

## **Introduction: Integrative Plurality**

Arnold Richards's psychoanalytic contributions follow the leitmotif of "integrative pluralism": how to continue the dialogue between the contributors of disparate psychoanalytic schools of thought (i.e., thought collectives) with the larger psychoanalytic knowledge base as it grows and changes with each new contribution. The chapters of the first section of this book show us the evolution of this design.

Although these chapters give us a noticeable trace of this motif, it has taken more than half a century to develop, requiring life experience from the many roles Richards has played and the posts he has held (see Friedman, p.\_\_). He has been editor of *The American Psychoanalyst* (TAP), *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* (JAPA), Festschrifts for four prominent psychoanalysts (1986, 1988, 1993, 1994), two additional collections (2001, 2010), and lately *International Psychoanalysis.net*. He is also the publisher of I.P. Books. During this time he has practiced his craft as teacher, supervisor, training analyst, and clinician, along the way contributing over a hundred publications to the psychoanalytic literature. As editor-in-chief of *The Zine*, Richards has kept its readers up to date on all things psychoanalytically fit to print. He has also organized a series of annual conferences bringing together dissimilar points of view around (a) common clinical concerns and (b) major educational and training dilemmas. It has been suggested that he be given the title "omnicompetent editor" (Friedman 2004, p. 13). Throughout these dialogues, as we will see, Richards has attempted to engage those who claim a new orthodoxy and would minimize the overall efforts of psychoanalysis; those who claim new theories, usually untested and unproven, that would replace the old; and those immovably complacent in the status quo.

Richards begins the introductory section by reflecting on his personal journey. In “Growing up Orthodox” he locates himself in a variety of dialectics: orthodoxy and deviance, pluralism and uniformity, free exploration and dogmatism. He explores psychoanalysis as an historical discipline that needs to come to terms with its history on “personal, intellectual and institutional levels” (1999, p. 9). In the next paper, “A. A. Brill and the Politics of Exclusion,” he deepens our understanding of the institutional level by using as a case study Brill’s life and his shepherding of psychoanalysis in New York (primarily through the New York Institute) from 1911 through the end of the First World War. Exploring Brill’s motives in safeguarding the profession, he highlights Brill’s opposition to lay analysis. This opposition would become formalized as an institutional dynamic that Richards calls the “politics of exclusion” (p. 12). He traces the consequence of this form of segregation to its end result: not only prohibiting nonmedical personnel from training but extending it to the exclusion of dissenting ideas. The complex legacy of exclusionary policies has three main themes all, leading to the present state of fragmentation in our field. Richards, going beyond responses aimed at theoretical restoration, seeks a new politics of inclusion.

One can see, in the third paper of this section, the natural development of this theme as he advocates for a measure of humility regarding the presumed supremacy of traditional theory. He cites a willingness by those who this assumption to implement exclusionary politics to secure their professional and personal success. In this chapter (“Psychoanalytic Discourse at the Turn of Our Century: A Plea for a Measure of Humility”), Richards proposes that two variables (theoretical pluralism, increasing heterogeneity in the practitioner base) have exacerbated a problem in which competing

groups represent different ideas theoretically, professionally, and educationally. He finds that attempts to address this problem have led only to greater dissension and frustration between the groups. To mend these injuries, which have intergenerational sources, he suggests a spirit of transparency and a dialogue that accepts responsibility for mistakes. Although this reasonable request was attractive to those invited to respond to this paper, most had difficulty defining the problem or suggesting a solution.

Richards offers a broad historical understanding of the problem by defining the divergent paths since Freud. On one hand was the Hartmann group, who saw Freud as a cautious scientist accumulating data to frame hypotheses and confirm theories. They attempted to clarify and systematize many of the ambiguities of psychoanalytic theory and, as some believe, “to sanitize Freud” (Bergmann 2000, p. 60). Working alongside these theorists was another group who read Freud differently (Grossman 2000) and felt restricted by the incompleteness of his work. These theorists sought to advance Freud’s ideas with alternative theories. This uneven and often conflicted growth led to a series of disagreements and schisms.<sup>1</sup>

Having traced this stormy dimension of psychoanalytic history, Richards suggests a path that gives reason for optimism. He suggests that psychoanalytic theory has evolved into an irreversible pluralism differentiated by major perspectives (e.g., contemporary

---

<sup>1</sup>Richards distinguishes between “schisms” and “disagreements,” the former leading to an official break between the parties resulting in one party developing in isolation from the larger group. This rupture rarely leads to a period of quiescent growth, on either side. More often, whatever essential differences these groups had, they tended to mirror each other, and their difficulties continued to be enacted long after the rupture. This point has been made in various ways by Ekhardt (1978), Quen and Carlos (1978), Frosh (1991), Kirsner (2000), Roazen and Swerdloff (1995), and Rangell (2004) and can easily be illustrated, in the U.S. by continuous breaches beginning with the 1941 separation of Horney and her colleagues from the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. That break led, directly or indirectly, to the creation of the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, the American Institute for Psychoanalysis, the William Alanson White Society, the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis, the New York University Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis, the Association for Psychoanalytic Medicine, the Columbia Psychoanalytic Clinic, and the American Academy of Psychoanalysis (Frosch 1991; Gedo, 1999; Levenson 2006). All of these institutions bear, in some degree, the mark of the original conflict.

Freudian, object relations, self psychology, relational and intersubjective theory, interpersonal theory, and Lacanian theory). As Lombardi (2005) notes, and as Richards is aware, not everyone agrees with his conclusion that today's pluralism is irreversible, even those with whom Richards finds major theoretical agreement (Di Chiara 2003; Rangell 2004, 2007, 2008; Brenner 2006).

Given this pluralistic landscape, Richards argues that the only reasonable course of action is to reach out in an open-minded and scientific spirit and learn from one another. If we fail to achieve this outcome, he warns, the only solution remaining—hardly salutary—is to cling to the remnants of old attachments and alliances with our professional ancestors. This solution has not worked well in the past and most likely will not work now. To make his point, Richards uses the relational perspective. His dispute with the relational theorists is not over the important “neglected issues” they raise, nor does it involve theoretical disagreements, old or new. His main difficulty is with their consistent dismissal of the entire Freudian tradition, their approach to preserving the field's relevance. This movement had the potential to create a broader, more integrative psychoanalytic identity that would have provided an environment inclusive of differences, while maintaining the value of the psychoanalytic legacy. This was a moment of change that emerged out of a long and painful struggle in American psychoanalysis, with its intermittent radical shifts, all helping to redirect the field. Now, it is only through recognizing the diverse nature of psychoanalysis that we can see its full possibilities and make our contributions. Merton Gill saw this as well, and in his turn brought the roles of science and hermeneutics closer together.

The reactions from the discussants to this paper are an important reflection of the time and even today reflect the views of many. Although most of the commentators expressed agreement with the need for a more humble, civil, or respectful debate, there was little consensus among them regarding the nature of the problem, the context of the debate, or potential solutions. We must wonder what compelled Richards to write this when he did. Eisold (2003) thought that Richards had to know his message would be devalued—“dissected, deconstructed, and attacked” (p. 301)—and so it was. What wasn’t clearly recognized, however, is that the paper is offered as an organizing framework, not simply as a plea for humility. That was merely the lesson learned from being in the fray for fifty years. What one sees in the paper and finds repeated in each of the chapters that follow, is a struggle to understand and debate the claims for territoriality, the political misuse of science, and attempts at theoretical domination, often initiated by groups who were themselves victims of exclusionary tactics. The chapters that follow, all written in the heat of debate, together offer a broad perspective on the profession’s attempts to grow in an era of grand contributions and tumultuous change. This is the very hallmark of Richards’s work, bespeaking the tireless commitment he brings to psychoanalysis. He possesses a relentless curiosity about all things human, and seeks answers from a biopsychosocial/cultural/political perspective. For Richards, our knowledge of the human condition is never static or finished. Always evolving, it requires an integrative pluralism.

## **PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY**

In Sections II, III, and IV, Richards examines theories from self psychology, hermeneutics and

social constructivism, and the relational school. In one of his earliest papers “The Self in Psychoanalytic Theory, the Self Psychologies and the Psychology of the Self,” he explores the many alternatives then current in psychoanalytic theory.[AU: CONFUSING, AS THIS PAPER SEEMS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN THE BOOK. PERHAPS BEST TO DELETE THIS SENTENCE.]

Chapter 4, “Self Theory, Conflict Theory, and the Problem of Hypochondriasis,” is an attempt to compare self psychological and conflict models on clinical and theoretical grounds, Richards chose the case of a man suffering from hypochondriasis to evaluate the two models. His findings call into question any theory or technical approach relying on diagnostic categories to indicate technical interventions. Richards presents four additional concerns regarding Kohut’s theory: (1) the patient’s narcissistic and object-libidinal lines of development were not sharply distinct but interactive and intertwined; (2) the patient’s presentation of disintegration anxiety was could be described in everyday language and was never devoid of content; (3) the emerging analytic interaction did not require understanding through idealizing or mirror transferences, which may initially be useful organizers but tend to constrict the analyst’s attention as greater weight is assigned them; finally, (4) the patient’s and the analyst’s cognitive and synthetic mental functions were as critical in attaining the necessary insight that promotes change as were introspection and empathy.

Richards continues his exploration of Kohut’s ideas in chapter 5, “The Superordinate Self in Psychoanalytic Theory and in the Self Psychologies,” which broadens the subject of his critique to include the theories of George Klein and John Gedo as well; all three assign superordinate status to the self. Richards begins with Hartmann’s clarification (1950) of Freud’s ambiguous use of “das Ich”: ego or self?

Hartmann redefines narcissism as a libidinal cathexis of the self rather than of the ego, distinguishing three distinct domains of Freud's concept of das Ich: as ego, as self-experience, and as self or person. This refinement, which led to the concept of the "representational world" (Sandler and Rosenblatt 1962), offered analysts a new way to talk about the complex nature of wishes, fantasies, identifications, and attitudes.. Hartmann's distinction, unfortunately, seemed lost on those building the new self psychologies.

Richards begins his evaluation of the three self theories with that of Klein and his collaborators. They proposed to replace metapsychology with a "self-schema" containing both systemic features and individual personal qualities. The clinical theory flowing from this self-schema emphasized the personal encounter and the importance of relating observational data to clinical theory. Richards finds Klein's overall efforts seriously flawed and spells out his reasons.

Next he turns to the contributions of Gedo, who rejects metapsychology because it loses sight of the "person" as "agent." As a corrective, Gedo suggests a self-organization emerging from an "epigenetic model." This self-organization, a developing hierarchy of personal aims and values, has autonomy as its highest goal. Gedo's model of technique includes a wide range of interventions, each aimed at difficulties specific to a particular mode of psychological functioning, typified by the early modes of psychic organization. Richards's main criticism is of Gedo's emphasis on interventions directed at contentless states. These shift the clinical unit of attention from the intrapsychic reality of the patient to his or her environment. This problem appears endemic to the other psychologies of the self.

Richards returns again to the work of Kohut, broadening his earlier critique. Of all the self psychologies, Kohut's is most clearly presented as a new theory. Kohut (1977) accords the self a superordinate status, arguing for an understanding of the self as a single content of the mind within which we can find contradictory selves and varied degrees of stability and accessibility to consciousness. Richards argues that Kohut, like Klein and Gego, relies on a theory where mental agency is both the driving force and the entity driven.<sup>2</sup> Kohut's theory concludes with a view of the human condition organized around either Guilty Man or Tragic Man. Kohut acknowledges that this is a new conception of human beings, one in which self-cohesion is the highest aim and its loss the greatest danger. Richards ends by noting that all of these ideas are hypotheses in need of clinical validation.

In chapter 6, "Extenders, Modifiers, and Heretics," Richards evaluates Kohut's contribution using Martin Bergmann's taxonomy of psychoanalytic innovators (1991).<sup>3</sup> He begins by identifying three difficulties in the use of this classification: a certain asymmetry of the terms, problems with temporal orientation to reference[AU: THIS PHRASE IS OPAQUE], and historical variability of the terms. With these methodological weaknesses in mind, Richards tests the taxonomy by asking whether Kohut's views, especially his rejection of unconscious mental functioning, qualify him more as a modifier or as a heretic.

---

<sup>2</sup>As mentioned earlier, Kohut's emphasis on the underlying state of self cohesion or specific transference states leaves the analyst struggling with manifest content and no tools to discover a wealth of possible latent meanings.

<sup>3</sup>Bergmann's taxonomy included *modifiers*, who modify theory or practice but stay within the range of acceptable practice (e.g., Ferenczi, Hartmann, Winnicott); *extenders*, who explore new areas without modifications in theory or technique (e.g., Abraham, Nunberg, Waelder, Fenichel); and *heretics*, who often make important contributions but then leave to start their own schools (e.g., Adler, Jung, Rank, Wilhelm Reich).

Richards reviews the literature of several theorists who were struggling with Kohut's theory at the time. They include Curtis (1985), Friedman (1980, 1986), Modell (1986), Treurniet (1983), Reed (1987), and Wallerstein (1983). These authors found that in an attempt to extend the description of ego development Kohut depreciated the theory of drives by perceiving them as disintegration products or symptoms. These theoretical changes diminish the technical value of conflict, transference, and defense/resistance, which are further downplayed by the inflated use of introspection and empathy. Kohut's overreliance on those concepts further reduces the significance of the unconscious. With this in mind, Richards wonders how Kohut might be classified. He furthers his inquiry by turning to the concept of "scientific research tradition" (Laudan 1977). One conclusion is that Kohut is suggesting a methodology leading to a different kind of observation, which shows him to be following a different, even separate, research tradition. He is not only listening for different issues; he is listening in a different way, using different criteria for validation. The only remaining question for Richards is: does this research tradition fall within the parameters of psychoanalysis, or is it a separate tradition? In closing, he acknowledges that different research traditions can increase the clinician's awareness of features of human experience that tend to be overlooked. Regarding this paper, Arnold Goldberg (1995) noted that Richards's "careful and tolerant evaluation, searching for a way to share the rubric of psychoanalysis, is itself a tribute to one of Bergmann's often-cited hallmarks: to 'embrace rather than bemoan the multiplicity of models' (p. xvi)" (pp. 860–861).

Section III covers the work of Merton Gill and Irwin Z. Hoffman. In chapter 7, "Transference Analysis: Means or End?" Richards explores Gill's belief that the transference is

at the heart of the analytic process and has been overshadowed by genetic interpretation. To correct this flaw, Gill expands the definition of analyzable transference and advocates for the technical centrality of transference analysis. Richards finds Gill's transference taxonomy simple yet progressive. It includes "resistance to the awareness of transference," "resistance to involvement in transference," and "resistance to the resolution of transference." Gill believed that resistance to the awareness of the transference is ubiquitous and emphasized it as the essential focus in early treatment. Not talking about any particular issue is, Gill noted, an aversion to specifically telling the analyst anything. Although this is an important possibility, it is troubling to Richards because it ignores other possibilities, such as the patient's inability to admit a painful issue even to himself. Gill believed that the patient's neurosis should be translated into the transference neurosis and that from the beginning the analyst should make active transference interpretations to root out and surmount inherent transference resistance. For Gill, this was the very essence of the analytic process.

Later, joined by Hoffman (1982), Gill attempted to empirically validate this premise. Richards points out that this effort is fraught with methodological problems that make for a less than entirely convincing demonstration of the overriding power of here-and-now transference interpretation. His greater concern, however, is the authors' effort to place the transference technically front and center. He suggests that the only technical precept one can draw from their approach is that it requires the analyst to listen for unconscious meanings and themes that concern personal wishes and fantasies. These, among other data, are often related, but not limited, to transference wishes and fantasies. Interpretation or clinical inference, Richards notes, is often fueled by the analyst's knowledge of the entire analysis, while an insistent pursuit of transference meaning can

encourage formulaic inquiries and rote responses. He acknowledges that Gill's contribution on transference analysis provides an important correction in psychoanalytic treatment, but these must now be absorbed within the broader theory.

In chapter 8, Richards (with Arthur Lynch) broadens his exposition of Gill's many contributions. Beginning as a classical analyst, Gill looked at issues from a range of perspectives during a fifty-year psychoanalytic career. He went from promoting and extending a metapsychological framework with Rapaport; to renouncing metapsychology with Klein, Holt, Schafer, and others; to disclaiming first the topographical model and then the structural model; to briefly exploring neurophysiology. Throughout all these efforts, he kept a focus on concerns regarding the psychoanalytic process. As a result, Richards notes, it is difficult to locate Gill theoretically. In the end, he is best seen as a "theoretical extender" (Bergman 1993) at the center of investigation in many areas pursued in American psychoanalysis.

Richards addresses Gill's depiction of the classical analyst's perspective on the interactive nature of psychoanalysis by demonstrating how psychoanalysts have persistently struggled with the concept of interaction, the ubiquitous nature of transference, and the co-constructed perceptions that shape and move the analytic relationship. In developing these ideas, however, the authors did not neglect the deeper subtleties that Gill's work demands. Richards and Lynch discuss Gill's thoughts on one-person v. two-person psychology, transference, neutrality, alliance, and silence. Drawing special attention to the interactive spectrum, they show the travails and growth these concepts have undergone. Gill theorized from an apolitical position, maintaining that differences are best understood as the emphasis of an issue within a dialectic. This

position allowed him to explore psychoanalysis well beyond Freud's realm. He repeatedly challenged the clinical frontiers, from many perspectives, but in a truly Freudian spirit.

In chapter 9, Richards outlines Hoffman's use of social constructivism in psychoanalysis. For Hoffman, analyst and analysand are unavoidably engaged in interactions, the meaning of which the analyst must continually reflect on. This process replaces the use of free association. Richards examines this premise and how these beliefs fit into three specific aspects of Hoffman's thinking: (1) the position of the dialectic in psychoanalytic practice, (2) the nature of therapeutic change, and (3) the question of a new paradigm in psychoanalysis. Like Hoffman, Richards believes that the vast rift in psychoanalysis is between dialectical and dichotomous thinkers. Yet as sensitive as Hoffman is to this, Richards points out that Hoffman takes a positivistic position on the essential nature of the dialectic in constructivism. Richards agrees with Hoffman that the analyst always influences the patient: neutrality is an ideal never strictly met. But Richards adds that the analyst can offer valuable interpretations from a "neutral-enough" stance. Richards rejects Hoffman's, or anyone's, attempt at placing a single variable (e.g., "interactive subjectivity") as the center of attention in working toward psychoanalytic change. No singular connection is robust enough to fully account for the extremely complex nature of the psychoanalytic process. Richards concludes that Hoffman's perspective may enlarge our own but that little evidence suggests it should replace a reliance on insight and interpretation. Richards's final concern about dialectical constructivism is that despite its inability to offer empirical evidence or greater explanatory power in the real world, it claims to be a replacement for the older theory.

In chapter 10, Richards probes further into dialectical constructivism: “How new is the ‘new American psychoanalysis’?” Somewhat optimistic that contemporary psychoanalysis has entered an era of productive dialogue (Aron1996; Wallerstein1998), he nonetheless remains concerned that some proclaim a paradigm shift to a new psychoanalysis, providing no substantial evidence for the claim. Richards is convinced that paradigm shifts can be determined only in historical retrospect. To illustrate his point, he cites Hoffman’s evaluation of the concept of the “blank screen,” his insistence on the inevitability of interaction, and his acceptance of the constructivist perspective. These technical conclusions, Richards argues, act as self-fulfilling prophecies designed to imbue the analytic situation with countertransference in order to foster the illusion of an ordinary relationship. This in turn limits Hoffman’s intervention strategies primarily to attempts at correcting complaints at the manifest content level. For Richards, acknowledging interaction and the use of the analyst as a new object leads to a different technical conclusion, one calling for greater caution and restraint rather than suggestion and active influence.

Richards extends his argument for a neutrality<sup>4</sup> that creates a “predictable atmosphere” allowing for openness and compassion. This is not only possible; it is essential. So how new *is* the new American psychoanalysis? The title’s question, like the issues dealt with in this chapter, is offered in homage to those who would reach beyond complacency to engage in further dialogue.

In Section IV (chapters 11–13) we find Richards and colleagues engaged in dialogue and debate with relational theorists, on levels both intellectual and emotional. In

---

<sup>4</sup>He finds a sense of “good enough” neutrality in the work of Loewald (1960), who contends that Freud’s use of the term “*Indifferenz*,” is better construed as “disinterestedness” (i.e., a detached contemplation).

chapter 11, Richards (with Janet Lee Bachant) critiques Stephen Mitchell's *Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis* (1988). From the outset, the authors wonder how Mitchell arrived at his core argument, which proposes an inherent opposition between drive and relational premises.

They consider Mitchell's relational thinking at the time and compare it with the contemporary classical position on three clinical issues: sexuality, the importance of early experience in the development of psychic structure, and transference. They note that Mitchell found the dominant meanings of sexuality in the basic patterns of search, surrender, and escape but failed to recognize that Freud's concept of infantile sexuality was deeply ingrained in the emotionally dramatic experiences the child endures as he learns to love in new ways while traveling through life in a family of significant others. The authors next focus on Mitchell's efforts to redefine developmental theory based wholly on relational considerations. This, they stress, abandoned the importance of early experience as consequential in the expression of needs that are active throughout life. This redefinition of development substantially changed psychoanalytic theory, especially with regard to the dynamic unconscious, the pleasure principle, and technique. Consequently, it significantly reduces the explanatory base of the theory. Richards and Bachant also summarize Mitchell's view of transference as resting on three relational assumptions: transference as (1) an allegory contained within relational patterns; (2) a vehicle for rewriting and broadening the analysand's narratives; and (3) as dyadic in nature, interactive in style, and egalitarian by design. They end with some thoughtful ideas on the politics of model making.

In chapter 12, Richards (with Bachant and Arthur Lynch) return to the relational perspective, providing a broader evaluation and identifying the particular impact it has on the psychoanalytic situation. They discuss five exponents of relational theory.

The authors argue that the antagonism between relational theory and drive theory, as posited by relational theorists, is a false dichotomy designed to elevate differences and prove superiority. They show that Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) misrepresent drive theory, conceptualize development as derived principally from the interpersonal field, thereby minimizing intrapsychic conflict, and substantially redefine the concepts of resistance, transference, and free association. As the relational perspective progressed, there was much less concurrence among relational theorists. Mitchell remained committed to the complete rejection of drive theory, recommending a purely relational model. By 1992, Greenberg (1991), Ogden (1992a,b), and Slavin and Kriegman (1992) all argued for some form of drive theory in understanding the individual's differentiation. The authors conclude that psychoanalysis grows with careful attention to specific clinical and conceptual issues, as can be seen in the works of Ogden, Rangell, Pine, and Wallerstein, all of whom have struggled with a range of epistemologies.

In chapter 13 Richards (with Arlene Richards) comments on the work of Benjamin Wolstein, with special interest in the psychoanalytic situation and the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. They find that Wolstein's works, before the advent of PEP, had been isolated from the broader profession. The authors discuss many of Wolstein's fundamental concepts and begin a comparative exercise by pointing to parallels between Wolstein's work and that of contemporary Freudians. These parallels include an emphasis on individuation and the uniqueness of each individual and

therapeutic dyad; contributions in countertransference; and the need for the analyst to empathically experience the analysand's fear and pain. There is also some agreement that a crucial aspect of the analytic work is to attend to unexpressed affect. The authors describe three aims for the chapter: to convey what was lost in the period of isolation, to identify the areas of convergence in clinical findings, and to begin addressing ways to end theoretical estrangements. These examples, the authors find, illustrate how related clinical findings may be arrived at independently. This realization brings the authors to the question, How do theoretical differences exhibit or conceal different ways of working in the clinical situation? The authors note that clinicians draw on and/or create theory, in part, to correct for aspects of their character that would otherwise circumvent or impede the clinical process. The authors end the review with an appreciation of Wolstein's contributions, viewing him as a pioneer with the spirit of a broadminded thinker.

In Section V, (chapters 14–17), Richards and colleagues explore the theoretical core of contemporary conflict theory. In chapter 14 Richards outlines Brenner's contributions. Early in his career, Brenner (1955), considered psychoanalysis a natural science in which data is gathered by a particular method and evaluated from a specific attitude.<sup>5</sup> This data-oriented attitude continued to guide Brenner throughout his technical works. In 1964, Brenner and Arlow revised psychoanalytic theory and argued the case for privileging the structural model. In 1982, Brenner offered a new view of the mind that considered all aspects of mental functioning to be compromise formations: complex

---

<sup>5</sup>Richards points out that this was also Brenner's method for theory building: first a careful literature review, next an identification of assumptions not supported by clinical data, and then construction of a theory that better fits the data and points in a new direction.

pleasurable and unpleasurable affects; various wishes and fears<sup>6</sup> as unique expressions of libidinal and aggressive trends; defensive functions that deny awareness of complete or part components of unpleasurable affects; protective and self-punitive moral trends; environmental pressures brought to bear at a given point in time. Richards notes that for Brenner metapsychology was a mode of discourse or a way of observing no different from that in other sciences.<sup>7</sup> Brenner (1995) modified this view by moving to a model of functional categories and mental processes. The ego, Richards notes, becomes the person,<sup>8</sup> drive becomes wish, and superego becomes the moral component of compromise formation. What Brenner offers, Richards notes, is an ego that is dynamically indistinguishable from a neurotic symptom and a view of the child motivated above all by the need to win his or her parents' love. For Richards, the most important concept was Brenner's proposal of compromise formation. Brenner (2005) also advocated for a definition of psychoanalytic treatment defined not by frequency of sessions or use of the couch, but by an analytic attitude and the search for meaning.

The psychoanalytic situation, according to Brenner, is organized around this new model of mental functioning, which alters the goals and aims of technique. Brenner emphasized how technique follows conflict and warned that no single technical element or explanation attains greater prestige than its place in the theory of mental functioning. This data-oriented attitude continued to guide Brenner through his technical works, where he came to appreciate all aspects of mental functioning as compromise formations. Brenner required that all aspects of the conflict

---

<sup>6</sup>These wishes and fears (along with fantasies, dreams, neurotic symptoms, and associative material) express their meanings in language and gestures that make up the principal data of psychoanalysis privileged by practitioners.

<sup>7</sup>What Gill (1994) would later call a hermeneutic science, one where meanings are data.

<sup>8</sup>Richards (1982) speculates that Brenner would continue to focus on the constituents of psychic conflict while incorporating certain hermeneutic features and could eventually offer a model of the mind in which the elements of conflict replace the traditional concepts of agency. In 1995 he did.

presenting in behavior, character traits, and symptoms be looked at, while interpreting the components of conflict as they emerge in the analysands's associations.<sup>9</sup> In treatment, compromise formations change and alter the character and strategy of defense as a new homeostasis of mind is achieved.

Richards sees Brenner's work as establishing him as a psychoanalytic extender who innovated by addressing the meaning of traditional psychoanalytic concepts (e.g., drive, defense, superego, affect, transference, countertransference, regression). In providing this new theory, he challenged alternative schools to provide a comprehensive and coherent presentation of their fundamental principles and concepts.

In chapter 15, Richards (with Jacob Arlow) describes the principles fundamental to psychoanalytic psychology: psychic determinism, dynamic psychology, conflict, and the role of unconscious mental elements. These conceptual abstractions are detectable only in time of psychic conflict. Solutions or compromise formations resolve conflicts by ensuring that all aspects of the conflict find participation of their dynamism in the solution. When these solutions ward off unpleasure, they are considered successful. When they fail, the solution will bring a greater or lesser degree of pain or may place the person in harm's way. This leaves the mind in a constant effort to adapt, integrate, and compromise. Richards and Arlow describe the different methods available to accomplish this as the child encounters the vicissitudes of life.

As the authors move into the treatment section, they note that fundamental operational principles shape the psychoanalytic situation in order to attain a dynamic record of the analysand's style of mental functioning. Treatment aims at providing insight into the nature,

---

<sup>9</sup>Brenner puts this quite succinctly: "What psychoanalysts do (of particular importance) . . . is make inferences with respect to the causes of the wishes, fears, fantasies, dreams, neurotic symptoms, and associative material that constitute their data of observation . . . psychoanalysts try to discover or, to be more precise, to infer what it is that causes the normal and pathological mental phenomena they observe" (1982, p. [AU: P. REF]).

magnitude, and automatic actions of the unconscious, which broadens his capacity for choosing less conflictual compromise formations. The authors demonstrate the flexibility and growth of psychoanalytic theory in its continuous revision and integration of new insights and discoveries, offering clear discussions of transference, object relations, narcissism, identification, and the role of compromise formations.

Social applications are addressed as the authors propose that advances in psychoanalytic theory have provided insight into social and group phenomena, (e.g., myths, fairy tales, literary works, religious traditions), which embody repressed wishes often based on a secret rebellion against maturation and social prohibitions. Validation of these insights is lacking. In chapter 16, Richards (with Lynch) reviews, in five sections, the theoretical roots of contemporary conflict theory in ego psychology. In an introductory section, the authors trace the emergence of ego psychology from Freud's final theoretical revision (1923, 1926). The clinical implications now shift from an energy model to a meaning model, as Freud returns to the threatening wish that now elicits signals of danger.

In parts two, three and four, the authors review the clinical implications of ego psychology: the effect of theory change on technique and the shift of clinical observation to the ego; the analyst as participant observer (efforts to ensure that interpretation respect the unique interaction of analysand and analyst); and issues of transference and countertransference. They trace the concepts from Freud's early work through that of contemporary conflict theorists. Together, ego psychologists and object relations theorists provided the grounding for contemporary debates regarding a variety of clinical interactions, including enactment.

In the final section, the authors review contemporary conflict theorists who have critically examined such concepts as anxiety, repression, defense and symptom formation, affect,

and the superego. Two issues of technique are traced: the difference in clinical emphasis between those who espouse interpretation of defense, and those who focus on interpretation of conflict and compromise formation in the context of unconscious fantasy and the technical role of the patient-analyst relationship—its active use in the treatment versus a greater emphasis on its interpretation. The paper ends with a recognition that psychoanalysis will continue to generate diverse and conflicting positions that require a firm grasp of collective history and scientific influences if partisan squabbles are to be avoided.

In chapter 17, Richards and Lynch review the work of Leo Rangell. Rangell (2007[AU: BELOW THERE'S A 2007b; ARE THERE TWO 2007s?]) worked to create a unified psychoanalytic theory he called “total composite psychoanalytic theory.” He saw the domain of psychoanalysis as the study of unconscious intrapsychic conflict, and his efforts focused on how intrapsychic events that lead to action both affect and are affected by the varieties of human experience. The authors begin the review with Rangell’s concept of “the human core” and outline the twelve sequential steps he proposed as defining “the intrapsychic process.” The intrapsychic process is affected by signals of anxiety or safety that lead to active unconscious decision making and free will, to breaches of integrity, and to questions of personal responsibility and accountability as one struggles with the willingness required to live by superego values.<sup>10</sup>

Rangell believed that the final test of any idea is in the clinical domain. His clinical contributions fall into two areas: the psychoanalytic core (contributions made to the psychoanalytic process) and specific clinical problems in the application of technique. For Rangell, the authors note, it was the analytic process that distinguishes the method and not

---

<sup>10</sup>The compromise of integrity falls on a range from the familiar to the ego-alien and is found in psychopathology from mild to severe. Treatment is through the analysis of the syndrome with the analytic aim of “turning out an honest man,” free from both the compromise of integrity and neurosis.

frequency or furniture. He rejected privileging any technical aspect of the process until it is clinically called for.

The authors conclude that for Rangell most alternative psychoanalytic schools contain important individual contributions that could be supplemental to the total theory but instead often get stuck in partisan struggles. Rangell believed that theoretical pluralism is the current problem for psychoanalysis. This has been fostered by four basic fallacies<sup>11</sup> that have led to a theoretical drifting with no real efforts at “consistency or intellectual unity” (Rangell 2007b, [AU: SEE ABOVE]p. 99). Rangell’s alternative is “total composite psychoanalytic theory.”<sup>12</sup> What is accepted into the theory is decided by both the collective and the individual.

Section VI, *Clinical Theory and Psychoanalytic Technique*, begins as Richards, with others, turns to clinical issues and the interaction of theory and technique. In chapter 18 Richards (with Arlene Richards) asks, Are there technical consequences to theory, and are theories comparable? The chapter begins with a reflection of some important theoretical dialectics and then turns to a clinical case from a contemporary Freudian perspective. Insight into unconscious fantasies arises organically in the course of the analysis, as the analyst uses key aspects of contemporary conflict theory. These concepts inform a technical stance that successfully offers the patient new knowledge of her thoughts and feelings. The authors agree with Arlow (1994) that uncovering distressing wishes and thoughts is generally a painful aspect of analysis but is not, as some contend, a humiliating experience.

---

<sup>11</sup>These fallacies are (1) replacement of a preexisting set of observations or parts of explanatory theory by another when both new and old are both valid, (2) the pathogenic fallacy—“pars pro toto”—a selection of a part and its replacement for the whole, (3) failure to aptly apply knowledge and insight gained in one sphere to related relevant situations, (4) failure to follow up one’s thought or actions with the consequences that could be expected from new discoveries or insights.

<sup>12</sup> It is cohesive and cumulative, aiming at “completeness with parsimony” (Rangell 2007b[AU: B?], p. 116): “total”—containing all nonexpendable elements; “composite”—a blend of all valid discoveries; and “psychoanalytic”—fulfilling the criteria of psychoanalysis (Rangell 2007b[AU?], p. 85).

After a review of the literature, the authors identify the problem that theory is not unitary. Rather, it consists of a set of discrete yet interrelated models of the mind, development, pathogenesis and symptom formation, and the therapeutic process and cure. Additions or modifications to some of these subtheories may be more technically consequential than others. The authors ask, Do the technical modifications that follow from these new theories represent genuine advances? To answer this they review various pluralistic theories, outlining how each theory informs technique and then propose a series of technical challenges. They find that self psychology practitioners minimize the role of unconscious fantasy and focus technically on the real relationships with the parents and the analyst. The authors conclude, after reviewing the many helpful interventions, that the overall patient-analyst interaction appears to offer little more than friendly comfort. They are even less optimistic about intersubjective and relational theories, which appear to have important but deleterious effects on technique. The authors next turn to the modern Kleinians, who despite having a different subtheory in their models of mind, development, and pathogenesis resemble modern Freudian theorists in technique. Finally, the American object relations school attempts to devise treatments for patients who cannot tolerate the rigors of psychoanalysis practiced by ego psychologists. Technically, the authors find that American object relations theories and techniques fit comfortably into the ego psychology model. The authors conclude with some comparative issues. They agree with Wallerstein (1990) that differences in theory do not necessarily translate into differences in technique and follow Brenner and Arlow (1990), who note that analytic technique is best viewed as coterminous with analytic process. The authors come away from this exercise with the belief that maintaining an integrationist position is more challenging with some schools than others, but leave to the future the answer to whether or not convergence is possible with such divergent approaches.

In chapter 19 Richards examines in detail four Isakower-like experiences of a patient on the couch. This case report draws attention to the little-known hypothesis behind the Isakower phenomena, that certain perceptual experiences are related to childhood oedipal masturbatory fantasies at the time of going to sleep. Richards presents data from four sessions of an analysis in its fourth year. He attends to the dynamic context in which the Isakower-like phenomena unfolded and identifies six findings from the clinical data that reflect the multiply determined nature of the phenomena. On the basis of these findings, Richards advocates that this clinical data must be understood in the larger domain of regressive ego phenomena. This conclusion, he notes, while consistent with the Kris Study Group's reported findings (Joseph 1965), is contrary to how the Isakower phenomena has been understood from its inception.

In chapter 20, Richards describes a case of self-mutilation and father-daughter incest. This case traces the analytic treatment of a young woman suffering from substance abuse, sexual acting out, and suicide attempts. These symptoms, rooted in a history of parental and physical abuse, were accompanied by fears of abandonment, isolation, and unlovability. The patient engaged in a variety of self-mutilation activities, including cutting, burning, and aggravating wounds. Maternal care in her early childhood had been bleak. After a period of repeated hospitalization and outpatient psychotherapy, the patient entered a five-times-a-week analysis on the couch. The treatment uncovered the incestuous memory of intercourse with her father during late adolescence. This memory was expressed along with other memories and reconstructions of various forms of sexual experience with her father. Together these proved central to a multiply determined understanding of her self-mutilation, other symptoms, and recovery. Richards concludes

that the case strengthens findings in the literature of a significant link between self-mutilation in adolescent girls and earlier sexual experiences.

In chapter 21 Richards (with Bachant and Lynch) sets out to create a comparative model using various conceptions of interaction. The concept of interaction remains central to debates about the nature of the therapeutic process and has been informed by many orientations, including object relations theory, interpersonal theory, and contemporary Freudian theory. The authors see interaction as a dimension of every relationship and as an essential dynamic of the therapeutic encounter.

The model offered by the authors proposes that interaction be seen as a spectrum of distinct yet overlapping clinical phenomena: acting in/acting out, transference actualization, enactment, countertransference actualization, and boundary violation. The authors emphasize that these are clinical states with permeable boundaries that shift in the currents of treatment, providing the clinician a model that facilitates intervention strategies, exchange of ideas, and the organization of clinical data.

Each of these interactive possibilities is discussed. The authors propose that enactments lie at the center of the spectrum because they are interactions in which both parties construct and sustain a process that embodies a crucial aspect of their affective relationship. To either side of the center fall interactions that are more patient-focused at one end and analyst-focused at the other. This continuum helps delineate a range of options for analytic intervention. The authors contend that an oscillation between monadic and dyadic perspectives is integral to grappling with the interactive dimension of the analytic process. Two clinical vignettes are offered that illustrate the advantages of this model. The first is an instance of budding countertransference actualization; the other a more ambiguous example of enactment.

The authors conclude that interaction in its various forms has historically been part of the psychoanalytic tradition and that more recent attention to enactments and actualizations brings a refined understanding of the shifting interactions in the analytic process. The authors emphasize their perspective by noting that both participants experience repetitions aimed at wish fulfillment wrapped in conflict and fantasy, which remains unconscious to the participants. How much these interactions are the outcome of unconscious conflict and how much the interactions are constructed by factors in the present remain uncertain, as does how to tell which of these initiators is prominent at any given moment.

In chapter 22, Richards (with Arlene Richards) begin the discussion of the narcissistic patient with a review of current psychodynamic perspectives and a clinical description. Kernberg and Kohut were at the time two theorists who differed significantly on most issues of narcissism. Kohut saw the disorder as the result of faulty parenting creating disappointments that eventuate in developmental deficits interfering with a healthy sense of self. Kernberg viewed the narcissistic patient as enraged and hateful at being exploited and frustrated by unsympathetic parents who provoke paranoid states managed by grandiose and controlling behavior. In considering the differential dynamic diagnosis and intervention strategies, the authors point out that most clinicians agree on the phenomenology but not on the underlying dynamics. The authors list several possibilities for this that are embedded in the two distinct theories. The authors highlight five prognostic indicators and the different role the analyst serves in the treatment relationship. The authors note that Bach (1992, in R&R...[AU?]) has pointed out the two-sidedness characteristic in this pathology and its impact on intolerance in the countertransference.

Section VII, Epilogue (chapters 23–26), opens with “The Replacemnt Child.” The chapter begins as Richards (with Leon Anisfeld) explores the historical, biographical, and theoretical consequences of being a replacement child. The authors define the concept of the replacement child as centered on the idea that a child is conceived to take the place of another, who is often deceased. The authors specify that a replacement child is one born to a family for the purpose of filling an emotional void left by loss of the other child. There are many variations on this theme. Examples can be found in situations where a child is adopted and must meet the parents’ fantasies for the unconceived child, or the weight attributed to a healthy child who must make up for some severe deficiency in an older sibling. The authors show that the concept has special meaning for those with tragic losses from the Holocaust, where the children were seen as born not only to fill a personal emptiness but also for “the Jewish people as a whole.”

In chapter 24 Richards (with Lynch) discusses how psychoanalysis has been in a constant uninterrupted debate about its identity as both a discipline and a social institution. The chapter considers the place of science in psychoanalysis, on the one hand, and the hermeneutic nature of psychoanalysis on the other. Their aim is to articulate a typology of psychoanalytic knowledge that characterizes psychoanalysis as a form of therapy, an intellectual movement, and a theoretical system. This typology considers psychoanalysis as a thought collective that influences its members by exchanging and maintaining ideas. To be a well-rounded psychoanalytic thinker or practitioner one must be able to move easily among three realms of knowledge—the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. This effort will afford us a better sense of the identity of the discipline of psychoanalysis and its potential.

In chapter 25, Richards offers his thoughts on his years as editor of *JAPA*. He begins his reflections with a review of the history paralleling development of the journal. This begins from

homogenous beginnings to the changing landscape of the early 1980s. Richards identifies two additional decisive events that broadened the psychoanalytic mainstream: the 1992 “first delinkage” and the settlement of the lawsuit. This meant that groups once marginalized could now be considered for APsaA membership, a decision that left Richards, in 1994, confronted with how to carry out the journal’s mission while reflecting the changes in membership. Richards recounts his own history of becoming an analyst and the powerful influence that Menninger, a larger academic community more integrated with other disciplines, had on him. He wondered how to infuse this vitality into his work as editor, first at *TAP* and then at *JAPA*, to reflect the diverse growth in alternative American psychoanalysis. To succeed, he felt he needed to open the journal up to the larger community. To further this goal, Richards set up a democratic editorial process. Using Ludwig Fleck’s concept of the thought collective to describe a practical sociology of psychoanalytic knowledge, Richards warns that the editors of our journals are its guardians and are charged to protect them against conformity. Like the members of thought collectives, editors must nurture a style of openness that lets our journals adapt to and usefully integrate new findings from other disciplines and psychoanalytic schools.

In chapter 26, “A View from Now”, Richards offers us his thoughts on a long and productive psychoanalytic career.

## **POSTSCRIPT**

In this volume, Richards consistently advocates both plurality and union. He highlights the benefits and the challenges to the growth of psychoanalytic theory from disparate thought collectives, while maintaining a belief that ongoing integration, a necessary

function of theory, will culminate in a psychoanalytic science. He shows how ecumenical growth keeps the science and the profession alive and vital.

Clinically, this motif of integrative plurality is represented in his case material and theory building papers. In these chapters, Richards emphasizes the importance of the individual's development of meanings (hermeneutics) as they are sculpted into patterns of experience that define us as a species (science). This is the deep structure, the hidden framework of all his works as he reviews and critiques contributions from some of the leading psychoanalytic theoretists of our time.