The Virtues of Military Politics

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Abstract
Sociologists and political scientists have long fretted over the dangers that a politicized military poses to democracy. In recent times, however, civil–military relations experts in the United States accepted retired or indeed still serving generals and admirals in high-ranking political posts. Despite customary revulsion from scholars, the sudden waivers are an indicator that military participation in momentous national security decisions is inherently political without necessarily being partisan, including when civilian authority defers to a largely autonomous sphere for objective military expertise. Military politics is actually critical for healthy civil–military collaboration, when done prudently and moderately. Janowitz and Huntington, founders of the modern study of civil–military relations, understood the U.S. military’s inevitable invitation to political influence. Here, we elaborate on two neglected dimensions, implicit in their projects, of military politics under objective civilian control based on classical virtues of civic republicanism: Aristotle’s practical wisdom and Machiavelli’s virtù.

Keywords
civil–military relations, defense policy, democracy, professionalism/leadership

This article advances a heterodox idea. While it is a truism that American military leaders engage in a wide variety of ways with domestic American political processes, we think that certain manifestations of such “military politics” are a good
thing.¹ For most supporters of democracy, by contrast, “military politics” is at best an oxymoron and at worst an atavistic threat to civilian control that should be avoided. This conforms to the wisdom of both sociologists and political scientists who have long fretted over dangers that a politicized military poses to democracy. Leading civil–military relations scholars have agreed not only that military politics should be avoided but also how it should be avoided, namely through some combination of a professional military culture that disavows political meddling and a sufficiently robust external oversight regime to make sure no such meddling occurs (Shields, 2017; Snider, 2008; Ulrich, 2015).

It seems surprising, then, that many of these same civil–military relations scholars accepted the increasingly common practice of placing recently retired or indeed still serving generals and admirals in high-ranking political posts in the United States. We argue that as an important reason why so many senior officers are expected to navigate the transition links to a general misunderstanding. Contrary to the focus of attention within the prescription for avoidance, military politics is in fact a central feature of civil–military affairs. American military leaders are more politically engaged at the nexus of national security decision-making than is ever admitted. We claim this is good and ought to be studied. In our view, military politics, when practiced with the ancient republican virtues in mind, facilitates healthy democratic civil–military relations. It is a fact of life, one that should no longer be dreaded or brushed aside but fully appreciated and fit for purpose.²

In order to advance our argument, we reexamine hypotheses offered by Janowitz (2017) who established the field of military sociology with his 1960 classic The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait and who provided perhaps the most robust theory of military politics. Now is a propitious time to reexamine Janowitz who is experiencing a resurgence of interest.³ Notably, Janowitz was in part reacting to his political science colleague, Samuel Huntington (1957), who likewise founded a specialty a few years before in “The Soldier and the State: The Politics of Civil–Military Relations” but who was famously averse to military leaders engaging in partisan politics.

While the military politics dilemma was clear to both Huntington and Janowitz, we note its gradual disappearance from work of their interpreters and from the two fields they spawned, civil–military relations and military sociology. Nevertheless, military politics evolved in the absence of scholarly attention, giving rise to new forms of both virtuous and vicious military maneuvers at senior levels of policymaking. Drawing inspiration from Roennfeldt’s (2017) recent study of military practical wisdom, but also departing from that framework in key respects, we conclude this article by exploring intersecting concepts of civic republicanism, Aristotelian practical wisdom and Machiavellian virtù. We reflect on when and how military officers under civilian authority should engage their domestic political arenas, and ultimately ask, Can American military leaders in the rush of politics learn to “whisper” their full and frank advice?
Janowitz With Huntington on Military Politics

The United States, today, wrestles with anxiety and self-doubt that on its surface appears opposite to sociological and political challenges presenting themselves in Janowitz’s time. Today, the United States reels from geopolitical setbacks and financial failures while holding senior members of the profession of arms in high regard. Seventy years ago, at the height of its country’s relative power, the American public saw career officers tasked with managing the citizen army as little more than schoolmasters (Janowitz, 2017, p. xl). Even so, cultivating military expertise and harnessing it for decision-making on national security remain crucial for navigating global politics. Janowitz’s “fifth hypothesis” of military sociology on increasing political indoctrination of general officers, though crafted in 1960, applies to military dissent in 2020 as the ailing American superpower seeks to preserve its influence under shifting conditions in the international system.

Although Janowitz disputed Huntington’s portrayal of a yawning gap between the profession of arms and American civilian leadership, the two nevertheless supported a pattern of civil–military relations in which officers develop self-awareness to contemplate political consequences of their actions as they deliver candid counsel. When the United States faces its next national security gauntlet, keeping Janowitz’s fifth hypothesis in mind means, consistent with Huntington’s civil–military prescriptions, a military profession inside the halls of republican political power learning to whisper its wisdom in a treacherous partisan atmosphere.

Within the study of politics, Huntington’s thesis flowed from the concern that, for the first time in its comparably short history, American democracy dueled an implacable great power rival in the Soviet Union. America’s new standing army, in order to defeat Soviet conventional aggression in Europe, would be organized around an illiberal ethos—what Huntington termed the military mind—at the same time that its budget and force of arms would guarantee domestic political influence. How could such political energy, distinct from liberal society, be controlled at home without destroying it like some sort of cancer and hollowing out the army’s effectiveness abroad?

Although Huntington in the 1950s did not employ the language of contemporary principal–agent economic theory, his answer reflected its insights. Military agents’ expertise could be tapped to help secure liberal democracy; it could also be channeled within the political framework of a state. This was based on two conditions: First, that military elites, when advising civilian authority and managing organized violence on behalf of the state, adhered to high standards of professionalism; and second, that civilians rewarded responsible officers with ample trust and autonomy inside the military sphere of competence. The modern question, for both Huntington and Janowitz, of democratic control over a powerful military fell within the broader issue of how any free society under conditions of increasing complexity could harness rising professions in law, medicine, engineering, and other fields without undermining long-term growth and development.4
Huntington’s conceptualization of America’s Cold War challenge brought his study in close proximity to the concerns of American sociology. In the context of critical reaction to the Soldier and the State, Morris Janowitz’s capstone report on the Professional Soldier was interpreted as a competing alternative, even an antidote, to Huntington’s institutional prescriptions (Burk, 2002; Cohen, 2009; Feaver, 1996). The truth is more complicated, and it leads directly to our rediscovery of military politics, classic virtues of republicanism that both Janowitz and Huntington would have urged for senior American officers. Janowitz and Huntington had after all been workshop collaborators across disciplinary lines on the question of democratic control over the world’s most powerful military before either author completed their seminal work. When Janowitz (2017) declared his five sociological hypotheses, laying the foundation for Professional Soldier, he had politics, policy, and Huntington’s contribution very much in mind (pp. 5, 13).

Indeed, Huntington’s assumptions concerning natural separation of military culture and ways of viewing the world from liberal society were correct. The problem of channeling professional officers’ contribution for defense of the nation without succumbing to their vast potential for political interference was real, and Huntington’s solution—professional autonomy in exchange for socially responsible service—would work as far as it went (Janowitz, 2017, pp. 15–16). Yet Huntington’s astute political analysis did not go far enough. Systematic study of the military as a profession using tools of American sociology showed trends in the career trajectory of military elites that Huntington’s study largely ignored. These trends formed the basis of Janowitz’s five hypotheses that birthed a new field, military sociology.

Drawing from a rich pool of data which included both 761 responses to an earlier survey conducted by Masland and Radway (2015) and 113 structured interviews he conducted himself, Janowitz proposed five lines of accelerating convergence between military and civilian culture. The preliminary hypotheses identified patterns of authority, professional skill sets, promotion tracks, and recruiting in which military ways were adopting more civilian characteristics. Janowitz’s fifth hypothesis was not presented as such, but in a sense, it was a culminating claim. Officers who made it to the most senior ranks, where their points of view could directly affect American national security, more and more underwent political indoctrination, or socialization, that enabled them to exchange views with civilian policy makers. Indeed, Janowitz (2017) wrote that “these hypotheses,” meaning all five, were about politics and policy upon which hung the fate of the United States in its Cold War competition with the Soviet Union (p. 13).

Emphasizing the quality of democratic decision-making for national security placed Janowitz the sociologist in line with Huntington the political scientist. Janowitz also agreed that the military had its own profession, distinguished from civilian professions and exemplified by education and career experiences of its senior officers. Contrary to what has been reported, Janowitz did not offer an institutional solution for American civil–military relations that opposed Huntington’s balanced design with an alternative, integrated approach. Instead, Janowitz’s Professional
Soldier pointed out that, contrary to Huntington’s simplifying assumptions, the military profession itself was not a constant. Key trends in authority, skill development, career progression, recruitment, and political indoctrination did not imply that elite officers and civilian policy makers would merge into one homogenous foreign policy council under the president. The civil–military gap in expertise, responsibility, and outlook would persist as Huntington described. However, these trends, combined with the nuclear weapon and missile rivalry dawning in the 1960s, would exacerbate subdivisions among military professionals, dramatically complicating Huntington’s scheme for democratic civilian control.

Janowitz termed the permanent rival camps within the profession as absolutists versus pragmatists. Pragmatists responded to the advent of nuclear weapons by pulling the profession toward new standards of success. Rather than absolute victory over a rival army, the mission would entail effective political defense of a friendly government against communist-inspired insurgents. Unlike combat operations during World War II, military officers who were not managing the country’s nuclear deterrent could be working hand in glove with local civil authorities on problems related to law enforcement or economic development in order to immunize communities against small war tactics. Logically, then, absolutists within the profession disagreed that strategic momentum of states and armies had so completely changed, protesting that a military force primed for nuclear strike and occasional small-unit counterinsurgency operations would leave itself vulnerable to conventional defeat.

The professional watershed of the 1960s, which might have emerged at all events as officers reacted to revolutionary nuclear technology, was magnified to the extent that Janowitz’s hypotheses regarding elite officers’ recruitment, promotion, authority, and skill set held true. In crucial respects, highly expert agents seated at the table of national security policy-making were changing, approaching social equality with their civilian principals. Janowitz’s fifth hypothesis, that star officers increasingly acquired a sophisticated understanding of the external and internal political consequences of their best military advice, ensured that healthy friction between policy views would in future metastasize into something more like destructive collision. Moreover, just as civilian factions battled over competing ideologies, the new breed of military elites would be similarly split between absolutists and pragmatists.

Janowitz’s fifth hypothesis, then, pointed the way toward a more complicated and ominous world than even Huntington portrayed. After 1960, as the Soviet nuclear threat increased and communist-inspired wars of national liberation multiplied, the frequency of American civil–military train wrecks would climb. Each test of wills, though unlikely to prompt an actual coup, would rankle either the absolutists or the pragmatists. Before long, there would be deeply frustrated officers from both camps, highly capable, politically aware, and sorely tempted, out of patriotism (a cardinal virtue) to exploit fissures on the civilian side so as to move defense and national policy in the “right” direction.

Janowitz’s fifth hypothesis illuminated a nearly impossible problem of professional military dissent against civilian authority during the Cold War.
Notwithstanding the absence of coup, there have been waves of concern, around the time Huntington and Janowitz were writing and during the Clinton–Bush years, that senior military officers were beginning to exercise their political potential when they protested the operational consequences of presidential strategy. Before exploring whether we might be entering another phase of politically charged civil–military disputes, the next section discusses the spectrum of solutions that have been offered for preserving democratic control when best military advice dissents from established civilian preferences—and how insufficient attention to Janowitz’s fifth hypothesis prolonged debate, making it difficult for even hybrid or negotiated frameworks to attract working consensus among scholars or practitioners.

Civilian Supremacists Versus Principled Patriots

Two things can happen when there is significant military dissent over policy in the American system. Either the irresistible will of the commander in chief or the immovable object of best uniformed advice (reinforced by military science and centuries of professional experience) must give way. We can imagine a result that somehow combined elements of competing policy alternatives—deliberation and negotiation being in the nature of functioning democracy. Yet serious disagreement between civilian authority and military analysis will often crop up on defense and national security questions such as how many billions to dedicate toward a new bomber or how many troops to risk in support of a friendly government overseas. In these cases, both sides realize halfway compromises are hazardous, raising the prospect of expending precious resources while national security objectives recede further out of reach.

Two book-length political science works coming out of the strategic turmoil of the 1990s—the period between the wars, 11/9 and 9/11—confirm this intuition.7 Desch (2001) and Feaver (2003) wanted to emphasize different causes, but their books ultimately offered rival theories for similar results. During the post-1945 era when the United States led the international system, civilian authority, the American president in particular, trumped dissenting advice from ranking military. Whether it was reducing the size of the Army under Eisenhower’s New Look, canceling a new strategic bomber fleet under Kennedy’s Flexible Response, or (non)deployment of American boots on the ground in the war for Kosovo a decade after the Cold War, time and again, sooner or later, the American president would have his way.

With civilians winning in the most salient policy disagreements against the military and the country prospering after its victory in the Cold War, one could be forgiven if like Richard Betts of Columbia University, one questioned whether the turmoil of the Clinton or W. Bush years was not simply the bureaucratic friction inherent in democratic civil–military relations, natural whenever democratic leaders encountered dissent from professional experts (Betts, 2009). Yet, Huntington and Janowitz recognized that this sort of friction could be dangerous.
First, by democratic principle and customary practice, the American way implied civilians advising the commander in chief had a right to be wrong about military decisions vital to national security. Episodic spikes in friction from military dissent meant there was a distinct possibility that civilians were wrong and senior officers were protesting to help the country while straining to maintain their professional subordination. If civilians kept winning these types of disputes, if they were wrong too often because they refused to genuinely listen or permit themselves to be persuaded by best military advice, the friction, then, did not indicate healthy civil–military relations—or sound national security decision-making (Desch, 2007; Hoffman, 2008).

Second, Peter Feaver showed in his reading of the cases for Armed Servants that even though civilians were winning policy disputes, consistent with the microeconomic logic of principal–agent relationships, they had to work hard to do so. Without monitoring mechanisms and credible threats of punishment for deviating from the president’s intent, senior military agents at the nexus of civil–military relations were liable to pursue their own preferences for national security and defense policy through what Feaver, borrowing from labor economics, called shirking. The generals, of course, would not go on strike, though they could legally threaten to resign in the midst of a crisis (Shields, 2017). More likely, they might inflate cost estimates or slow roll execution of policy options they did not favor while using discretionary authority to take initiative, fill vacuums, or generate Congressional pressure for implementation they thought was best.

Feaver’s application of “rational choice” theory to American civil–military relations generated controversy because it discounted military professionalism, which had been crucial in the twin analyses that founded the field—Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (2017, c1960). When critics argued, however, that a professional code of honor imbued in the thinking of senior officers at every stage of their career would constrain military shirking, Feaver could cite survey results (supported by the occasional article for professional military education) that showed a significant percentage of promotable officers felt duty bound to “insist” as a kind of course correction for wayward civilians (Feaver, 2003; Milburn, 2010).

Another wave of scholarship responded to concerns that senior military advisers to the president had surged out of control once the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act removed some of the control rods of interservice rivalry and the end of the Cold War created a strategic vacuum for national security and defense policy (Avant, 1996; Kohn, 1994). These writings might grant that civilians had a “right to be right” or that any dialogue between professional military elites and civilian authority under democracy would have to be unequal in favor of civilians (Cohen, 2003; Feaver, 2003, pp. 6, 65, 300). Yet, as the surviving superpower and main underwriter of the liberal global order, politicians in charge of defense and national security policy could ill afford to be wrong, repeatedly, simply for refusing to listen. In general, this group of scholars appreciated the potential for clearer strategic thinking by the United States. Unlike civilian supremacists, though, they believed U.S. decision-
making after 9/11 had been flawed in Afghanistan and especially Iraq because civilian authority had not respected the professionalism of senior uniformed advisors and consequently did not pay proper attention to military counsel that in retrospect could have saved American lives and treasure.

In his *International Security* article on the 2007 Surge strategy for Iraq, Feaver (2011) labeled the camp who spared the military and aimed criticism squarely at the ultimate decision makers “professional supremacists.” The moniker was appropriate in the sense that benefits from respecting the military in the tragedy cases would only come to fruition when certain advice was accepted—empirically, then, it became difficult to distinguish who, civilian or military, should be calling the shots during frequent instances when national security decisions involved matters incident to the military sphere of expertise.

Still, members of the school rejected the name for themselves. After all, they acknowledged that language in the American Constitution designated the civilian president as commander in chief of the armed forces. On this fundamental, they were also civilian supremacists. Yet only a mortally flawed or foolish president would disregard military expertise found at the apex of the profession of arms. If not every piece of advice could be accepted, perhaps we could only feel confident that word was getting through based on the tone of the civil–military relationship. Rather than professional supremacy, the scholars advanced a perspective of principled patriotism. For the case of contemporary American civil–military relations, they observed uniformed professionals tended to respect Constitutional restraints more than the president and surrounding national security team. While active duty military had political potential, as described by Huntington and Janowitz, military professionalism warned senior officers away from attempting to use their strength against civilians as they were providing best military advice. Civilians, on the other hand, wielded actual political power. Too often, civilian advisers, or the president himself, were using their authority to snub the military. For principled patriots, then, civilians had to alter their own behavior; they, more than ranking officers, had to take the lead in repairing the civil–military relationship.9

Both principled patriots and civilian supremacists could point to strong evidence for their position, selecting from vignettes populating troubled post–9/11 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The lack of progress this portended for improving civil–military relations, and several grim reminders that U.S. military intervention continued apace, led some who had kept their powder dry during the Clinton and Bush controversies to suggest, as American presence in the Middle East wound down, some sort of workable compromise that would involve continuous bargaining between the military elite and the civilian authority (Moten, 2014; Owens, 2011; Sewall & White, 2009). Even Feaver, a self-described civilian supremacist, concluded after analyzing the Iraq Surge that the right path lay somewhere between the visions of Cohen’s hectoring civilian and Milburn’s obstructionist officers—or Christopher Gibson’s supreme general that subsumed functions of Joint Staff chairman and military combatant commander (Gibson, 2008).
More elaborate specification of what a workable hybrid form of civil–military relations might look like actually emerged from the line of principled patriots produced out of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Christopher Gibson, Suzanne Nielsen, Matthew Moten, Heidi Urban, and Jason Dempsey in their writings hewed to the approach: Breakdowns in civil–military relations resulting in suboptimal national security decisions during the age of Afghanistan and Iraq might have been avoided if responsible civilians had understood their military better and listened harder to sound advice—present among the professionals if not always obvious in the political cauldron surrounding the president.

Active duty cavalry officer James Golby followed a postdoctoral fellowship at Stanford with a featured contribution in a special issue of the Air Force’s *Strategic Studies Quarterly* dedicated to new thinking in American civil–military relations (Golby, 2015). Golby’s approach deviated in important ways from his principled patriot school. When it came to “practical implications” of Golby’s Clausewitzian framework, which, along the lines of Huntington’s objective control, demarcated military from civilian expertise, Golby aimed (2015) his prescriptions “primarily on the military side of the dialogue” (p. 36, emphasis added). According to the Clausewitzian framework, senior military leaders serving civilian principals should render advice grounded in the profession’s expertise, not one professional’s view, and provide the full range of military opinion… should recognize and articulate the uncertainty and limitations inherent in any military advice… [and] should provide well-supported military estimates and provide all information relevant to policymakers’ decisions. (Golby, 2015, pp. 36–41)

These three recommendations for “how to render military advice in a political context” echoed some elements in the literature prior to Golby and with the same touchstone case in mind: Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki’s February 2003 sensational response, before the Senate Armed Services Committee and just before the March 2003 invasion, on how many U.S. Army troops would have to stay in Iraq after successful combat operations there (Crosbie, 2015; Golby, 2015, p. 28). Measures relating to range and variability of advice across elite military offices, the uncertainty surrounding military projections, and presence (or absence) of scientific support for military advice were proposed, however, in the politically charged, hothouse environment of 2006–2007. Moreover, the implications emerged from a civilian supremacist theory of the case, laying blame for the collapse of constructive civil–military dialogue at the feet of the military and probing what might be done by senior officers, even in the face of cantankerous future secretaries of defense, to repair relations for improved national security decision-making (Coletta, 2007; Crosbie & Kleykamp, 2017, 2018).

By contrast, Golby (2015) preserved important articles of faith with his predecessors among principled patriots. Although Golby’s recommendations reinforced those of civilian supremacists and urged constraints on the military, his cautionary
flags unfurled in the context of Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey’s reality check on the Obama administration plan in 2014 to fight Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq without American advisers accompanying local units into combat. Although General Dempsey’s public remarks before the Senate Armed Services Committee did not reflect Golby’s prescriptions for the military any more than General Shinseki’s had, General Dempsey weathered his storm. Indeed, there was no civil–military crisis of the intensity, duration, or political–military fallout that ensued after the March 2003 use of force. Presumably, while both Dempsey and Shinseki kept the faith—that is, full and frank advice, same advice to Congress and the president, and advice that fell within the military sphere of professional expertise on troop levels and rules of engagement—civilians in the intervening decade shifted. Consistent with lessons of the principled patriot school, civilians presumably improved their listening skills and raised their receptivity to objective military advice. For Golby, then, a Clausewitzian separation of military from civilian competencies acknowledged potential political consequences of senior officer dissent, but it ultimately relied on civilian administrations muting their reaction when principled patriots raised politically charged obstacles to the president’s preferred course of action.

Janowitz and the New Clausewitzian Framework for American Civil–Military Relations

Despite hard-won scholarly disposition toward compromise, pragmatism, and mutual respect in the civil–military dialogue, recidivist civilian supremacists will not rest easy with military politics as manifested in this new Clausewitzian framework. Although it builds on sound presumptions—civilian principals and military agents both care about the country, good fences make collaborative neighbors in formulation of defense and national security policy, and critical decisions inevitably conjoin professional military judgment with civilian political discretion—the framework for proper civil–military relations still lacks something when it cannot distinguish among prior cases of successful and hapless military dissent. Before the Senate, General Dempsey on Iraq in 2014 and General Shinseki on Iraq in 2003 followed, more or less, strictures in the Clausewitzian framework but with strikingly different damage sustained to civil–military dialogue and strategic disarray from civilians exercising their right to decide.

Janowitz’s fifth hypothesis, along with a recent article in the same vein by one of the present authors, helps resolve this puzzle and supply a supportive amendment to the Clausewitzian compromise (Crosbie, 2015). Recall that Janowitz’s fifth and final claim about trends in the military profession, circa 1960, was that leading officers had “developed a more explicit political ethos” (2017, p. 12), which promoted military influence on civilian decisions respecting national security policy and military judgment on political consequences of military action for the international balance of power and behavior of foreign states.
Interestingly, Janowitz predicted, over time, not the “coup of 2012,” as an award-winning paper for the Joint Chiefs subsequently warned, but instead a simmering, “quiet resentment” (Dunlap, 1992; see also Janowitz, 2017, p. 13). What Janowitz anticipated in 1960, Feaver (2011) found in his case study of the 2007 Iraq Surge: President Bush hesitated after he decided, moved slower than he might have, on the new plan to save Iraq, out of healthy respect for brewing skepticism among the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Feaver’s body of work is appreciated for applying principal–agent logic to address anomalies from Huntington’s theory of civil–military relations, but at the conclusion of his acclaimed analysis of decision-making before the successful Surge in Iraq, his key lessons draw from Janowitz’s fifth hypothesis. Janowitz held that political sophistication among elite officers, far from consolidating best military advice, would exacerbate profound differences within the officer corps over appropriate theories of victory. In Janowitz’s time, at the dawn of the nuclear age, the fault line within uniformed opinion separated absolutists from more progressive pragmatists. The terms are sufficiently abstract and flexible to suit Feaver’s observations as well. Today’s absolutists favor a theory of victory aimed at territorial control through conventional military formations combining lethal fires, maneuverability, and traditional force protection, while pragmatists are in the mold of innovative Army generals such as David Petraeus, who designed and oversaw the 2007 Iraq Surge, showing willingness to armor down and insinuate officers into local politics as part of counterinsurgency operations.12

Continued emphasis on professionalization in all the armed services combined with the realization of Janowitz’s fifth hypothesis implies that the latest chasm cleaving military opinion will endure, lending form to the challenge of military dissent against civilian principals.13 As was the case during Vietnam and again after 9/11, the American president and circle of civilian advisers on the closest decisions about whether and how to use force—even in administrations where Clausewitzian allocations of authority are respected—will receive conflicting “best military advice.” This implies during high-stakes national security decision-making, there will be, as Feaver found, a professionalized, politically aware military school that is disappointed—and potentially resentful against civilian judgments.

The out-group will believe the president imbibed poor advice and in the end chose poorly for the nation. They will understand their political leverage, its limitations and strengths, within a Constitutional system that diffuses power across various agencies and institutions. It is quite unlikely, therefore, that any civilian policy clearly absolutist or pragmatic in its orientation can be implemented without concessions—time in Feaver’s (2003) example, perhaps numbers of troops forgone in the 2009 Afghanistan Surge—unless the commander in chief is willing to pay a political price (pp. 62, 66–67). All of these, policy concessions, mollification time, political backlash, proceed independently from the original decision’s strategic effect on foreign adversaries and regardless of whether the Clausewitzian framework for constructive civil–military relations is observed.
Navigating military political expertise is made more difficult by service utopianism. Crosbie (2015) operationalized the concept in his study of the U.S. Army’s “domestic strategy” between 1945 and 1965, precisely the transitional period when Janowitz coined his fifth hypothesis and mapped the fault line dividing absolutists from military pragmatists. Crosbie applied service utopianism as a schema, or cognitive lens, developed in the minds of most elite officers as they mature in their careers, succeeding at jobs with ever broadening scope of responsibility. In terms of Golby’s Clausewitzian map, senior officers bring service utopianism with them as their obligation to supply best military advice draws them closer to the intersection of a civil–military Venn diagram. This intersection lies just where military and political spheres of expertise collide on questions such as integration of force with diplomacy, objections of allies, or risk assessment of crisis escalation (Golby, 2015, p. 15).

Even a milder version of service utopianism, which Crosbie believes survived the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols attempt to privilege the joint perspective on military problems, works against natural buffering and ordering properties of Golby’s Clausewitzian framework. To the extent that Janowitz’s fifth hypothesis and Crosbie’s service utopianism hold, today, the proposed Clausewitzian solution for proper civil–military relations will require shoring up if it is to function as hoped.  

Drawing from the civilian supremacist school as well as literature on civic republicanism and American Political Development, the appropriate supplement addresses the subordinate, military side of the relationship. If increasing political indoctrination à la Janowitz and robust service utopianism are to be checked in order to prevent them from swamping Clausewitzian institutions, then organic political vices (from the civilian perspective) must be accompanied by political virtues. Among the most ancient and reliable are Aristotle’s practical wisdom and Machiavelli’s Virtù.

Practical wisdom in this context means “to know to do,” and it implies that officers asked to provide best military advice should, along with their extended education and professional experience, cultivate a literary sensibility as to their political situation, a sense of where they fit in the grand political drama directed by the Constitution. For Roennfeldt, such skills allow officers to achieve organizational ends in the sociopolitical sphere. This would be a kind of street smarts that afforded officers the prudence to maintain frank dissent from, say, the defense secretary’s view—in open testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee—without landing themselves in a knife fight with the president that they are bound to lose.

Knives, of course, played an outsized historical role in the destruction of ancient republics. Even today, “night of the long knives” stands for political assassination that rattles a democracy to its core. Machiavelli, who barely survived collapse of the Florentine republic, was highly attuned to the relationship between violence and the state. For him, Virtù was far more valuable than virtue as moral sanctimony. Virtù represented superhuman energy to act boldly outside the rules, when and only when
a leader’s individual transgression would benefit the state. If this interpretation of Machiavelli’s *Prince* is correct, he would have placed little faith in officers who would ignite a political firestorm within their home government on the eve of war, rather than refine an abstract moral to supply full, frank dissent—Golby emphasized the *same* advice—regardless of venue in a republican form of government. Venturing beyond Roennfeldt, we insist that practical wisdom be married with *virtú* as two entwined threads that together constitute military politics in practice.

Janowitz and Huntington alike understood the value of practical wisdom and *virtú* as elements of culture among political elites—military and civilian—charged with operating democratic institutions in general and civil–military relations in particular for security of the state. Janowitz introduced his fifth hypothesis not to announce that Clausewitzian separation of army and state were no longer viable but to warn that such reasonable arrangements would be under intense stress once internal military contradictions between absolutists and pragmatists became politically charged. Golby’s latest Clausewitzian framework for guiding American civil–military interactions is also consistent with Samuel Huntington’s objective control and “balanced” arrangement for civil–military institutions under the Constitution (1957, pp. 186–192; Huntington, 1957, pp. 186–192). Huntington warned repeatedly that partisan debate in American democracy made his right answer (which subsumes the Clausewitzian framework) inherently *unstable*—unless protagonists caught up in the civil–military drama acquired awareness of larger political forces, in effect the horse sense that came with practical wisdom and *virtú*.

Useful qualities as these are devilishly hard for social scientists, either political scientists or sociologists, to quantify, but Huntington believed they were nevertheless definable and on display in the historical record. It is worth noting one of Huntington’s exemplars in the art of military politics was (absolutist) Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway, caught between “incessant pressure” from the executive and his professional obligation to provide best military advice before the Senate during an unwelcome defense department shift toward President Eisenhower’s pragmatic, nuclear-based New Look strategy. General Ridgway did not hide his professional military opinion from Congress. Neither did he undermine politically the country’s commander in chief. In Huntington’s (1957) rendering, practical wisdom and *virtú* helped guide this officer to a third way under the Clausewitzian framework that prudently optimized dissenting military advice for civilian authority.

General Ridgway’s behavior under Senate questioning in 1954 and 1955 reflected an effort to find the proper path. In both cases, the general emphasized his acceptance of higher level executive decisions fixing the size of the Army which obviously did not accord with his own judgment. In 1954 he gave his own views in *executive session*; in 1955 he presented *in public* his military opinion on the desirable strength of his service. The maintenance of this *pattern of behavior* requires the mutual restraint and conscious cooperation of military man, legislator, and executive. (pp. 417–418, emphasis added)
Such restraint and cooperation under the Clausewitzian framework are far more likely when habits of practical wisdom and *virtù* among a politically sophisticated officer corps are in ample supply.¹⁶

When they are lacking, difficulties in the American system of civil–military relations multiply. The situation recalls political scientist James David Barber’s (2008) classic work on *The Presidential Character*. For Barber, and many students of the presidency who followed, personal qualities of optimism and activism were fundamental to how leaders coped with challenges of this unique office. Each president would face problems, unique in their historical detail but familiar in terms of the psychological stress they imposed. The president’s next crisis was likely to involve surprise elements, inherently fluid and unpredictable, but the president’s coping mechanism would remain constant as character. While dilemmas unfolded within broad categorical outlines encompassing high human stakes, uncertainty, large bureaucracies, and institutional checks and balances, even before a president decided specific actions, results of those choices, according to Barber, could be roughly predicted with attention to the commander in chief’s cognitive map, the psychological equipment he brought to the process.

A similar social system with somewhat predictable performance is likely to run just under the surface of presidential decision-making, military politics, at the support level of military advice to civilian authority. Garden-variety organization charts for military advising in the national arena are well understood. Yet, within formal rules, norms, and bureaucratic incentive structures, the impact of different operating systems among uniformed leaders, how they categorize and sort novel problems, has not been properly acknowledged in the grand debate between civilian supremacists and principled patriots. While compromise and hybrid civil–military hardware have been proposed, Barber’s essential contribution at the level of firmware, in this case, senior military character and attitude, remains taboo, too sensitive, perhaps, for polite conversation on civil–military relations.

Herewith, Figure 1 reproduces Barber’s summary table, modified from the presidency to capture the offices of senior military advisor within American civil–military institutions.¹⁷ The table suggests a way forward. The names in the chart are historical figures, exemplars in the literature on American civil–military relations. We expect that, following a structured, book-length analysis, well-known cases of top military advisers would break down according to the quadrants shown, parallel to the way in which historic presidencies landed in the quadrants of Barber’s character chart. Note how Barber’s crucial qualities of optimism and energy are swapped, according to our argument, for practical wisdom and *virtù*. After preliminary review of the famous cases, then, we claim, consistent with Roennfeldt (2017), a promising connection within military politics between individual character and civil–military outcomes that merit greater scrutiny. When certain psychological traits, virtues, among the military at the nexus of national security decision-making are lacking, civil–military relations according to Huntington’s objective
control and Golby’s Clausewitzian structure are much less likely to perform as decision aid for the American Republic.

**Toward a Theory of Military Politics**

Above, we first sketched the way in which Huntington and Janowitz initially conceived of military politics in relation to the military profession and the democratic state. We then explored the convergence of factors that led generations of scholars to downplay the critical role of military politics in military affairs more broadly, giving rise to what we consider to be an unhelpful taboo against discussing the realities of military political life. We then turned to consider the ways in which military politics intersects with practical wisdom and virtù. This theoretical distinction is necessary, in our view, to avoid conflating military politics with Janowitz’s pragmatists within the military profession or with military shirking from Feaver’s principal–agent approach. While our predecessor Roennfeldt (2017) argued correctly that successful officers need practical wisdom, the addition of virtù helps illuminate, and we hope will eventually dispel, scholars’ ritual angst over military politics. Clearly, an institution the size and scale of the U.S. Department of Defense inevitably interacts in political systems at many levels. Doing so adroitly rather than clumsily makes all the difference for applying the Clausewitzian framework of separate but overlapping spheres.

Many ask whether and when senior officers should engage in their domestic political processes. We reframe this critical discussion around two more targeted questions. How can officers act with greater practical wisdom within the political systems they serve? And equally important but less straightforward, how can

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>+ Practical Wisdom</th>
<th>- Virtù</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective: Machiavellian consigliere under objective control; steadying influence outside limelight.</td>
<td>Self-possessed: Ego fortified by service ideals; service cocoon before Congress or press.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early-M. Ridgway</td>
<td>M. Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early-D. Petraeus</td>
<td>C. Powell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Myers</td>
<td>Late-D. Petraeus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. McChrystal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>- Practical Wisdom</th>
<th>Ideologic: Insistent to point of pressing Constitutional constraints; maneuvering through Congress or public opinion to reduce presidential power.</th>
<th>Utopian: Reticent, inflexible service code anchors opposing view of national interest; frustration at novel technology &amp; defense transformation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G. McClellan</td>
<td>Late-M. Ridgway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Wood</td>
<td>A. Radford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. MacArthur</td>
<td>E. Shinseki</td>
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**Figure 1.** Military politics ideal types.
officers act with *virtú* during their inevitable engagement with politics? We identify in Figure 1 exemplars of all four types (high and low practical wisdom intersecting with high and low *virtú*), following Barber’s method of charting a course for profitable future research. Notably, those adroit officers with high practical wisdom and high *virtú* are not the loudest voices in the room. To the contrary, the uniformed advisors we highlight (the younger Matthew Ridgway and the younger David Petraeus as well as Richard Myers) are to our minds masters of the art of the military whisper, speaking to their civilian masters with equal parts clarity and prudence to convey best military advice regardless of parochial biases or careerist political calculations.

Like it or not, at least from the time of Janowitz’s culminating fifth hypothesis in the *Professional Soldier*, the military is political. There is no escape, no abdication from political life. Denial, silence, and total subservience on the part of military leaders will simply mean the institution can be paraded about at will for the political gains of the reigning party (often literally). On the other hand, a strident military can hijack policy, crippling American grand strategy, democracy, or both. Between the extremes, we confront the difficult realities of military politics. Let us then work toward understanding not simply the vices of military shirking but equally important the virtues of military effectiveness in American civil–military relations.

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**Notes**

1. Although it boasts a long history (e.g., Huntington, 1962), the term “military politics” remains poorly defined and is frequently used to encompass the many ways in which
military leaders do political things within their own domestic contexts. In this sense, it is inclusive of but more expansive than civil–military relations (which refers to relations between military leaders and their civilian counterparts). On the other hand, the term does not overlap with civil–military cooperation (since this refers instead to relations between military leaders and foreign governments). Still, the flexibility of the term makes it useful for the present purpose. Our goal is to carve out a new research area that focuses on the full spectrum of political (not simply partisan) engagement by military leaders with their domestic political processes (and not only with their elected civilian counterparts). Readers will have noticed that almost all previous uses of the term “military politics” in the pages of this journal refer to militaries of nondemocratic or quasi-democratic states. Examples include research articles by Trafzger (2001) on Guatemala, Ruhl (2003) on Nicaragua, and Lee (2005) on China and Indonesia. Our use of the term “military politics” conforms to these previous uses but applies it to the American case. Here, we follow Tama (2015) and Coletta (2007), both of which use the term (albeit briefly) to refer to American military leaders’ engagement in political processes. Essential to our argument is the recognition that military politics is an appropriate descriptive term for the behavior of senior American officers who engage variously in domestic American political processes (whether this is a good thing or a bad thing) and the recognition that scholars of military affairs seem exceptionally reluctant to identify and describe American military politics.

2. To clarify, military politics is used throughout as a descriptive category. It is neither good nor bad, just as military policing, for example, is neither good nor bad. We argue that some officers engage virtuously and others viciously in military politics, just as some military police virtuously uphold their oaths while others viciously betray them.

3. Signs of resurging interest in Janowitz include the reissue of *The Professional Soldier*, several recent conference panels dedicated to Janowitz’s life and work, and the Army Research Institute’s funding of Crosbie’s ongoing replication of *The Professional Soldier*. See also Travis (2017, 2018) and Crosbie and Kleykamp (2017, 2018).

4. On the sociology of professions, see Parsons (2010, c1939, Chapter 2), Mills (2000, c1956), Abbott (1988), and Johnson (2016). See also Crosbie and Kleykamp (2017) and Crosbie and Kleykamp (2018). Feaver (1996, 2003) reframed the question in terms of Huntington’s apparent failure to predict favorable resolution of the Cold War. For the previous authors, military professionalism was a critical explanatory factor in making sense of why the American military’s uniformed leaders did not do what the framers of the Constitution feared they might, namely use the means of violence concentrated in their hands against other elements of state and society.

5. Correspondence between the two during the 1950s makes clear their mutual respect and collaborative approach to their respective projects. In a letter to Janowitz written on November 9, 1955, for example, Huntington remarked upon the “high convergence in our thinking.” Janowitz’s comments on the early draft of *The Soldier and the State* were well received and appear to have led Huntington not only to focus on the theory rather than historical material but also to adopt the eventual subtitle, “The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations” (Morris Janowitz Collection [Box 2, Folder 10], Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
6. Schiff (2008) did do this after the Cold War for a related but distinct dependent variable in comparative civil–military relations—propensity of military officers to interfere domestically with civilian rule. If senior military professionals and civilian authority could achieve “concordance” on four sociological principles relating uniformed leaders and society under their protection, the overarching democratic bargain would hold. This covered one of Huntington’s imperatives for civil–military relations—keeping military political potential contained within societal bounds. The second, simultaneous imperative that brought Huntington and Janowitz together was sustaining functional capacity for defeating the nation’s external competitors.

7. On strategic turmoil of the 1990s, see Chollet and Goldgeier (2008).

8. For a perspective after the 2003 Iraq War, see Burk (2009).

9. Among principled patriots would appear many authors who appeared in Feaver’s list of professional supremacists. Professor Richard Kohn’s views do not fit easily in either category, having criticized Joint Chiefs chairman Colin Powell’s public remarks under Clinton but defended Army Chief Shinseki’s more explosive testimony under Bush before the Senate as sacrosanct. His combination might be considered historical Constitutionalism, with Powell’s dissent skirting the Charter and Shinseki’s observing it. However, all sides in this debate over how to optimize military advice, even Lt. Col. Milburn and General MacArthur, believe themselves to be applying principles of the Constitution.

10. Order of these recommendations is shifted in order to reflect the sequence appearing in Coletta (2007, pp. 117–118). Note that Golby’s and Huntington’s interpretation of Clausewitz has been vigorously challenged. Binkley (2016) argued in the pages of this journal that Clausewitz would have endorsed a civil–military relations concept closer to subjective control! For the moment, we disagree, unless Huntington’s “subjective” concept is substantially rehabilitated from the partisan notion formulated in Soldier and the State. We focus, here, with Golby, on refining Huntington’s objective control, showing the inevitability of military politics and the real necessity of practicing such with ancient republican virtues close at hand.

11. The vague and unsupported figure, offered under glare of the Senate Armed Services Committee spotlight, was “several hundred thousand,” defenestrating norms that would become Golby’s recommendations. Historian of the principled patriot school Col. Matthew Moten (2009) shifted the onus for breakdown of unequal dialogue from military advice to the toxic environment cultivated by civilian authority, primarily the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Civilian supremacist recommendations in Armed Forces & Society coming out of the Shinseki case were not addressed, justifying Golby’s subsequent claim that they never were.

12. Travis (2018) expands on the relationship between pragmatists and absolutists and type of war (limited or large scale).

13. New York Times analysis of the U.S. National Defense Strategy (January 2018) pointed at the U.S. military losing its global edge due to difficulties in addressing both unfinished insurgent wars of the last 17 years and rising threats from regional powers China and Russia. It appears the cleavage Janowitz observed between professional military absolutists and pragmatists cannot be entirely resolved while military security threats to the
United States assume a complex form, encompassing conventional, state-on-state modernization and asymmetric, irregular warfare (Schmitt, 2018).

14. Donnithorne (2018) employs a somewhat broader concept than service utopianism, “service culture,” to explain how leading professionals of the four military service branches, decades after Goldwater-Nichols, frame and resolve national security challenges using systematically different modes of analysis. A body of literature has recently sketched metastasizing debates within established American foreign policy communities. Glennon’s (2015) celebrated discussion of the American “double government” provides one rich perspective on political feuds among entrenched bureaucracies largely invisible for the mass public. Walt (2018) argues that energies dedicated to quelling bureaucratic contests knocked American foreign policy from its realist perch of maintaining the international balance of power, a claim that intriguingly echoes Huntington’s conclusion in 1957.

15. We are largely consistent, here, with former Air Force pilot Janine Davidson’s (2013) prescription after her civilian experience as deputy assistant secretary for Plans at the Pentagon. In her analysis, Davidson did not feature tertiary fault lines within the military advising complex that we highlight, here, using Crosbie’s service utopianism. Our prescription, like Golby’s and Feaver’s, is less symmetric than Davidson’s in that it leans on the military side for making change, that is, working to attain our ancient political virtues.

16. Note that our two-by-two model allows for four ideal types (effective, self-possessed, ideologic, and utopian) of military political behavior. This superficially resembles the two categories of professional outlook (absolutist and pragmatist) that interested Janowitz (and more recently Travis, 2018). Accordingly, any given officer may be characterized by Janowitz as absolutist in general military outlook and yet in a particular moment (our focus) may display both high levels of practical wisdom and of virtú, making that officer “effective” in military politics and civil–military relations.

17. Multiple images of Barber’s summary table from Presidential Character are available online, and the value of the chart, over 40 years later, is still addressed in contemporary textbooks (e.g., Barbour & Wright, 2014).

18. As noted above, the question has been asked by various scholars over the years. Most recently, the question was posed by Roennfeldt (2017) in Aristotelian terms, by Travis (2017) in pragmatic terms, and by Rapp (2016) and Golby (2015) in professional terms.

References


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