly authoritarian, military, and/or totalitarian single-party regimes are less likely to achieve their goals.

Introduction: The Use of Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool

For policymakers, economic sanctions have persevered as the foreign policy tool of choice to respond to international conflicts and objectionable conduct of foreign governments owing to the increasingly integrated global economy of the 21st century. Economic sanctions used for foreign policy purposes are punitive measures employed by an initiator state to “limit a target state’s access to economic resources or cultural and social engagement.”¹ An initiator state may

¹ Risa A. Brooks. “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?” Security Studies 11.4
target another actor with sanctions in order to achieve a political goal, signal its resolve to the international community, punish or deter violations of international behavioral norms, affect regime change or alter unfavorable government structures, and/or elicit a behavior or policy change from the target state or non-state actor that aligns with international order conventions or national interests. Sanctions can take the form of either trade sanctions, restricting the target country’s exports and/or imports, or financial sanctions, which hinder international transactions such as foreign aid or freeze the target country’s foreign assets. Sanctions can also be classified as “comprehensive” to the extent that they impede overall commercial activity with a target country, tending to cause more damaging economic consequences on the target country’s population as a whole, or “smart” by targeting specific individuals, businesses, or political groups. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has shifted away from “comprehensive” to “smart” sanctions as a more ethical and humanitarian alternative that minimizes the suffering of innocent civilians while directly targeting the leaders able to effectuate the policy demands of the initiator state. These economic measures may coerce a target government to change its political behavior based on the calculation by target leaders that the issues at stake are not worth a potential drastic decrease in national economic welfare or the mobilization of a domestic popular uprising. As a result, in practice, sanctions tend to be regarded as a viable foreign policy tool alternative to diplomacy, which may be too weak or unpersuasive to effectuate behavioral change, and military intervention or force, which is oftentimes viewed as too heavy-handed and costly.

When it comes to evaluating sanctions, the pertinent question is not simply whether they “work” or not. Rather, as emphasized by leading scholar Kimberly Ann Elliott, the guiding research question is under what circumstances and conditions are international economic sanctions most likely to be effective? In other words, what variables affect the degree of effectiveness? To further narrow the scope of this question, this paper seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. or U.S.-led sanctions through the analysis of their relationship to one key variable (among various other complex deciding factors): the targeted country’s regime type or domestic political structure. However, there exist several limitations in assessing the degree to whether U.S. sanctions achieve their stated purpose: (i) the number of sanction case studies targeting democratic governments is few as liberal states generally share peaceful cooperative

norms related to democratic political culture, and (ii) it is difficult to isolate the causal effect of sanction effectiveness in contexts where multiple factors are often at work. Despite these limitations, it is possible to draw a strong correlation between sanction effectiveness and regime type.

**Literature Review**

The question of whether sanctions are effective and capable of delivering sustained ramifications on target countries remains a contentious issue in academia. On the one hand, leading scholars in the field such as Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliot (HSE) have concluded that economic sanctions have a poor track record in prompting significant policy change based on their study of 115 cases that found sanctions successful only 34% of the time.5 On the other hand, Robert Pape re-examined HSE’s data set and deduced that only 5% of the sanction cases were successful solely on the basis of economic coercion, as opposed to the other 29% of sanction cases that were highly influenced by additional factors such as the complementary use of direct or indirect force.6 These results highlight the substantial methodological disagreement among academics over how to measure the individual role of sanctions, particularly when they are used in conjunction with other methods, and the inherent difficulty in measuring sanctions’ effectiveness when no control group exists to compare what outcomes would have occurred in their absence.7 However, most academics reluctantly admit that sanctions, or “wars without bullets,” remain one of the primary foreign policy tools most often utilized by leaders in an attempting to reduce civil strife, secure human rights, promote democracy, counter terrorism, and suppress nuclear proliferation. The contrast between academia and policymakers’ stance on sanctions reflects what David Baldwin has termed the “sanctions paradox,” the notion that despite the overwhelming evidence that sanctions rarely achieve their stated goals, leaders continue to resort to this device simply because military force is viewed as too costly and unpopular while diplomacy does not display enough force. Nevertheless, leaders feel they must demonstrate their resolve to “do something.”

As stated, scholarship on sanctions has shifted to focus on what causal mechanisms and conditions render sanctions most successful.⁹ At the core, there exists a broad consensus among scholars such as Peter Rudolf, David Cortright, George A. Lopez, HSE, and Daniel Drezner that sanctions are theoretically likely to succeed in leveraging bargaining power and attaining their stated goals when (i) the disputed issue is of low salience for the targeted state and the costs of defiance (threat of sanction escalation, relationship degradation) outweigh the costs of compliance (compliance promoting greater external security, stability, and

5  Ibid.
international political well-being); (ii) the initiator state’s demands are limited, clearly defined, and aimed at realistic, concrete political behavior modifications; (iii) sanction implementation is quick and decisive; (iv) sanctions are imposed on a multilateral basis; and (v) the target state is a friendly democracy. However, sanctions effective in one context may fail in another based on numerous factors. In particular, Johan Galtung criticizes Donald Losman’s conventional notion that the success of economic sanctions represents “the extent of disutility experienced by the target”10 since (i) there exist several counter measures available to the targeted state to extensively nullify the degree of economic damage (e.g., by spurring domestic production, extending to other global markets, or seeking out substitute goods) and (ii) economic value-deprivation may induce increased political integration, as opposed to political opposition, through the “rally-around-the-flag” effect.11 As echoed by Gary Wilson, “the international community becomes perceived locally as the villain, as opposed to the entity the sanctions were supposed to weaken,” rendering the sanctions largely ineffective.12

Sanctions are also heavily criticized by scholars due to their demonstrated undesirable externalities. By definition, sanctions have double-edged effects on both the initiator state and the target with immediate losses of economic efficiency and reliability on both sides (e.g., the loss of undelivered regular exports/imports and future orders, administrative adjustment costs to recreate competitive trade patterns, etc.). However, as argued by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, sanctions usually impose greater costs on targeted states than sender states as the sender state tends to be the less dependent party in the interdependent economic relationship.13 For example, research by Gary Hufbauer, Kimberly Elliot, Tess Cyrus, and Elizabeth Winston demonstrates that the overall impact of sanctions in 1995 on the U.S. economy (during which the U.S. levied sanctions against a staggering total of 26 countries) amounted to a trivial 0.02% of U.S. GNP and a loss in U.S. exports constituting a cost of five cents for every dollar.14 On the other hand, scholars like Robert Pape emphasize the unacceptably high human costs of comprehensive sanctions on the innocent civilians of target states, who, particularly in autocratic states, have little influence over their government’s behavior or policy decisions.15


11 A political science notion demonstrating that sanctions or other means of economic deprivation implemented by a foreign country may be perceived by the target country’s population as a direct attack; leaders of the targeted country can experience a boost in popularity and increased nationalism. Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions,” *World Politics*, vol. 19 (October 1966-July 1967), pp. 378-416.


As Thomas Weiss argues, while initiator states ideally hope that sanctions will generate structural and political change, oftentimes sanctions instead serve as “a catalyst for worsening socio-economic and related conditions, or…may exacerbate deteriorating conditions that already exist in the economic sphere.”\(^{16}\) From a utilitarian perspective, Joy Gordon debates the ethicality of comprehensive sanctions as they reduce vulnerable civilians to nothing more than a means to an end with human damage and “suffering as a means of persuasion.”\(^{17}\) As a result, since the 1990s, literature in the field has advocated for the use of smart sanctions, which more narrowly and precisely sanction powerful elite supporters of the targeted regime while imposing minimal hardship on the mass population, as the negative collateral impacts of comprehensive trade sanctions have become more apparent.\(^{18}\)

Many scholars have chosen to focus on Iraq during the 1990s as an instructive example of comprehensive economic sanctions that produced significant humanitarian and political costs on the country but were ultimately ineffective in achieving the stated political goals of (i) eliminating Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction; (ii) coercing Saddam Hussein into full compliance with the requisite UN Security Council resolutions 687 and 1284; and (iii) forcing Hussein out of power with the long term objective of demilitarizing and disarming Iraq.\(^{19}\) David Cortright and George A. Lopez attribute the U.S.’s unsuccessful sanctions effort to the autocratic nature of the Iraqi Ba’athist regime and its degree of control over domestic political discourse/institutions that rendered “domestic opposition groups and reform constituencies unable to exert pressure for political change.”\(^{20}\) Within their individual scholarly publications, Meghan O’Sullivan, Risa Brooks, Richard Haass, Evan Thomas, and Gregory Gause focus on the tactics Saddam Hussein and his elite circle employed to circumvent and nullify the sanctions, which included import substitution techniques (i.e., coercive tactics toward farmers to increase domestic agricultural production), oil-smuggling, black market utilization to transact foreign exchange and reconstitute its military, forceful control over the distribution of goods, reallocation of state resources away from the civilian population, and exploitation of the declining humanitarian conditions as a propaganda tool to retain political dominance (otherwise known as the “rally-around-the-flag” effect).\(^{21}\) Consequently, the

majority of Iraq case studies of U.S./U.N. comprehensive sanctions, while acknowledging their effect in considerably weakening Iraq militarily and economically, believe that scant political gains were attained at the cost of extensive, deplorable human suffering, thus demonstrating that high levels of economic impact do not always induce target state compliance.

**Methodology**

Through examination of real-world case studies of recent U.S.-led sanctions in South Africa and Russia, this essay hypothesizes that sanctions are more likely to spur institutional policy change if the targeted country is a government accountable to its electorate (e.g., a democracy or a republic), while sanctions imposed on authoritarian, military, or totalitarian single-party regimes are less likely to achieve their stated goals.

The “Domestic Politics” theory, encompassing concepts of public opinion and domestic lobby influence, provides a framework for understanding the relationship between sanction effectiveness and domestic political and governmental structures. It contends that government leaders accountable to their electorate and responsive to domestic opinion will act in the interest of their people and the well-being of their country; therefore, in regard to sanctions as exemplified by Peter Rudolf’s “Classical Model Theory of Sanctions,” a rationally calculating government accountable to its citizenry and their welfare will ultimately make concessions to the aims of sanctions when the domestic political, economic, and human costs of sanctions become too high. On the other hand, the domestic political supposition hypothesizes that authoritarian or totalitarian regimes (characterized by limited political freedoms, limited social/political mobilization, and censorship) that are not accountable to their populace or threatened by a loss of power or influence will act in their own self-interest and insulate themselves from sanctions’ economic repercussions by reallocating resources at the expense of their general population.

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Sanction Case Studies on South Africa and Russia

South Africa

U.S.-led comprehensive sanctions imposed against South Africa in 1986 provide an instructive example of how a primarily democratic, electorate-accountable government chose to end its sanctioned policy in response to domestic pressure from influential interest groups’ dissatisfaction with stringent international economic measures. By use of sanctions, the U.S. hoped to undermine South Africa’s apartheid policy that encouraged the segregation and disenfranchising of black people, spur the establishment of a multiracial democracy, and curb regional violence and human rights abuses. South Africa’s government from 1984 to 1994 functioned as a “Tricameral” Parliamentary Republic, a multiparty democratic system within the confines of enfranchised white, Indian, and colored populations. While the government structure institutionally excluded its majority black population from political power, it fundamentally operated within a democratic system.26

By limiting imports of iron, steel, textiles, coal, and agricultural goods; restricting exports of arms, petroleum, and nuclear material; banning financial loan and investment transactions; and even prohibiting South African participation in international sports competitions, South Africa experienced significant economic impairment and international isolation. With a dramatic reduction in international demand for South African goods (U.S. sanctions alone reduced the apartheid regime’s exports by a third) and in the availability of imports, business sector productivity, employment, and overall economic growth was stifled.27 In addition, U.S. private companies liquidated their investments and withdrew business ventures in South Africa due to rising costs of continued operation there, and foreign commercial banks called in their existing loans as a result of increased South African political uncertainty and risks. The U.S. General Accounting Office estimated that $10.8 billion in loan repayments and capital flight flowed out of South Africa from 1985 to 1989.28 In total, the sanctions cost South Africa $354 million annually or 0.5% of GNP, an increase in food prices by 40% from 1988 to 1989, and an approximated 30% inflation rate, further exacerbating already harsh economic conditions.29 Consequently, with South African businesses rendered less competitive and sidelined from global trade transactions and the politically-influential white population subjected to a sharp decrease in quality of life, the white business and elite communities utilized their political clout and access to democratic institutions to mobilize in opposition to the government’s apartheid policy and exert internal pressure on policymakers to spur a course of reform. Further, the sanctions elicited stronger consensus among both the black and white South Africans that the future of the apartheid system was simply unsustainable, and legitimized

the domestic anti-apartheid “Free South Africa Movement.”

The aforementioned adverse effects of the sanctions (economic costs, international isolation, and possibility of further sanction tightening) and rising domestic unrest led the South African head-of-state Frederik W. de Klerk to respond to the concerns of his constituency. Consequently, in 1990, he initiated a significant transition in the Nationalist Party by distancing itself from apartheid rhetoric and engaging in a policy of fundamental reform and good faith negotiations with the African National Congress. As explained by de Klerk, “surely [the U.S. sanctions] focused the minds of people on the need for change. Surely it made people realize that we were in a dead-end street, that there would be ever-growing isolation, and therefore surely it influenced people.”

The aggregate costs of sanctions to the overall economy and their implications for voters’ standard of living (i.e., the wellbeing of the white population) drove the decision of policymakers to spearhead dramatic policy revisions in regard to racial equality, as demonstrated by a 69% white-population majority general election vote in support of negotiations to eliminate apartheid and engage with the black majority. Therefore, this empirical case study demonstrates that sanctions are most likely to exert a political or behavioral change (i) in governmental systems accountable to their populace and sensitive to public domestic and international opinion and (ii) when victimizing potentially influential domestic groups, prompting them to lobby their governments.

**Russia**

In contrast, the U.S. (and E.U.) imposition of “smart” sanctions on Russian wealthy individuals, officials, and businesses following President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 have been largely ineffective in deterring further Russian military intervention in eastern Ukraine or prompting the government to abide by its Minsk commitments, a 13 point-plan outlining Russia’s commitment to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from Ukraine. Since then, the U.S. has expanded sanctions in response to Russia’s domestic human rights abuses (e.g., suppression of public dissent) and its escalating involvement in Syria and relationship with the Assad regime. Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election has recently provided additional impetus for passing new sanctions legislation. Sanctions have targeted state-controlled producers and finance sources through restrictions on energy sector investments, bans of arm-sales, and bank penalties to undermine its state revenue stream, as

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well as Russian oligarchs and senior foreign-policy officials close to Putin in order to destabilize the regime and produce substantial pressure for policy change.\textsuperscript{35}

Sanctions have had and continue to have adverse economic effects on Russian society with a drop in foreign direct investment from $69 billion in 2013 to $6.8 billion in 2015, a 57\% depreciation rate of the ruble against the dollar from 2014 to 2016, and a 35\% decrease in Russian GDP from 2014 to 2015.\textsuperscript{36} However, while Russia has faced serious economic difficulties caused by the dual shocks of sanctions and declining global oil prices, U.S. sanctions in coordination with Europe have not been successful in achieving their stated goals. They have disproportionately affected the civilian population with skyrocketing food prices while having less impact on Putin’s close circle of oligarchs that the sanctions were principally intended to target. Since Russia’s domestic government takes the form of an authoritarian oligarchy, or virtually a kleptocracy, Putin’s inner elite circle’s loyalty to the regime is highly correlated to the protection the regime can guarantee them.\textsuperscript{37} As a result, Putin has shown “no reservations about sacrificing Russians’ well-being to protect his inner circle of political support” and has prioritized strong centralized leadership over the democratic interests of his population and the economic welfare of his country.\textsuperscript{38} Putin has also been successful in circumventing external import bans by promoting self-sufficient, import-substitution industries such as dairy and meat and reallocating state resources to evade and insulate his inner circle from the harsh economic conditions engendered by sanctions.

Moreover, sanctions have had the counterproductive effect of catalyzing a sense of profound Russian nationalism, known as the “rallying effect,” effectively reinforcing existing authoritarian Russian power structures.\textsuperscript{39} Instead of inciting widespread domestic opposition to the regime in response to its prioritization of military might over the societal and economic grievances caused by sanctions, Putin has instead received a boost in popularity and strengthened domestic support for his authoritarian leadership as demonstrated by a surge in his approval rating to 86\% at the height of sanctions in 2015 and his recent announcement to seek a fourth term as president in March 2018. As stated by prominent scholar Olena Lennon, “Putin has successfully blamed Russia’s economic woes on American greed and interventionism, and the nationalism he peddles as a consolation for domestic woes is flourishing.”\textsuperscript{40} This paradigmatic condition can also be attributed to Russia’s culturally traditional strong sense of patriotism.

\textsuperscript{39} Rudolf, “Sanctions in International Relations.”
and emotional ties to the “Motherland” and its leadership, which has allowed for a much more durable, empowering rallying effect.\textsuperscript{41}

With the absence of powerful oppositional voices to his party, Putin has enjoyed free reign to control the internal flow of ideas and information within state-controlled media, using its influence to distract the blame for Russian economic and societal woes from the Russian leadership while characterizing the U.S. and its sanctions as the scapegoat. Consequently, state control over the media has further contributed to fortifying the nationalistic rallying: “The themes and issues that are repeated in television news coverage become the priorities of viewers…and become especially influential as criteria for evaluating public officials. Close attention to the news broadcast by state media might lead to a change in opinion (from disapproval to support) about the president.”\textsuperscript{42}

Unfortunately, despite the continued expansion and re-impositions of U.S. “smart” sanctions from 2014 to 2017, Russia persists in displaying the limitations of sanctions as a policy tool, particularly due to its authoritarian, oligarchic domestic political structure that enables Putin and his high-level officials to insulate themselves from the adverse effects of internal public pressures or opposition. The sanctions have yielded no concrete policy gains or behavioral changes as the Kremlin retains its foothold in eastern Ukraine, continues its militaristic presence in the Syrian civil war, and has undertaken cyber warfare and interference in domestic U.S. political affairs, perhaps in part as retribution for the economic sanctions.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Projections for the Future}

The two empirical case studies above demonstrate that sanctions, whether comprehensive or “smart,” are unlikely to bring about regime change or substantial policy or behavioral reversal in an autocratic government target. However, sanctions remain an integral part of U.S. foreign policy today as exemplified by the current U.S. escalation of sanctions on North Korea. Faced with a situation in which productive diplomatic channels are practically non-existent between the DPRK and the U.S. and mobilizing military action on the Korean Peninsula would spark a deadly and potentially-nuclear regional war, U.S. and U.N. sanctions have offered a relatively uncostly alternative to convey the U.S. policy stance and resolve to constrain North Korea from the relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. The sanctions regime has comprised both comprehensive measures targeting the supply, sale, or transfer of coal, iron, seafood, lead, textiles, oil, petroleum products, and natural gas and “smart” measures targeting North Korean businesses, individuals, banks, and sources of funding.


\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, pp. 9.

While it is too early assert with confidence, current evidence and the reasoning behind this paper's thesis point to the conclusion that sanctions will not be effective in persuading Kim Jong-Un to halt his current course of action.\textsuperscript{44} As stated by Gary Hufbauer, a trade expert at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, “historically, sanctions have not been effective on dictatorships, and there is no autocracy which is more autocratic than Kim Jong-Un’s dynasty in North Korea.”\textsuperscript{45} Strict economic sanctions have disproportionately affected the livelihood of North Korean citizens; however, in a country that subscribes to communist ideologies under a tightly-controlling dictatorship unaccountable in practice to its populace, the government has chosen to insulate itself from potential public domestic discontent and international opinion and prioritize its personal agenda over the well-being of its people, as it had done previously under Kim Jong Il’s regime in the 1990s during the Great North Korean famine. As in the case of Russia, increased domestic suffering has, at least for the short-term, legitimized the leadership’s claims that “shortages of food and other goods are the fault of foreign powers” and reinforced the country’s will to defend itself.\textsuperscript{46} Additionally, the government heavily controls North Korean radio and TV broadcasts to promulgate anti-Western propaganda depicting an unfairly victimized North Korea.\textsuperscript{47}

China, North Korea’s closest ally and trading partner (accounting for 90% of North Korean trade) has undertaken the necessary steps to partner with the U.S. in cutting off Pyongyang’s sources of revenue to finance its nuclear/missile operations. Even with the decrease in Chinese fuel exports to North Korea by 99.6% and imports by China of North Korean coal down by 71.6% since last year, the North Korean economy has been able to withstand increased global pressure by sustaining lucrative commercial relationships with African countries, stockpiling goods and foreign currency to finance imported goods, and using a complex network of banks and shell companies to launder money. Therefore, as painful as economic sanctions may be to North Korea and its leadership, Kim Jong Un has a compelling incentive to skirt the sanctions and build a weapons program that elevates him to the status of other world powers; as a result, economic suffering is unlikely to prod the North Korean leadership any closer to full denuclearization.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

In conclusion, empirical case study experience has shown that sanctions, whether comprehensive or “smart,” are unlikely to bring about regime change or a substantial short-

\textsuperscript{44} In addition, North Korea’s closed, clandestine society makes monitoring and measuring the impacts of sanctions difficult.


\textsuperscript{47} As stated by the regime in a propaganda newspaper, “North Korea will continue to build up its “self-defensive nuclear deterrent in order to put a definite end to the US imperialists’ outrageous nuclear threat and blackmail.”
term reversal of a major policy course or bad behavior in an autocratic state target. However, in cases where doing nothing, conducting diplomacy, or mobilizing military action are demonstrably inappropriate, useless, or inadequate U.S. foreign policy options, sanctions may offer a relatively uncostly means to signal a policy stance or demonstrate a resolve (and the possibility of future hostile/military intentions) that may serve to constrain the target or make it less capable of further objectionable conduct. Although limitations exist when analyzing and evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions due to the difficulty of isolating their causal effect since multiple factors are often at work and the limited number of case studies of U.S. sanctions implemented against democratic governments, the case studies of U.S. sanction implementation against South Africa in 1986 and Russia in 2014 unveil a strong correlation between regime type and sanction effectiveness. Consequently, with repeated examples of ineffectiveness of sanctions in regard to autocratic regimes, future U.S. policymakers must consider the targeted state’s domestic political structure as a primary factor in assessing whether sanctions should be employed in a particular instance.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Chloe Reum is a junior in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania studying International Relations with a concentration in International Law and a minor in French and Francophone Studies. Chloe grew up in a bi-national, bilingual household in Chicago (native Parisian mother, American father) and has experienced a full immersion of each culture separately, going to school in America and fully integrating herself into French life when visiting family annually in Paris, Normandy, and the Cote-d’Azur and Champagne-Ardenne regions. Her internship experiences at the think tank Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques in Paris, the U.S. State Department, and Penn Lauder Institute’s “Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program” have furthered her interest in researching issues relating to foreign policy tools, international human rights and humanitarian law, and migration and citizenship. In her spare time, Chloe heads the University of Pennsylvania’s John Marshall Pre-Law Honor Society, and mentors and teaches the French language to children from disadvantaged backgrounds at the Lea School in Philadelphia. Chloe hopes to pursue her interest in foreign policy by going to Law School and specializing in international law.
The Responsibility to Protect and Its Weaknesses: Reforming a Practice to Protect Oppressed Groups

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ABSTRACT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 1999 intervention in Kosovo has led to a debate regarding the future of state sovereignty and the role of the international community concerning the preservation of life and liberty. Arguments which favored conditional sovereignty over complete sovereignty began to garner support from Western democracies like the United States. Under this philosophy, states maintain unchecked control over their territories only if the respective governments protect their people from grave human rights infringements. This legal theory, designated the Responsibility to Protect, was legitimized through international covenants such as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and the 2005 World Summit. Since 2005, controversies regarding the Responsibility to Protect have arisen out of failures within the United Nations to subdue violent regimes. This study examines two specific examples, Libya and Syria, to determine where the United Nations erred, with the hopes of discovering courses of action which may be taken to improve the application of the Responsibility to Protect for future emergencies.

THE RISE OF R2P ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE

With the emergence of the 21st century, many United Nations member states have pursued the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as an aspect of international law. While the alleged reasoning behind R2P may be altruistic, with countries employing military force to protect citizens from mass atrocities when their own governments are unable or unwilling, its
application has sparked severe controversy in the international community. Recently, R2P has been successfully employed as the legal basis for the use of force in Libya and unsuccessfully utilized in similar arguments regarding Syria. In both situations, the weaknesses of R2P have led to disaster for the affected populations. Libya has faced serious issues concerning the rebuilding process after the fall of Gaddafi, while geopolitical ambitions between the permanent member states of the Security Council have halted humanitarian intervention missions from occurring in Syria. If these weaknesses are left unaddressed, R2P will prove to be inadequate relative to how it infringes upon state sovereignty and may ultimately be prohibited from entering into common law in the international legal system.

The 2005 World Summit marked a change regarding the use of force on the international stage. At the summit, the member states of the General Assembly swore to protect their populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and to protect populations through peaceful and non-peaceful means when [the populations’] governing bodies no longer uphold this responsibility.” By accepting the responsibility to protect citizens from mass atrocities, the members of the United Nations also began to codify a legal system whereby states may deploy armed forces to protect citizens of other member states when their respective governments are no longer able or willing to provide these basic protections. Although the 2005 World Summit marked a turning point for R2P, the concepts brought forth in this summit were building upon practices that were already introduced in the 1990s and early 2000s with the likes of NATO intervention in Kosovo and the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Such prior practices may have helped with establishing international acceptance for these new norms. Among these norms were the responsibilities for the international community to “prevent deadly conflict and other forms of man-made catastrophes, … react to situations of compelling need of human protection, and … to rebuild durable peace.” The lofty goals set during the 2005 World Summit sought to release some of the constraints built around unchecked state sovereignty, which disallowed military interventions except when national security or international peace were at risk. This new framework would provide more exceptions to the restriction of force, while codifying many guidelines that ought to be followed before, during, and after military intervention.

4 Williams, “Responsibility to Protect,” 537.
5 Williams, “Responsibility to Protect,” 538.
6 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect,” XI-XIII.
The report *The Responsibility to Protect*, published by the ICISS in December of 2001, offers the greatest insight into the guidelines and restrictions behind R2P today. In it, the ICISS outlines R2P as applicable when “a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it” by claiming that non-intervention, as a principle of state sovereignty, is overridden by the “international responsibility to protect.”7 Beyond explicitly defining R2P’s role in the international legal system, specifications were provided that detail when intervention is appropriate and what steps should be taken before resorting to force. For instance, force may only be permitted in the face of “large scale loss of life” or “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’” and only if the duties invoked by the responsibility to prevent atrocities before they begin and to react to atrocities through peaceful means have first been exercised.8 Under these barriers, the international norm of non-intervention can be preserved, thus maintaining the sovereignty of states which are unable to protect themselves through other means.9 Although *The Responsibility to Protect* is only a report laying out the elements of a doctrine as opposed to a legally binding treaty, the principles within the document have set the standard for how humanitarian intervention is permitted through the Security Council and has laid down the foundation for R2P as a part of common law in the international legal system.

When the theory used to justify R2P is put into practice, the concept’s weaknesses become rapidly apparent. To limit the application of R2P to only the most egregious of atrocities and to ensure that force could not be applied unilaterally, the power to determine when to intervene was granted to the UN Security Council.10 Given that Article 2(7) of the UN Charter does not allow for military intervention in issues “which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,” the only way in which force could lawfully be applied would be through enforcement measures bestowed to the Security Council in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.11 Unfortunately, the Security Council has proven to be inconsistent in its application of R2P primarily due to the geopolitical goals of its permanent members.12 A lasting detriment to the United Nations, born out of the post-WWII international political climate when the UN Charter was drafted, is the application of the veto given to each of the Security Council’s permanent members.13 Allowing any of the five states to block proposed Security Council resolutions immediately removes one of the main principle behind R2P: that no state will govern the prospects of using military force unilaterally. While providing the Security Council the responsibility to determine when to apply military force is entirely legitimate within the structure of the United Nations in theory, the reality of the Council leads to an inconsistent

7 Ibid., XI.
8 Ibid., XIII.
9 Ibid., 12.
and delayed application of intervention in the face of atrocities, as can be witnessed through Security Council proceedings during the crises in both Libya and Syria.

**LIBYA AND THE FAILURE TO REBUILD**

In response to demands made by the Libyan people during the Arab Spring, dictator Muammar Gaddafi utilized the military to brutally massacre protesters and bombard their demonstrations. The Security Council’s initial response had been swift with the issuance of Resolution 1973, which called for a ceasefire, no-fly zone, and sanctions to be placed on Libya. As noted by Professor Mojtaba Mahdavi, “The Libyan case was the first occasion where no member of the UNSC objected to the implementation of the R2P doctrine, since it came into existence in 2005.” Additionally, the Security Council had been able to garner the support of the Arab League, which provided implementation of the resolution with regional support as well as greater international legitimacy. Once forces were used to inflict airstrikes on Libya, the Arab league dropped their support, with the League’s Secretary General Amr Moussa claiming, “what has happened in Libya differs from the goal of imposing a no-fly zone and what we want is the protection of civilians and not bombing other civilians.” The intervention in Libya had extended beyond what was originally intended in Resolution 1973, thus infringing upon the norms of R2P as outlined by the ICISS. Two of the guidelines behind R2P are to ensure that the objectives of the intervention are outlined before force is used and that these objectives are followed. While it is true that plans for intervention can change as circumstances develop, the clear extension of force beyond what was originally drafted in the Security Council resolution could be construed as unlawful since the measures used did not receive explicit support from the Security Council. This increase in scope ultimately proved that the states which carried out implementation of R2P could be prone to expanding their influence once given the green light to act. Tragically, the airstrikes would be only the beginning of the controversies to rise out of Libya.

Although Muammar Qaddafi died six years ago, bringing an end to his decades long regime, the situation in Libya remains disastrous, with epidemic levels of violence still ensuing. It was very important for the international community to ensure that rebuilding measures would be successfully incorporated into the intervention mission in Libya, especially once Qaddafi had been killed. Globally, there was still significant debate over the scope in which humanitarian intervention could be utilized, with countries like China and Russia barely acknowledging that there may be instances where R2P could be justified. For instance, in 2006, China’s former

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16 Ibid., 19.
19 Morris, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 204-205.
ambassador to the United Nations issued a statement declaring R2P may be acceptable in matters of “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.” However, the statement added that R2P must not be abused or expanded beyond this limited purpose. In the case of Libya, however, military intervention ultimately concluded with the death of Qaddafi and a profound change in regime. Considering the severity of this extension of R2P from providing citizens protection to changing the Libyan government, it became vital for the United Nations to aid with the rebuilding process in Libya, as outlined in chapter five of the ICISS report on R2P. Nevertheless, such obligations were ignored since measures were not taken to ensure that Libya was able to make a steady transition to a politically stable form of government in the face of a serious power vacuum.

Among theorists, there is a commonly held view that “the aftermath of an intervention is important to the justice of the intervention itself.” With respect to R2P, such a belief is often ignored, as exemplified in the case of Libya. Presently, reports continue to surface regarding the massive slave market in Libya and how the country’s judicial system remains staunchly politicized. The determination that the rebuilding of a country is a primarily domestic matter conflicts with the beliefs concerning “just wars,” which are usually justified as being fought for moral reasons, with the wellbeing of the people living in the affected countries in mind. “Just wars” are comparable to humanitarian interventions for this reason, although the two forms of conflict are viewed differently in the academic sphere. If western countries are to continue to argue that R2P is meant as a measure to prevent human suffering and large-scale atrocities, rebuilding measures must become mandatory. As the international community continues to be neglectful of its obligations, opponents of R2P will continue to produce legitimate criticisms of the legal principle, which places the future of R2P further in question.

THE INABILITY TO INTERVENE IN SYRIA

The United Nations’s handling of the civil war in Syria documents an important factor of the modern interpretation of R2P: it is subject to the whims of the global powers. As demonstrated by the inaction of the Security Council in the face of the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against his citizens, oppressed groups cannot depend on foreign aid in the name of the responsibility to protect citizens from all countries. While initial intervention may have been possible in Libya because of support from the Security Council, the Assad

23 Ibid., 333.
24 Ibid., 343; CNN, “Slavery on Agenda as Merkel, Macron Meet African Leaders.”
regime in Syria maintains strong foreign ties to China and Russia, which offer support through the Security Council, and Iran, which maintains significant regional influence. Since China and Russia both have the power of the veto in the Security Council, it is very easy for them to prevent an international response to the atrocities Assad committed.

The situation in Syria was exactly what the doctrine of R2P was designed to prevent. To maintain control, the Assad regime has systematically subjected its people to torture, arbitrary detention, and death by chemical weapons, which infringe upon some of the most fundamental principles outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While the Security Council adopted resolutions 2042 and 2043 in 2012, which sought to establish a ceasefire in Syria, no further resolutions aiming to increase military presence were passed in the following three years, even as ISIS began to sweep across Syria in 2014. Although additional resolutions were brought to a vote in the Security Council, Russia would not risk permitting military intervention that could possibly lead to a regime change in Syria. While the Security Council would eventually pass Resolution 2249, which permitted intervention in Syria to combat the rise of ISIS, the measure came only after the bombing of a Russian jetliner on October 31 and the Paris attack on November 13, 2015. The events leading to the vote on the resolution indicate that it was passed in response to the growing threat ISIS posed to the world, rather than on behalf of the Syrian people. The ICISS claims that R2P is not meant to ensure that the world’s greatest powers remain in control, but rather to “[deliver] practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them.” Since the world’s most powerful states are in control of the Security Council, R2P will remain a secondary contender for the ambitions of the global community, behind the basic geopolitics that continue to govern the world order at large.

Although there was no authorization from the Security Council, both Russia and the United States did participate in military operations in Syria before the passing of Resolution 2249. Russian forces intervened on behalf of the Assad regime to ensure that the Syrian government maintained control of the country, although this intervention caused the displacement of millions of citizens, who fled to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and many European countries. As such, classifying the use of such military force as on behalf of the Syrian people or in the name of protection would be dishonest. The United States, on the other hand, launched airstrikes beginning in 2014 although there was not consent from either the Security Council

or the Syrian government. Although the United States had not gone through the proper channels to legally begin a military campaign in Syria, this use of force should not be classified as unilateral. Countries such as Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia had been supportive of the intervention while Jordan and Canada had begun to perform airstrikes of their own against ISIS in April of 2015. Although this series of airstrikes would fail to hold back the spread of ISIS, whose forces grew to over 31,500 during the same period, it highlights an attempt to stabilize the region although international security was the provided justification rather than R2P. These examples of intervention concerning Syria highlight the reality that the states with the greatest means to protect the rights of oppressed peoples continue to show greater concern for their own security and a status quo that benefits themselves. Such an underlying weakness needs to be addressed by the defenders of R2P if this principle of western political theory is to garner any future legitimacy.

RESTORING CREDIBILITY TO PROTECTION

Considering the fallouts from botched R2P missions, it is difficult to determine what should be the fate of the legal doctrine. In theory, there are legitimate claims regarding why R2P would be beneficial in the international community. Similar to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, a “just war” fought on the grounds of preserving human rights, R2P could be used to ensure that oppressed groups are protected when their governments infringe upon their responsibilities. However, the atrocities that were committed in Syria, coupled with the delayed reaction of the United Nations, present the harsh reality that power politics continue to trump humanitarian efforts while the premature withdrawal from Libya proves that even intervention does not ensure long term peace or prosperity. If these two examples are representative of the reliability of R2P moving forward, the call to abandon both the doctrine and the notion of conditional sovereignty may be justifiable. Equal sovereignty and the respect the international community gives it are a significant form of defense which smaller countries possess to fend against the world’s military powers and should thus be limited only under the gravest of circumstances. Rather than jump to such an extreme conclusion of abandoning R2P, however, there are specific ways in which conditional sovereignty, constructed to ensure that all people remain protected, can be implemented into international law.

To restructure R2P and conditional sovereignty in a way that protects oppressed groups and garners support from skeptics, a greater emphasis needs to be placed on three key areas: consistency of intervention, the responsibility to rebuild, and a broader interpretation of the responsibility to protect. By reinforcing the ideas behind these three areas, states will have a concrete understanding of when sovereignty is to be limited and for what purposes. To clarify

34 Ibid., 9.
the first aspect, the ICISS report on R2P and the 2005 World Summit declare intervention to be permitted when a government fails to protect its citizens. Nevertheless, this outline ought to be further expanded to include “the kinds of failures to protect civilians that can justify armed interventions by other states, as well as which agency has the authority to determine how low to set the bar for intervention, and who makes the rules.” Beyond this clearer understanding, the United Nations, and more specifically the Security Council, needs to ensure that once these rules are made explicit they are followed without room for exception. Although such reforms may not achieve the elusive standard of consistency, they send a message to the international community that an egalitarian use of force is still pursuable and desired.

A restructuring of how R2P is employed may be necessary if the Security Council continues to prove ineffective in deploying forces to protect oppressed peoples, as it did in Syria. Although unlikely, given the nature of the Security Council, a separate organ of the United Nations devoted to monitoring governments and their effectiveness at protecting their citizens may be the most ideal way to enforce R2P. Giving the power to “make the rules,” regarding R2P to a panel that is less political than the Security Council and relies entirely on a majority vote, rather than bestowing the veto power to a few select states, appears to be the optimal way to ensure that R2P is utilized consistently. Unfortunately, the pressure that the United Nations would need to face to pursue such a monumental change appears to presently be outside the realm of possibility.

The responsibility to rebuild was an initial pillar of the ICISS document regarding R2P but has since fallen out of favor with the world’s leading powers. In the 1998 report The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, the UN Secretary General stated, “Experience has shown that the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated [peacebuilding] effort is needed to address the various factors which have caused or are threatening a conflict.” Based on precedent and the language found in the ICISS document, the intention behind R2P, and for that matter the United Nations, is the promotion of international peace and security. Abandoning this crucial dimension of the Responsibility to Protect undermines the legitimacy of R2P as a credible and durable tool of protection. Unfortunately, rebuilding efforts do not possess the same political support that interventions can garner since rebuilding lacks the urgency of interventions to stop a catastrophe. In addition, there are significant time and resource commitments required to pursue rebuilding

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projects.\textsuperscript{42} This does not, however, make the need for rebuilding projects any less crucial. If states cannot reconcile the political factors behind R2P, its status in the world may continue to weaken.\textsuperscript{43}

In Syria, the spread of ISIS forces and the subsequent Russian intervention have led to an influx of refugees across the planet.\textsuperscript{44} In parallel to an increase in global refugee populations, the United States has called for a reduction of refugees admitted into the country to 45,000 in 2018, the lowest limit petitioned by the government since 1980.\textsuperscript{45} Under the obligations prescribed by the ICISS is the responsibility to react, which calls for states to “react to situations of compelling need for human protection” without the use of force.\textsuperscript{46} Although an emphasis is given to military actions such as arms embargoes and economic responses such as sanctions, the admittance of refugees works within the same vein of non-intervention and highlights an important perspective: countries which seek to protect oppressed groups are willing to provide aid to the individuals who are affected by conflicts. A greater emphasis in R2P on relocation programs such as the UNHCR would promote the ideal that the responsibility to protect is a calling to which states respond, rather than the opportunity for a self-serving military operation.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The purpose of these three proposals is to reform R2P to ensure that it can survive the scrutiny of critics and so that international failures like those in Libya and Syria may not repeat themselves. The doctrine of R2P has immense potential within the sphere of international law to ensure that people from countries victimized by international forces like ISIS or governed by oppressive regimes like Qaddafi’s maintain their rights as outlined by the Declaration of Human Rights. Such a goal continues to be worth pursuing, even if initial operations have been less than exemplary. What remains important is that the international community identifies why initial R2P efforts have been so disastrous and determines methods to remedy the doctrine’s weaknesses for the future.

\textbf{Works Cited}


\textsuperscript{42} Keranen, “What Happened to,” 345.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 345.
\textsuperscript{44} Dolan, “Obama’s Retrenchment-Protraction Doctrine,” 54.
\textsuperscript{46} International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 29.


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Understanding the U.S.’s Relationship with the Russian Space Industry

By Elizabeth Marino
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Abstract

This paper investigates the complex relationship between the space industries of the United States and Russia, two state adversaries. Despite their frequently combative relationship, the two regularly collaborate on spaceflight programs, and the U.S. is wholly dependent on Russian rockets for any human space-launch missions. The first part of this paper details the economic and political implications of space flight and summarizes a brief history of the U.S.-Russian space industry relationship following the end of the Cold War. The paper then incorporates the theories of Stephen Krasner and Friedrich List to posit why such a close relationship developed between former enemies. In a synthesis of the presented historical context and economic theories, the paper will argue that U.S. hegemony and a decline in the National Aeronautic and Space Administration’s budget caused the U.S. to build a close relationship with the Russian space industry. Additionally, this paper will detail how the gradual dissolution of this close relationship has spurred private sector involvement in the U.S. space industry and speculate how this privatization will shape U.S.-Russian space cooperation in the future.

The U.S. claims its economic and national security are of the utmost importance, superseding almost all other affairs. Yet the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the executive agency responsible for nearly all space activity, is dependent on Russia, a frequent state enemy, for a majority of their space launch programs, despite the potential threat posed to U.S. security and the economy. This paper will argue that U.S. reliance on Roscosmos, Russia’s governmental body responsible for their space science program, originates from American global dominance following the Cold War, along with a general decline of domestic political interest in space. The United State’s eroding hegemony has caused NASA to attempt to assert their independence from Russia through contracts with private domestic aeronautic companies. Initially, I will detail how space travel and the space industry directly affect a nation’s economic and political standing. Then, through a combination of a history of U.S-Russia space relations post-1991, Stephen Krasner's
hegemonic stability theory and Friedrich List’s economic nationalism theory I will argue that U.S. hegemony and a lack of capital fostered a close relationship between NASA and Roscosmos. Lastly, I will detail the dissolution of this partnership and the decreasing NASA budget, both of which have spurred private sector involvement in the U.S. space industry.

Despite endless popularization through science fiction films or Neil DeGrasse Tyson, the important economic and military benefits of space exploration and travel remain largely unknown to the general public. Communication satellites have increased U.S. engagement with space dramatically, whether through civilian usage in GPS devices and LTE access on smartphones or military tools like the Global Command and Control Systems (GCCS). GCCS is used by the Department of Defense and provides a communications system for the entirety of U.S. armed forces; it equips military forces with necessary information on troop movements, ground weapon analysis, and upcoming weather impediments.¹ The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the country’s primary means of space surveillance, forms another tenet of U.S. national security. The nine SBIRs currently in orbit provide missile warnings, missile defenses, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness to the U.S. Air Force.² The 1991 Gulf War saw the first instance of space satellites playing a critical role in international conflict. They provided the GPS information necessary for navigating the vast desert landscape and gathered images of Iraqi troops, providing U.S. forces early warning of enemy movements. After the conclusion of the war, General Powell noted, “Satellites were the single most important factor that enabled us to build the command, control, and communication network for Desert Shield.”³

Satellites show clear tactical benefits, but the power outer space brings to a nation is not purely martial. A nation’s strength and stability can be shown through its dominance over global discourse. Sociologist Sarah Liberman provides a Cold War era example, stating that

> On space issues, whether either side had actual military advantage was considered less important than the prestige advantage conferred where the other had failed. The Soviet Union’s Sputnik success gave rise to widespread questioning of the fundamental ideals of liberal capitalism, while the tenets of liberal democracy were shown to have produced the most technologically advanced event in history when Apollo 11 landed humankind on the moon.⁴

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Sociologist Joseph Nye theorized two types of power: hard and soft. Hard power comes from “coercive” means like economic or martial threat. Soft power, on the other hand, comes from persuasion and appeal. Above all, soft power is non-coercive, while hard power is. Significantly, a nation’s space engagement strengthens both their soft and hard power’s thresholds.

Additionally, U.S. space activity has proven to be crucial to the U.S. economy. Aside from the thousands of jobs NASA and its contractors provide, sociologist Sarah Liberman found that the return on investment for each dollar NASA spends is around $7, spread over the course of approximately eighteen years. A 1971 report by the Midwest Research Institute calculated that the $25 billion allocated to NASA between 1959 and 1969 had already generated $52 billion to the national economy. Researchers predicted that the $25 billion would produce returns to the domestic economy until 1987, totaling $181 billion. NASA’s innovations have informed countless other inventions and discoveries which have furthered economic growth. The technological research conducted at the International Space Station (ISS) has been used to predict and monitor impending natural disasters, providing cities sufficient time to prepare and evacuate, and perfect MRI imaging for breast cancer patients. While space travel serves plenty of other civilian purposes such as general inspiration and spurring the interest of young people in STEM fields, it is imperative to remember that a large part of America’s national and economic security depends on a U.S. presence in space.

That is why collaborations between the U.S. and Russia merit academic investigation. Despite the clear risk this partnership poses to U.S. security, NASA continues to collaborate with Russia to reach new heights within the solar system. Prior to 1991, when the Soviet Union officially fell, the two countries were actively competing for outer space dominance. Although the U.S.S.R. succeeded in launching the first artificial satellite, the first man, and the first woman into space orbit in 1957, 1961, and 1963, respectively, the U.S. ultimately made the greatest achievement of the “space race” by landing Apollo 11 on the moon. The first and only mission to put a human on the moon, Apollo marked an end to any competition between the space industries of the two nations. Soviet astronauts continued attempts at a lunar landing, but never succeeded, and the U.S. established a clear dominance of outer space. Furthermore, the dominance of America’s space industry over Russia gave them enough confidence to embark on a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. space mission, the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Mission. At the request of

7 “Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity,” 10-11.
NASA administrator Thomas Paine, two Soviet astronauts flew with three Americans and the mission was seen as a diplomatic act of peace and evolution.⁹

The Apollo-Soyuz Test Mission was the beginning of numerous space industry collaborations, most of which were initiated by the U.S. due to their dominance of the global community. Discussions between U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on space cooperation began as early as June of 1992, when they announced they were developing a plan to share early warning ballistic missile technology with each other.¹⁰ As some of the first U.S.-Russian contact following the end of the Cold War, it indicated a growing respect for each other’s technology resources. This trend was continued under President Bill Clinton the following year when RKK Energia and NPO Energomash, two Russian missile manufacturers, signed contracts with Lockheed Martin and NASA that shared Soyuz technology for a joint U.S.-Russian space endeavor. This marked their first post-Cold War joint space endeavor, and a few months later, Clinton invited Roscosmos to join the U.S., Canada, the EU, and Japan in efforts to create the ISS. Russia became truly integrated in the global space network, and was seen by the U.S. as on-par with such allies as Canada and the EU. When Russia was hit with a financial crisis in 1998, the U.S. loaned them money so that they could fulfill their ISS economic requirements; the station was officially launched later that year.¹¹ In 2000, the NPO-Lockheed technology collaboration came to fruition when Lockheed created their Atlas launch vehicle with usage of Russian-manufactured engines (the RD-180).¹² Its primary function is to launch unmanned American military satellites, and Russian produced RD-180s are still used in Atlas production today. In fact, U.S. space launches are entirely dependent on RD-180s, pivoting their interdependence on Russian space technology to a relationship of total dependence.

So why did the U.S. embark on a multi-billion dollar space station with a country that was their greatest space competitor only a few years prior? Following 1991, the U.S. was seen as the sole hegemon of the world. As such, they were inclined to act as leader of the global space industry, and the main arbiter of international trade agreement - at least according to Krasner’s hegemonic stability theory (HST) which has been popularized by many political scientists. The main tenet of Krasner’s theory states that “the distribution of power among states is the primary determinant of the character of the international economic system. A hegemonic distribution of power, defined as one in which a single state has a predominance of power,

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is most conducive to the establishment of a stable, open international economic system. The hegemon sees an opportunity to save money, foster industry growth, and increase their political sphere of influence and takes it; smaller or less powerful states are inclined to follow suit due to the sheer power and authority of the hegemon. The United States, the greatest global superpower in the 1990s, could significantly gain by opening their space industry to international cooperation. At the time, it made sense to integrate the second most powerful space fleet in the world. Combining U.S. and Russian technologies would facilitate rapid growth, not just of the ISS, but also of space exploration and innovation as a whole. Even if the two nations were enemies merely a few years prior, the potential benefit of acquiring Russia’s space knowledge was too great for the U.S. government to ignore, and the hegemon had little to lose from a partnership with a decimated Russia.

Until 2011, joint research and development missions to the ISS continued, and Lockheed Martin produced dozens of Atlas rockets. In 2004, however, President George W. Bush announced that NASA would discontinue the Space Shuttle, their only launch program powerful enough for human spaceflight, in 2010. NASA's space shuttle had suffered two failures, Challenger in 1986 and Columbia in 2003, and was to be replaced with a program that would return to the moon by 2020. During this time in the early 2000s, NASA's budget was on a sharp decline. In 1991, at the end of the Cold War and during the early days of the ISS, NASA accounted for 1.05% of the national budget, or $24 million (adjusted to 2014 inflation). Comparatively, in 2004, when the cancellation of the Space Shuttle was announced, the NASA budget was .66% of the federal budget, or $20.5 million (adjusted to 2014 inflation). In 2010, when the program was officially discontinued, the budget reduced to .52%, or $19 million (adjusted to 2014 inflation). For an organization that demanded $1.5 billion for each Space Shuttle program launch, this lack of funding was an obvious problem. Despite this, NASA drafted plans for the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), a human space transporter and fully assumed it would be ready for debut in 2011. Due to a lack of funding, CEV production was stalled, and eventually halted all together. 2011 arrived, the Space Shuttle Program was decommissioned, and NASA had no foreseeable options for space launch. Stuck in a tight position, both politically and economically, NASA granted multibillion dollar contracts to SpaceX and Boeing, two private America aeronautic companies, for the purpose of developing a rocket launcher by 2014. As a temporary solution, the organization also brokered a deal with Roscosmos to transport American astronauts to the International Space Station on Russian Soyuz rockets at a cost of $62.7 million per seat. This was to last four years until a U.S. launcher was ready for use.

Though cooperation was once again occurring between the U.S. and Russian space industries, the U.S. entered into the Soyuz collaboration with serious concerns since the agreement would leave them entirely dependent on Russian Soyuz rockets for human spaceflight at a time of escalating tensions between the two nations following the 2011 election of Vladimir Putin. Either the U.S. would use the Soyuz rockets, endangering national security and providing millions of dollars to the Russian government to further their national interests, or the U.S. would not be involved in human spaceflight at all. Were they to choose the latter and not engage in spaceflight until a domestic launcher was created, the U.S. would allow Russia to become the dominant power in the global space industry. Consequently, Russia would be the primary profiteer of any discoveries made, thus earning them political and economic influence. Additionally, once NASA was equipped with launch capabilities, they would have had to play catch up with Russia to ensure equal technological, political, and economic power. No matter what it cost the U.S. to be aboard the Soyuz spacecraft, either economically or politically, the risks of America not being involved in space for four years was greater.

The space industry resides in a unique marketplace as it is both protectionist when considering the high barriers to entry for private companies and liberal as international partnerships are encouraged. Given the dual nature of space, there is not a theory that applies to every aspect of the marketplace. While not every part of Friedrich List’s theory of economic nationalism can help decode the U.S.-Russia relationship, the main argument of his writings speaks to why the U.S. decided to use Soyuz rockets. List diverged from many other economists of his time, who thought mainly of maximizing their profits in the short term. Instead, List understood that each economic decision “involved complex trade-offs between emphasizing short- and long-term economic goals.”¹⁷ National interest is not a black or white decision. It involves competing pros and cons, and what is in a nation’s interest one day may be harmful to it the next. In such a complex situation, List suggests taking the action that will be most beneficial long-term, not the action that yields the most positive results short-term.¹⁸ In a similar way, there was no clear cut indicator as to which option the U.S. should choose when deciding whether to send U.S. astronauts on Russian rockets. Backed into a corner, they were left with two problematic options – should they fund Russian innovation or allow Russia to become a world leader in the space industry? The U.S. chose what appeared to be the best long-term option at the time and paid for space aboard Soyuz rockets. This would allow them to maintain international relevance while working on a space launcher of their own, as opposed to being isolated from the space industry for nearly half a decade. Reverberations of this decision continue today, and there is no clear indicator if this was the correct decision. Regardless, it serves as a testament to List’s idea that every economic decision involves multiple interests to consider.


Initial plans to create a domestic space launcher were to be completed by 2014, but SpaceX and Boeing faced obstacles in manufacturing a rocket powerful enough to lift astronauts to the ISS. As of 2017, these rockets will not be ready for launch until at least 2019, extending the estimated four year dependence on Russian rockets to six years and counting. Following the end of their initial contract with NASA, Roscosmos increased the cost to approximately $71 million for each seat on a Soyuz rocket. Most recently, the U.S. paid the Russian government $424 million for six seats aboard the Soyuz for use in 2016 & 2017.\footnote{Danielle Wiener-Bronner, “NASA Is Paying Russia $71 Million for a Ride to Space,” The Atlantic, Last modified March 25, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/03/nasa-is-paying-russia-71-million-for-a-ride-to-space/359559/. (accessed December 4, 2017).} NASA has been the one executive agency exempt from the American 2014 and 2017 sanctions against Russia, indicative of how reliant the U.S. is on this agreement. However, recent efforts by NASA to privately contract American firms suggests a change in their space policy towards partnering with private corporations instead of competing states. While it is unlikely for the agency to ever receive as much funding as it did in during the Cold War or the late 1990’s due to the decline in public interest in space, legislators observe a pressing need to end their overdependence on Roscosmos technology. Legalized in 2004 with the commercial Space Launch Amendments Act, space privatization has increased dramatically as SpaceX, Sierra Nevada, and Boeing have launched military satellites and carried cargo to the ISS. The work of these private organizations has occurred without the use of Russia’s RD-180 and foreshadows a domestic space industry in which we are less dependent on Russian technology and more efficient in our use of money. During a hearing before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, Tim Hughes, SpaceX’s Senior Vice President for Global Business and Government Affairs, testified in support of public-private partnerships. In the hearing, he stated, “in 2011, NASA estimated that it would have cost the agency about $4 billion to develop a rocket like the [SpaceX’s] Falcon 9 booster based upon NASA’s traditional contracting process. It cost NASA only $1.7 billion to pay SpaceX.”\footnote{Tim Hughes, “Statement of Tim Hughes, Senior VP for Global Business & Government Affairs Space Exploration Technologies Corp (SpaceX) before the Subcommittee on Space, Science, & Technology Committee,” Last modified July 13, 2017, https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/8a62dd3f-ead6-42ff-8ac8-0823a346b926/7F1C5970AE952E354D32C19DDC9DDCCB. mr.-tim-hughes-testimony.pdf. (accessed July 21, 2017).} Additionally, according to basic market principles, privatization of space will lead to competition within the aeronautic industry, generating increases in innovation and economic returns.

Given the recent fractures in the U.S.’s relationship with Russia, on the ground and in the cosmos, private space companies may soon be the only way for Americans to reach the ISS. The U.S.’s hegemony is fading, if even still existent, and Russia has seen fit to take advantage of this loss in status. In July 2014, just after NASA was deemed exempt from the Crimea sanctions leveraged against Russia, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin spoke on the Soyuz partnership, “we will continue to do what benefits us...we need the most modern engines that produce the most thrust. In order to design them, we need free money. This is
why we are prepared to sell them.”21 In 2014, Roscosmos announced that their involvement with the ISS would end in 2020, though eventually that was pushed back to 2024; at that time, Roscosmos plans on detaching some of their modules - necessary for ISS functionality - and creating their own, independent space station.22 In July of 2016, Rogozin again voiced veiled threats towards NASA, declaring, ‘They [the U.S.] say that ‘space is outside politics.’ We take the ‘space is outside politics’ slogan into account, but nothing lasts forever.”23 While these statements have all been recanted or disregarded at one point or another, the public realization that U.S. spaceflight is dependent on Russia’s whims has led to renewed calls of a U.S.-built vehicle launcher by various legislators, most notably Senator John McCain.24 Since significant increases to NASA’s budget seem unlikely, the agency is continually establishing new public-private partnerships to receive a greater return on investment. In addition to their pre-existing contracts with SpaceX and Boeing, NASA signed eight companies to work on small-scale launches in 2017.25 At a time when Russia increasingly endangers U.S. national security, the U.S. must continue to reassert the power of NASA. Engaging the private aeronautic industry provides a way for the U.S. to do so.

This is not to say that collaboration between the U.S. and Russian space industries will end completely. For one, no domestically-produced rocket launcher has proved successful, and with launch dates pushed back each year, it is easy to see SpaceX and Boeing’s production being delayed another year or so. NASA’s contract with Roscosmos allowing usage of the Soyuz rockets is valid until 2019, with 2020 contract negotiations currently underway if private production is delayed.26 In March 2017, NASA scientists met with Russia’s Space Research Institute to discuss a potential joint space probe program. The program, Venera-D, would be sent to Venus sometime in 2026 to gain information on the planet’s atmosphere, surface, and possibility of possessing microbial life.27 Additionally, in September 2017, Roscosmos

announced that they had officially joined a NASA-led project to build a lunar space station, informally known as the Deep Space Getaway (DSG). The DSG is to be a stepping stone for landing a human on Mars, thereby enabling greater scientific understanding of the galaxy. These future collaborations are not surprising, even given the growing discord between the U.S. and Russia. Unlike the Soyuz or Atlas rocket collaborations, these projects are done in the name of scientific exploration, not domestic security. While it is within U.S. interest to become self-sufficient in terms of space launchers, this does not mean cooperation between the two nations should stop all together. Space has traditionally been a field where countries can unite for the sake of discoveries that benefit the universe as a whole, and these future collaborations speak to that tradition. In the future, we can expect to see U.S.-Russia space collaborations, as long as they do not endanger domestic security.

Since the current relationship between the U.S. and Russia is strained, the levels of interdependence between NASA and Roscomos can appear nonsensical or counterintuitive to our national security. However, when looking at the post-Cold War global power structure and Krasner’s hegemonic stability theory, their initial collaboration is rational. When the Cold War ended, the United States, as the global hegemon, stood to lose very little and gain much by acquiring Soviet technology. The originally healthy partnership transformed into one of irresponsible dependence when Russia’s rise to power and NASA’s miniscule budget converged, resulting in the retirement of the Space Shuttle program and the beginning of U.S. usage of Russian Soyuz rockets. The Soyuz rockets have kept the U.S. over-reliant on Roscosmos power, seriously devaluing America’s space industry. However, this dependence appears likely to change in the coming years once private space companies are finally able to debut their rocket launch technology. The introduction of U.S. space launchers to the aeronautic marketplace will safeguard the country’s economic and national security and spur growth in the space industry as a whole. Transnational space collaboration will still occur, but the U.S. will be able to drive those efforts instead of being merely a passenger.

A competitive U.S. domestic space launch industry will have widespread implications in the future when satellite-provided internet, asteroid mining, or space colonization are within technological reach. Though these ideas sound futuristic and improbable in 2017, they are legitimate goals for the next 50 years or so, considering the rate of space innovation today. If and when outer space becomes a new global marketplace, the U.S. must be able to launch its own space vehicles in order to remain economically competitive. Given the gradual replacement of Soyuz rocket use with domestically, privately produced rockets, it seems that when the time arrives to fully invest in space, the U.S. will be able to assert marketplace dominance.

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Works Cited


**About the Author**

Elizabeth Marino is currently a senior at Marquette University, studying International Affairs, Gender Studies, and Digital Media. She serves as the funding and grant co-coordinator for Marquette’s Pad Project, a pilot initiative striving to provide for the sanitary needs of disadvantaged Milwaukee women. She has a strong interest in the intersection of sustainable development and gender equality and plans to obtain a Master’s degree in International Development following her graduation later this year.
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