



## Registered Report

# The misattribution of emotions and the error-related negativity: A registered report

Nathaniel Elkins-Brown <sup>a,\*</sup>, Blair Saunders <sup>b</sup> and Michael Inzlicht <sup>a,c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Canada

<sup>b</sup> Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Dundee, Scotland, United Kingdom

<sup>c</sup> Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada

## ARTICLE INFO

## Article history:

Protocol received: 19 October, 2016

Protocol accepted: 6 January, 2017

Received 21 June 2018

Reviewed 22 June 2018

Revised 23 June 2018

Accepted 20 August 2018

Action editor Chris Chambers

Published online 7 September 2018

## Keywords:

ERN

Emotion

Misattribution

Anxiety

Replication

## ABSTRACT

A growing body of work in social and affective neuroscience suggests that emotion plays an instrumental role in error monitoring processes, rather than only a moderating one. High-powered replications of studies that support this idea, however, are lacking. Here, we attempted a preregistered replication of our own study that had provided evidence for the functional role of emotions in error monitoring: that a neural signal of error monitoring—the error-related negativity—is reduced when participants undergo a misattribution of arousal procedure (Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012). Like a previous replication attempt (Rodilla et al, 2016), our misattribution procedure failed to reduce the amplitude of the ERN. However, it also failed its manipulation check to reduce state anxiety, limiting the conclusions we can draw. Nonetheless, these findings are consistent with the view that our original study may have been a false positive. We discuss these findings in the context of the replication crisis in psychology and of work on the emotional properties of the ERN.

© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

## 1. Introduction

Monitoring performance for errors is important for day-to-day functioning. Errors can impede or prevent progress toward desired goal states, and failures to detect or adjust for errors in performance can have consequences of physical, social, and economic import. Errors while driving vehicles or performing surgery, for example, can have fatal consequences. Although research over the past two decades has done much to advance

our understanding of the cognitive and neural systems that support error monitoring, there remains a dearth of literature on the role of emotions and motivation in error detection and compensation. Here, we seek to replicate [Inzlicht and Al-Khindi \(2012\)](#), our own previous study that provided experimental evidence that emotions contribute to error monitoring: the finding that a neural signal called the error-related negativity (ERN) is reduced when participants misattribute their emotions to a placebo.

\* Corresponding author. University of Toronto, Department of Psychology, 1265 Military Trail, Toronto, Ontario, M1C 1A4, Canada.

E-mail address: [nat.brown@mail.utoronto.ca](mailto:nat.brown@mail.utoronto.ca) (N. Elkins-Brown).

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.08.017>

0010-9452/© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

### 1.1. The ERN

In electroencephalography, the ERN is a negative deflection in the event-related potential (ERP) that occurs within 100 msec of error responses over frontocentral electrode sites, and is thought to be generated in the dorsal regions of the medial frontal cortex (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Pourtois et al., 2010; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). While the functional significance of the ERN remains a topic of debate, a number of computational theories have proposed that the component represents conflict monitoring (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004), reinforcement learning (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), or error likelihood (Brown & Braver, 2005). Recent work has also described ERN amplitudes as representing to the affective, motivational, or evaluative aspects of errors (Aarts, De Houwier, & Pourtois, 2013; Proudfit, Inzlicht, & Menin, 2013; Weinberg, Riesel, & Hajcak, 2012). Consistent with this perspective, ERN amplitude become larger when task performance is incentivized or punished (Legault & Inzlicht, 2013; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004; Riesel, Weinberg, Endrass, Kathmann, & Hajcak, 2012), and when participants focus on affect during performance (Saunders, Rodrigo, & Inzlicht, 2016). Conversely, ERN amplitude is reduced when negative emotions are attenuated through cognitive reappraisal (Hobson, Saunders, Al-Khindi, & Inzlicht, 2014) or through the consumption of alcohol (Bartholow, Henry, Lust, Sauls, & Wood, 2012; Ridderinkhof et al., 2002). ERN amplitude also increases as a function of trait anxiety (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003; Meyer, Weinberg, Klein, & Hajcak, 2012; Pourtois et al., 2010) and trait negative affect (e.g., Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000; Luu, Flaisch, & Tucker, 2000), and either increases or decreases as a function of clinical status (e.g., Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; Weinberg, Olvet, & Hajcak, 2010; Xiao et al., 2011). These findings have led researchers to propose that the ERN reflects—at least in part—the degree to which errors are motivationally significant or endogenously threatening (Aarts et al., 2013; Proudfit, Inzlicht, & Mennin, 2013; Weinberg et al., 2012, 2016).

### 1.2. Misattribution and the ERN

In our original study (Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012), we had investigated how ERN amplitude and task performance would be influenced by a misattribution of arousal paradigm. Since the 1960s, researchers have shown that the source of emotions can be misattributed, and that misattribution can alter the quality, magnitude, and labeling of emotional experiences (Reisenzein, 1983; Schachter & Singer, 1962). Indeed, classic studies from social psychology have shown that the intensity of emotional experiences is reduced when individuals misattribute their emotions to a benign, external source (Ross, Rodin, & Zimbardo, 1969; Zanna & Cooper, 1974). When patients with insomnia were instructed to consume a sugar pill, for example, those who were told the pill would make them feel anxious fell asleep faster than those who were told the pill would make them feel relaxed (Storms & Nisbett, 1970). Ostensibly, patients in the former group experienced less anxiety because they could attribute at least some of their restlessness to the pill, while patients in the latter group could only attribute their restlessness to their own thoughts and feelings.

Accordingly, the original study investigated whether ERN amplitude would be reduced under the effects of misattribution. We reasoned that if the ERN reflects an affective response to mistakes, its amplitude would be reduced when participants had the opportunity to misattribute their emotions to something other than their own task performance (i.e., the placebo). In an initial pilot study, we found that state anxiety was increased after performing a task, and that this increase was smaller for the misattribution group ( $M = 1.97$ ,  $SD = .58$ ) compared to the control group ( $M = 2.29$ ,  $SD = .39$ ),  $t(46) = 2.16$ ,  $p = .036$ ,  $d = .64$ . In the main study, we repeated the misattribution paradigm while measuring the ERN. We found that ERN amplitudes were smaller in the misattribution group ( $M = -3.92 \mu\text{V}$ ,  $SD = 2.18$ ) compared to the control group ( $M = -6.52 \mu\text{V}$ ,  $SD = 3.96$ ),  $F(1, 34) = 6.12$ ,  $p = .019$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .15$ . We also found that error rates were negatively correlated with the magnitude of the  $\Delta\text{ERN}$  (the ERN minus the correct trial equivalent; the correct-related negativity, CRN) in the control group ( $r = .54$ ,  $p = .02$ ) and not the misattribution group ( $r = .19$ ,  $p = .44$ ), although this difference was not significant between groups. In both the pilot and main studies, task performance and performance expectations were not significantly different between groups.

With less ambiguity than previous studies, these findings provided evidence of the emotional characteristics of the ERN. Without altering task performance or performance expectations, the study's misattribution paradigm was successful in reducing both state anxiety and ERN amplitudes. Further, a significant relationship between ERN amplitudes and error rates was present in the control group, but not in the misattribution group. Although the relationship between the ERN amplitudes and behavioral measures is unclear (see Weinberg et al., 2012), these findings implied that the ERN's association with task performance may be dependent on whatever processes are altered by misattribution; at least some of these processes are probably emotional in nature. In short, we had found compelling evidence that the ERN has emotional properties.

### 1.3. The present study

The results from Inzlicht and Al-Khindi (2012) should be replicated for several conceptual, statistical, and practical reasons. Firstly, despite the original paper having more than 80 citations to date,<sup>1</sup> only one recent study constitutes a replication attempt of the original study (Rodilla, Beauducel, & Leue, 2016). Given the recent attention to replication attempts of many seminal findings in psychology (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015), it would be prudent to try further replicating one of the first studies to clearly demonstrate the emotional properties of the ERN. In the single replication attempt, Rodilla et al. (2016) failed to find any differences in ERN amplitudes across misattribution and control groups while using a between-subjects design with high power. They also did not observe any differences across groups for self-reported anxiety; both misattribution and control groups experienced an equal increase in anxiety from before the task to after the task. This failure to replicate may have occurred

<sup>1</sup> As assessed on Google Scholar, June 2018.

because the authors used only the information available in the original publication, and did not contact the original authors for complete experimental protocols and procedures. If there is a true difference in ERN amplitudes between misattribution and control conditions—and the replication attempt did not constitute a Type II error (i.e., a false negative)—it may be the case that the divergent findings between these studies are the result of differences in their respective methodologies. If this is the case, then a replication attempt with full information should be made to elucidate what factors might be influencing this divergence.

Our original experiment should also be replicated because of its low statistical power. We made use of a between-subjects design with less than 20 individuals in each group. This low sample size limited the study's ability to detect any true small- or medium-size effect, while simultaneously being more susceptible to experimenter degrees of freedom that could inflate the probability of false positive results.

Lastly, new perspectives on the function of the ERN may make an even stronger argument for the results reported in the original study than the reasoning we originally provided for it. If the ERN at least partially signifies the motivational significance of errors (Aarts et al., 2013; Proudfit et al., 2013) or trait defensive reactivity to errors (Weinberg et al., 2012), then the misattribution paradigm may constitute an exceptionally pertinent manipulation of how endogenously threatening participants find errors to be during task performance. Under the conditions of misattribution, emotional experiences that would typically be attributed to the self—like failures and successes in task performance—are instead attributed to an exogenous, benign placebo. Consequently, errors under misattribution should be perceived as less self-caused and less threatening than typical errors. Accordingly, the efficacy of the misattribution paradigm may depend on individual differences in body consciousness (Brockner & Swap, 1983; Heatherton, Polivy, & Herman, 1989) and self-perception (Duncan & Laird, 1980), where high self-awareness is related to a typical effect of a misattribution, while low self-awareness is related to nonsignificant or reversed effects of misattribution (i.e., a typical placebo effect). Thus, to the extent that ERN amplitudes represents an affective or defensive response to errors, it should be reduced when a misattribution paradigm diminishes how endogenously threatening participants perceive their errors to be.

Therefore, we attempted to replicate our previous study while employing a more statistically powerful design and while using more appropriate statistical procedures. By combining a repeated-measures design with multi-level modelling, the present replication had higher statistical power to detect differences across conditions compared to the original experiment. Further, by pre-registering our hypotheses and analysis plans, we increased our error control and reduced the likelihood of inflated Type I errors.

## 2. Hypotheses

**1. Both the ERN and  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes will be less negative when participants have the opportunity to misattribute their emotions to a placebo during the task, compared to**

**their performance when they do not have the opportunity to misattribute their emotions to the placebo.**

In the original experiment that used a between-subjects design, both ERN and  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes were smaller in the Misattribution group compared to the Control group. In the present replication, we will compare ERN and  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes both between and within participants, who will perform the task both with and without the placebo (see Methods for details). For participants in the Misattribution group, we hypothesize that the amplitudes of the ERN and  $\Delta$ ERN will be reduced when participants perform under the perceived anxiogenic effects of the placebo, compared to when they perform while not under the perceived effects of the placebo. Conversely, for participants in the Control group, we hypothesize that ERN and  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes will be the same or larger (i.e., more negative) when participants perform under the perceived effects of the placebo, compared to when they perform while not under the perceived effects of the placebo.

**2. State anxiety will rise after participants perform the task under the effects of the placebo, but this increase will be reduced for participants in the Misattribution condition compared to the Control condition.**

In the original pilot study, participants in both the Misattribution and Control groups experienced greater anxiety after performing the task. However, this rise was smaller in the Misattribution group compared to the Control group. Accordingly, we expect that participants will have greater state anxiety after performing the task compared to before it, and this rise will not be as large for participants in the Misattribution group compared to the Control group. Further, participants will perform the task twice in a counterbalanced fashion, so the second time they perform the task they will be less likely to experience a change in anxiety from before the task to after it. Thus, we will also ask participants about their state emotions related *specifically* to task performance, with the same expectations as those in the original study: Participants in both Control and Misattribution groups will experience a rise in state anxiety *about task performance* after the task compared to before it, and this increase will be reduced for participants in the Misattribution group compared to the Control group.

**3. There will be no direct effect of group or condition on behavioural performance (i.e., no-go error rates) or performance expectations. However, there may be an indirect effect of group on error rates through the ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN, such that reduced ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes in the Misattribution group will predict higher error rates. In general, we anticipate that ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes will be negatively correlated with error rates, but significantly less so for participants under the effects of the placebo in the Misattribution group compared to performance under the effects of the placebo in the Control group.**

In the original experiment, participants in both groups had no significant differences in no-go error rates and performance expectations, despite significant differences in state

anxiety and ERN amplitudes.  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes were also negatively correlated with error rates in the Control group and not the Misattribution group, although difference between the groups for this relationship was not significant. Accordingly, we hypothesize that no-go error rates and performance expectations will not be significantly different across groups and conditions, and that ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes will be correlated with error rates in the Control group and either not correlated or less correlated in the Misattribution group. However, we also extend this further and hypothesize that there will be an indirect effect of group on error rates through the ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN, such that reduced ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes in the Misattribution group will be related to higher error rates.

**4. The relationships between variables in the present replication—namely, between (1) group and the ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN, between (2) group and state anxiety, and between (3) group and error rates via the ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN—may be moderated by trait anxiety.**

Unpublished work with a misattribution paradigm has suggested that the amplifying effect of trait anxiety on ERN amplitudes (e.g., Moser, Moran, Schroder, Donnellan, & Yeung, 2013) is dependent on the correct attribution of state anxiety, such that misattribution eliminates the relationship between trait anxiety and  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes (Rodilla, Beauducel, & Leue, 2015). These findings highlight the importance of both state and trait anxiety in varying ERN and  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes. Because both ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes and state anxiety may be reduced in individuals who are low in trait anxiety (and vice-versa), relationships between variables in the present experiment may be weaker or fail to reach statistical significance when not accounting for trait anxiety. Thus, we hypothesize trait anxiety may enhance the relationships between group and the ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN, between group and state anxiety, and between group and error rates via the ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN.

### 3. Methods

#### 3.1. Power and participants

Prior to collecting data, we conducted an *a priori* power analyses in G\*Power (Erdfeider, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) to determine the sample size for our study. Although the effect size of the original study was medium-to-large ( $\eta_p^2 = .17$ ), the original study did not have the power to accurately detect a small or medium-sized effect, and so the original effect size may be inflated (Button et al., 2013). Thus, we chose a small-to-medium effect size estimate (Cohen's  $f = .15$ ) to accurately detect a smaller but still meaningful difference across conditions. This analysis determined that 74 participants would be needed to detect an effect of this size with 90% power using the aforementioned repeated-measures ANOVA, probing for between-within interactions (see <https://osf.io/su58j/files> for details of the power analysis). Because of our subsequent use of primarily multilevel models without random slopes in the present study, this estimated sample size provided either accurate or conservative power for all analyses (Quené & van der Bergh, 2004).

Thus, prior to collecting data, we aimed to recruit 84 participants in total, expecting that some participants (10–15%) would be excluded entirely because of computer malfunction, too few usable error trials, suspicion about the effects of the placebo, or task disengagement. If after exclusions there were fewer than 19 participants in any of the four counterbalanced groups (see below), recruitment would continue until there were at least 19 participants in each group.

In the beginning of recruitment, the first three participants were “pilots” used only to ensure our data collection procedures and preprocessing pipeline were free from errors. The first two of these pilot participants had computer errors that prevented complete data collection, which were fixed for the third participant. The third participant had acceptable data, so all participants after the third participant were considered valid to be included in the study. We did not preregister the use of pilot participants to ensure error-free data; however, data from these pilot participants were not analyzed, so they did not influence our hypotheses, procedures, or analyses.

At the end of data collection, we recruited 82 participants in total following the third pilot participant. Based on preregistered exclusion criteria (see Data Removal Summary below), we completely excluded the data of three participants and partially excluding the data of two participants. This produced a final sample size of 79 participants for multilevel models and 77 participants for all univariate models.

All participants were recruited at the University of Toronto Scarborough and received course credit or \$10 payment as compensation for their involvement in the study. Advertisement for recruitment specified that participants needed to have normal or corrected-to-normal vision and must have been speaking English fluently for at least 10 years. All participants provided informed consent before participating.

#### 3.2. Procedure

Participants were told that the purpose of the experiment was to investigate the effects of an herbal supplement (called *panax senticosus*) on brain responses during a self-control task. However, they were only ever administered a placebo pill that contained sucrose. A specific protocol was used to increase the plausibility of this herbal supplement cover story to participants, the details of which are outlined below and described in full detail on OSF (see Cover Story Procedures at <https://osf.io/su58j/files>). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two supplement groups (Misattribution or Control), and one of two counterbalanced ingestion groups (Supplement First or Supplement Second). The supplement group was used as a between-subjects factor in later statistical analyses, while participants in the two ingestion groups were combined in all preregistered analyses. All participants contributed two separate sets of data (the within-subjects “placebo” condition) over the course of the experiment: one set in which they believed they were under the effects of the supplement (either a “Misattribution” or “Control” supplement, depending upon their randomly assigned group), and one set in which they believed they were not. In using this mixed design, we sought to increase statistical power from the original study by having participants act as their own “control” group, i.e., performing the task both with and without the placebo pill.

After giving informed consent, participants were provided information about the *panax senticosus* supplement and its ostensible role in the experiment on the computer screen. This information is provided verbatim below, and was only minimally altered to address the differences in protocol between the original study and the present one. These differences are denoted in square brackets:

*As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of an herbal supplement, Panax senticosus, on cognitive performance. Panax senticosus grows along the west coast of North America (from British Columbia to California). Panax senticosus contains compounds that strengthen bones (Rhodes and Schwartz, 2007), and is increasingly being used in the elderly population (Black et al., 2009). It is commonly available at health food stores and is completely safe.*

Although Panax senticosus has been marketed widely over the past 5 years, few studies have investigated its effects on cognitive performance. The present study was designed to address this question. In a few moments, the experimenter will give you [two pills] containing Panax senticosus [and 150 ml of filtered water in a cup]. We ask that you please [take the pill and] consume the entire [cup of water].

### 3.2.1. Misattribution group

Following these two paragraphs, participants in the Misattribution group—but not the Control group—were then told that the herbal supplement could have minor side effects:

*Please note that there are certain side effects associated with Panax senticosus. Studies have documented that Panax senticosus can activate the body's sympathetic nervous system, which governs arousal (Selariu et al., 2006). Past participants have reported feeling a number of side effects, including tenseness, anxiety, increased heart rate and a racing mind. From our experience, the effects of Panax senticosus begin to occur approximately [20] minutes after ingestion and last approximately [35–40] minutes [thereafter]. Please do not be alarmed if you feel [any] side effects [—] they are temporary and will disappear [before] the conclusion of today's study session.*

### 3.2.2. Control group

Conversely, participants in the Control group—and not in the Misattribution group—were told that the herbal supplement is not known to have any side effects:

*Please note that there are no physical side effects associated with Panax senticosus. [From our experience, the effects of Panax senticosus on the brain begin to occur approximately 20 min after ingestion and last approximately 35–40 min thereafter.]*

### 3.2.3. Supplement first group

After being informed about the supplements on the computer, participants in the Supplement First group were verbally reminded of whether the supplement would have side effects, and then asked to consume a pill containing the supplement. After consuming the pill, participants were again told that they had to wait 20 min for it to take effect, during which time they were prepared for the EEG recording. Two minutes before the waiting period ended, participants were asked to provide a small saliva sample to verify that the supplement had “begun working”. This saliva sample was mixed into a vial that appeared to participants to contain water and starch;

however, it actually contained water and iodine, and a sleight-of-hand procedure was used to switch the saliva sample with one dipped in starch. Participants saw this mixture turned blue, and were then told that this indicated that the supplement had begun working.

Participants were then asked to complete 3 sets of questions: a 6-item version of the State Anxiety Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992; Spielberger, 1983), 2 questions that specifically assessed state anxiety about task performance, and a modified version of the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (McAuley, Duncan, & Tammen, 1989). The 4-point State Anxiety Inventory is a reliable measure of state anxiety ( $\alpha = .82$ ) that includes items about feeling nervous or relaxed (e.g., “I am worried”; “I feel tense”). These items were presented with two additional items that assessed state emotions about expected task performance (i.e., “I feel good about the upcoming task”; “I am anxious about how I will perform on the task”). The modified version of the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI; McAuley et al., 1989) contained only a set of items from the Perceived Competence ( $\alpha = .80$ ) and Effort-Importance subscales. This set of questions included four adjusted items from the former subscale that assessed expectations about the upcoming task (e.g., “I think I will be pretty good at this task”; “I think I will be satisfied with my performance at the upcoming task”), and which was used to assess performance expectations. The remaining items from the Effort-Importance subscale were present only to reduce demand characteristics. Following the completion of these questions and at the 20-minute mark, participants were instructed to begin the Go/No-Go task.

The protocols of this task did not differ from that of the original study. In this task, participants responded using the M key on a DirectIN PCB keyboard (Empirisoft, New York, NY) in response to two stimuli on screen, the letters M and W. The presentation probability for each stimulus presented randomly was asymmetric, giving a correspondingly asymmetric response ratio of 85:15 for M and W, respectively. Participants were required to press the M key when they saw the “go” stimulus (i.e., the letter M) and to refrain from pressing the M key when they saw the “no-go” stimulus (i.e., the letter W). Each trial began with a fixation cross (“+”) presented randomly for 300–700 msec, which was followed by either a go or no-go stimulus for 100 msec. The maximum time allowed for a response was 500 msec, while the minimum time allowed for a response was 100 msec. Participants first completed a practice block of 20 trials. These trials included response feedback for errors of omission (i.e., “respond faster!”) and errors of commission (i.e., “wrong response!”) to ensure participants understood the task. Practice trials were followed by five experimental blocks without feedback, each consisting of 85 go trials and 15 no-go trials. With this task, we measured the average reaction time for correct (i.e., key presses on “go” trials) and incorrect trials (i.e., key presses on “no-go” trials), the number of errors of commission (pressing M during a no-go trial), and the number of errors of omission (not pressing M during a go trial).

After completing the first Go/No-Go task, participants then immediately completed another State Anxiety Inventory with the two questions about emotions and task performance, with

the latter modified to assess current emotions about previous task performance (i.e., “I feel good about how I performed”; “I am anxious about how I performed on the task”). Participants then waited 15 min for the supplement to ostensibly “wear off”. During this waiting period, participants read some provided magazines. Two minutes before the end of this second waiting period, participants again provided a saliva sample to verify that the supplement had worn off. This sample was mixed into a vial that appeared to participants to contain water and starch. Unlike before, this mixture did not turn blue, and participants were told that this indicated that the supplement had worn off. Participants were then asked to complete a third State Anxiety Inventory with the two additional questions about emotions and task performance, and a second modified IMI Scale. Following these scales, participants were then instructed to begin the second Go/No-Go task, which contained the same number of blocks and trials as the first Go/No-Go task.

After the completion of the second Go/No-Go task, participants were immediately asked to complete a fourth State Anxiety Inventory with two additional questions about emotions and task performance. This scale was followed by a BIS/BAS scale (Carver & White, 1994)—our measure of trait anxiety—and a funneled debriefing procedure (Chartrand and Bargh, 2002) to ensure that participants believed the cover story. In this procedure, participants were asked to freely respond to a series of questions that gauge their beliefs and knowledge about the experiment, its procedures, and their understanding of its intentions. The questions began by asking about the experiment very broadly, and then became increasingly specific.

- (1) *What do you believe the experiment was about?*
- (2) *Was there anything you believed the experimenters did not tell you about the experiment?*
- (3) *What effects did you think the supplement had on you?*
- (4) *At any point in this experiment did you think the experimenters may have deceived you, and that the supplement may have been fake? If so, at what point during the experiment did you think this?*

Participants were then asked about their demographic characteristics, and to verify that they had been speaking English fluently for 10 years. Finally, participants were fully debriefed, compensated, and thanked for their participation in the study.

#### 3.2.4. Supplement Second Group

Participants randomized into the Supplement Second group engaged in identical procedures to those in the Supplement First group, but ingested the supplement after the first Go/No-Go task instead of before it. Participants began with preparations for EEG recording, and completed a State Anxiety Inventory and modified IMI before the first Go/No-Go task. After the first Go/No-Go task, they immediately completed a second State Anxiety Inventory and IMI. They were then informed about the supplement and its side effects, ingested the supplement, and waited 20 min for it to take effect. They then completed a third State Anxiety Inventory and IMI before the second Go/No-Go task, and a fourth State Anxiety Inventory

and IMI after it. Procedures thereafter were the same as the Supplement First group.

#### 3.2.5. Blinding Procedures and Behavioral Exclusion Criteria

For research assistants to verbally remind participants of whether or not the placebo had side effects, they were forced to be aware of the group (Misattribution group or Control group) to which a participant had been assigned. However, they were not made aware of any of the dependent variables or hypotheses of the experiment until its completion. They were asked not to read the debriefing form over the course of data collection. In general, because most instructions and participant task performance are computer-administered, experimenter effects on participant behavior were small.

Only participants who explicitly reported having believed the placebo pill was fake had their “supplement” data excluded, and only the portion of their data during the time in which they believed the placebo was fake. Participants who expressed suspicion about certain aspects of the procedures—but not specifically suspicion about the placebo—did not have their data excluded. Participants who only expressed some level of suspicion about the placebo did not have their data excluded. Participants in the Misattribution group who reported believing that the placebo had no effect on them also did not have their data excluded; unregistered, exploratory analyses excluding these participants did not change any of our results.

Participants had their data excluded if they had an overall commission or omission error rate greater than 45% for all trials, collapsed over placebo condition. Further, even if a participant verbally reported understanding the directions and had been speaking English for more than 10 years, they would have had their data excluded if there was substantial evidence that they were no longer following directions or had disengaged from the task. Evidence that participants had disengaged from the task included pressing the response key without looking at the screen, which experimenters checked for by observing participants surreptitiously on each block of trials.

#### 3.2.6. Neurophysiological Recordings and Artifact Removal

Continuous EEG activity was measured over the cortical midline (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, Oz) using 6 Ag/AgCL electrodes embedded in a stretch Lycra cap (Electro-Cap International, Eaton, OH). Vertical electrooculography (VEOG) was recorded using a supra-to-suborbital bipolar montage placed around the right eye. EEG activity was amplified using an ANT Refa8 TMSi (Advanced Neuro Technology, Enschede, The Netherlands) device. The continuous EEG signal was grounded to the forehead and referenced online to the average of all electrodes. Offline, the EEG signal was re-referenced to the average of two bilaterally placed ear lobe electrodes. Impedances were kept below 5 k $\Omega$  for all recordings. Recordings were digitized at 512 Hz using Advanced Source Analysis 4.9.2 software.

All filtering, artifact corrections, and segmentation of EEG data were then implemented in BrainVision Analyzer 2.0 (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany). EEG data were digitally filtered between .1 and 20 Hz (24 dB/oct, zero phase-

shift Butterworth filter), and corrected for blink artifacts using an independent components analysis procedure (Makeig, Bell, Jung, & Sejnowski, 1996). Automatic procedures were then used to reject EEG artifacts from individual channels according to the following criteria: voltage steps of more than 25  $\mu\text{V}$  between sample points, a voltage difference of 150  $\mu\text{V}$  within 150-msec intervals, voltages above 100  $\mu\text{V}$  and below  $-100 \mu\text{V}$ , and a maximum voltage difference of less than .50  $\mu\text{V}$  within 100-m intervals. Participants with more than 35% of their EEG epochs rejected this way within placebo condition or trial type—regardless of whether they have enough artifact free trials remaining to reach a dependability threshold (described below)—had their data excluded from analyses involving ERP data.

Participants had averaged cells of their data excluded if they did not have at least 6 artifact-free trials within them for an internally reliable signal. Previous research suggests that ERN amplitudes becomes moderately reliable ( $\alpha > .50$ ) in 6 trials in undergraduates (Meyer, Riesel, & Proudfit, 2013; Olvet & Hajcak, 2009).

As reliability is dependent on each specific sample and condition of any experiment, dependability estimates (a generalizability theory [G-theory] analogue of reliability) were also calculated for each supplement group, placebo condition, and trial type using the ERP Reliability Analysis Toolbox (Clayson & Miller, 2017a, 2017b). This toolbox calculates ERP reliability based on algorithms from generalizability theory (see Baldwin, Larson, & Clayson, 2015 for review) and used CmdStan v2.17.1 (Stan Development Team, 2016) to implement the analyses in Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017). Overall dependability estimates and their 95% credible intervals (CIs) for cell averages used the mean number of trials retained for each supplement group, placebo condition, and trial type.

Participants whose data would have been excluded only because of too few trials remaining after artifact-removal had their missing data estimated using multilevel models (see Analysis Procedures and below). Conversely, participants who did not have enough artifact-free trials because of naturally low error rates would not have had their data estimated this way, and would have been removed from analyses entirely. However, no participants were excluded either for having too few trials after artifact-removal or for having naturally low error rates.

Epochs were defined as between 200 msec before and 800 msec after the response, and baseline corrected using a  $-150$  to  $-50$  msec pre-response window. For statistical analyses, the  $\Delta\text{ERN}$  was operationalized using a collapsed localizer method (cf., Luck & Gaspelin, 2017). In this method, we collapsed data across all groups and conditions to determine the time window and scalp distribution that best characterized the  $\Delta\text{ERN}$ . The mean amplitude measure taken from the chosen electrode was then used to analyze the non-collapsed data for the all hypothesis tests. The same time window and electrode site determined for the  $\Delta\text{ERN}$  was also used to operationalize the ERN and its correct-trial counterpart (the correct-response negativity; CRN). Using the collapsed localizer method, we operationalized our ERPs with a time-window of 15 msec pre-response to 115 msec post-response over the FCz electrode.

### 3.2.7. Data Removal Summary

Participant exclusions and recruitment, artifact removal, and data organization for statistical tests occurred in the following ordered steps:

1. Participants or portions of participant data were excluded based on belief that the placebo was fake, too high error rates, and evidence for task disengagement. If this procedure had reduced the number of participants in a counterbalanced group below 19, recruitment and exclusion would have continued until there were at least 19 participants in each group. Using this procedure, one participant was removed for belief that the placebo was fake, and two participants were removed for too high omission error rates.
2. Individual trial epochs for remaining participants were removed based on artifact rejection criteria.
3. Portions of participant ERP data were excluded for having more than 35% of all EEG epochs removed from that placebo condition and trial type. Using this procedure, two participants had half of their ERP data removed.
4. Portions of participant ERP data were excluded for having less than 6 artifact-free trials within a cell average. No data were removed using this procedure.
5. For multilevel models, participants with missing data for a given cell were excluded entirely from analyses that require full data, unless data was missing exclusively because of artifact rejection or computer errors (Step 3). No participants were excluded from analyses this way. Participants with missing cell average trial numbers that would have been 6 or greater (Step 4) had they not been rejected due to artifacts (Step 3) were included in all multilevel models.

### 3.2.8. Missing Data

Because of a computer error, all state self-report data for the first 32 participants had to be recovered manually from recorded key presses in our physiological data. Because we did not always begin recording physiological data immediately when participants started responding to self-reports, 16 participants had missing data for at least one of four measurement times of three possible variables: state anxiety, task-specific anxiety, or performance expectations. Of all measurement points for all three of these variables, only 5.2% of data in total was missing. Because no participants had entirely missing data for all measurement points of any variable, all missing data were capable of estimation using multilevel models. Because our missing data qualified as Missing Completely At Random (Little & Rubin, 2002), these models provided unbiased estimates of missing data.

---

## 4. Analysis Procedures

To account for heteroskedastic, non-spherical, and excluded data (Quené & van der Bergh, 2004), multilevel models were calculated in SPSS (v23) for almost all analyses. Because tests of the relationship between ERP amplitudes and error rates did not contain any within-subjects factors, we decided before

analyzing data that they would be calculated using univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs). All analyses were conducted in SPSS using the MIXED or UNIANOVA functions, and all main and interaction effects were evaluated using a Type III sums of squares approach.

For the multilevel models, we used a restriction maximum likelihood method for fitting, and an unstructured covariance matrix and Satterthwaite method to estimate random intercepts for each participant for all fixed effects. For ANOVAs, we decided before analyzing data that if residuals were found to be non-Normal based on significant results from Shapiro–Wilk or Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests, we would log-transform or natural-log transform dependent variables (i.e., commission error rates) until these tests were nonsignificant. The residuals for all tested models were found to be sufficiently Normal (all  $ps > .20$ ), so error rates were not subsequently transformed.

For statistical calculations, effect sizes are denoted using either semipartial  $R^2$  ( $R^2_{\beta}$ ; Edwards, Muller, Wolfinger, Qaqish, & Schabenberger, 2008) or partial  $\eta^2$  ( $\eta^2_{\beta}$ ; Cohen, 1973). To reduce the incidence of Type I error from multiple comparisons, tests for different dependent variables were corrected using a false discovery rate procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995; Benjamini & Yekutieli, 2001).

## 5. Statistical tests & results

Statistical tests divided by category are described below, followed by their results. Interaction terms are denoted using an asterisk (\*) between factors. Our models assessed the effect of group (misattribution vs. control), placebo condition (on vs. off the placebo), trial type (error vs. correct trials), and time (before vs. after the task) on our behavioral, physiological, and self-report measures. In our multilevel models, these categorical variables were effect coded such that data from the misattribution group were = 1, while data from the control group were = -1; data under the effects of a placebo were = 1, while data not under the effects of a placebo were = -1; data from error trials were = 1, while data from correct trials were = -1, and data from before the task were = -1, while data from after the task were = 1.

For all tests, only interactions with  $p$ -values below .05 were followed up by simple effect or simple slope analyses, and only significant  $p$ -values of interest were corrected using a false discovery rate procedure for all tests within the same dependent variable (so if a main effect is significant but is not of direct interest to our hypotheses, its  $p$ -value would not be included in a correction procedure). Please note that all models conducted with trait anxiety and all post-hoc analyses were exploratory, and may be underpowered.

### 5.1. The CRN, ERN, and $\Delta$ ERN

One multilevel model was calculated to assess CRN and ERN amplitude across groups, placebo condition, and trial type, and another calculated to assess  $\Delta$ ERN amplitude across groups and condition. For the first model, the between-subjects factor of group (Misattribution and Control), within-subjects factor of placebo condition (Placebo and Non-

Placebo), within-subjects factor of trial type (Correct and Error), and three-way group\*condition\*trial type interaction term were used to predict ERN amplitudes. These predictors were also accompanied by all other possible two-way interactions between factors that were not of central interest to our hypotheses. For the second model, the same predictors without a trial type factor—and with a group\*condition interaction term instead of the three-way interaction term—were used to predict  $\Delta$ ERN amplitude.

For the ERN, we hypothesized that there would be a significant three-way interaction between group, placebo condition, and trial type. A simple effects analysis of this interaction would reveal that ERP amplitudes would be smaller (i.e., less negative) in the Misattribution group than in the Control group, specifically for Placebo data and for error trials. For the  $\Delta$ ERN, we hypothesized that there would be a significant two-way interaction between group and condition, and that a simple effects analysis of this interaction would reveal that ERP amplitudes would be smaller in the Misattribution group than in the Control group, specifically for Placebo data.

#### 5.1.1. Results

Overall dependability estimates and trial characteristics of the CRN and ERN are depicted in Tables 1 and 2.

Indicating the presence of a robust ERN, error trials had more negative amplitudes ( $M = -4.69$ ,  $SE = .49$ ) compared to correct trials ( $M = 5.53$ ,  $SE = .49$ ),  $b = 11.81$ ,  $SE = .96$ ,  $F(1,227.808) = 454.053$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $R^2_{\beta} = .67$  (see Fig. 1). For both the ERN and  $\Delta$ ERN, there were no significant main effects of group,  $F_s < 1.986$ ,  $ps > .163$ , nor of condition,  $F_s < 1.480$ ,  $ps > .228$ . Contrary to our predictions, we did not observe a significant three-way interaction between trial type, group, and condition for the ERN,  $F = .341$ ,  $p = .560$ , nor a significant two-way interaction between group and condition for the  $\Delta$ ERN,  $F = 1.230$ ,  $p = .271$ . These findings suggest that ERP amplitudes were not influenced by the type of placebo participants consumed, nor by whether participants were on or off the placebo.

#### 5.1.2. Exploratory Analyses

The null findings for ERP amplitude may have been confounded by order, such that participants' emotions could have been altered when they performed the Go/No-Go task for the second time. To account for these effects, we conducted the same multilevel analysis on ERN amplitudes as specified above, but only included Placebo data for participants who consumed the placebo the first time they performed the task. For the  $\Delta$ ERN, we similarly conducted a one-way ANOVA for the effect of group on ERP amplitudes. These two analyses can be considered conceptually equivalent to the between-subjects tests conducted by Inzlicht and Al-Khindi (2012), with  $n = 19$  for both Misattribution and Control groups. It should be noted that these analyses are underpowered, and so results should be interpreted with caution.

Like our standard analyses, we found a significant effect of trial type on ERP amplitudes,  $F(1,36) = 116.198$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $R^2_{\beta} = .76$ , but no significant main effects of group or significant interactions between trial type and group for the  $\Delta$ ERN or ERN, respectively,  $F_s < .734$ ,  $ps > .397$ . These findings suggest that



**Table 1 – Estimates of dependability and 95% credible intervals of error- and correct-related ERP amplitudes across groups and placebo condition.**


ERN	Control						Misattribution					
	Off Placebo			On Placebo			Off Placebo			On Placebo		
	Est	LB	UB	Est	LB	UB	Est	LB	UB	Est	LB	UB
OD	.85	.77	.91	.90	.85	.94	.88	.82	.93	.92	.88	.95
BSSD	4.95	3.69	6.54	6.35	4.86	8.16	5.52	4.31	7.12	7.06	5.41	9.22
WSSD	11.82	11.35	12.32	11.93	11.46	12.40	11.37	10.93	11.82	11.89	11.45	12.36
ICC	.15	.09	.24	.22	.14	.32	.19	.12	.28	.26	.17	.38
CRN												
OD	.98	.98	.99	.98	.97	.99	.99	.98	.99	.99	.99	1.00
BSSD	4.28	3.39	5.48	3.79	3.05	4.78	4.96	3.97	6.23	6.56	5.23	8.30
WSSD	10.27	10.16	10.39	10.50	10.38	10.61	10.32	10.20	10.43	10.77	10.65	10.89
ICC	.15	.10	.22	.12	.08	.17	.19	.13	.27	.27	.19	.37

Note. ERN = error-related negativity; CRN = correct-related negativity; Est = point estimate; LB = lower-bound; UB = upper-bound; OD = overall dependability; BSSD = between-subjects standard deviation; WSSD = within-subjects standard deviation; ICC = Intra-class correlation.

**Table 2 – Trial characteristics of ERP amplitude data submitted to dependability analyses across groups and placebo condition.**

	Control				Misattribution			
	Off Placebo		On Placebo		Off Placebo		On Placebo	
	ERN	CRN	ERN	CRN	ERN	CRN	ERN	CRN
Mean# Trials	34.47	388.00	33.33	386.74	32.00	387.28	34.10	385.98
Min# Trials	19	316	9	272	11	129	11	37
Max# Trials	58	423	60	425	65	424	63	422
Trial Cutoff	14	14	9	13	11	11	7	9
N Included	38	39	39	39	39	40	39	40
N Excluded	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Note. ERN = error-related negativity; CRN = correct-related negativity. Trial Cutoff refers to the minimum number of trials necessary to reach dependability of .70; results of present study remained unchanged when participants with data beneath the minimum cutoff were excluded.



**Fig. 1 – Error- and correct-related ERP amplitudes over the frontocentral electrode (FCz) across placebo condition and supplement group. The ERN, CRN, and ΔERN were operationalized in all statistical tests as the mean activity between 15 and 115 msec.**

even after eliminating potential order effects, ERP amplitudes were not influenced by the type of placebo participants consumed.

## 5.2. State and task-related anxiety

Two multilevel models were calculated to assess state and task-related anxiety across groups and time, looking only at data within the Placebo condition. For both models, state and task-related anxiety were predicted by group (Misattribution and Control), time (Pre-task and Post-task), and a group\*time interaction term.

We hypothesized that there would be significant interactions between group and time for both measures of anxiety. Simple effects analyses of these interactions would reveal that state and task-related anxiety would rise from pre-task to post-task more for the Control group than for the Misattribution group.

### 5.2.1. Results

When participants were on the placebo, state anxiety increased significantly from before the task ( $M = 1.80$ ,  $SE = .07$ ) to after the task ( $M = 2.07$ ,  $SE = .06$ ),  $b = .27$ ,  $SE = .09$ ,  $F(1,66.736) = 17.947$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $R^2_{\beta} = .21$ , indicating that our task induced a mild increase in state anxiety (see Fig. 2a). This increase was also true of task-related anxiety from before the task ( $M = 1.99$ ,  $SE = .08$ ) to after the task ( $M = 2.51$ ,  $SE = .07$ ),  $F(1,71.543) = 32.355$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $R^2_{\beta} = .31$  (see Fig. 2b). These findings replicate those of our original study. There were no significant effects of group on state or task-related anxiety,  $F_s < .781$ ,  $p_s > .380$ .

Contrary to our main predictions, there were no significant two-way interactions between group and time,  $F_s < .510$ ,  $p_s > .478$ . These findings indicate a crucial manipulation failure: the misattribution placebo did not influence the increase in state anxiety from pre- to post-task compared to the control placebo. Because our manipulation did not influence affect, our data cannot test the theory that the ERN has emotional properties.

### 5.2.2. Exploratory Analyses

Because state anxiety was low in general for the present study, misattribution may have only occurred in participants

who experienced a larger rise in state or task-related anxiety when not on the placebo. We performed two additional multilevel models for the  $\Delta$ ERN to see whether the interaction between group and condition was moderated by the difference in state and task-related anxiety from before to after the task. In these models,  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes were predicted by group, placebo condition, the difference in anxiety from before the task to after the task while off the placebo, and all two- and three-way interactions for these predictors. In both models, no predictors were significantly related to the  $\Delta$ ERN, all  $F_s < 2.553$ , all  $p_s > .117$ . These findings show that changes in anxiety when off the placebo were altogether unrelated to the effects of group and condition on ERP amplitudes.

## 5.3. Behavior and performance expectations

Five multilevel models were calculated to assess the similarity in behavioral performance and performance expectations across groups and placebo condition. For all five models, each of the following dependent variables were predicted by group and placebo condition: commission error rates, omission error rates, correct-trial reaction times, error-trial reaction times, and self-reported performance expectations. We hypothesized that there will be no significant interaction between group and placebo condition for all five tests, so that we would fail to reject the null hypothesis that there was a significant difference in behavioral performance and performance expectations across conditions and within groups.

### 5.3.1. Results

We found no significant effects of group, condition, or their interaction for any of our five measures, all  $F_s < 3.908$ , all  $p_s > .052$  (see Table 3). Because our first test on performance expectations combined data from before and after the task, we conducted a second test of performance expectations to distinguish these sets of data. In this model, performance expectations were predicted by time, group, condition, their three-way interaction, and all two-way interactions not of interest to our hypotheses. We found a significant effect of time,  $b = .46$ ,  $SE = .10$ ,  $F(1, 76) = 119.564$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $R^2_{\beta} = .61$ , such that participants rated their performance expectations before the task more positively ( $M = 2.67$ ,  $SE = .06$ ) than after the task ( $M = 2.12$ ,  $SE = .06$ ). There were no significant effects of group,




Fig. 2 – State and task-related anxiety across time and group while participants were on the placebo. Error bars denote 95% between-subjects confidence intervals. Scale responses ranged from 1 to 4.

condition, or the three-way interaction between group, condition, and time on performance expectations, all  $F_s < 1.335$ , all  $p_s > .249$ . These findings show that regardless of group or placebo condition, participants' performance expectations dropped over time, reflecting a tendency among participants to overestimate their competence before performing the task.

In line with our predictions, these findings show that our misattribution paradigm did not significantly influence behavior or performance expectations from before to after the task, either as a function of the type of placebo consumed or as a function of being on or off the placebo.

**5.4. The brain and behavior relationship**

Two ANOVAs were used to assess the relationship between ERP amplitudes and commission error rates as a function of group: one for the ERN, and another for the ΔERN. These tests were conducted only on Placebo data. For both models, error rates were predicted by ERP amplitude, group, and an amplitude\*group interaction term. For both the ERN and ΔERN, we hypothesized that there would be significant interactions between ERP amplitude and group. Simple slopes analyses of these interactions would reveal that ERP amplitudes on error trials would be negatively correlated with error rates, but only for the Control group and not the Misattribution group (or at least more for the Control group than for the Misattribution group).

We also hypothesized that ERP amplitudes would mediate the relationship between group and commission error rates in

Placebo data, such that reduced ERN/ΔERN amplitudes in the Misattribution group would be related to increased error rates. In conducting these mediation models, we assumed there would be a significant effect of group on ERP amplitudes; however, because group was not significantly related to ERP amplitudes in earlier tests, we did not conduct these models.

**5.4.1. Results**

When participants were on the placebo, we found significant main effects of ERN amplitudes on commission error rates,  $b = .01$ ,  $SE < .01$ ,  $F(1, 39) = 18.807$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .20$ , such that ERN amplitudes became larger (i.e., more negative) as error rates decreased (see Fig. 3a). This same main effect was also found for ΔERN amplitudes in the same direction,  $b = .01$ ,  $SE < .01$ ,  $F(1, 39) = 7.986$ ,  $p = .006$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .10$  (see Fig. 3b). However, there were no significant main effects of group nor significant two-way interactions between ERP amplitudes and group on error rates, all  $F_s < 1$ ,  $p_s > .381$ . Contrary to our predictions, we did not observe a reduction in the correlation between ERP amplitudes and error rates for participants under the effects of the misattribution placebo compared to those under the effects of the control placebo. These findings show that the misattribution paradigm failed to disentangle the relationship between brain and behavior, unlike our original study.


**5.5. Trait anxiety**

Each preregistered analysis above was accompanied by a model that included an additional main effect of trait anxiety,

**Table 3 – Means and 95% between-subjects confidence intervals of behavior, performance expectations, and ERP amplitudes across groups and condition.**

	Control (n = 39)						Misattribution (n = 40)					
	Off Placebo			On Placebo			Off Placebo			On Placebo		
	Mean	LB	UB	Mean	LB	UB	Mean	LB	UB	Mean	LB	UB
Om ER (%)	5.48	3.60	7.35	5.20	3.46	6.94	5.05	2.94	7.16	4.19	2.79	5.60
Com ER (%)	46.67	42.15	51.28	45.73	40.72	50.74	42.68	37.05	48.32	46.80	41.07	52.53
RT Correct	292	285	299	293	283	302	294	282	306	289	276	302
RT Error	250	244	256	246	239	254	247	240	255	246	238	354
Pre-task PE	2.71	2.51	2.91	2.73	2.55	2.90	2.60	2.38	2.81	2.64	2.39	2.89
Post-task PE	2.05	1.83	2.28	2.13	1.96	2.29	2.08	1.85	2.30	2.18	1.97	2.38
ERN	-4.24	-5.92	-2.57	-3.94	-6.07	-1.80	-4.78	-6.58	-2.98	-5.68	-7.88	-3.48
ΔERN	-9.62	-11.50	-7.74	-9.67	-11.89	-7.44	-11.09	-13.06	-9.13	-12.21	-14.43	-10.00

Note. LB = lower-bound; UB = upper-bound; Om ER = omission error rates; Com ER = commission error rates; PE = performance expectations. RTs are denoted in milliseconds and ERP amplitudes are denoted in microvolts.



**Fig. 3 – Correlations between ERP amplitudes and commission error rates as a function of group.**

and all possible two-, three-, or four-way interactions between trait anxiety and other predictors. These models—preregistered but exploratory—assessed whether any principal interactions of interest were moderated by trait anxiety, such that trait anxiety would confound significant interactions or suppress non-significant ones.

### 5.5.1. Results

Trait anxiety did not moderate any of our interactions of interest, all  $F_s < 1.402$ , all  $p_s > .206$ . It also did not have a significant main effect on ERP amplitudes or state anxiety,  $F_s < 1.609$ ,  $p_s > .209$ , failing to replicate positive correlations found in previous studies (see Moser et al., 2013; Weinberg et al., 2012). Trait anxiety did not suppress the effect of misattribution on ERP amplitudes, state anxiety, or the relationship between brain and behavior, nor did it confound significant increases in state anxiety from before to after the task.

However, trait anxiety was positively correlated with task-related anxiety,  $b = .07$ ,  $SE = .02$ ,  $F(1, 69.171) = 10.120$ ,  $p = .002$ ,  $R_p^2 = .13$ , showing that while anxious participants did not report greater anxiety in general, they did report greater anxiety about their task performance.

In tests of the relationship between ERP amplitudes and error rates, trait anxiety was also positively correlated with commission error rates for the model involving the ERN,  $b = .01$ ,  $SE = .01$ ,  $F(1, 39) = 4.275$ ,  $p = .042$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .06$ , but not the model involving the  $\Delta$ ERN,  $F = 3.482$ ,  $p = .066$ . This effect did not survive a correction for multiple comparisons,  $p_{\text{adjusted}} = .082$ . To clarify these findings, we recalculated the tests without ERP amplitude as a predictor, finding that trait anxiety was positively correlated with commission error rates,  $b = .01$ ,  $SE = .01$ ,  $F(1, 39) = 8.483$ ,  $p = .005$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .10$ . These findings show that relationship between trait anxiety and error rates disappears when accounting for ERP amplitudes.

## 6. Discussion

We reproduced a previous study of ours (Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012) that had revealed the emotional properties of the ERN by manipulating emotions through a misattribution of arousal paradigm. In this previous study, misattribution of arousal reduced ERN amplitudes and state anxiety without concurrently altering behavior or performance expectations. The study also found that misattribution reduced the negative correlation between ERN amplitudes and error rates. These findings showed that the ERN could be dissociated from performance, but not from negative affect. While other studies have described the emotional properties of the ERN, this was one of the first to do so while experimentally controlling for task-related behavior and performance expectations.

In the present study, we modified the design and analyses of the original study to increase statistical power, but subsequently failed to replicate its three principal findings. Although our paradigm did not alter behavior or performance expectations as expected, it also did not reduce state anxiety, the amplitude of the ERN/ $\Delta$ ERN, or the negative correlation between ERP amplitudes and error rates. Further, trait anxiety did not significantly moderate any of the interactions between

these measured variables, and our results were unchanged when order effects and changes in state anxiety were controlled for in exploratory analyses.

It is unclear why our paradigm failed to reduce state anxiety or ERN amplitudes. Although participants believed in the effects of the placebo, we did not ask them about the degree to which they may have misattributed their emotions to it. Participants who did not report the placebo having a strong effect may have felt that it was too mild to impact their anxiety. Conversely, participants who believed the placebo had a strong effect on them may have viewed it as a threat to their performance, and thus enhanced their own levels of performance-monitoring to compensate for errors “caused by” the placebo. Given the range of participants’ possible responses to our paradigm, the present study may have benefited from collecting and coding participants’ construals of the placebo in greater detail.

Because the present study failed to manipulate state anxiety through misattribution, our data cannot address the question of the ERN’s emotional properties. Our measure of state anxiety served as a manipulation check for misattribution, where we expected the rise in anxiety from pre-to-post task to be blunted for participants taking the misattribution placebo compared to those taking the control placebo. Our data failed this manipulation check, with changes in anxiety being the same across groups. Because of this manipulation failure, our study cannot provide evidence for or against the hypothesis that the ERN has emotional properties.

Despite these findings, the present study still contributes important information toward research on emotions, misattribution, and the ERN. In the following sections, we will interpret the present findings in the context of the two previous related studies and discuss future research in this area.

### 6.1. The present study in context

The failure of our paradigm to manipulate emotions aligns with the findings of Rodilla et al. (2016), the only other published replication attempt of Inzlicht and Al-Khindi (2012). Using a high-powered version of the original study, the authors’ misattribution paradigm failed to reduce state anxiety and ERN amplitudes, and they did not find evidence for or against replication of the correlation between  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes and error rates. This failure to replicate may have occurred because of unreported differences in methodology between the two studies, which could have influenced the paradigm or participants’ behavior. For example, for reasons that are unclear, reaction times in the replication attempt were faster than those in the original study. However, equality-of-effect Bayes factors (Bayarri & Mayoral, 2002) indicated that the mean differences in behavioral variables across groups within each study were comparable, such that each study’s misattribution paradigm exerted equivalent nonsignificant effects on error rates and reaction times. This showed that despite methodological differences between the studies, their respective misattribution paradigms were at least equivalent in their influence on behavior.

When considered together, the present study and replication attempt cast doubt on the replicability of the original study. This is for three major reasons. The first reason is the

**Table 4 – Means and 95% between-subject confidence intervals of behavior, performance expectations, and ERP amplitudes across studies for On Placebo data.**

	Present Study						Inzlicht and Al-Khindi (2012)					
	Control			Misattribution			Control			Misattribution		
	Mean	LB	UB	Mean	LB	UB	Mean	LB	UB	Mean	LB	UB
Om ER (%)	5.20	3.46	6.94	4.19	2.79	5.60	3.83	2.28	5.38	4.89	2.69	7.09
Com ER (%)	45.73	40.72	50.74	46.80	41.07	52.53	47.01	39.84	54.17	47.79	41.06	54.52
RT Correct	293	283	302	289	276	302	288	278	297	283	266	258
RT Error	246	239	254	246	238	354	245	238	253	245	232	258
Pre-task PE	2.73	2.55	2.90	2.64	2.39	2.89	2.67 <sub>a</sub>	1.84 <sub>a</sub>	3.50 <sub>a</sub>	3.12 <sub>a</sub>	2.11 <sub>a</sub>	4.13 <sub>a</sub>
Post-task PE	2.13	1.96	2.29	2.18	1.97	2.38	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
ERN	-3.94	-6.07	-1.80	-5.68	-7.88	-3.48	-6.52	-8.40	-4.64	-3.92	-4.90	-2.94
$\Delta$ ERN	-9.67	-11.89	-7.44	-12.21	-14.43	-10.00	-4.25	-6.86	-1.64	-1.87	-3.36	-.38

Note. LB = lower-bound; UB = upper-bound; Om ER = omission error rates; Com ER = commission error rates; PE = performance expectations. Subscripts denote data from pilot study. This table only depicts data while participants were under the effects of the placebo.

fundamental similarities between the present study and original study. Except for alterations made to increase statistical power, the materials and sampling populations of the two studies were nearly identical (e.g., same written directions, same laboratory environment, same recruiting procedures, etc.). 95% between-subject confidence intervals across the two studies overlapped for all measures except the ERN and  $\Delta$ ERN (see Table 4). Results from the present study were also unchanged when split to eliminate order effects and replicate the precise tests of the original study. Thus, it is unlikely that the different findings across the two studies can be attributed to differences in methodology.

The second reason is that both the present study and the replication attempt had high power, while the tests of the original study had medium or low power. If we assume that we accurately determined the true effect size of misattribution on ERN amplitude ( $\eta_p^2 = .17$ ) in the original study, we had only a 75% chance of successfully capturing that effect (i.e., 75% power). Conversely, both the replication attempt and present study had a *a priori* power of 98% or greater to detect an effect of this same size. Further, if the small-to-medium effect size calculated for the present study had been the true effect size (about  $\eta_p^2 = .02$ ), our original study would have had only a 14% chance of capturing it (i.e., 14% power). This was also true for the power of the original study's manipulation check; with a sample size of 47 in the pilot study, the test for the difference in state anxiety across groups had only a 61% chance of capturing its acquired medium-to-large effect ( $d = .66$ ) and would have had only a 17% chance of capturing that effect had its true size been small-to-medium ( $d = .35$ ).

The third reason is that the present study was fully pre-registered, while our original study was not. Because all primary analyses and exclusion criteria were determined before data collection took place, the present study had few experimenter degrees of freedom that could have inflated the rate of false positives. In contrast, our original study had undisclosed flexibility in statistical analyses, exclusion criteria, and the content of hypotheses, increasing the chance that at least some of those positive findings were false. Indeed, several procedures in the original study lacked details or explicit justification, giving us the opportunity to inadvertently adjust data in support of our hypotheses. For example, we did not justify log-transforming commission error rates before

correlating them with  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes, and did not perform this same transformation for error rates when they were compared across groups. Inconsistent transformation procedures without explicit justification are not evidence of *p*-hacking, but do reveal the analytic flexibility that was available to us in our statistical procedures at the time.

Two high-powered replication attempts with failed manipulation checks are reasonable grounds to question the validity of the paradigm used in the original study. However, these findings should not be misinterpreted as providing evidence that misattribution cannot reduce the amplitude of the ERN, nor that a successful manipulation of the ERN requires a substantially different approach to misattribution than the approach employed in the original study. Until a misattribution paradigm is developed that passes manipulation checks with greater reliability, researchers should treat Inzlicht and Al-Khindi (2012) with more caution as experimental evidence for the emotional properties of the ERN.

## 6.2. The future of misattribution and the ERN

Our findings should also not be interpreted as evidence against the idea that the ERN has emotional properties, nor as evidence against the efficacy of misattribution of arousal paradigms in general. There are many independent lines of experimental and non-experimental evidence expounding on the role of affect in error monitoring (e.g., Koban & Pourtois, 2014; Saunders, Lin, Milyavskaya, & Inzlicht, 2017; Weinberg et al., 2012), and misattribution paradigms have shown promise in other areas of psychology (e.g., Heerdink, van Kleef, Homan, & Fischer, 2015; Huang & Gong, 2018; Yeung, Sharpe, Glozier, Hackett, & Colagiuri, 2017).

Instead, our findings should highlight the critical role of preregistered replications in creating a comprehensive and reproducible literature on a topic. Many studies conducted prior to the replication crisis (see Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012) are underpowered, only a small proportion of studies in psychology have received published direct replications, and no published study in experimental psychology was preregistered before 2013. Indeed, these facts all pertain to the five most-cited publications that use a misattribution of arousal procedure (Cantor, Zillman & Bryant, 1975; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Storms &

Nisbett, 1970; Zanna & Cooper, 1974), which across eleven studies have a mean of only 18.58 ( $SD = 4.69$ ) participants per cell.<sup>2</sup> The present study adds nuance to this literature, remedying potential publication bias and drawing attention to findings that may require greater scrutiny.

The present study should also serve as a model for studies investigating the emotional properties of error monitoring signals that have yet to receive published replications. This is particularly the case for experimental studies that control for the cognitive and behavioral aspects of error monitoring. For example, Spunt, Lieberman, Cohen, and Eisenberger (2012) found that error-related activity in the dorsal medial frontal cortex tracked subjective reports of frustration; these findings held after controlling for cognitive engagement and task performance. Pfabigan et al. (2013) found that experimentally induced helplessness enhanced  $\Delta$ ERN amplitudes without influencing task-related behavior. And Ganushchak and Schiller (2008) found that monetary incentives increased ERN amplitudes and latencies in a verbal picture-naming task without altering reaction times or error rates. For researchers concerned with the emotional properties of the ERN, these studies represent opportune cases for direct replication: they can be well-powered at relatively low sample sizes, they are methodologically simple to implement, and they can be easily adapted to meet evolving standards in statistical analyses.

Influential studies that are underpowered and analytically flexible will continue to be published and cited until power analyses and preregistration receive wider adoption among peer-reviewed journals. To reduce opportunity costs from attempting to extend such studies, researchers should examine the potential replicability of both their own paradigms and those of others when preparing projects. This can be accomplished in several ways, depending upon the heterogeneity of the relevant literature. When coupled with bias-correction tools (Inzlicht, Gervais, & Berkman, 2015), meta-analytic procedures such as the p-curve (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014) or mini meta-analysis (Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016) can be used to determine the evidential value of a study or line of research. If the supporting evidence is weak, such analyses can reveal whether certain studies are worth trying to replicate at all.

Far from being uninteresting or redundant, replication attempts like the present study can greatly enrich our understanding and application of findings in psychology. Successive and independent replications elaborate on the generalizability, conceptual boundaries, and underlying ontology of phenomena like the ERN and paradigms like the misattribution of arousal. They help confirm the most plausible components of our theories and paradigms, while directing attention toward components that may be superfluous, incoherent, or in need of change. They will also be invaluable in shielding us from unreplicable programs of research that waste resources, effort, and time. Lastly, as the ERN receives increasing attention among clinical researchers as a possible biomarker of pathological anxiety (Kessel et al., 2016; Meyer, 2017), high-powered replications will be critical for developing an understanding of the signal that can be translated into clinical practice. By deliberately reserving resources to

conduct replications, researchers will do much to speed up—rather than slow down—the development of new and effective ways to diagnose and treat mental illness.

## 7. Conclusion

We conducted a methodologically precise and statistically powerful replication attempt of Inzlicht and Al-Khindi (2012), using nearly the exact same materials as the original study; however, our paradigm subsequently failed to manipulate emotions, and thus the present study cannot address the question of the ERN's emotional properties. Further studies with successful manipulations must be conducted to evaluate the degree to which variance in ERN amplitudes can be attributed to variance in state and trait emotions.

Nevertheless, the present study does provide some evidence against replicability of Inzlicht and Al-Khindi's (2012) misattribution of arousal paradigm in concurrently reducing state anxiety and the amplitude of the ERN. Researchers should be more cautious in considering Inzlicht and Al-Khindi (2012) as evidence that the ERN has fundamentally emotional properties, and may benefit from seeking out alternative approaches to misattribution that manipulate emotions with greater reliability.

In general, researchers have much to gain in pursuing and replicating paradigms that manipulate emotions while controlling for the cognitive and behavioral aspects of error monitoring. Establishing what paradigms are reproducible in this area of the literature—and in psychology in general—will greatly speed our acquisition of knowledge, especially for those aiming to translate psychophysiological findings into the clinical domain.

## Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all the members of the Toronto Laboratory for Social Neuroscience for their valuable input throughout the development of this project. This research will be made possible by grants from Canada's Natural Sciences and Engineering Research and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Councils to MI.

## Supplementary data

Supplementary data related to this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.08.017>.

## REFERENCES

- Aarts, K., De Houwer, J., & Pourtois, G. (2013). Erroneous and correct actions have a different affective valence: Evidence from ERPs. *Emotion*, 13(5), 960. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032808>.
- Baldwin, S. A., Larson, M. J., & Clayson, P. E. (2015). The dependability of electrophysiological measurements of performance monitoring in a clinical sample: A

<sup>2</sup> As assessed on Web of Science and Google Scholar, June 2018.

- generalizability and decision analysis of the ERN and Pe. *Psychophysiology*, 52, 790–800. <https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12401>.
- Bartholow, B. D., Henry, E. A., Lust, S. A., Sauls, J. S., & Wood, P. K. (2012). Alcohol effects on performance monitoring and adjustment: Affect modulation and impairment of evaluative cognitive control. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 121(1), 173. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023664>.
- Bayarri, M. J., & Mayoral, A. M. (2002). Bayesian analysis and design for comparison of effect-sizes. *Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference*, 103(1–2), 225–243. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-3758\(01\)00223-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-3758(01)00223-3).
- Benjamini, Y., & Hochberg, Y. (1995). Controlling the false discovery rate: A practical and powerful approach to multiple testing. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B (Methodological)*, 289–300.
- Benjamini, Y., & Yekutieli, D. (2001). The control of the false discovery rate in multiple testing under dependency. *Annals of Statistics*, 1165–1188.
- Brockner, J., & Swap, W. C. (1983). Resolving the relationships between placebos, misattribution, and insomnia: An individual-differences perspective. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45(1), 32–42. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.32>.
- Brown, J. W., & Braver, T. S. (2005). Learned predictions of error likelihood in the anterior cingulate cortex. *Science*, 307(5712), 1118–1121. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1105783>.
- Button, K. S., Ioannidis, J. P., Mokrysz, C., Nosek, B. A., Flint, J., Robinson, E. S., et al. (2013). Power failure: Why small sample size undermines the reliability of neuroscience. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 14(5), 365–376. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3475>.
- Cantor, J. R., Zillmann, D., & Bryant, J. (1975). Enhancement of experienced sexual arousal in response to erotic stimuli through misattribution of unrelated residual excitation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 32(1), 69. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0076784>.
- Carpenter, B., Gelman, A., Hoffman, M. D., Lee, D., Goodrich, B., Betancourt, M., et al. (2017). Stan: A probabilistic programming language. *Journal of Statistical Software*, 76(1). <https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v076.i01>.
- Carver, C. S., & White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS scales. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67(2), 319–333. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.319>.
- Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (2002). Nonconscious motivations: Their activation, operation, and consequences. *Self and Motivation: Emerging Psychological Perspectives*, 13–41. <https://doi.org/10.1037/10448-001>.
- Clayson, P. E., & Miller, G. A. (2017). ERP Reliability Analysis (ERA) Toolbox: An open-source toolbox for analyzing the reliability of event-related brain potentials. *International Journal of Psychophysiology*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.10.012>.
- Clayson, P. E., & Miller, G. A. (2017). Psychometric considerations in the measurement of event-related brain potentials: Guidelines for measurement and reporting. *International Journal of Psychophysiology*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.09.005>.
- Cohen, J. (1973). Eta-squared and partial Eta-Squared in fixed factor ANOVA designs. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 33(1), 107–112. <https://doi.org/10.1177/001316447303300111>.
- Dehaene, S., Posner, M. I., & Tucker, D. M. (1994). Localization of a neural system for error detection and compensation. *Psychological Science*, 303–305. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.007>.
- Duncan, J. W., & Laird, J. D. (1980). Positive and reverse placebo effects as a function of differences in cues used in self-perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 39(6), 1024–1036. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0077721>.
- Edwards, L. J., Muller, K. E., Wolfinger, R. D., Qaqish, B. F., & Schabenberger, O. (2008). An R2 statistic for fixed effects in the linear mixed model. *Statistics in Medicine*, 27, 6137–6157. <https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.3429>.
- Erdfelder, E., Faul, F., & Buchner, A. (1996). GPOWER: A general power analysis program. *Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers*, 28(1), 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03203630>.
- Ganushchak, L. Y., & Schiller, N. O. (2008). Motivation and semantic context affect brain error-monitoring activity: An event-related brain potentials study. *Neuroimage*, 39(1), 395–405. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.09.001>.
- Gehring, W. J., Himle, J., & Nisenson, L. G. (2000). Action-monitoring dysfunction in obsessive-compulsive disorder. *Psychological Science*, 11(1), 1–6. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00206>.
- Goh, J. X., Hall, J. A., & Rosenthal, R. (2016). Mini meta-analysis of your own studies: Some arguments on why and a primer on how. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 10(10), 535–549. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12267>.
- Hajcak, G., McDonald, N., & Simons, R. F. (2003). To err is autonomic: Error-related brain potentials, ANS activity, and post-error compensatory behavior. *Psychophysiology*, 40(6), 895–903. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8986.00107>.
- Heatherton, T. F., Polivy, J., & Herman, C. P. (1989). Restraint and internal responsiveness: Effects of placebo manipulations of hunger state on eating. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 98(1), 89–92. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843x.98.1.8>.
- Heerdink, M. W., van Kleef, G. A., Homan, A. C., & Fischer, A. H. (2015). Emotional expressions as social signals of rejection and acceptance: Evidence from the affect misattribution paradigm. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 56, 60–68. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2014.09.004>.
- Hobson, N. M., Saunders, B., Al-Khindi, T., & Inzlicht, M. (2014). Emotion down-regulation diminishes cognitive control: A neurophysiological investigation. *Emotion*, 14(6), 1014–1026. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038028>.
- Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. (2002). The neural basis of human error processing: Reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity. *Psychological Review*, 109(4), 679. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.109.4.679>.
- Huang, Y., & Gong, H. (2018). The minimal deviation effect: Numbers just above a categorical boundary enhance consumer desire. *Journal of Consumer Research*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucy048>.
- Inzlicht, M., & Al-Khindi, T. (2012). ERN and the placebo: A misattribution approach to studying the arousal properties of the error-related negativity. *Journal of Experimental Psychology. General*, 141(4), 799. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027586>.
- Inzlicht, M., Gervais, W., & Berkman, E. (2015). *Bias-correction techniques alone cannot determine whether ego depletion is different from zero: Commentary on carter, Kofler, Forster, & McCullough, 2015*. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2659409>, doi:0.2139/ssrn.2659409.
- Kessel, E. M., Meyer, A., Hajcak, G., Dougherty, L. R., Torpey-Newman, D. C., Carlson, G. A., et al. (2016). Transdiagnostic factors and pathways to multifinality: The error-related negativity predicts whether preschool irritability is associated with internalizing versus externalizing symptoms at age 9. *Development and Psychopathology*, 28(4pt.1), 913–926. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0954579416000626>.
- Koban, L., & Pourtois, G. (2014). Brain systems underlying the affective and social monitoring of actions: An integrative

- review. *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews*, 46, 71–84. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.02.014>.
- Legault, L., & Inzlicht, M. (2013). Self-determination, self-regulation, and the brain: Autonomy improves performance by enhancing neuroaffective responsiveness to self-regulation failure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 105(1), 123. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030426>.
- Little, R. J. A., & Rubin, D. B. (2002). *Statistical analysis with missing data* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). New York: John Wiley. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119013563>.
- Luck, S. J., & Gaspelin, N. (2017). How to get statistically significant effects in any ERP experiment (and why you shouldn't). *Psychophysiology*, 54(1), 146–157. <https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12639>.
- Luu, P., Collins, P., & Tucker, D. M. (2000). Mood, personality, and self-monitoring: Negative affect and emotionality in relation to frontal lobe mechanisms of error monitoring. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 129, 43–60. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.129.1.43>.
- Makeig, S., Bell, A. J., Jung, T. P., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1996). Independent component analysis of electroencephalographic data. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 145–151.
- Marteau, T. M., & Bekker, H. (1992). The development of a six-item short-form of the state scale of the spielberger state–trait anxiety inventory (STAI). *British Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 31(3), 301–306. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8260.1992.tb00997.x>.
- McAuley, E., Duncan, T., & Tammen, V. V. (1989). Psychometric properties of the intrinsic motivation inventory in a competitive sport setting: A confirmatory factor analysis. *Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport*, 60(1), 48–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02701367.1989.10607413>.
- Meyer, A. (2017). A biomarker of anxiety in children and adolescents: A review focusing on the error-related negativity (ERN) and anxiety across development. *Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience*, 27, 58–68. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2017.08.001>.
- Meyer, A., Riesel, A., & Proudfit, G. H. (2013). Reliability of the ERN across multiple tasks as a function of increasing errors. *Psychophysiology*, 50(12), 1220–1225. <https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12132>.
- Meyer, A., Weinberg, A., Klein, D. N., & Hajcak, G. (2012). The development of the error-related negativity (ERN) and its relationship with anxiety: Evidence from 8 to 13 year-olds. *Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience*, 2(1), 152–161. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2011.09.005>.
- Moser, J. S., Moran, T. P., Schroder, H. S., Donnellan, M. B., & Yeung, N. (2013). On the relationship between anxiety and error monitoring: A meta-analysis and conceptual framework. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, 7. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00466>.
- Olivet, D. M., & Hajcak, G. (2009). The stability of error-related brain activity with increasing trials. *Psychophysiology*, 46(5), 957–961. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2009.00848.x>.
- Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. *Science*, 349(6251). <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aac4716>.
- Pailing, P. E., & Segalowitz, S. J. (2004). The effects of uncertainty in error monitoring on associated ERPs. *Brain and Cognition*, 56(2), 215–233. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2004.06.005>.
- Pashler, H., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2012). Editors' introduction to the special section on replicability in psychological science: A crisis of confidence? *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 7, 528–530. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612465253>.
- Payne, B. K., Cheng, C. M., Govorun, O., & Stewart, B. D. (2005). An inkblot for attitudes: Affect misattribution as implicit measurement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 89(3), 277–293. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.277>.
- Pfabigan, D. M., Pintzinger, N. M., Siedek, D. R., Lamm, C., Derntl, B., & Sailer, U. (2013). Feelings of helplessness increase ERN amplitudes in healthy individuals. *Neuropsychologia*, 51(4), 613–621. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.12.008>.
- Pourtois, G., Vocat, R., N'diaye, K., Spinelli, L., Seeck, M., & Vuilleumier, P. (2010). Errors recruit both cognitive and emotional monitoring systems: Simultaneous intracranial recordings in the dorsal anterior cingulate gyrus and amygdala combined with fMRI. *Neuropsychologia*, 48(4), 1144–1159. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.03.004>.
- Proudfit, G. H., Inzlicht, M., & Mennin, D. S. (2013). Anxiety and error monitoring: The importance of motivation and emotion. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, 7, 636. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00636>.
- Quené, H., & van der Bergh, H. (2004). On multi-level modeling of data from repeated measures designs: A tutorial. *Speech Communication*, 43(1–2), 103–121. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.specom.2004.02.004>.
- Reisenzein, R. (1983). The Schachter theory of emotion: Two decades later. *Psychological Bulletin*, 94(2), 239–264. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.94.2.239>.
- Ridderinkhof, K. R., de Vlugt, Y., Bramlage, A., Spaan, M., Elton, M., Snel, J., et al. (2002). Alcohol consumption impairs detection of performance errors in mediofrontal cortex. *Science*, 298(5601), 2209–2211. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1076929>.
- Riesel, A., Weinberg, A., Endrass, T., Kathmann, N., & Hajcak, G. (2012). Punishment has a lasting impact on error-related brain activity. *Psychophysiology*, 49(2), 239–247. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2011.01298.x>.
- Rodilla, C. C., Beauducel, A., & Leue, A. (2015). Misattribution of anxious arousal reduces the effect of trait-anxiety on the ERN. *Poster session presented at the 55<sup>th</sup> annual meeting of the society for psychophysiological research, seattle, OR*.
- Rodilla, C. C., Beauducel, A., & Leue, A. (2016). Error-related negativity and the misattribution of state-anxiety following errors: On the reproducibility of Inzlicht and Al-khindi (2012). *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, 10, 475. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00475>.
- Ross, L., Rodin, J., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1969). Toward an attribution therapy: The reduction of fear through induced cognitive–emotional misattribution. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 12, 279–288. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0027800>.
- Saunders, B., Lin, H., Milyavskaya, M., & Inzlicht, M. (2017). The emotive nature of conflict monitoring in the medial prefrontal cortex. *International Journal of Psychophysiology*, 119, 31–40. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2017.01.004>.
- Saunders, B., Rodrigo, A. H., & Inzlicht, M. (2016). Mindful awareness of feelings increases neural performance monitoring. *Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience*, 16, 93–105. <https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-015-0375-2>.
- Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state. *Psychological Review*, 69(5), 379–399. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0046234>.
- Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45(3), 513–523. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513>.
- Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L. D., & Simmons, J. P. (2014). P-curve and effect size: Correcting for publication bias using only significant results. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 9(6), 666–681. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691614553988>.
- Spielberger, C. D. (1983). State-trait anxiety inventory for adults. *PsyCTESTS Dataset*. <https://doi.org/10.1037/t06496-000>.



- Spunt, R. P., Lieberman, M. D., Cohen, J. R., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2012). The Phenomenology of error processing: The dorsal ACC response to Stop-signal errors tracks reports of negative affect. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 24(8), 1753–1765. [https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn\\_a\\_00242](https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00242).
- Storms, M. D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1970). Insomnia and the attribution process. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 16, 319–328. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0029835>.
- Team, S.D. (2016). *CmdStan: The command-line interface to stan, version 2.10.0*. Retrieved from <http://mc-stan.org/>.
- Van Veen, V., & Carter, C. S. (2002). The anterior cingulate as a conflict monitor: fMRI and ERP studies. *Physiology & Behavior*, 77(4), 477–482. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0031-9384\(02\)00930-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0031-9384(02)00930-7).
- Yeung, V., Sharpe, L., Glozier, N., Hackett, M. L., & Colagiuri, B. (2017). A systematic review and meta-analysis of placebo versus no treatment for insomnia symptoms. *Sleep Medicine Reviews*, 38, 17–27. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smr.2017.03.006>.
- Weinberg, A., Riesel, A., & Hajcak, G. (2012). Integrating multiple perspectives on error-related brain activity: The ERN as a neural indicator of trait defensive reactivity. *Motivation and Emotion*, 36(1), 84–100. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-011-9269-y>.
- Weinberg, A., Meyer, A., Hale-Rude, E., Perlman, G., Kotov, R., Klein, D. N., et al. (2016). Error-related negativity (ERN) and sustained threat: Conceptual framework and empirical evaluation in an adolescent sample. *Psychophysiology*, 53(3), 372–385. <https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12538>.
- Weinberg, A., Olvet, D. M., & Hajcak, G. (2010). Increased error-related brain activity in generalized anxiety disorder. *Biological Psychology*, 85(3), 472–480. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2010.09.011>.
- Xiao, Z., Wang, J., Zhang, M., Li, H., Tang, Y., Wang, Y., et al. (2011). Error-related negativity abnormalities in generalized anxiety disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder. *Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry*, 35(1), 265–272. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnpbp.2010.11.022>.
- Yeung, N., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural basis of error detection: Conflict monitoring and the error-related negativity. *Psychological Review*, 111(4), 931.
- Zanna, M. P., & Cooper, J. (1974). Dissonance and the pill: An attribution approach to studying the arousal properties of dissonance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 29, 703–709. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0036651>.